Plato vs Aristotle (Forms/forms)
Are Forms and forms thought to be incompatible? Can’t material objects be manifestations of Plato’s Forms, while also having form as an essential metaphysical component as conceived by Aristotle? I don’t know their metaphysics well, but at a glance it seems to me that both accounts must (if they are at all) be true; my considerations being that in material objects matter and form are inseparable, and the forms that matter takes must (since both accounts posit a divine intellect) have existed prior to - and so also be separate from - their instantiations. Maybe this is all obvious, but it’s not clear to me why you’d adopt one view but not the other.
Comments (109)
Because?
Because the forms exist within the divine intellect, which is eternal. From what I understand this is the case with both Platonism and Aristotelianism, but there might be an important distinction I’m not aware of.
Ah, so you're not arguing that in general, "the forms that matter takes must (since both accounts posit a divine intellect) have existed prior to - and so also be separate from - their instantiations," you're saying that per your understanding of both Aristotle and Plato, they both are basically asserting this?
If so, I misread you as changing scope for a moment, from a discussion of Aristotle and Plato per se to making a general comment outside of that context.
Yeah, my OP is all within the context of their thought. There are Platonic and Aristotelian arguments for the divine intellect though; it’s not just an assertion.
What I know about Aristotle I’ve learned from Edward Feser’s books, and about Plato from Dominic O’Meara’s introduction to Plotinus. Here’s something from the latter:
But I don’t see the important difference if forms come from the divine intellect regardless.
But if you take Aristotle’s metaphysics to be true then you believe in the divine intellect, which is where the forms matter has come from, right? On Plato’s view, as interpreted by Plotinus anyway, the Forms exist within the divine intellect. To my limited understanding the difference appears to be a matter of emphasis.
“Intellect independent of the world” is what I mean by “divine intellect”.
It means “intellect independent of the world”. In the book I quoted from it’s referred to often as “the divine intellect”.
Quoting tim wood
It’s part of Plato and Aristotle’s metaphysics. I’m not arguing for either, that’s not what my OP is about.
Quoting tim wood
This is from Edward Feser’s book on Aquinas (emphasis mine):
This is the problem: Feser's take on Aquinas' take on Plato and Aristotle.
The quote refers to material objects, not matter per se. Material objects is what I’m referring to as well.
Quoting tim wood
So to answer the question someone could enlighten me to certain definitions that make the two views in contention incompatible.
Quoting tim wood
An explanation of any detrimental changes you’d have to make to reconcile them would be an interesting answer also.
The quote refers directly to an Aristotelian doctrine. It doesn’t refer to Plato.
Yes, on the Aristotelian doctrine material objects are composites of matter and form. So you can’t in a material object have one without the other - I was referring to them as “inseparable” for that reason.
I’ve quoted Feser referring to the doctrine already. Material objects are a composite of matter and form.
Go to the section on hylomorphic compounds:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#SubsHyloComp
The doctrine doesn’t refer to matter per se; it refers to material objects, of which matter is a component along with form.
From one of the most influential commentators on Plato and Aristotle in the ancient world, Alfarabi. He had a strong influence on Aquinas.
– Alfarabi, Harmonization (unpublished translation by Miriam Galston,
quoted by Bolotin in Approach to Aristotle’s Physics, 6
This was the accepted view in the ancient world. For more see the section on Aristotle: https://www.press.uchicago.edu/sites/melzer/melzer_appendix.pdf
Perhaps you have a point, though I think what you’ve quoted there may be misleading. Here’s something else from the pages you linked to:
A review of Melzer's Philosophy Between the Lines:
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-between-the-lines-the-lost-history-of-esoteric-writing/
A real eye opener for anyone interested in the interpretation of texts.
I think Aquinas demonstrated that the two conceptions are compatible.
This was discussed in Dfpolis’s thread on realism, and Feser talks of it in his book (matter per se is termed “prime matter”):
So matter is simply the potential for there to be a form instantiated in the world, as opposed to being a mere abstraction.
Ah OK, well there you go. Do you know where in particular I could read about that?
The problem is, once again, that you are not talking about Aristotle, but the Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. There is no consensus as to whether Aristotle actually accepts the notion of prime matter.
See, for example the section of prime matter: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/form-matter/
From what I understand there’s a distinction to be drawn between philosophical scholarship (what so-and-so actually said and thought) and interpretation (which understanding gives us the best insight into something). The objection being made was that the concept of prime matter is hard to grasp, when on the Scholastic interpretation it isn’t, really.
There is no clear distinction between them. What so and so said and thought is an interpretation of what so and so said and thought, unless one simply points to the work of so and so in her own words. But even here there is interpretation involved.
