"Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette."
That is how many people feel about it. It has even been formalised as the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory of ethics - that ethical judgement is a matter of 'boo' - don't like it - and 'hurrah' - I do. It is a natural consequence of secular-scientific culture, first anticipated by Hume's famous 'is/ought' dichotomy - that what we can be certain about, is what can be measured precisely, whereas qualitative judgements - 'ought' statements - have no such mooring.
My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion.
And the problem is here you're implicitly judging it in evolutionary terms, against biological criteria. The whole, in fact the only, criterion in evolutionary biology is what is advantageous for propagation. So implicitly this amounts to a form of utilitarianism and/or pragmatism - greatest good for the greatest number, or whatever works.
Consider some humanistic alternatives - eudaimonic ethics, from Aristotle, the aim of which is flourishing, realising one's own purpose. I suppose you could argue that Abraham Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' is essentially eudaimonic in nature, in that he proposes a set of needs higher than the simply biological, of self-actualisation or realising your innate capacities and potential.
But ultimately, for ethical judgements to be grounded in something more than opinion or individual prerogative, I think there has to be some judgement about what constitutes a higher good or true good. But the dynamics of modern culture are such that any of those kinds of judgements are instinctively reviled - because they sound religious.
Have you read, or are you aware of, Alisdair McIntyre's After Virtue?
Well, first off, it's obviously not a matter of personal preference. Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures. Those values are enforced, for better or worse, by social controls including persuasion, reward, shame, force, and legal penalties.
So, morality is a system of values. Values are necessary for human action. I remember a discussion a while ago about the necessity for emotion in order for people to make decisions or act. When certain parts of the brain associated with emotion are damaged, a person may be unable to make the simplest decisions - what to wear or eat. I guess some values are built in and some are learned or taught.
Which type of value makes up moraility? I guess both. I think some of what we think is right or wrong comes from our natural place as social animals who like each other. Some, especially the specific details of a particular morality, are developed and taught socially. Morality is a system of values which make it easier for people to live together in groups. Whether you like morality or a particular moral system or not is irrelevant to the fact that morality makes sense. If you don't like the morality that applies to your particular group, you'll have to face the consequences.
Of course, many people believe that morality is established absolutely by a god or other mechanism. That's not my personal belief.
Terrapin StationMarch 09, 2019 at 22:44#2631730 likes
But ultimately, for ethical judgements to be grounded in something more than opinion or individual prerogative, I think there has to be some judgement about what constitutes a higher good or true good. But the dynamics of modern culture are such that any of those kinds of judgements are instinctively reviled - because they sound religious.
I don't revile them, and certainly not because they sound religious.
The problem I have with them is the same problem I have with the notion of objective meaning (in the semantics sense, which has been the topic of a handful of recent threads): there is no evidence of extramental meaning/moral judgments/judgments about ("higher") good, etc., and a fortiori that's the case on my view as I don't buy realism for any abstracts whatsoever--I'm a nominalist.
I'm also a physicalist in general, and I have sort of a logical positivist disposition on metaphysical/ontological claims (although I'm not at all an orthodox logical positivist, I disagree with their "schematic," etc.--It's more just that my approach is that stingy/parsimonious/skeptical, and I tend to want to interpret everything in terms of observables/what actually is going on in reference to something in "practical," everyday terms of just what we're doing, just what we're observing, etc.)
Terrapin StationMarch 09, 2019 at 22:45#2631760 likes
Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures.
Societies/cultures having values is really just a loose manner of speaking. It's individuals who have values. Individuals interact and can influence each other, which leads to social/cultural statistical tendencies, but the society or culture itself can't literally have values.
Reply to Terrapin Station Really, you don't believe that social or cultural systems have any existence outside of a particular human's thought, feeling, or behaviour? Can we know all we need to know about a society by taking a series of polls and tallying their results?
In my view, there are social systems, institutions, structures that are related to, but separate from, psychological factors.
Terrapin StationMarch 09, 2019 at 23:00#2631810 likes
Really, you don't believe that social or cultural systems have any existence outside of a particular humans thought, feeling, or behaviour?
I don't know, because I don't know the scope of the term "systems" in your usage. You'd have to detail that better.
But I do know that societies/cultures don't literally have values. That's a category error. Values are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occur in individuals.
Reply to Terrapin Station But I do know that societies/cultures don't literally have values. That's a category error. Values are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occurs in individuals.
So, there is no English language. Languages are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occur in individuals?
Terrapin StationMarch 09, 2019 at 23:08#2631840 likes
Reply to tim wood
I take it you mean "evolved" in the sense that thinking over time approaches what is good and evil as they really are. The non-arbitrary element being considered is not going to mean anything to those who dismiss that sort of thing as illusion. The baby must be tossed out with the dirty water.
Wayfarer's observation regarding "humans" and the proposition that they have their own nature is germane. I would only add that models of "being a person" in the way Kant based his psychology are oddly less idealistic in that regard. His model was the encouragement to make many others.
So there is a big disconnect between looking at models to determine whether they provide accurate maps of the territory and the debate whether anybody should be making maps at all.
My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion. I'd even argue that to some degree morality is sure as arithmetic, but the world from time to time and here and there lapses into such barbarous immorality that either humanity is at times collectively both stupid and ignorant, or morality ultimately lacks apodeictic certainty (but that has some other kind of certainty).
Evolution is propelled by natural selection. Nature was here before us, and it will be here after us thinking animals. Certain anthropocentric selective agents pretend to be natural selection and the difference between natural selection and anthropogenic selection tends to be where I apply morality (virtue is wiser than morality, however); humanism confuses anthropgenic selection (Anthropocene) with natural selection. Evolution occurs far slower than the life span of any one species. What will have happened if thought itself no longer exists? Evolution. Evolution, then, is far more encompassing than evolved thought.
"Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette."
I do not agree with the thought expressed, but I've shot my bolt at the writer and he is unaffected. I suppose first question is, is he alone or does he have company?
He has company. In a practical, meaningful sense, that's more or less what it is.
My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion.
There are two problems with this straightaway. Firstly, opinion is no more nothing than evolved thought is nothing. Secondly, your use of "mere" is an example of loaded language and a poor representation of the position that you're supposed to be criticising. A mere opinion makes me think of the opinion that salt and vinegar flavour crisps are better than cheese and onion flavour crisps. This is clearly not what was intended. Your characterisation is uncharitable.
I'd even argue that to some degree morality is sure as arithmetic, but the world from time to time and here and there lapses into such barbarous immorality that either humanity is at times collectively both stupid and ignorant, or morality ultimately lacks apodeictic certainty (but that has some other kind of certainty).
There's nothing there that explicitly contradicts the position you're supposed to be arguing against. You're expecting us to read between the lines in what you're saying? Okay. So you're just [i]assuming[/I] that morality is objective morality, and that there's an objective right and wrong, and that there are obvious examples of this. Yawn.
VagabondSpectreMarch 09, 2019 at 23:45#2631920 likes
To a large degree it depends on how we define "morality". If human preference is the locus of a given definition, it's wielders will go around equating morality with preference. But if, for example, "serving human preference" is instead the locus, then it's wielders might go around equating morality with objective strategy.
Both views can be simultaneously true, and even complimentary, with a bit of effort. Human preferences (especially shared preferences) (eg: the desire to be free and unmolested), can form the basis of our moral objectives, agreements, and actions, but at the same time empirical truth must also play a part in our determinations of what to do next. According to human preferences, some moral schemes are objectively inferior to others because they do not effectively serve those preferences.
To a large degree it depends on how we define "morality". If human preference is the locus of a given definition, it's wielders will go around equating morality with preference. But if, for example, "serving human preference" is instead the locus, then it's wielders might go around equating morality with objective strategy.
Both views can be simultaneously true, and even complimentary, with a bit of effort. Human preferences (especially shared preferences) (eg: the desire to be free and unmolested), can form the basis of our moral objectives, agreements, and actions, but at the same time empirical truth must also play a part in our determinations of what to do next. According to human preferences, some moral schemes are objectively inferior to others because they might not effectively serve those preferences.
But that would still boil down to preferences, so at the most fundamental level morality would be subjective.
Terrapin StationMarch 09, 2019 at 23:50#2631950 likes
We could say that "not molesting Billy serves Billy's (and whoever else's when it comes to Billy) preference to not molest Billy," but then if we're calling that morality, does morality no longer have to do with good/bad conduct, ways that we should versus shouldn't behave, etc.?
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 00:01#2631990 likes
Reply to S True, but as far as the most prevalent (nearly universal) and most important moral preferences are concerned, we're all so similarly positioned that in practice it doesn't really matter that we're basing morality on human preference (its human morality after-all); most of our moral dilemmas and efforts in moral suasion concerns how to socially accommodate our existing values, not how to force our own preferences on others. There need not be moral conflict on the grounds of differing preferences unless they are somehow mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, merely acting on personal preference lacks such a significant component of how most people conceptualize "morality" that it is basically antithetical. Under most definitions, morality only begins when we consider the preferences of others, whether for greedy, strategic, or empathetic causes. Impulsively acting on our hedonic urges (as "mere preference" might be boiled down to) seems antithetical to what it is we do when we do morality.
For most people, morality isn't fundamentally "personal preference", it's "personal preference in world of others' preferences, which pragmatically demand consideration".
True, but as far as the most prevalent (nearly universal) and most important moral preferences are concerned, we're all so similarly positioned that in practice it doesn't really matter that we're basing morality on human preference (its human morality after-all); most of our moral dilemmas and efforts in moral suasion concerns how to socially accommodate our existing values, not how to force our own preferences on others. There need not be moral conflict on the grounds of different preferences unless they are somehow mutually exclusive.
Furthermore, merely acting on personal preference lacks such a significant component of how most people conceptualize "morality" that it is basically antithetical. Under most definitions, morality only begins when we consider the preferences of others, whether for greedy, strategic, or empathetic causes. Impulsively acting on our hedonic urges (as "mere preference" might be boiled down to) seems antithetical to what it is we do when we do morality.
For most people, morality isn't fundamentally "personal preference", it's "personal preference in world of others' preferences, which pragmatically demands consideration"
I agree with much of that. It doesn't matter! It doesn't matter in the sense that morality would be no less important. The problem is getting the other side to see it that way. I see the same errors repeated over and again. They seem to see preference as some kind of affront, and try to trivialise it as "mere" preference. It's a quite ridiculous and unproductive way to react.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 00:10#2632040 likes
does morality no longer have to do with good/bad conduct, ways that we should versus shouldn't behave, etc.?
It's simply that we base our ideas of what actions are "good and bad" (and thereby a way to derive oughts) around concepts like "Billy doesn't want to be molested" or "molestation is extremely harmful to health, and everyone wants to be healthy" in the first place. In this case we can actually use our shared preferences to make virtue or deontological moral arguments (general laws) that are very useful for creating a better (more preferable) world. We can also make consequentialist arguments by asking whether or not an action does physical or reasonable disservice to the preferences of anyone else. If it does not, then it cannot be an immoral action. And we don't need shared preferences to have consequentialist arguments to make sense. When preferences are actually mutually exclusive or in direct competition, things naturally become much more complex (morality can break down), but that's just the way the world is.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 00:16#2632070 likes
As soon as you introduce bad/good, better/worse, etc. you've left the objective realm, though.
So you can focus on something objective like "Doing x serves S's preference," bit then we're not actually talking about the stuff that we conventionally talk about with morality --good/bad, better/worse, should/should not, etc.
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 00:24#2632120 likes
They're preferences about interpersonal behavior that one considers more significant than etiquette.
They're more important than etiquette because they concern the "preferences" which we value and seek to protect above all others (eg: the desire to go on living). Etiquette is about avoiding annoyance and petty confrontation, morality is about avoiding suffering and other existential threats.
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 00:26#2632130 likes
Reply to tim wood It's moral nihilism. I'm not sure why you're acting like it's from outer space.
Everyone thinks amorally from time to time: for the sake of sociology, anthropology, or any other time we examine people mechanistically. There is even ethical benefit from doing so. You're less like to delude yourself if you can look at yourself without judgement.
For those who say they think amorally 24/7, I think you'll find they're really no different from the rest of us in terms of behavior.
Try interviewing instead of flabbergasting. You may learn a new thing about your fellow human.
That four quarters equal a dollar is true never mind what anyone wants or feels or thinks as a matter of opinion. Which is just a long way of saying that the quality of being true is in some sense real.
But four quarters making a whole is unquestionably quantitative. What about - ‘should I cheat in this exam?’ ‘Should I give this stranger a ride?’ ‘Should I report that infraction I observed?’ They’re ethical judgements; how could they be expressed in quantitative terms? They require value judgements by their very nature.
if nothing is true in morality, then anything is moral - or nothing is moral. And any horrific grotesquerie you can imagine to test the point is thereby, by any moral standard, perfectly all right.
There is famous and oft-repeated aphorism ‘If God is dead, then everything is permitted’, from Dostoevsky, which I think, dramatises the sense in which ethical maxims have been underwritten by divine law.
It has even been formalised as the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory of ethics - that ethical judgement is a matter of 'boo' - don't like it - and 'hurrah' - I do. It is a natural consequence of secular-scientific culture,
For most people, morality isn't fundamentally "personal preference", it's "personal preference in world of others' preferences, which pragmatically demand consideration".
This is a really nice summary. Once you take into account the pragmatic necessity of dealing with other people's preferences, the statistical facts about those preferences (most common, range, average etc...) become necessary parts of the process, and those parts are facts about the world, not individual subjective feelings.
Your first paragraph seems rather disdainful of 'boo/hurrah' ethical judgement, but the rest of your post seems to be advocating it. Which is it?
I don’t regard eudomianic ethics as being emotive. They’re grounded in the notion of telos, which is that individuals have an end towards which their efforts should be directed. I take the positivist approach to be basically meaningless.
So a question might be, is there anything about morality that is true? To which the substance of any answer is, [i]there had better be![/I]
I get that, which is why - having rejected moral objectivism as without warrant - I pragmatically opt with moral relativism, which means that moral statements, suitably interpreted or suitably qualified, are truth-apt, and some are true, whereas others are false. There [I]is[/I] truth to be found in or relating to morality. You just have to look it at in the right way.
The alternative would be error theory, which keeps the interpretation of moral objectivism, and simply accepts that all moral statements are false.
Or emotivism, which denies that moral statements are even truth-apt.
And moral objectivism simply isn't a viable option, because it is without warrant, and no one when put to the test ever proves themselves capable of providing warrant. Moral objectivism is for dogmatists.
Evolved thought is merely movement of thinking through time, presumably and seemingly to some determinate end.
Presumably and seemingly make it okay with me. So it's just opinion which is itself considered to be progressive. I don't find that so objectionable. You might even have a lot of people on both sides agree with you on that point. Human rights certainly look like progress to me. But this is still all ultimately just a subjective matter. A huge number of people feel the same way, so we did something about it.
Yeah, yeah. Except that you knowingly used "mere" instead because of the connotations.
And you're still being uncharitable, I think. Did you ever bother to seek clarification about what exactly was meant by "nothing more than" in the context of what you were quoting? Or did you just assume your own interpretation? I think that Terrapin Station, who is presumably the author of the unattributed quote in your opening post, just meant something along the lines that it is not objectively true, rather than that it's not popular or useful or seemingly progressive.
Some moral practices are objectively worse than others from a given set or sets of moral preferences, and some are objectively better.
Child vaccination springs to mind: both parents prefer their kids to be healthy, but only one of them is actually achieving it.
Try telling a pediatric physician that vaccines amount to ettiquette ;)
... And this is exactly why the moral subjectivists do what they do, because of bullshit like this. Vaccinating your child (or not) is not an objectively moral action. To do so, you have to trust the medical establishment (where is the moral requirements that you do so?), you have to trust the pharmaceutical company (again, where is the moral requirement here?), you have to trust the statistics (no moral requirement), you have to trust that your child has the same health prospects as an average child (again, empirical, not moral data).
If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so.
I think that what is 'moral' is not 'merely' personal preference, as @S has already mentioned, there's nothing 'mere' about it, but if entertaining a degree of moral objectivity means allowing people the tools to strong-arm others into feeling obliged to go along with their own personal world-view, and use their children's health as leverage, then I'm with the subjectivists.
I don’t regard eudomianic ethics as being emotive. They’re grounded in the notion of telos, which is that individuals have an end towards which their efforts should be directed. I take the positivist approach to be basically meaningless.
Doesn't matter, its still someone's 'boo', and someone's 'hurrah'. It's still someone's 'rekon' about telos, and someone's feeling about what comes from it.
I don't think anyone of the 'boo/hurrah' camp think these preferences springs out of nowhere.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 13:49#2633350 likes
Child vaccination springs to mind: both parents prefer their kids to be healthy, but only one of them is actually achieving it.
People can get wrong just will achieve some particular state, but that does no work to make the moral part more or less objective.
"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective.
"X does/does not cause autism," etc. is the stuff that one can get correct or incorrect. There is no moral aspect to that, though.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 13:57#2633380 likes
They're more important than etiquette because they concern the "preferences" which we value and seek to protect above all others (eg: the desire to go on living). Etiquette is about avoiding annoyance and petty confrontation, morality is about avoiding suffering and other existential threats.
Plenty of people--almost everyone to some extent, values etiquette, too. The distinction from etiquette is simply because there are two different classes of interpersonal behavior we make these sorts of judgments about--one falls under the rubric of etiquette, and many consider it extremely important, and the other falls under the rubric of morality.
How about because your examples are not opinions. "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," are categorical statements, true or false as what they aver is true or false. An opinion is a judgment with respect to some criteria. "In my opinion, X is better than Y."
If someone likes cauliflower, they're going to say that cauliflower is better than some food they don't like. "In my opinion, x is better than y" is another way of saying that one likes x (more than one likes y.)
So again, how can they be right or wrong about that? Don't just tell me they can be. Tell me how they can be.
If they say they like cauliflower, that's either true or false.
It's true or false that they have that opinion, yes. It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, which is another way of stating the same opinion. It would be true or false that they think it's good, though.
Anyway, you're ignoring what I'm asking you.
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 19:59#2634310 likes
... And this is exactly why the moral subjectivists do what they do, because of bullshit like this. Vaccinating your child (or not) is not an objectively moral action. To do so, you have to trust the medical establishment (where is the moral requirements that you do so?), you have to trust the pharmaceutical company (again, where is the moral requirement here?), you have to trust the statistics (no moral requirement), you have to trust that your child has the same health prospects as an average child (again, empirical, not moral data).
If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so.
Do you agree that it is either a good decision or a bad decision or vaccinate your child?
Yes, the truth of vaccine effectiveness can be difficult for laymen to behold, but the truth is out there. In reality, the statistical benefits of vaccines far outweigh any risks (the validity of statistical analyses are not a matter of personal preference). Refusing the empirically proven vaccines not only puts the child at greater risk, but it also threatens our "herd immunity" by giving pathogens a host/vector to infect more people (in the height of the anti-vax movement, there are a lot of recent stories about localized disease outbreaks being caused by unvaccinated children).
I accept that people don't automatically understand this stuff, and I even understand why they reject vaccines; they're just wrong about it. Anti-vax parents would not need to side with the subjectivists if they could actually address the content of the specific moral dilemma. Do vaccines lead to more disease and suffering, or less disease and suffering? We want to have less disease and less suffering as a moral prerogative, so which path should we choose?
If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so.
You're basically agreeing that, potentially, the only different between a moral doctor who supports vaccinations and an immoral and superstitious parent who is refuses to vaccinate their child is ignorance.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 20:09#2634340 likes
I accept that people don't automatically understand this stuff, and I even understand why they reject vaccines; they're just wrong about it.
Again, the problem here isn't that people can be correct or incorrect about the effectiveness, the dangers, etc. of vaccination versus foregoing vaccination. It's that those facts aren't in themselves moral facts. Even having preferences about vaccinating versus not vaccinating is not sufficient for us to be talking about morality. We have to be talking about preferences about interpersonal behavior (that's more significant than etiquette). We can have such preferences with respect to vaccinations, but not any old preference re vaccinations would count, and the facts about it, in themselves, just don't have anything to do with morality.
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 20:10#2634350 likes
"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective.
Think about how often, in practice, someone promotes the opposite...
"It is right to undermine the health of your child?"
Physical and mental health are such basic necessities to well-being and happiness that in practice nobody ever disagrees with the idea that promoting the health of children is morally important/obligatory.
So yes, you can saw we have a preference-based or relativist/subjectivist-based moral value to protect children, but since nobody ever disagrees with this in practice we get to wield it as if it is an objectively true moral value.
People never disagree (reasonably anyway) with the idea that we should protect children, so we don't often have to worry about debating/negotiating our starting moral values, we can skip right to the factual empirical questions of how to actually achieve those values.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 20:12#2634360 likes
Think about how often, in practice, someone promotes the opposite...
"It is right to undermine the health of your child?"
Physical and mental health are such basic necessities to well-being and happiness that in practice nobody ever disagrees with the idea that promoting the health of children is morally important/obligatory.
Even if literally no one ever felt otherwise, what would that have to do with the issue? Are you saying that it has something to do with how common a particular sentiment is?
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 20:59#2634510 likes
We have to be talking about preferences about interpersonal behavior (that's more significant than etiquette). We can have such preferences with respect to vaccinations, but not any old preference re vaccinations would count, and the facts about it, in themselves, just don't have anything to do with morality.
When the facts change from our perspective, the moral status of the actions in question can also change from our perspective (to vaccinate or not to vaccinate).
Basically you could also argue that science itself amounts to personal preference about which empirical beliefs to adopt, but you would be focusing on the wrong thing. Yes preference plays a role (e.g: humans prefer precise and reliably predictive models), but once we set out with specific goals and tasks in mind, there are always better and worse possible methods and outcomes. In the case of science, better outcomes mean greater precision and predictive power (and while, like all knowledge, scientific understanding exists on a spectrum of certitude (it is inductive), it is so high on the spectrum that it's reasonable to say that science approximates objective truth).
Moral propositions are not too unlike scientific ones; they propose causal relationships that may or may not be universally true, and the more accurate or reliably predictive they are, the more useful to us, as tools, they become. If we agree about our starting moral goals (like the starting goals of science), then we can treat the dilemma of how to realize our moral goals as a purely empirical question, and we can even try to answer them using the scientific method (thereby eschewing preference for the remainder of the problem). Finding the right starting moral values (and negotiating different or competing values) can be important, but it's just the foothill of a much more pressing pile of moral dilemmas that need empirical solving, such as whether or not vaccines promote child health.
Even if literally no one ever felt otherwise, what would that have to do with the issue? Are you saying that it has something to do with how common a particular sentiment is?
How common a particular sentiment is can be very important, or not at all. It depends on the nature of the sentiment (how strongly people value it, whether it is achievable, whether it competes with other values, etc...), the environment that moral agents find themselves in, and the landscape of other values.
If all humans valued erecting great pyramids over all else, including our own lives, (in other words: if pyramid building was our only significant source of happiness), then we would all be building pyramids at any cost. Consider that certain economic arrangements might be more or less conducive to pyramid building: a form of government which is organized to maximize pyramid construction by any means might be said to be the most morally praiseworthy form of government [possible (and not immoral to any degree, because it does not transgress on the preferences of any individual).
Now suppose that only most humans are into pyramid building while others are obelisk obsessed. A system of government which makes slaves of these unwilling in the name of pyramid building might be objectively less moral than a system which does not. Instead of allowing citizens a narrow range of freedom, diversity in existential values is generally better accommodated by a form of government which allows people to make their own decisions.
Yes these are massive simplifications, but with some issues things can indeed be simple. If we fleshed out real enough (or used real world) examples, then we could come to useful and highly accurate moral statements like "X form of government is morally inferior to Y form of government". Of course we have to take into account our starting value hierarchies, to what extend they are shared, differ, or directly compete. And yes, our "moral truths" only amount of inductive approximations, but so does all other truth; it's an epistemic limitation inherent to our limited information gathering capacity and our ignorance of the physical world.
If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence, if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, and if c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), then: it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, this being a core reality that is universal to all subjective beings.
A possible candidate for this core preference universal to all subjective beings: the preeminent, basic, and generalized want of not having one’s intentions, or context specific wants, obstructed or barred (to be barred from doing what one wants to do will arguably always lead to some degree of displeasure in the short term if not also in the long term); or, more succinctly, the minimization of dolor, of suffering.
Then, considering such core and universal preference: parents who hold child vaccinations to be good and parents that hold child vaccinations to be bad, for example, will both operate from the same core preference universal to all subjective beings: say, that of minimizing dolor, this then of itself being an/the objective good (which is just as much an objective truth as is the existence of subjective beings to which this universal core preference pertains).
Given the objective good of the here hypothesized universal preference of minimizing personal dolor among all subjective beings, there will then be an objectively better and worse means of optimally actualizing this objective good—in the given example, via either vaccinating children or not.
But in short, if there is an objective good, it will not be found outside of subjective beings (like rocks over there are) but, instead, it will be an invariant and intrinsic preference universal to all subjective beings, one that is as objectively true as is the very presence of subjective beings.
Devil’s in the details. Nevertheless, to deny such objectively true good is to deny that subjective beings share any core characteristics of want/desire/need which defines all of them/us as subjective beings. Again, such as the generalized, hence universal, want of minimizing personal dolor—a preference whose universality among subjective beings can well be argued to be an objective truth.
I’m not intending by this to prove the reality of an objectively true good. I’m only adding to what previous posters mentioned: that a preference based ethics is in no way contradictory to the presence of an objectively true good.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 21:07#2634550 likes
Basically you could also argue that science itself amounts to personal preference about which empirical beliefs to adopt, but you would be focusing on the wrong thing.
But all we'd have to do is point out that that's rather a matter of whether we're matching some objective state of affairs.
The problem with morality is that there is no objective state of affairs to match with respect to the moral part.
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 21:17#2634600 likes
The problem with morality is that there is no objective state of affairs to match with respect to the moral part.
When you say "the moral part", you're appealing to a meta-ethical definition of morality as theoretical. When I say it, I appeal to morality as an applied [meta]-physics in service of human values.
I suspect we completely agree, which would be clear if we could be more specific about what we're each addressing (if we had better language).
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 21:17#2634610 likes
If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence
First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error.
There are objective facts (states of affairs) in my view, but no objective truths. "Truth" isn't the same as "fact." Truth is a relation of a proposition to something else, and that relation is necessarily a judgment on my view. Judgments are mental phenomena. Hence truth isn't objective.
Aside from that, I unfortunately have no idea what "hold presence" might refer to. ("Hold presents," yes, just in case it's Christmastime. ;-) )
if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings,
Aside from the same comments about "objective true," I wouldn't use "valid" that way, but that might not matter for anything. "Subjective," by the way, I use to refer to mental phenomena. And that's it. I'm not implying anything else with that term.
it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them,
I don't buy the notion of "implicit understanding." Also, you seem to be using "what is good for them" so that it's referring to something other than whatever an individual's opinion is.
It's really laborious to go through a long post like this . . . the above was just about a sixth or seventh of your post.
Do you agree that it is either a good decision or a bad decision or vaccinate your child?
What I agree with is neither here nor there. 99.9% of the world could agree with it and would still not make it morally right to believe certain facts as presented. Believing people is not a moral question, morality, as we generally speak of it, seems to be about intent, not belief, and it rather clouds the issues for you to start using it so differently now.
Yes, the truth of vaccine effectiveness can be difficult for laymen to behold, but the truth is out there. In reality, the statistical benefits of vaccines far outweigh any risks (the validity of statistical analyses are not a matter of personal preference).
You may well be in the privileged position to have first hand access to the relevant information, in which case I don't doubt you could make an excellent moral choice. I, like most people, have only access to what an ultimately very small group of people have told me. Are you seriously suggesting that trusting the government is a moral obligation?
Do vaccines lead to more disease and suffering, or less disease and suffering?
If you had the slightest understanding of epidemiological statistics you would know that such a question cannot possibly be answered with any certainty, and even if it could, such a study could only be carried out by a few large organisations with access to the data. Again, is trusting the word of some organisation or other a moral obligation?
You're basically agreeing that, potentially, the only different between a moral doctor who supports vaccinations and an immoral and superstitious parent who is refuses to vaccinate their child is ignorance.
No, unless you have direct access to the actual data then it is trust, not ignorance.
When you say "the moral part", you're appealing to a meta-ethical definition of morality as theoretical. When I say it, I appeal to morality as an applied [meta]-physics in service of human values.
?? I'm referring to stances a la "x is good/right conduct," "x is bad/wrong conduct," "x is morally permissible," "x is morally obligatory" etc. So no, that's nothing meta-ethical.
"x is good/right conduct" and the like are what morality/moral stances are.
"x causes autism," "x doesn't cause autism" and the like are not morality/moral stances.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 21:28#2634710 likes
I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then.
It's difficult to agree with something if I'm not sure what it's claiming, and I'm not sure if you're just using words in different ways than I would or if you believe that different things are the case than I do.
VagabondSpectreMarch 10, 2019 at 21:30#2634730 likes
?? I'm referring to stances a la "x is good/right conduct," "x is bad/wrong conduct," "x is morally permissible," "x is morally obligatory" etc. So no, that's nothing meta-ethical.
You're saying that moral "truth" has to not depend on human preference, because human preference is not objective. That's meta-ethical.
"x causes autism," "x doesn't cause autism" and the like are nor morality/moral stances.
No, but the stances we take on issues like these factual issues do impact our moral actions and arguments. In other words, whether or not it is true that X causes autism can determine whether or not an action is moral (especially when disagreement about objectives are neither here nor there).
Reply to Terrapin Station Fair enough. Never mind my post. I don't have the heart to enter into discussions about the proper significance of all the terms you've pointed out.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 21:38#2634760 likes
You're saying that moral "truth" has to not depend on human preference, because human preference is not objective. That's meta-ethical.
In the bit we were just talking about, I was pointing out that the facts you're talking about have nothing to do with ethics. I wasn't saying anything about the requirements for moral truth etc.--at least not aside from the requirement that we're actually talking about morality "x is good/right conduct" etc. and not stuff that has nothing to do with morality "x causes/does not cause autism" for example.
Are you seriously suggesting that trusting the government is a moral obligation?
I haven't brought the government into this. In fact, all I suggested was that there is indeed a correct answer to the question of whether or not vaccines are harmful/worth the risk. At first I didn't even give an explicit answer to the question, although I did allude to my own position. I was just using it as an example to make the point that some courses of action are objectively morally superior/inferior to others per our values, and that sometimes when we disagree about matters of fact, we disagree about which choices are best as a result.
It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure.
In the same way that the scientific method "objectively" serves the subjective starting goal of acquiring predictive knowledge, morality can "objectively" serve the subjective starting goals of human beings. This makes moral truth relative to the values of interested moral agents, but there is obviously still an objective component to our moral arguments.
When people say morality is "mere" preference, they're ignoring the bulk of what it is we do when we do morality, which is figuring out how to best accommodate our existing values (a largely empirical question). This is why I'm accusing you of having a malformed meta-ethical definition: just because morality is not universal doesn't mean we cannot or need not strive for objectively better moral arguments for the situations/values we find ourselves in and with.
It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure.
"Subjectively, relative" - No.
The fact itself is objective, and the way it relates to existing values is objective. Only the values are subjective.
In other words, if you know the starting moral values, and you know the matters of facts, then you can objectively evaluate the moral superiority/inferiority of moral arguments.
Terrapin StationMarch 10, 2019 at 22:00#2634840 likes
When people say morality is "mere" preference, they're ignoring the bulk of what it is we do when we do morality,
When I say that morality is mere preference, what I'm saying is that "x is good" and the like are mental phenomena and do not occur elsewhere. That's all that I'm saying. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm simply focusing on a very specific ontological claim.
Some people believe that "x is good" occurs in the world extramentally. It does not.
My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion.
I agree. I hold that morality is an emergent property of living in a society. There are at least some knowable moral truths. For example, you don’t boil babies. This is a moral truth, not just mere opinion where individuals feel disgust.
It’s true or false that cauliflower is good for nutrition, just as it’s true or false that boiling babies is good for society. A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong.
I haven't brought the government into this. In fact, all I suggested was that there is indeed a correct answer to the question of whether or not vaccines are harmful/worth the risk. At first I didn't even give an explicit answer to the question, although I did allude to my own position. I was just using it as an example to make the point that some courses of action are objectively morally superior/inferior to others per our values, and that sometimes when we disagree about matters of fact, we disagree about which choices are best as a result.
That's fine, it didn't come across that way, but that must have been my misunderstanding.
I should add, however, that even on the understanding that you are not claiming we have a moral duty to trust some particular data source over another, I'm still not quite following how you got from the valuing of children's health to there being a fact of the matter about whether vaccines are 'good'.
To get there, even in a world in which we could all know personally that vaccines were safe and effective, you're still making a whole load of presumptions that others might legitimately disagree with.
For a start you presuming that safety and effectiveness are the only factors someone might like to consider. Someone might, for example, simply consider it an inadvisable risk to have a private company, overseen by a single government organisation, responsible for injecting every child in the county with a chemical mixture. Its current safety might not enter into it. Evil Kineval used to jump flaming buses on a motorbike and remain whole, doesn't make it safe or advisable, it just means he happened to get away with it.
Others might object on religious grounds such as the Amish, having their ethics based on the divine command.
People might hold strongly a virtue of 'do no harm' which would prevent them from ethically giving any kind of prophylactic drug, not because of a utilitarian calculation of harm, but on a principle designed to accommodate uncertainty.
Values (by which you seem to mean objectives) and facts together still are not enough to make a moral path objectively true, we're not all utilitarians.
Terrapin StationMarch 11, 2019 at 17:30#2636430 likes
Cauliflower is good either is a fact in respect of some criteria,
How would it make sense to say that anything is good in respect to some criterion/criteria? That would never capture what "good" refers to. For example, say that one criterion is "Cauliflower is good if it's not moldy." If all that amounts to is that "good" is a synonym for "not moldy," then it doesn't at all capture the conventional sense of "good."
Terrapin StationMarch 11, 2019 at 17:40#2636440 likes
It’s true or false that cauliflower is good for nutrition, just as it’s true or false that boiling babies is good for society. A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong.
No, it's true or false that cauliflower has x effect on nutrition. Having x effect on nutrition isn't objectively good versus having not-x effect on nutrition.
Likewise, boiling babies might have x effect on society (a fact that would be much, much harder to establish than the fact that cauliflower has whatever effect on nutrition, by the way). But it's not objectively good to have x effect on society versus having not-x effect on society.
Objectively, there are just facts. All possibilities, if actualized, would make particular facts obtain rather than other facts. No facts are objectively preferable, better, worse, etc. than any other facts.
The sense in which you are correct is a narrow one. When it is said (by anyone) that something is good, the word "good" is a shorthand, a code, that the speaker presumably supposes that his auditor will understand, that if understood saves much periphrasis. But this same thing is true of all language acts meant as communication.
Say what? How does this answer how anything is good with respect to some criterion, where we'd be at all capturing the conventional sense of what we're referring to with "good," rather than simply using the term as an "empty" synonym for some objective state?
Reply to Terrapin Station Say, someone says the brakes on that car are good or the bones of that house are good. Does that simply mean that that person approves of them?
Terrapin StationMarch 11, 2019 at 21:30#2637000 likes
How do you define “good”? Is something good merely in the capacity of someone approving of it?
"good" in a moral sense amounts to the person approving of or preferring the (usually interpersonal) behavior in question, if not directly, then as a means to some other end that they approve of or prefer.
Terrapin StationMarch 11, 2019 at 21:32#2637020 likes
Say, someone says the brakes on that car are good or the bones of that house are good. Does that simply mean that that person approves of them?
— Noah Te Stroete
Yes, it's a term of approval or preference. "Yaying," accepting, sanctioning, etc. the thing in question.
I tend to think it is more than just approval. If the bones of the house are “good”, then they are also in a state that tends toward structural integrity. It’s a hypothetical imperative. If one wants a sturdy structure, then one would want it to have “good bones”. Just as there are hypothetical imperatives, there is the Categorical Imperative. One does not say “if one wants a working society” though. Society is a given to social creatures as ourselves. So, in order for society to continue (something that’s objectively in our biological and cultural DNA), there must be duties to act or abstain, such as the duty to not boil babies.
Terrapin StationMarch 11, 2019 at 21:55#2637150 likes
If the bones of the house are “good”, then they are also in a state that tends toward structural integrity.
But that only follows if one prefers "bones" that tend toward structural integrity. Insofar as individuals do not prefer that, what would be good about that? The notion of "good" makes no sense outside of preferences, approval, etc.
Statements like, "this orange is good," or "that is a good pocket-knife," are ordinary and meaningful. Criteria, such as they are, are implied, and it's assumed the hearer or reader knows what they are. Do you disagree? Do you deny this?
Obviously I disagree, because I just said that it's not possible to make any sense of that.
The challenge I proposed to you was to make sense of it.
So what criteria, for example, would you say "This orange is good" refer to?
Reply to Isaac Can a society function well if its inexpert members do not trust the most expert available opinion when it comes to scientific, medical, ecological and economical matters?
If morality is based on doing what promotes the flourishing (health and happiness) of a society and all its members, and the basic requirements for such flourishing are established and universally acknowledged, then morality as an "if, then" set of principles can be established and universally acknowledged, and the problems with the "is, ought" divide circumvented.
Societies cultivate their citizens' moral dispositions. Modern democracies are largely founded on the notion of the competition of the individual against the rest, and the idea of the natural world as a mere resource to be exploited. Even human subjects are fair game to be exploited for individual gain within merely legal constraints. This means that they are not well suited to provide the best conditions for human and natural flourishing. The problem is how to fill the vacuum left by the (justifiable) rejection and (welcome) decline of organized religion.
Mores are shared values that unify societies and yield solidarity among their members. The more morally bankrupt, the more corrupt, a society is, the more laws will be required to protect each citizen from the predatory behaviors of the others. The US is a paradigm case of a society that is rotten to the core. It is not alone, but is just the most extreme exemplar of moral bankruptcy.
Reply to tim wood
The gap does not require explaining why some do one thing and others do another in response to the question of what is arbitrary in moral judgements. The activity is either a process that is a perception of what is happening or it is not.
The phenomena is framed by one means or another. That one or another frame lets us hear and see a certain way either is involved with actual beings or they are dreams, projected against a screen.
Your results may vary.
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 01:22#2637600 likes
When I say that morality is mere preference, what I'm saying is that "x is good" and the like are mental phenomena and do not occur elsewhere. That's all that I'm saying. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm simply focusing on a very specific ontological claim.
Some people believe that "x is good" occurs in the world extramentally. It does not.
This is a fair enough point. You're right; some people suppose morality is some tangible set of laws that exist in some kind of ultimate and universally applicable moral realm (see: God), and they're wrong.
Our starting moral values are not extramental, but they can be inter-mental and intra-mental. Even from an individually subjective starting point, one's value hierarchy can be more or less internally consistent. Objectivity is quite useful when we negotiate our own hierarchy of starting values. The fact humans tend to share so many fundamental starting values also adds a layer of cooperative opportunity that would not be there otherwise, and navigating these opportunities for mutual benefit is the bulk of the ethical work that lays before us.
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 01:53#2637620 likes
I should add, however, that even on the understanding that you are not claiming we have a moral duty to trust some particular data source over another, I'm still not quite following how you got from the valuing of children's health to there being a fact of the matter about whether vaccines are 'good'.
I didn't expect any push back about the effectiveness of vaccines, so perhaps we could substitute the example for something else:
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced for a myriad of confused reasons, and among them is the belief that it will improve the quality of life of victims. Ostensibly it is performed because it is believed to be good, and they don't happen to trust medical authorities who insist otherwise. From our enlightened ad-vantage point, it's clear to us that FGM does not actually improve the lives of victims (hence: "victim".)
So in what ways might we say FGM is objectively immoral? Well it objectively undermines the preferences of victims, and it also reasonably undermines the values of perpetrators as well (in some cases, villages can't remember why they started doing it, and can't say why they choose to carry on with it). When we look at the most fundamental moral values of everyone involved, it's quite clear that FGM undermines them, which is why not practicing FGM is an objectively-morally superior practice.
People might hold strongly a virtue of 'do no harm' which would prevent them from ethically giving any kind of prophylactic drug, not because of a utilitarian calculation of harm, but on a principle designed to accommodate uncertainty.
There's really not much difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalizations. What do you think causes such moral maxims as "do no harm" to evolve? Because they're useful.
We have many fancy calculi for navigating the many moral landscapes we inhabit (and the mix of moral games we play upon them), but ultimately, serving humans - utility- is the only real and reliable perspective to adopt. Where dilemmas become too complex for other frameworks to solve, we all intuitively revert to utilitarianism.
I want to point out that straight-forward utilitarian calculus often amounts to a vast oversimplification of moral dilemmas, which is why we have other frameworks which can account for contextual nuance (e.g: the broader implication that organ-harvesting the random hobo has on society, and on the very agreement that social moral cooperation is based on)
Values (by which you seem to mean objectives) and facts together still are not enough to make a moral path objectively true, we're not all utilitarians.
As I keep stating, the values component is subjective, but the way they relate to others and the world is not subjective. Once we've settled on a definition of exactly what morality is supposed to do, we can assess whether or not the actions we propose will actually achieve our individual or communal moral goals.
How do you define "morality" exactly? In my view, boiled down, it amounts to a realm of strategic knowledge intended to help us make decisions (decisions which impact others, and in a way which considers their values). I think some moral strategies/choices are objectively better or worse than others for a given set or sets of subjective values, just like how some chess strategies/moves are objectively better or worse than others for given arrangements of the chess board.
