Emotions and Ethics
I've long been an avid novice in the art of Stoicism. Yet, I don't like ethical theories that are too complicated or resort to exorbitant and taxing rationality to asses the moral worth of some action. Which has led to my minimalist take on ethical theories.
Under this minimalist assumption, I feel as though the only moral theory, which makes any sense is Hume's moral philosophy of the emotions. Now, if we take a step back and asses Hume's moral philosophy, then one has to come to the conclusion that emotions are not entirely irrational, as they seem to have their own set of logic or rationale.
Hence, I tend to view ancient philosophy (mainly Plato), which classified emotions as irrational or not helpful to the attainment of eudaimonia, as fundamentally prejudiced against the very thing which would allow them to taste or experience something which they called ataraxy.
It's a commonsensical approach in my view, to throw away the prejudice of ancient philosophers towards the emotions, along with many of the rationalists, and instead embrace one's emotions towards the ethical. I feel as though I have wasted a great deal of time and effort in neglecting what my emotions had to "say". Under this view Stoicism or other rational based theories are quite stifling, and counter-productive to assessing the moral worth of some action or sentiment.
I'm interested if anyone else arrived at this conclusion or whether it makes sense.
Under this minimalist assumption, I feel as though the only moral theory, which makes any sense is Hume's moral philosophy of the emotions. Now, if we take a step back and asses Hume's moral philosophy, then one has to come to the conclusion that emotions are not entirely irrational, as they seem to have their own set of logic or rationale.
Hence, I tend to view ancient philosophy (mainly Plato), which classified emotions as irrational or not helpful to the attainment of eudaimonia, as fundamentally prejudiced against the very thing which would allow them to taste or experience something which they called ataraxy.
It's a commonsensical approach in my view, to throw away the prejudice of ancient philosophers towards the emotions, along with many of the rationalists, and instead embrace one's emotions towards the ethical. I feel as though I have wasted a great deal of time and effort in neglecting what my emotions had to "say". Under this view Stoicism or other rational based theories are quite stifling, and counter-productive to assessing the moral worth of some action or sentiment.
I'm interested if anyone else arrived at this conclusion or whether it makes sense.
Comments (54)
Without emotions, there can only be behavior, not ethics. Technically of course one could generate some 'logical' set of behaviors, but it would either be random, or it would be grounded on emotions and what we would like things to be like. And what we would not like things to be like.
Well, yes. Reason under Hume's dictum is secondary to the emotions. It only serves as an instrumental faculty of our desires or wishes or passions.
Let me know what you're grappling with and I'll try and clarify.
Thanks.
I fully support your thoughts. Emotions are the neglected children of rationality. As an evolutionary, I believe that all that we are -- reason, emotion, desires, hates and dislikes, and / or the lack thereof, -- are all borne out of survival advantages.
As such, we must pay attention to all that we are, in order to find the human in ourselves.
Most historically very famous philosophers -- with the exception of a very few -- were suffering from autism. They were highly functional, but still, the basic driving force of a philosopher is the inability to see the world as a normal person, and therefore possessing a wish to make sense of it. Normal people don't care about philosophy because they lack the need to know, and that is so because they have a well-rounded world view with their own role in the general scheme of the cosmos well defined and smoothly, seamlessly integrated.
And as autists, most philosophers discount the value of emotions. To them (to us) that's where problems begin. If it can't be reasoned, then what's the use of something? Emotions-driven thought and actions are like smudged-out areas on a painting of reality for an autism sufferer: an area which he can't gain insight into even if he kills himself, and which he tries for the rest of his life to explain with reason, while at the same time rejecting its importance as it is not "reason".
Hume was the first and last of the great thinkers who saw this happening, and he responded in kind, and very aptly and smartly.
Well, it's strange that you phrase things this way, as if autism is the supreme reason what drives a philosopher. But, then again, I'm pretty sure Wittgenstein was a high functioning autist or had Aspergers along with an extraordinarily high IQ, which could be seen as some aid in his philosophical endeavors, which most philosophers are enjoying to this day.
Some thinkers now believe that reason is yet another driving force, in and by itself. Reason is a need in humans, much like the feelings of love, hate, -- crap, I can' t name any other emotions. Some emotions manifest as needs, some others, as responses. (Examples: Needs: be loved. Responses: anger.) Reason and rationality also can present as both need and response.
