Is Physicalism Incompatible with Physics?
Physicalism is the idea that nothing exists except for concrete objects in the material world. But physics is the study of the mathematic principles which determine the behavior of these material objects. And these abstract principles (e.g. F=G(m1m2)/r^2) surely don't exist in the material world. You can't locate them under a microscope. So acknowledging that the laws of physics exist seems to contradict the theory of physicalism. Thoughts?
Comments (156)
:up:
Ideas are still Nouns. If you think about it further, aren't all nouns ideas? My cat exists outside of my mind, but I can only observe him from within my mind. I can tell you his name, and you may be able to identify him. My cat's name (Rico) is the equation and my cat is the concrete object. Is it not correct to say that my cat is Rico? The molecules that make up his cells that make up his body are certainly more complicated than that, so if you want I could go into more detail about his features and personality and chemical makeup. You could say something like Name+Genetics+Experience=Rico. That is a simple albeit relatively accurate formula. The more complicated the formula, the more accurate it seems.
I've never attempted to explain my cat as an equation and I don't know how I feel about doing it either. Regardless, I've always seen language as the bridge between what is real in our minds and what is real in the outside world. I consider equations a kind of language. Language can be broken down to the vibrations of your vocal cords to make different sounds. That sounds like something that can be watched under a microscope to me.
Seriously, though, it depends on the kind of physicalism we are talking about. Regarding the OP I doubt many physicalists, or any sensible physicalist, would claim that nothing exists except "concrete objects in a material world" since elementary particles are not, according to current physical theory, any such thing; they are fields or waves or intensities in a field. On that conception of the physical, why could ideas, equations or theories not also be such?
I suppose his equation pleases me. I mean, he did just claw me, but I still like him. Surely.
Enjoyment of Cats(Rico)-Being Clawed=Love for Rico
I guess.
The element I have the most difficulty understanding is the matter of corresponding identity. If brain states are matches of cognitive events, the only way to check if that is the case appeals to something beyond either register.
This reminds me of Gilbert Ryle's example of a foreigner visiting Oxford and remarking that he had seen the colleges and the libraries, but was wondering where the University was.
So I think one approach for a physicalist here is to say that the laws of physics aren't some additional thing that exists beyond what is observed. Instead their existence, if it is that, just is in the way that those observed things are organized.
(As it happens, Newton's Law is no longer considered to be one of those abstract principles since it's been superseded by GR.)
But I think there's a serious problem with your argument. When people refer to laws of physics like gravity, they are not referring to the sum of a particular sort of phenomena. They are referring to a principle which they understand to govern the material world. If we use your definition of physical laws, then the laws will lose their character of necessity. If the law of universal gravitation just refers to a type of movement, then there's no reason why objects of mass should necessarily attract other objects of mass. Laws of physics would cease to be laws and become mere description of the past. And if gravity is just a simplified description, then I have two questions. 1) why have all objects observed in all controlled experiments always obeyed the law of gravity (as well as every other well established law of physics)? and 2) why should objects continue to obey the law of gravitation in the future? If it's just a description of past phenomena, then perhaps I'll suddenly float up into space. There's no good reason to think I won't unless we understand the gravity equation to refer not to a concrete object, but to an abstract principle which governs the physical universe.
I'm using the words physical and material interchangeably. So if elementary particles aren't concrete objects in the physical world, then how are they physical? They can't be abstract objects in the physical world. So they're not in the physical world. But if they're not in the physical world, which I understand to include all physical things, then they are not physical things. And isn't the core tenet of physicalism that only physical things exists?
I think my reply to TogetherTurtle basically covers your argument. If the laws of physics are just descriptions of the way things happen to be organized, then they are not laws. And if the laws of physics aren't actually laws, then why does the universe obey them. It can't be random. What are the odds that every physical object, in the absence of laws, would always act as if it were governed by laws? Statistically infinitesimal, I would say.
Physics is physical theory, and not all of what is material or physical in the ordinary sense of those terms is describable or explicable in those fundamental terms. Which is to say that disciplines like geology and biology would become unintelligible if you tried to express our understandings of them in terms of QM or Relativity.
But it doesn't seem to follow that we cannot consistently and coherently say that the entities that are studied in the disciplines of biology, and geology are ultimately constituted by elementary particles or fields. Those entities are complex structures that we think are constituted by, but are not reducible to, or "nothing but" those fundamental entities.
Right, we may be able to show that there are brain processes which correlate with cognitive events, but we can never, it seems, definitively show that the latter are reducible to the former. There would not seem to be any contradiction involved in saying that the latter are constituted by the former, while acknowledging that there are emergent properties which cannot be coherently and comprehensively understood in terms of the former, though.
Indeed they do. The key word is 'reducible to'. Another way of putting it is that such things as consciousness, ideas, thoughts, and so on, supersede on the physical (per the SEP entry on physicalism. If someone doesn't hold that, then they're not physicalist, because physicalism is above all monistic, i.e. there is only one basic category of stuff, and that is the physical.
One way to argue against that, is to say that such capacities as rational inference and abstract thought are of a different order to anything disclosed by the study of the physical. Or, put another way, there's no coherent means to get from the laws which govern physics and chemistry, to those which govern mathematics and language, as they belong to a different domain. Nor will any amount of neuroscience reveal anything about the foundations of logic, so to speak, as it inheres solely in the relationships of ideas, not on the relationships of physical substances.
That suggests a form of dualism, which I'm willing to defend, if need be.
The best plan, if you want to critique them, would be to study their works to ascertain just what it is they are saying. There are some on these forums who go on endlessly about how ridiculous and deplorable these eliminative physicalists are, and yet when you question them, you discover that they have not read any of their actual works. They just rely on secondary articles and book reviews from those who share their own prejudices. This is nothing more than confirmation bias at work.
Regarding physicalism, I am not arguing against any particular eliminative physicalists. Maybe physicalism, like humanism or conservatism, is one of those philosophies which continues to evolve and branch out. In that case, there doesn't seem to be any point in critiquing it, since its defenders can simply claim 'not all physicalists think that' or 'physicalists haven't believed that since 1917.' But the definition of physicalism I was using was the simple one that you get in encyclopedias, namely that everything is ultimately reducible to physical entities.
I don't claim that it will ever be possible to precisely correlate brain activity with complex experiential processes. But there does not seem to be anything in principle wrong with the idea that there may be neural processes correlated with all experiences. We just have to decide which, on the available evidence is more plausible: that there are neural processes correlated with experiences or that there are not, and more strictly that there are neural processes correlated with all experiences or not.
So ,emergence is one possible explanation and "infusion by the holy spirit" or 'transcendent awakening" might be others. How will you decide as to which is the more plausible?
In regard to your definition: what does "reducible" here mean, though? Does it mean explicable? Nothing but? And what is your definition of a physical entity?
Regarding physicalism, I'll try to give adequate definitions of the terms you asked for. By 'reducible', I mean that nothing in addition is required to explain. So I mean both explicable and nothing but. By physical entity, I mean fundamental particles and the composite objects that are made of fundamental particles. Maybe space-time should also be included as a physical entity.
What about physical properties that are not themselves entities; like wetness for example?
The other point is that a physicalist, in order to be counted as any kind of physicalist, does not need to say that wetness, considered either way, is "reducible to the composite state of physical entities", but might rather say that it is an irreducible emergent physical property.
When it comes to the phenomenological feeling of wetness; why say that is "in our own consciousness" rather than saying it is in the physical or material interaction between liquids and sentient bodies?
Nothing that we experience is the direct representation of an interaction between our bodies and the world. First, it gets processed through our brain (and perhaps a non-physical mind as well). So the phenomenological feeling of wetness can only be a mediated result of the body's interaction with a liquid.
You are offering definitions or descriptions, but these don't seem to amount to explanations.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
To be sure there are neural processes within the body that, along with physical contact with the liquid give rise to the feeling of wetness. What is it that feels wet, though, apart from our bodies or parts of our bodies? Our brains don't feel wet, in fact we don't feel our brains at all. If I dive into water my whole body feels wet. If I dip just the tip of a finger into a liquid it is only my fingertip that feels wet.
Why not? I'm sure there's more to be said. But can you find me any scientifically observed properties of liquids which can't be explained in terms of basic physical concepts like shape, volume, motion, temperate and pressure?
Quoting Janus
Our minds coordinate visual and bodily sensations to form a distinct impression of body parts like fingertips. And when one of our body parts is wet, our minds associate the sensations of wetness with the body parts from which they originate. But the feelings themselves are in the mind. If you jump in pool without a brain, the feeling of wetness will not occur. In the context of our current argument, I'm using mind and brain interchangeably.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Aren't you relying on science to tell you all that? I can't tell whether you are accepting or rejecting physical explanations of the experience of wetness.
You might want to say that all of our experience is in our brains, but if all of science is also only in your brain then how would you know what the notion "in our brains" even means?
Perhaps you mean to say that the models of experience that are created, including the models of the brain itself, are in our brains, but that would be to suggest that there is a real brain that corresponds to our models. How could you know that?
If there were a real, physical brain that corresponds to our models, why would there not be a whole world of other real physical objects which correspond to other models, which are not in our physical brains?
The corollary of this kind of thinking seems to be a weird kind of dualism like Descartes'. The you have the problem of how something physical could interact with something non-physical.
I meant that while gravity is a real thing that we can observe, the name "gravity" simply tells me what you are talking about. It's a useful short term for when not everyone at the dinner table understands math. So the name "gravity" only exists within our minds, but the actual phenomena is what is undeniably real.
Well, undeniable to an extent. You mention that these names turn into descriptions of the past, and you would be absolutely correct. After all, we can not know and study the future. Rico may one day have white fur instead of orange, and while I will obviously be confused about how that happened, you can't blame me for thinking he was orange.
Essentially, I see science as a whole as reverse engineering nature. No one can tell you if you are right in science. Sure, a supervisor or respected elder may tell you what they know, but there is no answer key on the field. Gravity may be a whole lot of hoo-ha. I don't think it is, I hope it isn't, but if you think it is, you still have to explain everything gravity does. While flat earthers have more of a conundrum than a theory, they are still at least attempting to explain what they see.
