Thought and Being

Quoting frank

Imagine that we're in an alternate world (called WG) where everything is green.

Are you saying 1) that the only electromagnetic radiation that exists in that world has wavelengths between 500 and 565 nanometers? Or 2) do you mean that that is the only light that people could detect visually? Or 3) something else?

If you mean 1), I doubt that that world could exist. If you mean 2), I would guess that people would break the spectrum they could see into many colors with their own names just as we do. The distinctions they made between colors would be just as real to them as the distinctions we make between red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, and violet are to us.

I would imagine that no term could describe what "green" connotes in WG. WH would only have a rudimentary term that would never apporach what is meant by "green" in WG. For someone to speak of "green" in WG to someone in WH would require something like that the other person would learn another language.

Reply to T Clark Reply to thewonder
:up:

I think the question is paradoxical. I don't think people in WG would be aware of color at all. They would focus on light and dark. They might have words for different shades, but no word for green for lack of anything to compare it to.

The idea here is that what we're aware of, and therefore think in terms of, is contrast and opposition.

Our thoughts don't simply "follow what is."

So it would follow that you wouldn't be able to think about what I just said unless you could compare it to the negative of the thesis!

Reply to frank I don't actually agree. I think that the people in WG would have a plethora of terms to describe "green". It'd be like what they say about Inuits and words for snow, which apparently is a bit of a myth.

Quoting thewonder

I don't actually agree. I think that the people in WG would have a plethora of terms to describe "green". It'd be like what they say about Inuits and words for snow, which apparently is a bit of a myth.

But dont you think they'd need to be able to compare greenness to something else in order to be aware of it?

In a monochrome world, colour words would have no application. In particular, the term 'monochrome' would have no application.

But we have gone from our RGB world of 3 dimensions of colour to a 1 dimensional 'black and white' one. Why not consider the colour language of 2 dimensions - a world of red and green but no blue for instance? Or the world of some insects and others that have more than three kinds of colour receptors?

Quoting unenlightened

In a monochrome world, colour words would have no application. In particular, the term 'monochrome' would have no application.

Wow. I really didn't expect anybody who understands that to post on this thread.

The totally green world is a colorless world. The totally green world is a contradiction.

I can go to my grave knowing that at least one living person on this barren world gets that.

Thank you. (for real)

Reply to frank I think that they'd be acutely aware of green. I don't necessarily know a lot about water, but I feel like a chemist would be be able to tell you all sorts of things about the properties of water. It could go unnoticed, though. It's your hypothetical.

Reply to thewonder So you're thinking that something like greenness would be detected by scientists?

Ok. I have another question. It'll take a while to formulate it.

The people in the green world would still experience dark and light areas, or else how would they distinguish objects from the background, or from each other? What color do they experience when they close their eyes? If they still see green then how do they know if their eyes are closed or their eyes are open? This seems to be just another silly philosophical question about impossible situations that we cant learn anything useful from.

Reply to frank That 'colorless world' conclusion seems self evident to me. Nor are 'scientists' from such a world likely to be interested in the rest of what we call 'the visible spectrum' except in terms the behavior of other species who might be 'sensitive' to other wavelengths.

From a general philosophical pov, 'color perception' has been been a central microcosm for debate, from the ontological status of qualia through to Wittgenstein's interest in Goethe's phenomenological 'color theory' which allegedly caused W to reject his own earlier Tractatus. Such 'color issues' in particular, and 'concept boundaries' in general, have also formed the backbone of some of the experimental studies of 'Embodied Cognitionists', like Rosch, who have researched W's 'prototype concept' within semantics.

And more generally, this microcosm the cutural differentiation of color categories in humans, and the species differential in physiological receptors, has raised the issue of 'anthropocentrism' in macrocosmic discussions of 'realism'.

theyd have a word for green but it would mean what we mean by 'color'

Another question: if everything was green would they even perceive it the way we perceive green? isn't perception as contrast-centric as language? At some point, the very idea of everything being green falls apart, even as an an imaginative hypothetical, and we have to resort to saying they can only perceive this subsection of light, and find a material basis for what green means. One could, as un hinted at, consider more color-perceptive species than us for whom everything we consider as 'the spectrum of color' is just (the analogical equivalent of) 'green.'

Reply to csalisbury Yes...you've reached the foothills ...keep going !

Reply to fresco Yep. I think the basic idea here runs through philosophy from at least Plato onward. I'd like to hear more about Goethe's color theory.

Quoting csalisbury

theyd have a word for green but it would mean what we mean by 'color'

Exactly. The other thought experiment I was thinking of is about a spaceship full of men. After millions of years (where I guess they clone themselves), they've lost any memory at all of female-ness. They don't even have female plug adapters. The question being: would they know that they're male?

As you hinted, their concept for what they are would stop at human. They don't know that they're male because they don't have anything to compare that to.

