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To Be Is To Be The Value Of A Variable

creativesoul April 30, 2019 at 20:52 14225 views 33 comments
I've been reading and re-reading Quine lately, and wanted to discuss a few of his suppositions beginning with his mantra...

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

Seems Quine doesn't honor/accept that distinction.

Comments (33)

Deleted User April 30, 2019 at 20:58 #284141
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creativesoul April 30, 2019 at 21:12 #284147
Reply to tim wood

Quine argues - quite impressively actually - on empirical grounds. His work is theory laden, and I find much agreement between some things he holds and my own position. However, I am very confident that I do not grasp much of what Quine argues. The formal aspects require formal understanding, and in that I am surely lacking.

Deleted User April 30, 2019 at 21:38 #284155
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creativesoul April 30, 2019 at 22:06 #284164
Reply to tim wood

I hold that there is most certainly a difference between being taken account of and existing prior to being taken account of. I would take it even further than that...

However, what I'm hoping to see here is someone who can set out Quine's line of reasoning that supports his mantra.
andrewk April 30, 2019 at 22:16 #284167
Reply to creativesoul My recollection of the saying is different: 'To be is to be the value of a bound variable'. What the bolded word adds is that the variable is quantified, either by 'there exists' or 'for all'. So it is not necessary to refer to the object individually. One need only assert its existence by an existential quantifier (as we do for dinosaurs that occurred long before any human could observe them, or stars that are too far away for anybody to observe), or comment on its attributes by a universal quantifier.

With that correction, the objection - so far as I understand it - seems to disappear.
creativesoul May 01, 2019 at 00:27 #284213
Reply to andrewk

Does the difference between what counts as being a variable and what counts as being a bound variable bear upon whether or not existence is equivalent to being taken account of?

As I understand it, Quine wants to reject certain conceptual schemes(linguistic frameworks), namely those which posit the existence(the reality) of abstract objects, or how certain schemes posit such things... at least.

If it is true that some things exist prior to our account of them, then it cannot be true that to be(if that is synonymous with "to exist") is to be the value of a variable, regardless of existential quantification...

If being the value of a bound variable is equivalent to being (adequately?)taken account of, then I've no objection, but being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery.
andrewk May 01, 2019 at 01:08 #284243
Quoting creativesoul
being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery

Beware the use of 'clearly'. Things are rarely if ever as clear as one first thinks. The truth of the proposition in question is far from clear to me.

'Taking account of' is a woolly term, which can mean whatever one wants it to mean. Was the Higgs Boson not taken account of before they finally detected (discovered) one, decades after it was predicted?
creativesoul May 01, 2019 at 02:02 #284265
Reply to andrewk

I just remembered, or at least I think I remember, that I owe you an apology. There is no excuse, no justification, for my attitude displayed towards you as a person in a recent thread. I think that it was the Kripke reading group thread. No matter which thread... I am regretful for not handling that situation with the respect that was/is due. That said...

The Higgs particle was posited as a result of necessity stemming from taking account of things other than the Higgs. In other words, regarding the Higgs field and boson, it's discovery was a consequence of other accounts(the standard model). Post hoc. The Higgs field/particle was posited as a means to account for (missing)mass that the standard model couldn't account for without positing the Higgs field/boson.

With that in mind...

The Higgs particle was taken account of(conceived) prior to it's physical detection - assuming, of course, that it was actually detected. That is still contentious for some it seems. Nevertheless, I'll grant that it was, for it will allow our discourse to continue unabated.

I've no problem at all with being able to discover some things before they are detected/verified. Some things are discovered by taking account of other things.
andrewk May 01, 2019 at 10:57 #284402
Quoting creativesoul
I just remembered, or at least I think I remember, that I owe you an apology.
Thanks. No worries at all. That thread was a minefield!
Quoting creativesoul
That is still contentious for some it seems.

I was not aware of that. Is that scientific contention, involving criticism of whether the experiment was definitive, or is it philosophical, along the lines of what constitutes an 'observation'.

I wonder whether Quine would say that the Higgs Boson is the value of a bound variable.
creativesoul May 01, 2019 at 15:54 #284526
Reply to andrewk

The CERN website offers brief mention in simple easy to understand terms...

I think that he wouldn't equate an object with being the value of a bound variable. That's more about being an object within an account, is it not... for Quine? More about the use of "existence" or "exists"... Yes?
Shawn May 03, 2019 at 01:44 #285063
Quoting andrewk
That thread was a minefield!


It was a difficult yet ultimately rewarding thread. *Grows emotional.*
TheGreatArcanum May 07, 2019 at 00:20 #286592
'to be is to be the value of a variable,' yet that which possesses the potential to contain a limited value within itself, has being, for that which possesses an essence, i.e. the potential to contain value, cannot not have being. that is to say that being isn't predicated of empty variables, but predicated of variables which correspond to unique essences.
creativesoul June 02, 2019 at 18:06 #293871
Reply to Banno

I've been wondering what you think about this...
Banno June 02, 2019 at 20:57 #293897
Reply to creativesoul He's right, isn't he? Although that is only on of many senses of "to be".
creativesoul June 02, 2019 at 21:00 #293898
Reply to Banno

Well. In one sense, certainly. As I said to andrewk earlier...