So, what is real is the phenomena. Objects are naturally drawn toward each other. My cat is orange.
The name can be simple or complex. Gravity can be F=G(m1m2)/r^2 or just simply gravity. Rico can be Rico, or the sum of his genetic code plus his experiences of the world, plus his name, etc.
However, different people explain things in different ways. To a flat earther, what you call "gravity" is simply flat Earth falling at 9.8m/s. You can tell him his definition is wrong, and I would agree, but he is still talking about the same thing we all experience.
What we observe could change tomorrow and never change back. As so, I believe our names and definitions should change with them. Of course, I don't think gravity is ever going to change, but we can only know the past and use that to predict the future.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Oh look, Janus has reversed the roles, asking Dusty to defend physicalism. Janus, why are you asking Dusty to defend physicalist principles? if you recognize that liquidity cannot be explained by physical principles, then why not just accept the principles which Dusty is putting forward, and follow the conclusion which is made concerning physicalism?
Quoting Janus
The problem of how the physical interacts with the non-physical was solved a long time ago by Plato, through the introduction of a third principle, the medium between the two. This is called "Plato's tripartite soul", mind, body and the medium spirit. Look it up. Descartes did not adequately describe this principle and so reintroduced the problem of interaction to anyone who does not look beyond Cartesian principles to understand dualism. However, anyone who has studied dualist principles with more effort will know that interaction is a non-issue, which was resolved for western philosophers prior to the life of Jesus.
lol
Yes, they do exist in the material world, or senses wouldn't be able to sense them. Symbols are just manipulations of material. Their conceptualization is processed, transmitted, received, memorized by way of chemical and energetic functions within physical locations--brains. That we perceive them as non-physical doesn't affect their being physical or not. Perception is also a physical and energetic exchange between the senses and the brain.
Particles in a liquid move in a different way than particles in other states of matter. They'll don't resist being rearranged the way particles in a solid do, but they can't be compressed the way particles in a gas can.
Quoting Janus
I partially accept physical explanations. We know from experimentation that experiences correlate with brain states. But I'm not a Cartesian dualist. I think experiences like wetness or surprise or the color blue have real substantial existence. I think it's self evident that they do, because we experience them. I think that physical objects only exist in the sense that they can explain the world we experience. And physical explanations are compelling enough that I think it's pretty safe to say that there really is something (let's call it OR for objective reality) corresponding to our concept of the physical world. But we don't what OR is. We only know how it affects our experiences. I'm drawing the same distinction that the Orthodox Christians use when they talk about God. They can know the energies of God, but they can't know his essence. So when I talk about the physical brain, I'm just referring to the causal source of experiences. I'm not specifying what the nature of the source is. And I'm also drawing the Aristotelian distinction between different types of causes. The physical brain might be the efficient cause of our experiences, but I don't think it's the material or formal cause. The material causes of experiences are not neurons, but the components of experience itself such as colors and sounds and feelings. And the formal cause of experience, I think is best described by what Kant referred to as the schemata: the functions by which our manifold of sensations are arranged according to space, time and the Categories. I'm happy to defend and elaborate upon my own ideas, but I'll just remind you that the original purpose of this post was to challenge the idea that everything that exists is physical.
D.M. Armstrong developed a physicalist metaphysics that is consistent with these abstract principles. In a nutshell:
Everything that exists is a state of affairs (SOA). An SOA is composed of 3 types of constituents:
a particular, its properties, and its relations to other SOAs. The gravitational force between 2 objects is a relation between those objects (states of affairs) that is describable as a function of the internal properties of their respective masses and of the distance between them.
The relation described by the gravitation equation does not exist independent of the objects; it exists only in the objects (states of affairs).
Physical laws are expressed as mathematical equations. So they are not merely descriptions of the past but are also predictions of the future. Scientists observe structure and patterns and hypothesize testable laws and explanations. That seems to work pretty well.
So it appears you are asserting a Euthyphro-style dilemma. Either the universe obeys a law external to it or else there can be no law (in which case we should expect a disorderly universe). Would that be a fair description?
That there are certain patterns to the interaction of matter and that these patterns can be described mathematically doesn't undermine physicalism.
Physicalism basically claims all is matter. It doesn't deny that there are patterns/laws in the way matter behaves.
You're begging the question here. Why would you say "it can't be random", what is preventing that from being the case? You've already presumed there are laws which prevent certain things from being the case by claiming that particles cannot randomly act in the exact manner they do. If there are truly no laws at all, then one of the things that can be the case is that all particles simply behave the way they do for no reason at all. With no laws, what is there to prevent them from doing so? Also, with no laws, there is no such thing as statistical liklihood either, so you can't even say it is unlikely.
a particular, its properties, and its relations to other SOAs.
The gravitational force between 2 objects is a relation between those objects (states of affairs) that is describable as a function of the internal properties of their respective masses and of the distance between them.[/quote]
I wonder where/how maths fits in this ensemble?
Quoting Isaac
It’s only because of ‘observable regularities’ that science can even do its work. In a totally unordered universe, how could there be any specific thing? I mean, science presumes natural order, surely.
I wasn't talking about a totally unordered universe. I was talking about a universe which was ordered the way it is for no reason at all. I'm saying that that to presume order must have a law enforcing it is to presume the natural state of affairs is disorder, which is question begging, presuming we already know enough about fundamental particles to know they cannot become ordered without some force compelling them.
I agree that in a universe without any perceived order, there could be no individual thing, but that does not require such order to actually exist, nor does it require such order to have been enforced by laws external to that which is thus bound.
i) We write a statement which expresses a physical law.
ii) We demonstrate the meaning of the written statement by performing an experiment.
iii) We summarize the result of our demonstration: "Performing action U in state A resulted in state B, in accordance with the law"
According to realism, we've demonstrated the truth or coherence of the law as well as the meaning of the written statement, but the meaning, agency and whereabouts of the law itself mysteriously lie elsewhere.
In contrast, according to anti-realism our demonstration is part of the very meaning of the physical law. That is to say, the physical law is in part an anthropological description of what physicists do in certain situations to achieve a sense of coherence.
Of course, the anti-realist shouldn't forget the role and responsibility of the environment in the truth of experimental outcomes, that is to say the construction of such outcomes. The difference is, the anti-realist includes the very actions, perceptions and mentation of the physicist as part of the very definition of the physical law he is verifying.
What is it about realism that you think commits it to believing these "mysteriously lie elsewhere"?
Meaning lies in the minds of those understanding the concept, agency is not required since not everything has to have agency, and the law itself is no more a thing than a name is.
By realism I mean the idea that the meaning or truth-makers of a proposition are fully transcendent of the process of it's verification. For instance, take Hooke's Law.
The realist is the person who thinks "The elastic deformation of this spring is governed by Hooke's Law"
The anti-realist is the person who thinks "The elastic deformation of this spring is part of the definition of Hooke's Law"
OK, so this is the bit that makes you want to reify the law. Cannot a realist say "The elastic deformation of this spring is described by Hooke's Law", and negate the need to reify?
But patterns are not physical things. Doesn't physicalism dictate that all things are physical? How can one be a physicalist and accept the existence of such patterns?
You'd have to explain that if you mean it literally. If you're saying that physical laws per se aren't physical things, that would be more understandable. Surely you're not claiming that, say, a pattern on a checkered shirt isn't physical?
Thanks. Realized that after I made the post. Was hoping it'd slip by.
Anyway, I don't think we can use the existence of abstraction as an argument against physicalism because abstractions are functions of the physical brain isn't it?
I understand that thoughts aren't physical but the interesting thing to note is that arguments that are based on it seem to be argumentum ad ignorantiams: ''Look. We can't explain mind in physical terms. Ergo, it must be non-physical.''
Basically, what if mind is physical and we just don't know it yet. I'm willing to go only so far as to admit that there's something physical that hasn't been discovered rather than infer, possibly erroneously, that the mind is non-physical.
If these abstract principles don't exist in the "material" world, then how did they make their way into your post for me to see and read? Is an internet forum with people's ideas that you access via your computer an abstract principle? How did you come to know of abstract principles if not by the world itself, which you call "material" and "physical"?
The problem with arguments like this is because they assume some type of dualism - where two or more kinds of substances exist and are so different that they are incompatible, or unable to interact.
There is no "physical" or "non-physical". Everything is part of the same world, or reality, or substance that do interact. How do you explain your non-physical ideas being put into a physical form for communicating to other minds? How do you get your ideas into other people's minds, if not by your non-physical mind interacting with the physical and then vice versa, when I read your posts?
These terms are incoherent and unnecessary. We can talk about the world without using such terms. Your mind is a representation of the world, and as such mathematics is a model of the world. We could use words just as well as numbers to describe the world and numbers and words are composed of visual scribbles or sounds if they are spoken. How did you come to know the existence of numbers and words if not by using your senses to access the world?
The terms arise because people want to answer questions such as "just what are minds, anyway?" Some people think the answer to that is that minds are just brains in particular states. Some people don't at all agree with that. They believe that minds are a very different sort of thing.
The distinction also arises in positing things like gods, souls, etc.
The relation between (or among) states of affairs can often be described mathematically. The point is that the equation is an abstraction, and doesn't exist independently of the states of affairs.
Armstrong is a realist regarding laws of nature. He believes there are actual laws of nature, not just regularities. To Armstrong, "laws of nature are dyadic relations of necessitation ... holding between universals." Where a universal is a "state of affairs type".
Electrons and protons are two different "state of affairs types". Each electron has the property "-1 electric charge"; while protongs have "+1 electric charge." It is a "law of nature" that protons and electrons attract one another because of their properties. This attraction is a dyadic relation (involving any electron-proton pair) necessitated by their properties.
I will tentatively accept your summary as a fair description, although I'm slightly worried that you have an argument in store that will make me regret doing so.
But that is what I was saying - that it doesnt help in using those terms to answer those types of questions. Minds are different in what sort of way? Apples and oranges are different fruit states but both are not so different that they can't interact causally, or are incompatible substances.