I didn't expect any push back about the effectiveness of vaccines, so perhaps we could substitute the example for something else:
I find that hard to believe, given the range of opinion on the matter, but I'm happy to go with another example.
With regards to FGM, I only know what the Who has to say on the matter, which is "for these women this is part of their identity and failure to undergo this procedure can lead to condemnation and ostracism within their own community". They also seem to suggest that in some cultures and there's a religious element, and in others women will be unable to find a husband without it, which, in extremely patriarchal societies, can seriously reduce their well-being, even their lifespan.
So again, the actual single individual carrying out this violence is not 'mistakenly' doing so for the woman's well-being, they very likely actually are doing so for the woman's well-being. They basically have a choice between complete social ostracisation and being mutilated. A brutal choice, but not one we 'enlightened' westerners can just sweep in and point out how the idiot natives are getting it wrong as if they'd made a mistake in their maths.
it objectively undermines the preferences of victims,
... it tragically does not. Not unless their entire culture changes around them and not everyone, even victims of FGM, wants their whole culture changed.
Such people are confused, but thankfully these types of beliefs are assailable by science, logic, and an appeal to their human values.
This seems to be closer to the thrust of what you're saying. The Amish believe in God and that certain practices here on earth (which may include the refusal vaccines) are necessary to ensure a good afterlife for the rest of eternity. How exactly do you propose to assail that belief with "science, logic, and an appeal to their human values."? Have scientists recently visited the afterlife and I missed the story? Has CETI just picked up some communication from God saying its OK?
There's really not much difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalizations. What do you think causes such moral maxims as "do no harm" to evolve? Because they're useful.
There's a massive difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalisations. It's just not one you can see because of your blind faith in the 'truth' of modern Western culture. The difference is in how they deal with uncertainty. Utilitarian calculus (or more properly consequensialist), no matter how complex, takes all the 'known' facts about a matter and uses them to work out the best strategy to achieve a goal. It takes no account of how small a proportion of all there is to know about a matter the amount we actually do know is.
Virtue ethics, by contrast, presumes (in some manifestations at least), that such calculations are so fraught with error, that it makes more sense to focus on doing what feels right, given that we will never fully establish whether it actually was right in the long term.
Once we've settled on a definition of exactly what morality is supposed to do, we can assess whether or not the actions we propose will actually achieve our individual or communal moral goals.
No. We absolutely cannot do this. It is arrogant beyond belief to suggest that the calculus that those in cultures practicing FGM can be mistaken, but our knowledge is so exhaustive and accurate that we can have this level of certainty about whether certain actions will achieve our goals in the long term. We can't even predict our own ecomony, let alone the long term consequences of every cultural and personal change in behaviour.
You're basically saying that it is very possible for ethnic cultures to have made a clear mistake in their calculus (which, just for the record, I agree they have, in case that's not clear), but that we in the 'enlightened' West are so unlikely to make a mistake in ours that we can claim our choices are practically 'objective fact'. You realise how that sounds?
Personally, I think of morality as that particular collection of subjective feelings about one's actions which relate to a potential negative effect on others. I'm not a moral relativist though, because I don't believe the subjective mental realm is a mystical, or supernatural place. It is amenable to science, it is subject to natural selection, sexual selection (and all manner of other selection pressures) and it responds in an (at least theoretically) predictable manner to environmental stimuli. All this put together makes these subjective feelings very homogeneous in large part and practically universal in some cases. These I take to be moral facts.
It doesn't matter in the sense that morality would be no less important. The problem is getting the other side to see it that way. I see the same errors repeated over and again. They seem to see preference as some kind of affront... It's a quite ridiculous and unproductive way to react.
Will this truth stand against the destructive tendencies of relativism? I do not think so, but neither will anything else.
First it was "mere" and "nothing". Now it is "destructive".
These are clear examples of loaded language. Maybe try to be more reasonable and less emotional. I know that that might sound ironic coming from me, given my position on the role of emotions in morality, but they're appropriate in normative ethics, not in meta-ethics. It's appropriate to appeal to emotion in judging whether or not slavery is wrong, but it's not appropriate to appeal to emotion in judging which meta-ethical position is true. The latter is fallacious.
Can a society function well if its inexpert members do not trust the most expert available opinion when it comes to scientific, medical, ecological and economical matters?
A difficult question for sure, but I think that one would have to balance the advantages of people being more likely to be right about stuff, with the disadvantages of the power that authorities would then wield to manipulate events. In most areas of science, we have mechanisms in place to prevent such a misuse of power, mainly having a large enough number of people involved and an uncensored publishing industry, but that is only a pragmatic issue. If we start saying that the mere pragmatism of being able to trust our experts (because we have good safety measures in place) becomes a moral obligation to do so (which is what I was arguing against) then we run the risk of it becoming enculturated and we can't by any means guarantee the continued good functioning of our system.
If morality is based on doing what promotes the flourishing (health and happiness) of a society and all its members, and the basic requirements for such flourishing are established and universally acknowledged, then morality as an "if, then" set of principles can be established and universally acknowledged, and the problems with the "is, ought" divide circumvented.
In theory, yes. But I don't see how either of those 'if's are ever going to be the case.
The more morally bankrupt, the more corrupt, a society is, the more laws will be required to protect each citizen from the predatory behaviors of the others.
True, but this presumes the law-makers are not also so afflicted, and the law-makers are just people. If society is morally bankrupt, then surely law-makers, scientists, experts in general, who are drawn from that society will be morally bankrupt too?
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 10:00#2638080 likes
So again, the actual single individual carrying out this violence is not 'mistakenly' doing so for the woman's well-being, they very likely actually are doing so for the woman's well-being. They basically have a choice between complete social ostracisation and being mutilated. A brutal choice, but not one we 'enlightened' westerners can just sweep in and point out how the idiot natives are getting it wrong as if they'd made a mistake in their maths.
Oh but we can. FGM is indeed erroneous...
There's no good reason for anyone to ostracize a woman who had her clitoris forcibly removed at puberty. Basically, we get to call the people who do the ostracization "stupid" because their relevant beliefs are based in nothing but the dogma of tradition. A practice that is useful only when nested within anti-utility and stupidity isn't necessarily useful per se.
What if a society society expected mothers to sacrifice their first born children to Quetzalcoatl? Their well-being would be affected if they refuse, so who are we to scoff at such necessity?
The whole practice is based in ignorance, and your argument relies on the ignorant making the boons of FGM into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Inter-generational extortion isn't an adequate moral justification for the practice of FGM, me thinks.
If a drug addict believes a certain dose of drugs is the best amount they should take, but you know that to be a fatal dose, do you have no grounds upon which to convince them it is not a good decision?
The individuals being unwillingly extorted into carrying out FGM aren't who I'm calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened...
It is arrogant beyond belief to suggest that the calculus that those in cultures practicing FGM can be mistaken, but our knowledge is so exhaustive and accurate that we can have this level of certainty about whether certain actions will achieve our goals in the long term. We can't even predict our own ecomony, let alone the long term consequences of every cultural and personal change in behaviour.
I think we can safely say that removing clitorides doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.
Frankly I'm flabbergasted that you would try to put up any defense of FGM whatsoever. Sure, indigenous knowledge and all that; "spirits" too while we're at it, but genital mutilation? Really? You are aware that human stupidity has existed prior to western civilization right? That not every action humans have taken was in their own interest or the interest of others? That even hunter-gatherers, with all their ancient wisdom, didn't know some of the things that we now know? (That, for instance, deities aren't sitting around making good/bad things happen based on whether or not we pray at the right rock, or whatever; that superstition only works as a morale-boosting placebo because humans are so fallible).
You're basically saying that it is very possible for ethnic cultures to have made a clear mistake in their calculus (which, just for the record, I agree they have, in case that's not clear), but that we in the 'enlightened' West are so unlikely to make a mistake in ours that we can claim our choices are practically 'objective fact'. You realise how that sounds?
It's not clear at all that you agree FGM is morally errant. Why else would you object so profusely when I condemn the practice?
When did I say that the west is perfect? The west is "enlightened" in that we know better than to practice or tolerate FGM. From our vantage point, we can see why FGM is not good. Do you disagree? If not, what is your point? That I'm arrogant or racist? (If that is your point, why bother making it? It doesn't make my point wrong, and if you're right about my arrogance or racism, then it won't matter because I won't give a shit).
The Amish believe in God and that certain practices here on earth (which may include the refusal vaccines) are necessary to ensure a good afterlife for the rest of eternity. How exactly do you propose to assail that belief with "science, logic, and an appeal to their human values."? Have scientists recently visited the afterlife and I missed the story? Has CETI just picked up some communication from God saying its OK?
The idea that god exists and has some intentions about how we ought behave is an empirical claim, and it can be tested with empirical science and evidence based reasoning (science isn't in the business of proving negatives with objective certainty, it's in the business of making what amount to statistically strong (inductive) predictive models. It turns out that with sufficient education people tend to abandon superstition. Not always, but it is observable that exposing people to evidence based reasoning and science tends to persuade them toward not possessing hard theological beliefs. I bet if I could catch an Amish person out for Rumspringa, in the right setting, I would have a very good chance of persuading them away from theology and toward a more secular set of beliefs (although, the Amish are so tight-knit that I think many children stick around due to familial ties alone).
In any case, I feel no qualms about telling Amish people that their beliefs are factually incorrect, just as I have no qualms telling a Buddhist or Hindu or Muslim or Mormon or Jew or Rasta or any other religious person. They certainly can't all be right, so statistically I'm in a strong position.
There's a massive difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalisations. It's just not one you can see because of your blind faith in the 'truth' of modern Western culture.
You've gone off the deep end... You just can't see it because of your blind resentment of western culture... (Does this ever work?)
The difference is in how they deal with uncertainty. Utilitarian calculus (or more properly consequensialist), no matter how complex, takes all the 'known' facts about a matter and uses them to work out the best strategy to achieve a goal.
If you could do less grand-standing against your humble racist interlocutor, perhaps you would be able to address his point:
Virtue ethics is really only good so far as it is useful to the people who wield it. Yes, people have all sorts of highfalutin beliefs about where good comes from, but overtime, people with non-useful beliefs have tended to die off, and their beliefs forgotten, while people with useful beliefs (such as the "jesus said: do unto others" virtue) have tended to stay alive and pass on their useful ideas. Beliefs and practices which are useful to human well-being tend to perpetuate themselves while useless beliefs do not; harmful beliefs tend to destroy themselves. But beliefs that perpetuate are not always conducive to well-being. Sometimes beliefs that once had utility cease to be useful when the environment changes; sometimes a belief or behavior is harmful to some and beneficial to others; sometimes people do things for inexplicable and stupid reasons.
I don't respect magical, supernatural, or superstitious beliefs, even when they're useful; I like my utility without any junk in it.
Virtue ethics, by contrast, presumes (in some manifestations at least), that such calculations are so fraught with error, that it makes more sense to focus on doing what feels right, given that we will never fully establish whether it actually was right in the long term.
Ah Ah Ah, you said virtue ethics wasn't utilitarian! Where's the contrast? You've just described utilitarianism by intuitive guesswork.
Personally, I think of morality as that particular collection of subjective feelings about one's actions which relate to a potential negative effect on others. I'm not a moral relativist though, because I don't believe the subjective mental realm is a mystical, or supernatural place. It is amenable to science, it is subject to natural selection, sexual selection (and all manner of other selection pressures) and it responds in an (at least theoretically) predictable manner to environmental stimuli. All this put together makes these subjective feelings very homogeneous in large part and practically universal in some cases. These I take to be moral facts
By defining morality as only a collection of subjective feelings about hurting others, you've gone into the relativist deep-end (where facts don't matter). Deep-end-relativists don't realize that when they broadly question and rhetorically undermine our general ability to gather facts about the external world and make objective predictions about the future (e.g: we can't even predict the eCoMoNy!!!), they simultaneously undermine their own ability to perform moral suasion. Consider how instinctively you leapt to the defense of genital mutilators and anti-vax parents (although the latter might be a bad example if you're ignorant of the science). You know FGM is wrong, but you won't allow yourself to cast judgment upon the practice because it's not universally "true" that FGM is immoral, 'cause subjective preference. Wouldn't it be better (morally, even) if you had an argument that could persuade the perpetrators of FGM that it is wrong? (Let's say, a utility-inclusive argument?)
Once you've undermined "morality" to such a degree, there's nothing useful left-over. Functionally, it's anarchic nihilism; if it's all subjective feelings, why not attempt moral suasion through interpretive dance?
Terrapin StationMarch 12, 2019 at 10:13#2638110 likes
Our starting moral values are not extramental, but they can be inter-mental and intra-mental. Even from an individually subjective starting point, one's value hierarchy can be more or less internally consistent. Objectivity is quite useful when we negotiate our own hierarchy of starting values. The fact humans tend to share so many fundamental starting values also adds a layer of cooperative opportunity that would not be there otherwise, and navigating these opportunities for mutual benefit is the bulk of the ethical work that lays before us.
We can value the same things (nominalism aside). And we can cooperate with each other. I'm not sure why that would need a special classification ( "inter" or "intra").
Terrapin StationMarch 12, 2019 at 10:15#2638120 likes
"this orange is good," or, "that is a good pocket-knife," not only do not make any sense, but that "it's not possible to make any sense" of them. Tell us, do you ever yourself engage in this nonsense?
We're talking about your notion that those statements are about meeting some specific criteria, no? It's like all of a sudden you forgot the specific idea at issue, even though you brought it up and we'd been going back and forth about it for a few posts.
The orange in question might taste good, look good, be good.
So you're saying that rather than being an utterance of preference, approval etc. "X is good" utterances imply meeting a criterion that . . . x is good??? Seriously?
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 10:18#2638130 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station Because moral truth (for you) can depend on more than what is in your own mind, it must also consider what is in the minds of others.
To not consider others at all differs from the common fundamental conception of what morality is supposed to do (otherwise it's just regular greedy planning). It's not just what I believe is best for me, it's what I believe is best for me while considering what is best for others.
The intra classification was just an over-fancy way of saying that we must also negotiate our own competing internal values in addition to negotiating the values of others.
Terrapin StationMarch 12, 2019 at 10:21#2638140 likes
If the very definition is that it's preferences of interpersonal behavior, why would we need to point that out again? And why would anyone think that it's not influenced by, in response to, etc. other people. Wouldn't that be obvious?
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 10:27#2638160 likes
Because consideration in this case means more than just being aware of. A serial killer carefully considers the ramifications of their preferred interpersonal behavior, but they do not extend "moral consideration".
A hard moral relativist might conceptualize raw preferences (any behavior) as encompassing the moral sphere, but there's more to the equation: the way our preferences relate to others, the preferences of others, and our circumstantially available courses of action.
Behavior which extends no moral consideration toward others is not moral behavior.
Terrapin StationMarch 12, 2019 at 10:31#2638180 likes
That I don't at all agree with. They reach a different "conclusion" than most people. That doesn't mean that they're not reaching moral stances.
You can call them moral stances in so far as they are stances that impact others, but we can also say that such individuals are not "practicing morality" because they do not value or consider the needs of others.
Can you imagine a world without morality? Where nobody has the care or foresight to account for how their behavior impacts others? The way you frame morality, a world of psychopaths/sociopaths would still contain morality, but there would be no shareable or useful moral meaning; if how we affect others doesn't matter, then morality doesn't matter.
Terrapin StationMarch 12, 2019 at 11:10#2638220 likes
You're writing "consider the needs of others" but I'm guessing you have in mind something more like "acquiesce to the needs of others." There's no evidence that serial killers don't think about the needs of others. They simply reach different conclusions there.
In acquiescing to the needs of others, are you also acquiescing to the needs of serial killers, for example?
And no, I can't imagine a world without morality, because I don't believe it's possible given what human minds are like. Unless someone is a "vegetable," they're going to have stances on acceptable versus unacceptable interpersonal behavior.
That's irrelevant to morality. Whether it's immoral is what's relevant. You'd have to connect the two, but there's no necessary connection, and to say that this is an example where something is immoral because it is erroneous (according to some standard) is just to make a moral judgement founded in moral feeling. That we share the same judgement is not that we're correct in any kind of transcendent sense.
You've said [i]a lot[/I], but it isn't really doing anything. The same basic problems remain.
FGM is not a maths sum, it cannot be erroneous. A person committing it could be in error in thinking that doing so will lead to an outcome they desire/value, but the only way to check that would be to wait until the end of their life (including any afterlife, if they believe in such a thing) and tot up the total effect of the action. We can, and do, of course make predictions about the likely result of this calculus, but as with all predictions in complex systems they will vary depending on the model used. (and just pre-emting a possible "but some models are better than others" retort, just re-read this paragraph, my response would be the same. We can't possibly tell until the end of all time when we do the final count).
The individuals being unwillingly extorted into carrying out FGM aren't who I'm calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened...
Then who are you calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened (three very different accusations by the way)? Do you think the people in those societies doing the ostracising are somehow less constrained by their culture?
I think we can safely say that removing clitorides doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.
There you go undoing exactly what you just said. So if removing clitorises "doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.", then which is true of the actual people who do it - are they stupid, immoral, or unenlightened? They must be one of those three because they are carrying out a practice where the damage does not outweigh the gain. They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral.
It's not clear at all that you agree FGM is morally errant. Why else would you object so profusely when I condemn the practice?
You have not condemned the practice, and I have not defended it. You claimed that it was objectively immoral, and I claimed it was subjectively so. Your claim is that it objectively causes more harm than good, even if we share values about what 'harm' and 'good' are. I'm saying that such calculations are not so simple in complex societies where a lot of things would have to change all at once to make that true for any given individual.
When did I say that the west is perfect? The west is "enlightened" in that we know better than to practice or tolerate FGM. From our vantage point, we can see why FGM is not good.
What exactly do you think our 'vantage point' is? What data have we found out that we could provide to women who want their daughters to undergo fgm, that they, in their less advantageous position, are lacking? That it hurts? I suspect they already know that. That it's risky? Do you think they just hadn't noticed the infections and deaths? That it interferes will a woman's sex life? I think in many cases, that's the point. So, what bit of data do you think they're lacking that our enlightened culture has discovered? Quoting VagabondSpectre
The idea that god exists and has some intentions about how we ought behave is an empirical claim, and it can be tested with empirical science and evidence based reasoning
Not even going to give this any credence. How on earth would science test the theory that you will not get into heaven if you've been vaccinated?
Virtue ethics is really only good so far as it is useful to the people who wield it.
You're just not getting it are you? I'll try it in bold. How can you possibly measure useful when some people's idea of use extends to future generations and even the afterlife? How on earth do you intend to measure that? Are you going to just pop to the end of the world and see how it all worked out? Don't forget to drop in to heaven, valhalla, the spirit world and Mount olympus on your way back.
Ah Ah Ah, you said virtue ethics wasn't utilitarian! Where's the contrast? You've just described utilitarianism by intuitive guesswork.
Yes. You've just answered your own question. Intuitive guesswork. I explained it perfectly clearly olin my last post. The consequences of any action are so complex to work out for anything but the immediate future that it is more important to feel right about your actions than it is to have calculated their consequences. It's not rocket science.
Consider how instinctively you leapt to the defense of genital mutilators and anti-vax parents (although the latter might be a bad example if you're ignorant of the science). You know FGM is wrong, but you won't allow yourself to cast judgment upon the practice because it's not universally "true" that FGM is immoral, 'cause subjective preference. Wouldn't it be better (morally, even) if you had an argument that could persuade the perpetrators of FGM that it is wrong? (Let's say, a utility-inclusive argument?)
Firstly, I haven't leapt to the defense of anyone or anything. I'm saying that data is not sufficient to produce a moral duty even in a situation of shared moral values because data is inevitably limited. One cannot simply present the 'scientifically approved way' of getting x from y and then demand that everyone who wants to get x from y follow it.
You're treating really complex social and psychological issues as if they were maths equations. If a company wanted to build a bridge, they'd consult an engineer, but even in such a simple situation as bridge-building, they wouldn't necessarily just take the engineer's advice. They might need to think about the cost effectiveness, their business model, the advertising, whether the materials meet their sustainability policy, whether there's uncertainty about the design, whether their insurance will cover the risk. And that's just a bridge. You're suggesting the whole complex of social interaction and individual choice can be handed over to a few experts.
They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral.
He's got you there, @VagabondSpectre. I think your biggest problem is in not recognising the amoral as amoral, because your feelings get in the way of impartial judgement. That's why you seem to be misjudging others as condoning FGM. But they're not, they're just recognising that there's FGM, and there's relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", there are related factual and statistical matters, and then there's our moral feelings and judgement. There's no necessary connection linking them all together. There's no inherent moral quality in FGM, or relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", or in related factual or statistical matters. You seem trapped into thinking that it's somehow more than what it is, without realising that you're projecting.
I think that you're making this much more complicated than it needs to be. It seems obvious to me that you're just making the same sort of classic mistake which is more apparent in saying that it's objectively immoral not to brush your teeth every day, because not brushing your teeth every day increases the risk to your dental health. There's nothing objective in the morality of that.
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 21:16#2639270 likes
That's irrelevant to morality. Whether it's immoral is what's relevant. You'd have to connect the two, but there's no necessary connection, and to say that this is an example where something is immoral because it is erroneous (according to some standard) is just to make a moral judgement founded in moral feeling. That we share the same judgement is not that we're correct in any kind of transcendent sense.
You've said a lot, but it isn't really doing anything. The same basic problems remain.
My point is that FGM is indeed morally erroneous per the fundamental moral values of the concerned victims and perpetrators. Shared or un-shared, FGM disservices their extant values (one could say that practicing FGM is itself a value, but in reality (usually) it is (erroneously) thought to serve more fundamental values that ultimately relate to well-being). If FGM is taken as a value unto itself (eg: by divine command), it can still be pitted against fundamental well-being related values, although we would be limited by our ability to undermine their faith.
FGM is not a maths sum, it cannot be erroneous. A person committing it could be in error in thinking that doing so will lead to an outcome they desire/value, but the only way to check that would be to wait until the end of their life (including any afterlife, if they believe in such a thing) and tot up the total effect of the action. We can, and do, of course make predictions about the likely result of this calculus, but as with all predictions in complex systems they will vary depending on the model used. (and just pre-emting a possible "but some models are better than others" retort, just re-read this paragraph, my response would be the same. We can't possibly tell until the end of all time when we do the final count).
Every prediction we make is within a complex system, and we have no absolute certainty. According to this argument humans cannot know anything whatsoever about the future, so any predictive model, including science, is useless. That renders science kind of incoherent.
There you go undoing exactly what you just said. So if removing clitorises "doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.", then which is true of the actual people who do it - are they stupid, immoral, or unenlightened? They must be one of those three because they are carrying out a practice where the damage does not outweigh the gain. They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral.
There's a difference between a parent who is extorted into carrying out FGM and a parent who extorts their child to undergo FGM. As you said, society ostracizes them, so we can apply or diffuse the pragmatic moral guilt upon those agents in society who wantonly contribute to its perpetuation.
When a parent does carry out FGM because they believe it is best for their child, they've either made a factual error (and in this case a moral error, because it subverts their own primary values), OR, they're victims of an environment (an environment which includes pragmatically blameable others) which needlessly forced FGM upon them, which then becomes the pragmatically blameable party(s)).
We can call the perpetrators stupid or immoral (in this case it's stupidity leading to moral error/immorality), and we can call the entire practice of FGM unenlightened.
Your claim is that it objectively causes more harm than good, even if we share values about what 'harm' and 'good' are. I'm saying that such calculations are not so simple in complex societies where a lot of things would have to change all at once to make that true for any given individual.
Whether I establish an individual act of FGM as objectively bad per our shared values, or whether I establish the entire practice of FGM as objectively bad, it matters not. I chose it as an example because it isolates a practice that does not comport with the ultimate outcomes it is meant to bring about (this means the cultural-moral reasons for FGM as a practice, not the fact that individuals are being extorted into doing it).
What exactly do you think our 'vantage point' is? What data have we found out that we could provide to women who want their daughters to undergo fgm, that they, in their less advantageous position, are lacking? That it hurts? I suspect they already know that. That it's risky? Do you think they just hadn't noticed the infections and deaths? That it interferes will a woman's sex life? I think in many cases, that's the point. So, what bit of data do you think they're lacking that our enlightened culture has discovered?
The data comes from experience/observation in and with FGM-free societies. To persuade someone, first we isolate the underlying reasons that FGM is practiced, where they are known, and we challenge them. Depending on the reasons there is plenty of insight we could offer. FGM certainly interferes with sex life, and if someone morally values controlling the sex lives of others there may be nothing immediate we can do to sway them, but I suspect that controlling the sex lives of others is itself an errant proxy for more fundamental values or beliefs (e.g: the belief that too much sex is detrimental to well-being). If we can convince them that women are capable of sexual restraint despite an intact clit, or that sex isn't actually so harmful (i.e: the well being that FGM creates does not outweigh the well-being that it destroys), then we would have a good shot. If someone believes that clitorides should be removed for religious reasons, then we have to attack the religious beliefs directly.
They lack data which gives them perspective on the factual inaccuracy of superstition, or data concerning the effects of sexual liberty in society.
Not even going to give this any credence. How on earth would science test the theory that you will not get into heaven if you've been vaccinated?
By examining the evidence that reportedly indicates god or heaven or god's stance on vaccines and heaven. People tend to think they have good evidence for these kinds of things even when it's quite obvious they do not.
How can you possibly measure useful when some people's idea of use extends to future generations and even the afterlife? How on earth do you intend to measure that? Are you going to just pop to the end of the world and see how it all worked out? Don't forget to drop in to heaven, valhalla, the spirit world and Mount olympus on your way back.
We attack those beliefs (beliefs which concern matters of fact, and can be well supported, or not supported at all, by evidence) by examining the evidence supporting them.
If someone believes that heaven exists, hence the utility of not picking up sticks on Sunday, but it can be shown that their portrayal of heaven or god is unlikely or incoherent (if they can be persuaded that heaven or god might not or probably does not exist, or is entirely unknowable to us), then their perception of utility would change accordingly.
Yes. You've just answered your own question. Intuitive guesswork. I explained it perfectly clearly olin my last post. The consequences of any action are so complex to work out for anything but the immediate future that it is more important to feel right about your actions than it is to have calculated their consequences. It's not rocket science.
But you tried to distinguish between virtue ethics and utilitarianism as the latter being consequentialist, while the former not necessarily so. My point was that ultimately virtue ethics is subject to utilitarian selection by evolutionary forces.
Firstly, I haven't leapt to the defense of anyone or anything. I'm saying that data is not sufficient to produce a moral duty even in a situation of shared moral values because data is inevitably limited. One cannot simply present the 'scientifically approved way' of getting x from y and then demand that everyone who wants to get x from y follow it.
There are some courses of action that are so clearly counter-productive to their purpose that in practice they cannot be reasonably justified. I'm not saying people should be blamed for not knowing better (though in practice we ought rebuke them), I'm saying that A) in a specific situation or context and specific goals, some actions are actually more/less productive than others, and that B) more data can help us better approximate which actions are more or less productive than others.
Let's go to my last resort example: imagine you and I are strangers in an elevator. We both want to go on living, and we're both carrying ice-picks. It would, for us, objectively, be "better" if we did not violently stab-each-other with our ice-picks. Alternatively, you are alone in an elevator with an ice-pick, and you want retain 20-20 vision. For you, objectively, gouging your own eyes out would be a worse course of action than not gouging your eyes out. Do you have any qualms related to data-insufficiency in either of these scenarios?
You're treating really complex social and psychological issues as if they were maths equations. If a company wanted to build a bridge, they'd consult an engineer, but even in such a simple situation as bridge-building, they wouldn't necessarily just take the engineer's advice. They might need to think about the cost effectiveness, their business model, the advertising, whether the materials meet their sustainability policy, whether there's uncertainty about the design, whether their insurance will cover the risk. And that's just a bridge. You're suggesting the whole complex of social interaction and individual choice can be handed over to a few experts.
As far as our nearly universal human values are concerned, FGM is the Tacoma Narrows of bridges.
What you don't seem to be getting is that when we make moral decisions from a consequentialist perspective (decisions based on our ability to predict outcomes) sometimes we can actually do so with reasonable confidence. When we don't ground our predictions in sound empirical inquiry, we get useless bridges.
A difficult question for sure, but I think that one would have to balance the advantages of people being more likely to be right about stuff, with the disadvantages of the power that authorities would then wield to manipulate events. In most areas of science, we have mechanisms in place to prevent such a misuse of power, mainly having a large enough number of people involved and an uncensored publishing industry, but that is only a pragmatic issue. If we start saying that the mere pragmatism of being able to trust our experts (because we have good safety measures in place) becomes a moral obligation to do so (which is what I was arguing against) then we run the risk of it becoming enculturated and we can't by any means guarantee the continued good functioning of our system.
I'm trying to envision a society which runs with a different ethos. It seems to me that the Enlightenment paradigm of a mechanical Nature, coupled with the Christian notion of the world as having been created for human use, and the Darwinian idea of survival of the fittest and the competition of all against all, and economic models based on the the idea of unlimited growth and "trickle down" economics" has led to a lack of moral sensibility in modern life.
I think the essence of moral sensibility consists in seeing ourselves as part of the seamless web of nature, and seeing our lives as inextricable threads of the social fabric. On that view what we do to nature and what we do to others we do to ourselves.
So, trusting experts presupposes that the experts we trust are not corrupt to the point that they cannot be trusted; in other words it presupposes general good will. Whether or not the actual experts in our actual society are corrupt to the extent that they are not trustworthy is indeed a difficult question.
What criteria could be used to answer such a question? Do we need specific criteria for all our judgements? Aesthetic and ethical judgements do not seem to be subject to rigidly determinable criteria. But we think in terms of the rigid mechanistic paradigm we have inherited from the early modern and Enlightenment thinkers wherein there is just one right answer to every problem. I think what's needed is more a change of paradigm than a change of criteria within the existing paradigm, a new worldview rather than specific answers to specific problems that are part of the problematic of our whole current general approach.
True, but this presumes the law-makers are not also so afflicted, and the law-makers are just people. If society is morally bankrupt, then surely law-makers, scientists, experts in general, who are drawn from that society will be morally bankrupt too?
Yes, exactly! But it's always a matter of degree and individual variation, of course.
VagabondSpectreMarch 12, 2019 at 22:14#2639580 likes
He's got you there, VagabondSpectre. I think your biggest problem is in not recognising the amoral as amoral, because your feelings get in the way of impartial judgement. That's why you seem to be misjudging others as condoning FGM. But they're not, they're just recognising that there's FGM, and there's relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", there are related factual and statistical matters, and then there's our moral feelings and judgement. There's no necessary connection linking them all together. There's no inherent moral quality in FGM, or relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", or in related factual or statistical matters. You seem trapped into thinking that it's somehow more than what it is, without realising that you're projecting.
In societies where FGM is broadly enforced for reasons pertaining to well-being, I wouldn't consider it amoral because it's motivated by the moral value of human well-being (Yes, this may only hold true under a meta-ethical definition of morality as a strategy in service of human moral values, and an ethical definition of human well-being as a fundamental human moral value).
I think that you're making this much more complicated than it needs to be. It seems obvious to me that you're just making the same sort of classic mistake which is more apparent in saying that it's objectively immoral not to brush your teeth every day, because not brushing your teeth every day increases the risk to your dental health. There's nothing objective in the morality of that.
It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility. What is morally obligatory might be a different question from what is more or less moral. What people will choose ultimately has to do with how they are persuaded by the perceived risks and rewards. If we can say that not brushing our teeth is objectively immoral per our values, we can also say that it is not severely immoral because the relative costs are not necessarily that high.
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The reason why I try to frame morality in this way is because in practice, various moral frameworks are almost always oriented toward serving basic human values (exceptions like divine commands themselves are often proxies for actually useful values. E.G: charity is useful for society not because it gets people into heaven, but because it strengthens the ability of individuals to contribute to society). What is persuasive is what matters most, and any objectivity we can get in the game of moral suasion is extremely useful.
Every prediction we make is within a complex system, and we have no absolute certainty. According to this argument humans cannot know anything whatsoever about the future, so any predictive model, including science, is useless. That renders science kind of incoherent.
This is nonsense. Why would a predictive model become useless just because it is not certain? We are not 'certain' it will be sunny tomorrow, just because the weather forecast said it will be. How does that make weather forecasts "useless". The point I'm arguing against is that you seem to be saying that if the weather forecast says it's going to be sunny tomorrow, anyone carrying an umbrella just in case is morally bankrupt, they should believe wholeheartedly in what the modal tells them and act accordingly. It like talking to a religious fanatic.
As you said, society ostracizes them, so we can apply or diffuse the pragmatic moral guilt upon those agents in society who wantonly contribute to its perpetuation.
Have you really so little idea about how social groups function? There's not a small group of men sat in shed working out what their culture is going to be and then laughing maniacally about how cruel they've managed to make it. Cultures evolve over millenia as a result of thousands of individual choices and the complex interplay of social contracts, there's no one group to blame for it being the way it is. FGM is a result of a long history of bad decisions made under difficult circumstances. It needs to be dismantled with care, respect for the victims (including those who feel pressured into arranging it) and understanding that it is part of an interconnected Web of history of which we too are a part. This "enlightened westerner" telling the backward natives what they're doing wrong" shit is from the 50s, I had hoped we'd moved on from that.
When a parent does carry out FGM because they believe it is best for their child, they've either made a factual error (and in this case a moral error, because it subverts their own primary values), OR, they're victims of an environment (an environment which includes pragmatically blameable others) which needlessly forced FGM upon them, which then becomes the pragmatically blameable party(s)).
Right. So
a) Which is it, and in what way are you qualified to judge?
b) In the case of the second option, in what way are you qualified to judge who exactly is to blame (as opposed to themselves being a victim of their environment). Where's your objective scientific fact about who is responsible for creating the environment in which some people feel forced to commit FGM?
They lack data which gives them perspective on the factual inaccuracy of superstition, or data concerning the effects of sexual liberty in society.
This (and that above it) is patronising bullshit. You started this off with the 'scientific facts' and even then, there's reasonable cause to doubt, but look how quickly it's descended into judgement masquerading as fact. They lack the data about the effects of sexual liberty in society? Are you seriously suggesting that what information we have about the effects of sexual liberty in society amounts to objective fact, like gravity, or the earth being round?
We don't like their cultural practices, they think they're for the best. That's all there is to it. I'm more than happy to use whatever rhetorical device works to actually get FGM to stop, including presenting cultural preferences as if they were objective fact. If it works, I'm on board with it. But this is a philosophy forum. We're discussing moral truths, not trying to convince anyone to abandon FGM.
If someone believes that heaven exists, hence the utility of not picking up sticks on Sunday, but it can be shown that their portrayal of heaven or god is unlikely or incoherent (if they can be persuaded that heaven or god might not or probably does not exist, or is entirely unknowable to us), then their perception of utility would change accordingly.
Really. Had much luck with that? You still haven't answered my first question. What scientific evidence do you intend to present that heaven does not exist? Evidence that it might not is not good enough, because your claim is the people who did not vaccinate their children because they believe doing so will prevent them entry to heaven are "objectively wrong". Not "might be wrong". Nor even "probably wrong".
My point was that ultimately virtue ethics is subject to utilitarian selection by evolutionary forces.
The key word there being 'ultimately' in the case of atheist virtue ethics, that means at the very least several generations away, if not, the end of time. For theist virtue ethicists, 'ultimately' includes the afterlife, so the fact that both systems 'ultimately' are about consequences, is trivial, and meaningless to this discussion.
I'm saying that A) in a specific situation or context and specific goals, some actions are actually more/less productive than others, and that B) more data can help us better approximate which actions are more or less productive than others.
No, you're not. You're adding a third C) that we in modern Western society actually have that data and anyone who doesn't believe we do, in whatever field we claim to have it, is morally 'wrong'. You missed that. Without this last claim I entirely agree with you. There is a fact of the matter about whether vaccination is in the best long term interests of societal health. There is a fact of the matter about whether FGM is in the best interests of the victims within their current culture. There is a fact of the matter about whether attacking each other with ice picks is the best way to maintain a peaceful society. I'm not disputing that, I'm disputing your fanatical belief that 21st century wester society is in possession of all of those facts with such certainty that anyone who disagrees is just objectively wrong.
What you don't seem to be getting is that when we make moral decisions from a consequentialist perspective (decisions based on our ability to predict outcomes) sometimes we can actually do so with reasonable confidence. When we don't ground our predictions in sound empirical inquiry, we get useless bridges.
What you don't seem to be getting is that 'reasonable confidence' does not translate to 'objectively right', and that the "soundness" of much scientific enquiry in the less physical sciences (like medicine, sociology, psychology) is justifiably moot.
we think in terms of the rigid mechanistic paradigm we have inherited from the early modern and Enlightenment thinkers wherein there is just one right answer to every problem. I think what's needed is more a change of paradigm than a change of criteria within the existing paradigm, a new worldview rather than specific answers to specific problems that are part of the problematic of our whole current general approach.
Yes, this is key I think. I phrase it in terms of dealing with uncertainty. We don't know more than we do know, by which I mean that the proportion of all there is to know about a matter that we actually do know is very small. I think the bulk of what we call ethics actually revolves around how to make decisions in the face of this uncertainty.
The arguments about fundamental values are, in my opinion, misguided. I think there's enough similarity in the way people feel about the very basic human values that most groups (particularly within cultures) can have a meaningful discussion about ethics without having to worry about the fact that it is all relative deep down. That basic level of fundamental agreement has already been dealt with. No one (who we'd want to discuss ethics with) thinks boiling babies is 'good', and so the fact that our agreement is about subjective feeling is irrelevant.
What matters is how we decide what course of action best brings about the fundamental values we (mostly) already agree on, within our community.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 10:17#2641640 likes
What I'm explaining is that if "X is good" is saying that x matches some standard or criterion for x, so that it's simply a way of saying that x has some objective property, then that doesn't at all capture the conventional idea of the "good" assessment.
It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility.
Your blind faith is quite astonishing. Yes, today the best evidence is broadly that. Up to 2016, the advice was to use toothpaste, until a systematic review showed toothpaste to be of no statistically significant benefit to plaque removal. Only a few years ago it was to brush your teeth after meals, until it was discovered that this wears away the softened enamel and actually makes matters worse. Then it was to use alcohol mouthwash, until it was discovered that this may slightly raise the risk of oral cancer in some people. Then it was to floss, until it was shown that this may cause more gum problems than it solves.
Triclosan in some toothpastes has been shown in animal studies to modify hormone regulation and may encourage antibiotic resistant bacteria.
SLS in toothpaste has been linked by double-blind trial to aphthous ulcers.
All this is just from Wikipedia. The aim is not provide a knock-out blow against toothbrushing, the point is to try and at least put a chip in the rose-tinted glasses through which you view modern medical advice. It's a lot more complicated than you're making it out to be.
Medicine is a field made up, like any other, of normal flawed human beings. Some are ignorant (particularly about statistics), some mean (promoting what sells over what works), some are stubborn (listed as one of the biggest block to getting advisory organisations to accept evidence based medicine), some too enthusiastic (new discoveries gain statistically significantly more support regardless of their long-term results), some are well-meaning, dedicated and intelligent. To take the results of this mileau as if it were gospel truth is ridiculous.
In societies where FGM is broadly enforced for reasons pertaining to well-being, I wouldn't consider it amoral because it's motivated by the moral value of human well-being (Yes, this may only hold true under a meta-ethical definition of morality as a strategy in service of human moral values, and an ethical definition of human well-being as a fundamental human moral value).
Well it is amoral. Let's be clear. Your evaluation is just that. There's no moral value inherent in anything, and your evaluation doesn't magically make it so. There is nothing reasonable in simply saying that something or other is a moral value in any other sense than that it is so relative to a standard, which is in turn relative to feelings. If I don't feel the same way about this standard, then it simply doesn't apply to any moral judgements or evaluations that I make. All you're really telling me is how you feel about something. Good for you?
It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility.
Personal dental health is not of moral value. It's either morally valuable to you or it isn't. And there's nothing meaningful or relevant in saying that something has moral utility. That's not the issue at all.
Well, let me not be destructive, then. Perhaps a relativist reply to your comment. Here goes: what you think doesn't matter, because, after all it's all relative.
What do you think? Was that a good and constructive reply? Or do you think it was just a might destructive, in that it was dismissive of your reasoning on a basis that simply ignores your thinking altogether as, well, just relative.
I think that it is fallacious. And it is doubly so if it is intended to represent what I'm doing. I've done the opposite by emphasising that morality is no less important under moral relativism.
If Reply to tim wood point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur.
Pattern-chaserMarch 13, 2019 at 15:40#2642180 likes
Well, first off, it's obviously not a matter of personal preference. Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures.
:up: And so we can conclude that morality is a matter of collective (social) preference, can't we? :chin:
If ?tim wood
point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur.
I think the reason @S said it was a non sequitur was the conflation of normative with meta ethics. The opinion of a subjective relativist about what is' right' in some moral question may be of no consequence, but that doesn't mean their opinion with regards to meat-ethics is. Meta-ethical positions are argued by reference to shared standards like logic and reason. Normative ethical positions are argued from a position of shared values (although all too often, not even that, making such discussions hopelessly pointless).
To say that a relativist speaking of a variety of value positions must therefore also speak from an equally heterogeneous position with regards to logic and reason is the non sequitur.
If ?tim wood point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur.
