Are songs spatiotemporal?
The way you answer this question will follow your view of universals, of numbers, of propositions, the self of your most beloved, and of course: yourself.
The word music refers to both individual performances and the patterns of sounds we call songs. Pieces of music is a phrase that suggests the atomic character of universal or abstract realism. For the realist, the name of a song refers to a non-spatiotemporal thing.
Song anti-realists will argue that the name of a song doesn't refer at all, or that all there is to a song is whatever is there is in a particular performance.
A third way is to say that all there is, is music. We artificially divide it up into song and performance. This isn't the neatest answer, but possibly the best.
The word music refers to both individual performances and the patterns of sounds we call songs. Pieces of music is a phrase that suggests the atomic character of universal or abstract realism. For the realist, the name of a song refers to a non-spatiotemporal thing.
Song anti-realists will argue that the name of a song doesn't refer at all, or that all there is to a song is whatever is there is in a particular performance.
A third way is to say that all there is, is music. We artificially divide it up into song and performance. This isn't the neatest answer, but possibly the best.
Comments (23)
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5301/art-forms-relation-to-space-and-time
Does his view work for songs? A song is a fictional entity we speak of when we talk about music?
The spatiotemporal location is everywhere/every time that it's performed, as well as everywhere/everytime that it's documented in some manner, including vinyl, tape, CDs, digital computer memory, digital transmission, etc. So it's a complex set of locations.
A performance has a clear location. It's the song that was performed that I was asking about (as a metaphor for the self). Do you think a song has a location?
Quoting Terrapin Station
So expand on that. If we have multiple performances of one song, doesn't that mean there is some distinction between performance and song?
It's not literally/in terms of logical identity just "one song."
I'm a nominalist, by the way. I don't buy that there are any real/extramental/objective abstracts at all. I'm also a physicalist.
As I mentioned in the OP, I have an uneasy allegiance to the middle way, which I think was Nietzsche's view.
Works of art seem to be inspired by emotion which are, in turn, caused by something - a picturesque landscape, a beautiful maiden, etc. Don't these have locations.
I'm no music expert but I guess there is abstract music like there's abstract art. These probably don't have a spatial correlate.
How it sounds to you is irrelevant to what's the case ontologically, especially if you buy realism re univerals/types to any extent, as well as if you're not used to analyzing things in this way, etc.
In any event, what makes something "one song" is how an individual thinks about it. Abstractions are mental acts. (And mental acts have specific spatiotemporal locations.)
In terms of what any song is extramentally, it's many different things, each with its own (set of) spatiotemporal location(s).
Yes. And since I'm using a song as a metaphor for the self, I can note that some say consciousness is nothing other than representation. But the representation is something other than the represented, isn't it?
So how many songs is Sunrise? More than one?
In a discussion where we're getting down to the nuts and bolts of this stuff, then, we'd have to clarify in just what sense or context we're asking that question.
If we're talking about the idea of the song, the abstraction or concept of it--which is what we'd usually be talking about, it's usually going to be just one. ("Usually" because in this sense, the issue is how an individual is thinking about it. (It's not unusual for individuals to say something like, "There are two song x's--I consider the version where they reharmonized the chorus and changed the time signature and melody of the verses to be a different song"--in any event, we're talking about their personal concept/idea of the song(s) in this sense.))
If we're instead talking about the referent(s) per se, then we're talking about however many things are being counted as that one song (ideationally/conceptually) re the performances, documents, etc. Each occurrence would have to be counted.
When you speak of something, you're going to have your concept or idea of it in mind, sure.
You didn't answer the question. People frequently speak of songs as singular things. If I speak of the song Sunset, to what do I refer?
I did answer it, though. Let's explain the answer to you, although you're asking in a slightly different way there. Are you asking what the person has in mind, or what the referent is?
It's going to be some particular or particulars, with spatiotemporal locations, related to what the person has in mind, including what their concept is. (And it's possible for it to be the same as their concept.)
So, for example, one person might primarily be referring to a studio recording, someone else might have both a studio recording and a set of live performances in mind, etc.
You're saying... uh, I'm not actually sure what you're saying. :joke:
"It doesn't refer to anything" would make no sense. And that's not at all suggested by nominalism.
It refers to whatever an individual has in mind when they think about it. But when we're talking about extramental stuff in this regard (we wouldn't have to be talking about extramental stuff--we could be talking about a concept, for example), we're going to be talking about some set of particulars--such as the studio recording, from a particular CD (or whatever--maybe vinyl instead, or a stream, some combo of all of that, etc.), which the individual is familiar with via the occasions when they've listened to it.
An upshot of this is that if they have in mind a "real abstract," rather than whatever set of particulars, then the individual is mistaken about the sorts of things that can obtain in the extramental world, and the referent is going to instead be some set of extramental and mental particulars that led to (or that amount to) the belief in the real abstract.