Of the world
Here's an innocuous phrase I'm suddenly having tremendous difficulty with. 'Of the world'. Why do we use it so much? What are its bounds?
It's started because I'm in a 'metaphysics of mind' class and I'm grappling with physicalism which makes claims 'about the world'. I began to worry that I'm a Wittgensteinian of the Philosophical Investigations phase, where we don't talk about 'worlds' at all, whereas even the Good Guys in Consciousness Studies strike me as adherents of 'The world is everything that is the case', secret Tractarians.
Then I look about me and I see the problem everywhere. Possible worlds are an especial bother. What enormous claims people make.
I'm an atheist and a former creative (and sometimes not-so-creative, nay hack) writer. I used to imagine and invent fictional worlds. Over here in philosophy I make no claims about worlds. I think such claims, even made on behalf of science, are dodgy.
Hm. Which world is that?
I find myself wanting to use the Wittgensteinian 'linguistic community' some of the time, instead of 'world'. Among those talking about physics, for instance, perhaps physics is causally closed. But is it among the rest of us?
At other times I want to ask, as with 'The world is everything that is the case', are we to include in this world beliefs, feelings, emotions, territorial claims, ideas someone has just thought of that may turn out to be the next graphene or Hogwarts?
What are good and bad ways of talking about worlds, and how should we constrain our talk?
It's started because I'm in a 'metaphysics of mind' class and I'm grappling with physicalism which makes claims 'about the world'. I began to worry that I'm a Wittgensteinian of the Philosophical Investigations phase, where we don't talk about 'worlds' at all, whereas even the Good Guys in Consciousness Studies strike me as adherents of 'The world is everything that is the case', secret Tractarians.
Then I look about me and I see the problem everywhere. Possible worlds are an especial bother. What enormous claims people make.
I'm an atheist and a former creative (and sometimes not-so-creative, nay hack) writer. I used to imagine and invent fictional worlds. Over here in philosophy I make no claims about worlds. I think such claims, even made on behalf of science, are dodgy.
David Chalmers:It seems to me that we are surer of the existence of conscious experience than we are of anything else in the world.
Hm. Which world is that?
I find myself wanting to use the Wittgensteinian 'linguistic community' some of the time, instead of 'world'. Among those talking about physics, for instance, perhaps physics is causally closed. But is it among the rest of us?
At other times I want to ask, as with 'The world is everything that is the case', are we to include in this world beliefs, feelings, emotions, territorial claims, ideas someone has just thought of that may turn out to be the next graphene or Hogwarts?
What are good and bad ways of talking about worlds, and how should we constrain our talk?
Comments (46)
I think both the Hebrews and the Greeks, in very different ways, saw 'the world' as being only one aspect of the totality. For the Hebrews, I suppose you could say, the world was the stage of which God was the director. For Platonists, 'the sensible realm' was deficient and treacherous, compared to the world of the eternal forms. But for modern naturalism 'the world is all that is the case'. Somehow, they insist, the world must contain its own explanation, or ground: that is pretty well what 'naturalism' consists of. But so far, precious little luck in finding what it might be.
So really this becomes a metaphysical question, as much as we wish that metaphysics could be disposed of for once and for all. Philosophy, observed Etienne Gilson, has often been declared dead; but it usually ends up burying its undertakers.
There is no Biblical verse that says this so it really doesn't merit analysis. The closest Biblical verse would be ...
.. in which there is clearly no no ambiguity.
Two problems with that. Firstly it doesn't have the imperative but speaks of a situation which is already in place. In other words it is not a command(ment) but a description of the state of grace of the disciples. Second it's a very dodgy translation. in v. 15 ...
the phrase 'ek tov kosmov' is rightly taken to mean 'out of the world', yet when it appears again in v. 16, the translators ignore 'ek' altogether. Consistency demands that the verse should read ...
... which speaks not at all to the meaning of 'of this world' as expressed in the OP.