Why shouldn't we care? Again, your reaction seems to indicate an illogical connection. You wouldn't care if I had the moral belief that black people are an inferior race, or that murder is okay? That's just how morality is - it is relative - and yet we evidently do care. We care because we live as part of a society, and our respective moral views matter socially.
Reply to Isaac I think i see your point - What i was asking was - If Tim Wood's point was IF you are a moral relativist ( either a meta or normative one), then how can you have any basis to question the moral judgments of others. If that was the claim - i see the conclusion as following - and not a non sequitur.
Well, first off, it's obviously not a matter of personal preference. Moralities are systems of values associated with particular societies, traditions, and cultures.
— T Clark
:up: And so we can conclude that morality is a matter of collective (social) preference, can't we? :chin:
No, because my personal moral views matter, irrespective of those of society as some sort of "collective". What if I was the only non-racist in a racist society?
Why shouldn't we care? That's how morality is, and yet we do care. We care because we live as part of a society, and our respective moral views matter socially
The issue I was pointing to is not that the moral relativist shouldn't care, but why would he comment. My understanding of moral relativism would be something like this " that action is different than my moral belief, oh well, guess his is different ". I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. So what would be the moral relativists standing - in passing a moral judgement on others be ? In that case he is no longer a moral relativist, he just thinks his moral view is right. That is not my understanding of moral relativism -
Aside - that is the most times I have ever used "moral relativist" in one paragraph in my whole life.
My understanding of moral relativism would be something like this " that action is different than my moral belief, oh well, guess his is different ".
Then you have a very poor understanding of moral relativism. Unfortunately, these sort of misunderstandings are common. I don't accept that the moral beliefs of others are just different. Obviously I think that, for example, someone who has the moral belief that murder is okay, is wrong - wrong relative to my strong feelings against it. I'm no different to you in this regard.
So what would be the moral relativists standing - in passing a moral judgement on others be ? In that case he is no longer a moral relativist, he just thinks his moral view is right. That is not my understanding of moral relativism -
No, of course he is still a moral relativist, because obviously he interprets his moral view being right in accordance with how a moral relativist would do so, and not in a contradictory way involving a different interpretation. You can't just smuggle in an outside interpretation and pretend that the moral relativist is being inconsistent.
I think the reason S said it was a non sequitur was the conflation of normative with meta ethics. The opinion of a subjective relativist about what is' right' in some moral question may be of no consequence, but that doesn't mean their opinion with regards to meta-ethics is. Meta-ethical positions are argued by reference to shared standards like logic and reason. Normative ethical positions are argued from a position of shared values (although all too often, not even that, making such discussions hopelessly pointless).
To say that a relativist speaking of a variety of value positions must therefore also speak from an equally heterogeneous position with regards to logic and reason is the non sequitur.
What you were describing is amoralism. Moral relativism is not amoralism. [B]Tim wood[/b] was making the same mistake. Like I said, these are common misunderstandings.
I don't really understand S's position. He says he's a moral relativist. The trouble with relativism is that it ultimately destroys its own ground. But S doesn't like "destruction" or the like, as loaded language.
No, that's the trouble with a poor way of thinking about moral relativism.
Apparently some things are and some things are not relative. I begin to wonder if S even knows what "relative" means. What, S, is an example of something that is not relative - I assume that for you all moral judgments are relative.
Or perhaps by "relative" you mean only that everything is referenced (I..e., "relative") - indexed to - to something else. If that is all you mean, then agreed; but then everything is relative, not just some things.
What I think about everything else is entirely irrelevant in the context of this discussion. This discussion is about morality, and regarding that, I am a moral relativist. Relativism, more broadly, is a red herring.
Reply to S so if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgments on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person ? Or do believe your relative morality is right, and my relative morality is wrong ?
So if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgements on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person? Or do you believe that your relative morality is right, and my relative morality is wrong?
Both. Just don't misinterpret the latter. Think about it how I would think about it, as a moral relativist would think about it, that is. I can help you out if need be, but I'm interested in what you can come up with on your own.
Reply to S Ok - and I then can have the same view back at you. That you are then equally wrong and different, and I am of course right about that relative to me.
Reply to S "What I think about everything else is entirely irrelevant in the context of this discussion. This discussion is about morality, and regarding that, I am a moral relativist. Relativism, more broadly, is a red herring."
If you were to say that you believe the history of scientific or technological understanding is a linear progression it would be difficult to deny that such a view would color what moral relativism means to you. It would certain distinguish your notion of moral relativism from that of someone who thought that scientific history is a relativistic genealogy rather than a progressive teleology.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 20:06#2642750 likes
so if you are a moral relativist, and I am a moral relativist, can we both have different moral judgments on some action, and agree the other judgement is correct for the other person ?
On my view, by the way, "correct" is a category error there. We can say that each person feels their stance is morally right.
You're going to feel that a contradictory stance is morally wrong, of course.
This is just another way to say that each person has the preferences re interpersonal behavior that they do, and they don't prefer other preferences regarding interpersonal behavior than their own.
I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others.
The subjectivist brand of relativism doesn't imply this, at least.
The problem understanding this usually stems from difficulties parsing the issue so that we do not defer to objectivity.
When you frame things so that we have to, or so that we should defer to objectivity, then either (a) there's an objective fact that people can get correct or incorrect, or (b) there is no objective fact, and since we have to defer to objectivity, we thus simply can't pass any sort of judgment at all.
But that's not how subjectivists look at it. We can and do pass judgments--we're just passing subjective judgments. At the same time we're not saying that others' moral stances are incorrect--because as I noted that's a category error.
Subjectively, we're going to have likes/dislike, preferences, etc., and that in no way implies that we're going to be okay with others likes/dislikes or preferences, especially when we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, which is what morality is. When we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, those preferences don't just effect the bearer--they're about what someone wants to allow other people to do, too.
Reply to Terrapin Station Have no difficulty with a view of moral relativity where each person feels the stance is morally right and the other stance is not. My point is i don't think you can be a moral relativist and tell me my stance is incorrect nor should you have any desire to have me see it your way. If one is a moral relativist it seems to me that entails an inherent acceptance of the moral views of others. @s seems to disagree.
I hold no believe I have any expertise on this and could be all wet - but i can't see how you can be a moral relativist without an acceptance of the relative morality of others.
Reply to Terrapin Station I am not sure it is even consistent for a moral relativist to have any view on the moral view of others, other than " I am not them -how can i judge their view" any view other than that seems to me to be an argument for some level of objective morality from a professed moral relativist.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 20:21#2642900 likes
My point is i don't think you can be a moral relativist and tell me my stance is incorrect nor should you have any desire to have me see it your way.
I just added some stuff to my post that's pertinent to this.
Again, since morality is preferences of interpersonal behavior, our preferences do not wind up only being our own business and that's it. By their very nature, moral stances are about what we are okay or not okay with other people doing. Obviously people are going to try to have an influence on that, especially since these preferences wind up codified into laws, they impact persons' abilities to do various social things, etc.
We're not deferring to what's objectively the case (where everyone's stance is on equal footing), beacuse that's irrelevant for morality. The arbiter is our own preferences.
Reply to Rank Amateur Every notable philosopher, whether relatlvist , realist or platonist, has a position that they believe is original in some way, and in some sense superioir or preferable to competing positions (more clarifying, truer, more primordial, more comprehensive). If that philosopjher begins from a thinking of radical relativism (Nietzsche, Derrida, Fouccault, Heidegger) they would not want to justify distinguishing ways of thinking in terms of 'correctness', but they would be able to distinguish them on the basis of constricted vs expanded awareness, or lesser vs greater potentiality of transformation of meaning. So a morality applies to relativistic philosophy, but a different sort than that of traditional judgements of correctness, truth or falsity.
Reply to Joshs In my mind, i am not arguing about the merits of one moral philosophy over another - which is what I think you are doing above. No issue with that at all. I am arguing about particular judgement made inside a philosophy of some type of moral relativism.
My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist.
I understand i am way out on my element on this topic - so I am learning here more than arguing, and trying to explain this logic log jam i have in my head on this point.
Reply to Rank Amateur
"You cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist."
I want to quote a passage from one of the most notorious radical relativist philosophers, Jacques Derrida. Here he is defending deconstruction against charges that it denies the possibility of determining truth in any sense. What he is trying to say here is that while any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible, within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that arent.
I see his view here as consonant with other moral relativistic philosophers that i have read.
.
"For of course there is a "right track" [une 'bonne voie "] ,
a better way, and let it be said in passing how surprised I have often been, how
amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by the use or abuse of the
following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-
relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of
meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we
read him with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand that his own text
be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood,
simplified, deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and
discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple enough: this definition
of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it
supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous
texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread. Then perhaps
it will be understood that the value of truth (and all those values associated
with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in
more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive contexts
(that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example,
socio-political-institutional-but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively
stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to
invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith,
lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy." Derrida, Limited, Inc.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 20:45#2643190 likes
My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist.
Relativism or not, in what sense does anyone not "allow" others to have whatever moral views they have?
I'm not sure I know what sort of thing you're referring to there.
To Moral relativist A - action X is immoral
To Moral relativist B - action X is moral
If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other. If they do not, than their adherence to moral relativity ( as poorly as I seem to understand it) seems questionable.
I want to quote a passage from one of the most notorious radical relativist philosophers, Jacques Derrida. Here he is defending deconstruction against charges that it denies the possibility of determining truth in any sense. What he is trying to say here is that while any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible, within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that arent.
So where is the line between "any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible," and "within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that are not." and who is to judge?
you can't have your cake and eat it too. to me there is some continuum between relative and objective morality - and we all place ourselves somewhere on that continuum. Even Mr Derrida is hedging in his quote - seems to him morality is relative unless it is not - and he knows when that is.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:01#2643380 likes
If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other.
Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.
But subjectivists aren't advocating deference to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.
Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they?
Ok - and I then can have the same view back at you. That you are then equally wrong and different, and I am of course right about that relative to me.
What's your point? That is indeed how it works and how we think. You think you're right and I'm wrong, I think I'm right and you're wrong. To you, you're right and I'm wrong, and I accept that to you, you're right and I'm wrong. To me, it is otherwise.
As soon as you demonstrate that morality is anything other than subjective and relative, I will concede. Good luck with that.
Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.
But subjectivists aren't advocating a deferral to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.
Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they?
no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all - you are assuming something I am not saying.
no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all -
Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts.
But subjectively, the stances aren't on equal ground, are they? (That's not a rhetorical question. I'm hoping you'll answer it.)
Reply to Rank Amateur I think the point is that morality is more of an art than a science. Think about the arts; there are real differences in quality between different works, some really are better than others, and yet everyone has their own tastes, and no universal agreement about the relative quality of works is possible to any high degree of precision.
The other thing is that people are more or less deficient in moral feeling; and it really is feeling, not rules, that is key when it comes to morals, just as it is with the arts.
Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts
no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:08#2643460 likes
no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist.
Okay, subjectively two competing stances aren't on equal ground, are they?
no issue with that - if as equal moral relativists we accept each others relative moral judgments. If that is what you are saying.
What you just said is too ambiguous for me to say whether or not I agree with it. I don't morally accept someone else's moral judgement if it doesn't accord with my own. I don't accept that murdering children is okay. And that's what matters. Some people seem to be blind to this. Again, I'm not an amoralist just because I'm a moral relativist. That connection is illogical.
Reply to Terrapin Station can't play these word games with you. I have restated the concept like 4 times to you - i can't do it any better sorry - I am out of other ways to say it
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:13#2643540 likes
can't play these word games with you. I have restated the concept like 4 times to you - i can't do it any better sorry - I am out of other ways to say it
There's no word game to this. I'm not hinging anything I'm saying on any particular words.
I'm trying to explain the point of view to you so that you can understand it. I'm trying to keep things very simple and ask very simple questions.
Reply to Rank Amateur Sure, every art critic has their own judgements which will differ from others. The point is that some judgements are better than others just as some works are better than others, and we know this is true, and it can be detremined in extreme cases of difference, but in cases of subtle difference precision is not possible.
Reply to Terrapin Station we are talking past each other - i don't feel you understand the point I am making - I am very sure that is my fault - but I am out of ways to explain it
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:15#2643580 likes
The point is that some judgements are better than others just as some works are better than others, and we know this is true, and it can be detremined in extreme cases of difference,
I don't at all agree with that by the way. (Given that you're implying that some judgments are better than others objectively, or that it's true that they are, etc.)
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:16#2643590 likes
Reply to Janus how can one relative judgement be better than another relative judgment - by definition they are equal - they can only be unequal if there is some objective criteria they can be evaluated against - and then they are not relative anymore.
Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:
Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.
Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.
Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?
Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are.
Reply to Terrapin Station Some judgements are better than others; the word "objectively" is meaningless in this context, unless it refers to something like 'in accordance with the best subjective feelings'.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:30#2643650 likes
Some judgements are better than others; the word "objectively" is meaningless in this context, unless it refers to something like 'in accordance with the best subjective feelings'.
The best subjective feelings per some individual's subjective judgment? (But likely not others?)
Reply to Rank Amateur I think the notion of objectivity is confusing you here. You are thinking that two subjective judgements must be from an objective point of view equal. There is no such objective point of view; all points of view are subjective. Yet some points of view are subjectively better than others; which means more in accordance with the best and highest subjective feelings and views.
Reply to Terrapin Station No, not per any particular individual's judgement. Think of it this way; some subjective views are poison, and others are manna. The subjective view that torturing babies is good, for example, is poison, subjectively speaking. The subjective view that it is good to feel compassion for all beings is manna, subjectively speaking.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:37#2643680 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station Of course there is. Individual subjective views are more or less consonant with general subjective human good will. Only the sociopath (if they are being honest) is going to say that it could be morally better to feel enmity, or even indifference, to all beings, than to feel love for them.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:41#2643740 likes
That is, look closely enough and there's a right and a wrong, a moral and an immoral. But it's not too difficult to make excuses for not looking.
If it's so clear, all you need to do is to point out how we'd observe/check/etc. the objective moral stances.
The answer, of course, can't be merely what anyone thinks/feels, because that wouldn't be evidence of anything objective. The answer would have to point to something independent of persons' opinions, the independent thing that their opinions can get right or match, versus get wrong or fail to match.
Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:
Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.
Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.
Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?
Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are.
That's a good way of explaining it. Hopefully those who make the error you're explaining will see why it is an error, and why it makes no sense whatsoever.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:42#2643760 likes
Individual subjective views are more or less consonant with general subjective human good will.
More or less similar to the norm or the statistically common views, sure. You're not suggesting that something being statistically common makes it right, are you? Because that's simply the argumentum ad populum fallacy.
Reply to S I don't think it's a good way of explaining it at all. Culinary and moral preferences are not at all of equal consequence to human life. Aesthetic tastes are somewhere in between.
Reply to Terrapin Station It's not an argument ad populum; it's an acknowledgement that there is an inherently normative aspect to what makes a healthy human subject; and valuing torturing innocents, for example, is not, never can be, an aspect of a healthy human subject.
Aztecs are known for cutting the living hearts out of their human sacrifices. Thuggees, in India, as a matter of faith felt they ought to strangle strangers. Anyone willing to dismiss these as mere exercises of a relative morality themselves neither right nor wrong probably should be excused from this thread.
Anyone who obstinately persists in their own misunderstanding of what the other side is arguing should take a time out and consider the principle of charity.
Now go and sit on the naughty step.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:48#2643800 likes
Culinary and moral preferences are not at all of equal consequence to human life.
But the explanation had nothing at all to do with whether anything is of equal consequence. That's a pretty serious misunderstanding of the gist of the analogy.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:49#2643820 likes
Yes, it is, if you're saying that something is correct because it's statistically common. That's the whole nut of what the argumentum ad populum fallacy is.
Re "healthy," if you're attaching any sort of value judgment to that at all, it's again subjective.
Reply to Terrapin Station So, you believe that all preferences are possible in an emotionally healthy individual; you don't allow that there might be moral health or sickness just as there can be physical health or sickness?
Janus hasn't said anything about being statistically common being a reason for something valuable. In the posts I've read, they talked in terms of harm or well-being, which is defined on an individual's relation to everyone else.
I don't think it's a good way of explaining it at all. Culinary and moral preferences are not at all of equal consequence to human life. Aesthetic tastes are somewhere in between.
I am certain that that is not at all what he was doing with the analogy. He has even explicitly stated that moral preferences aren't trivial in the way that other preferences are.
He was showing why it is unreasonable to reach the conclusion from an outside perspective that the one guy thinks - or should think - that his own preference is just as good as the other guy's. It makes no sense.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:57#2643870 likes
So, you believe that all preferences are possible in an emotionally healthy individual; you don't allow that there might be moral health or sickness just as there can be physical health or sickness?
Again, if you're attaching any sort of value judgment of normative (in the "should" sense) to emotional AND physical health, you're engaging in something subjective for which there is no correct answer.
Objectively, there are simply different possible states--having cancer, living to 100 and being able to still run a marathon at that age, thinking that you're the incarnation of Napoleon and drooling all over yourself, being able to foster worldwide peace as a political leader--anything imaginable. Outside of individuals' judgments, none of those states are preferable to other states.
Are there some mental states that would preclude particular preferences? Probably, especially as we could basically set up definitions there so that we'd just be stating tautologies.
But one emotional state compared to another is not objectively preferred, and the fact that 99 or even 100% of everyone we ask says that they prefer mental or physical state A to B doesn't imply that they're correct--that would be an argumentum ad populum.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 21:59#2643880 likes
In the posts I've read, they talked in terms of harm or well-being, which is defined on an individual's relation to everyone else.
Again, if we're attaching any sort of judgment or normative to different objective states (and those terms typically have those sorts of connotations), we're doing something that's only individuals' preferences and that can't be correct or incorrect.
Re "healthy," if you're attaching any sort of value judgment to that at all, it's again subjective.
'Healthy' in the social context of subjective interaction, just means 'able to function harmoniously within the context of general subjective moral feeling'. Basically, we all value pretty much the same things. Almost no one thinks murder, rape or torture is a good thing; and someone who thinks those things are good will not be able to function harmoniously in interpersonal relations, if they are honest about their views, which means that their views are subjectively unhealthy.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 22:01#2643900 likes
'Healthy' in the social context of subjective interaction, just means 'able to function harmoniously within the context of general subjective moral feeling'. Basically, we all value pretty much the same things. Almost no one thinks murder, rape or torture is a good thing; and someone who thinks those things are good will not be able to function harmoniously in interpersonal relations, if they are honest about their views, which means that their views are subjectively unhealthy.
You can just ignore "if you're attaching any sort of value judgment of normative (in the "should" sense) to emotional AND physical health (as well as "harmonious" etc.), you're engaging in something subjective for which there is no correct answer" I suppose.
you're engaging in something subjective for which there is no correct answer" I suppose.
Here's an example: I'm not saying that there is a "correct" view, an objectively determinable right or wrong answer as there might be with an empirical claim. As I said before, moral philosophy is more an art than a science.
Do you disagree that most people value and dis-value pretty much the same things, and that this is on account of their natural human desire to live harmoniously with their fellows?
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 22:03#2643930 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station You think that only because you are apparently incapable of reading what I write except through the lens of your own presuppositions, which I don't share.
For most things, it is mostly reflex, but not all things. Someone above mentioned boiling babies. Any one care to argue that's just an exercise in relativity?
Are you trying to goad moral relativists into defending your own strawmen? Is there a moral relativist here who would say that? That makes it sound trivial, but you know that already, don't you? You're doing that on purpose. Again. It's another example of loaded language. They would much more likely say that it is extremely immoral.
The point of morality is the presence of a normative judgement. When we engage in morality, we are identifying a normative meaning to ourselves which is whether or not an action is worthwhile.
In the case of this pyschopath, for example, their lack of care (or at least the actions and motivations which have gone with it in this case) are harmful to both the population at large and the pyschopath themselves. They are the difference between the people in question living in a world of this pain, conflict and strife or not. With any question of morality, it is these "subjective" (i.e. impact on a subject) which are at stake. It's never been about an "objective" command or rule.
Morality is about awareness of the impact of actions and things upon people. And the differences between when one is present or not.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 22:23#2644020 likes
I say "chooses" because while moral relativism may appeal to thirteen-years-old boys, nearly all grow out of it as they approach adulthood; that is, it's a choice for the post-pubescent crowd.
I will award a point to whoever can correctly name this fallacy.
I bet you thought that that sounded clever, but it is just an uncharitable and irrelevant attack on a person's presumed motive and their character, rather than any reasonable and substantive criticism of moral relativism.
Do you argue that if I or anyone else tried we could not come up with something you would agree is wrong by any standard? No limits? No boundaries?
That doesn't even make sense when properly analysed. You know that I'm a moral relativist. Why on earth would you expect me to agree to that? Why don't you just admit that you have no real argument? You don't have to put on a show.
TheWillowOfDarknessMarch 13, 2019 at 22:36#2644070 likes
That's because the subjective impact has a logical independent from the desire or wishes of a subject.
I can desire or wish to smoke, but that doesn't mean it lacks harmful effects. I can desire or wish to take heroin all day, it's doesn't take away the harmful effects of heroin on my body or wider harm on people who interact or dependent.
The subjective harm may will be according to no-one at a given time. Everyone might think smoking is harmless. Everyone might think taking heroin all day is great and harmless.
But this doesn't mean the harm isn't there. Much like our beliefs about how the world came to be, our beliefs about what is harmful to ourselves and others can be terribly flawed. People do the equivalent of thinking orange juice will cure their cancer all the time.
VagabondSpectreMarch 13, 2019 at 22:39#2644080 likes
This is nonsense. Why would a predictive model become useless just because it is not certain? We are not 'certain' it will be sunny tomorrow, just because the weather forecast said it will be. How does that make weather forecasts "useless". The point I'm arguing against is that you seem to be saying that if the weather forecast says it's going to be sunny tomorrow, anyone carrying an umbrella just in case is morally bankrupt, they should believe wholeheartedly in what the modal tells them and act accordingly. It like talking to a religious fanatic.
I was making the point that we have some capacity to predict whether or not FGM is beneficial to a society's subjective moral values, and you went on a tirade about how it's impossible to know whether or not FGM would make a positive or negative difference without god-like knowledge. I haven't brought up moral obligations or called people morally bankrupt, where is this coming from?. I realize you want to defend the humanity of people who carry out FGM, but this discussion isn't the place to do it (I'm attacking values, ideas, and practices, not specific people). I'm not going to back off of FGM as morally errant just because the condemnation is somehow insensitive.
I'm glad you brought up weather models, because they're frightfully uncertain predictive models, but they still have some utility. We cannot be absolutely certain that NOT cutting off a girl's clit won't harm the girl or society (harm their subjective values), but the forecast certainly indicates this (care to make a pragmatic argument for the practice of FGM? Extortion doesn't count, obviously). If the weather forecast is 99% possibility of precipitation, it would be prudent to carry an umbrella. This doesn't mean we're obligated to believe and obey weather forecasts, but it does mean that they can be useful in helping us make decisions, just like how the foreseeable and observed ramifications of FGM are useful in helping us make decisions about whether or not it effectively serves relevant human values, and hence to do it or not.
When it comes to vaccines, statistical examinations of their usage overwhelmingly indicates their safety/health-improving quality (the value they serve). You might not know it, but we're more certain of the measurable benefits of proven vaccines than the weather, which is why if health and well-being are the goals being serviced by taking or not taking vaccines, it is, statistically, (and as far as statistics can be "objective"), objectively, a superior decision to acquire the vaccinations (note: I'm not saying you should be sent to hell for not taking vaccines, I'm in effect saying you're stupid for not taking vaccines, and that you would have fewer health risks if you took vaccines. It only becomes a relevant moral condemnation if we can agree that morality should be concerned with preserving our physical health. Note*: Yes it is a moral condemnation if we agree on basic starting values, but I'm still not calling you morally bankrupt/hell-bound). You can claim ignorance on the matter, and that's fine, but your immune system and the pathogens it fights don't depend on your belief or ignorance; whether or not vaccines benefit or burden the average immune system, and the ratio of risks to rewards to our immune systems, is a question about objective fact. (we cannot access objective facts directly, but we approximate them through experience and observation; a cumulative inductive process.
The point is what could dissuade someone who promotes FGM as moral or morally obligatory because it promotes well-being?. (also, we don't need a "scientific" predictive model to have a useful predictive model, nor do we need "established science" to discriminate between the predictive power of competing models; experience alone can help sort that out). IF someone is practicing FGM because they believe it promotes individual and societal health, that amounts to a predictive model that can be questioned or falsified with reason,evidence, and sufficient experience; and while it is indeed a complex behavior nested in a complex system, we're not roundly incapable of gaining that kind of knowledge. I am interested in the strategic soundness of moral systems with given moral goals, their strategic objectivity, not the inconvenient fact that some people have ridiculous or contrary starting values (we get around this by trying to appeal to more fundamental values that are shared or non-comeptitive, which is essentially to attack the values themselves), or that we can never access "objective and absolute certainty" directly.
Have you really so little idea about how social groups function? There's not a small group of men sat in shed working out what their culture is going to be and then laughing maniacally about how cruel they've managed to make it. Cultures evolve over millenia as a result of thousands of individual choices and the complex interplay of social contracts, there's no one group to blame for it being the way it is. FGM is a result of a long history of bad decisions made under difficult circumstances. It needs to be dismantled with care, respect for the victims (including those who feel pressured into arranging it) and understanding that it is part of an interconnected Web of history of which we too are a part. This "enlightened westerner" telling the backward natives what they're doing wrong" shit is from the 50s, I had hoped we'd moved on from that.
Ye Gods...
Some cultural practices are, in fact, morally superior to others in the context of those nearly universal human values which we all share (the desire to go on living, free, and unmolested, etc...). Thems just the breaks. I'm not trying to insult anyone or make people feel bad, I'm just pointing out that from the perspective of basically every human that has ever lived, and will ever live, some social systems/cultural practices/moral laws are more or less desirable than others. How can we hope to make any progress unless we're willing to point out mistakes and problems? FGM is a long history of bad decisions in difficult circumstances; you said it! How can we fix it? By pointing out in what way the decision to do FGM is "bad" and by changing the difficult circumstances that perpetuate it (which happens to be sufficiently wide group belief that FGM is good, for whichever reason, which creates pressure on individuals and families to carry it out).
I used a single word "enlightened", and it colored your perception of me as racist from the get go. So let's go back and look at my actual usage:
"Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced for a myriad of confused reasons, and among them is the belief that it will improve the quality of life of victims. Ostensibly it is performed because it is believed to be good, and they don't happen to trust medical authorities who insist otherwise. From our enlightened ad-vantage point, it's clear to us that FGM does not actually improve the lives of victims (hence: "victim".)"
I said that the reasons for FGM are "confused" (is that so objectionable?), and I said "from our enlightened ad-vantage point". I did a kind of pun, you see, our enlightened vantage point (concerning FGM) is the result of circumstantial advantage. I was in-fact trying to be sensitive and nuanced, but I guess it wooshed right over your head... Only because you weren't expecting nuance from a racist of course!
"Enlightened westerner" are your words, not mine...
In any case, "sensitivity" in practical approach to dealing with the moral problem of FGM is neither here nor there, we're supposed to be debating the moral and meta-ethical implications of what it means to say "FGM as a practice is objectively morally inferior to not practicing FGM".
This (and that above it) is patronising bullshit. You started this off with the 'scientific facts' and even then, there's reasonable cause to doubt, but look how quickly it's descended into judgement masquerading as fact. They lack the data about the effects of sexual liberty in society? Are you seriously suggesting that what information we have about the effects of sexual liberty in society amounts to objective fact, like gravity, or the earth being round?
Now you're just being obtuse. I remember saying that all or nearly all predictive models are assailable, according to their merit, by science, logic, and evidence, I never said we needed lab-work to make well informed decisions. You're trying to hold me to some ridiculously high standard of certainty where all I'm after are relatively strong inductive arguments.
P.S Applied statistics is a science (or at least highly objective when done well).
We don't like their cultural practices, they think they're for the best. That's all there is to it. I'm more than happy to use whatever rhetorical device works to actually get FGM to stop, including presenting cultural preferences as if they were objective fact. If it works, I'm on board with it. But this is a philosophy forum. We're discussing moral truths, not trying to convince anyone to abandon FGM.
But if your beliefs don't make for effective moral suasion, what use is your moral framework? If you have to say things you don't believe are true to get people to behave in ways you believe are moral, what makes you think your moral position is any better than theirs? If it's not any better than theirs, then why try to persuade them to stop in the first place?
I posit that persuasive moral arguments correlate with strong predictive models, and that assuming our starting values are nearly or sufficiently aligned, more persuasive and effective predictive models should eventually bridge any remaining gap of moral disagreement. I don't need to persuade a group practicing FGM using cutting edge science, I just need to make a better argument than their current one which appeals to their fundamental values (while obviously confronting the circumstantial and complex social forces which keep them converged around the practice of FGM).
Really. Had much luck with that? You still haven't answered my first question. What scientific evidence do you intend to present that heaven does not exist?
Yes I have had luck with that actually.
To answer your question, I don't need to present any "scientific" evidence because that which is presented without evidence can often be dismissed with only ridicule (it doesn't have to be hurtful ridicule). Using hypothetical analysis alone, and given the right subject, I can do a fine job indeed of making the idea of "god" seem absurd and even detestable (to the point where their doubt exceeds their belief), but unless they're also given some kind of existential (and perhaps moral) replacement framework, it won't stick (happiness and welfare, for instance). Some people are so emotionally dependent on their religious beliefs that they cannot be persuaded by reasonable methods, and to do so would deprive them of too great a part of their identity, possibly leading to depression, and so I don't attempt to disabuse them of their delusions. If this is the kind of person I am confronted with, I'll have to weight my options. What is the moral cost of manipulating or otherwise intervening in the behavior of others versus the cost of not doing so? If a religious person attempted to perform FGM in a country where it is is not culturally enforced, I would physically try to stop them if I could not dissuade or otherwise manipulate them to stop. The point here, I guess, is that we can actually use reason and evidence to engage in moral suasion; it's not one big values craps shoot.
The key word there being 'ultimately' in the case of atheist virtue ethics, that means at the very least several generations away, if not, the end of time. For theist virtue ethicists, 'ultimately' includes the afterlife, so the fact that both systems 'ultimately' are about consequences, is trivial, and meaningless to this discussion.
I don't understand what you mean with this end of time stuff. Specific virtues (or even entire virtue frameworks) can be naturally selected over a finite time-span. I realize that if heaven is real then pascal was right, but I don't see how this colors my statement that extant virtue ethics have been selected over long histories for their utility? We're having several discussions, so please be more specific, is this not relevant to my meta-ethical point about what moral frameworks ought to do, based on what they overwhelmingly do? (they are strategies in service of human values, and they tend to serve those nearly universal human values which my use of "utility" approximates).
No, you're not. You're adding a third C) that we in modern Western society actually have that data and anyone who doesn't believe we do, in whatever field we claim to have it, is morally 'wrong'. You missed that. Without this last claim I entirely agree with you. There is a fact of the matter about whether vaccination is in the best long term interests of societal health. There is a fact of the matter about whether FGM is in the best interests of the victims within their current culture. There is a fact of the matter about whether attacking each other with ice picks is the best way to maintain a peaceful society. I'm not disputing that, I'm disputing your fanatical belief that 21st century wester society is in possession of all of those facts with such certainty that anyone who disagrees is just objectively wrong.
I think it's obvious enough that the widespread practice of FGM is not beneficial even to the values it purportedly serves. I didn't exactly make this about the "west", I tried to make it about the advantage of being able to learn about many cultures and ways of life, and to compare them, that is afforded individuals in contemporary western society. FGM is the unique result of, as you say, a series of bad decisions and unfortunate circumstances. We don't even know where it originated or why, exactly, with the best guessed being potentially ancient Roman and Egyptian sources where it was likely used to control female slaves.
I don't know why you're demanding a rigorous study of why FGM is not beneficial as a practice. If I were to condemn slavery as objectively immoral per that set of nearly universal human values, would you wonder if sometimes people are or were better off as slaves? Would you say that we cannot possibly know the factual matter of whether slavery is beneficial or harmful as a practice because [insert appeal here]?
Question: if it is indeed true that FGM is detrimental to the victims and the society, or that vaccinations are beneficial to individual and group health, and we happened to know with certainty, would you then feel comfortable stating that FGM and not vaccinating is morally inferior to doing otherwise?
What you don't seem to be getting is that 'reasonable confidence' does not translate to 'objectively right', and that the "soundness" of much scientific enquiry in the less physical sciences (like medicine, sociology, psychology) is justifiably moot.
From our perspective, we can never be certain. I've never proposed "objective moral certainty". The kind of objectivity we can have from our perspective is not unlike when a sound preponderance of sufficient evidence strongly indicates one conclusion over another, it would be "objective" to say that one conclusion is much more likely to be true than the other. Hence, from our perspective, all we can do is weigh the options and make the moral decisions we think are superior, more reliable (more likely to be true). This is why we can say with high confidence (highly reasonable confidence), that stabbing each-other with ice-picks as a matter of course is objectively morally inferior to not doing so. In practice it would be so detrimental to our shared values that we would say the ice-pick-stabbing practice is immoral.
Maybe the only miscommunication between us is that you assumed I'm proposing we can have "objective certainty" in the classically slippery sense. I'm not proposing that. Soundness and inductive strength (which is the kind of truth science deals in) is the more usefully persuasive of the two.
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 22:40#2644090 likes
Above, when I wrote " if we're attaching any sort of judgment or normative to different objective states (and those terms typically have those sorts of connotations), we're doing something that's only individuals' preferences and that can't be correct or incorrect," what happened when you read that?
Terms like "harmful," "healthy," "harmonious" etc. typically have those sorts of connotations. You can just ignore it, I guess, but that doesn't make the terms not typically have those sorts of connotations, and it doesn't make those states, with those sorts of connotations, obtain independently of an individual's preferences.
TheWillowOfDarknessMarch 13, 2019 at 22:46#2644100 likes
Well, I'm saying they are more than just connotations about things people care about.
The harms in question are facts of that subject, whether the subject cares or not. A cancer patient is harmed by using just orange juice as a treatment option, whether they care about it or not. Impact on the subject is not determined by what they want , wish, believe or care about, but how they actually exist and are affected.
Someone else's example. But, "extremely immoral"? Why not just immoral? Or maybe for you it's not immoral, but rather only just "extremely immoral," which could be a way of saying it could be moral.
My only point is that there are absolutes in every moral question. Most aren't worth the trouble of articulating. Some are, and in some cases it can be hard to get to the bone of the matter, for the fat. And sometimes it approaches an art.
That's not an argument. You don't have one, do you?
Terrapin StationMarch 13, 2019 at 22:48#2644120 likes
And so we can conclude that morality is a matter of collective (social) preference, can't we?
I have no problem stating it that way as long as we recognize that "collective (social) preference" is not a simple thing. It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions.
“....This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles a priori...”
(CPR, Bxxxv)
Critical dogmatism, in the pursuit of truth, but dogmatism nonetheless.
VagabondSpectreMarch 13, 2019 at 23:11#2644190 likes
Well it is amoral. Let's be clear. Your evaluation is just that. There's no moral value inherent in anything, and your evaluation doesn't magically make it so. There is nothing reasonable in simply saying that something or other is a moral value in any other sense than that it is so relative to a standard, which is in turn relative to feelings. If I don't feel the same way about this standard, then it simply doesn't apply to any moral judgements or evaluations that I make. All you're really telling me is how you feel about something. Good for you?
I get what you're saying, but I think amoral isn't the right word. Essentially you're saying that everything is amoral (right?) but that would render the term "moral" useless. I would use the term amoral to describe decisions that fall outside the realm of moral decision making entirely (which do not concern, or consider, extant moral values).
Personal dental health is not of moral value. It's either morally valuable to you or it isn't. And there's nothing meaningful or relevant in saying that something has moral utility. That's not the issue at all.
Brushing has sound moral utility given the moral value of dental health. This reflects a major part of the point I have been trying to make.
VagabondSpectreMarch 13, 2019 at 23:13#2644200 likes
I guess so. I just happen to also think that more often than not it is the matters of fact which drive moral disagreement, not disparate or competing values.
Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:
Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.
Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.
Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?
Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are.
Sorry the delay - real life got in the way
What I would say is joe has no right to make any kind of value judgment about bob preference at all and still hold that he believes in relative food judgements. The minute joe utters any qualitative word at all about joe's relative preference- it is no longer relative. Because all value judgments imply against some standard, and if you are applying them against a standard they are now objective.
Joe can say nothing at all to bob about his presence other than OK.
joe has no right to make any kind of value judgment about bob preference
“Right” doesn’t have much to do with it; he is going to make a value judgement because it’s a circumstance calling for him to do it, otherwise he couldn’t think it opposed to his own. But he no right to act on it. He might say, as you did.....OK.
—————————-
any qualitative word at all about (...) relative preference- it is no longer relative.
It is still relative, it has merely become a public comparison of preferences. He could have kept it to himself, but he didn’t. Saying OK is itself a relativism.
—————————-
Because all value judgments imply against some standard, and if you are applying them against a standard they are now objective.
If the judgements are acted upon the actions are objective manifestations of the value standard. The standard itself remains internal, hence subjective. Even if the culturally-relative value system is instilled, as opposed to, say, chemically enforced, or even if the agent is a deontologist, he still has the choice of adhering to it. What is now objective is the volition judgement has authorized.
You’re doing fine. Tough subject matter, to be sure.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 00:23#2644290 likes
Because all value judgments imply against some standard, and if you are applying them against a standard they are now objective.
Let's look at this part first.
So, first off, "I prefer pizza to horseradish" is a value judgment. Comparing and preferring one thing to another is making a judgment about them, and it has a valuation included--"I like A more than B" is valuing A more than B.
So, per your theory above, Joe's value judgment that he prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish "imply against some standard." What standard would you say it "implies against"?
So, first off, "I prefer pizza to horseradish" is a value judgment. Comparing and preferring one thing to another is making a judgment about them, and it has a valuation included--"I like A more than B" is valuing A more than B.
Which both bob and joe can make individually relative to how they individually feel. They just can't make any value judgments on what anyone else values and still believe in relative food judgments
This point I am trying to communicate is not that hard to grasp. lf you want to have relative morality for yourself, you have to allow relative morality for others.
Reply to Terrapin Station Yes, and I maintain that, and also that I am not appealing to populism, in using what most people agree about regarding what is morally right and wrong.
Reply to Terrapin Station You are muddying the waters by trying to draw an analogy, which is inevitably simplistic and inadequate, between moral values and culinary tastes.
Reply to tim wood I will take a page from @S’s playbook. Anyone who says “that boiling babies is wrong” just means “Ew, I don’t like boiling babies, boo” is a moron.
For example, you don’t boil babies. This is a moral truth, not just mere opinion where individuals feel disgust.
Uh, oh. I was sure I was right when I said I would boil three babies if the aliens promised not to destroy earth to build their galactic bypass (not sure how boiling 3 babies helped them, but it saved earth!)
What would Kant have concluded on the above situation? It is clearly a wacky scenario, but shows at least one example of that "objective" moral being untrue...is there anything you can come up with that I cannot add "unless under threat of something worse" to? Are they still "objective" morals if they need qualifiers? With enough qualifiers they eventually just become facts, right?
If morality is based on doing what promotes the flourishing (health and happiness) of a society and all its members, and the basic requirements for such flourishing are established and universally acknowledged, then morality as an "if, then" set of principles can be established and universally acknowledged, and the problems with the "is, ought" divide circumvented.
This is the only type of objective morality I could ever get behind. However, the series of if-then statements would end up being infinite to account for any situation that could ever exist...right? Does that make it an impractical method?
Uh, oh. I was sure I was right when I said I would boil three babies if the aliens promised not to destroy earth to build their galactic bypass (not sure how boiling 3 babies helped them, but it saved earth!)
Just because you choose the lesser of two evils doesn’t make boiling babies morally right. It is still evil. It is still an objective moral truth. Common sense says you should boil three babies to save humanity from the aliens, as sometimes it may be expedient to choose a lesser evil. That said, I would rather die and take others with me than boil even one baby. Never mind that it is the alien race who are committing an evil act.
That said, I would rather die and take others with me than boil even one baby. Never mind that it is the alien race who are committing an evil act.
So you are unwilling to sacrifice your spiritual enlightenment (never doing anything "wrong") for the lives of billions? Doesn't seem so moral anymore?
So you are unwilling to sacrifice your spiritual enlightenment (never doing anything "wrong") for the lives of billions? Doesn't seem so moral anymore?
Just being honest and nothing to do with spiritual enlightenment. I wouldn’t blame others for saving humanity in this way, although it would still be an evil act. I just don’t have the stomach to harm a baby.
I have no problem stating it that way as long as we recognize that "collective (social) preference" is not a simple thing. It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions.
You [i]should[/I] have a problem stating it that way, unless you're okay with being wrong. My morality need not involve any "complex interaction" with "religious institutions". It need not be about "collective preference". I have no intention of "recognising" your flawed view of what morality is.
You're simply talking about something else and calling that morality. Morality is broader than what would better be called something like social or cultural morality. That Christianity is prominent in the morality of my society is not that it is prominent in my morality. I don't judge right and wrong by thinking about the ethical lessons in the Bible.
I get what you're saying, but I think amoral isn't the right word. Essentially you're saying that everything is amoral (right?) but that would render the term "moral" useless. I would use the term amoral to describe decisions that fall outside the realm of moral decision making entirely (which do not concern, or consider, extant moral values).
