The moralistic and the naturalistic fallacy
When we use evolutionary psychology to understand human behavior there are above all two common logical fallacies that have to be avoided.
One common pitfall is known as the moralistic fallacy : we assume that undesirable qualities of nature simply cannot be true.
Political liberals may be more prone to the moralistic fallacy, for example when they argue that gender equality is desirable, therefore any psychological differences observed between men and women must be a priori false; or that war is morally wrong— therefore it cannot be rooted in human nature.
The second trap is the naturalistic fallacy , (which is the inverse of the moralistic fallacy), which assumes that what is natural must be moral or desired. The naturalistic fallacy is the idea that what is found in nature is good. It was the basis for social Darwinism, the belief that helping the poor and sick would get in the way of evolution,..
The take-away message of these two fallacies is that there is no logical link of "is" and "ought", the latter can never be deduced from the way things are
One common pitfall is known as the moralistic fallacy : we assume that undesirable qualities of nature simply cannot be true.
Political liberals may be more prone to the moralistic fallacy, for example when they argue that gender equality is desirable, therefore any psychological differences observed between men and women must be a priori false; or that war is morally wrong— therefore it cannot be rooted in human nature.
The second trap is the naturalistic fallacy , (which is the inverse of the moralistic fallacy), which assumes that what is natural must be moral or desired. The naturalistic fallacy is the idea that what is found in nature is good. It was the basis for social Darwinism, the belief that helping the poor and sick would get in the way of evolution,..
The take-away message of these two fallacies is that there is no logical link of "is" and "ought", the latter can never be deduced from the way things are
Comments (63)
They are more likely a form of political bias confirmation than actual fallacies.
In any case, they are overstated. Most people do not argue from either position, but rather use elements of the two as structure to bolster positions they have already taken due to the political bias.
A baby can learn to walk. We struggle onward - seems dumb not to doesn’t it? Who am I to say though, a conceit unto myself!
Actually, that's not so. The naturalistic fallacy is far more interesting than just that. See G E Moore.
"The will to POWER!!!"
:grin:
There is no objective "better," but I don't have the opinion that that fact is better than the alternative. There would be many advantages to an objective "better." So that might be better in my opinion. Unfortunately, it's not the case that there's an objective"better."
Kanazawa's conclusion is that we can avoid these fallacies by never speaking about 'ought'. I don't think that will do. 'Ought' is easily smuggled in to the most analytic-looking remark. Evolutionary psychology is in my view especially prone to that: it tends to omit the historical situation of the scientific 'fact' it uses in an argument because its exponents have prejudices of their own, as we all do. Essentialism about women and men, for example, easily follows, for who could be more typical of all women and men who ever lived than 23 Columbia University students having a scan for a neuroscience experiment?
EP is a fantasy discipline. It assumes a perfection in evolution by attributing all traits a naturally selected positive.
As complex bodies we have evolved with hit and miss, carrying along selectively neutral and even selectively negative traits. As long as a trait or behaviour does not result in the failure of reproduction it shall be preserved in any successful progeny.
In this way EP fails to understand that complexity, and attributes and invented positive to "explain" the trait.
EP fails since it confuses the difference between
(1) The claim that evolution is a process in which creatures with adaptive traits are selected and
(2) the claim that evolution is a process in which creatures are selected for their adaptive traits.”
1 Is correct, but 2, assumed and fetishized by EP renders EP ridiculous.
I'm not sure what you're saying in any of that.
It's very simple. "Better" is a judgment of preference, or a valuation of two or more different things being compared, where one (or more) of the different things is valued more than the others.
That judgment, that valuation (or indeed any judgment or valuation), does not occur in the world outside of minds.
Subjective/objective are location terms. Objective things occur in locations other than minds (that is, locations other than brains functioning in mental ways).
The hammer the clerk shows you is objective. The location of it is not a brain functioning in a mental way. The location is the hardware store). The hammer, all of its properties, etc. are objective. The judgment whether it's useful, whether it's a better tool whatever job you have in mind (than other possible tools), etc. are subjective. The location of those judgments is a brain functioning as a mind.
The distinction is a lot like saying whether things are inside or outside of a refrigerator, a cabinet, etc.
If you're merely recording an objective fact, then there needs to be an objective judgment, right? Otherwise you're not merely recording an objective fact, but you're doing something unique, something not found in the extramental world with respect to objective facts.
(There are other things to address in your comment, but I want to go one step at a time, and keep things as simple as we can while doing that, partially to make sure we don't overlook anything.)
So if you believe there are objective judgments, what is any evidence for them?
Er wait, later on you're saying that you agree there are no objective judgments. So what are you agreeing on above? What is "there's something out there" about in the context of a discussion about whether there are objective judgments?
Let's solve one issue at a time. Keep things simple so we can solve things and move on.
If you think we need to, sure.