This is not accurate. Physicalism refers to a spectrum of positions, but it is most commonly formulated as a commitment to the claim that everything that exists supervenes (or in some way depends) on the physical, where "the physical" is defined in terms of the ontological commitments required by the physical sciences (whether future or current). Again, there are many nuances on this general theme - perhaps as many nuances as there are physicalists!
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Mathematics is a tool used to model relations that obtain within the physical universe, so I'm guessing that an appeal to mathematics is not likely to persuade physicalists who are willing to admit relations into their ontology.
It should be obvious that I am neither defending physicalism nor asking @Dusty of Sky to defend it. Dusty seemed to be claiming that there are comprehensive, definitive reductionist physicalist explanations for liquidity. I don't believe there are any such reductive of explanations of what are considered to be emergent phenomena. Many thinkers, who will still call themselves physicalists consider emergent physical properties to be irreducible; which means that mechanistic explanations will be impossible in principle.
Often people who wish to reject physicalism characterize it as a necessarily mechanistic model, which it only is insofar as it is in accordance with outmoded paradigms. This is nothing more nor less than knocking down strawmen.
The interaction problem only exists for those who think of mind and matter as completely different substances. Positing a third intermediary which is a composite of both does not really help, since we have no good reason to consider mind and matter to be completely different substances in the first place. The whole of nature would be better considered to be composite like the intermediary in the tripartite model, that would be much more parsimonious.
There is the checkered shirt, that is a physical thing. Then there is the pattern which the colours are said to be in, that is not physical. So the pattern which a checkered shirt has, is not a physical thing.
Quoting TheMadFool
OK, let's say that an abstraction is what a physical thing (a brain) does. How can you construe what a physical thing does, as something which is itself physical? The brain is physical, but how is what the brain does something physical? For example, a person walks to the store. The person is something physical, the store is something physical, and the ground is physical. But how is walking something physical? Despite the fact that "physics" is involved in understanding the relations between physical objects, this does not mean that these relations are physical.
Quoting TheMadFool
I don't see the problem. When it becomes evident that mind cannot be described in physical terms, we assume that it is not physical. How is that a problem? When it becomes evident that colours are not smells we assume that colours are not smells. Where's the problem? Colours are not smells, nor is mind physical. There is no problem unless you want to believe that everything is physical, then there's a problem
Quoting Janus
Despite your claim that "many thinkers" believe this, if you yourself think, you ought to recognize it as incoherent. If something is "emergent", then it emerges from something else, and it is therefore reducible to its constituent elements. It is contradictory to say that something which is emergent is irreducible.
Quoting Janus
There is very good reason to consider two completely different forms of actuality, and therefore two completely different substances. These reasons are evident all over this forum in the form of various philosophical problems. Mind and matter are apprehended as completely different. The so-called interaction problem is an argument used against the dualist description, which is to treat these two as different substances. But the third "intermediary" renders this interaction argument as impotent. Therefore dualism remains as an acceptable solution to these philosophical problems.
When something is apprehended as "composite", a proper understanding of that thing requires an understanding of the individual elements of that composition, and the reasons for their union. So it does not serve us in our attempts to understand nature to simply say that nature, as a whole, is a composite, and ignore the fact that a composite is composed of distinct parts, united somehow. The division is evident to us, like the division between past and future, and to ignore the division in order to claim that the two distinct parts are really one, without understanding how the two distinct parts are united, is just a mistake.
To summarize, we actually have very good reason to consider mind and matter as distinct substances. The so-called interaction problem has no bearing. And, if our goal is to understand nature, and nature appears to be composite, there is no reason not to make the appropriate divisions in analysis. So denying the dualist distinctions is just detrimental to the process of understanding.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think Armstrong's theory is that physical properties are universals which particulars instantiate. So even if physical laws are just functions of properties, the properties have universal natures which exists over and above their particular instances. Are these universal natures real things? They're not physical objects. How do you resolve this problem without admitting non-physical objects into your ontology?
Quoting Harry Hindu
I'm not assuming dualism. There are a number of alternatives to physicalism and dualism. I personally prefer a sort of Kantian idealism. I believe in an external world of one kind or another, but I don't think we can know what it is. We can only know how it affects us.
Quoting Isaac
That would be true if there were no laws of logic and statistics. But a universe without logic and statistics would be utterly absurd and inconceivable. A universe without gravity, on the other hand, is easy to imagine. The existence of a universe where mass did not affect the curvature of space-time would not violate any principles of logic or statistics. A universe where all objects always obeyed an intricate set of laws for no reason would absolutely violate statistics, and perhaps even logic. A random process can occasionally yield non-random results just by random chance. But if a random process exclusively yields non-random results, the chances of that draw closer to zero with each passing second.
And why are we using the ease with which you personally can imagine something as a measure of what is, or may be, the case. What possible mechanism of reality could there be which ensures its inner workings are conceivable to a particular 21st century Homo sapiens?
Quoting Dusty of Sky
You'll have to explain this, as I'm not getting it from your assertion alone. How would such a universe violate the laws of statistics?
Quoting Dusty of Sky
I never said the process was random. Your term (which I used) described the cause, not the process. What I was asking is why all the particles in the universe could not behave the way they do (consistently) without the need for a guiding law? In order to see that as statistically unlikely you'd have to make two presumptions 1) the default position of particles in the absence of guidance is to act randomly, and 2) out of all the other universes with fundamental particles none of them (or very few of them) are like ours.
As you don't have either of those two pieces of information, nor any reason to believe them, then I don't see why you would reach such a difficult conclusion.
Why would you think it is contradictory?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's funny....I don't find anything in what you wrote, and I haven't seen anything anywhere else, that I would consider to be a good reason to hold that view.
The brains's function (thinking) deserves special treatment is something I agree with, mainly because it hasn't yet been explicated well and understanding it would be awesome. However, there are many instances analogous to brain-mind that don't attract as much attention and that surprises me. Look at a car. It's made of metal, rubber, plastic and glasses that come in varird shapes. Separate they're nothing but together they acquire a property/function that can't be understood if we consider only the parts. Only the whole, all parts together, is what we call a car. I think brain-mind is something very similar and, so, shouldn't cause us to overactivate our imagination.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, if we take a cellular phone and time travel back to the 12th century it would be unexplicable and I'm quite sure 12th century folks will ''explain'' it as sorcery or something to do with spirits etc. The truth however is that cellular phones are correctly explained with physical radiowaves. This clearly shows that we shouldn't default to magical thinking just because something can't be explained readily with the physical sciences.
The pattern is simply the arrangement of colored threads as they comprise the shirt, the relations of them to each other.
Not a specific argument, just an observation. I think framing physical laws in that way implicitly assumes Platonic dualism. That is, Platonism assumes there is a material domain and a separate domain of forms. On that framing, subordinating form to matter would imply that physical laws are contingent and nominal rather than necessary and universal - and so not really laws.
But a different approach is to reject the Platonist framing. Instead there is a unitary universe that can be investigated and described in both experiential and logical terms. The universe exhibits form rather than obeying it or creating it as the horns of the dilemma suggest.
So, if the pattern exists as some other thing to the shirt, what happens if we destroy just the pattern (but leave the shirt completely untouched)? If the two are two different things, there should be some result that is one without the other (A+B, - B, is A, not A+B still), but I can't think what that could be. All the while we leave the physical shirt untouched it seems to still have its pattern,suggesting very strongly that the pattern and the shirt are not two seperate things.
The idea that the universe can be understood is a fundamental presupposition that underlies nearly all human thought, especially scientific thought. If we can't use logic and mathematics to draw conclusions, then science is futile. Planning out your afternoon might even be futile.
Quoting Isaac
In statistics, we collect data about a sample in order to make inferences about the whole to which the sample belongs. For instance, we might survey a sample of coin flips in order to find whether heads or tails is more likely. And unless we are biased in the way we choose our samples, we assume that the more individual samples we take, the more confidently we can make estimations about the whole. If we consistently find that half of coin flips land on heads, we infer that the 50/50 principle applies to all coin flips. It can't just be that the coin flips we came across happened to result in heads half the time for no reason. There must be something about coin flips, as a particular kind of phenomena, that causes them to behave this way. And the same applies to objects of mass attracting objects of mass. If all the objects we observe attract each other in accordance with the law of gravitation, then we conclude that gravitational attraction applies to all objects. It can't just be an arbitrary pattern in the sample we took.
Quoting Isaac
Randomness is the default state of something which isn't governed by laws. Isn't that self evident? If something isn't ordered, we should expect it to be disorderly. Coin flips are random because there isn't any regular principle which determines how we flip them. Conversely, if something does exhibit consistent regularities in its behavior, that indicates that it is governed by a principle. Regarding the second assumption, all we need to accept is that a universe where fundamental particles behaved differently wouldn't contradict anything about logic or statistics.
Quoting Andrew M
Something seems very wrong to me about saying that everything in universe exhibits the same forms for no reason. And if there is a reason, I don't think the reason could be framed as simply a property of the objects which exhibit form. For instance, it seems to be a property of mass that it causes space-time to warp around it. But I don't think you can just take this fact at face value. Why does the universe exhibit these patterns? It's not logically necessary. Maybe it's physically necessary, but necessity, it seems to me, implies the existence of laws. Something can't just happen to be necessary. There must be something else that makes it necessary.
There are alternatives to dualism, which is what I was arguing for - monism.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
This sounds like indirect realism. How is Kantian idealism different from indirect realism? It seems to me that you'd need to explain the difference between physical things and ideas. If both of these things have causal power, then what difference is there between them other than the type of thing it is? - not any more different than how dirt is different from water. How is it that we can put dirt and water in the same domain of "physical" but not minds, even though they all have causal power and interact with each other?
The fundamental thing to keep in mind is that (according to Armstrong), everything that exists is a state of affairs (a particular with its properties and relations). The properties and relations do not exist independent of the state of affairs in which they are instantiated. We can still think abstractly about properties and relations (through the "way of abstraction"), but these are just mental exercises.