Yes, strictly speaking, in a very literal sense, everything is amoral, just like everything is meaningless. But switching back to the ordinary way of speaking, there are things which are moral and immoral, and there are things which are meaningful. A strict interpretation leads to nihilism, but that's not the end point. Nihilism is why you should interpret things pragmatically, like I do. This pragmatic interpretation is why "moral" and "meaningful" are not useless.
Brushing has sound moral utility given the moral value of dental health. This reflects a major part of the point I have been trying to make.
The issue is not about "moral utility", so your point misses the point. You're just saying that it's useful to brush your teeth every day if you value your dental health. Lots of people value their dental health, so generally, brushing your teeth is useful. Who cares? No one is going to disagree with that, and it doesn't effect the wider issue.
I guess so. I just happen to also think that more often than not it is the matters of fact which drive moral disagreement, not disparate or competing values.
If you're a subjective moral relativist, you kind of sound like you're weirdly in denial or something. Morality is subjective and relative, [i]but[/I]... !
Cleaning your teeth is objective and matters! It's useful if you value your dental health!
We cannot be absolutely certain that NOT cutting off a girl's clit won't harm the girl or society (harm their subjective values), but the forecast certainly indicates this
the weather forecast is99% possibility of precipitation, it would be prudent to carry an umbrella. This doesn't mean we're obligated to believe and obey weather forecasts,
You see, this is the problem I have with your position. You talk accurately about epistemological when pushed (I've bolded the relevant sections), but then you reveal this authoritarian undercurrent with the likes of...
Some cultural practices are, in fact, morally superior to others in the context of those nearly universal human values which we all share
We're just going round in circles on this one so I don't see the point continuing, you've brought up vacancies again (despite not even a glancing recognition of my arguments as to why people might legitimately doubt the statistics). You keep insisting that the models held by current academic, research, and government institutions in the developed countries are absolutely beyond question. That there are no legitimate grounds to doubt that they are the best models we have.
In order for it to be morally 'right' given shared values about children's health, for a parent to vaccinate a child, they would have to...
1. Trust the pharmaceutical company to have performed their tests accurately and to have used ingredients which are in the best interests of the child.
2. The trust the government agency to accurately test the ingredients against the possibility of long and short term harm.
3. Trust the academics to have properly conducted and properly understood the statistical significance of any epidemiological studies designed to show the net benefits of vaccination.
4. Trust that the epidemiological statistics relate to the particular ingredients they are about to inject their child with, and not some similar but significantly different set.
5. Trust that the widespread agreement on safety and effectiveness is the result of repeated independent analysis and not 'groupthink' and other well-known cognitive biases related to the tendency for ideas to coagulate. And again, trust that any agreement relates to the exact ingredients they are about to inject, not just the general idea.
6. Trust that, given these uncertainties, the statistics showing the risk of not vaccinating relate to their actual child in a statistically significant manner, ie that their child, and that child's environment, are sufficien6tly close to the average for the risk factors to apply to them.
All six of these issues have legitimate, documented and widely agreed upon reasons for doubt.
1. Pharmaceutical companies do not consider the health of their customers above other considerations. It is written in black and white in their company articles that their objective is to increase the value of the company for their shareholders. Its not tin-foil hat wearing conspiracy, it's written in every public companies articles. Not only that, but pharmaceutical have been directly caught manipulating test results to suit product sales.
2. Do I even need to argue the documented cases of collusion, inefficiency and plain incompetence in government agencies? I can prepare you a list if you like, but I might need a whole thread for it.
3. Again, I'm sure I don't need to insult your intelligence by pretending that you do not already know that there is a massive problem with scientists being able to correctly interpret the statistical significance of their data. Most now work with statisticians for this very reason, which has reduced the problem, but it has not by any means eliminated it.
4. Ingredients change all the time as cheaper, or more efficient options become available. A parent has no way of knowing that statistics related to the methods used 40 years ago have any bearing on the safety of the method they are considering.
5. Once more, I can produce evidence if you're really naive enough to not know this already, but when first produced, 90% of research papers wee positive about the effectiveness of type 2 antidepressants. A few years later only 10% supported them, now its up to 60%. Have the effectiveness changed? No, it was simply the 'thing to say' when they were new and exiting, it became more fashionable to dismiss them when they were old, now they're being 'rediscovered'. Scientists are not superhumans, they're prone to the same biases and social pressures as any other human.
6. The average chance of dying in a plane crash is 1 in 14,000,000. But that is not my chance. My chances of dying in a plane crash are zero, because I don't fly. The chances of complications from childhood viruses for the average child are not the same as the chances for a healthy child (in terms of diet and exercise) living in a relatively isolated rural area.
All of this legitimate uncertainty is on top of the fact that you are talking only about the current (and maybe a few future) generations. Who knows how far into the future someone's legitimate values might extend. Is it a good idea to be reliant on private companies to maintain the health of our children? Is it a good idea to steer investment into necessary prophylactic solutions rather than investing in responsive cures? Can we always rely on having the money and resources to deal with the problem this way?
I'm not an anti-vaxxer. I'm too old for it to even be an issue and it just wasn't questioned at the time. I could, just as easily present a similar list of reasons why someone might legitimately not trust any number of models apparently showing the 'objective truth' of the matter. These thing are graded and you're treating them as black and white. I'd think anyone insane if they seriously thought the earth was flat, or that the sea was made of gold, but that's not the kind of data we're dealing with here.
I've posted this particular line of argument separately so that it can be easily deleted if anyone thinks the level of detail is too far off topic. I may be way off the mark with what you are saying, but you keep treating the word of the scientific community as if it were gospel truth and I can't think of any reason why you would do that other than that you are blind to these problems.
Which both bob and joe can make individually relative to how they individually feel. They just can't make any value judgments on what anyone else values and still believe in relative food judgments
This point I am trying to communicate is not that hard to grasp. lf you want to have relative morality for yourself, you have to allow relative morality for others.
I can't see how such a thing as that is possible.
Indeed, it is not hard to grasp. Anyone familiar enough with common objections to moral relativism will recognise this. And it is easily refuted. You're making the illogical argument that if you're a moral relativist, then you must be an amoralist. I pointed that out ages out. Sorry, but you're not doing fine. You're still not getting it.
You are muddying the waters by trying to draw an analogy, which is inevitably simplistic and inadequate, between moral values and culinary tastes.
It didn't muddy the waters for me. You could say a similar thing about my analogy with meaning and an orange, but that would be to massively miss the point. In fact, this actually happened. It is what Banno did. He thought that I was suggesting that meaning is a thing like an orange. "Darling, grab me an orange from the fruit bowl. And whilst you're at it, could you pick me up a meaning? It's in the cupboard on the left". :lol:
So, it turns out that it is "just toxic" to point out logical errors in an argument. That is news to me.
When someone says that it will rain tomorrow, because I like custard, it is "just toxic" to reply that that's a non sequitur.
This is just more silliness from the estimable Tim Wood. He is quoting me out of context to make me look bad. That's another fallacy. Go ahead: quote me saying, "This is just more silliness from the estimable Tim Wood", as if your silliness has nothing to do with it.
I dismissed Tim Wood bringing up the categorical imperative because he merely asserted that it had answered relativism. Hitchen's razor.
I will take a page from S’s playbook. Anyone who says “that boiling babies is wrong” just means “Ew, I don’t like boiling babies, boo” is a moron.
Your bias is showing. I haven't resorted to simplistic name calling like that. I did call him a dogmatist, but that's in another league from calling him a moron. I wasn't calling him that to insult him, I was calling him that because it seems to me to be an accurate term to describe his position here. It is dogmatic. We must simply accept that there is an absolute moral standard, because Tim Wood says so.
I acknowledge that I have said things which didn't need to be said, but that was very clearly a response to Tim Wood's playbook. He set out to make moral relativists look bad from the very beginning, but you seem to be blind to that because of your antagonism towards me and towards moral relativists in general. You're as bad as him, if not worse.
And these childish attempts to trivialise moral relativism and make it superficially appear to be so obviously wrong are frankly pathetic. And yes, in a sense, I don't need to point out that I think that it is childish and pathetic, and perhaps I shouldn't, but fuck it. I've said it, and I don't regret doing so.
And these childish attempts to trivialise moral relativism
Does your idea of what is morally wrong have anything to do with anything other than personal disgust? If so, then enlighten me please. Perhaps you can persuade me to your way of thinking?
what could dissuade someone who promotes FGM as moral or morally obligatory because it promotes well-being?
Everyone else not doing it. Same thing as persuades most people to do most things. Have you looked at society lately? See much rational decision making going on? The largest ecomony in the world just voted in a clown for a leader because of a wave of 'popular opinion'. Since when has rational argument made any difference?
I'm just pointing out that from the perspective of basically every human that has ever lived, and will ever live, some social systems/cultural practices/moral laws are more or less desirable than others.
No, you're not, you're additionally telling us all which ones they are, and telling anyone who disagrees that they are 'objectively wrong'.
As I said before, given similar starting values, there are more or less correct courses of action to achieve them. There are definitely arguments to be had about those courses of action, and those arguments should be had using reason and evidence because I think most people agree these are good thinking techniques. One of the competing arguments may well come out looking so much more reasonable and well-supported than the other, that anyone would have to be stupid to reject it (again, given the same starting values). I don't disagree with any of that.
I disagree with your repeated return to the idea that you can 'objectively' pick any activity you personally approve of (such as vaccination) and claim it to be such an argument, purely on the grounds that it is the model most scientists in the field currently agree on. That is not anywhere near a good enough reason to consider that model to be so far above the others.
You're trying to hold me to some ridiculously high standard of certainty where all I'm after are relatively strong inductive arguments.
Saying that someone is morally wrong requires a high standard of certainty, in my opinion. Maybe this is our sole point of contention. You're happy to throw around accusations of immorality on the basis of a belief that your modal is 'probably' better. I'm not.
But if your beliefs don't make for effective moral suasion, what use is your moral framework?
I don't understand this line of argument. You seem to be suggesting that I should believe something other than what seems to me to be the case, because what I currently believe is not very useful in persuading people to do what I want them to. That seems like a really weird argument. Maybe I've misunderstood so ill wait for some more clarity before going into it.
I don't understand what you mean with this end of time stuff. Specific virtues (or even entire virtue frameworks) can be naturally selected over a finite time-span.
Yes. That is basically the difference between the class of virtue ethics I'm talking about and utilitarian consequentialism. Virtue ethics does not require a fixed point in the future for its calculus, utilitarianism does. With virtue ethics you are comparing the way actions make you feel about yourself right now. With utilitarianism you are comparing the net utility of actions, but to do so you must use a fixed timescale, otherwise one would advise an action which made the whole population ecstatically happy, but wiped out all future generations (not far off our current attitude). The decision you make will depend on the timescale over which you wish to maintain maximum utility.
I think it's obvious enough that the widespread practice of FGM is not beneficial even to the values it purportedly serves.
Exactly. And you think it's obvious enough that one should vaccinate their child, and you think it's obvious enough that we should brush our teeth, and you think it's obvious enough...
The trouble is, other people disagree, and they do so with perfectly rational arguments of greater or lesser strength. The vaccination issue is exactly the reason why I so strongly disapprove of your approach. It seems to you like it fits right in with not committing FGM, or not killing each other with ice picks, but to me, it stands out a mile as being something which transfers a hell of a lot of trust to organisations which have absolutely shown themselves to be untrustworthy.
This is the problem in a nutshell. If you were arguing for a moral framework which condemned FGM as objectively immoral, for some reason which applied only to those sorts of barbaric actions, then I might well disagree on logical grounds, but I would not have bothered with such an impassioned response. What really bothers me is that you're advocating a system which basically gives moral weight to current scientific opinion with no consideration at all for how vulnerable some fields of science are to fashion, government influence, corporate influence, or plain human greed and bias. You're giving over decisions about what is fundamentally 'right' to a system which has proven itself to be morally questionable at times by the very standards you're using it to uphold.
Does your idea of what is morally wrong have anything to do with anything other than personal disgust? If so, then enlighten me please. Perhaps you can persuade me to your way of thinking?
Anyway, enough jokes and throwing shade. Back to business.
How can you explain morality in a sensible way without a foundation in moral feelings? I doubt that you can.
Reply to S I should say that I believe that some moral sentiments are relative. Others are knowable moral truths. Child raping is wrong is a moral truth. Kosher diet is morally relative.
I should say that I believe that some moral sentiments are relative. Others are knowable moral truths. Child raping is wrong is a moral truth. Kosher diet is morally relative.
Moral truths in what sense? In a meaningless sense? I reject that way of thinking for obvious reasons. But yes, it is a moral truth in a sensible sense.
Moral feelings and what they're about suffice for moral truth. Harm to society is just one particular thing which a moral truth could be about, depending on how you morally feel about it.
So you are definitely a descriptive moral relativist. So am I. Are you also a meta-ethical moral relativist? I am not.
Shit. You've caught me out. Now I'll have to look up the philosophical jargon. I'm a little rusty on that one. I think I'm both, but await my confirmation. :grin:
So you are definitely a descriptive moral relativist. So am I. Are you also a meta-ethical moral relativist? I am not.
Yeah, I'm both.
Oops, too many consecutive posts. Sir2u is going to have a field day. Still, I'm closer to getting that prized 10k and becoming the new Agustino, only funnier, wiser, better looking, more humble, and less ironic.
Reply to S whether it is my inability to state it clearly or your lack of understanding it correctly- but that reply has nothing at all to do with the point I was trying to make.
I disagree with your repeated return to the idea that you can 'objectively' pick any activity you personally approve of (such as vaccination) and claim it to be such an argument, purely on the grounds that it is the model most scientists in the field currently agree on. That is not anywhere near a good enough reason to consider that model to be so far above the others.
Exactly. And you think it's obvious enough that one should vaccinate their child, and you think it's obvious enough that we should brush our teeth, and you think it's obvious enough...
Yes, and Tim Wood thinks that it's obvious enough that there's an absolute moral standard. We had better follow suit, I suppose, even if that means throwing reason out of the window.
Indeed, it is not hard to grasp. Anyone familiar enough with common objections to moral relativism will recognise this. And it is easily refuted. You're making the illogical argument that if you're a moral relativist, then you must be an amoralist. I pointed that out ages out. Sorry, but you're not doing fine. You're still not getting it.
Thanks, I’ll do a few hours of research today. It would have been easier if you just directly pointed to the lack of logic. Understand how demeaning it might make you feel to engage the point directly to such an ignorant person as myself. I will crawl back down the mountain master S.
whether it is my inability to state it clearly or your lack of understanding it correctly- but that reply has nothing at all to do with the point I was trying to make.
Odd. It certainly looks otherwise. Are you sure you're not just in denial?
Thanks, I’ll do a few hours of research today. It would have been easier if you just directly pointed to the lack of logic. Understand how demeaning it might make you feel to engage the point directly to such an ignorant person as myself. I will crawl back down the mountain master S.
I try to help. You can reproach me for not being all nice and cuddly about it, but I do try to help. That I'm arrogant and insensitive doesn't make me any less right or logical.
I thought that pointing out the logical error seemed appropriate. Must I construct a logical argument [i]for you[/I] as well? What would I need [i]you[/I] for in that case? The way I see it, it's on you to put forward an argument for whatever it is that you're claiming, and I will then analyse it and inform you of any problems I detect, and then we can either work on them or you can just close it down as you sometimes do when it gets a bit too much for you.
You have tried. I will give you that much. But I'm not going to lie and call it a big success.
If I might dare to bridge the gulf between the extreme moral relativist and the moral absolutist, I think the slightly maligned notion of ethical naturalism is the elephant in the room which no-one wants to address.
We cannot argue that morals are objective because there is no means for them to be, but we must somehow account for the fact that, of the 7 billion people on the planet, the vast majority of them prefer not to kill each other on a whim, or boil babies, or torture for fun etc.
The statistics are way beyond statistically significant, in some localised situations, maybe even 100%. This widespread agreement does not make their values 'right', I'm absolutely a moral relativist, but it does demand an explanation. Whether you argue for evolved biology, random selection, cultural homogeneity or God's will... Ignoring the fact is what often makes the moral relativist argument sound bizarre. Likewise, ignoring the utility of this fact as an explanation is what makes the absolutist argument sound unnecessarily mystical.
I think the question of whether there exist objective morals is a pseudo question. It depends entirely on what criteria we are going to allow to constitute existence. The more important question is - to what extent are we going to allow the consistency of certain preferences in a majority of the population to act as a justification for imposing those on the remainder? That's basically what I see as the job of normative ethics.
I think the question of whether there exist objective morals is a pseudo question. It depends entirely on what criteria we are going to allow to constitute existence.
One of many pseudo-questions in philosophy. Have you checked out the discussion on ancient texts? If we apply the criteria of moral objectivism, it results in error theory. How pragmatic is error theory? Not as pragmatic as moral relativism in my assessment.
(That [i]itself[/I] was a joke. There's never enough jokes and throwing shade. Even [i]this[/I] is itself a joke. But the biggest joke of all is philosophy. Or am I just joking? I can't even tell anymore, and neither can you. Just cave in to the absurdity and everything will work out just fine. Either that or it will be our biggest downfall. It's one of the two, anyway).
Have you checked out the discussion on ancient texts?
Yes, I briefly paid a visit. "If I define everything to mean exactly what I say it does, does {insert thing here} mean exactly what I say it does?" seems to be about the jist of it, I just left him to it.
If we apply the criteria of moral objectivism, it results in error theory. How pragmatic is error theory? Not as pragmatic as moral relativism in my assessment.
I agree. If we are to make any progress at all on those moral matters where there is widespread agreement (but significant disagreement), those of us who agree are not going to make much inroads by first positing that our agreement is somehow objectively right, having it shown that no single moral statements conforms to that standard and so being sent away muttering.
I'd much rather turn up and say "we prefer things to be this way, and there's more of us than there are of you (and we've got guns)". At least it's honest.
Yes, I briefly paid a visit. "If I define everything to mean exactly what I say it does, does {insert thing here} mean exactly what I say it does?" seems to be about the jist of it, I just left him to it.
No, no, no. It's [i]serious philosophy[/I]. (Don't ruin the illusion with your blasted logical analysis!).
I agree. If we are to make any progress at all on those moral matters where there is widespread agreement (but significant disagreement), those of us who agree are not going to make much inroads by first positing that our agreement is somehow objectively right, having it shown that no single moral statements conforms to that standard and so being sent away muttering.
I'd much rather turn up and say "we prefer things to be this way, and there's more of us than there are of you (and we've got guns)". At least it's honest.
Not at all, Bordeaux is huge (plus the fact that that's its in Burgundy... as well you know)... Damn... No, wait, it was a double bluff, its not in Burgundy at all. Phew, philosophy is hard isn't it.
Not at all, Bordeaux is huge (plus the fact that that's its in Burgundy... as well you know)... Damn... No, wait, it was a double bluff, its not in Burgundy at all. Phew, philosophy is hard isn't it.
I love the idea of a blue Tuesday being located in Burgundy of all places. :lol:
Or is it yellow? And in Croydon? Who knows? Thank goodness we have philosophy to work these things out.
What if I was the only non-racist in a racist society?
Then your morals would be out of step with your community. That would put you 'in the wrong'. Unless you think there's some kind of natural law that defines racism to be wrong?
I have no problem stating it that way as long as we recognize that "collective (social) preference" is not a simple thing. It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions.
I thought that pointing out the logical error seemed appropriate. Must I construct a logical argument for you as well? What would I need you for in that case? The way I see it, it's on you to put forward an argument for whatever it is that you're claiming, and I will then analyse it and inform you of any problems I detect, and then we can either work on them or you can just close it down as you sometimes do when it gets a bit too much for you.
this is the issue i am struggling with - happy to be schooled on my errors -
If morality is completely subjective to the individual, than it is equally subjective for all other individuals as well.
for any action - X
person A - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is moral
person B - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is immoral
They are both subjectively right in their individual judgments.
So both must admit the others subjective judgement is correct or
give up the position that all moral judgments are subjective.
Then your morals would be out of step with your community. That would put you 'in the wrong'. Unless you think there's some kind of natural law that defines racism to be wrong?
Wow. Really? You think that it's either cultural relativism or natural law? The funny thing is, I accept cultural relativism, but I don't accept that it is the whole story when it comes to morality. Yes, I'm wrong relative to them. But they're wrong relative to me, and my morality is better. And yes, better in accordance with my own standard on what's better and worse, obviously. Not in accordance with an imaginary absolute moral standard which makes no sense, and for which there is zero evidence.
They are both subjectively right in their individual judgments.
So both must admit the others subjective judgement is correct
If I may. They only must admit that the other's subjective judgement is correct for them (the other person) it is still incorrect for the person thinking about it and so still requires action to remediate (or not, depending on the degree).
The realisation that one cannot make objective ones preferences, does not prevent one from acting to further them. Afterall, you're invoking a kind of 'fairness' here, that it would be somehow 'unfair' if we were to impose our moral preference on another knowing that they feel just as justifiably right as we do.
But what is 'fairness' but another subjective moral preference?
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 13:02#2646760 likes
this is the issue i am struggling with - happy to be schooled on my errors -
If morality is completely subjective to the individual, than it is equally subjective for all other individuals as well.
for any action - X
person A - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is moral
person B - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is immoral
They are both subjectively right in their individual judgments.
[B]So both must admit the others subjective judgement is correct[/b] or
give up the position that all moral judgments are subjective.
The part in bold is the problem. Who has committed to an absolute sense of correctness in this context? Is the relativist a relativist, or an absolutist?
If the relativist is a relativist, which he obviously is, then there is no internal contradiction, and your criticism is therefore ineffective. Both are correct in a way which does not violate the law of noncontradiction, [i]nor[/I] logically imply a [i]normative[/I] acceptance of the others moral judgement.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 13:06#2646790 likes
If I may. They only must admit that the other's subjective judgement is correct for them (the other person) it is still incorrect for the person thinking about it and so still requires action to remediate (or not, depending on the degree).
The realisation that one cannot make objective ones preferences, does not prevent one from acting to further them. Afterall, you're invoking a kind of 'fairness' here, that it would be somehow 'unfair' if we were to impose our moral preference on another knowing that they feel just as justifiably right as we do.
But what is 'fairness' but another subjective moral preference?
Exactly. Which is what I was getting at above re his framework being that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. (And since what's objectively the case to a subjectivist is that there is no objective preference, then we have to defer to that and have no preference, too.)
Right. Its a form of question begging, I think. The hidden premise is {we must defer to what is objective when we make demands on the actions of others}. So then the argument goes "objectively there are no rules, therefore you cannot ask anyone to abide by a rule" . But take away the hidden premise and the argument fails.
Then your morals would be out of step with your community. That would put you 'in the wrong'.
— Pattern-chaser
People who think that "out of step with their community" amounts to "wrong" in any manner are the last people I want to be spending time around.
This is a good point. It can be a worrying way of thinking, as my example involving racism conveys. Good luck trying to tackle institutional racism by talking about the racists being right, and me being wrong.
it is still incorrect for the person thinking about it and so still requires action to remediate (or not, depending on the degree).
fine - but must now give up the the believe that all moral judgments are subjective. Because now you are comparing subjective judgement - how can it be possible to compare them subjectively - that is impossible - they must be compared in measure of objectivity.
Right. Its a form of question begging, I think. The hidden premise is {we must defer to what is objective when we make demands on the actions of others}. So then the argument goes "objectively there are no rules, therefore you cannotaask anyone to abide by a rule. But take away the hidden premise and the argument fails.
that is exactly what I am saying - don't see how that begs the question
The part in bold is the problem. Who has committed to an absolute sense of correctness? Is the relativist a relativist, or an absolutist?
If the relativist is a relativist, which he obviously is, then there is no internal contradiction, and your criticism is therefore ineffective. Both are correct in way which does not violate the law of noncontradiction.
subjectively you are both right, if you do not allow some level of objectivity into the judgment you can not compare them, other than saying they are different
if you do not allow some level of objectivity into the judgment you can not compare them, other than saying they are different
What you're saying is illogical. I don't need to go outside of myself for any reason, and I cannot do so anyway. My own judgement is all I have, and all I need. He is wrong in this way - the only way that matters as far as I'm concerned. He should change his judgement.
Even if there was an objective standard, it wouldn't matter to me. If we somehow discovered that boiling babies is objectively right, do you think that I'd change my judgement and behaviour accordingly? Hell no! Would you? :brow:
There's that scary link between notions of an objective moral standard and divide command theory. Is it good because god willed it? Genocide is good? Saying that genocide is good for some guy and his bad judgement is no where near as scary. It's very much not good for the rest of us. The rest of us do not accept his judgement in any normative sense. We accept [i]that[/I] it is his judgement. It is not [I]our[/I] judgement. Our judgement is that it is [i]wrong[/I].
It's not the moral relativists you should be worried about, in spite of the negative propaganda.
Is it a coincidence that Noah is a Christian? Is it a coincidence that you are also a theist, if I'm not mistaken? Perhaps there's a correlation. Religious and theological thinking can infect thinking on other matters. The best solution is to kill it at the roots.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 13:36#2646910 likes
fine - but must now give up the the believe that all moral judgments are subjective. Because now you are comparing subjective judgement - how can it be possible to compare them subjectively - that is impossible - they must be compared in measure of objectivity.
I don't understand what you're thinking here.
Say that my view is that it's not okay to rape others.
I run into someone who thinks that it's okay to rape others.
Per what you're saying above, I can't subjectively compare "not okay to rape others" and "okay to rape others," But I don't know why. It seems like it would be easy to compare them, especially since I already have a view about it, that view being "It's not okay to rape others." When I consider "It's okay to rape others" I reject that, because I don't agree with it.
now you are comparing subjective judgement - how can it be possible to compare them subjectively - that is impossible - they must be compared in measure of objectivity.
I'm not comparing subjective judgements. I'm comparing his actions to my subjective judgement, not comparing his subjective judgement to my subjective judgement. I don't care about his judgement, its his actions that bother me.
Say that my view is that it's not okay to rape others.
I run into someone who thinks that it's okay to rape others.
Per what you're saying above, I can't subjectively compare "not okay to rape others" and "okay to rape others," But I don't know why. It seems like it would be easy to compare them, especially since I already have a view about it, that view being "It's not okay to rape others." When I consider "It's okay to rape others" I reject that, because I don't agree with it.
It's not logical. It must be psychological. His drive for objectivity is psychological, and it is of such force that it overrides logic for him. This makes even more sense when you consider his background: his desire that there be a god.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 13:43#2646940 likes
What you're saying is illogical. I don't need to go outside of myself for any reason, and I cannot do so anyway. My own judgement is all I have, and all I need. He is wrong in this way - the only way that matters as far as I'm concerned. He should change his judgement.
What is your argument than to person b who has a different subjective judgement that he is incorrect, other than - "in my opinion" any other argument you chose must be adding a degree of objectivity.
and as an aside - i am not championing any morality over another on this point -
my argument is just pointing to what i think is a logic flaw.
If all judgments are subjective - than all judgments are subjectively correct - I see no way around this
Per what you're saying above, I can't subjectively compare "not okay to rape others" and "okay to rape others," But I don't know why. It seems like it would be easy to compare them, especially since I already have a view about it, that view being "It's not okay to rape others." When I consider "It's okay to rape others" I reject that, because I don't agree with it.
go ahead and make the argument please - tell me why my subjective judgment that rape is not immoral.
I'm not comparing subjective judgements. I'm comparing his actions to my subjective judgement, not comparing his subjective judgement to my subjective judgement. I don't care about his judgement, its his actions that bother me.
you have missed the point - neither person A or B have done the action - person A and B are making subjective judgments on the same action X - than someone else did
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 13:57#2647000 likes
go ahead and make the argument please - tell me why my subjective judgment that rape is not immoral.
It's a subjective judgment comparing two stances. It's not an argument about it in the sense of premises leading to a conclusion. What I explained is all that needs to be involved.
Are you not saying that we can't make a subjective judgment comparing two different stances?
What is your argument than to person b who has a different subjective judgement that he is incorrect, other than - "in my opinion" any other argument you chose must be adding a degree of objectivity.
Opinion, if you call it that (I prefer the term "moral judgement" as it conveys the importance better), is all I have. It is founded on moral feelings. I would try to get him to empathise with my feelings on the matter. This can and does work in some cases. It is very evident when a child realises that they've behaved badly by, for example, snatching a toy out of another child's hand. At first, they judge that what they did was morally acceptable, but then you get them to empathise with the victim.
If all judgments are subjective - than all judgments are subjectively correct - I see no way around this
Relative [i]to[/I] those individual subjects. Relativists are relativists, remember? Not absolutists.
So what? This is not a problem in itself. It is not a problem for me. There is no internal contradiction. The only logical error here is your own. It is a problem for you. (It's ironic when this happens, because it's the same sort of error in not understanding moral relativism).
you have missed the point - neither person A or B have done the action - person A and B are making subjective judgments on the same action X - than someone else did
In that instance I refer you to what @Terrapin Station said above with regards to judging stances.
Opinion, if you call it that (I prefer the term "moral judgement" as it conveys the importance better), is all I have. It is founded on moral feelings. I would try to get him to empathise with my feelings on the matter. This can and does work in some cases. It is very evident when a child realises that they've behaved badly by, for example, snatching a toy out of another child's hand. At first, they judge that what they did was morally acceptable, but then you get them to empathise with the victim.
no issue at all with that - that is my point - as long as the basis of every argument you make is your own subjective judgement. Any plea to anything else adds some degree of objectivity.
Are you not saying that we can't make a subjective judgment comparing two different stances?
this is very hard - we can all make whatever subjective judgments we want, you can even say your subjective judgement of my subjective judgement is wrong.
But if you are committed to subjectivity - there is no way to compare subjective judgments. Each attempt is just one more subjective judgment.
no issue at all with that - that is my point - as long as the basis of every argument you make is your own subjective judgement. Any plea to anything else adds some degree of objectivity.
Some degree of objectivity doesn't make any real difference. That I feel a certain way about something is itself factual, not opinion. That's a degree of objectivity. That still doesn't mean that morality is objective. There is no objective standard, as feelings differ. We don't accept that different beliefs about the moon indicate an objective standard. The moon can't both be made out of cheese and not made out of cheese, and relativism doesn't help here. Morality isn't like that. It's different. And relativism is useful for making sense of it.
Some degree of objectivity doesn't make any real difference. That I feel a certain way about something is itself factual, not opinion. That's a degree of objectivity. That still doesn't mean that morality is objective. There is no objective standard, as feelings differ. We don't accept that different beliefs about the moon to indicate an objective standard. Morality isn't like that. It's different.
getting closer - my view is there is no such thing as either absolutely subjective or absolutely objective morality - it is a continuum and we place ourselves somewhere on that continuum.
My subjective moral judgment is that Hitler did nothing that is morally wrong.
Assume your subjective moral judgement is Hitler did lots of stuff that was morally wrong
Make an argument - absent of any objective moral standard to change my mind
Are you like a child who has just snatched a toy out of the hand of another child? No, I don't believe that you are, so no argument from me is necessary. I've already explained what I would try to do. You don't need to see me act it out with you. You are more intelligent than that.
Are you like a child who has just snatched a toy out of the hand of another child? No, I don't believe that you are, so no argument from me is necessary. I've already explained what I would try to do. You don't need to see me act it out with you. You are more intelligent than that.
that is a non answer to a direct question -
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 14:23#2647200 likes
getting closer - my view is there is no such thing as either absolutely subjective or absolutely objective morality - it is a continuum and we place ourselves somewhere on that continuum.
No one, as far as I'm aware, has claimed that there's an absolute subjective morality. Moral subjectivism can acknowledge aspects of objectivity relating to morality, but these aspects are not of any logical significance in the broader context of what the debate is about. You can't kick a puppy if there is no puppy. That there is a puppy is factual, objective. But that's insignificant in proper context.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 14:32#2647240 likes
My subjective moral judgment is that Hitler did nothing that is morally wrong.
Assume your subjective moral judgement is Hitler did lots of stuff that was morally wrong
Make an argument - absent of any objective moral standard to change my mind
Rather than trying to make an argument for that--because it would take a lot of time, take a lot of steps, etc. I'll explain how I'd go about doing it.
Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect, though it is necessarily manipulative.)
At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances.
and now we enter semantics - and ad hominem - seems the discussion is nearing an end
It's very relevant that you seem to be feigning ignorance in order to get me to do something which I judge to be unnecessary. It is no fallacy for me to point that problem out. You are choosing not to progress past this problem by returning sensibly to what we were talking about. You have a bad habit of blaming other people when a discussion doesn't go your way. I make no apology for refusing to let you wrap me around your finger.
If it's all becoming a bit too much for you, then you're free to do what you usually do. The door is over there.
Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect.)
At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances.
fine with all that - your right I don't change my mind. And it leaves us with two different subjective options about the morality of Hitler and no objective way to resolve our differences.
that does not seem a good endpoint to such a moral judgment to me.
Reply to S we are good - as soon as you acknowledged, as you did that there needs to be some degree of objective view in comparing moral judgments - i am fine - I have no need to find where exactly that line is.
Pattern-chaserMarch 14, 2019 at 14:43#2647290 likes
Then your morals would be out of step with your community. That would put you 'in the wrong'. — Pattern-chaser
People who think that "out of step with their community" amounts to "wrong" in any manner are the last people I want to be spending time around.
If you have understood that I posted a personal moral verdict, I have miscommunicated, and I apologise. I merely note that any community would consider the views of one of its members who disagreed with every other member as "wrong", wouldn't they? :chin:
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 14:43#2647300 likes
fine with all that - your right I don't change my mind. And it leaves us with two different subjective options about the morality of Hitler and no objective way to resolve our differences.
that does not seem a good endpoint to such a moral judgment to me.
Well, but isn't it clear to you that no matter what we do, whatever we believe about meta-ethics, we're left with people with diametrically opposed moral stances? That's hardly a new situation, and it's hardly the result of there being a bunch of meta-ethical subjectivists or relativists.
If we're all objectivists we don't magically arrive at a scenario wherein we all have the same moral stances. We just believe that the folks with other stances are incorrect, that they're unreasonable, etc. That doesn't help change anyone's mind.
My meta-ethical views are not not supposed to be a solution to everyone having the same moral stances. It's just aiming to get right what's really going on ontologically when it comes to morality.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 14:44#2647310 likes
we are good - as soon as you acknowledged, as you did that there needs to be some degree of objective view in comparing moral judgments - i am fine - I have no need to find where exactly that line is.
That's fine, so long as you don't twist what I say and walk away with a misunderstanding which you perhaps don't even realise is a misunderstanding. That some degree of objectivity is required to make sense of morality is completely irrelevant. Moral subjectivists are not solipsists. It would be foolish to treat them as though they were, by interrogating them about the objectivity involved which no reasonable person would deny.
If we truly agree, then fine. But I object to fake or illusory agreement.
Pattern-chaserMarch 14, 2019 at 14:50#2647340 likes
But sure, it's not unusual that a lot of people are pro-conformist enough that they think that.
I'm not convinced that 'pro-conformist' is a position one would choose. Societies (communities) are quite demanding of their members. Conformity is one general requirement that communities make of their members, although specific and individual non-conformities might be tolerated, up to a point. Don't you think this is how societies work in the real world? It seems so to me. :chin: [ I offer no moral judgement, only my observations of how the real world seems to be, to me.]
Here's an interesting link I just found today. It's not about this specific issue, but it's about culture and societies, and the effect they have upon us and our lives. I've never read anything like it, although I have had vague feelings in this direction for some time. Worth a read, I found. :up: :smile:
That's fine, so long as you don't twist what I say and walk away with a misunderstanding which you perhaps don't even realise is a misunderstanding. That some degree of objectivity is required to make sense of morality is completely irrelevant. Moral subjectivists are not solipsists. It would be foolish to treat them as though they were, by interrogating them about the objectivity involved which no reasonable person would deny.
I will leave here subjectively believing what I darn well please and there is nothing subjectively you can say to change my mind :)
Well, but isn't it clear to you that no matter what we do, whatever we believe about meta-ethics, we're left with people with diametrically opposed moral stances? That's hardly a new situation, and it's hardly the result of there being a bunch of meta-ethical subjectivists or relativists.
If we're all objectivists we don't magically arrive at a scenario wherein we all have the same moral stances. We just believe that the folks with other stances are incorrect, that they're unreasonable, etc. That doesn't help change anyone's mind.
My meta-ethical views are not not supposed to be a solution to everyone having the same moral stances. It's just aiming to get right what's really going on ontologically when it comes to morality.
Exactly. There are so many common misconceptions in this topic. I've seen this one before, and I'm sure you have.
I will leave here subjectively believing what I darn well please and there is nothing subjectively you can say to change my mind :)
I can deal with that. It's not an uncommon experience for someone to have. No technique is guaranteed to succeed, and that is completely irrelevant as Terrapin rightly argued. But remember that in your task, you're the one who believes that Hitler did nothing morally wrong. I wouldn't even want to associate with you if that was really your view.
But remember that in your task, you're the one who believes that Hitler did nothing wrong. I wouldn't even want to associate with you if that was really your view.
I thought that was odd, too. I suspected he mixed up his two statements.
Reply to S goodness gracious of course i don't - you just couldn't resist one last ad hominem could you. Did that really add any philosophic significance ? Just don't understand the motivation for such comments.
Just don't understand the motivation for such comments.
I don’t know S personally, but maybe he’s bad at sports and was always picked last in gym class. Philosophy is his forum for defeating others and winning. At least in his mind.
goodness gracious of course i don't - you just couldn't resist one last ad hominem could you. Did that really add any philosophic significance? Just don't understand the motivation for such comments.
Whoosh.
I clearly wasn't accusing you of actually having that view.
I don’t know S personally, but maybe he’s bad at sports and was always picked last in gym class. Philosophy is his forum for defeating others and winning. At least in his mind.
And of course, you have to get in on the act as well. I didn't go to sports. I bunked off and smoked weed and played videogames with friends. But apparently I'm not allowed to talk about how much of a cool rebel I am. @Baden
And I stopped believing something just because some old dead fart said it when I was 14.
— Herg
And now you're fourteen-and-a-half and brimming with wisdom. Step aside, Hume. Behold, Herg!
How I wish I was still fourteen-and-a-half. But if anyone in this forum thinks they can move their case forward by quoting edicts from a dead philosopher rather than by advancing cogent arguments, they are in the wrong place. These are not the foothills of Mount Sinai, and no-one here is Moses.
How I wish I was still fourteen-and-a-half. But if anyone in this forum thinks they can move their case forward by quoting edicts from a dead philosopher rather than by advancing cogent arguments, they are in the wrong place. These are not the foothills of Mount Sinai, and no-one here is Moses.
Alright then, fourteen-and-three-quarters. I had already made several related points. That quote just puts it in a way that hits home for many people. That's why it stands out amongst his writings. It has utility.
Your reply, on the other hand, only stood out for the wrong reasons.
I am not Moses, but I AM Noah, father of humankind.
Ah, but you are not just Noah, father of humankind. You are Noah Te Stroete, father of humankind who spends all day rolling around in a marsh. :snicker:
Make an argument - absent of any objective moral standard to change my mind
Well, here I may diverge from TS and S, but I would argue one of three ways.
1. Everyone else thinks Hitler is a monster (only works if it's true, but can be very effective, especially with the easily led)
2. I think Hitler is a monster and look how cool I am. Not as facetious a line of argument as it sounds. Basically you sell your way of doing thing by the outcome on you. It's the way brave people who risk their lives for others sell it.
3. You're a human being, and my knowledge of psychology/anthropology indicates that humans don't generally like people like Hilter (in the fullness of time), so if you think you like Hitler, your probably wrong. I know TS and I have disagreed about this, but I believe it is possible to be wrong about your own self-reported feelings.
no - sorry as a moral relativist i appreciate that is your subjective moral view, but it is not my subjective moral view. And as one believer in subjective morality to another we both know there is no objective answer on if Hitler was moral or immoral - so we will happily have to go on acknowledging that we are both right subject to our own views of morality.
(and of course - hope it does not need to be said that IRL I know Hitler was an abominably immoral man)
No, he's not, because he is just playing a role to make a point which is actually trivial, which is why I'm glad I didn't go all out by throwing myself into a role like he wanted me to. The trivial point is that some people won't be convinced, no matter what. And the illogical connection is that moral objectivism somehow magically has the answer.
In real life, the role that he is playing is only a reflection of some, but not all, cases. In other cases, people are persuaded to change their mind. And again, this has nothing to do with moral subjectivism or moral objectivism.
I hope he's actually listening and absorbing this, instead of doing his "okay, whatever, have a nice day" thing.
(and of course - hope it does not need to be said that IRL I know Hitler was an abominably immoral man)
Indeed, it still doesn't need to be said, and yet you've now said it on two separate occasions. Relax, no one thinks that you're a supporter of Hitler. We understand what role play is.
Reply to Isaac Isaac - I can help you with the right answer - here it is:
Rank - Me and a few million other relative morality believers all seem to hold 2 of the same subjective beliefs - the first one is we think Hitler is a monster, and the second one is we subjectively believe we are going to hang anyone who doesn't subjectively think he is a monster too.
Now I am convinced.
Wish there was kind of name we could use for such a widely and commonly held belief.
no - sorry as a moral relativist i appreciate that is your subjective moral view, but it is not my subjective moral view. And as one believer in subjective morality to another we both know there is no objective answer on if Hitler was moral or immoral - so we will happily have to go on acknowledging that we are both right subject to our own views of morality.