Re the content being objective, the content of a judgment such as "Frank Zappa is a better composer than Haydn" is that the work of one is better than the other, no? How is that content objective? Isn't it just that Frank Zappa and Haydn and their work is objective?
I use "subjective" to refer to mental phenomena (which again, in my view is a brain functioning in mental ways).
"Objective" is the complement of that ("complement" in the set theory sense). So everything that's not in the set of mental phenomena (that is, in the set of brains functioning in mental ways).
Again, just to reiterate, I see these primarily as terms of physical location.
So the act of judging is something we do mentally. Hence, by the definitions above, it's subjective, not objective.
The content of "x is better than y" is a judgment that x is better than y, of course. That "better" judgment only occurs mentally. Nowhere that we look outside of brains functioning in mental ways amounts to a "better" property or judgment or whatever we'd want to call it.
You mentioned reasoning above. On my view, then, reasoning is subjective. It's a mental activity.
On philosophy of perception I'm a direct realist. I don't buy representationalism.
You observe the external brick. There's no good reason to believe that what you're observing is your mind as such, with some mysterious connection to some "possibly-external-who-knows-what," which is the alternative view amounts to.
If you like - but it does not follow that one thing is not better than another.
Sure. Things are subjectively better or worse to particular individuals.
Just when people say wonky things in relation to it. And they often do. It's one of the more common confusions.
Are you not familiar with direct (aka "naive") realism?
I'm not saying I'll agree with every sentence of the following, but these provide some basics on direct/naive realism if you're not familiar with it (rather than me having to explain all of this a la reinventing the wheel):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism
https://www.iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/#H1
"It" being the object-subject distinction. Yes, I agree.
It makes sense to talk of my preference for Darjeeling as being subjective, and it makes sense to talk of rising global average temperatures as being objective.
It's very common for folk, often with a philosophical intent, to take this distinction further than might be sensible.
Would you agree?
Yes.
I think two things often happen that lead to confusion about it:
(1) People tend to mistake or conflate "objective" with ideas like agreement/consensus, as well as facts (in the states of affairs sense). That's a mistake because people can agree on subjective things--obviously many people have a preference for Darjeeling, for example, and agreement can be quite widespread--for example, the vast majority of people would say that the London Symphony Orchestra has better musicians than the band the Shaggs (assuming we make sure the people we ask are familiar with both groups). Also it's a fact that one has the preferences that one does, which is going to be due to physiological facts.
(2) People tend to think of things that they feel very strongly about as being objective. There seems to be a bit of projection going on, partially due to feeling that something that seems so unquestionable to that person "can't merely be a disposition that I have and not some more fundamental fact of the universe in general."
I dont see the distinction. I can talk of Banno's preferences as an property of Banno, just as I can talk about rising global temperatures as a property of the Earth. One is only subjective if you project your preferences, or values, into things that don't have that property. Subjective statements are category errors.
I don't see the distinction either.
The distinction is that the preference for Darjeeling only occurs in brains, whereas the temperatures occur elsewhere.
You don't find the preference for Darjeeling in air masses over the Atlantic, say, and when we talk about global warming, we're not talking about persons' brains increasing in temperature.
Beliefs about rising global temperatures only occur in brains. I still don't see the distinction.
Rising global temperatures are different than beliefs about rising global temperatures.
What's the relevant difference? Is it, in your view, simply that one exists as a brain state and the other doesn't?
Yes.
One definition of subjective is "based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions."
I'd have thought brain states aren't based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions they are personal feelings, tastes, or opinions .
Taking what you believe to be a "literal" meaning of a dictionary definition, and approaching philosophy as if everyone must be using the dictionary definition you looked at, in what you took to be its "literal" sense, will leave you perpetually confused.
A dictionary definition is simply an indication of common usage, That's all.
I'm just attempting to understand your usage.
The way I use the terms, which is a common way to use them in philosophy contexts, is that "subjective" refers to mental phenomena (which on my view is a subset of brain function) and "objective" refers to the complement--everything other than mental phenomena, or the mind-independent world.
If most philosophical problems are the result of poorly defined terms and category errors, then we should be looking at how these terms are defined in a more objective way and that is more consistent.
If we can already distinguish a particular kind of phenomena by using terms like "mental", "geologic", "electro-magnetic", etc. then why use terms in a way that is anthropomorphic - as if minds are a special type of phenomena and other phenomena don't deserve that kind of distinction?
Ok but I find your usage confusing (it can be confused with the more commonplace usage I cited earlier). If all mental phenomena are subjective why not just call them mental phenomena - the use of subjective seems to be unnecessary.
It's just making a distinction. It's not attaching any valuation whatsoever to that distinction. The reason to make the distinction is that it's something people frequently get confused about. One of the primary aims of philosophy, in many opinions, including mine, should be to help sort out confusions, so that we can have accurate beliefs about what the world is like.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That's an example of the sorts of confusions that occur. Definitions are something we create as individuals. We can agree with others to use terms a certain way, but just because something is common, that doesn't make it correct.