To me, the world is all that is - the objective reality, which includes subjective perspectives of it. It is everything. So for someone to say the phrase, "Of the world" I take to mean that some thing is part of the world. This would also imply, to me, that they believe in things NOT of this world. For what would be the purpose of claiming that something is of the world IF the world is all there is because it would be logically deductive that all things are of this world, and therefore redundant to say this.
If someone claims that the world isn't all there is, I would make the claim that they are misusing terms. The world is all there is, which includes their area of time and space that they claim isn't part of the world, especially if this other domain, not some other world, has a causal effect on the "world".
Cosmos, the Greek word, is interesting in itself, for it implies an order, vis-vis chaos, and I gather was re-invented, as it were, by Humboldt in the 19th century. Again his implication is of unity. (Barry's reference to translation made me think about this)
I think part of my difficulty is that the claims of 'science' are indeed metaphysical, but they often insinuate themselves into that sphere as if it were an innocuous development from scientific enquiry. I see that methodological naturalism will, in its methods, treat some 'world' as within its orbit. That's where the likes of me and you and Harry Hindu can agree about the details of science and enjoy its fruits and its follies. But beyond that, I can't follow them into the way things are in the world.
There is a secondary issue, I realise, in the detail of what I'm studying, about whether physical scientists can imagine that 'social science' has validity. For instance:
Here the 'world' of physical science is insisting on jurisdiction over the 'world' of psychology, society and economics, as if there wasn't already some perfectly good scientific work going on over there.
Thanks, Harry. This word domain can sometimes stand for a subsidiary zone and might be useful to me. I don't claim that the world isn't all there is, myself. I just allege we don't even need to ask and answer that sort of question to get on with our scientific enquiries, our art and our lives.
It is the relish for the word 'world' that I'm fretting at, in part. The word does seem wonderfully all-encompassing, while conveniently glossing over, if one wants to, what's included and what isn't.
There must be a four fold symmetry applicable to everything if there are such things as higher dimensions or even if the universe is to keep that a mystery and this can be described as part of the metaphoric logic of existence itself. In a metaphorical universe every dimension or universe would inevitably transform into its complimentary-opposite of nonexistence and everything would appear to organize around what apparently does not exist such as the future. Among other things, in physics it would explain the mass of the Higgs Boson as reflecting the fact that symmetry and asymmetry are so fundamental it will require cosmic ray energy levels to observe symmetry vanishing into indeterminacy. It also means, if you prefer, you can describe philosophy as concerned with Metaphorical Fuzzy Factual Metaethical Bullshit Values because analog yin-yang logic rules the universe.
Notably, on his deathbed, Wittgenstein's last regret was not formulating his philosophy as comedy.
People sometimes use the word "world" in a restricted sense. Plato distinguished between the world of substance and the world of the Forms. The religious distinguish the world from heaven (and other afterlives).
To make a case that they're misusing the word "world" you'd first have to justify your claim that what you mean by it is the correct meaning.
And, you know, the word is also used to refer to just the Earth (and everything on it), but I guess we're ignoring that meaning?
I define it this way because it limits the world to what we encounter as incarnate beings. Thus allowing a myriad of other realms and things etc that may exist and which may constitute or interact with this world, but which we are not aware of as not being a part of this world, but due to our lack of capacity, or for some other reason, are veiled from us.
And what people mean by it is different things in different contexts. In some contexts, it refers to extramental or objective facts.
In other contexts, it refers to any phenomena whatsoever and maybe it's a bit redundant--for example, in the Chalmers quote you mention in your initial post in this thread. He could have just as well left off "in the world," but it does have some semantic utility, maybe, in that context via emphasizing that we're talking about everything. Kind of like "than we are of anything else, and I mean anything."
Those two possibilities don't exhaust the usage of the term, but it becomes clear what people mean in context as you read more philosophy.