Right, but how does objectivism help us with this kind of problem? If I was an objectivist about morals, you could just disagree with my reasoning. I mean, just take a glance over any of the posts on this website, are people being regularly persuaded by rational argument, or are people sticking to almost exactly what they started out saying regardless of any argument to the contrary?
Right, but how does objectivism help us with this kind of problem? If I was an objectivist about morals, you could just disagree with my reasoning. I mean, just take a glance over any of the posts on this website, are people being regularly persuaded by rational argument, or are people sticking to almost exactly what they started out saying regardless of any argument to the contrary?
I agree - the difference is now it is not 2 subjective moral views in opposition - now it is one moral view aligned with an objective norm and one not. I can still chose, as many do, to be outside the objective norm, but that is a very different position than I hold a different - but equally valid subjective view.
The trivial point is that some people won't be convinced, no matter what. And the illogical connection is that moral objectivism somehow magically has the answer.
In other cases, people are persuaded to change their mind. And again, this has nothing to do with moral subjectivism or moral objectivism.
To be honest I think subjectivism has the edge here and people are using it despite claiming to oppose it. Look at Tim's argument, or VS's. It's basically saying "I think x is wrong and I'm very clever, wouldn't you like to sound clever like me?"
I can still chose, as many do, to be outside the objective norm, but that is a very different position than I hold a different - but equally valid subjective view.
Yes to the first part (by my particular view of moral subjectivism), but in the second, you're adding terms to the argument that no one (to my knowledge) has added. No one said the two subjective moral stances were equally valid. Go back over what @S or @Terrapin Station said about judgement. In the sense you're using the term 'valid', it is not the claim that subjectivists are making
No one said the two subjective moral stances were equally valid.
that is my position that i have been arguing - not theirs.
How can one subjective moral view be better than any other subjective moral view - if the basis for both is purely the subjective view of the person who holds it? Any judgment on either view that does not employ some degree of objective morality as a standard to measure against is just one more subjective view.
If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other.
Isaac - I can help you with the right answer - here it is:
Rank - Me and a few million other relative morality believers all seem to hold 2 of the same subjective beliefs - the first one is we think Hitler is a monster, and the second one is we subjectively believe we are going to hang anyone who doesn't subjectively think he is a monster too.
Now I am convinced.
Wish there was kind of name we could use for such a widely and commonly held belief.
There is a name for that. It's called a popular belief, and it does nothing to support moral objectivism. Boy, it turns out you were easy to convince. You would've been convinced that slavery was a good thing back in the day.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 19:48#2648470 likes
If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other.
Yes--that's exactly right.
The thing is that "objectively better" is a category error in the first place.
So competing views are not better or worse than each other objectively--but the objective realm is the entirely wrong place for doing that sort of work. It's akin to noting that a dog has no category number as a hurricane. Dogs aren't the right sort of thing for that--they're not hurricanes, so it's not going to make sense to talk about a dog having a hurricane category number.
But that doesn't at all imply a problem with making judgments about competing moral stances. Judgments, by their very nature, are things that occur in the subjective realm, not the objective realm. Judgments are indeed just one more subjective view--they can never be anything other than that. The trick is to recognize and deal with them as what they are.
The trivial point is that some people won't be convinced, no matter what. And the illogical connection is that moral objectivism somehow magically has the answer.
— S
To be honest I think subjectivism has the edge here and people are using it despite claiming to oppose it. Look at Tim's argument, or VS's. It's basically saying "I think x is wrong and I'm very clever, wouldn't you like to sound clever like me?"
Oh yes. And Tim has used all the tricks in the book! They might've worked on me if I hadn't taken the time to learn about logical fallacies and develop my skill in being able to identify them.
[U]Argument 1[/u]
Moral relativism: boo! Moral objectivism: yay!
[U]Argument 2[/u]
It's obvious.
Therefore, moral objectivism.
That was Tim's tactic in a nutshell. Vagabond Spectre's was more like: "I agree with everything you say, but brushing your teeth is handy, therefore objective morality".
the objective realm is the entirely wrong place for doing that sort of work.
can you give just one example of anything that is subjectively better than anything else, in any sense of the word better, that is not just an opinion/view.
It didn't muddy the waters for me. You could say a similar thing about my analogy with meaning and an orange, but that would be to massively miss the point. In fact, this actually happened. It is what Banno did. He thought that I was suggesting that meaning is a thing like an orange. "Darling, grab me an orange from the fruit bowl. And whilst you're at it, could you pick me up a meaning? It's in the cupboard on the left". :lol:
It muddies the waters because it is a false, or at least weak, analogy. We don't tend to care much what others like to eat, provided it doesn't smell too bad. When it comes to morals almost everyone agrees about the basic principles, and those principles are based on what makes for a harmonious community.
Kant was basically right: there would be a contradiction in saying that you want to live harmoniously with others, but that you think it is OK to lie, cheat. steal, exploit, rape and murder. If you are honest and say that you don't really care about living harmoniously with others, but that it suits you to remain in society because you don't like being alone, you wouldn't be able to survive alone, you need others to exploit and torture lest you be bored, and so on; then there would be no contradiction. But would such a person be moral, immoral or amoral?
(What I don't like about Kant's CI is the notion of duty).
How can one subjective moral view be better than any other subjective moral view - if the basis for both is purely the subjective view of the person who holds it? Any judgment on either view that does not employ some degree of objective morality as a standard to measure against is just one more subjective view.
So an argument from incredulity. You don't see how it is possible, so it's not possible. We've all tried to explain it to you. You can lead a horse to water...
If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other.
Moral subjectivists don't claim or accept that, so it doesn't work as a criticism at all. That's like saying to a solipsist that the existence of other people means that they can't be the only one who exists. It's kind of silly when you think about it.
yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse.
yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse.
This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much.
It muddies the waters because it is a false, or at least weak, analogy. We don't tend to care much what others like to eat, provided it doesn't smell too bad. When it comes to morals almost everyone agrees about the basic principles, and those principles are based on what makes for a harmonious community.
Kant was basically right: there would be a contradiction in saying that you want to live harmoniously with others, but that you think it is OK to lie, cheat. steal, exploit, rape and murder. If you are honest and say that you don't really care about living harmoniously with others, but that it suits you to remain in society because you don't like being alone, you wouldn't be able to survive alone, you need others to exploit and torture lest you be bored, and so on; then there would be no contradiction. But would such a person be moral, immoral or amoral?
(What I don't like about Kant's CI is the notion of duty).
I still don't agree that it muddies the waters. I think that you're throwing mud into the water and blaming it on the analogy.
What supposed relevance is a harmonious community in the very specific context of this discussion, as opposed to the context of morality in general? I care about a harmonious community to some extent, but so what? I would steal from a rich corporation if I could get away with it, whether we assume that that's immoral or otherwise. I wouldn't rape or murder, even if I could get away with it. None of this seems relevant in terms of the debate that's going on.
This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much
there still is no better or worse, you can have more or less widely agreed - inside or outside the predominate view, even the overwhelming predominate view - but if you hold to subjectivity - still can't get to better or worse. You can add comparative terms, but you still can't add qualitative terms and hold to subjectivity.
Yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse.
I know what your conclusion is. I was questioning this supposed argument you referenced.
Then please show me how it is possible, before you invoke the fallacy - show it applies please.
But I think that you need to go back and reconsider the explanations already given, not that I need to repeat them. It should go without saying that without a contradiction, then it is possible. And there's no contradiction. That a contradiction results from one of your premises that we don't accept is in itself trivial.
And they are welcome to their view, but it has no real meaning to anyone else.
That's not true, because people [i]become[/I] moral subjectivists. They're not born that way. I became one myself, because I found it convincing enough. But yes, obviously if you're not convinced by it, and that can't be changed, then it is meaningless in a sense. That's not unique to moral relativism, it is true in general. How do you suppose we see your position?
there still is no better or worse, you can have more or less widely agreed - inside or outside the predominate view, even the overwhelming predominate view - but if you hold to subjectivity - still can't get to better or worse. You can add comparative terms, but you still can't add qualitative terms and hold to subjectivity.
I can't see why you would say that. If the vast majority of people agree, that is feel the same way, about the broader moral issues: theft, deception, murder, rape, pedophilia, and so on, then there is a shared cultural set of morals. To say that you wish to live harmoniously with your fellows and yet hold contrary views about those matters, would be to contradict yourself. You would be a liar or a fool in that case.
That's not true, because people become moral subjectivists. They're not born that way. I became one myself, because I found it convincing enough. But yes, obviously if you're not convinced by it, and that can't be changed, then it is meaningless in a sense. That's not unique to moral relativism, it is true in general. How do you suppose we see your position?
nothing at all to do with the point - but thanks for sharing
A command of pure practical reason. Without acceptance of the Kantian notion of duty, however, moral law, and by association, the notion of imperatives, becomes irrelevant, along with the entire deontological rational philosophy.
I can't see why you would say that. If the vast majority of people agree, that is feel the same way, about the broader moral issues: theft, deception, murder, rape, pedophilia, and so on, then there is a shared cultural set of morals. To say that you wish to live harmoniously with your fellows and yet hold contrary views about those issues, would be to contradict yourself. You would be a liar or a fool in that case.
tell me any meaningful difference between what you propose as subjective, and those beliefs are to a high degree objectively immoral. Just some coincidence that the vast majority of subjective moralist all view them the same way ?
1. You have no argument, or at least no valid argument.
2. You aren't willing to help yourself out of your own incredulity. Rather, you want us to repeat our earlier attempts [i]ad neaseam[/I], even though there is little evidence that you'll get it this time instead of repeating the same problems.
3. You don't realise that your criticism of moral relativism as meaningless is not uniquely a criticism of moral relativism, but applies in general and can easily be turned back on you.
Reply to Mww Yes, I think Kant was right about the contradiction involved in saying that lying, theft, exploitation, theft , murder, etc. are good, but he was wrong to say that duty is the highest moral imperative.
tell me any meaningful difference between what you propose as subjective, and those beliefs are to a high degree objectively immoral. Just some coincidence that the vast majority of subjective moralist all view them the same way ?
Those beliefs are objectively immoral if you count universal inter-subjective agreement as being objective. But I would see that agreement as being socially evolved, not as given from on high.
This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much.
The distinction seems trivial, since a collective is made up of individuals. So what if lots of us have in common a moral judgement. The topic is meta-ethics, not normative ethics. All I can think of are normative points or more value judgements. Where's the supposed relevance, given the confines of the topic?
Either way, the better and worse is relative, it's not that everything is equal. What's not to understand about that? Better or worse by my standard, better or worse by the popular standard...
Those beliefs are objectively immoral if you count universal inter-subjective agreement as being objective. But I would see that agreement as being socially evolved, not as given from on high.
no issue - don't care very much on the basis of the objectivity - just there has to be some degree of objective standard in order for their to be some value judgement.
1. You have no argument, or at least no valid argument.
2. You aren't willing to help yourself out of your own incredulity. Rather, you want us to repeat our earlier attempts ad neaseam, even though there is little evidence that you'll get it this time instead of repeating the same problems.
3. You don't realise that your criticism of moral relativism as meaningless is not uniquely a criticism of moral relativism, but applies in general and can easily be turned back on you.
you of course realize that relative to my point of view all of equally applies to you. Ironic
Reply to Rank Amateur Yes, and the objective standard (although obviously it is not an object) is the shared set of mores which have evolved. But there is no absolutely 'hard and fats' rule book which can cover every contingency with all its nuances; so some individual subtlety and creativity is called for.
You of course realize that relative to my point of view all of equally applies to you. Ironic
You of course realise that I have not committed to relativism in general, just moral relativism. Ironic indeed. We can swap around for this part if you want to. You're wrong, irrespective of what you think. Reason is objective, not subjective. Facts are certainly not subjective. Nor rocks. Nor meaning, as I conceive of it.
Reply to Janus agree as I have said a few times - my view is there is a continuum with pure subjectivity on one end and pure objectivity on the other - and we all place ourselves individually, and society generally somewhere along that continuum.
And again, what's the supposed significance of that, given the strict confines of the topic?
That should be obvious; I am talking about the context of inter-subjectively shared values being the overarching context within which, perhaps even against which, individuals define their own sets of moral values. How do you think it is not significant?
So this was what you were getting at. Well no, I don't, because it isn't. It's not universal for starters, and it isn't objective. It is subjective.
On the broader issues it is, for all intents and purposes, universal. The fact that there might be some deviants who think that what most people consider to be heinous acts are actually good is what is morally and subjectively irrelevant.
I’m not sure he said duty was a moral imperative, but rather a principle which justifies the possibility of moral law. No reason for positing a law if one feels no sense of being bound to it. Stronger and more fundamental than the alleged “moral feeling”, but serving the same purpose, at the root of moral worthiness.
That should be obvious; I am talking about the context of inter-subjectively shared values being the overarching context within which, perhaps even against which, individuals define their own sets of moral values. How do you think it is not significant?
Well, for a start, it wasn't clear to me what you were getting at, so why would you ask me that as though I actually knew exactly what you were getting at and was denying the significance of it? Just saying that it should be obvious is naive. Just be clearer next time. It's not difficult. If you had simply said that the last time, I would've understood.
Anyway, now that you've explained yourself properly, I'm not saying that I don't see the supposed relevance. But I don't agree. Primarily, my morality is founded individualistically. My moral feelings are [I]my[/I] moral feelings, not those of all of the other subjects. Whether they happen to share my feelings or not is neither here nor there. I appeal within myself, not outside of myself to others.
On the broader issues it is, for all intents and purposes, universal.
This is just smoke and mirrors. It simply isn't universal. Full stop. Adding "for all intents and purposes" completely undermines your claim. We could all just say "for all intents and purposes" morality is objective, or universal, or absolute, and be done with this debate. But it's deeper than that.
The fact that there might be some deviants who think that what most people consider to be heinous acts are actually good is what is morally and subjectively irrelevant.
I agree that it's irrelevant normatively, but normative ethics is itself irrelevant in this context, so you aren't saying anything relevant in making that point. I don't share the moral judgements of the deviants in terms of all of the big stuff, like rape and murder, so in that sense they don't matter, but that sense is relative and subjective. Still no objective morality.
Reply to Rank Amateur "Tell me any meaningful difference between what you propose as subjective, and those beliefs are to a high degree objectively immoral. Just some coincidence that the vast majority of subjective moralist all view them the same way ?"
Clearly, any aspect of human behavior to which standards, laws and prohibitions are applied cannot considered morally relative in an absolute sense. A word like murder, as opposed to killing, presupposes the intentional violation of a standard.
But its important to see that there are different kinds of moral relativisms. Maybe the easiest way to approach 'relativism' to start from meaning relativism, since morality cannot be determined without first having a theory of truth, since any understanding of morality and ethics begins from what truth is taken to be. So lets see how the notion of truth relativism has evolved with regards to the understanding of science.
It could be argued that Descartes was the first relativist in that he recognized that humans construct theories of truth rather than simply directly observing it in the world as earlier philosophers believed. So Descartes was the first to realize that truth is relative to a model of the world.But Descartes still believed that scientific and moral truth were a function of mirroring, through cognition, the way things are in the world. Kant radicalized Descartes by arguing that not only is truth a function of our constructions and concepts, but that those concepts can never get at a final exhaustive truth (we cannot reach the thing in itself). So for Kant truth is relative to our evolving schemes. In science we can disprove but never exhaustively prove any theory. The truth of any scientific theory is contestable. But we can assymptotically approximate ultimate truth. He modeled his moral theory on this idea of universal truth that we have to assume but never see directly.
This is Kant's moral relativism. Hegel did Kant one better by seeing truth as relative not only to our holistic schemes but sees those schemes and categories themselves as evolving. So Hegel introduced the idea of cultural relativism. Each culture's moral standards are on the way to something true in a totalistic sense but they havent arrived there yet. Marx took Hegel's idealist dialectic of moral truth and put it in the material plane of human economic arrangements. Marx kept the idea of morality as a cultural becoming, however. We become morally better through the dialectical development of economic arrangements.
Nietzsche was among the first to throw out this idea that becoming is an improvement toward some ultimate telos, challenging us to think beyond good and evil. For him there is no moral progress or progress of truth, only contingent perspectives that cannot be arranged according to conformity with an ultimate reality.
So Nietzsche gives us a relativism from top to bottom, with no grounding or telos. People often ask, how does one keep one's own philosophy of radical relativism from being itself a morality in claiming itself as a truth? The answer is that the terms of such a philosophy are meant to be contestable and internally self-reflexive. SO Nietzschean truth is not truth in the traditional sense. It is more a being-in-transformation.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 21:24#2648990 likes
can you give just one example of anything that is subjectively better than anything else, in any sense of the word better, that is not just an opinion/view.
With repect to "not just an opinion/view," no, because that's what "better" is. It simply amounts to preferring one thing over another, often because of some goal that one has.
the objective standard (although obviously it is not an object) is the shared set of mores which have evolved
Bill of Rights, Magna Carta, the Boy Scout Pledge.....whatever the KKK uses....objective shared set of standards or mores, represented by an object. Any cultural code of conduct.
Those to be taken as objective morality is the categorical error.
As I see it "the debate that's going on" is itself a litany of irrelevancies and category errors.
Not so different from other debates then. The key debate, as I see it, has been about meta-ethics, and has been moral subjectivism vs. moral objectivism, with some trying and failing to argue for a sort of "third way" whereby they have their cake and eat it.
Those to be taken as objective morality is the categorical error.
Of course they are not really "objective" they are inter-subjective. And we might judge them according to their efficacy in promoting harmonious relations. The individualistic ethos of capitalism is arguably not going to lead to the most harmonious communal life or to sustainable future for humankind.
It's all but universal, and that's what matters. The anomalies of a deviant few are irrelevant.
But it doesn't matter that it's all but universal in terms of my morality, because that's not where my morality stems from. My morality has pride of place in any consideration of morality whatsoever. If murder being good was part of my morality, then that would be of greater importance to me than an almost universal judgement that it was not good.
The anomalies of a deviant few if they are other than me are irrelevant either way, because it is my moral judgement that matters to me. I'm not appealing to theirs or anyone else's. You are fundamentally mistaken about where morality stems from. It stems from the individual, from their moral feelings. I would stand by my moral judgement that murder is wrong, even if everyone else in the world judged it to be right.
In practice, though, your morality is not going to differ form the vast majority unless you're one of the deviant few; so it is not uniquely yours, and you never would have had it in the first place if you were not enculturated into it.
Of course, on the other hand, I am not saying that an individual's moral principles are not what matters most to them.
No, you know that I didn't say that, and you're bright enough to pick up that I specified a corporation for a reason.
Yes, and I suspect that would be because you don't consider corporations to be morally justified in their practices, and therefore feel justified in taking whatever you can from them. But you declined to spell that out.
In practice, though, your morality is not going to differ form the vast majority unless you're one of the deviant few; so it is not uniquely yours, and you never would have had it in the first place if you were not enculturated into it.
Of course, on the hand, I am not saying that an individual's moral principles are not what matters most to them.
Whether it is uniquely mine or not, in the sense of whether or not it matches up to the moral judgements of others, is a difference which makes no difference.
Yes, and I suspect that would be because you don't consider corporations to be morally justified in their practices, and therefore feel justified in taking whatever you can from them. But you declined to spell that out.
That's true to some extent. But I've also knowingly done bad things in the sense of popular or traditional morality, and in the sense of being in two minds about something, perhaps feeling that it is wrong in a sense, but also right in a sense, yet doing it nevertheless. I am indeed an amoralist at times. It is quite liberating. You know, just steal the wallet and don't even worry about it. Morality is what we make it and nothing more. Life is what we make it and nothing more. There are no rules which we simply must follow, absolutely. And being categorised as a rapist or murderer really only matters insomuch as it matters to me.
How's that for radical thinking? Does that make me a deviant? Even if it does, does it matter to me? It's just another box to be put in.
And where does the individual stem from? Hint: It begins with "S". You didn't choose your moral system so much as it chose you.
Except that I'm autonomous and it is fully within my power to override whatever influence that the morality of society has over me. Do you think that I would let that stop me if it mattered that much to me? If, for example, I really thought that murder was good, and worth the very high risk of going to prison?
I haven't seen a good response to this. Just name calling. Ugh! Deviant! You're irrelevant! You don't matter! You're an anomaly!
You're a fragment of the sociocultural awkwardly expressed through the mostly compliant body of an ape. Your perceived individualism and autonomy is largely formed of retroactive confabulations designed to make the marriage between the fragment and the ape less acrimonious. There's plenty you can't do but manage to convince yourself you don't want to.
You're a fragment of the sociocultural awkwardly expressed through the mostly compliant body of an ape. Your perceived individualism and autonomy is largely formed of retroactive confabulations designed to make the marriage between the fragment and the ape less acrimonious. There's plenty you can't do but manage to convince yourself that you don't want to.
Trying to play psychologist, are you? I can do that too. You're just rationalising your own deep-seated aversion to confronting the dark side of our human nature.
It goes for almost all of us to a large degree except for true deviants like sociopaths where through some combination of environment (often abuse) and genetics, enculturation is seriously short-circuited.
And we might judge them according to their efficacy in promoting harmonious relations.
Aside from just what counts as harmonious relations being a matter of individual judgment, lest you be suggesting yet another argumentum ad populum, the notion that harmonious relations are preferable is yet another individual judgment (or argumentum ad populum that you'd be forwarding)
It goes for almost all of us to a large degree except for true deviants like sociopaths where through some combination of environment (often abuse) and genetics, enculturation is seriously short-circuited.
True as that might be, there's a trend in ethics to dismiss anything too different or radical as some kind of illness, even though they almost certainly aren't qualified to make that judgement, given that they're most likely a) not a psychiatrist, and b) even if qualified, have not performed a proper assessment.
It paints a neat little picture, but that's all it really is. And the irony is that [i]I've[/I] been called a romantic and a fantasist.
We are human, all too human. Being human is not an illness, is it?
Nothing you've come up with here is particularly dark compared to what goes on in the real world daily.
And the irony here is that you actually know very little about me and my life. Certainly not enough to rule out that I'm part of the dark goings on in the real world which occur on a regular basis.
And the irony here is that you actually know very little about me and my life. Certainly not enough to rule out that I'm part of the dark goings on in the real world on a regular basis.
Not important, I'm more interested in the general point, which is that we're all apt to overestimate our moral autonomy and when it comes to the crunch, fall mostly in line, often inventing some reason why we 'had' to.
Not important, I'm more interested in the general point, which is that we're all apt to overestimate our moral autonomy and when it comes to the crunch, fall mostly in line, often inventing some reason why we 'had' to.
Sure, that's true. Except when it isn't. And there's also a popular psychological mechanism to deny or underplay the darker side of our nature. Even though, like you say, it goes on every day. There have been hundreds of wars, barbaric torture, genocide, slavery, rape, and this continues into our modern times. There are still wars, crimes are committed all of the time, there's modern slavery, stoning to death, cutting off of heads, and so on. That is just part of human nature. Wherever there are humans, there are these sort of things.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 22:56#2649330 likes
Not important, I'm more interested in the general point, which is that we're all apt to overestimate our moral autonomy and when it comes to the crunch, fall mostly in line, often inventing some reason why we 'had' to.
You can't be non-autonomous when it comes to your ethics, because no one else can make a judgment for you.
You are fundamentally mistaken about where morality stems from. It stems from the individual, from their moral feelings. I would stand by my moral judgement that murder is wrong, even if everyone else in the world judged it to be right.
How do you think socialization works? How do you think society works? If we were all lone wolves fighting for territory, this might make sense. As the human world is, it doesn’t make any sense.
The difference between prevalence and popularity is?
The way you constantly misunderstand English is irritating. Look up a dictionary on this too and if you still can't figure it out, I'll tell you. But make an effort.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 23:05#2649400 likes
The way you could constantly misunderstand English is irritating. Look up a dictionary on this too and if you still can't figure it out, I'll tell you. But make an effort.
Not near as irritating as your attitude. Presumably I'm challenging that there is any difference in this context, right? So how about supporting the notion that there's a difference?
Reply to Joshs thank you for the history, truly thank you for taking the time and making the effort.
My main issue in the debate is not that morality purely objective, as you can see above I have already conceded such a thing is not possible. As well as no such thing as purely subjective morality is possible. We as individuals and as a culture and as a society place ourselves somewhere on the continuum between those exteams. What ever particular label you place on the points in between I am not that concerned with.
My issue is if you chose as best you can to place yourself close to subjective end, you are forgoing the right to evaluate the moral judgment of others. It can't just be subjective for you. Nietzsche has to assume the guy stabbing him in the back with a knife is just listening to his particular truth, and his personal morality based on that truth
How do you think socialization works? How do you think society works? If we were all lone wolves fighting for territory, this might make sense. As the human world is, it doesn’t make any sense.
You're either drifting off topic or making an illogical connection. The functioning of society has nothing to do with the point that I was making. Why do people keep confusing normative ethics and meta-ethics? The issue is not what the goals of society should be and how we should best achieve them or anything of that sort. The topic isn't whatever you imagine or would like it to be.
Reply to S Nothing to do with any teleological goals of society, unless you mean the survival of the community. Morality comes from society/socialization as we are inherently social creatures. Morality does NOT come from the individual. If it did, the world would look very much different. We probably wouldn’t even be having this discussion in such a world as the one you are claiming exists.
My issue is if you chose as best you can to place yourself close to subjective end, you are forgoing the right to evaluate the moral judgment of others. It can't just be subjective for you. Nietzsche has to assume the guy stabbing him in the back with a knife is just listening to his particular truth, and his personal morality based on that truth
And you're completely wrong on all of those points.
I'm not "choosing" to place myself somewhere on the scale, I'm making an honest assessment and reporting that assessment.
I'm not forgoing "the right" to evaluate the moral judgement of others. Rights are just a useful fiction anyway, and I most certainly can and do evaluate the moral judgements of others.
It can indeed be subjective for me, and it is so.
There's not much that Nietzsche can do about a guy stabbing him in the back with a knife, unless he is equipped to defend himself and manage his knife wound, if it isn't fatal in a matter of minutes. But he certainly doesn't have to accept it with indifference as you have persistently asserted with no reasonable support whatsoever, and it makes no sense to anyone other than to you, in your own mind, with your own blinkered assumptions. So it is completely ineffectual as a criticism.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 23:28#2649470 likes
Would you say that morality is something other than judgments/assessments of behavior? Or is it that you think that judgments or assessments can occur outside of minds somehow?
It comes from a variety of sources. One is religious belief ('the gods have told us what to do, so we ought to do it'), another is social programming ('our leaders have told us what we should do, so we ought to do it'), and a third is the one I mentioned earlier, the recognition that pleasure is good and pain bad, and the entirely reasonable inference from this that we ought to promote pleasure and reduce pain. It's in this third area that the basis for a degree of objectivity in moral truths is to be found. For example:
Proof that intentionally boiling babies is morally wrong
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
2. Pain is bad.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
If anyone wants to disagree with 1, 2 or 4, I'd be interested to know their reasons. I'd also be interested to know from moral relativists here how they would go about persuading someone else not to boil a baby.
Of course none of the above shows that every deontological principle is based on an objective truth, and I wouldn't want to claim that it was; my view of morality is that some of it is based on objective truth, and some of it is relative.
BTW, I'm quite a bit older than fourteen and three quarters, but it's nice to have it noted that I have a fresh and youthful approach.
Would you say that morality is something other than judgments/assessments of behavior? Or is it that you think that judgments or assessments can occur outside of minds somehow?
I already gave my views of the extra-mental in I believe it was the “Horses are Cats” thread. Nothing we can speak about is truly extra-mental. Are you asking me if judgments or assessments can occur in the material realm? That seems silly.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 23:35#2649510 likes
I already gave my views of the extra-mental in I believe it was the “Horses are Cats” thread. Nothing we can speak about is truly extra-mental. Are you asking me if judgments or assessments can occur in the material realm? That seems silly.
So then how is morality not of individuals? Are you positing some sort of communal mind?
all due respect, and I mean that. None of that self description is close to an argument against the point I was making.
Ah, someone else who is giving off the impression that they've never heard of Hitchen's razor. Like for like is perfectly permissible. As for arguments, you go first, and then maybe I'll respond. But understand that your assertions can simply be dismissed or met with counter-assertions.
It comes from a variety of sources. One is religious belief ('the gods have told us what to do, so we ought to do it'), another is social programming ('our leaders have told us what we should do, so we ought to do it'), and a third is the one I mentioned earlier, the recognition that pleasure is good and pain bad, and the entirely reasonable inference from this that we ought to promote pleasure and reduce pain.
I would argue that all of these except for pleasure and pain come from society. Pleasure and pain are the foundation of moral feeling I think. I said to S that both together are sufficient for the moral truths. As a descriptive moral relativist, I know that minds can differ on morality, but I am not a meta-ethical moral relativist. There are “objective” moral truths. Whatever “objective” means to people. Cold-blooded murder, rape, child molestation are all examples of morally wrong moral truths.
Terrapin StationMarch 14, 2019 at 23:38#2649550 likes
It comes from a variety of sources. One is religious belief ('the gods have told us what to do, so we ought to do it'), another is social programming ('our leaders have told us what we should do, so we ought to do it'), and a third is the one I mentioned earlier, the recognition that pleasure is good and pain bad, and the entirely reasonable inference from this that we ought to promote pleasure and reduce pain. [\quote]
Again, if morality is a judgment or assessment of behavior, how can someone else make a judgment for us? If you're saying that we literally receive a judgment from someone else, how does that work?
Nothing to do with any teleological goals of society, unless you mean the survival of the community. Morality comes from society/socialization as we are inherently social creatures. Morality does NOT come from the individual. If it did, the world would look very much different. We probably wouldn’t even be having this discussion in such a world as the one you are claiming exists.
Sorry, but I'm not interested in a bunch of bare assertions strung together like that, as though they're a real argument. I already addressed some of this earlier, so you should start from what I said before, not from scratch.
It comes from a variety of sources. One is religious belief ('the gods have told us what to do, so we ought to do it'), another is social programming ('our leaders have told us what we should do, so we ought to do it'), and a third is the one I mentioned earlier, the recognition that pleasure is good and pain bad, and the entirely reasonable inference from this that we ought to promote pleasure and reduce pain. [\quote]
— Herg
Again, if morality is a judgment or assessment of behavior, how can someone else make a judgment for us? If you're saying that we literally receive a judgment from someone else, how does that work?
It was only for my third category that I was claiming objectivity, not the first two. They were just anthropological notes, and I don't wish to defend them at all.
To refer to commonalities in morality as 'popular' rather than 'prevalent' suggests a relatively irrelevant meta-level of judgement of judgements. Morality consists primarily in how people's judgements are borne out in action not how much people like or admire those judgements. Ergo, referring to moralities as 'popular' rather than 'prevalent' is imprecise and inapt as Janus pointed out.
E.g. we don't say that in modern society the prohibition of rape is 'popular', we say that the prohibition of rape is 'prevalent'.
It comes from a variety of sources. One is religious belief ('the gods have told us what to do, so we ought to do it'), another is social programming ('our leaders have told us what we should do, so we ought to do it'), and a third is the one I mentioned earlier, the recognition that pleasure is good and pain bad, and the entirely reasonable inference from this that we ought to promote pleasure and reduce pain. It's in this third area that the basis for a degree of objectivity in moral truths is to be found. For example:
Proof that intentionally boiling babies is morally wrong
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
2. Pain is bad.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
If anyone wants to disagree with 1, 2 or 4, I'd be interested to know their reasons. I'd also be interested to know from moral relativists here how they would go about persuading someone else not to boil a baby.
Of course none of the above shows that every deontological principle is based on an objective truth, and I wouldn't want to claim that it was; my view of morality is that some of it is based on objective truth, and some of it is relative.
BTW, I'm quite a bit old than fourteen and three quarters, but it's nice to have it noted that I have a fresh and youthful approach.
I don't see anything worth taking seriously in that. It is just dogmatism. You need to actually explain, as though speaking to a sceptic, why your reader should accept that it is as you say. Why not, alternatively: in accordance with my moral judgement pain is bad as far as I'm concerned? You don't seem to have put any real effort into defending your stance against obvious objections.
And you have put no effort at all into making any.
That's not how the burden of proof works, and I asked you why not, alternatively: in accordance with my moral judgement, pain is bad as far as I'm concerned? You merely assume or assert controversial premises and reason from that point onwards, which is the fallacy of begging the question.
It is not valid to suggest that it is the case that they're true unless proven false. And you can't shift the burden. That would be an argument from ignorance.
So how about you take this criticism seriously and try again?
Reply to Rank AmateurReply to Rank Amateur "My issue is if you chose as best you can to place yourself close to subjective end, you are forgoing the right to evaluate the moral judgment of others. It can't just be subjective for you. Nietzsche has to assume the guy stabbing him in the back with a knife is just listening to his particular truth, and his personal morality based on that truth."
Nietzsche could conclude, for instance, that the man stabbing him in the back was operating on the basis of an assessment that not only the man, but Nietzsche himself, could accept as justified given the man's understanding. The act, then could be thought of as akin to a shark attacking me. I don't blame the shark ,any more than I would blame wind for knocking a tree onto me.
So here we have the assessment of unpleasantness without the attribution of blame or guilt or evil to the perpetrator of that unpleasantness. IS this still a moral issue or a pragmatic issue of figuring out how to defend myself against back-stabbers, shark attacks and falling trees?
You merely assume or assert controversial premises and reason from that point onwards, which is the fallacy of begging the question.
Very well, since you evidently lack the energy to discuss whether my premises are true or false, I will present my reasons for believing them to be true. You will find that I am not, in fact, begging the question.
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
Babies have a similar enough physiology and behaviour to mine and yours for it to be reasonable for us to infer, from the fact that you and I experience pain when boiled, that babies do too.
2. Pain is bad.
If you went to a doctor and said, 'doctor, this pain is bad', you would have good reason to be annoyed if his reply was, 'ah, so you have a personal dislike of pain, do you?' Everyone whose views have not been tainted by bad philosophy knows that pain is bad - this is a truth we learn by experiencing pain. If you wish to pretend that you aren't aware of this truth, then of course that is up to you.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
Entailed by 1 and 2.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
'Wrong' here is simply the equivalent of 'bad' when applied to actions: that we happen to say 'wrong' rather than 'bad' is an accident of linguistic history. The material point is that the badness of the intended result of an action necessarily infects the intention with which the action is performed. The two cannot be reasonably separated, and therefore if an action is intended to have bad consequences, the action itself must be a bad action.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
Entailed by 4 and 5.
Reply to S Proof that intentionally boiling babies is morally wrong:
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
2. Pain is bad.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
Justifying moral truths on the basis of syllogisms runs into the same difficulty as grounding truth in general in syllogisms. Formal logic is only as 'true' as the underlying presuppositions grounding the thinking of objective causality. There's a history to this thinking, which gets itself into trouble after Godel, Putnam and Quine. There was the discovery that language gets in the way of grounding logical assertions. An assertion has to be communicated, and there is no interpretation -free communication of an assertion about the world.
If morality came from the individual, there would be no need for socialization.
There is a need for socialization.
Thus, morality doesn’t come from the individual.
Reply to Rank Amateur Maybe you could spell it out. What if we take a time machine to a hypthesized time when everyone thinks like Nietzsche. Then no one would make use of morality or justification or law or standard or ethics. They would talk instead of contingent perspectives that organize the world for each of us. They would recognize communities of loosely overlapping interests but without claims being made for rightness or wrongness. Instead, there would be relatively adaptive(for ourselves) adjustments each of us can make within the context of particular engagements within a community. If we would still want to call this an ethics it would change the meaning of ethics to the variabillty of effectiveness personal coping within situations. A more ethical comportment would be one where one's understanding more effectively allowed one to make one's way.
2. Pain is bad.
If you went to a doctor and said, 'doctor, this pain is bad', you would have good reason to be annoyed if his reply was, 'ah, so you have a personal dislike of pain, do you?' Everyone whose views have not been tainted by bad philosophy knows that pain is bad - this is a truth we learn by experiencing pain. If you wish to pretend that you aren't aware of this truth, then of course that is up to you.
Okay, so you're just talking about pain being bad in a sense that is not in itself morally relevant, in spite of the superficial appearance given the shared terminology of "bad". In that context, "bad" means something like severe or painful. The lack of relevance is obvious if you swap "bad" for "immoral". How do you think the doctor would react if I said that the pain is immoral? It's easy to make an obvious point, but you also need to make it relevant to the topic.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
Entailed by 1 and 2.
All that that is really saying, given your explanation of the meaning of "bad", is a misleading repetition of your first premise: that boiling babies causes them pain, or severe pain. So it is just a truism. No logical relevance yet.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
'Wrong' here is simply the equivalent of 'bad' when applied to actions: that we happen to say 'wrong' rather than 'bad' is an accident of linguistic history. The material point is that the badness of the intended result of an action necessarily infects the intention with which the action is performed. The two cannot be reasonably separated, and therefore if an action is intended to have bad consequences, the action itself must be a bad action.
If "wrong" is simply an equivalent of "bad" in accordance with your previous usage, then you're just making an irrelevant tautology: intentionally performing an action whose effect is severe pain is causative of severe pain.
That says nothing of morality. You are equivocating your terms, hoping that nobody will really notice.
The lack of relevance is obvious if you swap "bad" for "immoral".
This has to be a category error or something fallacious. He isn’t saying that “pain is immoral”. He is saying that by our very nature, pain is something we instinctively avoid.
Reply to Rank Amateur We would kill each other like sharks if thats the best we could do in terms of our coping in our world. If the idea of killing each other like sharks bothered us ,as is the intent of your bringing up that example here, the question becomes, what is the relation between this being bothered by a community of cannibals and morality?
Or , more specifically, since we already know how we have traditionally thought about our attempts to deal with our being bothered by interhuman violence, how could one understand a community that successfully minimizes interhuman violence without a traditional moral system?
The way that post modern, poststructuralist radical relativist discourses answer this is that interhuman violence is connected with the inability to relate to an other who appears alien to us. We dont do violence to ourselves generally, and those who we identify with as like ourselves(generally family and friends). Good and Evil have been replaced for poststructuralists by the opportunity recognized within any era of culture to encourage the ability to see the other as not alien. Their morality is not about enforcing a belief system , it is about encouraging the multiplying of belief systems. It is an ethic of diversification, which is what deconstruction is about. Radical relativism sees the protection from hating each other to death as freeing individuals and communities from being stuck in any given system of truth. If there is an evil for them it is the interruption of movement and transformation in thinking in general. 'Evil' for them is no longer something bound up with the content of particular beliefs, laws, actions but the very settling for any specific content as THE TRUTH.
This has to be a category error or something fallacious. He isn’t saying that “pain is immoral”.
That was my point, which you seem to have paradoxically both missed, and yet stolen. Of course it doesn't make sense and is a category error. He is saying something else that is not morally relevant. It's not morally relevant to say that cheese puffs taste bad or that my toothache hurts real bad. It is morally relevant to say that murder is immoral. The fallacies are his, not mine. And the relevant fallacy is equivocation, as I pointed out.
Reply to S
Pain is bad. (a given)
Pain is instinctively avoided. (another given)
Causing pain in other people is bad. (from the first given, and the fact that we live in a society as social creatures)
Causing pain in other people should be avoided. (From the second given and the third premise)
Things that should be avoided are wrong.
Causing pain in other people is wrong.
He didn’t say that. He is saying that the action is MORALLY wrong.
You are being careless and jumping to conclusions. I know exactly what he said. And I know exactly what I'm doing. My point was that he is switching from one meaning to the other without proper justification. And I was demonstrating that by consistently applying his meaning instead of covering it up with the terminology which he is exploiting. He himself said that "wrong" is just "bad" applied to actions, and his explanation of "bad" was not morally relevant, it just meant something like severe or painful. Simply adding the word "moral" in front of that doesn't magically make his argument work.
Yes, pain hurts and is undesirable. That's what you're saying there, I take it? That's trivial. Or are you going to do what a sophist would do, and exploit the ambiguity of terminology?
Pain is instinctively avoided. (another given)
Causing pain in other people is bad. (from the first given, and the fact that we live in a society as social creatures)
Causing pain in other people should be avoided. (From the second given and the third premise)
Nothing morally relevant. Just sophism.
Brushing your teeth is good for your health. Cheese puffs taste bad. Pain hurts.
We act relative to goals and values and desires.
Who gives a fuck? The topic is morality. Say something relevant to the topic.
You can't make an "is" into an "ought" that is morally relevant without a hidden premise which needs to be justified, and which hasn't been justified, and which you can't justify.
And equivocation is a fallacy.
[I]A feather is light.
What is light cannot be dark.
Therefore, a feather cannot be dark.
All jackasses have long ears.
Carl is a jackass.
Therefore, Carl has long ears.[/I]
If morality came from the individual, there would be no need for socialization.
There is a need for socialization.
Thus, morality doesn’t come from the individual.
The first premise is obviously false, so the argument is unsound. This is child's play.
No, you don't get to do that. You haven't demonstrated that it is true, and I'll retract my claim that it is false until you bother to attempt to support your own argument properly instead of deflecting.
I don't do:
[I]P1. Blah blah
P2. Blah blah
P3. Blah blah
Now prove me wrong![/I]
So stop trying, people. Do not take me for a fool.
Reply to Noah Te Stroete Why would you think that repeating the problem helps to resolve it? I have narrowed down the problem to your first premise. Either try to defend it or do not. The burden is with you, and if you don't take it up, then that is tantamount to conceding, and your argument will be destined to remain meaningless to anyone who doesn't already agree with it.
I don’t know how to prove to you that we are social creatures sharing linguistic meaning other than...
