A philosophy outline
Outline of Philosophy
In definitions, words have meanings. Word-meaning occurs in contexts, according to various factors such as a unit of time, or event. These meanings are traditionally ascribed by the process of reasoning. A “word” could be a picture, or any symbol. The word could also have a metaphorical association to its relations. In this vein, different words can have the same meaning and different meanings can be ascribed to the same word. Definitions occur by names, accounts of properties, and genus-species classification.
A picture in my mind may elicit the words lion, brown, and animal. The meaning of the word lion, brown, or animal can only mean that particular meaning to me (or anybody else for that matter), even if it is named differently. This meaning could even be expanded to include imaginary or metaphorical associations as mentioned earlier.
The sensory experiences which constitute intersubjective meaning in contexts are direct, undefinable, and infinitely varied, however. While there is some vagueness as to what “words” can mean at times because of the nature of context, since skepticism that negates all knowledge is disregarded here, there must be some singular, mathematical-physical-logical reality involved. Because the temporally prior cause of our varied experiences is the consequent of our knowledge of matter (empirical causal reality), we must acknowledge that this reality is both a-sensory or logical, *and* the origin of feeling life and consciousness. This shared reality is both quality (particular) and quantity (universal). So, truth (the one reality) must also be non-dual in substance.
In definitions, words have meanings. Word-meaning occurs in contexts, according to various factors such as a unit of time, or event. These meanings are traditionally ascribed by the process of reasoning. A “word” could be a picture, or any symbol. The word could also have a metaphorical association to its relations. In this vein, different words can have the same meaning and different meanings can be ascribed to the same word. Definitions occur by names, accounts of properties, and genus-species classification.
A picture in my mind may elicit the words lion, brown, and animal. The meaning of the word lion, brown, or animal can only mean that particular meaning to me (or anybody else for that matter), even if it is named differently. This meaning could even be expanded to include imaginary or metaphorical associations as mentioned earlier.
The sensory experiences which constitute intersubjective meaning in contexts are direct, undefinable, and infinitely varied, however. While there is some vagueness as to what “words” can mean at times because of the nature of context, since skepticism that negates all knowledge is disregarded here, there must be some singular, mathematical-physical-logical reality involved. Because the temporally prior cause of our varied experiences is the consequent of our knowledge of matter (empirical causal reality), we must acknowledge that this reality is both a-sensory or logical, *and* the origin of feeling life and consciousness. This shared reality is both quality (particular) and quantity (universal). So, truth (the one reality) must also be non-dual in substance.
Comments (22)
Perhaps you're conflating language, which is universally symbolic, with truth which is myriad.
IF you were saying that words have specific meanings (even if within contexts) in philosophic discussions...you are dead wrong.
Take the word "atheist" as a descriptor. Used in the context of "I am an atheist"...it can mean a diverse variety of things...and arguments over those differences often takes over for fundamental topics in which it comes to be used.
I acknowledge I may have gotten you wrong.
There is no ONE monolothic undivided truth in my opinion. A diamond has many facets and each may not be privilieged over any other except within a certain context. I could've misunderstood you. If I have please clarify your position if you care to do so.
Before I reply could you expand on this a little bit?
:
arguments over those differences often takes over for fundamental topics in which it comes to be used.
Clearly atheist could mean a variety of things, and often times the communication is less than ideal. Much seems to be lost in translation/naming, but if by Mona Lisa I mean this picture and you do too, how can we really argue with that when we both point at it?
I apologize, I use the word truth in two ways. The first is to describe what happens in a context where we all do approach reality from different vantage points, where knowledge is possible in language or some other mysterious way. But by truth I am also referring to the singular reality (not logical truth) that that knowledge is about, inferring it is there because I am not a solipsist/skeptic essentially. So I don't really disagree.
Sure thing.
Your first words were "In definitions, words have meanings."
I am merely pointing out that often they do not.
I used the example of "atheist" because it comes up often here in this forum.
In this case...THIS IS THE TOPIC.
I am sure there are a myriad of things on which we could agree. But in philosophical discussiong...often words have meanings that are not so cut-and-dry.
That is my point.
I am refuting the first argument you made. (Unless I am misunderstanding your first argument.)
Your concentration on 'words' is in accordance with die Kehre or 'the turn' to linguistics in philosophy, illustrated by the later writings of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. I suggest that you may be missing a central point that words, being socially acquired, are primarily communicative, i.e. with others, or between facets of 'self' in that internal dialogue we call 'thinking'. You may also be unaware that recent views of words is that they are non-representational, i.e. they evoke contextually modifiable 'concepts' rather than being isomorphic to independently existing 'objects'. Little wonder that die Kehre was considered iconoclastic to mainstream analytical philosophy !