The word 'world' is useful as a way of setting a scope for one's comments. For instance the quoted references from the New Testament are set in a context of a metaphysical hypothesis that there are two types of beings - those with bodies and those without, and the 'not of this world' says that the speaker is usually the other type of being.
Other metaphysical set-ups where the word 'world' has a specific local meaning are Everett's 'Many Worlds Interpretation' of quantum mechanics, and the 'Possible Worlds' approach to defining a semantics for modal logic.
I think in each of those three cases - New Testament Theology, Many Worlds and Possible Worlds, the word has a different meaning.
So perhaps where I'm ending up (for now at least) is that it's a bit of a portmanteau word that can be used to mean different things in different contexts, and does not have a meaning that transcends different metaphysical theories.
Our beautiful words hang in the air between us,
Defying even unbalanced gravity herself.
Rainbows of beautiful words that say what words cannot.
Sparkling laughter that becomes infectious,
Delightful giggles echo, rolling across the floor.
That is the reference I meant, although on reflection 'in the world but not of it', is more a saying than a quotation (albeit one with sound provenance). But throughout Christian doctrine there are frequent references to 'the world'. But, if you're exhorted to 'be not of this world', then what is the alternative? What other way could one be? I think the Christian answer is that to be 'one with the Father' is to align oneself to a different order, but the ability to do that, relies on being able to discern that order and conform oneself to it, which is the meaning of the teaching.
As I understand it, the precise meaning is 'an ordered whole' - which seems a remote possibility for current scientific cosmology at this time, what with the multifarious interpretations that are in play (per @andrewk's post .)
Carl Sagan's well-known saying is 'cosmos is all there is, or ever will be'.
I think this type of philosophical naturalism has transposed the Cosmos into the place formerly assigned to God, and assigns science the role previously assigned to religion. Of course that's a lot to say in a short sentence, but there are numerous historical studies which make the case in detail; a notable example being M A Gillespie's The Theological Origins of Modernity.
'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.'
Which must be the case if 'the world is all there is'.
Whereas, a transcendental argument (of the style of Kant) will argue that such things as laws are in an important sense prior to experience, insofar as they provide the basis of any kind of scientific explanation of the world, i.e. they are predictive of what will be confirmed by experience (as 'observation').
So 'the nature of order' - that is, whether scientific laws exist, or the sense in which they are or are not part of the world - is still a vexed question (as discussed in the Nancy Cartwright paper you have posted previously.)
I think, since you mentioned philosophy of mind, this is especially the case in philosophy of mind. The mind and the world sort of define one another, it often seems. Not always. Sometimes these are rendered explicitly -- such as in Descartes. But in other renditions it's a sort of taking for granted -- why, after all, are emotions generally situated within the mind? Or perceptions? Why not the world? Or vice-versa?
That isn't to say that these are wrong categorizations, but the underlying reasons why I think are where we might be able to say our notion of "world" becomes examined.
But we do need to ask the question because if other domains have a causal relationship with our domain, then there are effects here in this domain caused by changes in the other domain(s). If there are any causal relationships between domains, then they are all integrated into one whole and it is the whole that science seeks to explain.
Yes, Earth is another meaning of "world" and many people can mean/refer to different things with a word that has a fluid meaning. But then fluid meanings of words just makes it harder to understand what someone is talking about or specifically referring to.
My point in my post that you are responding to is that whatever term you want to use to refer to everything, must include these other domains that have a causal relationship with each other. If they can affect each other, then there is no difference between that domain vs. this domain, and our solar system (a domain) and another solar system (another domain). They all exist within the same whole and can affect each other given enough time.
To claim that there are separate worlds, realities, or whatever, yet claim that these "separate" things have a cause and effect relationship is to be inconsistent in your use of terms, if by what you refer to when you say "reality" or "world" is "all there is".
Sigh...
No, Wayfarer, science is in no way related to religion. They are different methods of seeking truth. One is based on authority and tradition, while the other is based on experiment and observation by your peers.