Quoting AJJ
What the article says is:
It is not that the concept is hard to grasp but rather that the concept shows itself to be problematic. If the school men interpreted it in such a way that there is no problem then perhaps they miss something or add something.
In any case you are not discussing Aristotle but the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle.
You say that, but then I think you illustrate the distinction I described when you say:
Quoting Fooloso4
———
Quoting Fooloso4
Or perhaps their interpretation lends the clearest insight. I guess they thought so, and it sounds good to me.
Quoting AJJ
Philosophical scholarship is interpretation and research that supports an interpretation.
There is, however, a clear distinction between reading Aristotle and reading what other people say about Aristotle.
Quoting AJJ
That is possible but how do you know it is the clearest insight without reading Aristotle?
Quoting AJJ
Okay.
This is the distinction I was describing, where what other people say about Aristotle is interpretation in an attempt to gain the best insight.
Quoting Fooloso4
I didn’t say I knew.
“Prime matter” is to my understanding the term for matter apart from an instantiating form.
Quoting tim wood
That’s fine I’d say; it’s appropriate to refer to those interpretations that lend the clearest insights.
Quoting tim wood
That definition I quoted is from a book on Aquinas, so I guess it is the Scholastic view.
Quoting tim wood
Sure, but what I don’t understand is why the forms on Aristotle’s view shouldn’t also exist perfectly in the divine intellect, where it seems they must originate.
If the divine intellect creates the world then all the forms things have must come from it.
It’s both Aristotle’s and Plato’s idea. The divine intellect is the unmoved mover in Aristotle’s metaphysics, the beginning of everything. In Plato’s metaphysics, as interpreted by Plotinus anyway, the divine intellect emanates Soul, which creates and organises the world by reflecting on the divine intellect.
The divine intellect is the ongoing source of everything I should say; that’s what the Aristotelian argument from motion establishes.
Paying attention to the title of the thread, and staying in the context of it, should advise the curious onlooker, that Quoting charles ferraro is utterly irrelevant.
Yes they are thought to be incompatible since Aristotle explicitly rejected Plato's theory of forms [*]. The difference is that Platonic Forms are independent of (or separable from) particulars whereas, for Aristotle, form and matter are correlates that are not separable from particulars.
Consider a typical abstract object such as a number or triangle. For Aristotle, these abstract objects are ultimately grounded in concrete particulars, not in a Platonic realm. As Aristotle wrote, "The best way to conduct an investigation in every case is to take that which does not exist in separation and consider it separately; which is just what the arithmetician or the geometrician does." (Aristot. Met. 13.1078a) [italics mine]
--
[*] As you are probably aware, there is much disagreement over what that rejection entailed. Some Neo-Platonist and Christian thinkers (such as Aquinas) argue that Aristotle didn't really (or fully) reject separability, with the unmoved mover and active intellect put forward as examples of this.
Thanks, that’s clarifying. Although it does still puzzle me why Aristotle would ground abstractions only in the world when the world is grounded in the active intellect - can you tell me where in particular Aquinas or others wrote about that?
The world isn't grounded in the active intellect for either Aristotle or Aquinas. Both were realists about the world (which contained concrete particulars) and moderate (immanent) realists about universals. Aquinas says:
Quoting Thomas Aquinas and the Early Franciscan School on the Agent Intellect
This SEP article on active intellect is also useful and highlights the nature of the controversies. Regarding interpretation, "The first and most consequential fault line, then, concerns whether De Anima iii 5 should be taken as characterizing the human mind or the divine mind." As indicated above, Aquinas argued for the "human mind" view.
I think the question would have to be asked, then, why Aristotelian philosophy is not nominalist. Because nominalism denies that 'forms' or 'types' have any reality outside the things which instantiate them; nominalism means 'name only'. So we call something a triangle because it happens to have three sides comprising straight lines that intersect; there is no triangle other than specific instances of triangles. But the very reason we can recognise a triangle, or a circle, or what have you, is because it obeys the requirements of a particular form - that it is a flat plane bounded by three intersecting lines, or a line drawn by points equidistant from a centre, and so on.
So there, the 'form' is truly 'an idea', not simply the shape of something, but the defining feature - the essence, if you like, which is what is perceived by the rational intellect.
[quote=Kelly Ross]Aristotle "immanentized" the Forms. This meant, of course, that there still were Forms; it was just a matter of where [or in what sense ~ WF] they existed. So Aristotle even used one of Plato's terms, eîdos, to mean the abstract universal object within a particular object. This word is more familiar to us in its Latin translation: species. In modern discussion, however, it is usually just called the "form" of the object.
