How do we know the objective world isn't just subjective?
How can you really define the distinction between objective and subjective if we only ever are subjective.
The objective world remains only ever an inference at best.
The objective world remains only ever an inference at best.
Comments (245)
Well what are you actually asking? Defining a distinction doesn't require an ability to experience both or indeed either, surely? X is not-Y requires no further point of reference at all to be verifiable. But I suspect that what you're really asking is how we can know that X (not-Y) is instantiated.
When you say "inference at best" you're really selling us short though. Inferences on their own can be weak, but with tests they can be strengthened, and with additional corroborating and testable inferences they can be strengthened even further. Even while our experience might be wholly subjective in any sense of the word, there are still consistencies within and between our experiences. The sun will rise tomorrow is a belief held by all humans because of a very strong cumulative argument (inductive reasoning) coming from our experience of it rising each day
Science does a pretty good job of this. Scientific theories such as those found in astronomy not only constantly agree with our observations of current and past events, but they also give us very reliable predictive power over forecasting future events. This power and utility is what convinces us to accept causality as an axiomatic truth. Even if all knowledge is subjective, we still highly prize it from within this subjective experience.
To answer your introductory question, we identify the difference between subjective and objective in science through testable hypothetical models of phenomenon. It's not objective in the ultimate sense, but it is a great tool for trying to approximate it. Something that is not objective in science is something that is either falsified through experiment or not falsifiable whatsoever. In broader philosophy, the subjective and the objective are essentially categories relating to the differences between "facts" and "feelings" (for lack of better terms). "The mountain has more mass than the mole hill" is something that could be considered an objective truth describing an "external world". "The mountain is more beautiful than the mole hill" is something that would be considered subjective even while it may or may not reflect some quality of the external world. We are careful about which subjective experiences we use in argumentation because they may or not be shared with everyone else. But if we base our arguments on objective facts we can essentially use the brute force of empiricism and reasoning to necessitate the shared applicability of our conclusions.
The problem here is that the sun really doesn't rise. The scientific explanation of this phenomenon, the illusion that the sun rises day after day, is that the earth is actually spinning. The sun is really not doing anything in this scenario, therefore it is actually false to say that the sun rises.
So why would you say "the sun will rise tomorrow is a belief held by all humans", when I in fact think that this is a false belief, so I try to resist the temptation to say what I don't believe. And, I think that the majority of human beings think that this is a false belief. Despite the fact that many human beings might say that they belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, I don't think that they really believe that the sun will do any such thing.
Should we think that some-thing must be the case?
Its an objective fact that our words only have demonstrable meaning in specific contexts. For example, if someone says, "She's Hot!" they could be talking about anything from a good looking woman to a hamster with a fever, a boat, or whatever. The more specific and explicit the context, the more explicit the meaning becomes. If you rely upon a dictionary definition it will merely take you in circles because objectivity and subjectivity define one another like up and down, back and front. Whether you wish to call everything being context dependent an objective or subjective fact is always up to the observer.
I don't see why this means that the sun doesn't rise. If I say that you're sitting to the left of someone else, is what I say false because, from some other perspective, this would be the wrong thing to say? I don't think so. The truth of at least some of our claims must be judged according to the perspective from which they're said, and one such claim is that the sun rises.
The "sun rising" every day is a great example of a strong cumulative argument.which requires very minimal technical or absolute depth in reasoning or understanding yet which delivers as reliably as any science what it promises; predictive power from experience. This is not a scientific argument, but it does delineate, albieit primitively, the logical shape that scientific theories set out to take.
Through repeated testing and rigorous precision and accuracy in data gathering scientists seek to strengthen or weaken various hypothesis. While "the sun will rise tomorrow because it has risen every day that I can remember" makes only one single prediction, and has only one premise which is tested and confirmed with each passing day, scientific theories can make a whole host of varying predictions, and themselves can employ other more fundamental scientific theories as parts in a model seeking predictive power. But in order to "confirm" any given hypothesis, scientifically speaking, and thereby make it "an objective scientific fact", what we must do is be able to confirm it through experiment (not being able to prove it wrong essentially) with adequate accuracy, precision and repeatability.
I guess one way of putting it is that the answer to lacking ultimate and absolute certainty is to instead of seeking to firmly arrive at it, we can seek to approach it by continuously reinforcing what we do know until the remaining doubt regarding specific truths becomes negligible in every respect.
We can know this, for example, by investigating what's wrong with the question.
Objective and subjective are categories used for how knowledge is acquired. Our knowledge can be subjective or objective, but to ask whether the things of which we acquire knowledge are subjective or objective is a category error, it makes no sense to ask whether the world is subjective or objective. It is neither.
You might want to see this. Referring to things (like the world) as either objective or subjective is a thing we do in philosophy.
And prior to the millennium you could guarantee that all years would always begin with the number "19" with the same "logic".
Quoting VagabondSpectre
So we can"confirm" that the sun will rise tomorrow *because* it has done so every day that you can remember?
I don't think so!
How can you define "subjective" without implying the existence of the objective? If there is no view, or perspective, then there is no subjectivity. If there isn't any more than what exists "subjectively", then what you define as subjective is really the objective because you are saying that what you "experience" is all there is, but then that means "experience" and "you" need to be redefined as well - redefined out of existence.
I don't understand why it comes naturally to babies when they discover through logical inference that their mothers continue to exist even when they don't experience them. They end up discovering object permanence. Yet when they grow up into adults they begin to question the natural conclusion that all babies end up making - that there is more to what they simply experience.
I don't see why we need objective things to exist for the word "objective" to mean what it does (and so for the word "subjective" to mean what it does). Words can be meaningful even if they don't refer to real things.
If we define an objective thing as a thing that continues to exist even when it's not being seen and a subjective thing as a thing that exists only when it's being seen, and if nothing continues to exist when it's not being seen then nothing is an objective thing.
To say that if nothing continues to exist when it's not being seen then those things that exist only when they're being seen (subjective things) are "really" objective things just doesn't make sense. It's a straightforward contradiction.
That is not at all analogous. "The sun rises" implies that the sun is involved in an activity, rising. But it is false to say that the sun is what is active in such an activity, the activity here is an act of the earth spinning. To employ a principle of relativity, and claim that the earth spinning is actually the very same thing as the sun rising betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of reality because it places the principle of activity within the sun rather than the earth. From this perspective, things far away from earth would be moving faster than the speed of light in their rising and setting.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yeah sure, but this is clear evidence of the fact that "predictive power" does not give us a proper understanding of reality. Ancient people could predict very accurately that the sun would rise, and where exactly on the horizon that the sun would rise, from a particular point of observation, for each day of the year, and this is how they measured the year. Yet they had no idea that this phenomenon was actually the sun being observed from the perspective of a spinning earth.
The "predictive power" which they had (Thales predicted a solar eclipse) even gave them immense confidence to produce vast theories of cosmology which were completely wrong. So what this indicates is that predictive power does not give us an understanding of what is actually occurring. And when predictive power leads us to believe that this predictive power is actually an understanding of what is going on, such that we produce theories based on this supposed understanding, we are only misleading ourselves.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The point which I am making then, is that no matter how well we confirm our hypotheses through experimentation which determines the capacity to predict, the only "objective scientific fact" which can be derived is that capacity to predict, under the conditions of the experiments. But the capacity to predict does not provide us with an understanding of what is occurring.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
So the problem which I am trying to bring to your attention, is that no matter how far we go with our efforts to produce a power to predict, this cannot give us an understanding of reality. Even if we can predict with near to absolute certainty, the true nature of the activity which we are predicting will lie unknown, beneath the superficial knowledge which the power to predict is a manifestation of.
This betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of language. You might as well take issue with the phrase "it's pissing it down" because nobody is urinating from the sky.
You can't take our everyday claims out of context and then argue that they're false because they wouldn't work when doing astronomy. The truth (or falsity) of the claim that the sun rises has nothing to do with celestial physics.
"The sun will rise tomorrow" was offered as an objective truth. Now you claim that it is a metaphor. That's fine by me, let's leave it as a metaphor rather then trying to defend it as an objective truth.
Quoting Michael
So how is it objectively true that you are not moving while you are hurtling through the universe at hundreds of kilometres a second?
I wouldn't say that's a metaphor either.
Because the movement of the Earth in space is irrelevant to the meaning (and so truth) of the statement. Context matters, and the appropriate context is one that is impartial to astronomical facts. But it's objective because, given the appropriate context, there's only one truth value. It is a fact that, while standing still, I'm not moving.
At any rate, I don't at all agree that the objective world "remains only ever an inference at best."
We can observe the objective world.
There can rather be no coherent support that we can only know (by acquaintance) our own minds. One either believes that purely on faith, on relatively unimaginative fantasy, or on incoherent empirical or logical support.
That may be your claim, and you can assert it all you like, but unless you qualify your statement to indicate this, I really don't see how your assertion could be true.
If you were sitting in a car which is driving on the highway, and you were keeping still, would you say that the movement of the car is irrelevant to the truth or falsity of your statement "I am not moving"? To someone sitting on the side of the road, your claim is clearly false unless you qualify it.
No, I wouldn't.
I don't see why you would think the movement of the Earth relevant. Do you not say of the statue "it's not moving"? I'm sure you do. It would be very strange of you to start telling people that it was moving at hundreds of kilometers a second. And it would certainly be strange if you were to say "it's not moving, but only in a metaphorical sense".
By this do you mean that we observe things continuing to exist even when they're not being observed?
No. I mean that, for example, I'm observing my kindle right now as I type this.
That doesn't address @intrapersona's claim, which is that that your Kindle is an objective thing "remains only ever an inference at best".
It does, because it's no inference. It's an observation. Inferences are not observations.
Not that that's all that I typed, but it's enough for the moment.
How do you observe that your Kindle is an objective thing (where an objective thing is a thing that exists even when it's not being observed)?
You'd have to observe that it exists even when it's not being observed, but you already said that that's not what you're doing (and how could you, anyway?).
First off, that's not at all the subjective/objective distinction that I make.
I also believe that "exists even when it's not being observed" is not at all part of any conventional definition of "objective." That's commonly considered to be a property of many objective things, but it's not a necessary property, it's not part of any conventional definition of the term "objective."
The distinction that I make is this, which I've spelled out before, and I'm pretty sure in a post addressed to you (in another thread):
Subjective=something that obtains in minds.
Objective=something that obtains extramentally.
So we observe something that's not a mind. We observe something extramental.
But I believe it's the one that @intrapersona makes, and so (again) you're not addressing his claim; which is that that things continue to exist even when not being observed is only ever an inference.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy would disagree with you: "Many philosophers would use the term 'objective reality' to refer to anything that exists as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.)."
What does "to obtain extramentally" mean? Seems like "to exist even when not being observed (or thought about)".
Based on?
If the statue is fixed to the earth, and the earth is moving, then in what sense is it true to say that the statue is not moving? And if the statue really is moving, then how is the phrase "it's not moving" anything more than metaphor? Clearly, if I said of the statue "it's not moving", I would be saying this in a metaphorical sense. If you took this to be a literal expression, then you would be mislead, because I clearly believe that the statue is moving.
In the ordinary sense, i.e. the only sense that matters when making such a claim. The truth of the claim has nothing to do with what the Earth is doing, as the claim doesn't say anything about what the Earth is doing. When I say that the statue isn't moving I'm not saying that its location in the universe isn't changing, so that its location in the universe is changing is not a relevant fact. Rather I'm saying something about the statue's location relative to the immediate environment (e.g. the ground), and its location relative to the immediate environment isn't changing, and so the statue isn't moving.
You have to examine the truth of claims like "the statue isn't moving" and "the sun rises" in the appropriate context, which you aren't.
Geocentric models of the solar system and much of ancient astronomy could be described as the result of primitive scientific approaches to gaining knowledge. Even while they did not have accurate descriptions of the fundamental hierarchy of phenomena that caused the goings on of the night sky they still had a very reliable ability to predict certain events. Even while they had a lot wrong, like the fact that the earth orbits the sun and not the other way around, the "objectivity" of their knowledge (what they could reliably predict) was never founded on the basis of "objective fundamental truth", it was founded on "reliable truth". The steady succession of improvements made from the primitive models of the past to the more objective models of today are products of the scientific process in action. They might not be ultimate objective truth, but they're the best we've got.
It's not that we need objective things to exist for the word "objective" to mean what it does. Objective is simply what exists. If all that exists is your mind, then your mind becomes reality itself - not some subjective perspective of what is - that doesn't include everything that is. It is the idealists who are misusing terms. They have this emotional investment in the existence of their mind and doubt anything beyond that. If that is the case, then they have defined their mind out of existence because in their view - their mind is reality. They are simply using a different term (mind) for something for which there is already a term (reality).
If there is nothing outside of my mind, then you only exist as text on a computer screen, not as an actual human being with a mind as the cause for their being text on the screen that I read.
I highly doubt that intrapersona is claiming that "[existence] is only ever an inference at best". Rather it seems that he's saying "[the existence of things not being seen or thought about] is only ever an inference at best". This would be consistent with the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy's definition of "objective reality" as "anything that exists as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.)."
They're not just changing the word that they use to refer to reality. They're making a claim about what sort of things are real. Minds are real, experiences are real, but objects existing even when not being seen or thought about are not real – they're a realist fiction.
It says exactly that. Objective things are things that exist independent of any conscious awareness of them (via perception, thought, etc.).
And to say that a thing "exists outside of minds" is to say that it exists independently of any conscious awareness of them (via perception, thought, etc), right? If not then what?
That's because logically, things can exist that are independent of any conscious awareness of them, but contingently, those things cease to exist when we're not aware of them. You're inferring a causal connection that isn't justified to infer (from a strictly logical perspective).
What? It's exactly the same thing. If a thing exists independently of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.) then it continues to exist even when we're not aware of it. That's just what it means.
This is just a contradiction.
You're not making any sense.
You're being ambiguous here. When you say "it disappears" are you just saying "it disappears from sight" or are you saying "it ceases to exist"? The former isn't relevant, and the latter isn't realism.
That the thing exists even when we're not aware of it.
It the thing pops out of existence when it isn't seen then it doesn't "exist as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.)" – because to exist as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.) just is to continue to exist when it isn't seen – and so isn't an objective thing as per the definition given in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Then forget the term "realism" as I don't want to get into that discussion again. If the toaster pops out of existence when it isn't being seen then it doesn't exist as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it (via perception, thought, etc.) and so isn't an objective thing.
In the part I quoted: "things can exist that are independent of any conscious awareness of them".
This is really getting ridiculous.
Are you being serious? You just said that it pops out of existence when we're not aware of it.
You're just wasting my time now.
Yes, I'm completely serious. It pops out of existence, as I stipulated, completely coincidentally when we happen to not look at it. So how is that dependent on conscious awareness? That it popped out of existence had nothing to do with the observation in the example I stipulated. There was no causal connection--I specified that. It was a complete coincidence--I specified that, too.
So where is the dependence?
"It exists when we're not aware of it" and "it exists as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it" mean the same thing. Therefore if it doesn't exist when we're not aware of it then it doesn't exist as it is independent of any conscious awareness of it. Therefore it isn't an objective thing.
The question I asked you was "where is the dependence in the example I specified."
Answer that question please--instead of taking a step back and doubling down on your misreading because you can't answer it.
Stop being intellectually dishonest, please..
The way to answer the question I asked is by saying, "The dependence on conscious awareness in the example you gave is ______________" and then you fill in the blank.
"The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it."
How much clearer does it need to be? A thing is objective iff it exists even if it's not being seen.