Yes, physical properties are universals, and exist in their instantiations. But it's not quite correct to say that physical laws are functions of properties. Rather, physical laws are relations between "state of affairs types" (SOATs). The distinction is subtle, but important, and it's lost if you conflate properties with SOATs:
We can consider there to be a SOAT for each property (i.e. the SOAs that have property x are a SOAT). But it would be incorrect to say "-1 charge" has an attraction to "+1 charge" - which implies a relation between properties (which is incorrect). Rather, we should say "states of affairs with a -1 charge have an attraction to states of affairs with a +1 charge" - which elucidates the fact that it fundamentally a relation between SOATs (a relation that is instantiated in SOAs of those types).
You asked, "Are these universal natures real things?" If a "thing" is an ontic object, then NO, because a property is not a SOA. Nevertheless, the universal "-1 charge" (which is a universal) exists, as a constituent of certain SOAs.
Interesting, and good to know. But if Armstrong takes the most basic objects in the universe to be states of affairs, then I don't see how he can call himself a physicalist in the traditional sense. States of affairs, as I understand them, consist of relations between abstract ideas like properties and particulars. These are not objects we can empirically observe. They are concepts by which we make sense of our observations.
I wasn't denying the use of logic to draw conclusions. Science takes empirical observations and uses logic to describe and predict things about the universe. But that's not what you were doing. You said "a universe without logic would be absurd" and "a universe without gravity, on the other hand, is easy to imagine". Neither of those two statements apply logic to empirical sense data. The first simply asserts that logic is a law and that without it the universe would seem absurd to you. The second just declares that you feel you are capable of successfully imagining a thing. I'm asking what either of those declarations have to do with the nature of reality.
That you see logic as a law without which the universe seems absurd, tells us about you, your beliefs and your limits of sense. It doesn't say anything about the universe. That you think you can imagine a universe without gravity tells us about your imagination (or your confidence in it), not the universe.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
This is a common misapplication of probability. I strongly suggest Ramsey's Truth and Probability if you can get hold of a copy. We only presume that something must have influenced a run of 100 heads in a coin toss because we know that normally the distribution would be 50/50. We don't know in advance how we would expect objects of mass to behave, so we can make no probabilistic statements whatsoever about the fact that they all act the way gravity describes.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
No. That's exactly the question of the thread. Why would you presume something must be governed externally in order to not be random. Have you seen Lagton's Ant?
Quoting Dusty of Sky
No. Coin flips appear random because we don't have the data to determine their path. If we did, their resting face would be entirely predictable.
No. A state of affairs is not "relations between abstract entities." Abstract entities do not exist (that would be inconsistent with physicalism). Abstractions are just tools of the mind (useful fictions) they do not actually exist as ontic objects.
Consider actual objects in the real world, such as a rock. Consider the mass of the rock (700 grams). You can't physically separate the rock's mass from the actual rock. There is not a relation between the rock's other properties and the property "700 grams". The rock's mass is an intrinsic property of the rock. You can think abstractly about the fact that the rock's mass is 700 grams, but that doesn't mean "700 grams" exists independently of the rock, or that the rock exists independently of its mass.
Multiple objects can have an identical 700 gram mass: consider all such objects with a 700 gram mass: they can be considered a State of Affairs Type (states of affairs with the property "700 grams mass"). "700 grams mass" is a universal, because multiple objects can have this property.
I hope this helps you understand that a state of affairs is an inseparable package: everything that exists (such as a rock) has properties and relations, but it actually doesn't make sense to say that any of those properties or relations has some sort of independent existence.
A universe that disobeys logic is absurd by definition. It would be circular reasoning to try to use logic to prove itself, and I don't have any other way to prove that it's valid. But if we can't use logic to decide what can and can't be true about the universe, then we can't use anything. Empirical observations are only useful because we can pair them with logic in order to draw conclusions. So what's the point in saying that universe might not actually make any logical sense? I guess it's good to be humble, but I think we need to assume that it makes logical sense if we're going to seek knowledge.
Quoting Isaac
If something happens over and over again in the exact same way, I assume there's a reason for it. And if something happens for a reason, it's not random. If something happens for no reason, it is random. And the ant is governed by laws. They're in his programming. He is determined to move in a certain way, and being determined is the opposite of being random. I take random, undetermined and for no reason to all be synonymous. Whether laws have to be external is a separate issue.
Quoting Isaac
If there is any consistent pattern in the behavior of objects of mass, then I think it's safe to assume that those patterns did not just show up coincidentally. Objects of mass will probably continue to behave as we've observed them to behave in the past, and there's probably a reason for that. Do you even disagree? If you don't think that gravity is a result of an external law, then what is it a result of? A lot of people here seem to think it's the result of the inherent properties of objects of mass.
Quoting Isaac
I don't think we disagree on this point. Perhaps the statement I made that you were responding to was unclear.
Quoting Relativist
The very phrase "state of affairs" seems to imply that there are multiple affairs in a single state. I'm not claiming that particulars, properties and relations can exist independently. But in order to explain what a state of affairs is, don't you need to appeal to the existence of its abstract constituents? Just because the abstractions are codependent doesn't mean they don't exist. And I don't think it would be helpful to define existence as being exclusive to things which can (hypothetically) exist independently. Because independent SOAs consist of their codependent parts and therefore depend on them.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
In your first statement you treat logic (correctly) as a method of thinking, we "use" logic. In your second statement you treat it as a set of rules which it is, at least theoretically, possible to 'disobey'. This is the problem I'm trying to highlight. Logic is a method of thinking about things (empirical data), which has proven incredibly useful. But its utility derives from the degree of success it has in predicting states of affairs. We can't now turn things the other way around and say that the states of affair are somehow forced (against their otherwise default state) to comply with this method of thinking we made up.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Because what does not make logical sense to you may not be so illusive to others. If I could put a banner at the top of this site it would be "Your incredulity is not an argument".
Logical sense is a property of your mind, not the entity your mind is considering.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
That's all very well, but again, a "reason" is a property of your mind (whether you find it to satisfactorily explain the phenomenon), not a property of the phenomenon itself. The ant merely has programming. Whether that programming 'causes' the pattern is up to you.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
Again, this just tells us about your psychology, not the universe. Why would you think it safe to assume that?
Quoting Dusty of Sky
I don't see any reason for it to be the result of anything.
That's consistent with Armstrong's view. The constituents (e.g. specific properties) actually exist, but only in their instantiations as part of states of affairs. Returning to laws of nature as "relations between states of affairs types" - it shows that there's not actually a dependency on an equation existing as an ontic abstract object. Abstract objects (as ontic objects) are incompatible with physicalism. Constrast this with Platonism, which can assume Newton's law of gravity exists independent of there being objects to which it applies. For that matter, Armstrong would deny the existence of "4" as an abstract object. Rather, there are states of affairs consisting of 4 objects (sub-SOAs), but we can still think abstractly about the universal "4".
I can't believe that this is not obvious to you. If a thing emerges, it emerges from those constituent parts, and is therefore reducible to those parts. How does it make sense to you that something could emerge, but is not reducible to the parts from which it emerges? That would be like saying that there is an effect which cannot be explained by its causes.
Quoting TheMadFool
I wouldn't say that the parts are nothing without the whole. They are not parts of the car, unless there is a car, but all those bits of metal, glass, plastic, etc., are still something without the existence of the car.
Quoting TheMadFool
Actually, I think the cell phone would be useless in that situation, without the necessary infrastructure. The cell phone is just a part. It is something without the rest of the system, but it isn't very impressive. I don't know what you mean by "magical thinking", you'd have to explain this. Do you believe that the non-physical is magical?
Quoting Terrapin Station
The shirt is composed of coloured threads. The threads are physical things. To say that the threads are in an arrangement, or a pattern, is to refer to something other than the threads. You refer to a pattern.
The pattern is something other than the shirt because many different shirts are said to have the same pattern. And, the person who designed the shirt had the pattern in mind before it came to exist on the shirt. I don't know how you would destroy a pattern. Suppose 2, 4, 6, 8, is a pattern. Erasing the numerals does not destroy the pattern because I still have the pattern in my mind. So the question doesn't make any sense until you propose how a pattern would be destroyed.
Quoting Isaac
That the shirt has pattern X, pattern Y, or some other pattern is a judgment which someone makes. The judgement is made by the person who designed the shirt, that it ought to have such and such a pattern. And so the shirt was made to have that pattern. The pattern exists in the designers mind, and on paper, before it exists on the shirt. It could be imagined to be on numerous different media. So it's actually quite easy to imagine the pattern without the shirt. I don't see why this might be difficult for you.
You're making the mistake of thinking of causality as only efficient. For someone who professes to be influenced by Aristotle, this shortsightedness is surprising, to say the least.
I don't see how that's relevant. What's relevant is that the concept of "emergence" is such that if something is emergent it is composed of parts. And anything composed of parts is reducible, according to the concepts of "parts" and "reducible". Therefore it is impossible, by way of contradiction, that anything emergent is irreducible. "Emergence" as such is nonsense.
Final cause as described by Aristotle is incompatible with emergence, because it requires that the form of the thing which will come into being is prior in time to the material existence of the thing, as its cause, like an idea, the blueprint or plan for the thing. Final cause implies intention. "Emergence" does not allow that the emergent thing's existence is intentional. Therefore "emergence" is incompatible with "final cause".
Dangerously close to it; not to mention the fact that it closes all inquiry since the non-physical, by definition, can't be investigated in anyway. That said I see an opening for inquiry into the mind with the mind itself - a sort of self-examination which philosophy encourages. However I don't know how much objectivity, a necessity I presume, can be attained along such lines.
If the universe is all there is, then there is nothing to reference outside of it. The reason why mass curves spacetime, if that's the right question to ask, is to be found by empirical investigation.
Assuming an external law wouldn't move us closer to an explanation. It would just raise the question of why there happens to be one particular law in effect rather than another.
I see the issue as this - given scientific laws/regularities/order, then science can do an awful lot of work. But it doesn't explain those laws; it doesn't know why f=ma or e=mc[sup]2[/sup]. Put another way, science reveals many things about the order of nature, but nothing much about the nature of the order ;-) And that is something that is often lost sight of.