If being the value of a bound variable is equivalent to being (adequately?)taken account of, then I've no objection, but being taken account of is clearly not necessary for existence, otherwise there could be no such thing as discovery.
fdrake June 02, 2019 at 21:10 #293900
I wonder why there was all that universe just hanging around waiting to exist for billions of years.
Banno June 02, 2019 at 21:40 #293911
Reply to creativesoul And as he replied, "Being taken account of" is wooly.
Banno June 02, 2019 at 22:07 #293923
The "bound" is often left out, but it makes all the difference. Without it, it sounds like Quine is equating being to being spoken of, as @fdrake. With it, it's a mere tautology.
creativesoul June 02, 2019 at 22:09 #293924
Reply to Banno

So it's more about accounting practices than existence?
creativesoul June 02, 2019 at 22:12 #293927
Reply to Banno

Quoting andrewk
With that correction, the objection - so far as I understand it - seems to disappear.


Could one of you help me to understand how?
andrewk June 04, 2019 at 00:28 #294257
Reply to creativesoul It depends on what the objection is. Without the crucial 'bound' qualifier, one might object that Quine's statement means we cannot say that any dinosaur existed other than one we can refer to individually, for instance because we are looking at the fossil of its skeleton. That would be a strange position because although we are confident that millions of dinosaurs inhabited the Earth, we can only recognise the existence of a few hundred of them. Hence, the misreported Quine definition becomes a partial dinosaur denial.

What the 'bound' qualifier does is allow us to refer to all dinosaurs (eg 'all dinosaurs had hearts'), and also to particular dinosaurs whose identity we do not know (eg 'the tallest dinosaur that ever lived'). Those dinosaurs meet Quine's criterion for existence. We can thus see that Quine was not a dinosaur-denier to even the slightest degree..
creativesoul June 04, 2019 at 07:34 #294356
Quoting andrewk
It depends on what the objection is.


I'll put it as succinctly as possible.

To be the value of any variable, bound or otherwise, is to be taken account of within some framework of logical notation.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

Surely there is.

The common language account existed in it's entirety prior to the translation into logical notation.

That's the objection.

It's not so much refuting and/or attempting to refute Quine. It's more like tempering...



Quoting andrewk
Without the crucial 'bound' qualifier, one might object that Quine's statement means we cannot say that any dinosaur existed other than one we can refer to individually, for instance because we are looking at the fossil of its skeleton. That would be a strange position because although we are confident that millions of dinosaurs inhabited the Earth, we can only recognise the existence of a few hundred of them. Hence, the misreported Quine definition becomes a partial dinosaur denial.

What the 'bound' qualifier does is allow us to refer to all dinosaurs (eg 'all dinosaurs had hearts'), and also to particular dinosaurs whose identity we do not know (eg 'the tallest dinosaur that ever lived'). Those dinosaurs meet Quine's criterion for existence. We can thus see that Quine was not a dinosaur-denier to even the slightest degree..


I was thinking more along the lines of Quine's statement means that to be is to be taken account of. My reasoning is above. Are there hints of Wittgenstein driving Quine? The whole we cannot get beneath language notion?
fdrake June 04, 2019 at 09:40 #294377
Reply to Banno

I don't like the 'is' either. I think it's misleading. It should be "if an object is bound in a formula on some domain of discourse then we are committed to that entity's existence'. It's less about ontology/metaphysics in the continental sense of studying how or why things are the way they are and just about what there 'is' in the first place.

Edit: to see how little this helps you decide, consider the difference between "The present king of France is bald" now (with the implicit domain of currently living people) and in 1774 (when the domain includes a king of France). In the first case it's false because there is no present king of France, in the second case it depends on whether he has hair or not. This maxim just spits out whatever you've put into the domain already.
Terrapin Station June 04, 2019 at 10:40 #294386
The Quine aphorism was forwarded under the umbrella of Russell's theory of descriptions. As such it's tackling philosophy of language issues.
andrewk June 04, 2019 at 10:54 #294387
Quoting creativesoul
To be the value of any variable, bound or otherwise, is to be taken account of within some framework of logical notation.

Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?

There is no difference that can be identified in language, because by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them.

The best one can do is feel - if one so wishes - that there is more to this than taking account of things, but you cannot articulate that feeling in any known language, or in any language I can imagine.

creativesoul June 05, 2019 at 03:24 #294710
Quoting andrewk
Is there no difference between being taken account of and existing prior to that account?
— creativesoul
There is no difference that can be identified in language, because by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them.


My objection is not about that. I agree, without prejudice, that by speaking about entities that are not taken account of, we are taking account of them. That's not in contention.


The best one can do is feel - if one so wishes - that there is more to this than taking account of things, but you cannot articulate that feeling in any known language, or in any language I can imagine.