Can you address my explanation? Or are you not capable of that?
But it is the definition that the IEP uses.
Again, it's not relevant, as I'm only explaining how the IEP defines the term. You're more than welcome to take issue with their definition, but that's a separate issue, and not one that I'm currently addressing.
So in your opinion if the IEP says, "The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. In other words, the object would be there, as it is, even if no subject perceived it," then it's saying that that's a necessary property of something being objective, and if something were to pop out of existence independently of observers, it necessarily wouldn't be objective? Also, what would it be if it's not objective? It wouldn't be subjective, would it? Because it's not something that's mental or dependent on observers in any way. What word would you use for that category?
Would you say that the IEP says that necessarily, people having subjective states are objective?
I guess some ideas are just too ridiculous to entertain, but yes, if you claim that objects objectively pop in and out of existence "independently of observers", then you are making an objective claim about reality.
But I'm not sure that is what you mean.
I don't think that any ideas are too ridiculous to entertain in a philosophical context. And thought experiments aren't typically very "realistic" in terms of what we expect to be likely metaphysically. That's not the point of them.
Re "independently of observers," yes, that's exactly what I mean--I specified that as plainly as I could.
Again, it's not that "continues to exist when we're not looking at it" isn't what realists or objectivists on x typically believe to be the case with x. It's just that "continues to exist when we're not looking at it" isn't a necessary property of x for it to qualify as real or objective. The only necessary property is that x obtains independently of us, that it's not a mental phenomenon, but a phenomenon that obtains "outside" of minds (with "outside" being a literal locational term in my view as an identity theory physicalist).
If the popping in and out of existence is independent of observation, then why don't we see it?
Well, that can be ruled out as it conflicts with our knowledge of reality. Plus, your "coincidental" popping in and out of reality is non-explanatory, so can't qualify as a theory of reality.
Also, it can't be a metaphysical theory, because it is a theory of how reality behaves.
I wasn't presenting any sort of theory. It's a thought experiment that clarifies a conceptual cleavage.
If there isn't an objective reality then there isn't any conscious awareness of it. That has been my point the whole time. When you declare that there isn't any objective reality then there cannot be any awareness of it. If you still make the claim that there is an awareness - then what is it aware of? Awareness is about things - like an objective world. If there is no awareness - then there is no aboutness - and that isn't how it seems to me.
You didn't seem to have an argument against you being text on a screen. Are you acknowledging that you aren't a mind - but are simply text on a screen? Because there isn't anything more to you than being text on a screen - then I know you completely (there is nothing I don't know about you) - as all you are is text on a screen.
Of course there wouldn't be an awareness of an objective reality. There'd just be an awareness of a subjective reality. The things I'm aware of are things that only exist whilst I'm aware of them rather than things that exist even when I'm not aware of them. Objectivity is not required for intentionality.
I don't understand the relevance of this.
So let's take for a moment a mind-brain physicalist/identity theory view where one believes that the mental is simply identical to specific brain states of specific individuals (and where one also believes that there are bodies, containing brains, situated in a world that contains a lot of other things, too). Under that view, there are things like toasters that can be observed, where the toaster isn't itself a brain in someone's body "acting" in a mental way.
However, if you use "objective" (and "real") to only refer to something existing when it's not being observed, then in a scenario where someone is observing a toaster, where the toaster isn't a brain "acting" in a mental way, then the toaster isn't objective or real until one stops observing it and it continues to exist.
If we want to make a distinction between (1) the toaster as something that exists in a different location than the persons brain "acting" in a mental way, and (2) the toaster-perception as it is in the brain "acting" in a mental way, what terms would you use for that distinction?
I'm not using it in that way.
Quoting MichaelHow do you reconcile the fact that you have a mind yet this isn't a fact from my perspective. Your mind doesn't exist from my perspective - only text on a screen. Your mind exists independently of my subjective experience of it, or you don't have a mind and are simply text on a screen.
So is something objective to you under the view I gave by virtue of it being located outside of a brain-acting-in-a-mental way?
I've already gone over this. It doesn't redefine awareness as reality. It simply restricts reality to awareness. That's not the same thing. If I restrict "intelligent species" to humanity (i.e. claim that humanity is the only intelligent species) I'm not redefining "humanity" as "intelligent species".
And besides, if awareness is defined as reality and if there is a reality then ipso facto there is awareness, and so what you say above is a contradiction. Just as if I defined a bachelor as an unmarried man and if there is an unmarried man then there is a bachelor.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Firstly, I'm not arguing for or against solipsism, hence why I don't think this relevant. What I'm arguing is that idealism doesn't define subjectivity out of existence, as you claim.
Furthermore, the very question is confused. If I were arguing for solipsism then I wouldn't consider your perspective at all. I'd only consider my perspective. And from my perspective I'm not just words on a screen. You, however, would just be words on a screen to me.
Also, not all idealists are solipsists. One can claim that nothing exists that isn't being aware of without claiming that nothing exists that I'm not aware of. So other minds exist, but not other things.
Another way of saying this is simply that the only way that the ideal/mental category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from. But under idealism, there's nothing to distinguish it from, since we can't (at least epistemically, or by acquaintance) know anything but the ideal.
There can be a conceptual distinction even if the concept is of a thing that isn't real. We can conceptually distinguish between the physical and the magical even though the magical isn't real. And so we can conceptually distinguish between the subjective and the objective even if the objective isn't real.
I'm skeptical that you could make any sense of an objective/real category if you're positing that we can only know (either epistemically or by acquaintance) the ideal. Although maybe I should stick to noting that it can't be supported without assuming realism somewhere.
But for example as a physicalist, I believe that the very idea of nonphysical existents is incoherent. No one is able to demonstrate that they can make any conceptual sense of it. It seems like that should be the case for (at least a) representationalist-oriented idealist, too, with respect to objective/real things.
I believe that the occurrence of a toaster is just a mental phenomenon (assuming that makes sense for a moment), and that that's all that one can know (again either epistemically or via acquaintaince).
To conceptualize objective/real things, I have to try to imagine a view like the one I outlined earlier (a la physicalists beiieving things about brains in bodies and so on). But I believe that we couldn't know such a thing either epistemically or via acquaintance. I believe that "brains in bodies situated in the world" etc. can only be a mental phenomenon. So how could I make sense out of the idea of it NOT being a mental phenomenon somehow? It seems like I'd have to be able to at least imagine what it would be like via acquaintance, but I don't believe that we can know such a thing.
However, if we can't make sense of the idea of knowing objective or real things, then the phenomenon of a toaster is just the phenomenon of a toaster. It's different than the phenomenon of something like thinking "I'm seeing a toaster" or imagining a toaster, etc., and then it's unclear just what I'm saying about it when I say that the phenomenon of a toaster is mental (which dissolves my earlier assumption that it makes sense to say that under my imagined idealism).
Yet the idea of physical existents is coherent?
So it seems to me that you're being inconsistent here. If "the only way that the ideal/mental category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from" then the only way that the physical category makes any sense in the first place is if we have something to distinguish it from.
If you want to argue that everything that exists is physical and that nonphysical existence is incoherent then how can you make the above argument against someone who wants to argue that everything that exists is mental and that nonmental existence is incoherent (or just never applicable)? Seems hypocritical.
The difference is that my physicalism only arises because people claim dualism etc., where they're relying on a putative distinction that's incoherent.
You could say that one's idealism only arises because people claim objectivism/realism, etc., where they're relying on a putative distinction that the idealist believes is incoherent, but then that would undermine the idea of being able to make sense of the distinction in the first place.
I fail to see why "but then that would undermine the idea of being able to make sense of the distinction in the first place" applies to the idealist but not to the physicalist.
If the physicalist can claim that all is X and that not-X is incoherent then the idealist can claim that all is Y and that not-Y is incoherent (or, if they allow for the coherency of not-Y, just that nothing is actually not-Y).
But I specified that I can't make sense of the distinction of physical/nonphysical. That's because the very notion of "nonphysical" is incoherent.
Quoting Michael
I just said this, and thus it undermines the idea of being able to make a coherent distinction.
Quoting Michael
Which I challenged the idea of above.
Of course it's the same thing. If humans were the only intelligent species, then by using the term, "intelligent species" I'm automatically referring to humans because they are the only species that is intelligent. They would be the same thing. You don't seem to understand the concept of redundancy.
Quoting Michael
Well, that is my point. Idealism logically devolves into solipsism. Once you question the external aspect of your experience as the cause of your internal experience, then you question the existence of all external, un-experienced things, which included other minds. Once you take that step of questioning the existence of just one external thing, you end up questioning all of it, or else you have to come up with a really good explanation as to how you know other minds exist but you know that apples and tables and cars don't exist outside of your experience of them. So you are arguing for solipsism the moment you question the external reality of anything.
If solipsism, then you are actually arguing with yourself.
That they refer to the same thing is not that they mean the same thing. And that "intelligent species" refers only to humans doesn't mean that there are no humans. So to say that idealism redefines awareness as reality or that if "reality" refers to awareness then there is no awareness is simply false.
You can't go from "only mental phenomena exists" to "only my mental phenomena exists". It simply doesn't follow.
Sure, but non-solipsist idealists will argue that there are good reasons to believe that other minds exist but not non-mental things. As above, the non-existence of non-mental things does not entail the non-existence of other minds, and so such reasons are not necessarily ruled out.
Again, that's simply false. "I question the existence of non-mental things" doesn't mean "only my mind exists", and neither does the latter follow from the former.
It seems like the best case for idealism that's not solipsism might simply be to partition off the stuff that realists consider mental phenomena--one's own thoughts, desires, etc., from the stuff that realists consider objective stuff--trees, rocks, other people as they appear, etc. and for the idealist to call the former "my mental phenomena" and the latter "mental phenomena that's not mine." The problem, however, arises with why the idealist would consider trees, rocks, etc. mental phenomena that's not theirs. I don't think I've ever seen a good reason for that, and I can't really manage to invent one that doesn't seem ridiculous/like the rationalizations of an isane person. Maybe someone who is an idealist and who isn't a solipsist could explain it.
I would not say that this ability to predict was founded on a reliable truth at all, it was founded on a falsity. If ancient astrologists, cosmologists, and geometricians mapped the sun, and other planets as circling the earth, and were capable of producing predictions based on these geometrical constructs, then these predictions were derived from a fundamental falsity, not a truth.
Well they had to bend their false models to comply with observations in order to be able to make reliable predictions, but you're missing the point.
The predictions that they made were not based in essence on their false models, but instead were based on identifiable patterns in observed phenomenon. For instance, they will have noticed that the sun appears in the sky every day with cyclical regularity. They will have taken this observed pattern and done two things with it: 1, they would be able to make future predictions based on the previously observed pattern, and 2, (If they believed the sun orbited the earth) would have guessed that the day and night cycle is created by how long it takes the sun to complete one orbit around the earth.
While conclusion #2 represents falsehood, conclusion #1 is a completely rational strong cumulative argument (induction) whose strength is can be found in the reliability of the pattern that it observes and hence the predictions that it makes. "Ability to (successfully) predict" IS "reliability". The actual core foundations of their predictions were sound observations, not falsehoods. Their predictions did not work because of sheer luck, they worked because the phenomenon they observed, measured, and then predicted was reliable. Sure it was not "science" in that they were plunging the depths of the physical world in search of root causation, but as it happens their arguments, particularly about what the sun would appear to do in the sky, are in the same magnitude and order of reliability (reliability is science's version of certainty) as much of the best science that we have today.
Many people say science works because of the process of falsification, and they're right. What rigorous attempts at falsification achieves the weeding out false positions, so that the batch of ideas we're left with, while not necessarily "certain", are distinctly more reliable than whatever came before. We care so much about the repeatability of our experiements/predictions because that's what makes them safe; what makes them reliable.
The patterns would have been of their own creation, how they interpreted what they saw. So they would have made geometrical figures, patterns, to represent what they experienced (saw). Since the interpretations of what they saw were inaccurate, so were the patterns they created. Why not call these geometrical figures, these patterns, false representations?
The point being, that you can make adequate predictions while maintaining false representations. One could claim that a dragon takes the earth in its mouth every evening, and brings it around, through the underground, spitting it out in the morning, and still predict that the sun will rise. You seem to be questioning whether these representations are actually false. I would say that they are false. How then, does the ability to predict come about if the representations are false?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The problem with #1 is that it refers to patterns. The patterns which are created by the observers, is where the falsehood lies. So it cannot be the patterns which gives the ability to predict, it must be something else. I would say that it is in the numbers. Suppose the ancient people marked an observation point, then they marked the point where the sun would rise each day, from that observation
point. By numbering the days they could have the capacity to predict how many days until the sun rises at a certain point. I suggest that the creation of patterns comes following this ability to predict using numbers, as speculation into why the numbers work for prediction. The patterns are theories then, theories as to why the numbers work for prediction.
"Reliability" is produced by accuracy in the numbering system. This is where you find the value of inductive reasoning, in its relationship to numbering. We can entirely remove the pattern, and rely solely on the numbers. It has always been (infinite number of days), in the past, that the sun rises the next day, so we conclude that it will continue. We need not speculate about patterns to produce this conclusion.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I would say that falsification comes about in different ways. First there is falsification with respect to the numbers themselves. Suppose the people found 365 days between when the sun came up at the same place. That's not quite right, so after a number of years, 365 days would be falsified, and they would have to adjust. Secondly, falsification also comes about in respect to the relationship between the geometrical patterns, and the numbers. That there are not precisely 365 days in a year indicates something. It indicates that the year and the day are not parts of the same phenomenon. There is incompatibility, inconsistency between the year and the day, because we cannot make a representation of a year, in which a day remains incomplete. Therefore we must have two distinct geometrical representations, one which represents the day, and one which represents the year. There is a much more evident incompatibility between the month (moon cycle) and the year.
Then you need to define the word "meaning". You also need to define "reality", "awareness" and "I" in such a way that they refer to the same thing but don't mean the same thing, and then you may begin to convince me.
Quoting MichaelWell maybe that's because I'm thinking of the word "my" in the way a realist does. You need to define "my" if it means something different to you or I will never understand.
Quoting Michael
How can any idealist argue for the existence of something that they have never experienced? You have never experienced other minds, only other bodies. You infer the existence of other minds by the behavior of other bodies, just as we infer the existence of atoms through the behavior of matter. What you are saying is that you are sure that something you never experience exists, yet the things you experience don't exist when you don't experience them. You are being contradictory.
You also can't go from "only mind exists" to "only minds exist".
Reality is everything that exists. Awareness is thoughts and memories and sensations. Exactly as it is for the realist. It's just that whereas the realist would say that both awareness and non-awareness things exist, and so that "reality" refers to awareness and non-awareness things, the idealist would say that only awareness exists, and so that "reality" refers only to awareness.
Again compare with "intelligent species" and humanity. That the former refers only to the latter is not that they mean the same thing or that humanity doesn't exist.
It means what the realist means. I don't understand what's hard to understand. You can't go from "only bodies exist" to "only my body exists" and so you can't go from "only mental phenomena exists" to "only my mental phenomena exists".
Except the claim isn't "the things I experience don't exist when I don't experience them". It's "things don't exist when they're not being experienced". It doesn't matter if I experience them, only that they are experienced.
The only idealism you're even considering is a solipsistic kind. But not all idealisms are solipsistic.
I think you might be missing something here. #2 is the conjectured *explanation* of #1. The reason that certain regularities exist is that the sun orbits the earth, and you cannot, via any logical process arrive at #2 via #1.