I'm not seeing the necessity here. How is our repeatedly using the same name to describe similar arrangements of colour and shape forcing a thing into existence?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If I asked you to imagine a world without apples are you seriously suggesting that the question doesn't even make sense until I can provide you with the details about how exactly I plan to destroy all the apples. Do you ask Putman how exactly he planned on making his vat? Do you require architectural drawings before considering Searle's Chinese room to have any meaning?
It's a thought experiment. Just presume I have some means of destroying things that exist in the realm of platonic forms (or whatever realm you're positing for this pattern). What would the shirt with alternating stripes now look like if I destroyed the pattern {alternating stripes} within the realm in which it exists?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't claim to be having any trouble imagining the pattern without the shirt. If you actually read my post I'm asking entirely about imagining the shirt (completely unchanged physically), but without the pattern.
As having properties is how we describe things. Where does the property emerge from, the human mind which does the describing? If you are direct realist, then the property is the thing, and it is therefore composed of parts.
Quoting TheMadFool
Why would you say that the non-physical cannot be investigated? It just cannot be sensed and so we must investigate it with the mind, logic. Magic is a performance, often associated with trickery, illusion and deception. When the method of an act of performance is unknown, it may be said to be magic. But the methods of magic may be investigated. I suggest to you, that the reason you associate the non-physical with magic is that you haven't taken the time to investigate the non-physical, and therefore the acts of the non-physical create the illusion of magic.
Quoting TheMadFool
Yes, that's the route, examine the mind with the mind. I think your concern about objectivity is misguided though. The mind is what is used to understand both sensible world, and the mind itself. But the mind is present to the mind directly and therefore has direct access to itself, while it only has a mediated access to the sensible world, through the means of the senses. So it only understands the sensible through the means of the principles by which it interprets sensations. These principles are not themselves sensible, they are non-physical, and are only understood directly by the mind. Therefore, all of our knowledge of the sensible world, the physical, is only as dependable, or "objective", as our knowledge of the intelligible world, the non-physical. And it is necessary to conclude that our knowledge of the physical is founded, grounded, and based in our knowledge of the non-physical, so it is impossible that our knowledge of the physical is more reliable, or "objective", than our knowledge of the non-physical.
This is why it is not very wise, and possibly dangerous to dismiss the non-physical as magic. The physicists, and other empirical scientists are using the non-physical principles in their performance acts of prediction. If we want to understand what they are doing in these acts, we must proceed towards an understanding of the non-physical principles. If we dismiss the usage of non-physical principles, and therefore the scientific performances, as magic, this is just a disposition of not wanting to know.
Quoting Isaac
Do you know what it means to arrange things in a pattern? Would you agree that you must know the pattern, in your mind, prior to arranging the things according to that pattern? If so, then how can you not recognize that the pattern exists in your mind prior to the things demonstrating the pattern? If you are having a problem with the word "exists", then we might leave it out, and say that the pattern is in your mind prior to the things being arranged in the pattern. Do you not understand this, or see some reason to deny it?
Quoting Isaac
The question makes no sense to me, but sense to you, because you and I seem to have a different understanding of what a "pattern" is. If "apples" were the type of thing which were impossible to remove from the world, as "patterns" are, then you would see that it makes no sense to ask someone to imagine a world without apples.
Quoting Isaac
OK, I'll try this thought experiment for you. I remove from my mind, a particular pattern. Let's say I forgot it. Then I really cannot say what the shirt would look like, because I forgot the terms I would use to describe it. Maybe I could think up some new, random words to describe it, but what good would that do?
The real issue here, which you seem to have no respect for, is that the pattern existed in the mind of the designer, before it is expressed in the shirt. So it really makes no sense to ask me whether I can banish the pattern from the intelligible world, now, because the pattern was necessarily there in the intelligible world, at that time when the shirt, with that pattern, was created. Whether or not I have the capacity to recognize the pattern is irrelevant.
Quoting Isaac
Unless you are direct realist, the pattern is not in the shirt, it is what the shirt is said to have. The designer has the pattern in mind, and makes the shirt as an example, or representation of that pattern. You can see this in all artificial physical objects, cars, planes, building, etc., they are representations of the ideas, concepts, used to construct them. There is a model, a blueprint, design, which the object is made to be a representation of. This is what is in Plato's cave allegory, sensible objects are a reflection of the ideas used to create them. That's how the philosopher comes to understand the reality of existence.
It's referring to the relation of the threads--the way they're situated with respect to each other extensionally (or we could more conventionally say the way they're situated in space). You don't think that the relation of the threads is nonphysical, do you?
No. I must have an image (or instructions) relating to a pattern in order to try to create another pattern just like it. Neither of them are the pattern in some way. They are two different patterns with many similarities.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. "Exists" is not the problem, "the" is the problem. There's no such thing as the pattern. There are patterns (which are just collections of properties we focus on), those patterns have similarities, that's all there need be to it. We don't need to then reify some archetype.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But a tartan pattern, for example, is just as possible as apples to remove from the world. In fact, before the advent of weaving, there was a world with no tartan pattern. What you can't do is remove all the tartan patterns from the world but leave all the kilts exactly as they were, meaning that the tartan pattern does not exist independently of the thing it is describing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I didn't ask that it be removed from your mind, I asked that it cease to exist entirely. What would a checkered shirt look like if the pattern 'checkered' ceased to exist as an independent thing?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. A pattern existed in the mind of the designer. A different pattern exists on the shirt. Are you trying to claim that the exact same pattern has been removed from the mind of the designer and placed on the shirt?
It depends upon the property. The apple's redness is not a property of the apple alone. It is a property of an interaction between the apple, light, and our sensory system. Through causation, redness can inform us of the state of our sensory system, the wavelength of light and ripeness of the apple. The property of ripeness belongs the the apple alone, not redness. Redness is a property of the mind when looking at, or thinking of, an ripe apple.
I think our philosophical premises are showing. :-) So if we can't discover the nature of the order by investigation of the natural world, then how can we discover it?
Do you think there is, at least in principle, an explanation? And if so where and how is it to be found?
Of course the relations of the threads are non-physical. How could they be conceived of as physical? The threads are physical things which we can sense, and spatial and temporal relations are not sensible so they are non-physical. That this thread is situated, in such a relation to another thread is purely a spatial concept, and therefore non-physical. Or do you think that space is a physical thing? If so, by what sense do you perceive space? And if you don't sense it how could there be a physical thing which you cannot sense?
Quoting TheMadFool
No I did not say everything is non-physical. I said that we interpret our sensations of physical things through the use of non-physical principles. Therefore our understanding of the physical is dependent on our understanding of the non-physical, and only as reliable as our understanding of the non-physical. This is why you are misguided in your assumption that knowledge of the physical is more "objective" than knowledge of the non-physical. In reality, the reliability of our knowledge of the physical cannot surpass the reliability of our knowledge of the non-physical. So your apple/light analogy is not relevant.
Are you aware of the tinted glass analogy. If you are looking at the world through a tinted glass, and you cannot avoid looking through that glass, then the tinting of the glass will affect how the colour of the world appears to you. Until you fully understand what the tinting of the glass adds or takes away from the appearance of the world, you will not be able to say how the colour of the world really is. The same is the case with the non-physical principles by which we understand the world. Our minds look at the physical world through these non-physical principles, and until we fully understand what they add or take away from the appearance of the world, we cannot say how the world really is.
Quoting Isaac
OK, let's say that they are two different patterns. Whether or not they are similar is a matter of judgement.
Quoting Isaac
If there is no such thing as "the pattern", then I see no reason to be talking about the pattern. But if you say that the shirt has "a pattern", then it is you who is trying to reified "the pattern", claiming that it is a real thing within the shirt. I see no principles whereby we might judge something, what you call "collections of properties" as "a pattern". Is any random thing a pattern to you? Can we agree that there is no point in talking about "the pattern", or "a pattern" if you insist that there is no such thing as 'the pattern", and to say that the shirt has a pattern is pure nonsense? if there is no such thing as "the pattern" which the shirt has, it is nonsense to say that it has a pattern.
Quoting Isaac
Talking about the world prior to the existence of some thing, is not the same as attempting to remove something already existing in the world, and then talk about that thing afterwards. These two are completely different. So this comparison is not useful. And since we have no premise to talk about the existence of patterns, as you have insisted there is no such thing as the pattern, we need to establish some premise whereby we can talk about patterns, before there is any point to making a claim such as the one you've made here.
Quoting Isaac
No, what I claimed is that a copy of the pattern which existed in the mind of the designer was made on the shirt. So we seem to have agreement here, maybe we can find a starting point. The pattern in the mind of the designer is not exactly the same as the pattern on the shirt. Let's say that there is a pattern in the mind, and there is a pattern on the shirt, and they are not the same, and neither can be said to be "the pattern". Do you agree that the pattern on the shirt is a copy of the one in the designer's mind?
Quoting Harry Hindu
That's strange I would think that "ripeness" is a judgement made by human beings, and not a property at all. When the banana is ripe for me, it is overripe for my son. Ripeness is not a property at all, it's a judgement, just like good and bad are not properties of moral and immoral acts, they are judgements of such acts. Come to think of it, redness, big, small, hard and soft, and everything that we call "properties" are just judgements made by human beings. When we say that such and such has X property, we are just making a judgement.
If you mean, do I think there is in principle an explanation for scientific laws, the answer is: I don't think there is. As I said, given that there are scientific laws or regularities or whatever you want to call them, and that we can discover them, then we can discover all kinds of things on the basis of those regularities. But as to why there are those regularites - I think that's actually quite out of scope for science. It seems the typical arrogance of today's world that we would think that this is something that could be discovered. Like the proverbial 'rooster taking credit for the sunrise'.
I suppose from the hypothetical theistic perspective, the reason you can't find the source of order in the world, is because it's not actually there; that nature is organised by principles which don't originate within nature herself. And that does seem at least logical, even though I know it's not a popular view of the matter.