Common language is more than adequate.

In order to take account of something, that something must exist. Common language expressions exist prior to being translated into logical notation. Being the value of a bond variable is to be put in terms of logical notation. So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.

andrewk June 05, 2019 at 03:32 #294713
Quoting creativesoul
So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.

I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing.

Limiting the interpretation to formal logical expressions would make the statement nonsensical. It would mean that Quine did not recognise the statement "Look, there's a wombat!" as taking account of existence.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence"
I think you might be right about that. An appealing (to me) interpretation is that he's just pointing out the futility of ontology. I would expect devoted ontologists to disagree. Fortunately, philosophy is a broad church, and can accommodate us all.
creativesoul June 05, 2019 at 04:14 #294719
Quoting andrewk
So, Quine's statement "To be is to be the value of a bound variable" stands in direct conflict with basic knowledge regarding what logical notation is existentially dependent upon.

I'm assuming Quine is advocating for predicate logic. I'm also working under the assumption that his aim is to target the superfluous nature of the term "existence" and other abstract 'objects'.
— creativesoul
I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing


That would be a very queer move for someone to make. Each and every day people say meaningful things in common language that are not amenable to logical translation. There are thought/belief governed by common language that cannot be aptly put into terms of being the value of a bound variable.

The semantics of common language is directly at odds with many a philosophical notion. "An abstract object of thought" is one such notion. Quine aimed at abstract objects of thought. "Existence" is held by some to be such an object. Quine had the right target. He did not have the right ammunition.





creativesoul June 05, 2019 at 04:46 #294724
Quoting andrewk
Limiting the interpretation to formal logical expressions would make the statement nonsensical. It would mean that 'Quine did not recognise the statement "Look, there's a wombat!" as taking account of existence.


Or a red herring?
creativesoul June 05, 2019 at 04:56 #294725
Quoting andrewk
I think when Quine refers to a bound variable he is not referring solely to a variable referenced in a formal, symbolic logic expression, but that he is including all natural language expressions that mean essentially the same thing


So he's including all the ones that can be and/or have been already translated into logical notation?

Nah. That can't be what you mean here.

He's including natural language expressions that already have been translated into logical notation and natural language expressions that have semantic dopplegangers?
creativesoul June 05, 2019 at 05:21 #294730
Translation is existentially dependent upon something to translate. In this case it is a common language expression. All translation is of that which is already meaningful. All meaningful statements sensibly rendered in/with common language presuppose truth, meaning, and existence.

Predicate logic cannot account for that.

To be meaningful is to be part of a mental correlation. Not all mental correlation places value upon a previously unbound variable and it's newly coined referent by drawing a correlation, association, and/or connection between the two.

To be the value of a bound variable is to be given a namesake, in common language terms. Namesakes are given to entities that already exist in their entirety prior to being named. This includes all metacognitive notions/constructs.

"Existence" is superfluous. I prefer the frame of existential dependency.

What's an ontologist?

:halo:
Terrapin Station June 05, 2019 at 13:26 #294789
Quoting creativesoul
That would be a very quieer move for someone to make. Each and every day people say meaningful things in common language that are not amenable to logical translation. There are thought/belief governed by common language that cannot be aptly put into terms of being the value of a bound variable.

The semantics of common language is directly at odds with many a philosophical notion. "An abstract object of thought" is one such notion. Quine aimed at abstract objects of thought. "Existence" is held by some to be such an object. Quine had the right target. He did not have the right ammunition.


Again, as I remarked above, Quine's comments here are building upon Russell's theory of descriptions. Quine's comments are not going to make much sense outside of that context. So it's important to not only be familiar with Russell's theory of descriptions, but the motivation for Russell's theory of descriptions, which was Frege's "semantic puzzles" and the background to those. The background is largely the anti-psychologistic theories of reference that Frege endorsed (and that subsequent analytic philosophy has continued to endorse), where those theories create problems when it comes to the ability to refer to nonexistent entities for example (a la "The present king of France is bald"), as well as referring to entities where the referent is identical but the referring terms are not (a la Frege's morning star/evening star example).

I'd agree that ultimately the whole thing, including Russell's theory of descriptions, is rather silly, really, but it's because of the wrong turn of rejecting psychologism. That was the bad move that a lot of inane, rococo work is intended to patch up, and that's still ongoing. (The reasons for rejecting psychologism are deeply-rooted in analytic phil, though, stemming initially from wanting philosophy to be more like a science, since science was seen as the academic ideal, where it was believed that that goal is not possible by admitting individual psychological foundations.)

(On the positive side of all of this, though, an initially unintentional upshot of the work in question is that it's had a lot of practical benefits for computer programming.)
creativesoul June 05, 2019 at 15:55 #294814
Reply to Terrapin Station

Granting the veracity of your account, it seems that Kripke was aiming at the same things... I'm unqualified to remark on the historical implications. Just a layman attempting to understand the professionals' accounts. Thanks.