An Epistemological Conundrum
Arthur Schopenhauer claimed that the human brain (the understanding) spontaneously constructed perceptual objects by applying (a) the pure “a priori” intuitions of space and time and (b) the transcendental principle of cause and effect to the body’s subjective “under the skin” sensations.
I consider this claim to be valid and to have been a significant advance over Kant’s epistemology.
However, neither Schopenhauer, nor Kant, ever attempted to explain where the body’s subjective sensations came from in the first place; i.e., what the nature of their originating source might have been prior to the brain’s construction of the perceptual objects out of them.
Schopenhauer did provide an explanation for the originating source of perceptual objects; viz., the brain’s activity, but he did not provide an explanation for the originating source of the bodily sensations that comprised those perceptual objects. Nor did he try to determine if the originating source which preceded the body’s sensations bore any resemblance to the constructed perceptual objects which succeeded the body’s sensations.
In other words, I submit that the perceptual objects (which are after-the-fact constructions of the causes of the given sensations by the brain) are merely “purported” causes of the sensations because we can never be certain that the brain’s spontaneously constructed perceptual objects actually coincide with the “real” cause(s) of the subjective sensations, which cause(s) would necessarily have “predated” the brain’s act of spontaneous construction.
What's your opinion?
Comments (38)
I haven't read an awful lot of Kant, but wouldn't he consider subjective sensations to be intuitions?
Intuitions would be the things in themselves that we can never have direct access to. However, our scientific constructions(based on constructions of perceptual and conceptual objects) can assymptotically approach the truths of the real world as a limit.
I certainly expect present day neuroscience to continue to provide us with more precise detailed descriptions/explanations of the myriad complex ways in which the human brain processes subjective sensations into perceived phenomenal objects and perceived phenomenal states-of-affairs; but no matter how successful neuroscience may be, and continues to be, in this regard, it will, I think, still not be able to describe/explain where the subjective sensations come from (their originating source) before they undergo neuro-cognitive processing.
We do NOT know if the BSCPO's NEVER coincide with the "real" causes. We are, in fact, unfortunately unable to determine, with certitude, if the BSCPO's actually coincide with, or are accurate renditions of, the "real" cause(s) of the subjective sensations which comprised the BSCPO's. For all we know, the brain constructed tree may, or may not, be an accurate rendition of the real cause of the subjective sensations of which it is comprised. Explain to me, please, with specificity, how those "doing biology" today are superior with regard to ascertaining the originating source of human sensations when compared to these so-called alchemists.
Notice the implicit materialist presupposition here in the equation of ‘brain’ and ‘understanding’. This also underlies the presumption that the ‘real causes’ are presumably neurobiological. Would that be corrrect?
For Kant, space and time were pure a priori intuitions and the manifold of sensations were a posteriori intuitions to which space and time were applied. The things-in-themselves would be the originating source(s) of the a posteriori sensations BEFORE being processed spatially and temporally.
Yes, it would! But who the hell knows where the unprocessed sensations come from in the first place? The processing of said sensations is certainly by the human brain (materialistic), but who knows what the nature of the originating source of the pre-processed sensations might be.
To imagine the process is meant to fool people is not the same thing as wondering what gets lost in translation.
The World as Idea
I think you misunderstand me! My question could care less about the materialist/idealist dispute. In fact, personally, as a matter of record, I agree with Schopenhauer. But please explain to me what any of this has to do with explaining the originating source of human (under the skin) sensations.
But, what kind of explanation are you seeking? I had assumed that with your references to 'brain' and 'under the skin' that you're looking for a neuro-physiological explanation. Are you not?
Not necessarily. I am seeking any explanation that works. See my response to I LIKE SUSHI.
Actually, I think you're mistaken in that regard. Schopenhauer has quite a lot to say about the brain, and had a particular interest in optics. Kant likewise was quite well informed scientifically and lectured in science as well as philosophy. So the general question is addressed in Schopenhauer, in terms of the way the human brain interprets stimuli. He's not interested in the physiological details, but an analysis in terms of will and idea, which he takes as being the fundamental constituents of human reality.