That doesn't contradict anything that I've claimed. I don't think that engaging with you further is going to be productive. You probably have something else entirely in mind to what I have in mind when you say that morality comes from the individual, because otherwise there is no logical link whatsoever to that somehow preventing socialisation altogether. I have not got the energy to draw out all of these problems. It's horses are cats, and I'll just end up really annoyed when it's finally revealed that you're talking about cats when I'm talking about horses.
I have narrowed down the problem to your first premise. Either try to defend it or do not. The burden is with you,
As I said, morality is taught just as any other linguistic knowledge. Socialization teaches the shared moral norms of a society. Any other function of socialization is secondary to and meaningless without the teaching of morals.
As I said, morality is taught just as any other linguistic knowledge. Socialization teaches the shared moral norms of a society. Any other function of socialization is secondary to and meaningless without the teaching of morals.
I don't care. You haven't given me any reason to. You're getting way ahead of yourself. My advice would be to slow down, try to regain relevance in relation to something I've actually said, and make explicit any key differences in interpretation. Otherwise this is going to be very unproductive, like my example in "Horses Are Cats".
I don't care. You haven't given me any reason to. You're getting way ahead of yourself. My advice would be to slow down, try to regain relevance in relation to something I've actually said, and make explicit any key differences in interpretation. Otherwise this is going to be very unproductive, like my example in "Horses Are Cats".
I don’t know what else I can say. I thought I laid it out before you.
I don’t know what else I can say. I thought I laid it out before you.
No, we're still stuck at the very first hurdle. Namely, the question of why morality can't stem from the individual in the sense that I meant that, and not any different sense which you might mean in place of that. If I assume my sense, then there's a giant logical gap between that as the antecedent, and no possible socialisation as the consequent, in the conditional of your very first premise.
Like I said, I suspect you aren't doing it right, because I suspect that you're probably talking past me. To avoid that, you should clarify key statements where I've indicated a problem, or seek clarification from me in order to check whether you mean the same thing as I do.
But all of this is time consuming and requires effort, and you've already wasted so much time and effort getting way ahead of yourself typing up formal arguments full of problems, and drifting off to bring up different points which don't help with the first problem, but only add to the number of problems you expect me to sort through and analyse and work on.
Just being honest and nothing to do with spiritual enlightenment. I wouldn’t blame others for saving humanity in this way, although it would still be an evil act. I just don’t have the stomach to harm a baby.
Evil is a tremendously loaded word that I would think has no place in a rational discussion of morality...but I will try. So boiling babies is evil. So is killing all humans. But given a choice between the two, one choice seems better in any measurable way. And based on your description, I think I would view most important morality as "picking between the lesser of two evils."
For example, there was only one war with a Hitler. Most of the rest are nothing but moral ambiguities.
Oh, and sorry for the Spiritual Enlightenment bit, I was half-joking based on your description sounding very much like a Buddhist monk who seeks to achieve enlightenment, but this requires that they are disconnected from the world and its problems. Good for them, but I sure hope they don't think the world would be better off if everyone thought like them.
For example, there was only one war with a Hitler. Most of the rest are nothing but moral ambiguities.
I don’t know why you would say that other wars were “nothing but moral ambiguities”. But maybe you know more about the history of warfare than I do. For what it’s worth, Sun Tzu once said that no protracted war ever benefited a country. Were other wars not also evil? Sorry, “morally wrong”.
How can one subjective moral view be better than any other subjective moral view - if the basis for both is purely the subjective view of the person who holds it? Any judgment on either view that does not employ some degree of objective morality as a standard to measure against is just one more subjective view.
If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other.
Have a look at the page number at the bottom of the page. I make it sixteen. That's about 200 posts. No one here is a relativist regarding logic, no one a solopsist. "Moral realism" brings up 203,000 results on Google Scholar.
So please, what blind faith leads you to believe that if all moral views are objective, one can be shown to be better than the other?
And if that is not possible (as it evidently is not), then in what way do you imagine the fact that it is also not possible with moral relativism serves as an argument against it?
If I assume my sense, then there's a giant logical gap between that as the antecedent, and no possible socialisation as the consequent, in the conditional of your very first premise.
In your view morality is about sentiments? If so, I disagree if that’s all there is to it, and I can see how you would not have socialization as the consequent. I believe in rationalism if by “innate knowledge” one means instinct. I believe in empiricism if one believes that the blank slate is a really complex and convoluted matrix that experience “writes on”. Moral sentiments are more than just feelings, though. One has to learn what one is feeling about. One learns through experience that pain is bad. It may also be instinctual or at least partly? Socialization (reports from elders or peers) teaches us that hitting someone causes pain in them, and this is reinforced when someone hits us and we feel pain. We learn through experience (also part of the socialization process) what pain feels like. In this way, we learn that hitting people unprovoked is bad. Now, you might feel that hitting someone unprovoked is satisfying, but socialization (reports from elders and peers that it causes pain) and experience should tell you it is bad. If with this you still feel that hitting someone unprovoked is good, then you are simply mistaken about a moral truth. It has nothing to do with what makes you feel good. It has everything to do with living in a community and not causing harm where possible. One should not harm community members when we depend on the community for survival, wants, and needs. If one harmed a community member unprovoked, then one should expect to be harmed in return. This is neither good for the individual (pain sucks), nor is it good for the community. One harm can lead to two. Two harms can lead to three, etc. Usually, the loved ones feel through empathy the harm done to the harmed party. This can lead to further aggression, and soon large parts of the community are at strife. This is not good for individuals or the community (remember how individuals rely on the community for survival, wants, and needs) because cooperation soon breaks down and it becomes more difficult to survive and satisfy wants and needs. I would then conclude that harming someone unprovoked is morally wrong. “Objectively” wrong. Whatever “objective” really means.
I will say more if you have objections or questions.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 10:27#2650920 likes
You've got to be kidding me. "Popular," in context, is about admiration you'd say? The argument ad populum fallacy has something to do with liking or admiring the claim in question? lol
Isn't "frequently encountered or widely accepted" a common definition of "popular"?
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 10:30#2650930 likes
Through shared meaning, communication, socialization.
Re shared meaning, for example, is your view that people are literally given meanings from others, kind of like you might hand a football to them, say, so that you share that same football with them?
Nice attempt to shift the goalposts from the original point in question, i.e. the inaptness of the term 'popular' as opposed to 'prevalent' in context and the difference in senses between the two words. @Janus originally used the term 'all but universal' and you switched that to 'popular' so you could use the argumentum ad populum to undermine his position. But that doesn't work because you misrepresent what he was saying by using an inapt synonym. 'Prevalence' and 'universality' share the meaning he intended whereas 'popular' muddies the waters. Deliberately.
So, I'll explain again in more detail, not so much for you, but for those actually interested in having a real conversation on the issue: What people tend to feel and do in terms of interpersonal behaviour cross-culturally, what's prevalent taking a holistic view, is constitutive of what's moral because it reflects commmonalities in the human condition unbeholden to the local, i.e. it's an appeal to the broadest level of intersubjectivity. Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. Or at the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting.
But then this type of wordplay is probably the only slim chance you have of getting any mileage of your utterly confused and self-contradictory position re morality where you've stated yourself you recognize pain and harm as salient, but only when it's inflicted physically, refuse to acknowledge all sense of degree re other forms of pain, refuse to offer any justification and then immunize yourself against any possibility of a rational challenge by claiming there's no recourse to reason possible and the only justification for moral claims is what we feel about them. Now that sequence of silliness is worthy of a lol. In short, you have zero of sense to offer on the subject and when that's pointed out you retreat into the usual nonsense, 'it's just an opinion' etc. That is literally all you've got.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 12:05#2651030 likes
is constitutive of what's moral because it reflects commmonalities in the human condition unbeholden to the local, i.e. it's an appeal to the broadest level of intersubjectivity.
This amounts to forwarding an argumentum ad populum. Basically, "It's the answer because it's popular."
and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain
Yeah, it can, because your argument, particularly in light of the word "truth," is simply an argumentum ad populum. You might not understand that, or maybe you do and you'll just deny in the vein of a political strategy, but that doesn't change the fact that it's an argumentum ad populum.
Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here
To not be an argumentum ad populum, the prevalence of pain, and either the mention of opinions about it, or an analysis of it in terms of preferences about it (a la "it's not pain if someone likes it"), can't be presented as if it has something to do with "pain is morally bad" being a "moral truth."
you recognize pain and harm as salient, but only when it's inflicted physically,
Even when "physical" (in quotation marks because "as if anything is not physical"), I don't frame any moral stances simply on the notions of pain or harm.
In short, you have zero of sense to offer on the subject and when that's pointed out you retreat into the usual nonsense, 'it's just an opinion' etc.
And here you don't even understand the most basic things I'm claiming. My metaethical views are not at all "just opinions." They're reporting the objective facts of what ethics/morality is.
For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe* concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. At the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting.
*"Popularly believe" means "widely accepted". I've covered that. But you saying that pain is "popular" because it is "frequently encountered" will rightly result in people laughing in your face, and your language will be inapt. Do you get it yet?
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 12:23#2651060 likes
But you saying that pain is "popular" because it is "frequently encountered" will rightly result in people laughing in your face,
This underscores your philosophical Achilles' heel. You formulate views based on popular belief, popular behavior. Conformity to the norm, to the status quo, is your arbiter.
It doesn't matter if there's one sense that overlaps. Your language use is inapt. Do you know what I mean by 'inapt'? Check out the whole area of collocations concerning the apt use of language. For example, 'exhibit' and 'display' are synonyms when talking about something in a museum, but not when talking about computer screens. My computer screen is a 'display', but it would be inapt to call it an 'exhibit'.
Is my computer screen an exhibit?
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 12:30#2651130 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station
Here's another one. 'Heavy' and 'massive' are synonyms, but saying 'the rain is 'massive' today' rather than 'the rain is 'heavy' today' would be inapt.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 12:34#2651150 likes
The expert on apt language usage thought that liking and admiring things might be what we're talking about in this context:
"Morality consists primarily in how people's judgements are borne out in action not how much people like or admire those judgements."
When you use inapt / imprecise language you can infect your claim with meanings unintended, which was the point I intended to make and which you've proven rather comically with your claim that "pain is popular". In any case, I've tried to make things clear enough by elaborating:
Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. At the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting.
So that's it in detail.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 12:43#2651190 likes
Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. At the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting.
So the reason I don't usually write long posts, especially to particular people, is exemplified here. I addressed all of that, but you just ignored it.
If you’re a descriptive moral relativist, all your moral qualifiers are *is* statements, in the anthropological, re: objective, domain, which presupposes a cultural or social regimen. If you’re a normative relativist, your moral statements are *ought* statements, in the rational, re: subjective, domain, which has no cultural presuppositions.
Morality is not taught, it is self-determined. What is taught is the actionable requirements of individual members consistent with a given social structure. Morality is the personal justification as to whether or not to so act, the ground from which *ought* statements arise, under certain necessary conditions.
There are moral laws, and even if they replicate a particular civil code, their derivation and their consequences are completely different. The civil law from inter-subjective agreement the means with order and harmony its ends, the true moral law from a freely determinant autonomous will the means with conforming non-contradictory volitions its ends. Civil law makes no amends for tolerance at all; moral law permits tolerance in other rationalities but not of itself. All law integrates a consequence; the consequence of disobedience to civil law is inconvenience, the consequence of disobedience to moral law is shame.
Humans *desire* socialization, they do not *need* it, as witnessed by homesteaders or “mountain men” in 1800’s American western frontier, “ronin” of feudal Japan, and any kind of social outcast. To say that socialization is the cause of morality, or that morality is the consequence of socialization is not supported by either descriptive or normative moral relativism, nor any established meta-ethical moral theory. (That I know of)
Pain and pleasure are feelings, and no feeling is a cognition. All moral predicates are cognized, hence cannot be derived from feelings. But feelings are nonetheless inescapable for otherwise rational agents, so must be accounted for as a possible influence on moral dispositions, and determined as to whether or not it is possible to negate such influence by positing a greater influence. The only rational method for negating a feeling is with a principle, and a principle sufficient to negate a feeling absolutely must be undeniable, otherwise we can never justify our own morality. The principle in its turn, is predicated on the moral doctrine abiding in the agent, of his own choosing, all of which sustains the theory of moral rationalism.
Morality, one of two fundamental human conditions, the other being reason, can never be given from examples, which merely demonstrate what morality may or may not do, but not what it is.
I'll get back to the rest of your earlier post later (after you answer whether you are going to persist in the mistake of insisting that language use such as "pain is popular" is apt. We won't even be able to communicate if that's how you insist on speaking).
Reply to Mww I will have to re-read your post when I’m not so tired. Right now I am not able to comprehend it. I also don’t have the energy, concentration, or motivation to respond right now.
Re shared meaning, for example, is your view that people are literally given meanings from others, kind of like you might hand a football to them, say, so that you share that same football with them?
No, I don’t think meaning is a thing. It’s a relation between the associated mental thought and the referent given how a word or symbol is used (I think).
No, I don’t think meaning is a thing. It’s a relation between the associated mental thought and the referent given how a word or symbol is used (I think).
To me that seems like you're positing something additional to what I posit. Because on my view the relation in question is a property of the "associated" mental event. In other words, the "associated" mental event and the relation in question are the same thing. So I have the mental event, the referent, and the behavior (how the word or symbol is used). And you have all of those things plus a relation that's apparently something more than those three whatever-you-want-to-call-thems (I'd say "things" but people often seem to use "thing" in a technical way)
To me that seems like you're positing something additional to what I posit. Because on my view the relation in question is a property of the "associated" mental event. So I have the mental event, the referent, and the behavior (how the word or symbol is used). And you have all of those things plus a relation that's apparently something more than those three whatever-you-want-to-call-thems (I'd say "things" but people often seem to use "thing" in a technical way)
Well, we should note that I’ve never actually studied or read anything on meaning.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 15:11#2651480 likes
My sole remaining vice. And the only one of all, I’d recommend, it’s only requisites being sufficient funds and proximity to a bathroom.
Well, if that’s your only vice, then you are a much more moral person than I am. I argue morality, but I don’t always follow it. I know what I should do. However, doing it is another matter.
Morality is not taught, it is self-determined. What is taught is the actionable requirements of individual members consistent with a given social structure. Morality is the personal justification as to whether or not to so act, the ground from which *ought* statements arise, under certain necessary conditions.
Is this a fact? Because I see morality as more than just a “personal” justification. It is a collective justification determined by social pressures as well.
Humans *desire* socialization, they do not *need* it, as witnessed by homesteaders or “mountain men” in 1800’s American western frontier, “ronin” of feudal Japan, and any kind of social outcast.
This presupposes that people are not social creatures meant to cooperate in a society. I would argue that the outcasts or Ronin are deviants or have some sort of pathological illness.
The only rational method for negating a feeling is with a principle, and a principle sufficient to negate a feeling absolutely must be undeniable, otherwise we can never justify our own morality.
This seems to me to be in contradiction to the previous quote. But maybe I misunderstand.
Morality, one of two fundamental human conditions, the other being reason, can never be given from examples, which merely demonstrate what morality may or may not do, but not what it is.
I was just illustrating how morality works, I think, not saying with the examples what it is.
You should have a problem stating it that way, unless you're okay with being wrong. My morality need not involve any "complex interaction" with "religious institutions". It need not be about "collective preference". I have no intention of "recognising" your flawed view of what morality is.
Although you copied my quote directly, you misquoted me in what you wrote. I said "It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions." Do you really think you created your morality out of nothing but your own self? Your parents had nothing to do with it? Do you really believe you created your mind and heart without being influenced by the society and culture around you. To me, that shows a profound lack of self-awareness.
I do think, although I didn't mention it, that a lot of our morality does come from "human nature" whatever that means, I guess it means some sort of genetic predisposition, to behave in a way that makes it easier for us to live together. As I've said many times, we are social animals. We are born to like each other.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 16:20#2651650 likes
1) relativism itself is subject to its own radical critique. Relativism itself, then, is relative. Which can only mean that not everything is relative.
There are a number of problems here:
(1) You're treating "morality is relative" in the manner of "everything is relative." The two claims are not the same.
(2) "Relativism is relative" is redundant in one sense. Ontologically, if something is relative, then of course it's the case that ontologically the thing in question is relative.
(3) "Relativism is relative" could refer, on the other hand, to the belief of relativism being relative. And again, that's certainly the case, as there are people, like you, who believe that morality is not relative.
(4) People often say "Everything is relative" can't be true, because they see truth as necessarily being "absolute" and usually objective. Of course, not all truth theories have truth as absolute or objective. Part of the issue there is if we're conflating truth with facts. If we look at "Everything is relative" as being something like "the name of a fact," then there's only a problem if one insists that facts are some sort of real (objective) abstract. Otherwise, we're back to (2), and there's no issue with relative ontological things being relative. They wouldn't be relative ontological things otherwise.
A simple example: a chair. A chair is absolutely a chair.
I'm not sure what that would be saying. For one, as you said above that part, "absolute" would need to be defined. That would help in figuring out what you're saying there.
You might just be asserting identity--A is A (from perspective x, at time T, etc.)
Thinking that relativists might be denying the above would be a straw man.
Although you copied my quote directly, you misquoted me in what you wrote. I said "It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions." Do you really think you created your morality out of nothing but your own self? Your parents had nothing to do with it? Do you really believe you created your mind and heart without being influenced by the society and culture around you. To me, that shows a profound lack of self-awareness.
I do think, although I didn't mention it, that a lot of our morality does come from "human nature" whatever that means, I guess it means some sort of genetic predisposition, to behave in a way that makes it easier for us to live together. As I've said many times, we are social animals. We are born to like each other.
Although you copied my quote directly, you misquoted me in what you wrote. I said "It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions." Do you really think you created your morality out of nothing but your own self? Your parents had nothing to do with it? Do you really believe you created your mind and heart without being influenced by the society and culture around you. To me, that shows a profound lack of self-awareness.
I do think, although I didn't mention it, that a lot of our morality does come from "human nature" whatever that means, I guess it means some sort of genetic predisposition, to behave in a way that makes it easier for us to live together. As I've said many times, we are social animals. We are born to like each other.
Would you say that the Beatles created the White Album by themselves?
Would you say that the Beatles created the White Album by themselves?
Sure, but they didn't develop their musical tastes, knowledge, understanding, and vision by themselves. They heard all kinds of music all through their lives. They've acknowledged the influence other musicians have had. They used standard western chord structure and musical formulations. Their music was played on regular AM radio stations and they had to tailor their music to their listeners.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 16:43#2651720 likes
Sure, but they didn't develop their musical tastes, knowledge, understanding, and vision by themselves. They heard all kinds of music all through their lives. They've acknowledged the influence other musicians have had. They used standard western chord structure and musical formulations. Their music was played on regular AM radio stations and they had to tailor their music to their listeners.
Right, but there's a manner in which it makes sense to say that the Beatles created the White Album themselves, rather than saying that what created it was a complex of societal, cultural, artistic, musical, etc. institutions, as if the complex of societal, cultural, etc. institutions should be getting the royalty/publishing/licensing payments.
The sense in which people (like me) say that individuals create morality is the same sense. We're not denying influences and such, but the influences aren't the same thing as the stuff we're saying that individuals create.
Why should people care about morality if they do not feel the pain of morally wrong behavior?
People should care about morality only insofar as they care about the conditions which make it possible to even have those feelings to begin with. If feelings come after the behavior, then feelings cannot be causality for them.
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You must be tired. The only way to illustrate is with examples. Theorizing, hypothesizing, or just claiming, how morality works doesn’t require examples, although examples can make the theory or claims clearer after its exposition. One can illustrate moral behavior, but moral behavior says nothing about how the behavior becomes morally authorized.
Point/counterpoint. Nothing more, nothing less. No right/wrong, good/bad intended.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 16:51#2651750 likes
I don’t think he is saying that. That’s a straw man.
You mean that he was saying in conjunction with individuals? Yeah, I meant that. I wasn't being that persnicketty about the wording there, I was just more or less copying the way he phrased it. The point is that we don't say that society, earlier musicians, etc. were just as much the creators of the White Album as the Beatles were.
That's the same sense in which folks like me are saying that individuals create morality. We're not denying social influence. But social influence isn't the same thing. Just like musical influence isn't the same thing as any particular tune/piece on the White Album.
Point/counterpoint. Nothing more, nothing less. No right/wrong, good/bad intended.
Okay. I appreciate your viewpoint even if I don’t totally agree with it. I am tired, and I probably shouldn’t be posting right now. I think I will just let it stand there. :smile:
The point is that we don't say that society, earlier musicians, etc. were just as much the creators of the White Album as the Beatles were.
But doesn’t that suppose by the regression of causality that the Beatles created themselves? I’m not saying that society should also be paid for the album, but what does that say about morality?
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 17:02#2651790 likes
But doesn’t that suppose by the regression of causality that the Beatles created themselves?
? No. You mean to tell me that you don't understand what people are referring to when they say that "the Beatles created the White Album"? Hopefully when people say that you understand at least roughly just what they're saying the Beatles did and didn't do, and you don't respond with, "By regression of causality the Beatles created themselves" or "The Beatles didn't create the White Album. It was actually a complex of societal, cultural, musical, etc. institutions interacting with the Beatles that created it."
The sense in which people (like me) say that individuals create morality is the same sense. We're not denying influences and such, but the influences aren't the same thing as the stuff we're saying that individuals create.
I don't think you "create" morality. I think you make moral decisions based on a complex set of social and personal psychological factors.
VagabondSpectreMarch 15, 2019 at 18:59#2651930 likes
Yes, strictly speaking, in a very literal sense, everything is amoral, just like everything is meaningless. But switching back to the ordinary way of speaking, there are things which are moral and immoral, and there are things which are meaningful. A strict interpretation leads to nihilism, but that's not the end point. Nihilism is why you should interpret things pragmatically, like I do. This pragmatic interpretation is why "moral" and "meaningful" are not useless.
This is just semantics, but "amoral" really is not the right word. What you're saying is that there's no absolute and universal objective moral truth (the kind of objective truth that must apply in all cases), you're not saying that "there are things which are apart from morality" (which is the etymological meaning). I get how you're using the term, but it's stupendously misleading:
Rocks are "amoral", but FGM is a human practice which presumably nearly always concerns operant moral values on the part of humans. Under the definition of morality as a strategy or set of strategies, FGM would indeed fall within the realm of morality. The practice itself is amoral in the sense that it is not sentient (like rocks) but we don't usually anthropomorphize things in that way. When I frame the issue of FGM as an inherently moral question, what I'm saying is that it concerns our starting moral values, and can therefore is subject to whichever moral calculus. In every possible case of FGM I can imagine, values-considerations are a part of the decision making process, which is why the "amoral" descriptor fails in practice. If FGM didn't have anything to do with human values, then it might make sense to call it amoral (like flying kites or jogging), but in practice it always does.
Maybe I'm not a subjectivist-relativist after-all, I'm a full-blown moral pragmatist. "Ultimate moral truth" is incoherent from the get go because moral truth can only come into existence in physically realized circumstances where strategy conforms to extant moral values and the situation it is to be employed in. Just as there is no "best" strategy in Chess, different circumstances may alter the specific action required to bring about the desired outcome. "Moral truth", under this view, only exists as moral frameworks pragmatically serve human values, where more pragmatic frameworks are considered better.
I guess I'm refusing to even begin to use the language of moral objectivism (by assenting to the phrase that everything is amoral, which rebukes it). In the exact same way people misunderstand the "objectivity" of the scientific method (they equivocate scientific knowledge with objective certainty), people misunderstand the objectivity of moral strategies in general, and in specific cases of its application.
The issue is not about "moral utility", so your point misses the point. You're just saying that it's useful to brush your teeth every day if you value your dental health. Lots of people value their dental health, so generally, brushing your teeth is useful. Who cares? No one is going to disagree with that, and it doesn't effect the wider issue.
The example simplifies the structure of moral truth in practice. The wider question is "in what sense can moral decisions be 'true' or 'objective'". The answer is in whether or not they conform to values and circumstance; this is how we improve our existing moral decisions, and but for mutually exclusive values, this is how we actually reach moral propositions that in practice "no one is going to disagree with": the objectivity of empiricism.
If you're a subjective moral relativist, you kind of sound like you're weirdly in denial or something. Morality is subjective and relative, but... !
Cleaning your teeth is objective and matters! It's useful if you value your dental health!
(There's no need for the "but").
If we agree on a specific meta-ethical definition, morality is not subjective (though in the case of our definition, moral "values" are subjective). Reason and evidence can sometimes do nothing to sway values where subjective feelings dominate, but feelings about "how best to achieve those values" can be factually inaccurate.
I've said this many times before, but humans share a set of fundamental values that are nearly universal to all of us. Most of our moral thinking is concerned with how to mutually serve these basic values in a complex environment. Take socialized healthcare for instance. It might be objectively true that it would greatly benefit the U.S (given the strength of examples set by other nations). We all want to be healthy, just like we want dental health, but there is severe disagreement about how to best achieve the desired end result. Appeals to feelings have no place in the debate about private vs public healthcare systems, which for America is one of the most important moral questions they face.
VagabondSpectreMarch 15, 2019 at 19:42#2651980 likes
You see, this is the problem I have with your position. You talk accurately about epistemological when pushed (I've bolded the relevant sections), but then you reveal this authoritarian undercurrent with the likes of...
Some cultural practices are, in fact, morally superior to others in the context of those nearly universal human values which we all share — VagabondSpectre
We're just going round in circles on this one so I don't see the point continuing, you've brought up vacancies again (despite not even a glancing recognition of my arguments as to why people might legitimately doubt the statistics). You keep insisting that the models held by current academic, research, and government institutions in the developed countries are absolutely beyond question. That there are no legitimate grounds to doubt that they are the best models we have.
Setting our disagreement about specific social issues aside for a moment, you're misinterpreting the point I'm making. By "in fact" I meant that there is actually an objective truth pertaining to empirical claims, I never said we can or must always have direct access to that objective truth. What I'm trying to say is that we should, with objectivity, try our best to approximate objective truths (akin to science, not "exactly science" (which is incoherent)), because they help us make more effective decisions.
I only used the examples I did because I thought they would not garner evidence-based resistance (in other words, I thought that the superior values-serving answers to these questions are obvious enough, or, that we are able to gather sufficient data on the matter). You went out of your way to explain why parents might be ignorant of vaccine related statistics and why they might be extorted into carrying out FGM, but you did not make any good argument as to why FGM as a practice could actually net any individual benefit (beyond not suffering from extortion) or why we cannot be reasonably informed by evidence as to whether or not taking vaccines is beneficial to health, and therefore a superior decision. You explained why individuals are forced into perpetuating FGM as a practice (a utility based argument) but you did not defend the utility based argument wielded by those who actually do the extortion. You explained why anti-vax parents can be filled with doubt, but you did not enter into an evidence based debate about the empirical question (good empirical evidence is the best way to convince an anti-vax parent who believes vaccines are harmful to health to believe otherwise; this is where feelings matter less than evidence, reason, and the "truth" they seek to help us approximate). Furthermore, you are conflating my condemnation of FGM as the direct assigning of moral guilt upon individuals who are involved in its perpetuation (and unnecessarily opening up a tangential discussion about whether or not I'm morally/racially insensitive). Personally I think the idea of absolute moral guilt is incoherent (per tentative determinism/lack of hard free will), and that only pragmatic moral guilt is relevant. Pragmatic moral guilt is basically where we intervene to remedy the moral problem. Intervening in the actions of the extorted parents with arguments or force won't do anything (they will be unpersuaded or punished by the community as a result), but by intervening with arguments against the supporting empirical beliefs of the broader community (e.g: that it is healthy for women and society) we CAN actually make a difference.
Put yourself in the shoes of somebody who believes FGM is good for practical utility reasons (the person who would extort others into doing it). Are you incapable of being persuaded by empirical evidence? How can you say it's merely "subjectively true" that FGM (as a practice, not as an individually extorted act) serves the values of human and social health, when we both know that there is an objective truth to the matter? Yes people have perspective, bias, and ignorance, but if we cannot mitigate their effects through reason and evidence, this whole "philosophy" thing is a big waste of time.
In order for it to be morally 'right' given shared values about children's health, for a parent to vaccinate a child, they would have to...
No, in order for a parent to feel confident that it is morally right, they need to have those things. It is either morally right, or wrong, per the given values, regardless of how they feel about it.
Re: my faith in scientific consensus. I'm a student of many things, and I have seen so much evidence pertaining to the issues I've mentioned that my trust doesn't spring from faith, which might better frame the point I'm trying to make with these examples. Sacrificing virgins to increase crop yields might be a better example. As a strategy to maximize utility, it absolutely sucks (unless you're performing an inconsiderate calculus, where fewer people means greater shares (which is ostensibly amoral, or more specifically, a breakdown of morality)). It's almost certainly true that sacrificing virgins doesn't have any direct causal relationship with crop yields (maybe it causes farmers to work harder to ensure that their lives aren't wasted, but any placebo could achieve that). Your objection will be that I don't know whether or not gods exist, and that's true, but the probability of a deity intervening on the basis of prayer or sacrifice is so low from an empirical stand-point that we can say with approximate certainty the proposition is false (at the very least, evidence and reason persuade the reasonable away from the proposition).
Everyone else not doing it. Same thing as persuades most people to do most things. Have you looked at society lately? See much rational decision making going on? The largest ecomony in the world just voted in a clown for a leader because of a wave of 'popular opinion'. Since when has rational argument made any difference?
Rational arguments very well might make zero difference, but whether or not we are able to recognize and accept them does make a difference (because the external reasons-centric "objective" worldis the way it is, not the way we want or believe it to be. Ultimately we learn this by experience.
To answer your question about when rational argument has made a difference, just look around you. Notice the absence of hay, of candle-light, of the distinct smell of manure, human shit, and body-odor. Notice the many medical institutions that surround and serve you, without which you might be a lot worse off than you are now. Notice your legal rights which we do our best to protect; maybe there is a ginger jester in the hot seat, but notice how it's just a seat and not a gilded throne that claims to own you. Notice the moral progress that the west has made in such a relatively recent period since the enlightenment era; how society is no longer fundamentally driven by superstitious religious beliefs, and how much better off we are for it all.
Collective thought turns very slowly, but it is inexorably turned by an accumulation individual arguments, and it turns more accurately when more of our arguments are rational and evidence based.
No, you're not, you're additionally telling us all which ones they are, and telling anyone who disagrees that they are 'objectively wrong'.
To be specific, I'm saying that either FGM as a practice does benefit individual and social health, or it doesn't; that either its proponents or their antipodes are "objectively wrong". Again, I chose the example because I thought the answer was as obvious as not gouging your own eyes is useful for retaining your eyesight.
Saying that someone is morally wrong requires a high standard of certainty, in my opinion. Maybe this is our sole point of contention. You're happy to throw around accusations of immorality on the basis of a belief that your modal is 'probably' better. I'm not.
Does it matter if I'm attacking a practice and not a person? It's not as if I'm trying to establish legal culpability by arguing that any reasonable person ought to know better (I'm well aware of how circumstance and inaccess to information can warp perspective).
Do you at least assent to the statement: "gouging our own eyes out is an objectively morally inferior course of action IF retaining our eyesight is of moral value"? (need I flesh out that specific argument?).
I don't understand this line of argument. You seem to be suggesting that I should believe something other than what seems to me to be the case, because what I currently believe is not very useful in persuading people to do what I want them to. That seems like a really weird argument. Maybe I've misunderstood so ill wait for some more clarity before going into it.
I know it seems strange, and it is: It's essentially a part of my meta-ethical framework states that rationally persuasive arguments are more useful (and that rationally persuasive arguments are more reliably accurate). If we're after a pragmatic moral framework (one that effectively serves the values that matter to us), then being persuasive to others actually becomes a derivative measure of its overall utility (and happens to represent a major component of how moral frameworks are naturally selected in the first place).
I'm not actually asking you to change your beliefs, all you really need to do is alter the language of your moral framework. To better persuade someone to assent to your moral views (to stop promoting FGM, for instance) you cannot approach them with language like "however you feel about it defines for you what is morally right, so who am I to insinuate that FGM is an immoral action?". You should be able to tell them that FGM is a morally inferior practice per the values of human and social health even if you're not absolutely certain. Reasonable certainty is certainty enough, and when the stakes are very high we're forced to scramble for the best and most rational evidence/arguments/conclusions we can find (the nature of all dilemmas) If you do believe that FGM does not effectively serve its purported values, how little epistemic respect must you have for your own beliefs/understanding that you object to its moral condemnation on epistemic grounds? The more epistemic doubt you cast on our ability to understand that FGM is harmful to given moral values, the more room you make for it as a morally acceptable/tolerable practice, and that's the over-skeptical mistake I'm challenging. If you are trying to say that FGM isn't actually perpetuated because people believe it has utility, I would understand, but in practice it IS perpetuated because of widespread belief in its utility. Convincing a group of people to change has to start somewhere.
If your moral framework doesn't help you to realize your values in the world because it lacks the form required to act persuasively on others, then for the sake of what matters to you, learn the common moral tongue. You don't need to compromise your values or specific moral beliefs to forgo the "all moral truth is subjective" rigamarole. We already live in a world dominated by compatible or aligned fundamental values; by focusing on the ontological nature of moral values as subjective (something that is indeed not obvious to everyone), instead of trying to work directly with and on our existing compatible values or the empirical arguments concerning how to serve them, you're just subverting the overall persuasive power of your subsequent arguments. If there is moral truth out there at all to be had, relative to our subjective values though it may be, we need to have an objective discussion about which methods are better than others (and how we should order and consider our own values and the values of others). Once foolish mysticism is eliminated from our moral debates (a largely separate labor to most moral suasion), we're in fact left with a rather straightforward series of propositions. We have moral values, we have an uncertain future, and we have more and less reliable predictive models which indicate "moral" courses of action. FGM isn't your typical calculus, but supporting it does amount to a prediction, an inevitably empirical claim, about how well it serves given values. We might have limited ability to solve these kinds of questions given their complexity, but in many cases we have more than adequate predictive power (I think in the case of FGM you also agree).
Yes. That is basically the difference between the class of virtue ethics I'm talking about and utilitarian consequentialism. Virtue ethics does not require a fixed point in the future for its calculus, utilitarianism does. With virtue ethics you are comparing the way actions make you feel about yourself right now. With utilitarianism you are comparing the net utility of actions, but to do so you must use a fixed timescale, otherwise one would advise an action which made the whole population ecstatically happy, but wiped out all future generations (not far off our current attitude). The decision you make will depend on the timescale over which you wish to maintain maximum utility.
My point was that specific virtue ethics are causally selected for their utility, over any time-span. The longer the time-span the more opportunity there is for specific "virtues" which promote long-term utility to evolve. This is following a different kind of meta-ethical viewpoint: a proponent of virtue ethics might use how they feel immediately about their actions as a guide for decision making, but because they have evolved over given periods of time, how they happen to feel actually tends to correlate with the future utility that their decisions generate. (I.E: at some point we moved away from "eye-for-an-eye" to "do unto others as they would do unto you" because as principles of virtue or deontological codes the latter is more useful). We are emotionally repulsed by death and senseless violence (especially to the innocent) because biological and cultural evolution has deemed it useful, and it has necessary ramifications on any moral framework, including virtue ethics.
[i]"Exactly. And you think it's obvious enough that one should vaccinate their child, and you think it's obvious enough that we should brush our teeth, and you think it's obvious enough...
The trouble is, other people disagree, and they do so with perfectly rational arguments of greater or lesser strength"[/i]
Do you see the contradiction in the bolded text? Maybe I'm reading into a colloquial use of the word "perfectly", but it seems like you're undermining the idea that rational arguments can have greater and lesser strength.
The vaccination issue is exactly the reason why I so strongly disapprove of your approach. It seems to you like it fits right in with not committing FGM, or not killing each other with ice picks, but to me, it stands out a mile as being something which transfers a hell of a lot of trust to organisations which have absolutely shown themselves to be untrustworthy.
I get that you have trust issues with government and the pharmaceutical industry, I do too, but the alleged risks of taking "proven" vaccines (vaccine formulas for which there is ample clinical trial data, real world data, and statistical analysis showing the decline of related diseases) are really quite overblown. I'm aware that it's a complicated subject, and I fully understand why people have their doubts, but it's a question that has been asked and answered by the field of medical science at large. It's like climate change due to the greenhouse effect; hard to understand because of the complex physics, and easy to doubt because of widespread misinformation and a lack of physics understanding.
When confronted with either a climate change denier, an anti-vaxer, or an FGM supporter, I will try to dissuade them by introducing them to evidence and rational arguments, thereby generating positive moral ramifications. Under your approach, we linger in moral and epistemic agnosticism with the assumptions that the evidence is too hard to come by and that rationally interpreting it is too difficult.
What really bothers me is that you're advocating a system which basically gives moral weight to current scientific opinion with no consideration at all for how vulnerable some fields of science are to fashion, government influence, corporate influence, or plain human greed and bias. You're giving over decisions about what is fundamentally 'right' to a system which has proven itself to be morally questionable at times by the very standards you're using it to uphold.
I'm not appealing to science as absolute, I'm appealing to science as better or the best we have (and not all science is equal; to know how confident we should be in a given "scientific" truth, we need to be introduced to the specific "science" that underlies it, else our faith in it amounts to black-box induction). The good news is, good science trends toward more and more reliable truth, just as better reasoning, more evidence, and more comprehensive analysis trend toward more reliable conclusions, which is why I'm so stoked to make them a part of moral discussion, debate, and frameworks.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 23:04#2652370 likes
Well, but in the metaphysical sense, the point is that the music you're hearing on the album is a creation of the Beatles and not simply something they're a conduit for, where the identical thing existed outside of them or prior to them. That's not to say, of course, that they didn't have lots of musical influences (and some pieces on the album are pretty clearly kind of a variation on something else, like "Revolution 9" being very similar to John Cage's Rozart Mix), but in a very literal sense, they're creating that music rather than something else creating it.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 23:06#2652380 likes
I don't think you "create" morality. I think you make moral decisions based on a complex set of social and personal psychological factors.
You're creating it for yourself in the sense of you making the judgments or decisions. Morality is those judgments. You can't literally receive them from elsewhere.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 23:10#2652410 likes
No doubt some morality is relative - although I think the issue of contradictory imperatives is a problem for any so-called relative morality. But all I claim is that it's not and cannot be all relative
If it's individual judgments it's going to be relative to the individual making the judgment.
Written by someone confident in his understanding of the words "true" and "truth." I'd ask you to define them, but I know you cannot. The best you can do is indicate that there are cases when both words can be meaningful.
I've posted my truth theory here a handful of times over the years:
‘P’ is true for S iff S judges ‘P’ to have relation R to either S’s phenomenal P, and/or S’s stock of previously adjudged true propositions, depending on the relation R. Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S feels is the appropriate one(s)—correspondence, coherence, consensus, pragmatic, etc.
So in other words, what it is for some proposition, 'P' (quotation marks denoting the proposition literally as a sentence), to be true to some individual, some S, is for the proposition to have the relation R to S's phenomenal P (their phenomenal perception etc. of some state of affairs) or their stock of previously adjudged true propositions, in S's judgment.
That's all that truth value is.
TheWillowOfDarknessMarch 15, 2019 at 23:18#2652450 likes
The point is the moral significance is distinct from our act of judgement.
It works much the same way as our accounts of empirical objects. Every time we observe a state of the world, we are making a judgement. We judge what we are looking at, how it relates to other things, etc. to from our description or theory of what's occurring.
Yet, our judgment is not the things we are talking about. The tree isn't in my backyard because I make the judgment its present. My judgments about it are just reporting something else (i.e. not my judgement) present in itself (the object of tree).
Morality is posited in the same way. When we encounter it, we are always engaged in a judgment (our experience of what is valuable, moral,. etc.), but that judgment is not how the morality true. Like the tree in my backyard, the moral significance is an independent thing my judgement is reporting.
Terrapin StationMarch 15, 2019 at 23:22#2652460 likes
Just as with "opinion," there are different senses of "judgment," and you're conflating them.
At any rate, we can just ignore that and pretend they're the same sense of the term. So what's any evidence of something extramental matching a moral judgment?
TheWillowOfDarknessMarch 15, 2019 at 23:28#2652490 likes
When we make an empirical observation, all the external evidence is only given if our judgements are correct. If the phenomena I point at isn't actually a tree, then it doesn't matter how much a scream about the presence of a tree in my experience, I will be mistaken. We make judgments to form our accounts of external evidence.
I am not deriving these judgements from an external thing or evidence.
I cannot use the appearance of an empirical object in my experience to ground this judgements about what it is and how it relates to other things. I only have "external evidence" for it if these judgements are correct.
External evidence allows me to show the presence of something only if I understand it, only if my initial judgements about it and its relations are correct. Without those, I don't have any account of what something is or what I would encounter if it were present.
Reply to Terrapin Station Yes, they created the White Album. My original point was that saying that @T Clark was saying that morality was somehow created was a straw man, but then I got confused by your reply to that.
TheWillowOfDarknessMarch 15, 2019 at 23:50#2652560 likes
Terrapin Station:At any rate, we can just ignore that and pretend they're the same sense of the term. So what's any evidence of something extramental matching a moral judgment?
We can further show the issue by examining this question. Anything I encounter in my experience, by virtue of being my mental state, is mental insofar as it is my judgment.
We can ask exactly the same question of our empirical accounts: where is the external evidence that there is anything extramental matching my judgement of the treeing my backyard? All I have is my experience, my mental judgement, a tree is present. Are we to take this as a reason to conclude there is nothing extramental?