And the point I was making is that some people don't use the word "world" to refer to all there is. Plato distinguished between the world of substance and the world of Forms. The religious distinguish between the world and heaven.
The thing I took issue with was your claim that "If someone claims that the world isn't all there is, I would make the claim that they are misusing terms". You're saying that it's wrong to not use the word "world" to refer to all this is. This assertion needs to be defended.
SEP
Are you seriously suggesting that there is as clear a dichotomy as that? There is no part of science based on authority and tradition? No part of religion based on experiment and observation by peers? I'm sure it is very comforting to live in this black and white world of yours but it is clearly a delusion.
2 things. One, even if the phrase isn't in the NT, the problem of navigating through this world to the world to come exercised Christians early on and ever since. It's especially complicated because in Jesus the world to come entered into this world, and presumably this mixing has never ceased.
Two, my impression of the OT is that this world is the only world there is. Even though I was dyed in the wool as a Christian, and despite the seductive attractions of a world to come, I came to prefer what I take to be the OT view -- this world is all there is of worlds. God doesn't exist in a "different world". God exists in this world--in the Cosmos.
A few decades ago when I began to extricate myself from the Christian dye my virgin wool had been immersed in, I phrased it this way: "I want to live in a knowable world" -- basically replacing religion with science. I wanted to get rid of the magic god who mysteriously intervenes in this world to make things happen (all sorts of nano-managed events which many believers think happens).
Making the transition by no means eliminated headaches. Instead of being irritated by claims of the magic god's nano-managing, there is now the irritation of determinism vs free will. I'm still working on that problem. I guess I agree with "Carl Sagan's well-known saying 'cosmos is all there is, or ever will be'".
Even though billions sincerely believe in other worlds, I now have to know better them all of them, and conclude they are deluded, and must conclude that imagined other worlds are as substantial as the suggestive shapes of clouds. Fanciful cloud shapes are part of "this world".
I know all of that. However, science is now normative, with respect to what ought to be believed, in the way that religion once was. It takes itself as the 'arbiter of reality'.
That's positivism. It is one of the master-narratives of modernity. I think I also probably don't believe in the god that you don't believe in, but I am neither positivist nor atheist.
What I mean is this - I don't think I have ever believed in that kind of God - the film-director pulling the strings behind the scenes; I think that is a popular image, but I never imagined that such a God existed. However I don't think the non-belief in that kind of 'sky-father' image of God, necessarily entails atheism.
Re-read my post. I acknowledged that people may use different terms for "everything that exists". As I have tried to show you before "meaning" is what words refer to. You refused to define, "meaning". The OP was particular about the word, "world", and the way it was used - "of the world" - which I took to mean "everything". In my first post I pointed out the inconsistency of someone who means/refers to "everything that exists" when they say, "world". If that isn't what they mean/refer to, then there isn't an inconsistency, but they would still need a term that means/refers to "everything that exists". We could use universe, multi-verse, reality, etc. Take your pick. It's not the word you use, it's what you are referring to when you use the word.
To make such claims about science without any examples severely dilutes your argument.
No, in your first post you said "To me, the world is all that is" and "If someone claims that the world isn't all there is, I would make the claim that they are misusing terms."
You're saying that it's wrong for someone to use the word "world" to refer to something other than "everything that exists". I'm asking you to defend this assertion.
"The President of the United States" and "the husband of Michelle Obama" mean different things even though they refer to the same person.
And to bring up an earlier example, "human" and "intelligent species" mean different things even though they refer to the same things (assuming no extraterrestrial life for the sake of argument).
Although I don't see how this is relevant to this discussion.
Try having several of your peers test the "truths" you find through revelation and question you on how you arrived at your conclusion. You'd be offended because your experience of revelation isn't to be questioned and it's subjective - not prone to be tested by others. It is taken at face value based on your already preconceived notion that spirits and a spirit world exists.
Science can't be normative for most people are religious which makes religion the norm, not science. When I was religious and questioned the validity of my beliefs - that wasn't being normal. I was going against the grain.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Meanwhile, back in the real world, away from this idealised notion of both that you seem to have ...