Now, when your table of regularities exists, you have an extremely useful tool - you have a "rule of thumb", which may prove invaluable for planting crops etc, but what you don't have is any science.
Science begins when an explanation of certain phenomena, be they regularities or irregularities, is proposed. Why does the sun orbit the earth? Why do we have seasons? Why can't Demeter and Zeus just get along?
I don't understand how that follows. Like Harry you seem to be understanding idealism as the claim "X exists only if I experience X". But that's not necessarily the claim. The claim might just be "X exists only if X is experienced by someone". So other minds can exist even if I don't experience them because they are nonetheless experienced by someone (namely, themselves).
And I don't quite understand what you mean by "exists for me". Does that mean something different to "exists"? If not then surely "X doesn't exist for me" doesn't entail "X doesn't exist", and so even if one were to accept "other minds don't exist for me" one need not accept "other minds don't exist".
"For me"--"from my perspective" is one way to read it, or "insofar as I know" would be another (and "know" could be read a la acquaintance or propositional knowledge). These different readings might produce differenf answers.
So you want to know if idealists would accept the truth of "the things I experience don't exist insofar as I know when I don't experience them"? Which is to accept the truth of "insofar as I know, the things I experience don't exist when I don't experience them". Which is to accept the truth of "the things I experience don't exist when I don't experience them".
Well, the solipsistic idealist would accept such a claim, but the non-solipsistic idealist wouldn't.
How would they know this?
They might infer it, just as the physicalist does. But unlike the physicalist they reject the claim that these things are non-mental in nature, either because such a thing is incoherent or because there's insufficient evidence.
That's a separate issue to the topic that I'm discussing, which is that idealism doesn't entail solipsism and doesn't 'define subjectivity out of existence'.
it's not separate to what I'm discussing at the moment, though. It's what I'm interested in. And it has to do with idealism entailing solipsism. To demonstrate that, you need to play along, or you'll never understand it.
But it doesn't. It's a straightforward semantic fact that "only mental phenomena exists" doesn't entail "only my mental phenomena exists", just as "only physical bodies exist" doesn't entail "only my physical body exists". If you want to argue that it does then show me that it does. You don't need my participation for that. You can provide the premises and the derivations all on your own.
I just wrote "To demonstrate that, you need to play along, or you'll never understand it."
I'm not saying that in idealists' views this is the case, by the way. What I'm saying is that solipsism is logically entailed by it, and idealists are believing something incoherent if they're not solipsists.
So, we can move past the meta discussion and get into details: Infer it how? Based on what?
But it isn't. How can you derive "only my mental phenomena exists" from "only mental phenomena exists"? You can't. Just as you can't derive "only my physical body exists" from "only physical bodies exist".
Neither is your inability to explain how one can derive "only my mental phenomena exists" from "only mental phenomena exists".
You should be able to. If one thing is logically entailed by another then you should simply be able to list the premises and derivations that show this. That's the beauty of logic.
So here's the starting premise: "only mental phenomena exists". Here's the conclusion: "only my mental phenomena exists". What are the additional premises that would make this a valid argument – and why must these premises be accepted by the idealist who asserts the initial premise?
What if it turned out that you really would only be able to understand this via going through a Socratic dialogue though? You simply think that's impossible?
Yes I do. Given that one statement only follows from another if they mean the same thing (or if the latter contains the former), and given that "only mental phenomena exists" and "only my mental phenomena exists" do not mean the same thing (and nor does the latter contain the former) it then follows that "only my mental phenomena exists" does not follow from "only mental phenomena exists".
No Socratic dialogue can undermine straightforward logic.
How do you know that the Idealist reality operates by "straight forward logic"?
I'm not at all of the opinion that people are all "ideal rational agents," without unique psychologies that have to be catered to . . . especially after they've demonstrated a number of times that they're not.
I certainly do not believe that I'm an "ideal reational agent," either. Things have to be explained in particular ways to me, with certain types of language, etc., for me to be able to understand them. Hence the huge problem I tend to have with contintental works.
How do we know that any kind of reality operates by logic? Does the question even make sense? It's language that operates by logic, and I see no reason to believe that the rules of semantic derivation depend on the ontological nature of things.
It doesn't matter if you're an idealist or not. The meaning of the sentences "only mental phenomena exists" and "only my mental phenomena exists" are such that the latter doesn't follow from the former, just as the meaning of the sentences "only physical bodies exist" and "only my physical body exists" are such that the latter doesn't follow from the former.
What, exactly, do you think a valid argument involves? A concluding sentence that follows from premised sentences. If you want to claim that idealism entails solipsism then you have to argue that "idealism is true" entails "solipsism is true". If you can't do that then your claim fails. And given that "idealism is true" (or "only mental phenomena exists") doesn't entail "solipsism is true" (or "only my mental phenomena exists") your claim is false.
So, if Idealist reality does not operate by logic, then what rules does it follow?
So it still remains the case that "only mental phenomena exists" does not entail "only my mental phenomena exists", and so idealism does not entail solipsism. The persistent claim that it does is simply false, and obviously so. Just as would be the claim that "only physical bodies exist" entails "only my physical body exists".
So, Idealist reality obeys the laws of physics. Thus Idealism and physicalism are identical except Idealism applies the label to everything in Reality "not objectively real"?
Under Idealism, how are these laws discovered?
Who said anything about the laws of physics? We were talking about logic; about what statements do or do not follow from others.
Which has nothing to do with Idealism?
Anyway, I asked what rules Idealist reality follows, and you seemed to reply,
Quoting Michael
Which, as far as I'm aware are the laws of physics. i.e. Reality obeys the laws of physics. So, how is idealism different from (Physicalism + Label)?
It has nothing to do with what I'm discussing, which is that idealism does not entail solipsism.
You asked "if Idealist reality does not operate by logic, then what rules does it follow?" and I replied by explaining that it's not clear what you mean by reality operating by logic, and then clarifying that language under an idealist ontology will operate according to the logic with which we're already familiar (given that, according to the idealist, idealism is the case, and language does operate according to familiar logic).
Again, I was referring to logical rules.
Logic is the same whether idealism or not-idealism is the case. And just as in either case "only physical bodies exist" does not entail "only my physical body exists", "only mental phenomena exists" does not entail "only my mental phenomena exists".
So unless you want to show that "only mental phenomena exists" entails "only my mental phenomena exists", I don't think whatever you're trying to say has any relevance to what I'm saying.
How do you know? How do you know that logic is independent of the rules that govern reality. For example, imagine a logical operator that might exist under certain rules of reality, but not others. What about a logic that is able to construct proofs that require infinite steps or, the square root of"not".
Why don't proofs with an infinite number of steps work under idealism, or the square root of "not" allowed as a logical operator?
Because, according to the idealist, these proofs don't work, such a square root isn't allowed, and idealism is the case.
How would the non-idealist address the same question (albeit "under not-idealism")?
Gee, it's surprising that you'd believe that you know what I'm claiming better than I do.
Here you said "What I'm saying is that solipsism is logically entailed by [idealism], and idealists are believing something incoherent if they're not solipsists.".
I'm claiming that "Logical consequence is one of the most fundamental concepts in logic. It is the relationship between statements that holds true when one logically 'follows from' one or more others. ... The philosophical analysis of logical consequence involves asking, 'in what sense does a conclusion follow from its premises?' and 'what does it mean for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises?'".
So when you say that idealism logically entails solipsism you're saying that the statement "idealism is the case" logically entails the statement "solipsism is the case".
In my opinion, one is not capable of having a conversation if one is not capable of answering a simple yes/no question. You'd certainly not be capable/qualified to do anything more complicated if you can't handle that.
Under physicalism, the square root of NOT is allowed, which is a good thing, since that particular logical operator exists in REALITY.
What exactly do you mean by the square root of NOT? I thought you were talking about the square root of the word "not", which doesn't make sense to me. Whatever it is, is it to do with logic or physics? If the latter then, again, it's irrelevant to what I'm talking about, which is logic. And specifically in this case the logic which shows that "only mental phenomena exists" does not logically entail "only my mental phenomena exists" (i.e. the logic of natural language).
So, again, unless you can show that "only mental phenomena exists" logically entails "only my mental phenomena exists" then whatever it is you're talking about is irrelevant to what I'm saying.
Because the square root of NOT exists in Reality, it is a logical operator available to any physical entity capable of using it to reason, whether it makes "sense" to you or not.
Fine, then my answer is "yes". Idealism is the sentence "only mental phenomena exists". For idealism to be the case is for the sentence "only mental phenomena exists" to be true. And so, for idealism to entail solipsism is for the sentence "only mental phenomena exists" to entail the sentence "only my mental phenomena exists". Which it doesn't.
Or, my answer is "no". Idealism is the sole existence of mental phenomena. For idealism to be the case is for only mental phenomena to exist. And so, for idealism to entail solipsism is for the sole existence of mental phenomena to entail the sole existence of my mental phenomena. Which it doesn't.
Either way, idealism doesn't entail solipsism. One can be an idealist without being a solipsist. Just as physicalism doesn't entail physical-solipsism (only my physical body exists).
It is straightforward logic that one can coherently assert that only X exists without asserting that only my X exists. There's no simpler way to put it.
Okay, so when I talk about idealism, I'm not talking about a sentence. Insofar as you see it as a sentence, we're talking about different things.
Since I'm not talking about a sentence, what logically follows from sentences is irrelevant to what I'm talking abuot.
But you are. The idealist is making the claim "only mental phenomena exists". You're then saying that the idealist is obligated to also make the claim "only my mental phenomena exists".
If you're not talking about a sentence then you're not talking about logical entailment, as logical entailment just is a relationship between sentences.
If you're not talking about sentences then you can't bring up logical entailment.
And even if you want to talk about logical entailment without mentioning sentences, it's still the case that it's wrong to claim that if only mental phenomena exists then it logically follows that only my mental phenomena exists.
Unfortunately, I have a view of not straightforwardly answering questions where I won't participate/won't move on if folks won't do it, because I consider it a fundamental criterion of having a good-faith, good-natured conversation, and that's all that I'm interested in.
SO, can't in what sense?
So I'm done with you. You've failed to support your claim that idealism entails solipsism. And you can't, because it doesn't. It's straightforward logic. One can claim that only mental phenomena exists without having to claim that only one's own mental phenomena exists, just as one can claim that only physical bodies exist without having to claim that only one's own physical body exists.
So can't in what sense?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The pattern is inherent in the numbers though; in the data; in the observations. In the most basic argument saying "the sun will rise tomorrow", the observational data is a series of 1's or checked boxes representing each previous consecutive day recording the fact that the sun rose on that day. The pattern is repeating ones. It's the same kind of reasoning which makes statistical arguments strong: induction. The fundamental truth behind "the sun rising", whether supposedly moved by dragon or chariot, does not change that fact that whatever it is, it appears to rise reliably.
The reason why you can believe that a chariot pulls the sun across the sky each day and still be able to predict when and where it will next rise with great precision and reliability is because that predictive power is predicated on precise observations of a real phenomenon which is itself reliable (it has a pattern) (which is the actual "rising and setting" of the sun), not the bit about the chariot or the strength of it's horses.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
What you're describing is an issue with precision rather than reliability or even accuracy. Overtime the inconsistency between the "365" day cycle of the "year" can be noticed and measured, even by ancients presuming they're around long enough to notice it, and then can be accounted for with an even longer unit of time which describes how many years it would take (of 365 days with leap years, or otherwise) for the imprecision (the gained or lost position of the earth in it's rotation around the sun when one year is described by a whole number of days) to come add up to one full rotation of the earth around the sun, when the cycle then would restart. This longer count would of course also have some imprecision, but an even longer count could then be constructed to reduce the imprecision even further.
Precision is great, but only a certain amount of it is needed depending on what we're discussing. If we're arguing about whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow, I don't need precision beyond "the sun rose every day within memory" in order to (through induction) identify a pattern with which to make the prediction "the sun will rise tomorrow". If I want to predict when or where the sun will rise over the horizon, then I need more precise observations (what we begin to call measurements). If I want to be able to make these predictions further and further into the future, then I will require more precise measurements in order to maintain the same level of precision in those predictions.
The thing of note here though, the thing which I think is of value to the thread, and which I've been trying to point out, is that the simplistic argument "the sun will rise tomorrow because it has always done so in the past" uses a particular form of reasoning which happens to be exactly the same as the reasoning which serves a large role in the foundation of "scientific objectivity" as a whole; repeatably. Repeatability is perhaps the best standard we have for approaching objective certainty in a world where we lack an un-doubtable source of knowledge. The OP is wondering how we can know for sure whether or not there is an external or objective reality. I'm here to tell him that we cannot know for sure, but what we CAN do is look for consistencies which would indicate that such an objective reality exists, but more importantly which also would pragmatically force us to behave as if there is one. The repeatability of experimentation in science and the reliable predictive power that this repeatability permits is what makes science a source of useful knowledge. We can never be absolutely certain that all the laws of physics wont all suddenly change one day, making science useless, but until then the overwhelming consistency of the empirical phenomenon that scientific theories are developed from represents an extremely strong inductive argument which is why science itself is strong.
Gravity is something whose fundamental nature we do not yet fully understand, we just approximate it's force with mass and distance. And yet, the sheer consistency with which we measure it's force allows us to construct theories and to make reliable predictions about what effect it will have on particular bodies of mass. Maybe one day we will fully understand gravity (like how people used to dream they would one day fully understand the sun), but until then we will have to settle for only being able to reliably predict it with very marginal degrees of imprecision (like how the ancients reliably predicted the rising of the sun without knowing the deeper nature behind the phenomenon.).
Unless we need to do accurate calculations for GPS, orbits of planets close to the sun, black holes, gravitational waves, the big bang, and indeed some long range missile targeting. Then we can't just approximate "its force with mass and distance", rather we need to deal with what we know gravity to be.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes, that is precisely how we are able to predict with absolute reliability that the next swan we encounter will be white.
Quoting MichaelExactly. And you also can't go from "only this mental phenomenon exists" to "other mental phenomenon exists". So, "my" is a term that has no meaning for an idealist. So to use terms like "I" and "my" is meaningless and causes confusion. Only mental phenomena exists. There is no "my".
Objects of the mind are not minds themselves. They are components of a mind. So you can't call the objects of the mind other minds. If you did, then that would give them a perspective - which is something that exists outside of your experience of it.
I wouldn't need to go from "only bodies exist" to "only my body exists" because it is clear that other bodies besides mine exist. I can't say that for other minds though because I have never experienced another mind before - only by proxy, like right now reading your posts. I can even distinguish your post from my posts. If I couldn't then how could I be having a conversation at all? If I didn't, then what purpose would be the use of language?
Quoting MichaelYou're being inconsistent again. I can't converse with someone who refuses to be consistent. If your argument is that something exists when another mind besides mine experiences it goes nowhere because you haven't shown why it is you believe other minds exist where things can exist that you don't experience yet they are still experienced. How do you know that they are being experienced outside of your own when you question the existence of things outside of your experience. If you can't provide a meaningful answer without being contradictory then I won't waste my time here. If you have something to teach then I'm all ears, but so far it's been nothing but contradiction and confusion.
We predict the force of gravity between two objects by looking at their mass and the distance between them. This is physics 101. We don't know what gravity is unfortunately, so rocket scientists have do things my way... With precise approximation...
Quoting tom
Reliability is not the same as "absolute reliability".
It's neither absolutely reliable that the next swan you see will be white, nor absolutely reliable that the sun will rise tomorrow. These things can be considered "reliable" (one much more so than the other) but we cannot call them certain.