Of course, talking about language with language is always problematic, and that is one reason why meditators (etc) resort to the word 'ineffable' in their attempts at transcendence.
Yes, you are misunderstanding my argument. My argument is that words have meanings *only within* contexts, and because there is meaning in those contexts only, no matter if we don't realize we are talking about the same thing or if we think we are but aren't, there is still meaning (an abstract or sensory object), which could be known by others if the circumstance allows. I do not mean it as the standard textbook version of meaning. In philosophical discussions, or a court of law, we encounter this at its peak, which is why communication can be tricky. Again, i am not arguing for an objective, referential view of language, quite the opposite.
Please read my response to Frank and rethink your interpretation of the writing. I agree with what you have stated and all of that is central to my argument in the initial post. If you read it now, you might see it. Words as contexts has everything to do with the dichotomy with subjective experience and why I argue they are facets of the same thing (non-dual reality).
Of what use would language be if not as objective as possible. If I am speaking of a rainbow and you are interpreting that to be a fox...we are NOT communicating.
My point is, though, that many words (especially descriptor words) are almost meaningless because they mean so many different things to different people...and that is regardless of context.
Use my earlier example...the word "atheist."
Try using it as a descritor...describe the context...and let's see if the word is unambiguous.
I have a hard time conceiving of ANY descriptor use or context that resolves unambiguously.
This is significant because almost all descriptor type words can be explained by avoiding the descriptor (when communicating) and using a description instead.
You seem to claim that language is so vague that the apparent logical picture of reality I need for my argument is not the case. So, within contexts, knowledge can be possible, but much of the time we are deluded, mainly because of names.
For my argument, all I need is for contexts to allow the possibility of knowledge of the empirical and logical worlds. The names don't really matter (but they could aid communication); it's the *content* of the account/definition which matters. When you say "atheist," a cluster of interrelated (to all existence, beyond logic) meanings (sensory experiences, abstract definitions) arise; the name is just a placeholder for logic and vagueness (a consequent of linguistic communication). I don't think language is purely representational, but neither is it schizophrenic/totally fallible. It works just how it should.
By that "reality" I mean it in the way we look through language (the semantic meaning of our experiences). If I am not to be a solipsist, how can I avoid acknowledging this mysterious inner truth-reality? If i must believe in other minds, other minds means an objective reality.
e.g. She thinks she dresses well but in reality she looks terrible
or
In reality, an electron can behave as both a particle and a wave.
Note that the 'objectivity' we might or might not associate with these uses merely equates to a claim for consensus.
The point is surely that 'objective reality' is a metaphysical extrapolation from real usage to what W might call 'language on holiday'. The solipsist issue is a red herring from that pov.
I claim nothing of the sort.
I do claim that certain words frequently used in philosophical discussions, particularly descriptor nouns, are so ambiguous as to be useless.
I pointblank think we can overcome that problem by NOT USING the descriptors, but instead accurately describe the essence of what we are attempting to communicate by describing it.
Let's take that word "atheist."
Here is a sentence: "I am an atheist."
The person stating that may mean:
a) I lack a "belief" that any gods exist.
b) I have a belief that no gods exist.
c) My guess is that there are no gods.
d) It is my opinion that it is more likely that there are no gods than that there is at least one god.
e) I believe that it is more likely that there are no gods than that there is at least one god.
f) Until someone comes up with proof that no gods exist...I will not accept that any gods do exist.
(Obviously there are more.)
These are significantly different things...differences that matter during a discussion.
I am simply saying that instead of using, "I am an atheist"...it would be better and clearer if the person used the words describing the position he/she actually means.
These concerns of mine stand in conflict with what your wrote in the OP.
Yes, it is definitely a logical leap to make a claim of reality which is just being happy with consensus because I think it is necessary because I want to avoid solipsism.
Ok then, in certain contexts the over simplification I described is seen to be that. I think it still is a useful entry point for discussion, but it is clear there are many, many more aspects to be considered.
I don't want to get involved with Frank's mission about 'belief'. I merely remark that in ordinary situations (not philosophical discussions) words like 'atheist' are rarely used even by atheists themselves ! i.e. For them, the word 'God' has zero functional personal significance, except in social situations where they might feel it is socially expedient to attend or respect the rituals of religious conformists. For them 'God exsts for others' in as much that it is a functional concept for others, who also don't actually need to label themselves 'believers', any more than atheists need to do label themselves. in normal interactions,
But there is no 'belief issue' going on in non - philosophical exchanges. The varieties of 'atheist' that Frank wants to discuss for his own purposes are meaningless in the contexts of 'normal life;.
I see. So there is a reality out there which we can know of. How do you refute the skeptic/solipsist because these positions seem well-grounded and any other belief seem to be simply ignoring the key points raised by them rather than solving them. Something like avoiding a bully rather than facing him/her directly.