The Aristotelian "form" of an object, however, is not just what an object "looks" like [in other words, not just it's shape ~ wf]. An individual object as an individual object is particular, not universal. The "form" of the object will be the complex of all its abstract features and properties. If the object looks red or looks round or looks ugly, then those features, as abstractions, belong to the "form." The individuality of the object cannot be due to any of those abstractions, which are universals, and so must be due to something else. To Aristotle that was the "matter" of the object. "Matter" confers individuality, "form" universality. Since everything that we can identify about an object, the kind of thing it is, what it is doing, where it is, etc., involves abstract properties, the "form" represents the actuality of an object.[/quote]
http://www.friesian.com/universl.htm
~From Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan, O.P.; Macmillan Co., 1941. (Additional paragraphing and emphasis added).
https://thomasofaquino.blogspot.com/2013/12/sensible-form-and-intelligible-form.html
Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism, 39:00
I’ve been confusing terms - I thought the active intellect was another way of describing the unmoved mover. So it seems to me on Aristotle’s view that universals must be ultimately grounded in the unmoved mover, rather, which is why I don’t fully understand the rejection of Plato’s Forms.
It's better to look at matter as the potential for change. The concept of "matter" is introduced by Aristotle as a means for understanding the nature of change. If a thing has one form at one moment, and a slightly different form at the next moment, we say that the thing has changed. If "the thing" is identified strictly by its form, then at one moment it is not the same thing as it is at the next, due to it's changing. So in his Physics, Aristotle wanted to be able to explain what we all observe, and say, that a thing remains being the same thing despite the fact that there are changes to it. Matter is the underlying thing which persists, and does not change when a change occurs, and assuming the reality of matter allows us to say that the same thing persists from one moment to the next, but it changes.
I say it is "the potential for change", because it is what has been determined by Aristotle as what is required (logically) to make change into something real, something comprehendible. If we can state the form of a thing (describe what it is) at one moment, and do the same at a following moment, and see that the form is slightly different, then we ought to be able to account for the change to the thing which happens between these moments. If we account for the change by stating an intermediate form, which is different from the other two, this does not solve the problem because now we have changes between this form and the others. We cannot posit an infinite number of forms between one form and the next, to account for change, so Aristotle posits matter. Matter is not a form, but it provides the potential for one form to change into another, with the thing remaining as the same thing. Matter is what makes becoming intelligible.
My bolds. I had read previously that 'mother' and 'matter' were etymologically related but never knew how.
Another point: that Aristotelian dualism comprised 'matter and form', not the Cartesian 'matter and mind'. However I think Descartes' version was ultimately derived from the same source, albeit Descartes wished to sharply differentiate his philosophy from that of 'the schoolmen'.
I read about 'angels on the head of a pin' recently. It's held up as an example of the vanity of scholastic metaphysics. But the real debate was about 'whether two incorporeal intelligences (i.e. 'angels') can occupy the same spatial location - which is not that daft a question at all, although of course in a materialist culture, the whole notion of 'incorporeal intelligence' is unintelligible. (That said, there's an echo of the same question in the conundrums surrounding superposition.)
Quoting tim wood
ON the contrary, I think it is quite useful to trace how Aristotelian (and other classical) terms and ideas, like 'hyle', 'ousia', 'esse', and so on, have been translated and interpreted over time.
But in the second paragraph you shared he explicitly says what he means by it; Augustine and Aquinas appear to have gotten it right.
Sure, it’s what allows there to be material objects in the first place and also what allows them to change.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don’t understand the above though. Since matter isn’t composite, doesn’t that mean the same matter underlies every object? In which case the only way to distinguish between objects is by their forms; but why then do individual objects remain the same objects as their forms change?
Plato described matter in Timaeus in sexist terms, coming from ancient myths. It is a passive principle which receives the form, like being impregnated. Notice also the duality in "conception". Plato plays with that duality in Theatetus, when Socrates refers to himself as a midwife.
The issue of the intellect receiving the form of the object, in conception, becomes a difficult question for Aquinas. In order to receive the form of an object, the intellect must have a passive aspect. The passive aspect is a potential, like matter, but Aquinas wants to maintain the immaterial essence of the intellect, and I think he refuses to refer to this passive aspect as material in nature. The way I understand this issue is that the intellect is essentially immaterial, but it has material accidentals. The accidentals are what individuate us as distinct, separate, and unique human beings.