The standard cosmological model is so sacrosanct that it is necessary to [s]invent[/s] propose dark matter to maintain its authority whilst Deuteronomic theology is subjected to a rigorous critical peer review (Job) and then rejected entirely when observation (the exile to Babylon) proves it counterfactual.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Hardly! It has been known for many years that the majority of published papers even in peer reviewed journals contain errors, false inferences, or conclusions that are not justified by the data and that far from being objective are biassed by all manner of subjective forces such as the pressure to succeed, the need to impress funders, personal ambition, and of course the simple reluctance to be proved wrong. (See also Reproducibility: A tragedy of errors in Nature this year)
That is the precise attitude of 'science-as-religion', or scientism, that I was referring to. The Western scientific method was a development of the general Western intellectual tradition; much of the groundwork was laid by the medievals. And it culminated in the advent of what we now know as the modern scientific method. It is indeed a powerful thing, but it's not all-knowing, and it's not applicable to every aspect of existence. For example, scientific method is basically restricted to questions which are amenable to quantitative analysis and measurement. So, science is indeed normative, for all the many things for which it is useful
In Greek philosophy, you can find the same general scepticism about the reliability of the senses, as you do in Descartes - a willingness to ask the question, what if the world we know through the senses is an illusion? (Nowadays the same kind of idea is expressed in science-fiction movies like the Matrix or Inception.)
So, for example, in Eastern religions - Vedanta and Buddhism - the discipline of meditation is very much aimed at detachment from 'the world' in the sense of being detached from reliance on sensory stimuli. In the Yoga Sutras it is said the yogi withdraws the senses 'like a tortoise draws its feet into its shell'.
Now if you look at modern, post-Enlightenment philosophy, it rests on the assumption of empiricism and naturalism - which generally boils down to 'only sense data which can be mathematically qualified provides the basis for valid knowledge'. So from that perspective, it is literally impossible to 'doubt' in the way that traditional philosophers did. Ours is a thoroughly worldly attitude, in their terms - we are so embedded in our naturalist perspective, that it would take a much stronger emolient than mere argument to soften it up.
(I think Wittgenstein intuited this. He was taken by the positivist movement to be endorsing positivism, but I don't think he was at all. When he said 'that of which we cannot speak...', and 'I am my world', he actually was speaking from the perspective of traditional philosophy in the sense meant above. He wasn't saying that nothing existed beyond what could be emprically verified, but was drawing attention to the limitations of language. )
As I have tried to show you before "meaning" is what words refer to.
Quoting MichaelYou keep bringing it up. I'm trying to get you to understand the point I was making in the actual thing that people refer to when they use some term to refer the entirety of what exists. Who cares what symbols people use to refer to it?
If there is a causal relationship between some "world" and another "world" then logically, "world" doesn't refer to the entirety of existence. They must use some other string of symbols to refer to the entirety of existence.
When? All I said is that some people don't use the word "world" to refer to everything that exists, and that you must justify your (since corrected) assertion that this amounts to a misuse of terms.
I don't see how this addresses my criticism. You said that a phrase's meaning is its referent ("As I have tried to show you before "meaning" is what words refer to."). I provided you with examples of phrases which have the same referent but mean different things.
But, again, I don't see how this is relevant.
Have to agree. I presume that's part of the reason why at one time he wanted the Tractatus to be republished in the same volume as Philosophical Investigations, to show the relations between his philosophical selves.
That is to say that founding metaphysical assumptions upon the notion that we only access self experiences is not a logically consistent position.
To reference the self requires that there is a distinction of the self from that which is not self.
Without such a distinction it is not clear what the term self is meant to reference.
Not only is the self not well defined as something which is distinct from the not self but there is the problem of infinite regress.
The self observes the selfness of self.
How does the self know?
The self observes that the self observed the selfness of self.