Reply to Terrapin Station Again, this is a poor analogy. there is nothing original about morality. About any issue you can have just three basic positions: for, against or indifferent. Music is nothing like that, music, at least good music, consists in creatively original syntheses; so again you use an inapt analogy to try to shore up your inadequate position.
@Baden already answered your last question to me, and clearly and eloquently said pretty much what i would have said, so i won't go over that again. Of course you didn't take that on board, and I have no doubt the same will happen in regard to what I have written here; any sophistry will do apparently for you to avoid admitting that your position is explanatorily inept.
What I'm trying to say is that we should, with objectivity, try our best to approximate objective truths (akin to science, not "exactly science" (which is incoherent)), because they help us make more effective decisions.
I would agree with this much, but then, in finding common ground on this we've reduced your claim to something trivially true "finding facts out about the world helps you achieve your goals". True, but who wouldn't agree with that?
you did not make any good argument as to why FGM as a practice could actually net any individual benefit (beyond not suffering from extortion) or why we cannot be reasonably informed by evidence as to whether or not taking vaccines is beneficial to health, and therefore a superior decision.
I thought I had. I precse them again. I don't know why FGM came about, but I find it unlikely that it was a result of a cabal of child molesters, who the rest of the community had mysteriously put in charge, coming up with a new way of mindlessly injuring innocent children. So I simply presume they had a reason. By what I know it's an aboniable practice, the difference is, I'm prepared to accept that I don't know all the facts. Vaccination has the additional problem that I never can have all the fact, not even a small proportion of them. Every single piece of information I have on the matter comes from sources I have good reason to doubt. I literally listed all the reasons why we "cannot be reasonably informed by evidence", but to save me listed them again, I could summarise them as - we cannot access the evidence we actually need.
you are conflating my condemnation of FGM as the direct assigning of moral guilt upon individuals who are involved in its perpetuation (and unnecessarily opening up a side tangent about whether or not I'm morally/racially insensitive)
No, that comes from the fact that every example you picked paints non-westerners (or detractors) as stupid and/or immoral. Any reason you didn't pick someone driving a 4 litre car (which objectively hastens damaging climate change). An arms dealer making a profit out of warmongering (which objectively causes thousands to suffer). A banker whose risky investments cause thousands to lose their jobs (objectively making their lives harder). No, you picked examples where modern Western civilisation has some moral superiority to claim over non-westerners. Maybe you didn't even realise you were doing it, but from the middle of a culture whose everyday activities are literally damaging the future of humanity, the fact that you looked further than just out of the window for your examples of objective, scientifically proven moral wrongs is telling.
I have seen so much evidence pertaining to the issues I've mentioned that my trust doesn't spring from faith, which might better frame the point I'm trying to make with these examples.
So you have personally conducted research? Looked at the actual data set for the trials of the latest vaccine? Personally checked the records on which the epidemiological data is based? Because if not, then your trust in the people delivering you this information is faith.
It's almost certainly true that sacrificing virgins doesn't have any direct causal relationship with crop yields (maybe it causes farmers to work harder to ensure that their lives aren't wasted, but any placebo could achieve that).
Yes. Which is why no one sacrifices virgins anymore (or at least does not do so to increase crop yields). Because broadly everyone agrees that it doesn't work. Hopefully, with some good luck and sensitive influencing, we'll be in a place where no one thinks FGM is in their culture's best interests too (things certainly seem to be heading that way). This is a constant refrain from the moral absolutist - "but isn't boiling babies obviously wrong", "isn't it obviously wrong to gouge one's eyes out", isn't it obviously wrong to sacrifice virgins". No one is dealing with those moral questions. We're dealing with much harder ones where the facts of the case or the complex social/political circumstances make the way forward difficult to see. It doesn't help to come along claiming to have the answer like it was a maths sum.
To answer your question about when rational argument has made a difference, just look around you. Notice the absence of hay, of candle-light, of the distinct smell of manure, human shit, and body-odor. Notice the many medical institutions that surround and serve you, without which you might be a lot worse off than you are now. Notice your legal rights which we do our best to protect; maybe there is a ginger jester in the hot seat, but notice how it's just a seat and not a gilded throne that claims to own you. Notice the moral progress that the west has made in such a relatively recent period since the enlightenment era; how society is no longer fundamentally driven by superstitious religious beliefs, and how much better off we are for it all.
And here we go again with the tiresome flag-waving for Western civilisation. Have you noticed the continued reliance on fossil fuel despite the fact that scientific consensus is that it is destructive to our society? Have you noticed that micro-plastics are now in every environment in the world and the scientific consensus is that they could be harmful? Have you noticed that careers continue to become more stressful despite the fact that the World Health Organisation consider stress to be a major factor in 80% of all disease? Any of that sound particularly rational?
We've got where we are because of a series of improvements whose short-term benefits could be directly seen and whose long-term consequences were barely given a moment's thought. That's not rational argument, that's seeing money in the minefield and going to pick it up and hang the consequences.
Do you see the contradiction in the bolded text? Maybe I'm reading into a colloquial use of the word "perfectly", but it seems like you're undermining the idea that rational arguments can have greater and lesser strength.
No, this goes back to what I said above about certainty. I completely agree that rational arguments have greater or lesser strength (for those who have already agreed to use rationality as a thinking tool). But I strongly disagree with the granularity, the exactness, you claim is possible when such arguments become complex. My position can be summed up as;
Given the complexity of the physical and social environment in which decisions have to be made, the vast majority of calculations can only be assessed so broadly that we end up with a very large group of options for all of which the most we can say is "yes, that broadly makes sense".
Your argument is like claiming to judge which is the higher mountain to the micrometer without any measuring equipment. We can all see the difference between a mountain and a hill, but from there it's just guesswork as to which is tallest.
Although you copied my quote directly, you misquoted me in what you wrote. I said "It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions." Do you really think you created your morality out of nothing but your own self? Your parents had nothing to do with it? Do you really believe you created your mind and heart without being influenced by the society and culture around you. To me, that shows a profound lack of self-awareness.
Of course not. I'm not denying any outside influence whatsoever. I'm rejecting any suggestion that factors such as the prevalent religion in my society are a primary determinant in my morality. They're simply not. And I know that better than you or anyone else, because I know myself better than you or anyone else. My morality is, as I say, determined primarily by my moral feelings, and [i]not[/I] those of society, or of the Tory government, or of the Anglican Church. I am not a sheep, I am an individual.
And it's [I]"parent"[/I] - singular. My biological father hasn't earned that title. He deserted me before I was even born and has played no role in my life. He certainly didn't play the role of a sort of "moral tutor".
I do think, although I didn't mention it, that a lot of our morality does come from "human nature" whatever that means, I guess it means some sort of genetic predisposition, to behave in a way that makes it easier for us to live together. As I've said many times, we are social animals. We are born to like each other.
Yes, we are animals: humans. And we don't have to resort to the mindset of sheep. We don't have to give herd morality pride of place.
Terrapin StationMarch 16, 2019 at 10:24#2653390 likes
Yeah, they are. And just in the same way. One refers to making an evaluation--stating how you feel about something, whether you like or dislike it, whether you prefer one thing to another, etc.
The other amounts to trying to get right, via stating a proposition, some state of affairs.
I'll leave it at that for the moment.
Terrapin StationMarch 16, 2019 at 10:26#2653400 likes
Yes, they created the White Album. My original point was that saying that T Clark was saying that morality was somehow created was a straw man, but then I got confused by your reply to that.
Ah, re "creation." Why would creation be any more of an issue there than it is for music or the other arts?
Terrapin StationMarch 16, 2019 at 10:34#2653410 likes
Again, this is a poor analogy. there is nothing original about morality. About any issue you can have just three basic positions: for, against or indifferent. Music is nothing like that, music, at least good music, consists in creatively original syntheses; so again you use an inapt analogy to try to shore up your inadequate position.
That's because you probably have an incorrect ontology of meaning, too. You're thinking that someone says to you, "Murder is wrong," for example, and you're simply for it, against it or indifferent to it at that point. But that's not how it works.
You have to understand the sounds you hear or text marks you read first. That involves doing something unique in your own brain. Part of that involves meaning assignments, which is also doing something unique in your own brain. These unique things do involve original syntheses. Then, in order for you to have a moral stance on anything, you have to make a judgment about it, a la making an evaluation--stating how you feel about something, whether you like or dislike it, whether you prefer one thing to another, etc. Otherwise it's not a moral stance for you at all.
Right. What was his response there anyway? I didn't understand what he wrote.
Actually, in hindsight, I think I might have misinterpreted what he meant there. But if so, it was badly worded. Given the rest of his post, which I've just briefly gone over, it seems he might have meant that not everything [I]about morality[/I] is relative. But then, that still misses the point. And it is different from what he was claiming before, where he clearly confused moral relativism for relativism simpliciter, which he has been rightly called out for doing.
It is easy to miss the point if you don't understand what it is that a moral relativist is actually claiming. I for one am only suggesting that morality is relative in the relevant sense which I've explained in this discussion. I'm not suggesting that every single aspect relating to morality must be relative to something in some way. I'm not, for example, suggesting that rocks are relative, whatever that means, just because the judgement that it is immoral to throw rocks at people is obviously relative.
It isn't helpful that a number of people in this discussion do not have a good understanding of moral relativism, yet they nevertheless think that they're somehow qualified to criticise it.
Morality, unlike rocks, only makes sense if you apply an interpretation inline with moral relativism. The interpretation of moral absolutism only [i]appears[/I] to make sense [i]on the surface[/I], but it crumbles under analysis. No one has succeeded in [i]reasonably[/I] demonstrating the supposed existence of any objective or absolute morality. Instead, predictably, we just get dogmatism and bad logic. Even if this discussion were to continue over another twenty pages, my prediction is that that would still be all that we get from them.
Right, but there's a manner in which it makes sense to say that the Beatles created the White Album themselves, rather than saying that what created it was a complex of societal, cultural, artistic, musical, etc. institutions, as if the complex of societal, cultural, etc. institutions should be getting the royalty/publishing/licensing payments.
The sense in which people (like me) say that individuals create morality is the same sense. We're not denying influences and such, but the influences aren't the same thing as the stuff we're saying that individuals create.
You mean to tell me that you don't understand what people are referring to when they say that "the Beatles created the White Album"? Hopefully when people say that you understand at least roughly just what they're saying the Beatles did and didn't do, and you don't respond with, "By regression of causality the Beatles created themselves" or "The Beatles didn't create the White Album. It was actually a complex of societal, cultural, musical, etc. institutions interacting with the Beatles that created it."
Rocks are "amoral", but FGM is a human practice which presumably nearly always concerns operant moral values on the part of humans.
FGM is amoral [I]except[/I] in the sense of moral relativism. So you either agree with me about moral relativism, or you're saying something false about FGM.
The example simplifies the structure of moral truth in practice. The wider question is "in what sense can moral decisions be 'true' or 'objective'". The answer is in whether or not they conform to values and circumstance; this is how we improve our existing moral decisions, and but for mutually exclusive values, this is how we actually reach moral propositions that in practice "no one is going to disagree with": the objectivity of empiricism.
You still don't seem to realise that what you're doing is lose-lose.
You either describe something subjective, like my values, in which case we agree, even though at times you seem to act as though we don't. This would just be to preach to the choir.
Or you describe something objective, but which lacks meta-ethical relevance. Comments of the sort about brushing your teeth are not in themselves meta-ethically relevant. You only make them relevant because of your own moral evaluation, which again is subjective. It is not correct to confuse [i]that[/I] for objectivity, and it is not correct to confuse objectivity which [i]lacks[/I] meta-ethical relevance for objectivity which [i]is of[/I] meta-ethical relevance.
That our decisions are explainable in terms of our values, and that they are either in our interest or not in our interest, does not in itself say anything meta-ethically relevant. Do you understand what meta-ethics is about, and what it is not about? It is not simply about values, it is not simply about what's useful to us, it is not simply about what is or isn't in our interest. It is about morality. You need an additional connection, and you can only do that subjectively. Nothing is moral or immoral in itself. That makes no sense.
It can be the case that not everything is relative, yet morality is.
— S
I did not say that everything is relative. That would be the position of relativists. Mine is that not everything is relative.
You must not have properly read what you just quoted me saying. Look again. I said that it can be the case that [i]not[/I] everything is relative, yet morality is relative.
That's why your point misses the point. You need to argue specifically against moral relativism.
I hope you get this, because it is basic level logic.
Murder. Murder is simple. I say that murder is absolutely wrong. Maybe in some cases understandable, but wrong. Now you explain how murder is not an absolute wrong. If you cannot then your relativism is a dead letter.
That's clearly an argument from ignorance, which is a fallacy.
And I feel just as strongly about murder as you do, so don't even try to suggest otherwise. But that still doesn't make it a moral absolute in a meta-ethical sense. On the contrary, it suggests moral relativism.
Now you explain how murder is not an absolute wrong.
But you haven't explained how murder is an absolute wrong yet, you just declared it to be the case. Why are you asking @S to explain how murder isn't an absolute wrong for his argument, but you don't see it necessary to explain how it is for yours?
But you haven't explained how murder is an absolute wrong yet, you just declared it to be the case. Why are you asking S to explain how murder isn't an absolute wrong for his argument, but you don't see it necessary to explain how it is for yours?
I'll answer that: because he's illogical and because his position is untenable.
Terrapin StationMarch 16, 2019 at 17:08#2654550 likes
Actually, in hindsight, I think I might have misinterpreted what he meant there. But if so, it was badly worded. Given the rest of his post, which I've just briefly gone over, it seems he might have meant that not everything about morality is relative. But then, that still misses the point. And it is different from what he was claiming before, where he clearly confused moral relativism for relativism simpliciter, which he has been rightly called out for doing.
It is easy to miss the point if you don't understand what it is that a moral relativist is actually claiming. I for one am only suggesting that morality is relative in the relevant sense which I've explained in this discussion. I'm not suggesting that every single aspect relating to morality must be relative to something in some way. I'm not, for example, suggesting that rocks are relative, whatever that means, just because the judgement that it is immoral to throw rocks at people is obviously relative.
It isn't helpful that a number of people in this discussion do not have a good understanding of moral relativism, yet they nevertheless think that they're somehow qualified to criticise it.
Morality, unlike rocks, only makes sense if you apply an interpretation inline with moral relativism. The interpretation of moral absolutism only appears to make sense on the surface, but it crumbles under analysis. No one has succeeded in reasonably demonstrating the supposed existence of any objective or absolute morality. Instead, predictably, we just get dogmatism and bad logic. Even if this discussion were to continue over another twenty pages, my prediction is that that would still be all that we get from them.
Of course not. I'm not denying any outside influence whatsoever. I'm rejecting any suggestion that factors such as the prevalent religion in my society are a primary determinant in my morality. They're simply not. And I know that better than you or anyone else, because I know myself better than you or anyone else. My morality is, as I say, determined primarily by my moral feelings, and not those of society, or of the Tory government, or of the Anglican Church. I am not a sheep, I am an individual.
An emphasis on individual action and decision making and rejection of societal, especially religious, influence is your wont. I think that approach is unrealistic, but I don't see any chance of changing your mind. What I do like about the individualistic approach is it's focus on individual responsibility for one's actions. I certainly would never claim that societal influences are all that matter.
The moral significance is a proposition or a status claimed in a truth context. A world where an action is moral is different to one in which it is not. Which is in turn different from a world without normative significance. In posing these concepts, we are trying to get something right.
These are concepts about the relations of normative meanings. They aren't "just what someone likes" any more than our sun is "just something we think is there."
If that's your position, that some murder is all right, then please say what kind of murder or what circumstance of murder that might be.
Murder committed by someone who thinks it is all right.
To qualify - your question doesn't actually make any sense, I've tried to parse it in as best a way as I can as something like "what circumstance could someone use the expression 'this murder was not wrong'".
Otherwise you're asking me to presume absolutism within your question because without doing so, the idea that I have to accept some murders are OK does not make sense.
Terrapin StationMarch 16, 2019 at 20:29#2655020 likes
The moral significance is a proposition or a status claimed in a truth context. A world where an action is moral is different to one in which it is not. Which is in turn different from a world without normative significance. In posing these concepts, we are trying to get something right.
These are concepts about the relations of normative meanings. They aren't "just what someone likes" any more than our sun is "just something we think is there."
So again, the challenge to you would be to present any evidence whatsoever of moral stances, normative stances, etc. being anything other than preferences that people have about interpersonal behavior.
that if you do not agree with me (more exactly with the view expressed - I take no credit for it), then in essence you're saying that at the least some murder is not absolutely wrong. If that's your position, that some murder is all right, then please say what kind of murder or what circumstance of murder that might be.
Nothing is absolutely right or wrong. Things are relatively right or wrong, and one of the things that's relative to is individuals. (It's also relative to time, context, and other things, depending on the individual in question).
So as mentioned above, murder isn't wrong to someone who has the opinion that it's not wrong.
Because moral stances are only opinions that individuals have, that makes any particular moral stance not absolute.
Yes. If my position were that some murder was all right, then the kind of murder that might be would be murder committed by someone who thought it was all right. I'm not sure what more we could ask of someone committing a murder that was all right. Do you understand what moral relativism is? It doesn't mean that I think everyone else's behaviour is right. It means I think what I think about it. They think something different.
Or do you mean that the Allies were morally justified in fighting Hitler but other wars lacked moral justification?
I just meant that was the one example where we can come close to blaming it 100% on one party. Even that situation had additional factors.
I can comfortably say that no war ever fought NEEDED to be fought. But that is far different than claiming them to be objectively morally wrong. Are the defenders as culpable as the attackers? Did everyone involved even have a choice? What if the attackers are fighting against an injustice (perceived or real)?
VagabondSpectreMarch 16, 2019 at 21:59#2655140 likes
don't know why FGM came about, but I find it unlikely that it was a result of a cabal of child molesters, who the rest of the community had mysteriously put in charge, coming up with a new way of mindlessly injuring innocent children. So I simply presume they had a reason. By what I know it's an aboniable practice, the difference is, I'm prepared to accept that I don't know all the facts.
How very humble of you.
If someone offered to cut off your daughters clitoris, would you be interested to know about the boons and benefits she would receive as a result?
FGM isn't unique to any one ethnicity, nor is it a culturally dominant practice in any of the major ethnic categories. I can't possibly be attacking non-westerners specifically because it's not a western/non-western distinction. It is a practice with varying prevalence across some parts of north Africa, some Middle Eastern countries, one South American country, and a few Asian countries.
As I revealed to you before, It is practiced out in the world for a myriad of confused reasons ranging from "because the elders demand it", to "it will benefit their health and correct their behavior". In some cases they literally have no record or recollection of why they ever began doing it (they might as well be doing it for aesthetic reasons alone). You don't know all the facts, but at what point do the facts you do know become sufficient? (for instance, the fact that female circumcision is painful, dangerous, performed on a child incapable of giving consent (and who usually resists), and limits their ability to have a gratifying sex life as an adult).
What more data are you waiting for? Do you think it slows the spread of STI's or something? That victims of genital mutilation are made more subservient to their future husbands, which justifies the initial harm? Is it that we have to respect a parent's right to decide how and why to raise their children, because a parent knows best?
Give me something that will help me understand why you're not willing to condemn the practice of FGM as immoral. I get the "amorality à la -S" angle, but given that we're discussing FGM in the moral context of agreed upon values (individual health and social health), from our perspective, why can you not morally condemn FGM?
No, that comes from the fact that every example you picked paints non-westerners (or detractors) as stupid and/or immoral
The anti-vax movement is a western movement led by mostly middle aged stupid white people whose actions are immoral (their race, age, and nationality doesn't matter to me, it is merely happenstance). (I thought that went without saying). The first example I brought up was vaccines, which you rejected, so I moved on to FGM because I thought you wouldn't deign to question our ability to know whether or not is is a harmful practice. (After that I moved on to eye gouging and human sacrifice, where you finally caved).
Your attempt to portray me as racist (or what? fantastically arrogant? I think I'm better than everyone else or that I'm morally flawless?) is quite unreasonable, which makes me wonder whether or not you are arguing from emotion instead of reason. Perhaps you feel that it is too mean for me to condemn the culturally significant practice of FGM, because what does that say about the human beings who practice it? So you've convinced yourself I must be even more than arrogant... (I guess this is my fault for thinking that condemning the mutilation of a child's genitals is an "enlightened" thing to do. By using that one contentious word, I showed my entirely racist hand). It's a good thing I didn't bother condemning MGM as well, else I'd also be an anti-semite! (Did you know hundreds of male babies die every year due to circumcision related complications?)
I might be wrong about vaccines and FGM, that's true, but in so far as my detractors share my starting values, and in so far as they have no evidence/reasoning showing the utility of their moral decisions which I show (with evidence/reasoning) to be harmful (contain anti-utility), I get to carry on as if I'm right, even to the point of arrogance, until someone offers be better evidence and/or better reasoning. I'm not interested in being absolutely right, I'm interested in being usefully right. In the case of FGM all the good evidence points in one direction.
No, you picked examples where modern Western civilisation has some moral superiority to claim over non-westerners.
This clearly factually inaccurate. My original example was against anti-vax parents. Please discontinue this disingenuous line of attack, else I'll turn up the petty psycho-analysis in kind.
Maybe you didn't even realise you were doing it, but from the middle of a culture whose everyday activities are literally damaging the future of humanity, the fact that you looked further than just out of the window for your examples of objective, scientifically proven moral wrongs is telling.
How in the world could you ever expect me to guess that you understand (or "trust"?) climate science if you don't even trust the statistics showing the boons of proven vaccines (or if you think it's too complicated for most people to learn about)?
Something is very backwards here... Climate change is more controversial than vaccines. I avoided climate change specifically because of the enduring denial that comes out of conservative camps (which would despoil the context of my example, much as your anti-vax and pro-FGM (pseudo)rhetoric has achieved). If you want to take this particular tangent in an anti-modernity, anti-western, anti-industrial, or even anti-enlightenment direction, that's perfectly fine, but you'll have to clarify the point you wish to make. Are you saying that modernity/industry isn't worthwhile given the effects we've had, and will continue to have, on the climate?
So you have personally conducted research? Looked at the actual data set for the trials of the latest vaccine? Personally checked the records on which the epidemiological data is based? Because if not, then your trust in the people delivering you this information is faith.
A careful read of my posts will reveal that I've only ever lauded the benefits of "proven" vaccines, which means vaccines that have undergone clinical trials. When it comes to vaccines that have been in widespread use for long periods of time, we have real world experience to go by (data gathering and statistical analysis has to be trusted on some level, but it can also be "tested" through repetition, which mitigates our need for faith based trust).
The specific science of vaccines is well beyond me, but the science of statistical analysis is not, which indicates with overwhelming strength that those well-known vaccines we use to fight once common and deadly diseases actually work.
We're dealing with much harder ones where the facts of the case or the complex social/political circumstances make the way forward difficult to see. It doesn't help to come along claiming to have the answer like it was a maths sum.
Framing it closer to a maths sum is probably more usefully persuasive (for change) than framing it closer to a sacred cultural artifact which we would be racist to condemn. In any case, I'm saying we can use evidence and reason to rationally appeal to their existing values as a means of persuasion. I don't have any grand illusions that everyone can easily be persuaded; I'm just identifying what I believe is the most effective vector of persuasion.
And here we go again with the tiresome flag-waving for Western civilisation. Have you noticed the continued reliance on fossil fuel despite the fact that scientific consensus is that it is destructive to our society? Have you noticed that micro-plastics are now in every environment in the world and the scientific consensus is that they could be harmful? Have you noticed that careers continue to become more stressful despite the fact that the World Health Organisation consider stress to be a major factor in 80% of all disease? Any of that sound particularly rational?
We've got where we are because of a series of improvements whose short-term benefits could be directly seen and whose long-term consequences were barely given a moment's thought. That's not rational argument, that's seeing money in the minefield and going to pick it up and hang the consequences.
I don't exactly see why I should have to defend the whole of western society. I'm happy with the goal posts at "better off now than we were before". We have new problems, but that's life; we solve one problem and it creates a new one or a new one just emerges on its own. Relatively speaking we're better off than before by almost every measurable metric (lifespan, health, comforts). Maybe the west will bring about the destruction of all humans, but until that happens we're in the utilitarian black.
No, this goes back to what I said above about certainty. I completely agree that rational arguments have greater or lesser strength (for those who have already agreed to use rationality as a thinking tool). But I strongly disagree with the granularity, the exactness, you claim is possible when such arguments become complex. My position can be summed up as;
Given the complexity of the physical and social environment in which decisions have to be made, the vast majority of calculations can only be assessed so broadly that we end up with a very large group of options for all of which the most we can say is "yes, that broadly makes sense".
Your argument is like claiming to judge which is the higher mountain to the micrometer without any measuring equipment. We can all see the difference between a mountain and a hill, but from there it's just guesswork as to which is tallest.
I get what you're saying, but I don't agree it reasonably applies to FGM and vaccines. From where I stand, they're both clearly foothills, and I can even see/fathom why the crowds gathered at their base mistake them for a high peak.
Asking "what should we do" in the context of all possible actions is overwhelming. But in comparing just two specific actions, or even comparing one action against its negation, we can still make useful relative statements about "superior and inferior decisions". It is far easier to say (to persuade) that something is morally superior than to say it is morally obligatory, (positive moral obligation might be incoherent) because we would have to establish that one particular action has a higher utility than all other possible actions, but often times we can quite confidently say that something is immoral (morally inferior), because all we need to do is show that not doing it has higher relative utility than doing it.
It's not that i think non FGM and being pro-vaccine are of extraordinary utility; I think that FGM and intentionally avoiding vaccines are direct or sufficiently proximate sources of harm, which directly controverts our fundamental moral values.
VagabondSpectreMarch 16, 2019 at 23:06#2655160 likes
FGM is amoral except in the sense of moral relativism. So you either agree with me about moral relativism, or you're saying something false about FGM.
Are you talking about the practice/concept of FGM or the act of FGM? I'm not following why we need relativism to escape the amoral descriptor. I thought what is or isn't amoral was a meta-ethical distinction.
You still don't seem to realise that what you're doing is lose-lose.
You either describe something subjective, like my values, in which case we agree, even though at times you seem to act as though we don't. This would just be to preach to the choir.
Or you describe something objective, but which lacks meta-ethical relevance. Comments of the sort about brushing your teeth are not in themselves meta-ethically relevant. You only make them relevant because of your own moral evaluation, which again is subjective. It is not correct to confuse that for objectivity, and it is not correct to confuse objectivity which lacks meta-ethical relevance for objectivity which is of meta-ethical relevance.
It's my meta-ethical definition which describes in what way moral decisions can be objective, relative to values.
I'm eschewing subjective feelings about what morality is from a meta-ethical standpoint (by defining it as values serving strategies) so that we can have a consistent/objective discussion about how to compare and evaluate competing moral decisions or frameworks. It can't just be subjective feelings all the way up and all the way down; reality needs to be inserted somewhere.
If I've given you the impression I'm defending any sort of meta-ethical absolutism then I have miscommunicated. I am however, though not overtly, defending a kind of meta-meta-ethical distinction that I don't yet have the right language for: ethical frameworks are all in service of some sort of value, but predominantly they are arranged to serve a certain range of nearly universal human values, and they continuously adapt toward more optimal values-service. The broad "convergence" of moral decision making which is oriented toward the same ends induces us toward the idea that some ethical and meta-ethical frameworks are more universally applicable than others; it implies that there are some moral frameworks that will be more agreeable and persuasive to our moral decisions and intuitions at large. Broadly speaking, ethical frameworks which account for methods, costs, and results (empirical matters) tend to be the most widespread and communicable. Reason based moral arguments might not always persuade individual proponents of X, Y, or Z moral framework, but they have stuck around because they're objectively effective at promoting human welfare per our environments, and they transmit well because they are based in shareable empirical fact-checking behavior rather than subjective whim.
Your meta-ethical definition focuses on the very fact that there is no "objective moral 'truth'" as a starting point that defines it ontologically as a realm of relative subjective truth (where truth conforms to values and beliefs). My own meta-ethical definition focuses on what it is moral activity is attempting to do more holistically: it's not just serving values, it's trying to serve them well. Under my view also, moral "truth" doesn't necessarily point to anything meaningful beyond the existence of relative values. And like any proposition designed to navigate uncertainty (any strategy), there are no "true or false" decisions to begin with, only "statistically better and worse decisions" (though there is an objective truth to the ramifications of our decisions, even when we're lucky we can only approximate it with strong induction). Even if a decision is 100% guaranteed to be the worst decision, it could only be "false" if we went out of our way to frame it as a truth statement (it is false that X move will create the desired outcome)., Though we cannot access truth with objective certainty (as Isaac will never let me forget), we can indeed often approximate it with objectivity. (e.g:if Isaac was "objective" and gathered facts, then he would come to realize that FGM has no meaningful benefit to individuals or society.)
You both miss. I am not arguing that murder is absolutely wrong; I am assuming it. You both are free to take any stance you like. The substance is, that if you do not agree with me (more exactly with the view expressed - I take no credit for it), then in essence you're saying that at the least some murder is not absolutely wrong. If that's your position, that some murder is all right, then please say what kind of murder or what circumstance of murder that might be.
And note that "self-defense" or any similar equivocation misses because it is not to the point. Killing is not murder, and the question is to murder. Your problem, given your stance (as I understand your stance) is since morality is relative, then there is no maintainable absolute or universal moral stricture against murder. And if not, then some is ok. Question to you both: is it?
That is a terrible argument which confuses normative ethics and meta-ethics. This error has been pointed out multiple times, and yet you still make it.
You're asking me normative ethical questions about murder, so obviously I'm going to answer from my perspective, and I've already told you that I feel just as strongly about murder as you do. Nope, no murder is okay or alright. That is obviously my moral judgement, as you're asking me, and not someone else. It is relative and subjective. Not absolute, not objective.
If you ask a murderer, you might get a different answer. And moral relativism just words that as saying that murder is okay for him.
And yes, morality is not absolute. Murder is wrong, just not absolutely wrong in a meta-ethical sense. Before asking me a silly question about murder, remind yourself that I feel just as strongly about it as you do. But I am capable of distinguishing between normative ethics and meta-ethics.
You need to be a lot clearer about the context in which you're asking whether murder is okay. The context matters, and my answers vary depending on the context. I make sense of ethics through moral relativism. If you ask me to set that aside and interpret as per moral absolutism, then the question is either nonsensical or implies a falsehood. It's a bit like asking whether the present King of France is bald.
Murder committed by someone who thinks it is all right.
To qualify - your question doesn't actually make any sense, I've tried to parse it in as best a way as I can as something like "what circumstance could someone use the expression 'this murder was not wrong'".
Otherwise you're asking me to presume absolutism within your question because without doing so, the idea that I have to accept some murders are OK does not make sense.
Exactly. I typed up my reply before having read yours, yet we both point out some of the same key problems. Great minds think alike.
It is a real shame that Tim's reply completely ignores your explanation and jumps straight into a question about your answer full of his own implicit misguided assumptions. What he's really asking is, "Do you really believe that, given all of my misguided assumptions, and completely disregarding the explanation you've put time and effort into producing?". Isn't philosophy supposed to encourage critical thinking and open-mindedness? Some people on this forum do not display these qualities to anything close to the standard that I would like to see. It's like in that other discussion on political correctness, where some people just showed up to reinforce the simplistic view that political correctness is good, without sufficient application of critical thinking, without thinking outside of the box. Maybe this forum should be more like an academy, and members should display suitable ranks, with members who merely parrot simplistic views uncritically being of a lower rank.
Some people here should go off and spend some time reading the moral philosophy of Nietzsche and Hume, even if only as a task to encourage thinking outside of the box.
My view is that morality is evolved thought, and in that sense is a something and not a nothing, certainly more than an individual's mere opinion. I'd even argue that to some degree morality is sure as arithmetic, but the world from time to time and here and there lapses into such barbarous immorality that either humanity is at times collectively both stupid and ignorant, or morality ultimately lacks apodeictic certainty (but that has some other kind of certainty).
I’m in agreement with you here.
Just because people act in terrible ways does not mean the above isn’t true. The evolution of morality exists to hold communities together because it was the moral factor that constructed them, that they were based on.
If someone offered to cut off your daughters clitoris, would you be interested to know about the boons and benefits she would receive as a result?
No, but I am already absolutely convinced that doing so would be monstrous. I don't need a rational argument either way. I'm not slightly inclined towards mutilating children and standing in need of an evidence-based argument to the contrary. The thought doesn't even enter my head.
What more data are you waiting for? Do you think it slows the spread of STI's or something? That victims of genital mutilation are made more subservient to their future husbands, which justifies the initial harm? Is it that we have to respect a parent's right to decide how and why to raise their children, because a parent knows best?
I'm not waiting for anything. I'm not making the decision, and if I knew anyone who was, I'd do anything within my power to prevent it. I don't understand why, in a debate about moral relativism, you've started asking me questions as if I support continued practice of FGM. I'd happily stop it right now, but I'd do so because I think it's wrong, not because I think everyone else must think that.
makes me wonder whether or not you are arguing from emotion instead of reason.
You're the one rephrasing my argument to make it sound as if there's some question about whether or not I condone FGM. Do you even know what moral relativism is?
so far as they have no evidence/reasoning showing the utility of their moral decisions which I show (with evidence/reasoning) to be harmful (contain anti-utility), I get to carry on as if I'm right, even to the point of arrogance,
What do you think I've been presenting (with regards to vaccines)? Reasoning as to why one might not want to immunise a child. What bit of my responses on the subject do not come under the category of 'reasoning'? It just comes down to the fact that you don't agree with my reasoning, not that I haven't presented any.
This clearly factually inaccurate. My original example was against anti-vax parents.
Exactly. People turning against modern Western culture. I may have only used the term 'non-westerners' here, but I clearly added 'or detractors' in my previous mention, so it's disingenuous to act as if I'm not including those in the West who reject part of it from your target group.
If you want to take this particular tangent in an anti-modernity, anti-western, anti-industrial, or even anti-enlightenment direction, that's perfectly fine, but you'll have to clarify the point you wish to make.
The point was that you had a load of equally 'objective' harms on your doorstep but you chose to condemn groups that are anti-western. It reveals the major problems with so called objective 'wrongs' someone will always twist them to suit their personal agenda. It doesn't get any more basic than that. "All the things I don't like are objectively wrong, all the thing I benefit from a I'll let slide, even if they are objectively shown to cause more harm". Which do you think kills more children, child labour products bought by everyday western consumers or parents who don't vaccinate? But who did you target as immoral?
I'm not accusing you of anything. I'm pointing out that the problem with claiming objective moral laws is that your biases inevitably cloud them. They just become your own set of personal bugbears anyway, only with an undeserved gloss of objectivity over them. Quoting VagabondSpectre
Are you saying that modernity/industry isn't worthwhile given the effects we've had, and will continue to have, on the climate?
Now who's willing to sacrifice virgins? Thousands will be displaced, many die, species become extinct, communities wiped out, but its OK because we've invented the cheeseburger out of it.
Have you read anything about how "clinical trials' are conducted? I suggest Ben Goldacre's Bad Pharma, or just just read his blog, or the Statistical Society's, or AllTrials, or just about any reputable interest group. Ben's blog has got 37 articles about the misbehaviour of the pharmaceutical industry, and given his other work against homeopathy and and the anti-vax movement, he's hardly trying to bring civilisation down.
When it comes to vaccines that have been in widespread use for long periods of time, we have real world experience to go by (data gathering and statistical analysis has to be trusted on some level, but it can also be "tested" through repetition,
How many though? For a parent, they want to know if the actual drug they are agreeing to inject into their child is going to be worth the risk. Their child, not the average child. So let's say I'm the parent of a five-year old. What epidemiological study should I be looking at to show the long-term benefits for a breastfed child, with a diet high in fresh vegetables, a low stress environment with only small isolated groups of children and good personal hygiene (all of which the WHO list as having significant effect on immune response). Show me a study following that specific group (or even one close to it) and I might be convinced, otherwise it's just about choosing risk categories. As I said, my chances of dying in a plane crash are zero, I don't fly, so why should I learn the safety procedure just because studies show it saves lives?
we can use evidence and reason to rationally appeal to their existing values as a means of persuasion. I don't have any grand illusions that everyone can easily be persuaded; I'm just identifying what I believe is the most effective vector of persuasion.
I have no problem with using evidence and reason. The trouble is, you seem to. I have been presenting evidence and reason as to why a parent might reject vaccination. I've not argued they might reject vaccines without any reasons, I've given reasons and you ignored them all because they don't give you the answer you decided on before the argument even began. A basic understanding of human psychology is all that's required.
You're equivocating. You argue for the seeming uncontroversial "we should use reason and evidence to determine our actions", but what you're actually saying is that reason and evidence, once applied, provide us with a single correct answer, and that's a much more controversial claim which remains unsupported.
Everyone has one. The nuance will vary accordingly.
Next.
Yes, but we should all be able to agree on that, and it completely misses the controversy, making no ground whatsoever towards resolving it, which is why saying, "Next", after making that point is full of comic irony. Sometimes it's like you and MU are battling for the position of best inadvertent comedian.
In my assessment, moral relativism makes much better sense of the nuance than moral absolutism.
The evolution of morality exists to hold communities together because it was the moral factor that constructed them, that they were based on.
I agree. I think if we had to explain the striking degree of homogeneity with people's moral judgement, evolved mechanisms to keep communities together would be top of my list of reasons. But I'm not seeing how you're moving from the existence of a cause for moral judgement being the way it is, to the existence of a moral absolute. There's an evolutionary reason why we tend to like junk food, and tend to turn our noses up a boiled veg. It's because we're programmed to seek out high energy return foods. Now, does that make eating junk food mandatory? Is it now the case that we 'must' eat junk food, because we've identified the biological cause of the general preference for it?
I've not doubt that there is some biological basis behind our feelings on moral matters. But there's some biological basis behind all of our feelings and motivations, but that doesn't mean they're all the same, any more than we all have blue eyes.
Are you talking about the practice/concept of FGM or the act of FGM?
Either: it's the same answer. Not immoral in itself, only immoral in the sense of moral relativism.
Moral relativism has a parallel in existential nihilism, so it might help to think about it in that way. There's no meaning in the world itself, the meaning stems from us.
I'm not following why we need relativism to escape the amoral descriptor. I thought what is or isn't amoral was a meta-ethical distinction.
Because moral relativism implicitly acknowledges that it's about our moral judgement in relation to the thing, whereas if you don't do that, then it leads to the absurdity of things being moral or immoral in themselves, independently of our judgement. And that makes no sense.
This [i]is[/I] a meta-ethical distinction. I am a meta-ethical moral relativist. We're doing meta-ethics here, or at least we're supposed to be, aren't we? Some people here seem to be getting confused about the appropriate context.
It's my meta-ethical definition which describes in what way moral decisions can be objective, relative to values.
I'm eschewing subjective feelings about what morality is from a meta-ethical standpoint (by defining it as values serving strategies) so that we can have a consistent/objective discussion about how to compare and evaluate competing moral decisions or frameworks. It can't just be subjective feelings all the way up and all the way down; reality needs to be inserted somewhere.
If I've given you the impression I'm defending any sort of meta-ethical absolutism then I have miscommunicated. I am however, though not overtly, defending a kind of meta-meta-ethical distinction that I don't yet have the right language for: ethical frameworks are all in service of some sort of value, but predominantly they are arranged to serve a certain range of nearly universal human values, and they continuously adapt toward more optimal values-service. The broad "convergence" of moral decision making which is oriented toward the same ends induces us toward the idea that some ethical and meta-ethical frameworks are more universally applicable than others; it implies that there are some moral frameworks that will be more agreeable and persuasive to our moral decisions and intuitions at large. Broadly speaking, ethical frameworks which account for methods, costs, and results (empirical matters) tend to be the most widespread and communicable. Reason based moral arguments might not always persuade individual proponents of X, Y, or Z moral framework, but they have stuck around because they're objectively effective at promoting human welfare per our environments, and they transmit well because they are based in shareable empirical fact-checking behavior rather than subjective whim.
Your meta-ethical definition focuses on the very fact that there is no "objective moral 'truth'" as a starting point that defines it ontologically as a realm of relative subjective truth (where truth conforms to values and beliefs). My own meta-ethical definition focuses on what it is moral activity is attempting to do more holistically: it's not just serving values, it's trying to serve them well. Under my view also, moral "truth" doesn't necessarily point to anything meaningful beyond the existence of relative values. And like any proposition designed to navigate uncertainty (any strategy), there are no "true or false" decisions to begin with, only "statistically better and worse decisions" (though there is an objective truth to the ramifications of our decisions, even when we're lucky we can only approximate it with strong induction). Even if a decision is 100% guaranteed to be the worst decision, it could only be "false" if we went out of our way to frame it as a truth statement (it is false that X move will create the desired outcome)., Though we cannot access truth with objective certainty (as Isaac will never let me forget), we can indeed often approximate it with objectivity. (e.g:if Isaac was "objective" and gathered facts, then he would come to realize that FGM has no meaningful benefit to individuals or society.)
[I]Your reply is too lengthy![/I] :rage:
So you're just being annoying by differing from me semantically? You have yet to learn that I'm always right, and that there should be a single unified meaning, namely my own meaning. One day I'll become a dictator and enforce my own unified meaning, like in 1984.