Quoting Wayfarer
What Aristotle does, which is not as evident in Plato (except perhaps Timaeus), is extend the duality of reality into all things, all objects, not just human beings. Notice that Descartes brings us back to the primitive form of dualism, similar to the dualism expressed by the myths described by Plato. Plato demonstrated how difficult it is to make sense of this dualism. From this position, where dualism is extremely difficult to make sense of, we have the choice of two distinct directions. We can dismiss dualism as simply incoherent (as is the modern trend), or we can follow a system like Aristotle's, which extends dualism into all aspects of reality. I find that the cosmological argument is very important because it demonstrates very forcefully, and decisively, that the only rational way to proceed is to extend dualism.
To those others discussing "prime matter", the cosmological argument denies the possibility that the concept of prime matter could refer to anything real.
Quoting AJJ
This is a good question, and I think that the best way to proceed is to understand "matter" as an assumption. Aristotle assumed "matter" as the principle of continuity of existence. Ultimately, it accounts for the fact that the world cannot be randomly different from one moment to the next. Newton characterized this as inertia. I understand matter as the continuity of time itself. Modern physics now uses "energy" (conservation of energy), to refer to that which remains, or persists, through change, this allows the principle of continuity to cross between one object and another, such that the continuity of an object is no longer assumed in physics, as it is in Aristotelian physics.
The quotes in this post are all exactly about that, and, I must confess, make perfect sense to me.
Yeah, time is change and matter allows there to be change.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I guess I don’t see why it does account for that; if matter is pure potentiality then it can be anything from one moment to the next. So this is where I like Platonism: the notion that there is an organising principle (Soul), which fashions the world after the Forms. That way it seems an object remains the same object throughout changes so long as it’s participating in the same Forms.
In other words: pure potentiality.
From the first paragraph you quoted earlier:
———
Quoting tim wood
It has no being; it’s rather the potential to be.
Or I guess that it has no actuality is the better way to put it.
I think that simply means you can’t say matter doesn’t have whatever properties for the same reason you can’t say it does: it’s pure potentiality - it can have or not have whatever properties you like, just not of itself.
Quoting tim wood
Well there you go; that’s just another way of saying it’s pure potentiality.
Sure :up:
You are right to point to the problems with what Aristotle says about matter. But I think he was smart enough to recognize that it is problematic. In fact, I think that is exactly where he leads the thoughtful reader. He, like Plato and Socrates, is a zetetic skeptic (not to be confused with modern versions of skepticism). We simply do not know and so cannot say what 'is' at the most fundamental level.
Of course, this does not stop people from making such claims. So, it is better he tell his own stories, reasonable stories, beneficial stories.
I mostly agree with what's in those quotes, except this:
Aristotle actually distinguishes two primary senses of "form", the form which we grasp, the universal, or the essence of the thing, and the form of the particular. The form of the particular includes all the accidentals, which are left out from the essence. We do not grasp the entirety of the thing's form. So it is not matter which confers individuality, it is form, but it is the property of a material thing, to be an individual. We have in Aristotle a distinction between form as essence, abstraction, or universal, and the form of the particular, material thing.
It is in understanding that each individual object has a distinct, and unique form, that you may come to realize that the form of a particular object is necessarily prior to the material existence of that particular object. This is one way that we come to see that form is prior to material existence. Material objects come into being. When a thing comes into being, it must be the thing which it is, and not something else. It is impossible that a thing is other than itself, by the law of identity. Further, a thing is an ordered unity, it is not random. By these two premises, it is necessary to conclude that what the thing is (its form) precedes its material existence.
Quoting AJJ
Sure, but for Aristotle prime matter, or pure potentiality, is incoherent, unintelligible, a logical impossibility by the cosmological argument. Simply put, a potentiality requires an actuality to be actualized. If there ever was a time when there was pure potential, there would be no actuality at that time, and therefore the potential could not ever be actualized, so there would always be pure potential with no actuality. However, we observe that there is actuality, so it is impossible that there ever was pure potentiality.
Quoting AJJ
The problem with the theory of participation, which Plato uncovered, and becomes evident from The Republic on, into his later work, is that the thing which is participated in is passive, as the thing participating is active. What Plato discovered, and this constitutes his proposal of "the good", is that in order for the Forms to have any real participation in the real world, they must be active, actual. He found this principle of action in "the good". We act for what we perceive as the good, and the Ideas, or Forms are directed towards the good, such that they receive actuality in this way, from the good.
This is why the philosopher in the cave turns things around, realizing that what the people in the cave see as reality, the material objects, are really reflections, representations of the Forms, which are actively causing the existence of material objects, which the cave people take as the totality of reality. So a material object does not participate in the Forms, the Forms actively cause the existence of the thing by informing the matter. This makes matter the passive aspect of reality, while Forms may participate in passivity by remaining the same, and having the potential to change.