I'm not talking about "explanations", I'm talking about empirical observations. I was pointing out that measuring and recording the suns behavior (#1) is how we can gain predictive power over it (through strong induction based on sound observations), not by "explaining" it.
As far as "science begins when explanations are proposed" goes, you have it completely backwards. Science does not "begin" with an explanation. It begins with a lack of an explanation, and then uses evidence and reason, like measurements of when and where the sun rises over the horizon, to try and figure out more and more functional (and presumably accurate) understandings.
Science does not begin with explanations, it ends with them; that's it's final goal or product. Science decidedly begins with that most basic and fundamental activity of data collection.
We haven't done that for 100 years.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Just don't go to Australia Eh?
How do we predict how much force one massive object will exert upon another through gravity?
What is the fundamental mechanism of gravity?
OK, so you have a record of past risings and settings of the sun. I have a record of milkman and postal deliveries to my house. I guess that makes us even?
I predict that there will be a milk delivery on Monday morning and a 66% chance of post. I am scientist!
Quoting VagabondSpectre
But in reality, most scientific theories are rejected because they are bad explanations. Geocentrism was rejected for that reason, despite, as you point out, its predictive reliability.
Science moves on, and we are in the era of unexperienced predictions. Entanglement was unexperienced for 50years, as was the Higgs. Gravitational waves were unexperienced for 100 years.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You mean like flogiston or the luminiferous aether is the end?
Are you asking for a science lesson?
You are misunderstanding the point or claim that I made. I never said that the simple argument that the sun will rise tomorrow (from experience) was a scientific claim or scientific argument, I merely pointed out it's similarity with the strength and type of reasoning that actual scientific arguments employ in the foundation of their proofs.
The sun rising every day for the last million days is like a repeated experiment which has always given the same result. Reproducible evidence. It's the cumulative inductive reasoning which gives us confidence in the foundational assumptions that we make about the world in order to facilitate, reinforce, and expand our understanding of it.
Where science begins and ends is a matter that is hard to pinpoint (see: Demarcation problem). Whether it's in the initial theorizing or exploration of hypotheticals, or in data collection, or in analysis of that data, or in the corrections then made to existing models, or all of it, I'm not exactly sure. What I can tell you though is that the confidence that we have in many of the scientific facts we rely on are strong not because they describe basic fundamental and objective truths (many of them don't, science has flaws), they're strong because the predictions we can make with them are reliably repeatable, including the initial experiments and predictions used to establish their normative parameters in the first place.
Here in this thread asking for how we can approach objectivity, I'm (trying to) explain how science achieves this.
Yes scientific theories, the big ones anyway, amount to vast explanatory models which employ many sub-theories and laws which interact with each other to model larger systems, but the nuts and bolts of these theories are all derived from repeatable experiments (giving them "predictive power"). And yes, sometimes hypothetical phenomenon are supposed in order to explain other phenomenon, even when we have had no direct experience of them, but these hypothetical inferences about what exists also stem directly from observations of other phenomenon, and they remain "hypothetical" (i.e: not scientific fact) until we can actually confirm their existence with direct, reproducible, evidence. That is to say, the Boson was not a scientific fact until we were able to actually "observe" it (repeatably).
Quoting tom
If you understand the mechanism of gravity, please don;t waste your time on me, write a paper about it and submit it to a physics journal for peer review at your earliest convenience.
Here's the equation for determining the force that gravity exerts between two objects:
Force of gravity=(Mass of object one)(mass of object two)/ (distance between them squared)
There is also something called "the universal gravitational constant", which is essentially just a modifier which assumes mass measurements in Kg's and outputs a force measurement in Newtons (IIRC).
Am I wrong?
Yes
Say I want to figure out what trajectory and velocity to use in order to make a rocket slingshot around the moon, which theory do I use? General Relativity or Newtonian physics?
Are you trained in physics at all? I'm just curious as to which one of us ought to be giving the science lessons...
No, that's the point I am making, there is no pattern inherent in the numbers. The pattern is a property of how the numbers are applied. So numbers, as objects, ideal objects, don't have inherent patterns. Take "two" for example, it indicates two distinct entities classed together under the same title, "two", but there is no necessary pattern within these two entities. But when "two" is related to "one", and to "three", or other numbers, then we have an ordering, which is a pattern. There is no pattern within the object itself, "two", or "the number", the pattern is created by the application of the number.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
See here, it is the series of 1's, and the checking, which creates the pattern. But let's not forget my original point, "the sun rose" is not a fact, it is a falsity. The sun did no such thing, the earth is spinning in relation to the sun. The capacity for prediction creates the illusion of objective certainty, but if the premise, "the sun rose" is an inaccurate, imprecise, or in this case false, description, then the conclusion "the sun will rise tomorrow", is equally false or imprecise.
The point being, that the predictive power, which science gives us, is only an illusion of objective certainty. If the observed, and predicted event is incorrectly described, then the predictive capacity may hide a profound falsity. The predictive capacity makes one believe that there is an objective truth there, when really there is a profound falsity. All that is required, is for the scientists involved to agree on a description of the event, then the prediction of that described event is supposed to validate the objective certainty of that event. But how is it the case that people agreeing on a description can validate the objective truth of that description?
Suppose we see a dark spot on the horizon, you and I, and we agree that it is a big rock. We can predict that every time we walk past this place, we will see a big rock in the distance on our right. We assume to have objective certainty about this big rock, because the dark spot is always over there whenever we walk by. Perhaps this dark spot isn't even a big rock though. The predictive capacity has hidden a deeper misunderstanding, such that there was no objective truth there in the first place.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
We can know, with a high degree of certainty that some of our descriptions will prove to be inaccurate. This we know from experience. Because of this, we can assume that the "laws of physics" will need to be changed to account for new, better descriptions. Therefore we can have a high degree of certainty that the laws of physics will change.
The pattern is that the sun is visible in the sky every day; that's the pattern, not the numbers or symbols we use to represent them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The sun appearing in the sky every day IS the pattern. The pattern is there whether I check a box, scribble a one to record it, or not. The pattern may be caused by physical forces I do not understand and my ability to observe it limited, but I can still describe a phenomenon which I observe, and make inductive predictions from how consistently the "phenomenon" (a bright thing appearing over the horizon) behaves.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
All "the sun rises" necessarily means is that "A big warm bright thing appears in the sky everyday over the horizon". That's not false. It might not be an absolutely thorough explanation of what the sun is, but I never claimed that the example argument I provided produces a thorough explanatory model. The only thing we gain from the argument I presented is predictive power in and of itself, over the bright thing, which is the phenomenon it records. Think of it as analogous to "I could see the sun from here yesterday, and every day before that, therefore I could see the sun from here tomorrow". I'm not saying anything about what the sun is on a fundamental level, how it was created, what causes it to appear to move across the sky, etc... All I can tell you is when and where it will appear, whatever it is. I understand your point, that "the sun orbiting the earth is falsity", but it's against a position that is completely irrelevant to the one I've articulated.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
"People agreeing" does not confirm or invalidate the "objective truth" of something. But in science we use "agreement" as a tool to approximate objectivity. On an individual level, scientists seek to find "descriptions" (sometimes to describe, sometimes to explain, sometimes to predict) of things which "agree" with observation and experimentation. There's a second level of "agreement" which is between individual scientists and their various theories; this is helpful for catching mistakes made by one individual, and for testing theories against one another to see what "agrees" and can be combined into a more comprehensive description of whichever physical system they seek to model.
That our descriptions, models, laws, and predictions remain consistent with observation and experimentation does not "confirm" their objectivity, but it does "approximate or approach" it. Even if there's no such thing as objectivity as the OP suggested, then this consistent "agreement with observation and experimentation" still can be used as a tool to point to more and more reliable (and perhaps more useful)"subjective truth".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I never said what the phenomenon was, you did. All I said was there is a dark spot on the horizon, and with my recorded observations of it's "relative position" over time I have identified a pattern which allows me to predict where this dark spot will appear tomorrow. I don't claim to have knowledge about what the dark spot is; that's your own presumption, I've never said it was a rock. All I claim is to have reliable predictive power over where this dark spot is going to be on the horizon tomorrow.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not talking about the inherent fact that science is incomplete or has flaws, I'm talking about the constant physical laws which science seeks to describe and understand. The constant improvement it makes to itself is essentially this process of approaching or approximating "objectivity and reliability". It's the fact that things appear to remain consistent which persuades us that whatever we uncover about them through repeatable experimentation (predictions) and observation (regardless of whether that knowledge is objective certainty or not), is worth knowing.
But by "laws of physics suddenly changed" I meant things like: "What if gravity suddenly reversed the direction of it's force?", "What if the speed of light suddenly slowed?", "What if the nuclear bonds holding atoms together suddenly became stronger or weaker?", "What if empty space suddenly became electrically conductive"?. These are the kinds of things which we hope will never change, because if they did then some or all of what we pragmatically rely on as scientific or even just general fact could suddenly change, and continue changing, forever, rendering some or all of our current models useless and evidently "not objective".
I don't think so, the pattern is in the description, it is described as a pattern. It is dark then it is light, that's how it is described. When it is light, it is called "day". Not by coincidence, the sun is in the sky when it is light. That the sun is "in the sky every day" , is the description. But is the sun really "in the sky", or is the description really inaccurate? The sky is the atmosphere, and the sun is not in the atmosphere. And if the description is inaccurate, then how is the pattern real? The sun is not really in the sky, so this is a false pattern on account of a false description.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No, I don't think so. The sun appearing in the sky every day is a description. Unless someone makes that description, how is that pattern actually there?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You seem to missing the point. Observations are themselves descriptions. Unless the scientists can agree on the terms of description, then the same event will be described differently by different scientists, hence there will be varying observations, which are actually just different descriptions of the very same thing. The point I am making is that when the scientists come to agreement as to how to describe a specific type of event, this does not ensure that the agreed upon description is an objective truth concerning that event. Agreement doesn't produce objective truth.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Your missing the analogy. The observation itself is a description of the occurrence. Even to call it "a dark spot on the horizon" is a description. The truth or falsity of the prediction depends just as much on the accuracy of the description, as it depends on the occurrence of the described event. That is why "the sun will rise tomorrow" is a false prediction. It is false because the description is false, the sun is not rising, the earth is spinning. It only appears like the sun is rising, but this is an illusion.
Your observation, "the sun rose yesterday" is a description. You and all your colleagues might agree that these are adequate terms for the observation. But this does not make it true that the sun rose yesterday, just because you and all your colleagues "observed" this. The description you provided, which constitutes your "observation", is itself a falsity. Despite the fact that everyone involved "observed" this, it is still a falsity, because the observation that they all agreed upon was inaccurate.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
My point is, that if your observations are not proper descriptions of the events which are occurring, if they are just the "agreed upon descriptions", then the current models are already "not objective", they may well be falsities, despite the fact that they may be highly useful in terms of predictability. Therefore predictability doesn't provide any type of objective truth.
The "sun" "appears" in the "sky" every "day". There's nothing untrue about this. The sun is visible each day from the surface of the planet earth. No amount of trying to enforce semantic technicalities to say this is "unobjective" will change this observable truth.
An observation does not have to amount to a complete description of something, it can be specific, incomplete, or even be inherently an abstraction. "The sun rises every day" is a very simple observation and the strong inductive argument which arises from it is extremely specific: the sun is visible with predictable regularity. Again this does not say anything about what the sun "is" beyond that whatever it is, "it's visibility from the surface of the earth follows a cyclical pattern".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because presumably the sun would be visible from the surface of the Earth even if people were not around to describe it, as evidenced by the proliferation of plant life.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreement does not ensure objective truth, but it makes regular truth more reliable.
We can differ about whether it's permissible to say "the sun will rise at 5:30" instead of "The earth spinning will result in the star at the center of our solar system being visible at 5:30 eastern standard time from New York city", but both of our "descriptions/observations" can be said to be true because they both contain truth: the moment that the sun becomes visible at a given point on the planet. This is why you saying that "the sun will rise at 5:30 is falsity" actually does not address the argument in question. The argument never established what the sun is, it only establishes when it becomes visible (or that it will become visible).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're still using semantics to try and make your point while missing the one you are trying to criticize.
"The sun rose" does not mean "the sun is inside of the earth's atmosphere". It means, "The sun was visible yesterday". That's the observation and nothing more. Now, the fact that we observe things repeatedly and that our observations agree with one another, as in the case of the sun's visibility, does not produce objective truth, but it does function as a tool to help us approach universally reliable truths.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Repeatable observations of reliable phenomenon assist in producing models which allow us to reliably predict various aspects of said phenomenon. It's not objective truth; it's reliable and useful truth; that's science.
You seemed to be inclined to attempt to avoid the problem by claiming "semantic technicalities", rather than to face the problem for what it is. The point is, that the precision, accuracy, or even truth of any stated observation, is questionable, even if numerous individuals agree on the terminology of that statement. So your original statement "the sun is visible in the sky every day" is questionable. Is the sun really in the sky? You may now desire to qualify this by saying that the sun "appears" in the sky, but all you do is imply that there is uncertainty as to whether the sun really is in the sky or whether it just appears to be in the sky, and that just verifies my point.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes, the point is that semantics is important to objective truth. You seem to think that you can dismiss the problem by saying "that's just semantics". That doesn't make the issue go away, it's just a case of you finding an excuse to ignore it.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Models which predict reliably is not truth at all, it's predictability. As I've just demonstrated, the capacity to predict can hide profound falsity which lies beneath. Therefore the capacity to predict is really irrelevant to truth and falsity. Prediction is derived from conclusions of deductive logic. The truth or falsity of the conclusions depends on the truth or falsity of the premises. The premises may be derived from conclusions of inductive reasoning, but the truth or falsity of these inductive conclusions is an issue of semantics. Whether "the sun rises each morning", "water boils at 100 degrees Celsius and freezes at zero", "the sky is blue", are true or not, is an issue of semantics.
The problem that you're pointing out with the statement "the sun rises" (i.e: the sun doesn't actually rise) does not have anything to do with what I'm pointing out about it, which is that whatever the sun is, there is consistency in our observations of it. A pattern is identifiable within those observations, and these particular observations and particular predictions (I could see the sun for the last thousand days therefore I will be able to see it tomorrow) take the form of a strong cumulative argument from observation (inductive reasoning).
Let's go back to the beginning of our disagreement, I said: "Even while our experience might be wholly subjective in any sense of the word, there are still consistencies within and between our experiences. The sun will rise tomorrow is a belief held by all humans because of a very strong cumulative argument (inductive reasoning) coming from our experience of it rising each day"
Then you said:
"The problem here is that the sun really doesn't rise. The scientific explanation of this phenomenon, the illusion that the sun rises day after day, is that the earth is actually spinning. The sun is really not doing anything in this scenario, therefore it is actually false to say that the sun rises.""
If you had charitably interpreted what I was saying, you would have acknowledged that my point was not to say or even imply that "the sun moves through the sky while the earth remains still", but instead that "whatever the sun does (or does not do), it does so with observable consistency, which can be the basis for an inductive argument which can be strengthened through additional repetition".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're focused on telling me how "the sun rises" is inherently a false statement when all I'm trying to discuss is the consistency of the observable phenomenon we all know and colloquially refer to as "the rising of the sun".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Everytime you say "truth", somehow I think you're always referring to "ultimate and objective truth". Well what is that? Does it even exist? Can we ever refer to something as "true" and not be inherently stating a falsehood? I've been very clear from the beginning, in every single one of my posts, that "objective certainty" is not achievable. I've not been concerning myself with it or been discussing it at all since my first post or only to clarify that science and what we call "objective scientific fact" is not founded on deductive certainty, it is founded in inductive likelihood from consistency in observations and reliable predictions. It's a whole different kind of truth than the truth you continuously charge me with not recognizing that science does not produce.