So we can see that being able to conceive of maleness isn't just a matter of being exposed to the positive qualities we think of as maleness. Conceiving of maleness is a matter of holding it up against a background of its negation. Conceiving of anything is a matter of doing something with an opposition.

Quoting csalisbury

At some point, the very idea of everything being green falls apart, even as an an imaginative hypothetical,

Exactly. Yay!

Quoting fresco

Yes...you've reached the foothills ...keep going !

Explorer's hubris has led me the mistake the lower ascent for the summit. I guess I need a sherpa who can see the full spectrum. What's the next foothold?

Goethe's color 'theory' was opposed to Newton's 'physics' of color, in that it stressed color as a phenomenological experience in which, for example 'black' and 'white' were still 'colors'. Wittgenstein, despite his earlier scientific training, had moved on to his adage 'meaning is usage' and seems to have taken Goethe as illustrative of this.
Note that this is my simplistic view of what was going on, and you might need to read up on W's 'Remarks on Color' for a more definitive view. But all of this needs to be set against the background that there is no strict isomorphism between physical 'wavelength' and perceptual 'color category' which loosens any propposed ties between 'physicality' and 'realism'. That's where the 'summit' lies IMO.

Quoting frank

Exactly. The other thought experiment I was thinking of is about a spaceship full of men. After millions of years (where I guess they clone themselves), they've lost any memory at all of female-ness. They don't even have female plug adapters. The question being: would they know that they're male?

As you hinted, their concept for what they are would stop at human. They don't know that they're male because they don't have anything to compare that to.

ah. Maybe, but - what that dick for then? whys it get hard? whats the weird white fluid all about?

So we can see that being able to conceive of maleness isn't just a matter of being exposed to the positive qualities we think of as maleness. Conceiving of maleness is a matter of holding it up against a background of its negation. Conceiving of anything is a matter of doing something with an opposition[

yeah definitely. That's why in almost every action movie there's either a cowardly sidekick, or the villain himself has some cowardly flaw, which fuels - and explains - his villainy. But I suppose thats an intra-male dramatization of masculinity.

I agree, in general with what you're saying.

Reply to csalisbury :up:

Quoting frank

Exactly. The other thought experiment I was thinking of is about a spaceship full of men. After millions of years (where I guess they clone themselves), they've lost any memory at all of female-ness. They don't even have female plug adapters. The question being: would they know that they're male?

As you hinted, their concept for what they are would stop at human. They don't know that they're male because they don't have anything to compare that to.

So we can see that being able to conceive of maleness isn't just a matter of being exposed to the positive qualities we think of as maleness. Conceiving of maleness is a matter of holding it up against a background of its negation. Conceiving of anything is a matter of doing something with an opposition.

From Carlo Rovelli’s ‘Reality Is Not What You Think’:

“A physical system manifests itself only by interacting with another. The description of a physical system, then, is always given in relation to another physical system, one with which it interacts.

“A description of a system is, therefore, always a description of the information which a system has about another system.”

While you're thinking about how concepts come in oppositions, focus on one of the more structural concepts:

changing ---- unchanging

This concept obviously has to do with time. If time is change, then how are we aware of it if not because we can conceive of its negation: timelessness.

If everything is changing (I think that's the conventional view), then where does this idea of timelessness come from? Is it a figment of the imagination? Did we invent it? Or is it based on experiences of apparent stasis, IOW: an illusion?

Our awareness of time is dependent on the concept of the eternal. What is it?

Reply to Possibility Interesting, but I think that's over my head. I don't quite understand what he means by "manifests itself."

Reply to frank It’s a description of the structure of quantum mechanics in terms of information. By ‘manifests itself’ I think he’s talking about reality from the POV of the observer, but that’s not related to the point I’m trying to make.

Extrapolated out, what he’s saying suggests that our description of an experience derives from how it interacts with or relates to information we have about different experiences.

So we cannot describe an experience of ‘greenness’ if every experience we’ve ever had has ‘greenness’ as a property. If the experiencing system has no experience that isn’t green, then green doesn’t exist for the system.

Reply to frank

No, it would be pointless. If everything is one color then there would be no need for words of separate colors. Color would mean nothing to people who live in a world with only one color.

Reply to Possibility Is green a kind of system? Or does it imply a system?

Is it the outcome of a system? Or would it be a name for one?

The parts of a system are described relative to the whole (or to each other). Does greenness have parts?

Or maybe we're using Rovelli's explanation as a simile?

Quoting luckswallowsall

, it would be pointless. If everything is one color then there would be no need for words of separate colors. Color would mean nothing to people who live in a world with only one color.

I agree. So what about the next question: if time appears to the mind only in contrast to its negation, what do we make of its negation: stasis?

Quoting unenlightened

Or the world of some insects and others that have more than three kinds of colour receptors?

