Hegel on Being and Nothing
In Chapter I of the Science of Logic, Hegel defines being to mean 'pure indeterminateness and emptiness', from which he concludes that being is nothing. Hegel then defines nothing as 'absence of all determination.' Since both being and nothing are absence of determination, Hegel concludes that 'being and nothing are the same'. But Hegel then writes:
'But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming...'
In other words, becoming is the union of being and nothing. Two questions.
(1) How can Hegel claim that being and nothing are and are not the same? This is a contradiction.
(2) How can being vanish into nothing and nothing vanish into being? This violates Parmenides' argument in On Nature, according to which being cannot come from nothing, and vice versa.
'But it is equally true that they are not undistinguished from each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable and that each immediately vanishes in its opposite. Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the other: becoming...'
In other words, becoming is the union of being and nothing. Two questions.
(1) How can Hegel claim that being and nothing are and are not the same? This is a contradiction.
(2) How can being vanish into nothing and nothing vanish into being? This violates Parmenides' argument in On Nature, according to which being cannot come from nothing, and vice versa.
Comments (4)
Well, the ordinary answer to this question is that he uses the term stipulatively in each case. Others more well read in the text can help point this out. This seems to be a common concern with Hegel, that is literal readings of the work.
The SEP article on Hegel's dialectics has a long section describing the Being and Nothing relationship.
Consider that when he says nothing, he just means 'lack of'.
Now - are something and a lack of something different? Sure.
But is a lack of something, something? It is. Void is something.
Quoting philosophy
Given that nothing means 'lack of', this vanishing act just describes the general process of change.
Something which is, changes, and vanishes in to a lack of itself.
But that 'lack of' as I stated is something, and so something is immediately reinstated.