Which ones? Are you thinking of Kant here or some other philosopher? It's my understanding that most philosophers nowadays are some cognitivists or neo-empiricists.
As an autist, I'm in two minds about this. :wink: No I'm not. I can see no direct contribution that autism makes to philosophy. We have some traits that could help, just as they could help in many other areas. But assigning autism to most philosophers does seem strange ... and wrong.
I think, going along down this line of reasoning, that autism can be useful in some way to promoting the required fixation or focus that a philosopher needs to penetrate a deep issue that requires insight and intelligence. Though, that's about you can take this idea towards, the rest just sounds funny.
I cannot even find something to guess at tbh. Maybe the problem is mine as others have responded, either way I may be able to add something if you rewrite the OP in a shorter and more succinct fashion (perhaps with a question or two posed?)
To be clear, you mention Hume and such but you assume I know what you’re referring to and that I agree (“I” the reader).
Ok, I'll make it easy for you. I've long been bothered, as a wanna-be Stoic by this quote by Hume:
The whole OP is just a *footnote to that quote. Do you agree with it, why or why not?
Think of it this way. We love love. We love food. We hate despotism. We love much money in the bank.
We desire, we hate, we repulse from, etc etc These are all needs that our emotions dictate to us, and there is no way we can avoid these emotion-driven needs.
But needs can't be fulfilled just by wishing and by wanting. You need action to fulfil those needs. If you are hungry, you must secure food. So you need your reason to help you figure out how to do that. If you want love, you must secure it; just wanting it will get you nowehre, you need your reason to create a path, a plan of action, that will get people to love you. etc.
Does this make more sense to you now?
I agree, with the caveat that one also embrace one's reason toward the ethical.
Morality is modelled by the human mind through the operation of ethical learning, ethical categorisation, ethical knowledge, ethical evaluation, conscience, introspection, and self-judgment. As such, it is an inherent part of a typical human being's nature and maturation, and has many subjective (personal) and intersubjective (cultural) manifestations.
Empathy is identification with, and the vicarious experience of, the thoughts and/or affect(n) of another person, which:
1) Describes moral events as those which satisfy fundamental human needs, and immoral events as those which do not satisfy fundamental human needs.
2) Is an ethical perception faculty (i.e., the sense of morality) which is inherent to human nature (except in the case of certain mental disorders) and entails ethical evaluation.
3) Has affective and/or cognitive components.
Rogers, Kimberley; Dziobek, Isabel; Hassenstab, Jason; Wolf, Oliver T.; Convit, Antonio. 2007. "Who Cares? Revisiting Empathy in Asperger Syndrome". J Autism Dev Discord 37 (4): 709–15. doi:10.1007/s10803-006-0197-8. PMID 16906462.
Taken at face value, what he says is quite obvious. Agree? Agree with what? What is there to agree or disagree with and why?
I can at least now guess you are looking at this as a black and white statement of reality rather than viewing the remark as being fully aware fo the nuances between (the grey areas). I think they call that ‘splitting hairs’?
Maybe I don’t see a huge issue here because I appreciate that all human action is emotive. We ‘feel’ something about every item of experience and if we didn’t we wouldn’t ‘experience’ at all.
I seem to recall that you point-blank refused to address my hypothetical line of moral questioning? If you didn’t understand the point of that, and still don’t, I can only suggest you readdress it. The kill a million and/or Trolley problem. If I remember correctly you were one of those that turned their back on those questions? - pretty sure I did a follow up explanation so maybe you did read my analysis of the hypothetical and its use (I’ll check later).
For the sake of clarity I do distinguish between ‘ethic’ and ‘moral’ in that morality is my way and ethical is that which humans understand as commonality - and here again there is an obvious no-man’s land where the skeptics dwell as bombs fall on their heads.
My position towards the Trolley dilemma you proposed a couple of months ago (start one again as the turnover rate is pretty high here) was that no sane person would be able to decide such a problem. I actually responded to this question of a thread of my own. Have a look at it again if you wish to.