So I'm saying, the question of 'why the universe is lawful' is not so much a scientific as a philosophical question. Obviously whatever philosophy makes of it has to take into account whatever science discovers, but at this point in history, the idea of big-bang cosmology seems very easy to analogise from the perspective of natural theology and many other forms of philosophical cosmology.
if not by the laws of physics in combination with some teleological force, how are things limited and compartmentalized in their limitation as they are?
No. I haven't the faintest idea what you're talking about here I'm afraid.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Demonstrating that a difference exists between two theoretical scenarios is not concomitant with the fact that there is no utility in the comparison. No two scenarios are going to be exactly the same, you've not presented any reason why their difference renders the comparison useless.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well not an exact copy, obviously. It will have some similarities and some differences. The key difference (which obtains no matter how accurate the representation) being the location in space. One is in someone's head, the other is on a shirt.
I don't think that the difference is a matter of "location in space". The pattern on the shirt can be seen and can be measured as occupying space, the one in the designer's mind cannot. The spatial existence of the two is what is different. If being able to be measured, and having spatial relations with other things is having a "location in space", then the imaginary pattern has no location in space. That, I think is the principal difference, the pattern on the shirt can be said to have a spatial location, but the imaginary one cannot.
This huge difference is why we're better off to move to something like what you mentioned, "instructions", or what I mentioned, a "plan" or 'blueprints", to understand the creation of the pattern on the shirt. We can say that the instructions have physical existence, on the paper, but this is a bunch of symbols which represent the ideas of what someone is supposed to do in order to create a shirt with a specified pattern. These ideas of what someone needs to do to create a specified physical object, are in minds.
There is no point in you and I discussing exactly where the pattern is, until we determine what a pattern is, because I think the pattern is what is specified about the shirt, and therefore is ideal, having no spatial location, and you think the pattern is what exists in the shirt therefore having a spatial location in the shirt. Studies in physics demonstrate that it is difficult, if not impossible, to assign spatial locations to parts (particles) within objects. So I think that my position is much more realistic than yours. The pattern is what is specified about the shirt, it is not something within the shirt. Can you agree with this, or would you prefer to demonstrate how you think that it is more realistic to conceive of the pattern as something in the shirt, or on the shirt, rather than something which is said about the shirt?
So, what are you saying - that there are no such things as properties - only judgments? Judgments about what?
It seems to me that a judgment is a property of a decision, goal, or intent. What is ripe for you isn't overripe for your son. It is still in a state of ripeness that either you or your son prefer. It isn't that it is over ripe for your son, it is the same ripeness as it is for you, it's just that he prefer's his under ripe, whereas you prefer yours ripe. You aren't determining the ripeness of fruit. It is your judgment, or preference, of the current state of ripeness. Your judgment has to be about something, and it is about the current state of the fruit. You are committing a category error in projecting "good" or "bad" onto the fruit, when the fruit is only ripe, over ripe, or under ripe, not good or bad. Good and bad are properties of judgments.
"Big", "small", "hot", "cold" are relative terms, meaning that they point to the relative properties of size and temperature when compared between two or more things.
Your syllogism is correct, but I don't agree with (nor can see any reason for) the premise. Why would our ability to measure something have anything to do with its having a location in space? Surely all our ability to measure something tells us is our current state of technology, not anything ontological?
If you mean our ability to measure something in theory, then you're just begging the question by asserting that the pattern in the mind cannot be measured. That is the very issue at hand.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't understand this connection. It is difficult to determine the spatial location of quantum particles, but as soon as they become physical objects their spatial location is not at all difficult to determine. It seems strange, if not even a little contrived, for you to use the uncertainty in particle physics to support your dualism, but allow no such uncertainty in neuroscience "we can't currently measure it, therefore it's unmeasurable". Let's either use science we know and understand (which would exclude all the 'spooky stuff' from quantum physics which has yet to be understood), or let's allow for uncertainty and progress in scientific understanding (which would not rule out a direct mind-brain correlation just because we have yet to fully explain it). Let's not pick ambiguity in one and certainty in another to support our preferred positions.
Not that "physical" is defined by "what we can sense," but you can't sense that something is, say, a meter to the left of something else? How do you figure out that something is a meter to the left of something else if you don't sense that?
We make judgements about anything. Do you recognize the difference between the thing and what is attributed to the thing (a property)? Or, the difference between the subject and the predicate? To say that something has a specific property does not mean that the thing actually has that property, the statement is a reflection of a judgement. It means that the thing has been judged to have that property.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That's nonsense. If it isn't a judgement which determines whether the fruit is ripe or not then how is the ripeness determined? Do you not see that there needs to be criteria as to what constitutes "ripe" and, that there needs to be a comparison of the fruit in relation to this criteria, in order for the fruit to be determined as ripe or not? If this comparison is not a judgement, then what is it?
This is the case when any properties are attributed to anything, it is a matter of judgement.
Quoting Isaac
Ok, you obviously do not like my claim that the imaginary pattern has no location in space, being imaginary. So perhaps you can offer a description or definition of what you mean by "location in space" which would allow that the imaginary pattern has a location in space. To say that the pattern has a spatial location inside a brain is really nonsense because the neurosurgeon will find neurons, synapses, and things like that, but not the pattern which is being imagined.
Quoting Isaac
So you believe that there is a time when a quantum particle is not a physical object? I suppose therefore, that at this time it is non-physical. If you accept that the quantum particle is at some times physical and at other times non-physical, then why would you have a problem with a physical/non-physical dualism? It seems like you accept dualism in the principles of physics, but not in ontology of the human being. Isn't this the type of nonsense which the op refers to? Dualism in physics is conventional, but the physicalist doesn't allow dualism in ontology. What's with that?
Quoting Terrapin Station
No I can't sense that one thing is a metre to the left of another, that must be measured or in some other way judged. Senses don't make judgements, minds do.
OK, thanks! However given what you go on to say, it seems you rule out a physical explanation for physical laws but not a philosophical (or theological) explanation.
I think that raises the question of what demarcates physics from metaphysics. Is it a difference in kind or a difference in focus? As I see it, philosophy goes meta by focusing natural investigation onto itself. That is, it is the investigation of investigation.
I think physicalism or material reductionism is best considered an educational tool, organization/contextualization... It is infintely important to have an educated public that knows for instance the cell, DNA and genes are basic units and concepts that relate to biology and know what the are.
In terms of the grand philosophy I think as we move forward we will be looking at more computational/information based theories because it actually reflects our understanding and practice. In particular synthetic biology is much more focused and defined as a methodological approach to biology understanding and utilizing it as a technology than it is any overarching concerns like the origin or meaning of life...
How are you determining that the "neurons, synapses, and things like that" are not the pattern? Again, you're begging the question. You're assuming 'the pattern' is some existant thing (such that you can say that a collection of neurons aren't it) in a discussion about whether a pattern is an existant thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. Not a physical object, and not physical at all are two different things. Energy is physical, but it is not a physical object. I'm not in any way an expert in physics, so my terminology might be all wrong, apologies if it is, but the difference I'm trying to capture is only that between energy and matter, which I understand are somehow convertible from/to one another.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, that's pretty much true in essence. I don't think physicists would use the term' dualism', but it certainly seems as though some very 'spooky' stuff is going on at the quantum scale. But it's not 'nonsense' at all to dismiss it at the human level. There is sound empirical and mathematical evidence for the 'spooky stuff' going on at the quantum level. There is none whatsoever for it going on at the human level. We do not require a 'realm of thought' to create useful models of the world (yet), so why invent one?
Can you sense the measurement?
As I said before, if the pattern which we are talking about is not an existent thing, then what are we talking about, and why are we having this conversation at all? We've already agreed that it is a pattern. We agreed that there is one pattern on the shirt, and one pattern in the imagination, two distinct patterns, that are somehow similar. Now you want to rescind that agreement and go back to where you were before that, claiming the imaginary pattern is non-existent, nothing. This is not progress. You agree on a proposition and then it leads you toward a conclusion which you dislike, so you withdraw the agreement.
Quoting Isaac
Energy is not a physical object, it is an attribute, a property of moving objects, the capacity to do work. It is "physical" only in the sense that it is something attributed to an object. Energy is a property of an object. The problem here is that some people assign "existence" to properties without having any physical object to assign these attributes to and then they create the illusion that the attribute has existence all on its own. In this case someone would say that energy exists as something physical, independent of any object. But of course that's nonsensical to say that there is a property existing independently of all objects, unless we look at that property as a concept, then it is an abstraction, in the mind.
I'm starting to see a pattern now in your thinking. It appears like you want to say that the non-physical is real, so long as it is not consider to exist as physical objects. The imaginary pattern is real, but not an existing physical object, energy is real but not an existing physical object. For you, these things are real, and they are not physical objects. However, instead of recognizing that "not physical objects" means that they are "non-physical" you want to make the incoherent move of disassociating "physical" from "object", to say that these things are physical but not objects. Do you understand that "physical" is defined as "of the body"? This is why your move to disassociate "physical" from "object", allowing that things like energy, and imaginary patterns, are physical but not objects is incoherent, because it renders the term "physical" as incoherent and self-contradictory. There are things of the body (physical) without a body (object)
Quoting Isaac
Oh come on Isaac. Do you truly believe that there is no quantum activity in the human nervous system? Biologists have determined that the molecular structure of living cells is extremely complex. And these molecules are very active, so I would say that they are most definitely making use of quantum activity. Why would you say that there is "spooky stuff" going on at the quantum level, but no "spooky stuff" going on in the human cells.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Of course not, the measurement is a judgement, in my mind. It is a comparison between the thing measured and the devise, or standard used for measuring. How would I sense the inside of my mind?
So say that you have two rocks and a tape measure. You put one end of the tape measure on one rock, and stretch it out to the other rock. You don't actually sense the tape measure where it meets the other rock, you don't sense what the tape measure reads at the other rock, etc. Is that right?