Quoting tim wood
Is this a trick question? The whatness of a thing is the thing's form. Matter is distinct from form. So it makes not sense to ask "what is matter", because asking "what", is asking for a form. If someone tried to tell you what matter is, they'd be handing you a form, saying "this is matter".
I assume that’s where the unmoved mover figures. Besides, whether formless matter ever was doesn’t change the fact that pure potentiality is the what prime matter is conceptualised as; and being so means it must be whatever is actualising it that prevents the world from being drastically different from one moment to the next, which is what I was quibbling about.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That’s fine. From reading a bit about Plotinus I take participation to mean being fashioned by Soul in imitation of whatever Forms.
Those quotes I referred to make a very clear point: the material senses (eyes, ears) perceive the particular being, the intellect perceives the form. The material thing must always, of necessity, be apart from us - in modern terms, an object to us, something outside of us. But 'the form' is known directly by nous, as the form is basically an idea, not a thing. That is the 'rational intellect' in operation.
(2) I think it's a common mistake to equate 'form' with 'shape'. The 'form' is not 'the shape' (or even 'what something appears to be'). The form is 'the type of thing it is'. We recognise a [chair/apple/tree/triangle] because we know the meaning of the concepts, what it is that gives the object its identity. It's partially shape or appearance, but it's something much more than that.
What do you think?
I think you're mistaken, but at least here, we can be very clear about the confusion, which should be instructive.
My thought is that there is no 'form of the particular' because 'forms' by definition are *not* particular but universal. Read this passage again: 'The proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized; the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.' And 'a particular being' is precisely a combination of accidents and universals, of (individualised) matter and (universal) form. Hence, hylomorphic, matter-form, dualism.
Socrates is of the [form or type] Man, but happens to have flat nose, etc, which pertain to him as an individual. It is 'the accidents' which confer individuality. But insofar as Socrates is a man, he is a form, or a universal.
The point though, is that it is impossible to conceptualize something which is logically impossible. You can say it "prime matter", but you cannot conceptualize it.
Quoting AJJ
The Neo-Platonists, like Plotinus use a different conception of participation than the one Plato described derived from the Pythagoreans. This follows the difficulties with the original theory of participation revealed by Plato and Aristotle. I believe Plotinus uses a system of "emanation", and some other Neo-Platonists refer to a "procession". But this is a participation of Forms, strictly, and I don't think material existence is even necessitated in Plotinus' system.
Quoting Wayfarer
The senses, and the intellect are both powers of the soul. They both perceive a form. "Form" refers to what a thing is. The senses perceive the form of the particular (though this perception is deficient), while the intellect may apprehend the essence, which is the universal form. So for instance, through my senses I perceive the form of the particular object in front of me, my laptop, but this perception of the object is deficient, because I am only actually perceiving certain aspects of the form, its shape, colour, etc.. At the same time, my intellect apprehends the form of the thing in the sense of "laptop", recognizing the essence of the thing as a laptop.
Quoting Wayfarer
Aristotle is very clear on this point, form refers to whatness, (I think it's called quiddity) what a thing a thing is. He starts with "form" as the type of thing, but proceeds to examine "form" in the sense of the individuality of a thing. This is made necessary by his law of identity which he proposed as a law against sophism. The sophist could claim that two things which are the same type, are actually the same thing. So the law of identity designates that two distinct things which appear to be the same (are the same type) cannot actually be the same thing. Since they are in fact distinct, there must be some formal aspects which distinguish one from the other. Remember, the intellect only apprehends form, so the distinction between two things must be formal if the intellect is to be able to grasp it.
Individual particular objects have a form proper to themselves. You'll see that this is one of the main topics Aristotle investigates in his Metaphysics, where he investigates being qua being. He dismisses the commonly quoted "why is there something rather than nothing", and poses instead, the question of "why is there what there is instead of something else". So this question becomes why is a particular object what it is, and not something else. This is because it is given a particular form. He's very specific on this point, a particular thing has a form unique to itself.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think if you read more you'll find it very clear that Aristotle proposed a form of the particular. "Accidents" are formal, part of a thing's form, they are just not part of a things essence.
Nope. One is material, the other intellectual. Otherwise, why is it ‘dualism’? And why doesn’t the soul simply die with the body?
I guess I just don’t see why conceiving of prime matter as pure potentiality is problematic. The concept seems fairly straightforward to me; I mean whatever exists materially must have the potential to do so, right? So that potential is prime matter.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Plotinus characterises bodies as being ‘in’ Soul, in a relationship of dependence. So I take participation to be that: a relationship of dependence. Plotinus has it that the One, being beyond the constraint of ignorance, creates freely and not of some necessity beyond its control; an important distinction I guess, although it seems to me it amounts to the same thing - since to not create would presumably then be an error made in ignorance, and so not free, and so impossible.