Needs and wants cannot be known unless felt. The rational problem is one of measuring multiple values and prediction - the tempering of desires of the immediate and the retention of some will in case they fall short (language - spoken/written - has enabled us to intricate our temporal space).
Stoicism has so many different little sections I don’t quite know what to address regarding the OP as it sounds, more or less, like the original theme of hedonism (not what many people vie was “hedonism” in everyday speech!) - I’d call it the beginning of Stoicism; perhaps a ‘practical’ version?
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5768/ethics-morality-the-use-of-the-hypothetical
Quoting I like sushi
Quoting I like sushi
I am sorry, "I love sushi" but you trapped me. You said two different things in the three posts you made. In the first two instances you denied understanding anything the OP said. In the third instance, you specifically denied these two posts by your own self.
I can't abide with traps like that. I won't. One more such utterance or the like of it, and I'm putting you on Iggi.
You trapped me into explaining where I thought you needed help. Then you outright decried my help.
This is not nice. This, in fact, is intolerable.
Hah! And you accuse me of black and white thinking. Good one. I'm not sure how to respond to that thread, as some impasse was reached in it.
Boo-fucking-hoo! If you imagine a trap so be it. If you get that self-righteous bear trap off your foot I imagine you’d think you’re an enable walker being equally crippled by both legs!
Why is it idiots forever imagine demons at their door?
Ok, I re-read that awesome thread again, and it seems to me that at the same time you're drawing out a distinction between the "moral" and "ethical", whilst also equating the two. Why is that so?
Note: I was still asking if I understood the OP hence the “was?” ... the above poster missed this too. I also said “appears” ... it is quite likely I still have no idea what the OP is getting at and if it is waht I;ve mentioned I guess the ball is in your court.
See my previous comment. I believe we can explore the issue further by the (normative?) distinction you are drawing between the "ethical" and "moral". I'm not quite sure where the scope between the two begins and ends in your line of thought.
Well, quoting from that thread you explicitly say:
Quoting I like sushi
It's my understanding that the difference between the two is not due to innate differences, given that we all experience emotions to some same degree, perhaps barring sociopaths or psychopaths; but, due to epistemic concerns. Again, I addressed this point in the thread referenced above. Or to put this another way, what is moral is governed by what is ethical and vice versa, in a loop so to speak.
The ‘line’ is not really there. I make the distinction of poles on a spectrum. The ‘individual’ is only ever an ‘individual’ in a ‘community’ - necessarily the counter term must be understood in order for the other to come into nascent being.
Anyway, before I attempt to go further, I am interested in what you are saying. Am I in the ballpark or not? Is it correct that I take your “ethical” to mean my “moral” (regarding the OP)? If so then what kind of stoicism are you referring to? Is it something akin to the original idea of hedonism?
I think so. Before I posted this topic I was waffling over the idea as to whether to name the topic "Minimalism in Ethics" or the current title.
Quoting I like sushi
Well, I've always held the notion that the two are interrelated, even if I grew up in Japan and some other bloke grew up in Holland or the US.
Quoting I like sushi
Well, I didn't mean to introduce any stipulative terms and meant Stoicism in the ordinary sense. I also see how one can conclude that this is akin to hedonism, yet, I don't think it is the right conclusion to be derived here. I don't think people are naturally inclined to be hedonists.
Not sure about that. I mean, every country needs law enforcement officials. It's just that, in general, people get along pretty well with each other without said officials governing their daily affairs.
Quoting I like sushi
Depends on your views of people in general. A cop once told me that in dire situations people can behave quite irrationally. But, such situations are quite rare, along with the fact that the Trolly dilemma is (in my view) a perversion of philosophy with extremist inclinations.
Sorry to get back to your post so late, as I got caught up in a dialogue with I like sushi.
From my posting and knowledge hereabouts, I understand the issue as a complex interrelated dynamic between emotions and reason. But, I don't understand the details here. For example, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy can serve as a backdrop where Hume's sentiment towards reason being the slave of the passions, as not being entirely true, at least not on face value.
What are your thoughts about this matter?
Sure. Foundational moral stances have to be emotional, because they're preferences re "how people should behave."
And yeah, rationality and emotions are definitely not isolated from each other.
Not sure if this is correct. Hume outlined the is-ought problem, have you been able to overcome it?