Semantically, you framed an attack on the point I was making about the consistency of experiences and how this consistency serves as a logical foundation for empiricism and science by stating "It is false to say that the sun rises" in order to try and point out how there might be deeper truth to a given phenomenon which therefore renders the more superficial observable truth false.
Well... No. They don't necessarily render them false... The superficial induction based truths, if strong enough from the get go, tend to remain true, while the deeper truths, which are also founded in induction, provide additional explanatory and predictive power which the more superficial truths lack. The fact that the earth spins does not falsify the actual meaning of the statement "the sun rises" (not the misinterpretation you keep using as a straw man, which I have clarified many times thus far), it is what creates the cyclical phenomenon we observe to begin with. I don't need to know the earth is round, or that it spins, or that this is why the sun is visible and then not visible in order to experience and record one of it's effects ("sunrise"), or to use induction to reason that it this effect will likely continue happening.
You're basically using plato's allegory of the cave to try and convince me that my statements are "false" when all I'm trying to do is point out that the more consistently the shadows on the wall behave, the more reliably we are able to predict their future behavior. I'm pointing at consistency in the behavior of the shadows and you are saying broadly "you can never be certain of shadows", but I never said that we could be certain, I said that the more consistently these shadows behave the more confident we can be in predicting the future behavior of said shadows.
Th very terms objective and subjective are about framing our world view in a particular way. The objective is only known by the subject in a subjective way. I do not know anything objective, but I may know of something in an objectifying manner.
Generally it is about the "thingness".
Kant may be worth a mention in regards to his use of the terms "phenonemon" and "noumenon".
Personally I just jump straight a phenomenological position so the whole objective/subjective question simply dissolves.
If I think I am on fire and in pain then I still feel like I am burning even if objectively viewed by others they assume I am merely in the grip of psychosis. Their objective opinions are not really important here.
By definition the term objective includes all subjective perceptions.
The only need for distinction is between a subjective belief and an objective truth.
Things can be objectively true irrespective of subjective beliefs.
That is to say the truth of objective states is not contingent upon any particular subjective belief about that state.
Quoting intrapersona
By definition the objective world is a brute fact.
There is no coherent way to logically found claims upon solipsism.
The thread questions "objectivity". You seem to think that consistency in observation is synonymous with "objective". I've demonstrated that consistency in observation does not imply "truth". My claim is that since it doesn't imply truth, we should not consider this to be objectivity.
Now, you have provided no principle whereby we can proceed logically from consistency in observation to your claim of observable consistency. Do you see the difference? We have as evidence, consistency in observation. Consistency is a property of the observations, the descriptions, that's my point. How do you proceed to the conclusion that consistency is a property of the object, to claim "observable consistency"?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The op deals with a difference between objectivity and subjectivity. Is it your claim now, that there is no such thing as objectivity? I think there is objectivity, but truth is essential to it.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
OK, so how do we determine whether the superficial induction based conclusions are true or not? Let's take the sun rising example. Your claim was that no person would deny that the sun rises, and therefore it is true. I deny it, and have explained how it is clearly false.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes, it clearly does falsify the actual meaning of that statement. The sun is the subject. It is engaged in the activity of rising, according to the meaning of the statement. But clearly the sun is not involved in any such activity, the earth is the proper subject here, engaged in the activity of spinning. The sun rising is a false description of what is occurring. Why do you not accept the reality, that this is a false description? You want to give to "the sun rises", a metaphorical meaning, and claim that there is "truth" in this metaphorical meaning. But you haven't explained how there is truth in metaphor.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You're missing the point. What is consistent is the observations, the descriptions. You conclude that the shadows are behaving consistently because there is consistency in the descriptions. But that's not the case, the consistency is in the observations, the descriptions, not in the shadows being observed. Perhaps it's like the sun rising, the shadows are not doing anything at all, the human mind is active, making it appear like the shadows are active. Isn't this what eternalism says?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It does not actually matter whether or not consistency is a property of the object because as long as the observations themselves remain consistent then reliable predictions of future observations can possibly be based upon them. If I never have direct access to real things (instead only faulty and subjective observations) then why would I bother trying to say anything about the "real thing" in the first place? Maybe I'm just predicting future observations?
Science deals with the empirically accessible world and as such necessarily flows through "subjective observations".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Here's the first thing I stated on page 1:
I'm not trying to substantiate science as ultimate and objective truth, I provided an answer but then I decided to provide more by answering the question: "If we have no direct access ultimate and objective truth, what is the next best thing we can access, or, how can we gain useful knowledge?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, you denied an interpretation of "sunrise" which I have expressly identified as an incorrect interpretation of the position I originaly articulated. I never said that we live in a geocentric solar system, or that the earth remains motionless while the sun moves in order to create the day/night cycle. What I clarified my position to be was that "the sun appears over the horizon or appears to move across the sky. The word appears is how at first I tried to make it clear that I was referring to a phenomenon of "relative perspective" which occurs when a human is standing on the surface of the earth. The fact that the sun appears over the horizon does not contradict the earth's rotation, it is caused by it.
Yes you have defeated geocentrism, but you have not defeated "sunrise as an observable phenomenon" (as caused by the earth's rotation). How do you prove an observation? You can't. You can record it or make a similar observation in order to increase the inductive strength of an individual observation, but the observation itself must on some level just be accepted for what it is until contradictory observations come along. Knowing the rotational speed and axis of planets in conjunction with their orbits around a star allows us to predict "sunrise" (when the sun would appear over the horizon at a given geographical point) without ever having been there; the observations agree with the model you say contradicts them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover Well it's not metaphorical, it is a statement of perspective "from this perspective, the sun becomes visible at A time and at Y vector". It's an observation and repeatability is the source of it's strength.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So now I cannot even observe the shadows!?!
Woah, bro... This is cave-ception:
"Imagine that you are in a dark cave and under physical restraints which force you to only ever be facing a single wall. A fire is lit behind you which casts shadows upon the wall in-front of you. You are also blindfolded, and so while you cannot see the shadows, all you can do is grope the wall in front of you, feeling for warmer and colder spots which might indicate where the firelight, or a shadow, has recently been lingering.
It's the warm and cold spots man; they're consistent. Every time I drop what I can only faultily describe as what I subjectively observe to be a "television" on my "foot", I am overwhelmed with a very particular feeling which happens to have a peculiarly rigid correlation with what I can only faultily describe to be what I subjectively observe as "significant damage to my physical body"....
we can see the shadows; that's the point of the metaphor.
---------
To summarize my intention in this thread, I sought to provide a useful alternative to objective certainly after having contested that we do not currently possess very much objective certainty, if any. One of the qualities we would expect objective truth to have is complete reliability (because it is true and unchanging or true at the time). The entire goal of the scientific method is to seek the most fundamentally reliable descriptions and models of phenomenon (those with explanatory or predictive power) that it can find as a way of attempting to either A: simulate or approximate or approach "objective truth", or B: produce reliable and useful "truth" (not the same thing, but still a very useful kind of truth none too less).
I never said that we can never access objective truth, or even that we can never be certain of it, just that right now we're certain of almost nothing. Science provides a useful answer to how we can improve what we "know", despite a lack of absolute certainty, by testing models against the consistency of our observations, experiments, and experiences. Science is limited by what we can empirically experience. That's a fact. Do you propose an alternative route which can certainly deliver us closer to absolute truth, or dare I say, upon it?
I disagree.
We can be certain that solipsism is not the case.
Solipsism leads to an ill defined infinite regress that would not allow you to form any conclusions about the existence of anything (including yourself).
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Self-Recursion.html
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infinite_regress
That is to say that if the term self is not distinct and mutually exclusive of the term not self, then there is no conclusion that you can draw what so ever.
This meany by definition the terms self and not self are independent of one another.
People don't seem to understand that we would not be able to make any sense out of anything if solipsism was true.
This is just a consequence of logic.
If you could only reference/access yourself (solipsism) then you would be stuck in an infinite loop of trying to define self by referring to self, by referring to self, by referring to self...ad infinitum.
But if a not self exists (objective reality), you can break the infinite cycle by reference self as that which is distinct from not self.
What I see people argue is this...
"The only thing we experience is our perceptions, therefor basis of our reality of is our perception."
That is fine if that is how you want to define terms but it is essentially a bare assertion about semantics and not an argument that demonstrates a point.
I say we have access to our subjective information which is nothing but objective information that has been processed by our brains.
I realize that this is not particularly interesting to think about, but the debate is really about semantics and is not that interesting in the first place.
I truly don't understand how people believe there is some profound philosophical dilemma here?!?
:-|
In my mind, (heh),The problem of an ill defined infinite regress inherent in solipsism makes it more difficult for us to make sense of things or to be certain of them, but the dilemma of solipsism is not that it has much (if any) merit as a hypothetical model, it's rather that many of it's variations cannot be fully falsified or discounted as a possibility. When it comes to "things of which we are certain", I do not count the statement "solipsism is not true" to be among them.
Quoting m-theory
Consider the brain in a vat scenario. A powerful scientist could be feeding impulses from a simulation into your brain in exactly the same way as if your brain was in a skull, rendering you unable to determine if the world you perceive actually extends beyond your potentially simulated or deceptive perceptions.
This isn't exactly full blown solipsism, but it establishes a primitive case which can cast some (albeit minimal) doubt on whether or not our perceptions even indirectly reflect an external or objective world.
Skepticism can really do away with a lot if it is applied to the extreme, but luckily pragmatism regularly steps in and sets us straight.
Quoting m-theory
That's quite alright, your point is well on topic.
Solipsism is not really a profound philosophical dilemma, but it is a proper hard dilemma none the less. Whether or not I (you) live in a solipsistic world in the end would change nothing of consequence as far as our perceptions are concerned, so I (you) don't have any reason to waste much time trying to validate or falsify it.
Your brain in a vat example does not cast doubt on whether or not there is an external world. There is still the need for your "powerful scientist" feeding impulses. The scientist comprises an external world. It is just that in this example, the real external world is not anything like the external world as the brain in the vat perceives it.
That is what I've been arguing is really the case, the real external world isn't anything like the way that we perceive, and describe it. That is evident from the example which we've already discussed, "the sun rises". The description refers to what we perceive, but we now know that what we perceive is not anything like what is really the case. We could extend this to our understanding of substance in general, molecules and atoms etc., what we perceive is completely different from what is really the case. Since this extreme difference exists, between how we perceive, and describe, the external world, and what we've determined is really the case, it may just as well be a brain in the vat scenario. We still haven't gotten beyond analyzing the impulses, understanding them well enough, to the point of determining the necessity for a "powerful scientist" sending us these impulses.
How we've progressed in this discussion, you and I, has been painfully slow, because we each have vastly differing perspectives on this. You want to assume that consistency in observations implies necessarily that there is consistency in the external world, but we haven't accounted for the brain itself, which in this example is assumed to be in a vat. So let's start with a real skeptic's position, let's assume that it is possible that there is no scientist at all, absolutely nothing external, just a mind, and the mind itself is producing all the images of perception.
Notice that I introduce this premise as a possibility. This is to counter your assumption that consistency in observation necessarily implies consistency in the thing observed. If we allow that the mind itself is capable of creating, and this is what is implied by the concept of free will, that the mind can create without the necessity for external causation, then it is possible that the observed consistency is completely created by the mind.
This is the point which I've been attempting to bring to your attention. If we allow the principles of free will, we allow that the mind itself creates without external cause. So when we proceed to analyze consistency in observations, we need to be able to distinguish which aspects of that consistency are created by the mind, and which aspects are proper to the thing being observed.
This is why we need to consider semantics, the words which we use, and the ways in which we describe things, as having real influence over the observations which we make, and especially the consistencies which we observe. I say this because it is clear that we actually seek consistencies, as consistency is what leads to understanding, so we describe things in terms of consistency. But of all particular things, in general, there are differences and similarities between them. We may overlook the differences to focus on the similarities. And this is what happens with our habitual word use, we call things by the same name, because they are similar in some way, overlooking the differences, and this creates consistency. The use of the same word to describe different things creates an illusion of consistency, through overlooking the differences.
So for instance we say "the sun rises in the east". This is a statement of consistency. However, each day the sun will appear to come up in a slightly different location on the horizon. So the sun isn't consistently rising in the same place, directly to the east, it varies from south to north, despite the fact that we say it rises consistently in the east. We create a generalization, overlooking the various differences, and say that the sun rises in the east. Now we have a consistency which has been created by this generalization, which acts as a description of many slightly different occurrences, describing them all with the very same words, "the sun rises in the east". This consistency has been created by our mode of description, which is to overlook slight differences, and focus on similarities. However, overlooking the inconsistencies, to focus on the consistency, produces a false consistency. It is necessary to negate this false consistency "the sun rises in the east", and focus on all the slight inconsistencies, in order to truly understand the relationship between the earth and the sun.
You think pragmatism sets us straight, but that is not the case at all. Pragmatism is what inclines us to create consistencies, and in creating these consistencies the real inconsistencies are hidden. By loosing track of the real inconsistencies through the claim of consistency, misunderstanding thrives.
That we can draw distinction from self and not self falsifies solipsism.
If solipsism was true we would not be able to form such a distinction because of the infinite regress problem.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The brain in the vat is not useful to your point as it takes for granted that an objective world does exist.
Again if objective information did not exist (that which is not self) then you would have no way to define self (form subjective perceptions).
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Again it is rather simple.
In order to form any notion of self there must exist a not self distinct and independent from that self.
If in reality there were no such distinction then you would lapse into an ill defined infinite regress of self referencing self ad infinitum.
That this is not the case is proof that solipsism is not the case.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
My point was that it is not a hard dilemma at all.
It is rather simple.
The debate is a semantic one.
Those that argue doubt of the existence of not self as distinct and independent are merely arguing that we redefine terms to entertain a philosophical dilemma where one does not exist.
That is to say there is no force of logic that it is necessary to redefine the terms self and not self such that these terms are not distinct and independent.
In fact it is not logically possible to construct such an argument because of infinite regress.
It is quite literally logically impossible to actually doubt the existence of the objective world (not self) without also doubting the existence of the subjective (self).
If the not self does not exist then it is logically impossible to define the self because of infinite regress.
If you assert that the subjective (self) does exist, the only logically founded way to reach this conclusion is by referencing the objective world (not self).
Exclusive access to only self reference does not allow one to draw a conclusion of the existence of self it leads to infinite regress and from ill defined terms.
So I balk notion that all one can be sure of is only the self (subjective perception).
This can only be true if are also sure of the not self (objective information).
There is no logical way to be sure of the existence of self otherwise?!?
:s
Those that are sure of self, subjective perception, or what ever you want to call it, are not solipsists.
This is why the position is incoherent.
The position asks that all you can be sure of as existing is the subjective (self) even while in order for that to be true it logically entails the existence of the objective (not self) as distinct and independent.
The position claims that we are ONLY sure of the existence of the subjective however, which is inconsistent logically.
In fact, from a foundation of logic, the opposite is the case.
We can only be sure of self if there is a definite distinct and independent not self.
I will grant that we may be subjectively wrong about what is the true state of objective existence, but what we cannot do is doubt that the objective exists in fact without also doubting that the subjective exists in fact.
You, perhaps hint at a true solipsist position.