Physics is derived from the Greek 'study of nature', conventionally distinguished from metaphysics. So I would say, different in kind. Post Galilean science concentrates on what is quantifiable, first and foremost. The primary or measurable qualities or attributes of any subject are just those factors which can be precisely described in such terms. So the natural sciences likewise are conceived in mainly quantitative terms which is why physics is the paradigmatic science of modernity. But as the OP points out, in fact the ontological status equations, algorithms, and mathematical theorems, are themselves not something which can be located in the physical domain. So, yes, agree with you that metaphysics is in some fundamental way thinking about the nature of knowledge itself, about what it means to know. That is mostly shoved aside or ignored or taken for granted in a lot of analytical philosophy.
I'm talking about "exists" in the sense in which one would answer "no" to the question "do unicorns exist". Not in the sense in which one would answer "well, if they don't exist, what are we talking about".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not sure I did, but I may have been careless with my language I suppose. I don't agree that there "is" a pattern on the shirt and one in the imagination (where 'is' is being used to convey existence). I think we can talk about the pattern of the shirt, and we can talk about the pattern of the imagination, but neither exist outside of what they both physically are (shirt and brain).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am very much out of my depth with the correct terminology within fundamental physics, so you'll have to forgive the occasional fumble over terms. What I'm trying to capture is whatever physicists would call something like a neutrino, or a beam of light, or gamma radiation. My limited understanding is that these things exist in their own right (a beam of light still exists after the star which made it has gone) but are not objects, nor properties of objects. I gather one can think of a beam of light as a stream of tiny particles, but that this is only symbolic as they are also waves.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, and I'm not sure where you might have got that impression from. My understanding of the physics is that the theories at a quantum scale do not apply to objects at a non-quantum level (which neurons certainly would be), that the uncertainties resolve as soon as physical mass is obtained. We might have the particle which mysteriously changes properties depending on whether it is observed, but we do not have any objects which behave this way.
Quoting Isaac
There's something energy thing; energy not a physic thing oh no; philosophy is covers physic then must know physic and philosophy; covers all thing philosophy because think is everything; energy is a material but think is everything I think...
So my question is does the immaterial phantom limbs count as evidence for conscious illusion for physicalism? or did the old phantom limb is an illusion count as evidence for physicalism?
Because I could run this case used to argue the irreducibility argument of consciousness too... I am unsure if it has already been used to do so as the only thing I need to prove in my mind the reducibility of consciousness to being based in a physical phenomenon is how lobotomy, dementia, brain injury and dementia clearly makes you significantly less or detectably non-conscious.
https://www.ted.com/talks/hugh_herr_how_we_ll_become_cyborgs_and_extend_human_potential#t-518741
That's right, the tape measure doesn't read, I read the tape measure, and reading is a mental activity. I read the tape with my mind, not with my eyes.
Quoting Isaac
Here's the problem right here. You seem to have agreed that we can talk about patterns without any judgement about whether or not these patterns exist. We'll just talk about patterns, and whether or not the patterns exist is irrelevant. So why do you want to make assertions about where they physically are? If the existence of the pattern is irrelevant to our discussion of it, then it doesn't make sense to make assertions about where it is, don't you think? Can we adhere to this? We'll just talk about various different patterns, acknowledging that where these patterns are, if they are anywhere, is irrelevant.
Have we identified two distinct types of patterns, imaginary patterns, and non-imaginary patterns?
Quoting Isaac
What do you mean by "physical mass"? Do you believe that particles without mass are non-physical? There are such particles within, and interacting with the physical mass of the human being, so how can you deny the non-physical aspect of the human being?
Woah, cool. You're a psychic!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. We can talk about unicorns without establishing whether they exist too.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I don't. I suppose I would be asserting where the origin of the pattern I'm talking about (which, as above, does not 'exist') physically is. Like a painting of a unicorn. I might say "the unicorn in that painting has black fur, that's unusual for a unicorn, and it looks like it's angry about something". Of course, the unicorn in question does not exist, neither do any of the unicorns I'm comparing it to in establishing it uniqueness, but that doesn't mean it's not relevant where the origin of my abstraction is located. Its about a presumption of shared experience. I see a shirt reflecting partly black, partly white light. I abstract from those light signals a pattern, as set of instructions (black....move an inch...white). I point out the origin of that abstraction, and even talk colloquially about its "being on the shirt" because I presume your mind is sufficiently like mine that you will form a similar abstraction.
But you might not. And that's the important point. There's no rule forcing you to abstract the same idea from the shirt as I do, so there's no generalised idea that exists independently of those two ideas in our minds. It's simply a convenience, given the likelihood that our two abstractions will be very similar, to talk about them as if they were one thing.
As so often happens in philosophy, what we can successfully talk about has been confused with what we can actually demonstrate to be ontologically the case.
So, the laws of physics are observed and measured (meaning not measuring some imaginary event!) and mathematical abstractions are then created - thought up - in order to make useful and applicable predictions about how experienced phenomena relate - or don’t relate!
From this the world of Pure Mathematics has branched off into its own little field of play and on occasions what we deem as “physics” meets up with “pure maths”. Really they are both extension of the same principle - that is to measure, by some given arbitrary units, events and to put these read measurements to use in order to theorise what has, will and is happening.
If abstract concepts cannot be related to physical phenomenon then they are useless to physics. Once they are discovered to relate to physical phenomenon then they are obviously no longer ‘useless’.
Where’s the confusion?
I see with my eyes and read with my mind. If that's what you call being a psychic, then I'm beginning to understand why you have so much difficulty understanding the non-physical. You appear to have a very narrow mind, if you class reading as not the type of thing which your mind does.
Quoting Isaac
I really can't understand any of this. I don't see how you can see a shirt, and abstract a set of instructions from the shirt. That makes no sense to me whatsoever. I've never abstracted instructions from a shirt, unless there was something written on the shirt. I don't see much point in continuing this discussion. As usual the person defending physicalism proceeds toward making ridiculous statements in order to defend the ontology, instead of proceeding toward understanding reality. That's not philosophy it's fanaticism
Quoting I like sushi
That's absurd. How would one observe and measure a law of physics? An event is not a law.
I already explained how saying something has a specific property does not mean that the thing has that property. Like I said, "The apple is red" is making a category error in attributing redness to the apple when it is actually a property of the apple, light and your sensory system. Like I said, redness carries information about all three causes, not just the apple. Just as a doctor can test your sensory system by making you look at letters, the letters are the constant, but our sensory systems could be different and create different visual effects in our minds. We can make different judgments about the letters, but the letters don't change. In other words, the letters have properties in and of themselves that makes them letters regardless of our individual judgments. If they didn't, then how could the doctor test your vision?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think you are confusing categorizations with judgments. Sure, humans create arbitrary categories to make sense of the world. These categories can vary from person to person and what one considers "ripe", another might consider "over ripe", but we are still both talking about the same thing - some property of the apple that we refer to as ripe. If we both weren't talking about the same apple, then we would both be talking past each other. If I was referring to the apple when using the word, "ripe", and you were referring to your judgment, then we would both be talking past each other. When I say that the apple is ripe, am I talking about the apple in your head, my head, or there on the table?
Is thinking a property of you? Are you a thinking entity? Is your thinking a judgment of mine, or is it really a property of you - part of what it means to be you?
It's much bigger than physics, I think.
Quoting Dusty of Sky
OK.
But science - the discipline(s) of science, not its subject matter - is not a concrete object in the material world. It's a concept, an immaterial thing. So it doesn't exist. The same applies to philosophy, for example. And religion. Oh, and politics. ... Capitalism. Greed. The American Way. Beauty. Happiness. Ambition. Joy. The list goes on and on...
Your arguments stand, I think. I can see no justification at all for this physicalism. It is wrong because it is incomplete. There are things that exist which it denies, or cannot see.
You’re being absurd if that’s what you think I meant. The relation is observed and measured. Thus ‘laws’ are established and further refined.
I wasn’t saying anything outrageous. The OP is ridiculous.
Do you sense the tape measure?
OK. So as I see it, metaphysics is 'the study of the study of nature'. My observation here is that investigation begins with qualitative interactions with nature. That is, something can't be measured unless it can first be experienced, observed or otherwise interacted with. So those interactions become the material to be formalized. But that investigative process assumes observers, goals, tools and schemas.
However those observers, goals, tools and schemas are themselves part of the natural world that, in turn, can be investigated and therefore become material that can be formalized. So the qualitative and quantitative are present in both investigative processes, the second process being meta in the sense that it is reflective and self-aware.
My point though, is that this is all just a judgement.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That there are letters in front of you is a judgement.
Quoting Harry Hindu
The doctor makes a judgement comparing what you claim to see, with a standard, the norm. Whether what is there is or is not really letters, is irrelevant, so long as what you say is consistent with the norm.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Categorization is clearly a form of judgement.
Quoting Harry Hindu
That the two different people are talking about the same thing needs to be established, that's why we have the law of identity. We identify the thing, in this case it is what we call "the apple", and we agree that this particular thing will be called "the apple". But how do we identify a property? I suggest that we do this with a definition, and this is why I say that we need to refer to some criteria (the definition), to judge whether the thing (called the apple) is ripe or not. If we do not agree on the definition of "ripe", which is often the case, then we are talking past each other.
Quoting Harry Hindu
You are talking about the thing, which you have identified as "the apple". So "the apple" is the subject of discussion, and this subject is related to that object by means of identity. That it is "ripe", what you predicate of that subject, is your judgement, and this is in your mind, just like the subject, the apple, is also in your mind. So in your mind you have judged "the apple is ripe", an act of predication, and this relates to the thing you have identified, because that thing is what you call 'the apple".
Quoting I like sushi
You very clearly said, "the laws of physics are observed and measured", "and mathematical abstractions are then created". You did not say that events are observed and the laws are abstracted, you said that the laws are observed and mathematics is abstracted, which is absurd. If you did not mean what you said, you could have simply apologized for making the mistake, instead of accusing me of being absurd.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Sure, I see something which I call a tape measure, but even in calling it a tape measure, I am making a mental judgement. I think the point is that there is no sensing without mental activity. So I think it would be incorrect to say I see this, or I see that, as an act of sensation alone, without an accompanying act of mind. Mind is required for seeing, and I believe, any type of sensing.