So again, if you're not looking for a neuro-physiological account, I'm not clear on what you're actually asking.
Yes, Schopenhauer certainly had quite a lot to say about how the brain processed sensations (he did not use the term stimuli), especially visual sensations, into empirical objects, but where did he, or Kant, have a lot to say about WHERE THE SENSATIONS CAME FROM BEFORE THEY WERE PROCESSED BY THE BRAIN INTO EMPIRICAL OBJECTS. Kant speaks of the manifold of sensation as "being given." And this is as detailed as he got.
Merleau-Ponty may be more help here than Kant or Schopenhauer.
Sensations, stimuli don't 'come from' an outside, nor do they originate in an inside. THey only exist as an interplay between the two, as an interactive coupling in which what constitutes body and world are mutaally determined.
"We cannot apply the classical distinction of form and matter to perception, nor can we conceive the perceiving subject as a consciousness which "interprets," "deciphers," or "orders" a sensible matter according to an ideal law which it possesses. Matter is "preg-nant" with its form, which is to say that in the final analysis every perception takes place within a certain horizon and ultimately in the "world." We experience a perception and its horizon "in action" rather than by "posing" them or explicitly "knowing" them. Finally the quasi-organic relation of the perceiving subject and the world involves, in principle, the contradiction of immanence and tran-scendence.'
Francisco Varela, a student of Merleau-Ponty's approach , developed his enactive approach out of it.
"The central concern of the enactivist position in a perceiver-depdendent world stands in contradistinction to the received view that perception is fundamentally the truthful reconstruction of a portion of the physical world through a registering of existing environmental information. in the enactive approach reality is not a given:it is perceiver-dependent, not becasue the perceiver "constructs" it as he or she pleases, but becasue what counts as a relevant world is inseparable from the structure of the perceiver."
Very interesting alternative approach to addressing the issue, precisely because it questions a basic assumption of the accepted epistemological paradigm; viz., that elemental, primordial sensations exist first in a state of isolation and are subsequently synthesized, integrated, or constructed by the perceiving subject into empirical objects that comprise the world.
If you reference a prior discussion of mine on this Forum entitled "Is the Foundation of British Empiricism Sensible?" you'll see that I, too, in my own way questioned the legitimacy of the basic assumption of isolated primordial sensations.
I believe you're missing my main point which is as follows:
Schopenhauer claimed that the human Understanding (the brain) spontaneously applied the Principle of Cause and Effect to human sensations.
The fundamental assumption was that it was possible for the human Understanding to spontaneously construct a veridical cause (the empirical object) out of the isolated, non-synthesized sensations (the effects).
But, then, the question arises as to what the originating source of the isolated sensations is before the brain constructs the empirical object out of them?
In other words, how can we verify that the cause of the isolated sensations before the brain constructs the empirical object out of them is identical to the cause of the isolated sensations after the brain constructs the empirical object out of them?
Young says things are projective, namely out there and in our heads at the same time. From the Varela quote I get that we humans are built as part of what is to be perceived, in order to perceive what is to be perceived.
Just as I knew when I was a kid but then that was just me.
This is what's called "the hard problem of consciousness." It is discussed here often. I checked, there are currently three or four active threads where it is being discussed. No reason we can't do it here too.
(1) the human brain (the understanding) spontaneously constructs perceptual objects
and
(2) the human brain (the understanding) does not spontaneously construct perceptual objects
What are the reasons that we'd believe one over the other?
Hopefully empirical evidence has some bearing on why you'd believe one over the other.
Question: Can this famous Cartesian epistemological hypothesis be empirically verified?
The answer, I submit, is yes. However, with the peculiar proviso that the empirical verification (thought experiment/thought act) that occurs must always remain subjective and personal, rather than objective and public.
I would be interested in arguing in the negative; against what I take the above to mean - on it's face.