Aristotle's use of common words always maintain that usage even when he extends the meaning. The term 'eidos' means the look or kind or essence or species of a thing. Form is also the term used to translate 'morphe'.
I do not think that Aristotle's aim is to provide a consistent definition of the term but to examine what is said and observed. That is why he typically begins by discussing earlier philosophers. He is not building arguments that lead to clear unambiguous conclusions and knowledge. He is leading the reader to think about these matters, to recognize that they are problematic, aporetic.
Computers can recognize forms (patterns).
Have you not read Aristotle's On the Soul? He's explicit, sensation is a power (potency) of the soul.
Quoting AJJ
Prior to the existence of a thing, is the potential for that thing. But the potential for that thing exists as something actual, so this potential is not "pure", it is restricted by what actually exists. Pure potential would be infinite, and this is what is impossible to conceive of as being real. It can't be real, because as I said this would mean that at this time, when there was infinite potential there would be nothing actual. And if there was nothing actual, there would be nothing to actualize anything out of that potential, so there would always be nothing actual. But this is inconsistent with our observations that there is something actual. That's why it's impossible to conceive of, because it requires that nothing is actual.
Quoting AJJ
That's right, there is no principle which we can say "necessitates" material existence. One Form necessitates another Form, through a logical process (logical necessity), but no Form can necessitate material existence. This is an indication that material existence is caused by an act of free will, the love of God, or because God thought it was good.
Quoting tim wood
Actually tim, you said: "What is it he says explicitly matter is". This is asking what Aristotle said matter "is". AJJ answered that very well, with "potential". Potential neither is (being) nor is not (not being), that's why it is proposed as a means of accounting for the reality of becoming And since "potential" is other than "actual", and this is what "is" refers to, what is actual, it really doesn't make any sense to ask what matter is. Now you've changed the question to what Aristotle says "about" matter, and this is a whole lot of different things, in a whole lot of different places, and that's why your quotes from Stanford show such a variance. When we say "what" a thing is, we generally state some sort of definition. But when we talk "about" something we tend to say many different things about it, and it is not necessary that "what it is" is one of the things that we say about it. So we might entertain the possibility that there could be something (like matter), which has no "what it is".
Quoting tim wood
OK, if this is the case, then you ought to be able to state these presuppositions which you believe Aristotle was operating with, and we can discuss whether he actual was or not, and if he was, we can determine whether your judgement that it is wrong is justified.
Quoting tim wood
Of course he knew perfectly well that he didn't solve that problem (the problem of becoming), he proposed some principles, and a direction to move in. I don't see the point in your comparison to modern science. Physicists know perfectly well that they have not solved this problem either. Modern physics points us in a direction slightly different from that proposed by Aristotle. The fundamental particle "isn't", but this isn't isn't even an isn't, because the fundamental particle is something, it's a wave. OK, I see the point to your comparison. But since neither solves the problem, on what basis would you claim that one is wrong?
While they are given independent accounts in Aristotle's writings, some commentators do consider them to be equivalent and that is one of the interpretive controversies.
Quoting AJJ
Aristotle rejected Plato's theory of forms and replaced it with his own hylomorphic theory. But per Aristotle's description, the unmoved mover doesn't seem to be a hylomorphic or natural being. Which puts the unmoved mover in apparent tension with Aristotle's otherwise consistent hylomorphism and naturalism. So interpretation here is also controversial with different commentators providing a range of Platonic and naturalist accounts.
My own view is that the unmoved mover should be understood in terms of Aristotle's hylomorphism and naturalism and not in Platonic terms. That would be consistent with his rejection of Plato's forms.
Aristotle was a student of Plato, he was not educated in modern naturalism. And, he clearly refers to the difference between artificial things and natural things which was the convention of his day. In the attempt to establish principles for resolving this difference (which was a chasm of misunderstanding), he employed the concept of "final cause", "that for the sake of which", "the good", which is clearly Platonic.
No, it is Aristotle's immanent realism that denies that 'forms' and 'types' exist in separation from particulars (though they can be considered separately).
Whereas nominalism denies that 'forms' or 'types' have any reality outside the people that name them. Ockham wrote, "I maintain that a universal is not something real that exists in a subject ... but that it has a being only as a thought-object in the mind".
Yeah, I see what you’re saying now and agree. To conceive of prime matter is to conceive of non-existence existing, which of course you can’t.
For Aristotle, knowledge comes from experience in the natural world.
Quoting Aristotle - Wikipedia
Interesting to consider how that might work.