If you claim we cannot be sure of the existence of the objective, then this logically entails that we are also not sure of the existence of the subjective.
These terms would be ill defined that there would be no distinction drawn between them.
That would be a consistent position at least, however you would nave no certainty about anything, subjective, objective or otherwise.
My response to this point is not only is that an unnecessary skeptical position, it is in fact logically impossible to prove that it is necessary.
Skepticism of about the existence of the objective is possible sure (granting that an infinite regress can be an actual occurance in reality) but just because it is possible does not make it necessary.
Again if it were not possible in reality to draw the distinction of not self and self then we would be stuck in an ill defined infinite regress in reality.
That is not the case at all, even those that argue the case for solipsism are claiming we can be sure of the existence of self, they simply fail to realize that this also logically entails the existence of some not self which is distinct and independent.
The brain in a vat scenario is useful to show that it could be the case that the sun (let alone sunrise), molecules, and atoms do not reflect or represent a true external reality, but it does not prove it to be the case.
I disagree that the term "sunrise" makes it evident that the real external world isn't anything like the way we perceive or describe it. People concluding geocentrism as a result of observing the obscured and then not obscured visibility of the sun at a particular point on the visible horizon shows how sometimes perception CAN be misleading, but nothing we have yet discovered through reason or science suggests that the observation or experience we colloquially refer to as "sunrise" is an illusion, or a farce, or inherently not reflecting of a true external reality. Further astronomical discoveries beyond "I can see the sun" (sunrise) have enhanced our understanding of the phenomenon, not invalidated the phenomenon itself or shown to be not real. Knowing the orbit and rotation and wobble of the earth can allow us to predict with approximate certainty exactly when and where sunrise will occur (throughout the past and into the foreseeable future). A round rotating Earth and a heliocentric model necessitates that sunrise occur (unless the axis of rotation were pointing directly at the sun at all times).
What is evident from the apparent falsity of geocentrism is that our perceptions can be falliable, but this does not mean that there might be some truth or objectivity contained in our perceptions. Take the heliocentric model for instance, do you think that whatever the sun is (or atoms, or gravity, or time, etc...) that if we were able to get down to "the true external world" that there would not be some fundamental "first principle" which gives rise to the corresponding phenomenon we experience on our end? Yes we could be a brain in a vat, and our perceptions necessarily deceptive, but we also might not be a brain in a vat, and whatever creates the sun (and sunrise, and everything), might be indirectly perceptible through observation, experiment, and induction.
You're willing to say that geocentrism is clearly false because heliocentrism has greater explanatory or predictive power (it's supporting evidence), so what makes you then so quick to assert that heliocentrism is equally as false?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I'm not saying it "necessarily implies" consistency, but instead "infers via induction", but really there's several points caught up in this statement.
First and foremost I'm asserting that "reliable and useful predictive power" can be found through inductive ("cumulative") arguments which are at their base founded on verifiable or repeatable observations. Basing models on reliable phenomenon (i.e: repeatable; having a pattern) is a way to approximate or simulate the strength of "objective truth". Objective truth hypothetically would be 100% reliable and always remain 100% consistent. Given that we can never be certain what we know "objectively reflects the true external world", inductive logic in this form serves as a pragmatic alternative to seeking out more "truth". Even though it is "approximate truth" rather than "objective truth" we can still make inductively gathered truths stronger and stronger through additional experimental rigor and through the expansion of more and more congruent explanatory and predictive models in order to simulate or approximate as best we can the consistency that we imagine objective truth ought to have.
The above position is thoroughly defensible, but what is slightly less defensible (as is directly derived from the above position) is the second position that seems to be getting caught up in our discussion: whether or not our perceptions can or do contain some semblance of information that can be said to "be something like the true external world" (as opposed to your position "it is evident the true external world is nothing like our perceptions"). While using induction to come to highly reliable and consistent explanations simulates some of the power we reckon an "objectively true explanation" might have (consistency and reliability), we can never use it to be absolutely certain it's "truth" may never one day be shown to be inconsistent or inaccurate, like geocentrism.
It is possible that the body of science is on a path toward closing in on or approximating actual universal first principles, but it is also possible that the first principles science might be closing in on are just the deceptive or abstract rules of an evil scientist's simulation. Either way my point is quite simply that induction, especially with respect to the scientific method and it's current body of knowledge, can produce "truths" so reliable that for practical reasons we might behave as if they are objectively true.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Even if my mind creates everything I experience, there can still be consistency in my observations. Whether or not my perception of something (a shadow I mistake for a person for instance) is actually a perception created by my mind might not alter the fact that I consistently observe or perceive it. Even though I may totally misunderstand what something is, I can still observe it (and misunderstand it) consistently. If past observations (despite a prevailing misunderstanding) are more and more consistent, the predictions of future observations (despite the same prevailing misunderstanding) become inductively stronger and stronger. Even if solipsism is true, some observations I make of the fictitious world I create for myself have peculiar consistency with one another, which leads me to guess that either I imagine things with consistency or there is some underlying mechanism which generates that consistency. In either case the observations themselves have consistency.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Science constantly improves by reducing the inherent "inconsistency" or inaccuracy of explanatory gap in it's various interwoven models. This is why you are so confident that geocentrism masks inherent inconsistency and generates a false model by focusing too much on overt consistency; heliocentrism came along and provided more accuracy and even in a more simplified format. The reason why science works is because it sheds obsolete models for one's which better account for apparent inconsistencies in the explanatory and predictive power of existing models, thus "approximating" "reliable truth".
It might all be my imagination, but cumulative induction and the scientific method in general works.
What if the things which I perceive of as "not-self" are actually just works of fiction from my subconscious with no actual continuous existence beyond me imagining myself interacting with them or my subconscious mind temporarily simulating them in my conscious experience?
In this case it would still be coherent to say "not-self" and solipsism hold true.
That's the whole point though, what we see as "the sun rising" is not a true external reality. You keep insisting that it is, refusing to face the reality of the situation. The sun does not rise, despite the fact that we see the sun rising. I would like it if you could create in your mind, a better imaginary model, so that you do not see the sun rising anymore. Tell yourself that the sun is staying still. Then imagine what is happening without getting dizzy. What science has demonstrated very clearly to us, is that we do not perceive the external reality the way that it truly is. We do not perceive molecules, or atoms, or sub-atomic particles. Sure, you might argue that we taste and smell molecules, but we don't, we taste tastes, and smell smells. Let's face the facts, the way that we perceive things is not the way that they are, according to what science tells us.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
It's not predictive power which makes me prefer heliocentrism. As I explained, prediction is based in recognizing consistencies, and geocentrism had great predictive power as well. What heliocentrism gives us is the capacity to understand many inconsistencies. The reason why I believe that heliocentrism is still false is that there are many inconsistencies which persist. There are inconsistencies in our understandings of space, time, electromagnetism, and such things. Further, when I go outside in the morning, I can feel the sun touch me with its warmth. And as much as our sense perceptions may be inaccurate, touch, as a fundamental feeling, is fairly reliable. So I do not believe that there is space between the sun and myself. Just like we talk about space between you and I, I know there is not space there, there is air, I can feel it on my face, and the air is the earth's atmosphere, part of the earth. Likewise, we talk about space being between us and the sun, but that's not space, it's the sun's atmosphere, or field or something. So just like I am within the earth, being in its atmosphere, I am also within the sun, being within its field, or some such thing.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes, this is the point I was trying to make, our minds could be creating all the consistency which we observe. In this case, the consistency would not be within "it", the thing being observed, it would be within the mind only. The thing being observed would be totally inconsistent, but the mind is making it appear to be consistent. Do you believe that this is possible?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
This might be true, but do you not see a big difference between "there is consistency in the thing being observed", and, "there is no consistency in the thing being observed, but my mind is creating the appearance of consistency"?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
So this is the problem I was referring to earlier. The observations become more consistent, the predictions become more reliable, but the misunderstanding remains. The problem is that the misunderstanding becomes stronger and stronger, because the reliability of the predictions creates the illusion that there is no misunderstanding, that all is understood. Then we do not bother to doubt this, what is perceived as an understanding but is really a misunderstanding, because the predictions are so reliable, that we don't even think that it might be a misunderstanding.
I've clarified more times than I care to count that the term "sunrise" as I have employed it should be taken to mean strictly: "The sun's visibility was obstructed by the Earth, then not obstructed".
You keep saying the sun doesn't rise like it's somehow going to convince me that the visibility of the sun has nothing to do with "external reality". I'm not talking about the sun "rising", I'm talking about it's visibility; your argument applies only to the straw-man of geocentrism that you feel the term "sunrise" necessarily entails, which even if it were the case I have already clarified my own position.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But we do perceive atoms, and molecules, and heliocentrism too. We perceive them through processes of observation, prediction, and experimentation; induction. If we could not (or "do not") perceive atoms, why do you think they exist, how did we ever find out about them?
If you can only perceive that the sun moves through the sky, why do you think it does not? "Perceptions" can extend beyond raw and uninterpreted sensory data you know...
Taste and smell are abstract, sure, but they still might indirectly perceive something real. Taste buds on your tongue react in specific ways to specific molecules that come into contact with them. The way something tastes may in fact contain some real data about the thing being tasted; taste has some degree of consistency within individuals and between them which indicates the phenomenon of taste is not completely random in addition to being abstract. Eyeballs react to light, presumably real light which emanates from real things. When light bounces off of something and then enters our eyes we can recognize a change in the light (via the eyeball mechanism) which we presume reflects data contained in the object reflecting the light. "Redness" might be an abstract visual experience, but we're pretty damn sure that red light is a certain portion of the complete light spectrum, and that when full spectrum light bounces off an object and we see red, that this means the surface of that object is absorbing all visible light except for the red part which gets reflected.
Science is inevitably based in perception, so when you say "Science tells us that the way we perceive things is not anything like the way they really are", what you're really saying is "Our perceptions tell us that our perceptions are wrong", which is merely to say "I doubt perceptions". However, falsifying one perception with another more refined perception (the act and product of science?) can never be used to deductively falsify the whole of perception and experience altogether because using the supposed truth of perception ("science tells us") to establish the falsehood of all perceptions ("our perceptions are nothing like the way the external world is") is an invalid argument where it's conclusion contradicts it's premise. If perceptions can never be anything like the external world, then science (based in perception) can never rationally be used to come in and provide evidence or proof that our perceptions are nothing like the external world.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Long story short you appeal to heliocentrism to falsify geocentrism because it has more predictive power. Why you believe heliocentrism is false is completely beyond me. Do you believe the sun even exists?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is possible although it seems unlikely. This is what I meant by "We cannot defeat solipsism".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I see the difference but if my mind is creating extreme amounts of consistency then pragmatically I ought to behave accordingly (I.E: not dropping T.Vs on my foot).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As the predictions get stronger, the model gets more useful (generally) this is not contestable.
If predictive power plateaus, maybe this is because a theory is beginning to closely approximate whatever aspect of the external world it presupposes to model; maybe it has reached maximum predictive power. OR, maybe the theory has a fundamental flaw within it which inherently bottlenecks it's precision or accuracy. All of our current scientific theories might be entirely wrong, but the likelihood that of all our scientific theories none of them reflect anything fundamentally true, if however incomplete, about the external world, seems extremely low. Furthermore, when a new theory eclipses and makes obsolete an old one, this gives us even stronger inductive reasoning that the new theory contains some or more real data about the external world; it has greater predictive power and greater explanatory power; more useful.
We cannot yet say anything certain except this very sentence.
You're worried that we're basing everything off of fundamental misunderstandings, and that's fine, maybe we are, but you're also presuming (at least by your language) that this is in fact the case; that everything we believe and perceive is nothing like the way the external world is... This can be based on a weak inductive argument at best, and even if it were true would seem like useless knowledge when contrasted with traditional science. Yet you then you go even further: When I use Plato's allegory of the cave and begin talking about the shadows on the wall (which is a metaphor for our perceptions and how they not directly derived from the external world and hence amorphous and fallible), you even questioned those, claiming that even the things my perceptions are based on have nothing to do with the way the external world actually works. By your logic, "the external world" has infinite layers of complexity such that no matter how much we refine our perceptions we can not get any closer whatsoever to getting our hands on any real data about any real universe. No actual ultimate truth can possibly exist in such a universe.
Assuming that the reality was that there was no distinction from self and not self would leave you in an ill defined infinite regressing loop from which no conclusions could be drawn.
The process of defining self or not self would never end.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
There is no logically consistent way to hold that solipsism is true.
If solipsism is true, in reality, then in reality we would not be certain of anything because we would be stuck in an infinite regress problem.
To say that "We can only be certain of the existence of self" is incorrect.
If we can be certain of self this is only true from a distinction of not-self which exist independent from that self.
If we cannot be certain of a distinct and independent not self, then nor will we have any certainty about self as a consequence.
From a logical standpoint the subjective world necessarily entails an objective world.
If we cannot be certain of one then by definition we cannot have certainty about the other.
A true solipsist would be an epistemological nihilist and assert that we could be sure of nothing at all.
And that statement itself would be something about which we could not be sure of.
This is why you cannot have any epistemological foundation with nihilism or solipsism.
The assertion "All things are uncertain" is itself an uncertain claim that regresses infinitely before it can ever reach a true or false conclusion.
It is all really quite simple and it boggles my mind that people are enamored with this non-dilemma.
If you are an epistemological nihilist/solipsist I say to you, well that position is not, and cannot be, logically grounded.
You have no and can have no foundation with which to support that assumption.
It is a non-starting point for philosophical inquiry.
I'm not exactly sure why solipsism is impossible as you describe it.
As far as I can tell you say that "not-self" would be incoherent if solipsism were true, and since "not-self" is coherent, solipsism must be untrue.
I also do not understand why being uncertain that "not-self" exists means we must also be uncertain that "self" exists.
I understand why something like "an orange" cannot be coherently defined unless we can say "not an orange", but in solipsism "self" is construed to represent the fundamental source of everything that exists. It becomes a matter of equivocation to argue that since we casually experience "not-self" solipsism results in incoherency because "self" under solipsism refers to the fundamental source of everything, not the way we interpret our casual experiences.
Perhaps I should amend my hard position though; the thing we are most certain of, aside from perhaps our own existence (cogito ergo sum), is our overall prevailing lack of certainty.
P.S, I'm somewhat less than enamored with solipsism as a hypothesis of any merit or utility than you might think, however since I cannot deliver a proof that it solipsism is certainly not the case, I admit that I cannot fully defeat it.
The issue as I see it is that for the posits of solipsism, or even any sort of idealism, to make sense, we have to posit the realist view of there being creatures with minds as well as other sorts of things, stuff external to creatures with minds, stuff that creatures with minds can perceive, and so on. That's the only way we can even get to contemplating how our perception works, whether we can know anything but our own minds, and so on. If we were to truly reject that picture, there wouldn't be any issues of this sort whatsoever. There would just be the phenomena there is, and we wouldn't wonder what its relation was to us--there would be no "that stuff" in distinction to ourselves. It would all just be phenomena and that's it .
So solipsism and idealism only make sense in the first place by thinking about how minds work in the context of the realist framework.
There are more than a few variations of solipsism, and not all of them reduce "the other" into incoherence.
A kind of hard solipsism would be "Only my mind exists and the other people and things I perceive are created by my mind, and have no continuous or necessary existence beyond my perceptions of them".