I can make no sense of the notion that we should found metaphysical assumptions upon the idea that the only access to information possible is self generated information from subjective experience.
Not only is that position logically inconsistent it defies common sense;
Clearly the mind has access to information which was not generated by that mind.
This is how we learn new things and discover when our beliefs are mistaken.
Sure you might argue that in order to grasp that information a mind must process that information but that processing alone does not negate the fact that information exists independent of any given mind.
I agree with Moliere that it's often unexplored, what 'world' is or represents: sometimes people feel they need to imply an ontology by incantation of 'world' when, perhaps, it only needs to be provisional, for the purposes of present discussion.
And with Cava I have been thinking about those two Sellarsian 'images'. Why only two? I had a fad, a year or two ago, in that way we self-taught folk do, for Nelson Goodman's 'ways of world-making' where worlds can be multiple, and I still roll the idea round my head fondly. In his conception a world didn't go over to relativism just by being not the only world there is: each world in his 'irrealism' had to have clear rules, bounds, definitions. I imagine such multiple worlds like a map on which you can overlay different properties - here's the geological way of seeing, here's the Google Street Views, here's the population of non-humans, and so on.
Lately my preoccupation is much more with emotion and with power. If you imagine 'the world' as an incredibly complicated 3-D map of what matters to each person, for instance, you can begin with a kind of Heideggerian approach - basic three elements being Dasein or selves, the present at and the ready to hand - and sketch out an immanent world of worlds, one where the 'objects' lack objectivity or even object-ness, yet truths are represented there that wouldn't be represented by the supposedly objective world, and all the known objects would still be in such a world yet strangely changed.
Or again, imagine a 3-D map of possession- and power-claims. This would show up a sort of political landscape beginning in the household/family and spreading out geographically across a locality and imaginatively through communities. My cup, my land, my society, my job. Our this and that.
The phrase "of the world" indicates that there is information which exists independent of any given observer experiencing that information.
The argument often goes that what ever is that information it must first be processed by a given mind before that given mind can verify the existence of that information.
Again suggesting that all information a mind encounters is self generated is not a logically consistent foundation for metaphysics because the self recursion leads to an ill defined infinite regress.
If the term self is not logically distinct from not self by definition then it is not clear what the term self means.
And if we do not first assume that the self is distinct from the not self then there is an infinite regress in the steps to prove the proposition that the self can verify selfness by consulting the self, which consults the self, and so and so forth ad infinitum.
Once again I think people conflate the notion that information that exists independent of the self with the problem of that information existence must be processed before the existence of that information is verified by a particular mind.
We can use logic to demonstrate that there is information which exists independently however.
If there were no such information which existed independently of the mind then we would never learn new things or discover that our beliefs were wrong.
There is no way to account for this phenomena if the term self is not distinct from term not self.
For me I see no great controversy to suggest that metaphysics be founded on the notion that there is a distinction of self and not self.
Once having done this, then by definition not self exists independently of self and there is nothing interesting to debate.
Simply put, that information which you do not know and which your mind has not processed is independent of self in every way.
That you can process such information and that the information can be made aware to the self is not the equivalent of therefor you can conclude that such information was never independent of the mind.
So there is no big metaphysical controversy at all.
The whole debate to me is not philosophically interesting considering the dilemma at hand.
The term self can be ill defined and ambiguous such that there now exists a metaphysical dilemma.
Or, the simple solution, define the term self such that it is logically distinct and exists independently from the term not self.
Sellars established two broad conceptual frameworks, which are analogous, not equal or parallel but are related. He suggests these views are like viewing though a stereoscope, where the two distinct views become one vision of the world. Neither framework is reducible to the other but each is in dialogue with the other. Neither can completely explain the other without leaving something out, He does not dismiss the fact that there can be multiple conceptual frames within each view, such as physics and biochemistry in the scientific image or between ethics and behaviorism in the manifest image.
His essay: http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/SellarsPhilSciImage.pdf
is short and concise.