I wasn't saying anything about how mind is or isn't involved. I was simply asking whether you sense the tape measure, whatever is involved with that.
Do you sense the marking on the tape measure?
Is this just another judgment, or are you actually explaining what is the case - that the doctor is making a judgment? You end up with an infinite regress of judgments which just becomes incoherent. Is the universe one big judgment? Does that even make sense?
You have to realize that judgments are about things, and it is what those judgments are about that matter. Sure, it could be that judgments is all you can do and make of the world, but the aboutness of those judgments creates a relationship that we usually refer to as "accuracy", so judgments themselves have a property of accuracy where they are more or less representative of what they are about.
Instead of "judgment", I think I prefer "interpretation". Our senses don't lie, but we can lie to ourselves by interpreting sensory data incorrectly. In interpreting sensory data, we are attempting to determine what they are about. What they're cause is. If they have no cause, then solipsism would be the case, which is what it seems that you are ultimately arguing for.
If they have a cause, then realism is the case and our sensory data actually has meaning in that they are the effect of prior causes - like your body interacting with the world that other minds share.
How else can you explain similar judgments by similar minds? Think about it. If we are all separate minds without a shared world (if that makes any sense) then how is it that we came to similar judgments about our separate sensory data - like that there is an "external" world and that there are other minds, and that you are similar enough to be part of a group of similar entities called "human beings"? How is it that "norms" can even be established and referred to? How is it that language could evolve at all? There must be more to the world than just our judgments - or its solipsism, and I assure you that if solipsism is the case, then I'm the solipsist and you are just a judgment in my mind that only exists when I read your words.
Yes, of course.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I see no need to bring in an infinite regress here. Of course a regress is possible though. If someone makes a judgement, and another asks for the reasoning, or justification for that judgement, then the judgement which follows in explanation, and so on, there would be regress. The regress would not be infinite though, because we are finite beings with finite capacities, so the regress would be limited to the point where someone would break it off and the issue would be left unresolved.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I would prefer to use "reliability" rather than "accuracy". Our judgements are themselves judged for reliability, but this again is a judgement.
Quoting Harry Hindu
"Interpretation" implies explanation, and very often we judge things without explaining them, so judgement is a far better term here. We very often judge things with little or no understanding of them, and those judgements are likely wrong, but "interpretation" implies that there is some understanding of the thing, which is not required for a judgement.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Similar minds seeing things in similar ways is explained by "similar minds". I'm not denying that there is a "shared world", what I am denying is that what we (as similar minds) say of the world, is the way that the world is. Remember, I am not questioning the thing, I am questioning the properties. For instance, that the red of the apple is "a property of the apple, light and your sensory system". That is just what you say of the world, it is not necessarily reality.
As long as an individual is judged as within the norm, then that person is correct. But correct, as the norm, does not mean that this is the way the world is. For example, we see that the sun rises and sets, and we might conclude that the sun circles the earth. This might become the norm, the sun circles the earth, and this idea could be judged as correct and be the norm. Just because it is the norm, and correct, does not mean that it is the way that things are.
How about sensing the tape measure stretched between the two rocks?
That there is a tape measure and there are two rocks is clearly a judgement rather than a simple sensation.
So you can't sense the tape measure stretched between two rocks?
No.
So can you sense any length--any extension of the tape measure, or do you just sense a point?
I don't sense numbers.
Numbers? I was asking you about a tape measure. You said you can sense a tape measure, including that you can sense markings on the tape measure. I'm simply asking you now if you can sense some length of the tape measure, that is, some extension of it, some section of it.
No, length is a judgement.
How would my eyes separate one section of the tape from another?
So when you sense the tape measure, the markings on it, you're sensing a point?
I don't understand your question. Why would I judge a tape measure to be a point?
You agreed that you can sense the tape measure, and you agreed that you can sense markings on the tape measure. But you denied that you can sense any extension of the tape measure--that is, (at least) some arbitrary segment of it. So if you can't sense any extension, but nevertheless you can sense the tape measure, you must be somehow sensing a single point of it only, no? (That is, in the mathematical sense of a zero-dimensional point.) Because anything more than that would have some extension. (How there could be a nonextended marking on the tape measure is another issue here.)
Right.
Quoting Terrapin Station
This does not follow logically, because both "point" and "extension" require a definition, they are mathematical terms, like numbers, things which are not sensed, but understood by definition. If we agree that what I am sensing is called a "tape measure", there is no point to asking whether that tape measure is a point, an extension, or both, without defining the terms. Saying that the tape measure is one or the other, or both, would be to assign properties to the tape measure. With definitions we can make the judgement as to whether the tape measure has those properties.
Wait, what's an example of something that would follow logically that wouldn't require a definition?
I think we'd have to move to inductive logic, but inductive conclusions are debatable.
Anyway, you seemed to be applying deductive logic. Something like "It is not an extension, therefore it is a point". Do you agree that by standard geometrical definitions, the tape measure has both points and extension, and to mark off a particular segment of extension requires points, which by definition have no spatial extension and are not sensible?
Okay, but I'm still hoping you can give an example.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's fine. All I'm asking you about is the fact that you agreed that you can sense the tape measure, but you denied being able to sense some extension of it.
I didn't see how this question was relevant. To me it seemed like you were trying to change the subject. Perhaps all logic requires definition, I don't know, this would dependent on one's idea of logic, but that's not what we're discussing. Since I haven't implied that some logic does not require definitions I see no warrant for your request for an example, and I am not interested in determining whether or not all logic requires definitions.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Right, until you explain what you mean by "some extension of it", I cannot say that I can sense some extension of it. If you are asking me whether I can sense a particular extension, and you indicate to me, the particular extension you are referring to, then I may be able to answer yes, but I definitely cannot sense the vague and indefinite "some extension of it".
As I implied in the last post though, to talk about a particular extension requires the assumption of non-physical points, to separate that particular part from the rest of the tape measure. So I don't ever really sense a particular extensional section of the tape measure as separate from the rest of the extension of the tape measure.
Your criticism of my comment was based on something not following logically because terms used require a definition.
So presumably, according to you, things only follow logically when terms used do not require a definition.
So I was wondering what an example of that would be. Otherwise, if there are no examples, then we're left with you effectively saying that nothing follows logically, period.
Right, I was saying that the logic you used could only be meaningful if you had some definitions. I was saying that you needed such definitions, requesting them.
Quoting Terrapin Station
What? I requested definitions, saying you needed definitions for your logic to be valid. How does that lead to the conclusion that I'm claiming that logic can only proceed without definitions?
The way you phrased the comment was "Due to the fact that these terms require definitions, this can not follow logically," as if any terms that would require definitions excludes those terms from arguments that follow logically.
If you just wanted definitions, you could have just asked that.
But aren't you familiar with the idea of extension(ality) in ontology? I'm asking because if this stuff is that unfamiliar/that new to you, it's going to be difficult to have the sort of conversation I was hoping to have.
Seems you didn't read the entire post.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes I am familiar with extension. That's why I asked for definitions You seemed to be saying that "extension" and "point" were mutually exclusive. But as I understand geometry, a line has both extension and points. So I didn't see the premises (definitions) which were required to make your conclusion.
What's mutually exclusive is that either you sense extension or you do not. If you do not, but you sense something, what's left? A point, right?
I don't sense extension, nor do I sense a point. That's why I asked for definition, to be clear on what you were asking. These are properties, like other attributes, which must be judged according to some definition, as I've been arguing.
So what do you sense?
This is the sort of thing it's worth doing philosophy over--"Thinking hard" about what it is that you sense.
In most of your arguments, it seems like you're trying to push the entire burden of proof onto me. I guess that's fair, since I'm the one making claims about the way the universe necessarily has to be. But if you're just gonna be a complete skeptic, then I can't think of any rational argument to convince you to change your mind. It seems like you're saying "maybe the universe is fundamentally inconceivable, so therefore there's no point in trying to use reason to understand it." If you're right, then I can't use reason to prove you wrong. Maybe reason is just a useful tool for building rocket-ships and laptops. I can't imagine how reason could be so useful without being capable of deducing authentic truths about reality. But maybe the only reason I can't imagine that is that I'm relying on my faulty powers of reasoning. So all I can think to do at this point is make an emotional appeal. Don't you want to understand the world you live in? The only reason that reason is such a useful tool is that we presume that it communicates truth about the way things really are. If we just treat it like an arbitrary construct of human subjectivity, then I suspect it will behave like one. Newton and Einstein didn't make their great discoveries because they thought they were merely using a tool. They believed themselves to be uncovering the secrets of existence.
But perhaps I'm misinterpreting you, and you're no really a skeptic and or pragmatist.
Quoting Andrew M
I agree. And unless you think that there's an infinite regress of laws, you have to eventually ask why law A is in effect rather than law B or C. And regardless of what your answer is, I don't think you can attribute it to physical objects or their features. Laws are unchanging and exert control over all activity throughout the entire universe, whereas physical objects and their features change and they are limited to particular regions of space time.
I think maybe it's the passing of time that I sense. What do you think?
I attribute unchanging laws to the universe itself, one example being the law of non-contradiction. In its ontological sense, it's a form that is exhibited universally (i.e., in all objects).
I see no need to separate out form (laws/rules) from the universe. I think this comes down to a philosophical choice here - whether one prefers to conceptualize things in a unitary or dualist sense.
I think that we sense relations including extension. :wink:
They ought to, then, give up the term physicalism with its baggage. What gets called physical has been extended to include thigns that would not have been considered physical earlier in history - by materialists,say. Anything that is considered real, will be called physical, so the term has no meaning. It gets even worse if one considers equations real, because there is no way to observe them and there is not even a hypothesis about what they are made of. They are transcendent.
Also no to the OP.
Physicalism is incompatible with morality because if a human being is just a set of atoms like any other, why consider her life inherently more valuable than her death? If humans are just machines, they should be disposable like machines are, once the cost of their maintenance exceeds their utility.
Physicalism is compatible with morality because morality is but the codification of our species social, collaborative instincts, which were shaped by Darwinian evolution, itself compatible with physicalism.