Some humans, most of them women, have four colour receptor types. It's quite rare, I think.

Quoting thewonder

It'd be like what they say about Inuits and words for snow, which apparently is a bit of a myth.

This is is true, but in a very mundane way. I don't think Inuits have so many distinct words for snow, but their language does allow them to describe it in many different ways. Just as we have the word "rain", but we use it as "heavy rain", "light rain", driving rain", "frozen rain" and so on, giving us a lot more phrases to describe the weather than we have individual words. The same applies, I think, to describing snow as an Inuit.

Reply to frank There are tribes in Africa that have distinctions between contrasts of blue and green. There can see subtler differences that we cannot and vice versa

I agree. So what about the next question: if time appears to the mind only in contrast to its negation, what do we make of its negation: stasis? Reply to frank

I agree also viz color.

With respect to time, relative to the OP of Being and its negation = anxiety or angst.

However if, say, the residents in WG were unaware of time, it would follow that there would be no conception of the so-called temporal-ness of time. And as such, (relative to Being) there would be no cause for anxiety or angst.

But I'd like to further expand on the metaphorical color experiment. What if residents of WH somehow had a brief period of awareness or knowledge about the world of WG?

Or better said, what if WH residents were allowed to access residents of WG. Could they speak to each other in terms of color language? Probably not. Could it be in some ways ineffable? I suppose so. Could they learn new language?

It would be a strange and completely novel experience nonetheless. (Assuming of course that the concept of experience is in itself even something available to be experienced in that [WG's] world.) In other words, just like color, the idea of experience may not exist in that world. And maybe then, viz the experience of timelessness; it just is.

(In a timeless-ness world, what's more conceivable: would you say' I am', or ' I is'.)

Quoting I like sushi

There are tribes in Africa that have distinctions between contrasts of blue and green. There can see subtler differences that we cannot and vice versa

That's cool.

Quoting 3017amen

agree. So what about the next question: if time appears to the mind only in contrast to its negation, what do we make of its negation: stasis? ?

Time is change. Its negation is changelessness or eternity.

Quoting 3017amen

With respect to time, relative to the OP of Being and its negation = anxiety or angst.

The negation of being is angst? Why so?

Reply to frank

Sure. I think I used the correct term 'timelessness' to convey eternity.

The reason why I used anxiety or angst there Frank is because of your OP relating to ontology/ Being. And in that sense human beings having a sentient existence, generally experience existential anxiety or angst relative to mortality.

AKA fear of the unknown.

Quoting 3017amen

And in that sense human beings having a sentient existence, generally experience existential anxiety or angst relative to mortality.

But isnt thanatos also a response to mortality?

Reply to frank

Set up a possible world in which everything is green. There most certainly will be green things in that world; that's the very supposition on which the possible world is built.

Would the folk of that possible world have a use for that word? it seems they could not. A fish does not have a use for the word "wet".

And that's about the end of the analysis, so far as I can see.

[@T Clark]
You seem to be over-thinking it. But I take your point that the folk there might well develop a more extensive vocabulary for green stuff.

Quoting frank

The idea here is that what we're aware of, and therefore think in terms of, is contrast and opposition.

Yep; that follows from language being a tool. We only invent words that are useful, because meaning is use.

Quoting thewonder

I think that the people in WG would have a plethora of terms to describe "green".

. That's not substantially different to Frank's notion that they would have words for shades.

Quoting unenlightened

But we have gone from our RGB world of 3 dimensions of colour to a 1 dimensional 'black and white' one.

Hm. When I burn image with a laser cuter, I must take care to set the dithering correctly.

Quoting frank

The totally green world is a contradiction.

There's no contradiction in "in a world that is all-green, the word green has no use".

Quoting csalisbury

theyd have a word for green but it would mean what we mean by 'color'

:grin:

That works.

Reply to fresco Good reply.

Just noticed that this is a zombie thread.

Reply to Banno

I was going to go on a big rant about how green still had a use in an all green world, but wasn't sure I since its been dead for months.

I'll just say this: if green is useless in an all green would, to what are we referring to with our statements of "All green world?" There is some private langauge nonesense going on here.

Quoting Banno

Set up a possible world in which everything is green. There most certainly will be green things in that world; that's the very supposition on which the possible world is built.

Would the folk of that possible world have a use for that word? it seems they could not. A fish does not have a use for the word "wet".

And that's about the end of the analysis, so far as I can see.

Well, a couple of people saw what I was pointing out, which was awesome. I had more, but as you noticed, the thread died.

Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness

if you green is useless in an all green would, to what are we referring to with our statements of "All green world?"

Ha! Yep, that's the confusion.

I think the answer is in possible world semantics - an ugly term for a good grammar. The word green is used in setting up the possible world; but that doesn't mean that the word green has a use in that possible world.

Despite that, green still refers to green things; and will do so in any and every possible world.