Quoting Aristotle - Wikipedia
I like the Aristotelian emphasis on the material, as opposed to the Platonic notion of the world being something we must ascend from; but I’m inclined also to think the world is an imitation of things higher than it - seems there’s enough ambiguity to hold to both approaches.
Yes I would agree with all that. That Aristotle was not a modern scientist is a rather obvious and trivial point, unless perhaps someone here thought he was, then there might be a need to point that out.
Quoting tim wood
What exactly does this mean to you, "significant thinking in the history of thinking"? Suppose that someone thinks, and comes up with some influential ideas. Would this constitute significant thinking in the history of thinking? Does this put Aristotle in the same category as someone like Einstein?
Earlier you said "The history of ideas shouldn't be confused with ideas in themselves." What does this mean? How would you propose to create a separation between an idea and the history of that idea? An idea has a temporal presence, an extension in time. Doesn't it appear to you, that to describe an idea is to describe its extension in time, its influence on people through time, how different people understand the same idea, etc.. What do you think would be 'the idea itself'? Consider the example of Einstein's general theory of relativity. The history of that idea would be how different people interpreted it, applied it, and the effects that it had on the people in general. What would be the idea itself? Suppose you tried to tell me what the idea of general relativity is. Wouldn't that just be an expression of how the idea affected you, and therefore just a small part of the history of that idea?
Sorry Tim, but I just can't understand what you're trying to say here.
Quoting tim wood
What do you mean by "the idea itself"? And how does an idea "stand as an idea"? Isn't an idea dependent on a mind? Do you think that an idea can stand alone out in a field, like a horse? We have books, and written material which maybe could be considered to stand alone, as representations of ideas, But to refer to the idea itself, wouldn't this be referring to what the mind produces from the reading and understanding of the book? And this is in a mind. What do you think is this "constant" thing? I believe that my understanding of two plus two equaling four is similar to your understanding of this, but similarity is not the same as "constant thing".
:up:
The whole point about Platonic idealism, and even Aristotelian realism, is that there is a sense in which ideas are real in their own right. They're not real by virtue of being 'patterns of neural activity' which is the almost irresistible way of thinking about them we nowadays have. They can be best understood as the organising principles by which we make sense of reality - the principles of intelligibility, if you like. I refer frequently to Augustine on Intelligible Objects by way of explanation. This entry on objective idealism is also useful.
Right - so basically a Darwinian account, that mind is the product of an evolved brain, and the brain a product of the evolutionary process. That is what almost every accepts, but I question it on the basis that at a certain point in evolutionary history, we became language-using, rational beings - and thereby transcend the biological, so to speak.
There’s an interesting dialogue between Einstein and Ravindranath Tagore, Hindu poet and mystic. Worth reading. But it contains this paragraph:
The question I would have asked Einstein is, who knows this other than man? It is a fact that can only be grasped by a rational intellect. So, yes, it’s independent of your mind or mine; but it is an intelligible, rather than a material, object. And we construct our ‘meaning-world’ around such principles.
Quoting tim wood
Disappointed in that remark. I am of the view that such figures as Socrates and the Buddha were historical persons, and were possessed of real wisdom. What happened in Western history, was an undue emphasis on belief in or acceptance of religious dogma (especially in Protestantism); but there’s far more to it than simply the acceptance or rejection of dogma.
But I think their communicative abilities can be understood in terms of behaviourism, stimulus and response. Certainly animals signal each other, bee dances, and whatever. But...
Stephen M. Barr, review of Why Only Us: Language and Evolution by Robert c. Berwick and Noam Chomsky.
Quoting tim wood
Fair point, but forecloses the possibility of there really being an experience of union with the divine. I'm sure such states of being a exceedingly rare, but they've been documented.
I'm not arguing anything here, I'm just trying to get some clarification of what you mean. You say things which do not make sense to me. For instance, why do you say "minds" instead of "mind"? I can have an idea in my mind, which does not seem to be dependent on any other minds, so why would you jump to this conclusion that ideas are dependent on minds, not on a mind?
Isn't it true that every instant of time in the history of the universe is unique? That seems very obvious, once something has happened we cannot go back to how things were before. Why would I need to argue this? Where do you get the idea of "continuity" from? We observe that some aspects of reality stay the same even as time passes. Aristotle posited matter as the principle of continuity, to account for the reality of what is observed. Newton took matter for granted, as the substance of "a body" and gave matter the property of inertia (continuity); Newton's first law. You seem to think that this idea is wrong, and ought to be replaced by a modern conception of "matter", how so?