Some philosophical theories are falsifiable/verifiable, are they not? Seems to me that they most certainly can be. Most aren't, but I digress...
I mean, I argue - mostly - along the lines of Ockham's razor and methodological naturalism.
My own theory of mind is quite verifiable/falsifiable.
Science have one of those?
Rubbish.
Thought experiments are not dependable methods of verification/falsification.
And...
This directly conflicts with the bit you wrote about all philosophical theories. Incoherency and/or equivocation is inevitable. Both are unacceptable, regardless of which is the case.
Close, but no cigar.
The brain does not construct perceptual objects. The brain's all by itself inside the skull with neither tools nor materials. Sense perception is direct. The brain does not 'construct' a tree. Rather, it helps facilitate the creature's ability to see the tree. The brain is necessary but insufficient for seeing, smelling, hearing, tasting, grasping, rubbing the tree, as well as thinking and/or talking about the tree.
Brains in vats are dead.
What are the basic hypotheses that comprise your so called OWN theory of mind that are subject to empirical test? What specific "If, then" statements does your own theory of mind generate, the validity of which, as you claim, can be put to objective empirical experimental test?
By the way, Einstein was noted for the many thought experiments he did conduct such as, for example, trying to imagine what it would be like (what his subjective experience would be like) to ride on a beam of light? However, this didn't mean that the validity of what he imagined to be the case subjectively didn't need to be put to objective empirical verification.
Also, Schopenhauer didn't smoke cigars so he really wasn't trying to land one; and only dogmatic brains are dead, not just those in vats.
The fact of the matter is that no one (neither you, nor I) will ever have airtight empirical verification about whether, or not, Schopenhauer's or Sartre's epistemological theory is empirically valid. Why? Because, unfortunately, neither theory, no matter how beautiful and complex its insights, generates empirically testable hypotheses.
For example, try to provide an empirical, experimental test for the following hypotheses:
Schopenhauer: If the human will is absolutely free, then guilt attaches to the "esse" rather than to the "operari."
Sartre: If human Being-for-Itself is defined primarily by a Pre-Reflective Consciousness, then such a consciousness will always be devoid of an Ego.
With respect to your "rubbish" comment.
Descartes' "When and while I think, I must exist" is a thought-act, an intellectual performance, that is existentially consistent and existentially self-verifying only when it is performed by the meditator (you and I) in the first person, present tense mode. In this sense, it is unique. One must execute it in order to "see" its truth. There is nothing incoherent about this!
Dude check out phantom limb syndrome.
Thanks for that Schopenhauer reterence.
You ask for an origin of 'bodily sensations', but from the pov that all perception is an 'interaction event' between 'organism' and 'environment' (Bohr et al), we might understand sensation as a bi-product of 'perturbation of structure of organism'. Maturana was the biologist/philosopher who developed the idea that 'cognition' was equivalent to 'the general life process' in which adaptatations to perturbations operated to maintain the integrity of the organism. Organisms were seen as emergent dynamic structures, far from equilibrium (Prigogine), which maintained themselves by 'successful' adaptation to perturbation. (BTW, the concept of DKS, ...dynamic kinetic stability.. has been used in developments in abiogenetic theory (Pross) as a counter principal to entropy increase) No doubt this 'systems view' of cognition can designate some components as subsystems which monitor adaptation. That 'monitoring' could be equivalent to what we call 'awareness'.
In your definition of this is an 'epistemological' issue, we might bear in mind Rorty's point that 'philosophy' per se has no epistemological authority outwith scientific advances.
The true understanding of neuroscience must be considered limited to the problems that they can really solve. Neuroscience can obviously solve some problems, but in my impression, you may seriously be overestimating its ability to solve arbitrary problems phrased in the language of neuroscience. My own impression is that they are many more questions that they cannot answer than questions that they can.
The realm of ‘understanding’ is a phenomenological puzzle and a physical one (there is no ‘actual’ difference, they’re just conveniently sectioned from each other in order to feed into the working paradigm of the ‘epistemic’ and the ‘ontic’).