And that does not rule out the possible world in which [i]green[/I] (that word) is not used to talk about green things.

Reply to frank SO now I am not sure if you missed something, or I missed something...

Quoting Banno

now I am not sure if you missed something, or I missed something...

You actually think it's possible that you missed something? :joke:

Reply to frank All the time. Just not as much as others hereabouts.

Reply to Banno

It's probably a duck and a rabbit.

I think frank missed more though. Or at least something important in the context of the discussion.

I get the point frank was going for too. The pheneonma of an all green world is something utterly alien to those who live in a world of distinctions. Can you imagine a world on which everything is green?

I mean it could be our world: let's say there was a being who encountered objects of our world but only ever saw the colour green. Such a being would never get our distintion of green from emprical observation. With green being constant, it's questionable whether they would even register it as distinct. They might be more inclined to think of it like we do "existence" or "world."

But such limits aren't really limits. One can always imagine much more than is ever in front of them. Just as we can imagine a world which is all green, they might imagine one which has more than green. Distinction isn't closed to them because they just see green. With the right imagination, they might speak of anything. They might even make the move of denying their own world is green.

Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness

Such a being would never get our distintion of green from emprical observation.

I'm not so sure. It could develop a theory of the electromagnetic spectrum, and recognise that we see a wider band of colour that it does.

Just as we c an speak of infra-red and ultraviolet...

It seems to me that there is a limit on the language that the folk in GreenLand can use; but that's not a limit on our language, and far from a limit on language in general.

Reply to Banno

It could, my point was it would have to be entirely imagined. They wouldn't have the distinction of colours or non-colours we do in our emprical observation. Since everything is green to them, the whole EM spectrum would appear as the colour green.

Quoting frank

isnt thanatos also a response to mortality?
2h

Yes of course I believe so...

Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness

Since everything is green to them, the whole EM spectrum would appear as the colour green.

Hm. I guess it would.

Quoting 3017amen

isnt thanatos also a response to mortality?
2h
— frank

Yes of course I believe so...

So its not just with angst that we face mortality?

Lately I've been filled with angst-less purposelessness. Just being.

Quoting frank

So its not just with angst that we face mortality?

With fear. Most humans have intrinsic fears. Many legitimate and some illusionary. Some of those that are illusionary can come from systemic means and methods.

While others face mortality with a heightened sense of wonderment. Of course we know from cognitive science NDE patient's lose the so-called intrinsic fears about mortality. Ironically enough perhaps they got a little glimpse of your WG world haha.

As far as angst -less purposelessness, perhaps that's a state of homeostasis for you.

An important point comes out of comparing Plato and Kant. Who is more a Rationalist

Kant had the innate powers of Time and Space. Plato had the infinity of innate Ideas. Kant thought the noumena unknownable. Plato rejected the noumena. His noumena, unlike Kants, was of another world

Reply to Gregory

Personally I don't dichotomize, I think both philosopher's had their virtues. I try to take the good from all of philosophy were possible. Easier said than done of course LOL.

In my opinion I think Plato was more of a rationalist. His reasoning seemed to be more a priori than not. And not that that's a bad thing; it's just that any one thing can be overdone.

Just like there's a so-called art to living, in Philosophy perhaps there's an art to philosophizing. Maybe it's all about the context.

Descartes thought we had an innate knowledge of God. This is either because of his birth or his dad. Do we get the sense that the world and our ideas come from God through the fact we come out of someone, or is it because of the father???

Quoting 3017amen

Personally I don't dichotomize,

I think you have to do a certain amount of dichotomizing. That's how the intellect works.

Reply to Gregory

I honestly believe it's Kantian intuition, which was part of his metaphysical theory; using your word, an ' innate' sense of being.

An innate sense of wonderment that we have. Thus, once again, the Kantian metaphysical judgement: all events must have a cause. Yay for the synthetic a priori !!!

Reply to frank

Sure you don't want to dichotomize the dichotomizing, ha.

Quoting 3017amen

Sure you don't want to dichotomize the dichotomizing, ha.

Sure. I just don't have anyyhing to say about the world where everything runs together.

Quoting frank

Sure. I just don't have anyyhing to say about the world where everything runs together.
3h

I would submit that's precisely another example of unresolved paradox in the world.

Take consciousness for example. Driving your car while daydreaming; both your consciousness and subconsciousness is working together. It breaks the laws of excluded middle.

And so in an ironic way you're right. What can we actually say about that? How do we explain or describe it?

Maybe in WG it can be explained.

Reply to 3017amen You have to slice the pie in order to conceive of an unsliced pie.

That was your profundus for the day.

Reply to frank

In the spirit of PoeticUniverse:

Profundity and pie
That caught my eye
Though surely sweet
Your trick or treat(ha)

Volition is Man
Discoveries are great
What you are not
You can't understand