I don't know how you're reading me as suggesting something contra the is-ought problem.
In other words, I was saying that foundational moral stances can't be reasoned, because of the is-ought problem. No fact(s) can give you a foundational moral stance. You only "feel" your foundational moral stances. That's emotion/preferences.
Well, you did say that foundational emotivist stances outline "how people should behave". Not, that they do in a certain way. Which led me to conclude that you were claiming an ought for an is...
Does that sound more like what you were saying?
A preference about how people should behave. The person is telling you how they feel about interpersonal behavior.
So, does adding that it is a preference, make this a normative claim for how people should behave or a positive statement?
If it's an "ought" utterance, it's a normative by definition. That's what normatives are. That doesn't make it true, or a(n objective) fact or anything like that. Normatives are value statements, preferences that individuals have.
It's not a "positive statement," because you can't derive values from non-value facts.
Here's what Wikipedia says:
Quoting Wiki
And, you say here:
Quoting Terrapin Station
So, this leads me to believe that you either don't believe in ought statements or that you stipulatively use normative claims as not value apt. What is it then?
I agree.
Quoting Wallows
I am unfamiliar with CBT and Hume, however; I agree that if Hume's sentiment is that reason is the slave of the passions, it is not entirely true.
I think that emotions:
1) Are a mind-body response to an awareness of the circumstance(s) of an object of concern.
2) Have intensity, duration, arousal, and valence dimensions.
3) Are caused by a triggering event, affect, personality, and context recognition or appraisal.
4) Produce affect display, motivation, and action/behaviour.
5) Are an automatic mental process. (Kahneman, 2011)
So, cognition is clearly involved in constructing emotion. (cf. Barrett, 2016)
Also:
1) Cognitive dissonance may result from a contradiction between thought and emotion, attitude, motivation, intent, volition, action, or behaviour. (Festinger, 1957)
2) Affect and motivational intensity may broaden or narrow cognitive scope. (Harmon-Jones, et al., 2013)
3) A peripheral (emotion-based) method of persuasion tends to activate heuristics rather than reasoning. (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986)
To what degree can reason influence emotions? I'm aware of higher brain functions ability to suppress impulses and direct behavior. Yet, to what extent, "valence dimensions" can be appraised by reason is something that I would be interested in uncovering.
Barrett, Lisa Feldman. 2016. The Theory of Constructed Emotion: An Active Inference Account of Interoception and Categorization. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2017, 1–23. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsw154.
Quoting Wallows
Brains transmit, convey, and receive, action potentials. Minds "suppress impulses and direct behavior".
Quoting Wallows
Let me know what you find.
Our ability to make rational choices is more like holding back the flood - that is roughly how I view what is going on (esp. in regards to the cortex versus the midbrain).
I agree.
So I agree that normatives are "about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong," which is what you quoted from Wikipedia.
I'd change the beginning--the language of "statements or claims," because those terms suggest something that has a truth value, something that you can get correct or incorrect. What I'd say instead is "Normatives are utterances about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong." And I'd add: "What one is doing when one makes such an utterances is stating how one feels, or stating one's preferences."
Yeah; but, if we take the summum bonum of all net preferences and tastes, then for interpersonal relations, some consensus can be derived. And, this is how you can derive an ought from an is. Is this in align with what you have said already?
To suggest that a consensus has any implication for "right" normatives is to commit the argumentum ad populum fallacy. So no, I wouldn't at all agree with that.
You definitely can determine consensuses. It's just that they don't tell you anything other than what's popular statistically. (And you can use them to pander to consensus tastes if you're marketing, and so on.)
The ad populum fallacy sounds like something a rationalist or any person with authoritarian tendencies might advocate. It's a topic worthy issue, as to whether group consensus overrides individual inclinations or knowledge, as it often does. I suppose Rawls would have something to say about this.
The idea behind it is simply that nothing is made correct merely by agreement about it. Agreement is just agreement. It doesn't make or change objective facts (besides the fact that there's an agreement).
We can't have knowledge about normatives (in other words, we can't have knowledge that "X should y" for example) because knowledge requires truth value (knowledge is justified true belief), and normatives have no truth value.
Which ones?
Nagel, Quine, Pinker, Chomsky just off the top of my head.
Well done.