With this kind of solipsism there is no guarantee that a fundamental way to "make sense" of how "minds" work is available in the first place. Living pragmatically would be greatly hindered by going around and treating "the other" as if it's existence is dependent on one's own mind (i.e "not real"), but the fact that we would be left in a very confusing situation (having no obvious or necessary way to determine how or why we experience what we experience) does not negate it as a possibility. It would change nothing from the perspective of a pragmatist, but this also gives no necessary indication that hard solipsism definitely is not the case.
A weaker form of solipsism posits that the only thing we can be certain of are the goings-on of our own mind, and points out that the realist approach involves several presumptions that cannot be proven or falsified. This kind of solipsism most closely tracks with the main question of this thread. It is in essence strong skepticism applied to the nature (or "truth") of our perceptions, which reduces what is "certain" to something like Descartes "cogito ergo sum" or something not dissimilar.
Out of the hard solipsist position stems a rather useless worldview, but out of the weaker version of solipsism stems several positions that do in fact have some merit. Descartes was right to apply skepticism for the sake of applying skepticism (in pursuit of something unquestionable; something certain), and out of it came a very sensical hierarchy of epistemological foundations. Our own existence is not questionable (per Decartes), but our senses and perceptions are highly fallible and so must be questioned and tested using apriori reasoning and confirmation and re-confirmation (for precision and accuracy) of actual empirical evidence.
The possibility that we might be a brain in a vat is enough to provide some doubt that the "the objective world is subjective" (or at least arbitrary in the sense that it may not reflect the "external world" of the scientist). This is is not a useful position to wield, but confronting it can be a useful exercise which forces us to improve as best we can the epistemic foundations that we base what we call "knowledge" on.
Again, none of those scenarios would make any sense if one didn't posit the realist picture in the first place.
Furthermore, the scenarios do seem to "make sense" to me. Are you suggesting that the world cannot be such that I am not something with continuous existence beyond your perceptions of me?
I'm not saying anything like that. What I'm saying I'll explain again in the context of a response to:
Quoting VagabondSpectre
They make sense to me, too, but because they were all framed within a realist picture of the world. What I said was that solipsism can't be made any sense of outside of a context of a realist picture of the world--which is how you presented your scenarios, but by framing it in those contexts, one necessarily undermines solipsism. If either ontological or epistemological solipsism are true, then that realist picture of what the world is like shouldn't make sense--because in both cases (ontological and epistemological solipsism) you can't know that realist picture. If any brand of solipsism is true, one can't know minds versus other sorts of things in the first place.
I understand what you mean by saying that a realist framework (i.e "the other" pragmatically and semantically exists (per prevailing perception)) is required for us to categorize and interact successfully (pragmatically) with the phenomena within the realm of our experiences. But even if hard solipsism were true there might still be consistency in our experiences, whatever they may be. As such, from our perspective of limited understanding, a realist framework could be entirely useful and perhaps the only way we can make sense of the world, but it could still be a misrepresentation of what is objectively real (as some here in this thread would gladly contend).
The fact that we have to inexorably conduct our affairs from within the construct and confines of what we all axiomatically accept to be "real" means that for an idea or understanding to have any utility it must refer to "real" things, but this is an issue only with utility, not "external objective truth" (or lack thereof). This may inductively undermine solipsism on many levels (aside from outright negating it's utility), but it does not deductively establish solipsism to be an impossibility, which is the only tired point I've really been defending.
Solipsism can be used as a skeptical tool - a hypothetical - to paint limits on the knowability of objective truth, especially as it relates to varying degrees of certainty. It's not a useful worldview outside of this context and I'm not suggesting anyone ought to wield it as an actual position, but I'm contending that we cannot actually discount many varieties of solipsism as certainly false.
It's not just that, it's that the very idea that some of the phenomena one experiences is mind and some is not mind is realist in nature, and solipsism doesn't make any sense as a concept if we don't accept that picture. We can't wonder if everything isn't just our mind or if we can't only know our mind if we're not assuming that the world is divided into mind and other stuff. Outside of that realist picture, there would only be the phenomena there is, and there would be absolutely no reason to wonder what our relationship to any of that phenomena is, there would be absolutely no reason to wonder about certainty--after all, what else could any of it be (or what else could we possibly know it to be) except the phenomena that it is under that scenario? There would be no other possibility for what that phenomena could be (or what we could know it as) other than what it is as phenomena.
So as a skeptical tool, if we assume solipsism, we have no skepticism whatsoever. We'd be certain of everything, and there would be no mind/other stuff cleavage, which wouldn't be solipsism after all.
Keep in mind I'm saying we should not give consideration to solipsism beyond the hypothetical; we should not assume it.
You say that if solipsism were true we would have no reason to wonder about relationships between experienced phenomena or degrees of certainty. Why? I understand that we have to live in a real world, but solipsism might not so much about establishing that direct experiences are unreal (to the point that we need not address them?) so much as an explanation of the source of all experienced phenomenon (and by extension a description of their underlying true nature). From within one possible experience of solipsism, what is perceivably one's own "mind" could be limited such that it simulates what we now experience as "the other" even though it if is somehow generated by or subject to deeper aspects of one's own mind (i.e subconsciousness?).
Your arguments completely ruin the utility of solipsism as a functional worldview, and I completely agree with that conclusion, but in my view a solipsist would disagree that we would have no skepticism, or be certain of everything. In their view understanding what they falsely perceive as "the other" by whatever means of inquiry available would be seen as the process of discovering more about their own mind.
I submit the following questions: "Are you certain you're not a brain in a vat à la Decartes? If so how? If not, presuming that you are in fact a brain in a vat, could you ever be certain of that, if anything? Would skepticism be useless from your perspective? Skepticism could in fact be what leads you to currently surmise that you are a brain in a vat in the first place, could it not?".
Well, keep in mind that I'm a realist first off, and with respect to philosophy of perception, I'm a naive or "direct" realist.
I thought I mentioned earlier (although maybe I just intended to do so but didn't get around to it, haha) that I see wondering about certainty as a misplaced concern. I agree with the philosophy of science/science methodology mantra that empirical claims are not provable, period. So certainty simply can't be had for any empirical claim, and it's not worth worrying about. What matters on my view are the reasons we have for believing one possibility over another.
Not all potential claims are equal. Some only have possibility going for them. For those claims the contradictory claim is almost always a possibility, too. (For example, "We're brains in vats." Well, "We're not brains in vats" is possible, too.) So possibility is never sufficient for belief. There have to be other reasons to believe whatever we do, and certainty isn't something to bother with, because it can't be had (for empirical claims, that is; logical claims are another matter).
So from my perspective, as a realist, skepticism isn't useless, but for a skeptical alternative to be worth consideration, there need to be reasons beyond possibility that it might be true. Thus, if soemone suggests "We might be brains in vats," the first thing I think is, "Okay, but why would we believe that?" There would need to be reasons to believe it--some sort of evidence, primarily, beyond the mere possibility of it, otherwise it's not worth bothering with.
Both the self and not-self would be incoherent if solipsism was true because of infinite self referencing.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Self-Recursion.html
You can't define these things using self as the only reference point.
If you do use only self and then try to reference the self, you create an infinite regress that never defines the term self, or any other term for that matter.
That is not what happens when we try to define ourselves.
At least not to me.
I can define myself and reach the conclusion that I exist without an infinite regress problem.
That should not be possible if solipsism is true.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Because the only logically coherent way to define self is as something which is distinct and independent from not self.
If you only use self reference to define self you don't get any clear definition of self or not-self.
You get an infinite loop of self reference with no conclusions.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
It is a logic thing.
You can never define the self in the first place using only self reference.
The only way to clearly define self that is logically consistent and does not fall prey to infinite regress is by introducing the not-self as a thing which must exist independent and distinct from the self.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You did not have a hard position you have an inconsistent one.
If you claim you can be certain that the self exists this logically entails that we can be certain that the not-self exists independent and distinct from the self.
Other wise you run into the infinite regress problem in the link that stems from self reference.
If all you have is self referenece as your foundational starting point you can arrive at no logical conclusions what so ever.
That means you would not be sure the not-self exists, and you could not be sure that the self exists either.
There would be an infinite amount of steps trying to reach any conclusion.
That is not what happens in reality, so we can be quite sure the solipsism is false.
In reality we are not trapped in an infinite loop of self reference, in reality we can reach logical conclusions.
This is mutually exclusive of the possibility of solipsism being the true reality.
Its really quite simple.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
This is where you are wrong.
The proof that solipsism is not the case is the fact that we are not trapped in an infinite regress and we can arrive at conclusions.
This is only possible if solipsism is not true.
I'm totally with you there. I don't hold solipsism as a belief nor would I advocate that anyone should. As a skeptical tool the fact that it could be true is used as a quick and dirty way to establish some degree of doubt (albeit a very small degree) to contrast against and weaken some notions of "complete/objective certainty". It's useless outside of an obscure and rather inconsequential lesson in epistemological limitations, and yet many find it an enduringly interesting thought experiment.
"Self" in the traditional sense (our discrete thoughts and experiences) is not the same as as the expanded definition of "self" (where it basically becomes "the source of everything") per some forms of solipsism. The connection between "self" and the "not-self" that we casually experience, per solipsism, is to do with the nature of the "not-self" being fundamentally different than the nature of the "self" (I.E, I am a mind that exists and you are just an impermanent illusion governed by my subconscious. Or, I am a brain in a vat but you are just fabricated electrical signals stimulating my brain and interpreted by me as another person).
Even a full blown metaphysical solipsist would not define other people as their own "self", they would merely say that other people have no fundamental or permanent existence akin to their own. This hard form of solipsism entails the presumption that nothing has permanent or tangible existence beyond what can be found within one's own ongoing experiences, but I do not see how or why linguistically referring to "not self", even in a metaphysically solipsistic existence, would actually create any logical issues of self-reference.
I am sorry you are having difficulty grasping the issue.
Maybe this article about self referencing will help you understand.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/
What I am saying logically has to do with self reference and infinite regress.
If all you have is self reference then you wind up with an ill define infinite regress which never reaches any conclusion.
So you can't conclude logically that the only thing that exists is the self if all you have is self reference because that self reference will regress infinitely.
If solipsism was actually true then in reality there would be no way to reference anything without an ill defined infinite regress (because everything would be self referencing).
However the fact that we can reference things like self and not self without infinite regress means that we can prove with logical certainty that solipsism is not true.
There is no metaphysical issue, solipsism can't be metaphysically true, because if it was we would be stuck in an infinite regress of self reference.
Not all self-reference invokes an infinite regress. That's only the case when either the self-reference (and each self-reference) must exactly mirrror the starting point, or when we're looking for something like a support of a claim (or state, etc.) and the support is self-referential, which then would need another self-referential support, and so on. But a lot of self-reference doesn't meet either of those conditions.
For example, take this picture:
(I'm not sure why the image isn't being embedded)
That has an infinite regress. However, if we we to change it so that the first "inside"/nested picture features the person holding a different photo or painting rather than yet another mirrored image, it wouldn't be a infinite regress, yet it would still be self-referential.
Under solipsism, there's no infinite regress automatically invoked simply because all experience is experience of self. An infinite regress would only arise if one felt a need to support self by appeal to something other than self (putatively), but where, under a supposition of solipsism, one of course isn't able to appeal to anything other than self, so that step would just keep repeating ad infinitum.
While I think there are other problems with solipsism, including that I can't see how it doesn't amount to first assuming a realist view and then arriving at solipsism as a skeptical reaction to the realist view, where the realist view is still subsumed in solipsism's framework, I don't think that a necessary infinite regress is one of its problems.
If solipsism was true then the only thing that existed would be you.
And the only thing you could reference would be yourself.
It would necessarily involve a problem of infinite regress from self reference.
So you reference yourself when you say something like, "Ah, look at that tree."
Where's the infinite regress in that?
The definition of recursion.
The definition self recursion
.
Perhaps you believe that if the only thing that exists is self (solipsism) you can avoid self recursion when defining objects.
I don't see how, and that notion makes no sense to me, but you are entitled to your opinion.
I am sorry you don't understand, it is pretty simple.
If solipsism was true only one object would exist, and it would only be able to reference itself when defining anything.
That would be self recursion and leads to infinite regress.
If other objects exist (something other than just self), even objects of the same type, you can use recursion to avoid infinite regress.
Okay, but first, that would just be about defining something, it wouldn't be about all reference (since, "Hey, there's a tree," for example, is a reference to a tree, but not a definition of a tree).
But even for definitions, I don't see why this would be any more problem for a solipsist than it would be for anyone if we were to "translate" terms into some general property. In other words, a solipsist defining a tree would presumably just as well present something like the following, just as anyone else would:
"a woody perennial plant, typically having a single stem or trunk growing to a considerable height and bearing lateral branches at some distance from the ground."
It's true that for the (ontological) solipsist, all of those things, ontologically, are really self, and that would be the case for anything they could possibly define.
But likewise, it's true for a physicalist (such as myself), that all of those things, ontologically, are really physical (that is, really matter in dynamic structures/relations), and that would be the case, on my view as a physicalist, for anything I could possibly define.
And likewise, it would be true for anyone, that all of those things, at least on one ontological level, are words in a natural language, and that would be the case for anything we could possibly define.
There are other categories we could appeal to there, too, such as "at least concepts if not existents" and so on.
So if those ontological categories are not problems for the rest of us, even though everything we could define would fit the category, then I don't see why that should be a problem for solipsists either.
Well, like I said you are entitled to your opinion.
But the fact is if the only thing that exists is self, then the only thing that can be referenced is self.
That is self recursion and it leads to an ill defined infinite regress in which you never define anything.
Including self or anything else.
If you can define things, including self, then this necessarily means solipsism is not a reality.
To me you seem to be confusing recursion with self recursion.
You say a solipsist can reference a tree then redefine that tree as being a part of self.
So the tree would in essence be an object like self, but the critical difference would be it would actually exist independent of the self.
If solipsism were actually true and a reality that would not be possible.
There would be no other objects, there would just be one object referencing itself, which leads to infinite regress.
I pointed out the definitions of recursion and self recursion.
If solipsism was true it would not be possible in reality to avoid self recursion when referencing.
You're equivocating between two different definitions of "self". The first is the conscious experience we're having right now; the traditional "self"(1). This is the context in which someone says "look at that orange tree". The second definition, which comes from solipsism, is "the source of everything that exists"(2.1) or "the only real mind"(2.2). So when a solipsist encounters a tree they could think/say: "look at that tree which does not exist in any reality external to some conscious or unconscious part of my mind" .
My second point is that solipsism is and always has been presented as a possible explanation for phenomenon, not a rejection of the existence of phenomenon. Saying that if solipsism were true there would be no trees blatantly misrepresents the inherent thrust of solipsism. The single object universe you describe as "self-referential" isn't solipsism because it says nothing about the nature of the phenomenon we perceive as solipsism does; it depends on their non-existence to be an apt objection.
As far as applying the epistemically/ontologically recursive objection to actual solipsism goes: once we invent some sort of original cause to anything we're always left holding the same empirically empty bag: What caused the original cause? Humans are unfortunately limited to this sort of causative temporal thinking. If my mind creates everything what created my mind? What created the big bang or sustains the universe?
My mind all the way back is no more problematic than turtles all the way down...
No.
I am saying that if solipsism was true then the only thing it would be possible to reference would be the self which is self recursive and leads to an ill defined infinite regress.
I don't care what definition of self you use, if there exists only one object and that object includes a reference to something, it will be a referencing only of itself.
That simply cannot be avoided.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I pointed out why that is simply not true.
If solipsism were a reality we would be certain of nothing, not the self or anything else.
If solipsism were true it would be incapable of explaining anything.