It's a synonym for mental phenomena, yes. Maybe synonyms are unnecessary, but they're going to arise and be in usage whether we like it or not, and it's common for people to like them when it comes anything that even comes remotely near literary writing or speech, as at least as many people have an aversion to repeating the same word many times in a passage.
It's not so confusing when you use it as a synonym for mental phenomena in general - precise details will vary from subject to subject. Confusion arises when you use 'subjective' to describe a single instance ( e.g. Banno's preference for Darjeeling) - it's not based on anyone's personal feelings, tastes, or opinions - it is a personal feeling/taste.
His personal feeling/taste is a mental phenomenon, right?
Yes but I'm saying it's not based on his personal feeling/taste (it's not common usage subjective)..
Unless you're saying his personal feeling/taste is based on his personal feeling /taste?
"Direct" is opposed to "representational" basically. Basically, representationalists believe that you get data via your senses, that that data is processed into something uniquely mental, and what you're actually aware of is the mental stuff. Direct realists believe that you get data via your senses, and what you're aware of is that data.
An analogy might be helpful.
Take the Eiffel tower. Imagine that this is the tower outside of our perception, the objective tower, or the noumenal tower, so to speak (I'm using a photograph here, and I'll use paintings for our perceptions):
Representationalists believe that your senses get that data, but then it's turned into something mental that can at least potentially be quite different than the objective/noumenal tower. You're not aware of the objective tower on their view, you're aware of the mental "translation"--maybe something like this, where there's no way to know the exact relation of our perception to the objective/noumenal stuff:
Direct realists, however, believe that our awareness, via our senses, is more or less just how the objective/noumenal stuff is from the perspective we happen to be located at--so something like this, which is actually a painting:
What else would it be based on?
You see no problem with saying one's preferences are based on one's preferences?
They're certainly not based on something that's not one's preferences. That would be deriving a normative from a fact.
I'm afraid that makes no sense to me.
If one's preferences must be based on other preferences, then those preferences must be based on other preferences which in turn...
How do you explain why anyone has any particular preference? Why do organisms appear to have preferences? And can one confidently say that all preferences are mental and not merely biological?
Quoting Terrapin StationSure it is. When you have a synonym specifically for one kind of phenomena that distinguishes it from all other phenomena, and not a similar synonym for any other phenomena, then that use of the term implies something special about it. Can you think of some other phenomena that has a similar synonym?
Again the mental is "merely biological." It's a term for a subset of properties of brain function. Brains are biological, obviously. Why anyone has the preferences then due to brain states, which are the way they are via a combo of genetics and environmental factors.
Quoting Harry Hindu
We went through this dance before, if you recall, but the special thing about it, which I mentioned above, is that people keep saying confused things about the properties and relationships of mental to non-mental things. It's one of the more popular confusions (maybe the most popular) when approaching anything like philosophical talk.
Then you were wrong here:
Quoting Terrapin Station
Then one's preferences are based on something that isn't their preference. They are based on genes and environmental factors.
Quoting Terrapin Station:meh: Uh, yeah. That is exactly what I'm saying that you are doing with your subjective/objective distinction - saying confused (contradictory) things.
That would only be the case if you're defining "based on" as being about contributing factors that aren't identical to what we're talking about. But of course, one wouldn't have to use "based on" that way.
One of the common confusions to avoid here, a confusion that the "based on" phrase is likely to engender, is the belief that any fact that's not a normative can imply any normatives. They can not. (And facts, when it comes to normatives, solely consist of individuals thinking should/ought or value expressions--an example would be, "Bill feels that Marines ought to leave no person behind." It's a fact that Bill endorses that normative.)
Quoting Harry Hindu
What would be an example of a confused thing that I'm saying (re this distinction) in your view?
Then what are you saying - that preferences are brain states, which are also genetic and environmental phenomena? I thought they were mental phenomena. How do you distinguish between genetic and environmental phenomena and brain states, or is it all the same to you? Is a preference an interaction between genetics and environment? Is that what a brain state is - an interaction between genetic and environmental phenomena?
Factors are not identical to the product. Causes are not identical to the effect.
Preferences are brain states. Mental phenomena are identical to particular brain states.
Brain states/mental phenomena are not identical to genetics and environmental factors, though those things are important factors in why brains develop as they do.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Exactly. Hence why it's important to be careful with "based on" as I explained above.
So preferences are not identical to genetic and environmental phenomena, which is to say preferences are based on something that arent preferences. Another way we could say it and it mean the same thing is that preferences depend on genetic and environmental phenomena.
Sure, again "That would only be the case if you're defining 'based on' as being about contributing factors that aren't identical to what we're talking about. But of course, one wouldn't have to use 'based on' that way," and I explained a reason we'd want to be careful with using the former sense in this case.