Quoting tim wood
There's a deep inconsistency here. Let's take the assumption that an idea is dependent on minds, and cannot be produced, nor maintained simply by the single mind of an individual human being. Because of this assumption you are forced to jump to "Mind", which is supposed to represent some sort of collective mind, as this is what is required to support the existence of ideas. But then you belittle this Mind by saying "this Mind in question is human Mind". Do you see the inconsistency? A human mind is a particular mind of an individual human being. If you assume some sort of collective Mind, it is impossible that this is a human mind. The assumption of a collective Mind is not so easily supported as you make it sound.
There's no mystery here, only an invalid conclusion. The point, is that many human minds does not make a "Mind". That's like saying many horses makes a "Horse". There's no justification for such a conclusion. No matter how many human beings with minds you put into the same room, they do make a Mind which is human, but which is not a human mind. You've inverted subject for predicate by pluralizing, such that a number of human beings with minds becomes a Mind which is human. How could you possibly justify such an illogical maneuver?
Quoting tim wood
That's nonsense. You're saying that this proposed "Mind" is not a human mind, though you said it is human, it's simply human mind. So there's this thing called Mind, and it's not a human mind, it's human mind. What are you guys smoking down there at the Boston Common?
So Aristotle gives a concrete example in Physics Book 8 where he describes a man who moves a stone with a stick.
Consider this in terms of a golfer hitting a golf ball with a golf stick. The golf stick is the moved mover of the golf ball (the efficient cause). In turn, the golfer's hand is the moved mover of the golf stick. But what causes the golfer to move his hand? Aristotle identifies a different kind of cause - a final cause. The golfer moves his hand because he desires to play golf. Thus he is the unmoved mover that causes the golf ball to move.
But note also that the golfer's hand moves, which is a part of his body. So he is the compound of a moved mover and an unmoved mover (in different causal senses). In this scenario, it is the "unmoved mover" explanation that finally grounds the golfer's activity. It is this intentional aspect of the golfer (his purposes, thoughts and desires) that explains the motions of the golfer, golf stick and golf ball throughout the game.
That is the kind of concrete and observable scenario that Aristotle generalizes from to explain all activity (or change) in the universe as by an unmoved mover in terms of final cause. In both the specific and universal contexts, the locus of causality (in terms of Aristotle's four causes) are the natural particulars.
Quoting AJJ
A subtle but important point: Aristotle's hylomorphism is not merely material, nor merely ideal. Instead it combines both aspects in the natural particulars that we observe.
Don't try to turn the table, you are the one making the illegitimate reification, talking about this Mind, as if it is a real thing. If it's not a real thing, then what are you talking about other than a group of human beings, each with one's own mind?
So, it's up to you to tell me, what are you talking about, a real thing called Mind, or real individual human minds. You talk about "Mind" as if it is something other than individual human minds, and when I point out that's nonsense, you say you weren't talking 'mind' as is it's a real thing. What were you talking about then, a bunch of individual minds? I think so. So stop calling this group of minds "Mind" if there's no such thing as Mind.
Quoting tim wood
I've never heard of such a thing as the "American mind". You're still talking nonsense. Freedom is not something that inheres in a mind, unless you are talking about free will. But free will is proper to each mind individually. We are each free to choose, individually, in one's own way, we do not choose collectively.
Quoting tim wood
What are you talking about, "where is language stored"? Have you never heard of "memory"? Each one of us has one's own memory. There's nothing collective about that, it's personal. Where do you get this idea that language is stored in some sort of collective memory? Do you mean books? But books just contain written symbols, which must be read and understood by individual minds, through reference to one's memory.
Quoting tim wood
"Thinking that comes in groups"? That is not common usage at all. We might classify a person as having this type of mind or that type of mind, just like psychiatry identifies "states of mind" which are common to different people, but in no way does this indicate that there is thinking which comes in groups. It is just classifying similar ways of thinking.
Saying "all human beings have a mind" doesn't justify talking about "a Mind which all human beings have", just like saying "all grass is green" doesn't justify saying "there is a Green which all grass has". You're either being totally abusive of the English language, or you really misunderstand simple logic.
This is where the concept of free will is derived, a cause which is not itself caused.
The issue is not a matter of my capacity with the English language. It is a matter of your inability to explain what you mean with terms like "Mind", and phrases like "American mind", "where language is stored", and "thinking that comes in groups". When you explain your use of these, simply by saying that this is common usage therefore I ought to know what you mean, this gives me no indication that you have any idea of what you are talking about. You could be a parrot, or a bot, for all I know. You've heard it, now you repeat it. Get back down to the Common, smoke some more of that weed, maybe try some psilocybe this time, and clarify your ideas, why don't you, tim?