Also you want to cling to an inconsistency in your position where by you imply that we can only be certain of self.
If we can be certain of the existence of self, conscious experience, subjective perception, or what ever you decide to call it, then we can be sure there exists something independent from that.
If there exists nothing independent of what ever you decide to call it, then we could not be certain of anything and any attempt to define or reference anything would lead to infinite regress, meaning there are an infinite amount of steps that must be taken to arrive at a conclusion.
Because we reach conclusions all the time within a finite amount of steps and without any issue this means we can be logically certain that solipsism is not really what is going on ontologically or epistemologically.
That just leaves semantics.
You want to argue semantics go for it.
Perhaps solipsism does not literally mean that all we can access is self generated subjective information.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
lol
So saying turtles all the way down never gets you to the bottom, just like saying only the self exists would never allow you to reach a conclusion about the existence of self or anything else.
It is only a problem if you take the assertion of solipsism seriously from in logically formal way.
It very obviously is not true that it is my mind all the way back because if that were true I would be stuck in an infinite loop.
I am not, so I can conclude solipsism is not true.
It doesn't have to be avoided because this is not a description of solipsism, it's description of something else entirely. Under solipsism "self" is more than just a single object; "self" is everything that exists, including one's personal "self"(1), but it is still distinct (being a part of, and not the whole. See: compositional fallacy) from the expanded solipsistic definition of "self"(2)
Quoting m-theory
What kind of conclusions do you reach that allows you to be logically certain solipsism is not true?
"Tree's exist"?
What about the ontological/epistemic gap that exists when confronted with the dogma of uncertainty?
Can you give me some examples of the infinitely regressive steps that we would begin taking in pursuit of a conclusion under solipsism?
Quoting m-theory
Turtles all the way down is an expression that has come to represent the inherent incompleteness in any of our cause and effect/ hierarchical descriptions (of any kind) of the universe. The moon orbits the Earth, the Earth orbits the sun, the sun orbits (another star) the gravitational center of the galaxy. What does the galaxy orbit? And so on. "Turtles all the way down" was allegedly one answer given to support the concept of a flat earth when confronted with the question "What holds it up?"; it point's out that a final "conclusion" of source or cause is unachievable because it must always be supported by additional claims, which in turn themselves must be supported. This kind of dogmatic regression exists in the currently accepted cosmological model and leads inexorably to an unanswered question or the supposition of an axiom. What created the universe? Ontological regression is not unique to solipsism.
"The tree is created by my mind. What created my mind" might be "ontologically regressive/recursive" but there is no actual infinite repeating loop and no "self reference". To say that a tree is generated by some aspect of my mind is not to say that the tree is in and of itself equal to my mind. Parts need not share characteristics with the whole, and vice-versa.
Solipsism is the notion that you only have access to your own existence.
If this true then my criticisms apply.
What you are describing is the notion that you can simply redefine objects (like trees for example) as being a part of self.
That redefining would not be possible if the only access to existence you had was your own existence.
If things do not exist independently of your own existence, the subjective experience, the mind, or what ever terms you want to use, then the ill defined infinite regress issue I pointed out will arise.
Claiming that solipsism avoids this issue by suggesting that there is access to independently existing objects is not a typical definition of the term solipsism and I am not arguing that point because I agree that, necessarily, we must have access to an existence that is independent for our own existence.
Of course that is not how solipsism is typically defined.
If you are claiming that all information we access is subjective, that we never access any information independent of that subjectivity, then you have not avoided the issue I raised.
Otherwise, if you are not claiming this, then I see no reason to debate because I agree that the above notion cannot be the case.
Also I am not talking about incompleteness I am talking about logical steps.
There would be infinitely many if solipsism was actually the case and we would never arrive at any conclusions, definitions, or any logical sense at all.
We would be stuck in an infinite loop.
If it is true that we can arrive at conclusions or definitions of things (including self) in a finite amount of steps, then this is mutually exclusive of solipsism.
The simplest way I can put it is like this.
Self is not logically equivalent to non-self.
If solipsism were true then the above would be false and it would not be possible to make conclusions or form definitions of self or non-self.
Because we know in reality that the self is not logically equivalent to non-self, we can draw conclusions and form definitions about either of these two distinct, and independent things.
For the life of me I don't understand why that is so difficult to grasp.
The self cannot be logically equivalent in reality to the non-self without infinite regress of self recursion.
You're equivocating between different definitions of the term "self".
Under metaphysical solipsism ("the world and other minds do not have objective "existence"."), everything that exists is presumed to be a part of one's own mind, but not equivalent to one's own mind (that's kinda the whole ontological point of solipsism). The "Mind" ("self"(2)) encompasses everything that exists, including "self"(1). Everything that exists, as a whole, is "the mind". The "self"(1) is a part of this whole, and the stimuli the self(1) experiences (like trees and animals) is also a part of the greater "mind" (the whole), but it (a tree) is neither equivalent to self(1) or self(2). It is a thing generated by self(2) and perceived by self(1) (under metaphysical solipsism).
When a hypothetical solipsist suggests that the world we perceive is actually generated by "the self" or is a part of "the self" they are not saying that the world they perceive or the things in it is equivalent to their consciousness, they're saying that their consciousness is the only thing with objective or continuous existence while the things they perceive are some form of non-continuous illusions brought on by some fundamental aspect of the way their conscious/subconscious minds work.
When people are dreaming they can perceive of things within their dream, like trees, but instead of the perception of the tree coming directly from some external reality, it comes from (is a part of) the mind itself. This is the kind of position that a metaphysical solipsist would take. In essence they would accuse you of being an illusion, and thus far your retort would be "But you perceive me/can draw conclusions about me, and if I was an illusion you would not be able to do either of those things". That is however the precise nature of an illusion. It is a perception offering false data (in some way).
You're saying in a solipsistic world "we would not be able to draw conclusions" (based on our perceptions?), but the only argument you have offered to establish that is the idea of an infinite logical regress which depends upon semantic equivocation between "the conscious mind", "the things the conscious mind perceives" and "the whole". Since solipsists are not conversing with trees while operating on the presumption that the tree is equivalent to their own conscious mind, you ought not maintain that this is what solipsism necessarily entails.
-----------------------
The relevance of all this to the question posed in the title is to assail the notion that our "knowledge" is absolutely sure to be correct when it comes to our understanding of "the objective world". Such a grand destination has simply not yet been reached in any rational or empirical schools. The fundamental nature of the universe ("objective reality") is still an open problem, and there are a host of annoying and goal post sliding hypotheticals, like solipsism, which exist as thorns in the side of even the most well founded epistemological systems which would seek to establish some absolute form of "objective truth".
This means then that my criticism applies.
If this were actually true that there were no independently existent things apart from self then the problem of infinite regress from vicious self recursion cannot be avoided.
But because things do exist independently of the mind, perceptions, subjective experience, self, or what ever terms you want to use, we are not subject to the problem of infinite regress in reality.
We can be logically certain that metaphysical solipsism is not true.
I'm probably being overly optimistic in assuming this might work, but could you explain to me in a specific, "practical" example how the infinite regress would go?
For example, say I'm talking to you and you discover that I'm a solipsist. I say things such as "That tree is actually just my own mental phenomena," and "You are just my own mental phenomena." "Only my mental phenomena exist."
Well, where on your view is an infinite regress going to enter the picture?
You will recall I provided a link to the definition of recursion.and self recursion.
The issue arises with the claim that there exist no independent and distinct objects.
Or the claim that everything is subjective perception.
If everything is just subjective perception, and that subjective perception has no access to any existence independent of itself, then this will be an example in which self recursion applies.
To avoid infinite regress necessitates that there exist things which exist independently of subjective perception, the self, the mind, or what have you.
If all that exists is dependent upon subjective perception then self recursion applies.
Basically you must concede the point that there are things which exist independent of subjective perception to avoid infinite regress.
What semantic acrobatics you perform to salvage solipsism at that point, I do not care.
My main point is that there necessarily exist distinct and independent objects.
Of course in reality there is no practical example of self recursion from solipsism because in reality solipsism is not the case, so I am sorry if this post does not address that.
Wait, though.
If I say things such as "That tree is actually just my own mental phenomena," and "You are just my own mental phenomena." "Only my mental phenomena exist," would you say that that is sufficient for me to be a solipsist? If not, why not?
And if it is, I'm asking you where, in this specific example, some infinite regress comes into play with my hypothetical views there. I'm not asking you with respect to things you'd need me to say in order for there to be an infinite regress. (And regarding that, by the way, I might very well say, for example, that there is no such thing as perception in reality; I could say that perception is a non-solpsistic concept, a fictional interpretation of my solipsistic mental phenomena. So it's not the case that everything is "subjective perception" because a fortiori it's not the case that anything is perception. But this is an aside, please address the other part instead.)
Re my request, I'm also asking for a specific example of what you think I'd need to say (that is, the sort of thing I'd need to say) that would be an infinite regress given "That tree is actually just my own mental phenomena" etc. In other words, give me a quote, not an abstract description as you did above. I want to examine how a hypothetical conversation would go, as if we were writing a Socratic dialogue.
This seems to fall in line with the claim that we only have subjective access to information, so yes to me this would be subject to the issue I raise.
Again you seem to be claiming that we can not be sure of independently existent things.
This means our own existence would also be ill defined, again recall that if things do not exist independently then self and not-self are essentially logically equivalent.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It is great that you realize that solipsism is only a hypothetical case.
The problem exactly would come from self reference or self defining.
Recall that if there is only subjective access then this means that any definition or reference will be restricted to that subjective thing.
So it is the claim that distinct and independently existing things do not exist or can not be reference which creates the problem of self recursion.
Lets look at what we mean by three important terms.
1. Recursion -
Note that when defining objects with recursion objects are treated as though they exist independently from each other, even if they are considered the same object each one must exist independently.
So you can claim that solipsism survives my criticism by appealing to the notion that perceptions have independent and distinct existence.
Perception of self exists independently of perception of tree.
That is a bit of semantic back pedaling but sure it check's out, as long as you don't then claim that the perception of tree cannot exist without the perception of the self.
That would mean you are implying that these things do not in fact exist independently and that is the sort of claim I debunk.
2. Self recursion -
This will apply in the case where objects do not have any independent existence.
That is to say the only way to define or reference will be self recursive.
The only way to avoid self recursion is things exist independently of each other.
That is to say as long as a tree is a distinct and separate existence apart from the self and one does not depended upon the other.
So if solipsism is the claim that things do not exist independently of yourself, then I think it should be the person making this claim that should demonstrate how self recursion does not apply.
But you keep implying the burden of proof is on me to show that self recursion is infinitely regressive.
To my mind it should be obvious why self recursion applies to solipsism for the reasons I have pointed out.
3. Definition -
So this will mean to formally/logically apply properties.
If we define or categorize something then we must avoid self recursion, and we can not avoid self recursion if there are no independently existent things.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Again this is not a semantic issue that I raise it is syntactical one.
If there are no independently existent objects then self recursion applies, and that regress infinitely without any clear definitions of anything.
Quoting Terrapin Station
The infinite regress, specifically, would apply if there were in fact no independently existing objects.
So it is if you say "Things have no objective existence in reality, there is only a subjective existence."
Then we can debunk this, because if it were in fact true there would be the problem of self recursion and the infinite regress it entails.
Again I do not agree with you that I have the burden of proof here and again I think the person claiming "There is no objectively existent things, only subjectively existent things." is the one that must show how self recursion does not then apply.
Again, I'm asking you to explain infinite regress specifically with the sentences I've put into quotation marks and ONLY with respect to those specific sentences. There's no reason to write anywhere near the volume of text you're writing--especially when you're not even responding in the context of the specific sentences I put into quotation marks.
Also, it's not that I believe that solipsism is necessarily hypothetical. It's just that I'm not personally a solipsist.
Yeah again it is not about semantics where you say something in particular that is self recursive the infinite regress is of syntactical consequence.
It is a syntactic consequence of self recursion.
Some examples of proofs are Curry's paradox and the Kleene-Rosser paradox.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox#Language_capabilities_for_expressing_the_paradox
^
Link to a plain language example
And again I think the burden of proof is on the person claiming there is no access to independently existent things that must demonstrate that this would not lead to self recursion.
So yes or no does the set of sentences I presented entail an infinite regress? (Just answer yes or no or explain why you can not just answer yes or no.)
I am saying that yes the problem of self recursion does apply if the notion that things do not have independent existence applies.
So if your sentences are trying to convey the idea that there is no independently existing things then yes.
How can you really define the distinction between subjective and objective if we only ever are objective?
The subjective world remains only ever an inference at best.
The idea that subjectivity really is just an objective process, is far more believable than the other way around.
If yes, then what I'm asking you is to give how the implied, infinite-regress sentences would have to go.
I feel like you don't understand as a result of your belief that because you can semantically express your assertions without infinite regress that then there are no syntactical issues.
Again I have already provided sources that explain the issue, if you are interested in how that type of self reference regresses infinitely I advise you to review this link once more.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curry's_paradox#Language_capabilities_for_expressing_the_paradox
Also I have pointed out several times, it is not my burden to prove that self recursion regresses infinitely, this is a result demonstrated in formal reasoning.
I am not here to discuss those results I am here to point out how they apply to solipsism.
It is your burden to demonstrate how your assertions avoid self recursion.
I have zero interest in you "explaining the issue."
What I'm interested in is you telling me what the infinite regress sentences would have to be in the example I gave.
There's a reason that that's what I'm interested in, but it's not something I'd explain until we've gone through the process, because doing so would undermine the whole point.
It is not my burden to prove that self recursion regresses infinitely.
It is your burden to show how you escape self recursion.
Why in the world would we be talking about "burdens"? And who is asking about a "proof" of anything? I thought we'd be capable of having a conversation, no?
To me there is nothing interesting to discuss.
Solipsism is not a very compelling philosophical topic.
It can only be hypothetically the case, and even then it is not logically founded.
I am amazed that people struggle with the "dilemma" at all.
Also I addressed your request with source material that illustrates how self recursion is infinitely regressive yet you continue to insist that I repeat myself.
If you had some point you wanted to arrive at, why not expedite our conversation and get to it?
;-)
"objectivity" requires consensus.
Subjective describes one's inner experience, objective describes a shared experience - things a group of people all experience and agree on.
While it is true that our interpretation of all external events is subjectively experienced, when others also report the same experience it becomes objective.
If I were to experience something (voices or images) that referred to external events, but others that should have also experienced the same event did not - then I would assume it was just subjective (a hallucination or delusion), even though it may have seemed objective.
So "objectivity"requires consensus.
That does not mean objectivity by defnition reflects ultimately reality - but it is a good starting point for progress through emperical, scentific/critical thinking.
I'd say that there's a difference between what you personally take as necessary to believe that something is objective (which isn't the same thing I require, by the way) and what it is for something to be objective. The latter doesn't at all require consensus. The former, for you, might require consensus.
This is not true unfortunately. Have you heard of the hard problem? It says that if everyone on earth except you were actually zombies but displayed all the signs of being thinking beings no different from how you perceive them now then you can't tell the difference. Likewise, whatever OTHER people say to you is true about states in the world (IE that table is brown) then it is still only the subjective perception of someone elses voice telling you that the table is brown. How can you know for certain that another person exists in order to prove objectivity? You can't.
This is the sum of your argument. You are trying to posit that because other people exist in the world, that they must be objective also and therefore consensus of them validates an objective world. That is circular reasoning as you are trying to prove something by something that isn't proved yet (namely whether other people even exists or whether they are just a sensory impression and nothing more).