I do think that we're talking past each other to an extent, and I blame you for that more than I blame myself. In a nutshell, you seem to be saying something like that there are some moral frameworks which are generally more useful than others, and which generally serve our interests better than others. But to me that is beside the point. It doesn't matter whether it is true or false, because the problem is that it is irrelevant. It is actually fallacious if you're appealing to the consequences in a meta-ethical context. For example, if you were to suggest that we should all believe that morality is objective, because if we do, then that would serve our interests better. That's appropriate in normative ethics, but inappropriate in meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is firstly about what's the case, then what's the best way of speaking about it. (That's actually what most if not all topics in philosophy are about, or what they should be about). So I conclude moral anti-realism, but then conclude moral relativism over error theory or emotivism. The differences between the positions I mentioned have much to do with how we should interpret moral language, but also about what is actually the case.
But I'm not seeing how you're moving from the existence of a cause for moral judgement being the way it is, to the existence of a moral absolute.
That is a big question, and probably entails more work than I can be bothered with to try and explain. It’s not that I can’t be bothered addressing your question, it’s just that it’s a complicated area, and after all, I’m not out to reshape our thinking, nor do I necessarily have the skills.
But, the incest taboo is an interesting area to think about. Why is it there?
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 09:45#2655940 likes
The support is the fact that morality is simply an expression of individuals' preferences of interpersonal behavior. There's zero evidence that it's anything else.
I agree. I think if we had to explain the striking degree of homogeneity with people's moral judgement, evolved mechanisms to keep communities together would be top of my list of reasons. But I'm not seeing how you're moving from the existence of a cause for moral judgement being the way it is, to the existence of a moral absolute. There's an evolutionary reason why we tend to like junk food, and tend to turn our noses up a boiled veg. It's because we're programmed to seek out high energy return foods. Now, does that make eating junk food mandatory? Is it now the case that we 'must' eat junk food, because we've identified the biological cause of the general preference for it?
I've not doubt that there is some biological basis behind our feelings on moral matters. But there's some biological basis behind all of our feelings and motivations, but that doesn't mean they're all the same, any more than we all have blue eyes.
Reply to IsaacReply to SReply to Terrapin Station this is an actual question not an argument. How does the language of moral relativism work? These are still judgments being made, and qualitative words are used to express them, good or bad right or wrong true or false. Now I understand that all of those words have some amount of degree, things can be righter, or wronged, but at the basic level the are either dichotomous or meaningless. Good can not be bad, right can not be wrong, etc.
So is the moral relativist using words with a high degree of objective meaning to declare their position?
And if that itself is not inconsistent, how can such words have any meaning at all, if they can be used interchangeably by anyone about anything. Can one event be both good and bad, and if so what does that do to the concept of truth?
If moral relativists disagree about if an action is right or wrong, does that mean that both are true? That neither are true? That there is no such things as truth in moral judgments?
Nothing is absolutely right or wrong.
— Terrapin Station
You completely miss the boomerang effect of this, don't you. And it's not trivial. Indeed it's a linchpin of your argument. Like this:
1) If nothing is absolutely right or wrong, then no moral proposition is absolutely right, or wrong.
2) Nothing is absolutely right or wrong.
3) No moral proposition is absolutely right, or wrong.
But 2) is just an unsupported claim. The syllogism is valid, just not true. But why would you care, after all, nothing is absolutely true or false? You can have what you want. Btw, does everyone benefit from this argument of yours? Or does it only work for you?
This is easily resolved in favour of the sceptic of moral absolutism, rather than the proponent of moral absolutism. One could just retract the stronger claim that nothing is absolutely right or wrong, and instead just point out that there seems to be no credible evidence or reasonable argument in favour of moral absolutism, only dogmatism and bad logic.
You would be just as guilty as he is with your own bare assertion that his argument is unsound because the second premise is not true. You haven't shown that it is not true, and you also just keep assuming absolutism, which renders your criticism trivial and ineffective.
Moreover, whether or not everyone benefits from his argument is irrelevant. Why do you keep confronting people like myself and Terrapin Station with irrelevancies, as though they are not irrelevancies? Are you so eager to attack our position that you're not thinking things through properly? It has seemed that way from the very beginning. You seem to have few qualms about throwing the logic rulebook out of the window if it seems to you that by doing so you'll gain the upper hand over your moral relativist opponents.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 10:20#2656070 likes
So, for me, first you might have noticed that I don't buy that meaning is objective.
And I've stated a number of times, including in this thread, and I'm pretty sure in response to you, that moral stances are not the sorts of things that are true or false.
In a moral context, "x is wrong," " x is bad" or "one should not do x" is an expression of disapproval by the utterer. The utterer doesn't like people doing x, it doesn't sit well with them, or they don't think that doing x is a good idea, because they don't like the notion of the sort of world that they believe allowing x will produce. That's the conventional "meaning," per functional analysis, of "is wrong/is bad/should not do."
So yes, the same thing can be right/wrong, good/bad to different people. That doesn't affect the conventional meaning of right/wrong or good/bad.
I'm basically an emotivist, and that provides a good analogy here. It's easy to understand that people might yay or boo the same thing--supporters of a team are going to yay them as they score, supporters of the opposing team will boo the first team as they score. We're not mystified in that situation what yaying or booing mean (otherwise you'd not be able to figure out who in the crowd supports which team).
Is it true that yay Red Sox? That should seem like a nonsensical question. It's the same with morality. That doesn't imply that yay Red Sox is meaningless, that it's not important to people, etc.
The evolution of morality exists to hold communities together because it was the moral factor that constructed them, that they were based on.
Completely irrelevant given the context. The context is about what morality is, not what morality is good for. Why is it that so many people in this discussion seem blind to what the discussion is supposed to be about? A subtle red herring or a subtle missing of the point are still problems.
There's an evolutionary reason why we tend to like junk food, and tend to turn our noses up a boiled veg. It's because we're programmed to seek out high energy return foods. Now, does that make eating junk food mandatory? Is it now the case that we 'must' eat junk food, because we've identified the biological cause of the general preference for it?
I think we eat junk food because it’s easy. We dont need junk food to give us a high energy return when we gave other food that we’ve eaten for years.
If instead of junk food you said morality, and that our survival and successful evolution was dependent on ideas of morality that evolved and held together our co-operative communities, then yes, we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.
I'm very much a 'meaning is use' person when it comes to language, so the problem you're outlining doesn't even arise. 'Good' when used of a moral type of action, simply doesn't mean the same thing as 'good' when used of a lawnmower, or 'good' when used of an answer to a maths sum. We use words to make something happen in the world and that varies with circumstance.
To give an example, I might say "murder is wrong" to someone about to kill a non-combatant in my platoon. By that I would really mean something like "I'm betting you think murder is wrong too and I'm reminding you that killing a non-combatant is technically murder".
Alternatively I might say "raising interest from loans to poverty strike nations is evil" by I which I mean "I'm in the camp of people who think this is evil and I want people to know it"
Like most language, it depends on the circumstances.
As far as truth is concerned, I'm pretty much a deflationist when it comes to truth values too, so the statements, of the form above, don't really have any bearing on 'Truth'. The truth they express (small 't' truth) is simply that of reporting my state of mind.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 10:26#2656130 likes
I think we eat junk food because it’s easy. We dont need junk food to give us a high energy return when we gave other food that we’ve eaten for years.
Evolutionarily, we have a physiological response that produces positive feelings in response to foods with high fat content, etc., because it wasn't easy to acquire such foods for most of our history, and it's a substance that's important to have, especially when we're doing a lot of exercise, which we routinely did when we were nomadic and had to forage and hunt for food.
What morality is? Don’t be so arrogant. If it doesn’t have a purpose, what it’s good for, then why would it exist?
No, not arrogant. Logical. Don't make irrelevant personal remarks about my character.
Yes, what morality is. That's a different issue to the issue your following questions get at. It is not about purpose, what it is good for, or why it would exist. That's a red herring.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 10:28#2656150 likes
If instead of junk food you said morality, and that our survival and successful evolution was dependent on ideas of morality that evolved and held together our co-operative communities, then yes, we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.
Firstly, you've just repeated Moore's open question argument without showing how you resolve it. You've argued "we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.", but now you need an argument to show why we must keep communities together.
Secondly, and I think most importantly here, what makes you think our survival was dependent on one single morality. It certainly wouldn't appear to have been reliant on one single personality type, or physical type. In fact, there's a very good argument in favour of the evolutionary advantage of neurodiversity within communities. So what makes you think one set of moral rules would be right for everyone, even from a purely biological point of view?
Reply to Terrapin StationReply to Isaac so if there is no truth value in any relative moral judgment, why make them? It just turn all such judgments to preference. Murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate.
I'm pointing out that the problem with claiming objective moral laws is that your biases inevitably cloud them. They just become your own set of personal bugbears anyway, only with an undeserved gloss of objectivity over them.
Yes! Tim Wood and Banno are perfect examples of this.
Because, from my point of view, morality is inherent in man. It had a purpose that enabled him to evolve successfully. Otherwise there would be no communities as we know them. That’s the context.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 10:40#2656260 likes
Would you say "There's no truth value in 'Yay Red Sox,' so why root for them? Red Sox or Yankees--it makes no difference"?
With your flavors analogy, you don't figure that people just buy any arbitrary flavor because it's not objectively the case that one flavor is better than another, do you?
if there is no truth value in any relative moral judgment, why make them?
Why make them? That doesn't even make sense. I don't start off with a blank slate and then 'decide' whether I think mutilating babies is OK. Do you? I already feel mutilating babies is monstrous. There's no choice in the matter. It's like asking why judge whether you like being hit in the face or not.
Reply to Terrapin Station that was my point, moral or not is just preference, there is no truth. Vanilla or chocolate, Red Sox or Yankees. One is not the true answer.
Because you deny relevance to me looking at the why of morality as irrelevant in an effort to determine what it is, and yet there is nothing in the posts but disagreement. Why is your approach better than mine, why is it irrelevant?
...we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.
I think we need to go back to the basics with anyone who makes a comment like that in this discussion:
Do you understand the distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics? Do you understand which category your above comment falls under? And do you understand what the topic of this discussion is supposed to be about?
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 10:51#2656360 likes
I'm very much a 'meaning is use' person when it comes to language, so the problem you're outlining doesn't even arise. 'Good' when used of a moral type of action, simply doesn't mean the same thing as 'good' when used of a lawnmower, or 'good' when used of an answer to a maths sum. We use words to make something happen in the world and that varies with circumstance.
To give an example, I might say "murder is wrong" to someone about to kill a non-combatant in my platoon. By that I would really mean something like "I'm betting you think murder is wrong too and I'm reminding you that killing a non-combatant is technically murder".
Alternatively I might say "raising interest from loans to poverty strike nations is evil" by I which I mean "I'm in the camp of people who think this is evil and I want people to know it"
Like most language, it depends on the circumstances.
@Rank Amateur, I'm with him on that. It makes way more sense to me to interpret moral statements as stemming from moral feelings, and moral feelings are evidently subjective and evidently vary. Moral relativism is a way of making sense of moral language which doesn't end up translating it to "Yay!" and "Boo!" which are not truth-apt. I would translate it to something which [I]is[/I] truth-apt, and which stems from moral feeling, like "I disapprove of murder". That's not necessarily what they mean, or at least, they don't necessarily realise that that's effectively what they're doing, but alternatives are nonsensical or false, and I don't see models which lead to nonsense or falsehood as being particularly helpful.
And there are no contradictions between different claims under moral relativism because of the relativism part. The law of noncontradiction has not been violated. And your self-made contradictions are your problem, not mine.
It seems to me that the arguments from moral absolutists here all seem to come down to the fact that they want there to be some system whereby they can tell other people to change their behaviour and have some weapon in their arsenal (namely objective fact) which their opponents lack.
I'm a pragmatist, so I'm actually less concerned than some here about 'the way things actually are'. I think moral relativism is 'the way things actually are' on account of a complete lack of evidence to the contrary, but that's not something I'm bothered to argue over.
The pragmatic point, however, is important to me. The idea of objective moral 'truth' requires that one construct an argument, based on evidence and logic, in order to try to get other people to behave the way you think is right. You're saying that the arsonist can carry on as he is unless you can 'prove objectively' that he is causing more harm than good. And he'll disagree with you, and bring his own reason and evidence to bear, just like we're doing here on the meta-ethical question. And just like we're doing here, the whole judgment will get bogged down in disagreements over the validity of the evidence, the validity of the logical steps, the epistemic status of any answers we get...
I'm just not seeing why people think objectivism is of any greater pragmatic use.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 11:22#2656520 likes
Good points again, and I pointed that same thing out earlier. If we're all objectivists, that doesn't help us to agree. As you point out, we're all objectivists on meta-ethics, after all, and we're certainly not in agreement about that.
Aside from fields where there are formal proof procedures that are pretty well-entrenched, to persuade anyone of anything requires mastering techniques that have nothing to do with whether anything is really subjective or objective.
Firstly, you've just repeated Moore's open question argument without showing how you resolve it. You've argued "we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.", but now you need an argument to show why we must keep communities together.
Secondly, and I think most importantly here, what makes you think our survival was dependent on one single morality. It certainly wouldn't appear to have been reliant on one single personality type, or physical type. In fact, there's a very good argument in favour of the evolutionary advantage of neurodiversity within communities. So what makes you think one set of moral rules would be right for everyone, even from a purely biological point of view?
Even if that were the case, what relevance would it be?
Brett has trouble with logical relevance. I group him with creativesoul and Metaphysician Undercover in that regard.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 11:35#2656560 likes
If one wants to persuade people of something, stop worrying about what's objectively true about the thing in question and start reading books like:
* Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert B. Cialdini
* Exactly What to Say: The Magic Words for Influence and Impact by Phil M Jones
* Conversational Intelligence: How Great Leaders Build Trust and Get Extraordinary Results by Judith E. Glaser
* Why People Don't Believe You: Building Credibility from the Inside Out by Rob Jolles
* The Art of Persuasion: Winning Without Intimidation by Bob Burg
* Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People by G. Richard Shell
I'm just not seeing why people think objectivism is of any greater pragmatic use.
It isn't, and thinking otherwise is a common misperception. One of many that we've seen in this discussion. I try to stamp them out, but sometimes it can be in vain, again, as we've seen.
Sweet Jesus. You are very much back at square one, as if twenty pages of correcting errors in understanding has achieved nothing.
Yea, I still see a logic flaw, you don't. Does it matter? Is one of us right and the other one wrong? Is there a truth about the nature of morality that we both may be unaware of? Nothing any of you has said effectively answers this point.
I understand there are circumstances and norms, and situations that effect moral judgments. But they are branches from a trunk. There is enormous unity regardless of culture or situation on many things most humans would consider morally wrong. Now you can chalk up that near universal consistency to evolution, God, or something else, but it exists and it is not coincidence.
What is the difference then between near universal agreement and nearly objective?
No, you are quite literally back at square one. You do realise that the following was quoted in the opening post:
[I]"Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behaviour that they consider more significant than etiquette."[/I]
And it was also clarified about a million years ago that it is similarly considered more significant than preferences about foodstuffs, yet the same idiotic false equivalence is being repeated.
Look at what I said in my very first reply back on page one:
[I]"There are two problems with this straightaway. Firstly, opinion is no more nothing than evolved thought is nothing. Secondly, your use of "mere" is an example of loaded language and a poor representation of the position that you're supposed to be criticising. A mere opinion makes me think of the opinion that salt and vinegar flavour crisps are better than cheese and onion flavour crisps. This is clearly not what was intended. Your characterisation is uncharitable".[/I]
"Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behaviour that they consider more significant than etiquette."
I undersatand that, but it does not answer how we as human beings have near universal moral judgments on many things, if there is not some things with a high degree of objectivity- do you have a theory?
There is enormous unity regardless of culture or situation on many things most humans would consider morally wrong. Now you can chalk up that near universal consistency to evolution, God, or something else, but it exists and it is not coincidence.
What is the difference then between near universal agreement and nearly objective?
There is near universal agreement about what we feel. Most people feel that they shouldn't murder someone and they feel that they should ostracise, or somehow discourage anyone who seems like they should murder people. So our feelings on many matters of moral judgment are similar. That means it is 'close to' an objective fact that most people feel that way.
So, for the one person who doesn't feel that way, what bearing does this objective fact (that most people think otherwise) have on your objective judgement of his moral feeling? All you can say objectively is that it is at odds with the majority. That doesn't require him to act any differently without some further link which you have not provided. I dread the day that being at odds with the majority position places on us a duty to change our behaviour accordingly.
Reply to S incredulity is not argument, and obviously not very effective on me. I am open to reason if you would care to take a deep breath and actually address the point.
Incredulity is not argument, and obviously not very effective on me. I am open to reason if you would care to take a deep breath and actually address the point.
I addressed the point. I identified the logical error, namely a false equivalence, and I just added the obligatory satirising of it, but I think that I was a little too late in adding that, so...
So anyway, I prefer cheese and onion flavour crisps and raping babies to ready salted flavour crisps. How about you?
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:23#2656760 likes
What is the difference then between near universal agreement and nearly objective?
"Objective" doesn't have anything to do with commonality or agreement. "Objective" simply refers to whether something occurs independently of persons.
I don't think that anyone is arguing the relative commonality of any stances. No one disagrees that the vast majority of people think it's wrong to murder, for example.
There is near universal agreement about what we feel. Most people feel that they shouldn't murder someone and they feel that they should ostracise, or somehow discourage anyone who seems like they should murder people. So our feelings on many matters of moral judgment are similar. That means it is 'close to' an objective fact that most people feel that way.
So, for the one person who doesn't feel that way, what bearing does this objective fact (that most people think otherwise) have on your objective judgement of his moral feeling? All you can say objectively is that it is at odds with the majority. That doesn't require him to act any differently without some further link which you have not provided. I dread the day that being at odds with the majority position places on us a duty to change our behaviour accordingly.
If, as I do, believe there is a high degree of objective truth that murder is wrong, I would say that person is objectively wrong.
If you believe there is a high degree of subjectivity, you can only say to him, that most people find your judgment that murder is ok incorrect. And try to change his mind, but if he chooses not to, you have no standard to value his judgment against, and must accept it as his subjective moral judgment, you can disagree - but that is all. It is now reduced to just preference.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:29#2656780 likes
I undersatand that, but it does not answer how we as human beings have near universal moral judgments on many things, if there is not some things with a high degree of objectivity- do you have a theory?
Human beings nearly universally have noses, don't they? But no one is saying that our noses aren't something that our bodies make.
In order to think that the fact that humans have something or other in common, where (almost) all of us have whatever it is, somehow suggests that the thing in question can't be of us, would only make sense if one thought that either humans are as they are more or less randomly or they have to be constituted/arranged/put in order by something outside of themselves. I don't know why on Earth anyone would think something like that, though.
'Universal' doesn't necessarliy mean 'objective'.
— ChrisH
I undersatand that, but it does not answer how we as human beings have near universal moral judgments on many things, if
You've lost me. What does "it" refer to above?
In any event, there's not much 'universal' about attitudes to abortion, homosexuality, animal rights, social welfare, health provision etc, etc. Doesn't seem to me to be any evidence of an objectively correct solution to these thorny moral issues.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:36#2656830 likes
It's frustrating that you can't get folks to follow through on a line of questioning about this stuff, because that could help them understand the other view. It seems almost like they're afraid to "go down the rabbit hole" though. So whenever it looks like they're getting too close to the rabbit hole, they back off.
"Objective" doesn't have anything to do with commonality or agreement. "Objective" simply refers to whether something occurs independently of persons.
I don't think that anyone is arguing the relative commonality of any stances. No one disagrees that the vast majority of people think it's wrong to murder, for example.
The question was why is there such unanimity, and is there some pragmatic difference between near universal agreement and objectivity.
It seems what you really want to argue is if morality has a is a human or supernatural origin. I am not arguing that, I am happy to say that you can have a very large degree of objective morality without any supernatural origin.
It's frustrating that you can't get folks to follow through on a line of questioning about this stuff, because that could help them understand the other view. It seems almost like they're afraid to "go down the rabbit hole" though. So whenever it looks like they're getting too close to the rabbit hole, they back off.
Yes, it is annoying. They just leave it down to others to connect the dots out in the open.
And so far no one has been able to say what morality is,
(Raising hand from back of the room)
Hellloooo!!! see page 17. I said, “Morality, one of two fundamental human conditions, the other being reason....”
Somebody did say what morality is, and happens to coincide nicely with your “inherent in man”. Problem is, everybody wants to jump from “inherent in man” as a “fundamental condition” out into the objective world of circumstance, without doing the work of grasping what happens in between.
I also said, pg 5 fercrissakes.......“In a discussion with a moral or subjective relativist, always first determine what exactly is relative to what.”, but people would rather dismiss the obvious than exploit it, so we end up with 20 pages of, as @Janus so aptly put it, “....litany of irrelevancies and category errors....”.
Everybody wants to be right; nobody wants to be laughed at, so nobody does real honest-to-farginggawd-philosophy, because doing so is never right and is often laughable. But some questions cannot be addressed any other way, and all answers are wrong if the questions are irrelevant.
Carry on, and good luck.
(Puts hand down and continues with idle doodling)
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:43#2656880 likes
The question was why is there such unanimity, and is there some pragmatic difference between near universal agreement and objectivity.
It seems what you really want to argue is if morality has a is a human or supernatural origin. I am not arguing that, I am happy to say that you can have a very large degree of objective morality without any supernatural origin.
First, I don't look at it as anything about supernatural stuff, because there are a lot of objectivists who aren't positing anything supernatural.
Re (near-)unanimity on some things (even though I think that tends to be exaggerated), the stuff about almost all of us having noses wasn't rhetorical or facetious. How and why most aspects of the human body develop as they do isn't very controversial. We don't see it as a big mystery that we almost all have noses, that we all have circulating blood if we're alive, and so on. We don't see many people believing that the only way we all have noses and circulating blood is because something outside of ourselves gave those things to us wholesale and we just took delivery of them. So it shouldn't be a mystery that the vast majority of people think that murder is wrong, either, that the vast majority of people agree that 2+2=4, that the vast majority of people don't like drinking hydrochloric acid, etc.
Re "there (being) some pragmatic difference between near universal agreement and objectivity," it depends on what the pragmatic goal is, but what is the pragmatic value of near-universal agreement in the first place? That's simply a fact about the way things are. It doesn't imply anything normatively.
In any event, there's not much 'universal' about attitudes to abortion, homosexuality, animal rights, social welfare, health provision etc, etc. Doesn't seem to me to be any evidence of an objectively correct solution to these thorny moral issues.
It seems that way to me too. It's probably because there isn't any. That's why some have resorted to dogmatism, and others try and fail to be logical about it.
Universal, near universal, a majority, evenly split, a small minority, one person... Doesn't make any real difference, meta-ethically. To believe otherwise is a moral delusion, a fallacy.
It's frustrating that you can't get folks to follow through on a line of questioning about this stuff, because that could help them understand the other view. It seems almost like they're afraid to "go down the rabbit hole" though. So whenever it looks like they're getting too close to the rabbit hole, they back off.
I am happy to go down any rabbit hole you want.
I am not sure either you or s even understand the point I am making. And I have yet to see it addressed in a complete thought.
Most of what I am hearing is you are wrong and you don't understand.
I keep asking what I think is a reasonable and logical issue, That either you can not, or will not address reasonably and logically.
Reply to S no issue there are many judgments people differ on. Is your point that there is no truthful answer to any of them? Even one we do not know. Or are all these equal and valid opinions on the item in question?
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:50#2656920 likes
I am not sure either you or s even understand the point I am making. And I have yet to see it addressed in a complete thought.
Most of what I am hearing is you are wrong and you don't understand.
I keep asking what I think is a reasonable and logical issue, That either you can not, or will not address reasonably and logically.
If you're talking about the unanimity thing, we have addressed it. Our bodies don't develop randomly, do they? You're not addressing that. You're not supporting the notion that there shouldn't be widespread commonalities if moral stances only occur in individuals.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:51#2656930 likes
I am not sure either you or s even understand the point I am making. And I have yet to see it addressed in a complete thought.
Most of what I am hearing is you are wrong and you don't understand.
I keep asking what I think is a reasonable and logical issue, That either you can not, or will not address reasonably and logically.
Your point that I addressed was your false equivalence. But you seem to be in denial that I even addressed your point. What don't you understand about why your point was fallacious?
Your last point didn't even go anywhere logically relevant, as Terrapin picked up on. That's a fallacy called missing the point.
If you're logically incompetent, then what tends to happen is that the discussion becomes about that rather than the wider issue.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:54#2656960 likes
If you're talking about the unanimity thing, we have addressed it. Our bodies don't develop randomly, do they? You're not addressing that. You're not supporting the notion that there shouldn't be widespread commonalities if moral stances only occur in individuals.
We are taking past each other, I see nothing in this that addresses my point.
Can you take a second to tell me in your words what you understand my point to be?
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 12:57#2656980 likes
Can you take a second to tell me in your words what you understand my point to be?
You believe, for some reason unbeknownst to me, that if morality is simply something that we do as individual human beings, there shouldn't be widespread commonality on some moral stances.
Your point that I addressed is your false equivalence. But you seem to be in denial that I even addressed your point. What don't you understand about why your point was fallacious?
No I obviously do not see the false equivalence- Can you explain it in a complete thought please.
He's in denial. I'm surprised his other coping mechanism hasn't kicked in yet. You can tell when it has, because he'll close down and go, "Okay, have a nice day!".
You believe, for some reason unbeknownst to me, that if morality is simply something that we do as individual human beings, there shouldn't be widespread commonality on some moral stances.
No my point was what is the origin of this commonality, is it coincidence, evolution, God, something else?
He's in denial. I'm surprised his coping mechanism hasn't kicked in yet. You can tell when it has, because he'll close down and go, "Okay, have a nice day!".
Usually in response to your ad hominem. Which is your default.
No I obviously do not see the false equivalence- Can you explain it in a complete thought please.
So you genuinely believe that my feelings about cheese and onion crisps are just like my feelings about raping babies, in every sense, respect, and degree?
If, as I do, believe there is a high degree of objective truth that murder is wrong, I would say that person is objectively wrong.
Well, obviously. If you believe that murder is objectively wrong (by which you mean someone committing murder is objectively wrong to do so), then is is simply a re-wording of your belief to say that a person who commits murder is objectively wrong to do so.
What we haven't heard from you yet is your reason for believing that. You have so far shown that most people feel murder is wrong, now show what logic or mechanism makes it the case that the few who disagree must also feel that way.
It sounds like you are saying that wrong, by definition, simply means those behaviours which the majority of people think are a certain way. But if that's the case, then what is that certain way? You can't use the word 'wrong' again because otherwise your definition is self-referring.
So you genuinely believe that my feelings about cheese and onion crisps are just like my feelings about raping babies, in every sense, respect, and degree?
I don't care if you want to wiggle out of my criticism and talk about something else. This is what I am calling you out for:
"It just turns all such judgements to preference. Murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate".
They are your own words. You can either concede or foolishly attempt to defend them. Or, you know, just revert to one of your coping mechanisms because you can't handle being wrong about something.
Well, obviously. If you believe that murder is objectively wrong (by which you mean someone committing murder is objectively wrong to do so), then is is simply a re-wording of your belief to say that a person who commits murder is objectively wrong to do so.
What we haven't heard from you yet is your reason for believing that. You have so far shown that most people feel murder is wrong, now show what logic or mechanism makes it the case that the few who disagree must also feel that way.
Because I believe there are things that are true. I believe you can make a truth statement about murder. And my argument to the person above, because his view on murder is not true
So we can argue that my view on murder is not true, or there is no truth about murder.
Can you separate truth from moral? Can one be mostly subjective and one be mostly objective?
No my point was what is the origin of this commonality, is it coincidence, evolution, God, something else?
Where does it come from.
Well, obviously not God. It's no more God than the Flying Spaghetti Monster or Russell's Teapot.
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism, which foolishly goes further and makes the additional claim that the commonality represents an objective standard. Ockham's razor.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 13:26#2657140 likes
You know darn well it was about the commonality of some moral judgments not where our bodies came from.
Moral judgments are something that our bodies do in other words. So with respect to my view, you're asking about a commonality of our bodies. (Which is why I brought up the stuff about noses, blood (circulation), etc.)
Re (near-)unanimity on some things (even though I think that tends to be exaggerated),
I realise this was an aside (hence the parentheses), but I wanted to highlight the point you're making.
The degree to which we all seem to agree is very broad... Murder is wrong, torture is wrong, that sort of thing. But this is almost never the actual moral dilemmas people seek an understanding of the which are things like - should we give money to beggars and if so how much, should it be related to my income or their needs, do I take their demeanour into account....
Any vague homogeneity here is virtually useless, if it even exists at all ,so the fact that we broadly agree murder is wrong, may well be interesting from an evolutionary point of view, but is completely useless, even to the objectivist, when judging real moral dilemmas.
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism.
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
As I asked terrapin, Can you briefly say what you understand my point to be, I think we are taking past each other.
Don't worry. I know how your psych works better than you do. You are predictable. What would happen is that I'd explain that your comment suggested a false equivalence, and you'd simply deny whatever I said rather than concede, blaming me for misinterpreting your comment. That way, you're right and I'm wrong. That's how it has to be for you, because you can't cope with the alternative prospect.
Reply to S I can just add this to the very long line of direct questions you refuse to answer. Because you have no real interest in ideas you are only concerned with winning an argument.
I believe you can make a truth statement about murder.
Why? This is precisely the contested point and instead of providing an argument to support it you've just re-asserted your belief. I understand you believe there is a truth value about murder. I gather you're religious, so obviously the fact of such a truth value is an article of your faith, but what purpose has it here? This is a philosophy forum, I'm not sure I see the purpose in our just declaring articles of faith and leaving it at that.
If there's a reason why you think there's a truth value about murder I'm interested to hear it. If it's just an article of faith then that's fine with me, but there's nothing left to talk about.
Why? This is precisely the contested point and instead of providing an argument to support it you've just re-asserted your belief. I understand you believe there is a truth value about murder. I gather you're religious, so obviously the fact of such a truth value is an article of your faith, but what purpose has it here? This is a philosophy forum, I'm not sure I see the purpose in our just declaring articles of faith and leaving it at that.
It is exactly the point. And they are linked. You can only have it your way if you tell me that you believe that there is no truth statement you can make about murder
You are asking me make an argument to prove 2 + 2 = 4 without using math.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 13:42#2657240 likes
Another non answer. No one is keeping score. Do you want to tag along with S and call it human nature?
It makes no sense to me why this wouldn't count as an answer to you.
Do you understand that on my view, moral stances are something that our bodies do? So if you're questioning my stance critically, you're questioning the origin of our bodies doing something, questioning why our bodies would do something where there can be such widespread commonality.
Doo you understand that on my view, moral stances are something that our bodies do? So if you're questioning my stance critically, you're questioning the origin of our bodies doing something, questioning why our bodies would do something where there can be such widespread commonality.
I think your base point is all judgments are thought, they only exist as individual human thought. And as such have to be subjective to that person.
I can just add this to the very long line of direct questions you refuse to answer. Because you have no real interest in ideas you are only concerned with winning an argument.
See? There it is again. Denial. No, of course you don't see it. That's the problem. But it is quite amusing from an outside perspective who clocks on to how your psych manifests itself in how you respond to me.
My point should be crystal clear, as it is no doubt crystal clear to others, but you are so in denial that you spin this as a refusal on my part to spell it out for you in the most obvious of ways. Okay, here goes, although I doubt that it will work on you, as you'll likely just respond in one of your usual ways:
I think that your comment suggested a false equivalence. It equated two very clearly different things, namely murder/not murder and vanilla/chocolate. You said that they're "the same". Of course, they're both preferences, according to the view in question, but that's it. That in itself does nothing at all logically (a fallacy of irrelevance) and the additional suggestion (which I'm sure you'll deny, because that's what you do: you deny what you can't cope with confronting) is also fallacious.
Any reasonable person will clearly see that that is either plainly false or highly misleading. It shouldn't even have to be explained to this extent. I think that you're just buying time and trying to avoid having to confront being wrong about something.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 13:47#2657270 likes
1.4k
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism.
— S
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
You can only have it your way if you tell me that you believe that there is no truth statement you can make about murder
By "truth statement" I'm presuming you mean something like "murder is..." where this corresponds to reality, yes. In which case I can say "murder is unpopular", "murder is the intentional killing of another in illegal circumstances", "murder is a six letter word"...
All those are truth statements about murder. I'm really not sure what you're asking for.
You are asking me make an argument to prove 2 + 2 = 4 without using math.
In a way, I guess you could say I am (metaphorically). If I don't agree with the axioms of mathematics, and you want to prove to me that 2+2=4, then you would be in such a situation. But, to continue the analogy, we'd be arguing, on this thread, about the axioms of mathematics. So the fact that you can't prove your point unless we agree with your axiom, is irrelevant.
I think that your comment suggested a false equivalence. It literally equated two very clearly dif
You lack of taking any time to actually understand what people say to you before you argue back is amazing. That is exactly my point, they are not equivalent. But if there is no underlying truth in the choice then it is just a preference. I say there is some truth that murder is or is not bad. There is no truth statement beyond mere preference if vanilla is better than chocolate
Your lack of taking any time to actually understand what people say to you before you argue back is amazing. That is exactly my point, they are not equivalent. But if there is no underlying truth in the choice then it is just a preference. I say there is some truth that murder is or is not bad. There is no truth statement beyond mere preference if vanilla is better than chocolate
It isn't "just" a preference. It isn't "mere" preference. That's back to square one again!
Obviously an emotivist like Terrapin [i]already[/I] accepts that both are preferences, and that there is no truth to them, so you are not doing anything logically relevant by pointlessly pointing that out. Like some of the others in this discussion, you struggle with logical relevance.
That is why he replied with, "And?".
What else could there be to that pointless point, unless, as suspected, you are suggesting something fallacious beyond a fallacy of irrelevance, like a false equivalence or an appeal to emotion by using loaded language in a superficial attempt to trivialise or smear your opponent? Are emotivists guilty by association with murderers or something? What's your bloody point? It still seems like you're dancing around the truth that you don't have a relevant or valid point.
You can only have it your way if you tell me that you believe that there is no truth statement you can make about murder
— Rank Amateur
By "truth statement" I'm presuming you mean something like "murder is..." where this corresponds to reality, yes. In which case I can say "murder is unpopular", "murder is the intentional killing of another in illegal circumstances", "murder is a six letter word"...
All those are truth statements about murder. I'm really not sure what you're asking for.
You are asking me make an argument to prove 2 + 2 = 4 without using math.
— Rank Amateur
No, what I am saying is there is a truth about murder being good or bad, right or wrong. We can disagree what the truth is, but it is important if both parties believe there is a truth. If we don't believe there actually is a truth. It is just preference. Then we can see if we think that truth is different than opinion. And if we believe there is a truth and that truth is more than opinion, we have left subjectivity.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 14:06#2657390 likes
So your view of the source of the near universal commonly held belief that murder is wrong is pure biology, It is a sneeze.
Yes. That's what I said about six or seven different ways above. Mentality period is just biology on my view. It seems so obvious to me that sometimes I forget that it wouldn't simply be understood without having to be explicit about it.
And yes, thoughts are the only things that have truth values. Propositions are thoughts.
If we don't believe there actually is a truth. It is just preference.
I thought we'd pretty thoroughly established this. Asking whether murder is right or wrong non-subjectively is like asking whether walking is right or wrong, or whether Birmingham is right or wrong. It's just not a question that makes any sense.
Only after we've sorted out your point that I was originally addressing. I want either a concession from you or proper non-evasive reply.
You need to admit that your point lacked logical relevance or explain what the supposed logical relevance was. I've connected the dots for you out in the open, but you just deny it without actually saying what your point was, except by repeating a point which lacks logical relevance.
I thought we'd pretty thoroughly established this. Asking whether murder is right or wrong non-subjectively is like asking whether walking is right or wrong, or whether Birmingham is right or wrong. It's just not a question that makes any sense.
Ok, if you do not believe there are any truth statements we can make about the rightness or wrongness of murder, we just disagree.
Then whatever my personal judgment on the topic is, you can disagree with, but have to accept as just as morally valid as yours
ok, so there is no truth, my thought is as valid on any moral subject is as good as yours?
I just said, "Thoughts are the only things that have truth values." Obviously I think there is truth, then. It's a property of some thought. (But not moral stances (at least not when we're keeping this simple, when I'm avoiding what would have to be a huge tangent on truth theory).)
Validity has to do with truth value. So no one's moral stance is valid on my view. Again this is because moral stances do not have truth values.
And no, almost no one--and definitely not me, would say that any arbitrary person's moral stances are just as good as other person's moral stances, because "just as good" is itself a value judgment that individuals make, and people--again including me--do not happen to judge all stances equally. Hence why I asked you earlier, "Equal from what perspective?"
My request stems back to something you said on page 20, which you still haven't properly dealt with. You are referring to something different, and which cropped up pages later. My request preceded yours and has priority. You are being unbelievably evasive, and unbelievably making it out as though I am in fact being the one who is being unbelievably evasive. Your psych makes for an interesting case study.
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism.
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
We are getting semantic now.
And you have not commented on this yet
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 14:23#2657510 likes
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
Not to speak for S, but I don't know what there would be to say to that. Is anyone disagreeing with it?
Because my request has priority. It relates to something that you said which precedes what it is that I said in reply to you about a tangent. You need to deal with what you said first.
6th dodge, I will be back later take your time for number 7
You are crazy if you think that I'm dodging instead of just holding you to my request which has priority over your request. You haven't explained why your request should have priority. You are the one dodging, and I am the one holding firm, but your psych has reversed this in your mind. You have an interesting psych.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 14:29#2657570 likes
Okay, I think I'm pretty good at strategic game playing, so let's try this. I will answer your request, even though my request has priority, but then you either have to answer my request properly and immediately, or you will face exposure as a sophist for deliberately avoiding the relevant issue which I originally raised and which you have yet to deal with properly by either admitting that your point lacked logical relevance or stating what the supposed logical relevance is.
And I am only answering your request in this single reply here, and then it is on you to answer my request, not to continue on this digression of yours. Is that understood?
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
We are getting semantic now.
Yes, and so what? (That's a rhetorical question - you shouldn't actually answer it unless you want to continue this digression and be exposed). The word "objective" obviously doesn't normally mean "near universal", and this is very easily demonstrated with examples. It wasn't the case that it was objectively true that the Earth was at the centre of the solar system, even when that was nearly universally believed.
So you can take your idiosyncratic and counterproductive semantics and stick them where the sun doesn't shine.
Now you must either deal with my request properly and immediately or face exposure as a sophist. Which is it to be? Let me know when you're back from seeing your therapist.
If you decide to do the right thing, then this is what you must properly address:
So if there is no truth value in any relative moral judgment, why make them? It just turns all such judgments to preference. Murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate.
That is exactly my point, they are not equivalent. But if there is no underlying truth in the choice then it is just a preference. I say there is some truth that murder is or is not bad. There is no truth statement beyond mere preference if vanilla is better than chocolate.
[b]It isn't "just" a preference. It isn't "mere" preference. That's back to square one again!
Obviously an emotivist like Terrapin already accepts that both are preferences, and that there is no truth to them, so you are not doing anything logically relevant by pointlessly pointing that out. Like some of the others in this discussion, you struggle with logical relevance.
That is why he replied with, "And?".
What else could there be to that pointless point, unless, as suspected, you are suggesting something fallacious beyond a fallacy of irrelevance, like a false equivalence or an appeal to emotion by using loaded language in a superficial attempt to trivialise or smear your opponent? Are emotivists guilty by association with murderers or something? What's your bloody point? It still seems like you're dancing around the truth that you don't have a relevant or valid point.[/b]
I think that you, Tim, and Vagabond Spectre have been suggesting [I]ad hominems[/I] throughout this discussion, but sometimes in a subtle way so that it has a better chance of going undetected. Some of the key fallacious suggestions from you three have been that us moral relativists are trivialising important matters, condoning things like murder or female genital mutilation, treating different moral judgements as not different but equal, being destructive, and thinking like an adolescent. Therefore, we're wrong, even though these suggestions are a steaming pile of bullshit and are nothing more than fallacy-laden propaganda.
Yes, and so what? (That's a rhetorical question - you shouldn't actually answer it unless you want to continue this digression and be exposed). The word "objective" obviously doesn't normally mean "near universal", and this is very easily demonstrated with examples. It wasn't the case that it was objectively true that the Earth was at the centre of the solar system, even when that was nearly universally believed.
Interesting to counter a claim of semantics by making yet another semantic argument. None of that addressed the concept addressed and you know it.
Maybe instead of making up rules for this forum, you should find a debate site, you are very good at it. Or if that falls through Trump may need another press secretary soon, he can use someone who never gives an inch and has no interest in answering questions, is always right, and has an indifferent attitude about the nature of truth.
Interesting to counter a claim of semantics by making yet another semantic argument. None of that addressed the concept addressed and you know it.
Maybe instead of making up rules for this forum, you should find a debate site, you are very good at it. Or if that falls through Trump may need another press secretary soon, he can use someone who never gives an inch and has no interest in answering questions, is always right, and has an indifferent attitude about the nature of truth.
You are extremely predictable. Do you know that? You have chosen to respond with denialism and evasion. Who would've guessed? Well, at least you have now been well and truly exposed.
Not to speak for S, but I don't know what there would be to say to that. Is anyone disagreeing with it?
— Terrapin Station
That was my answer to s, that he has yet to answer.
I think I speak for both myself and Terrapin when I say that we object to your lack of explicit acknowledgement that you made a point which lacks logical relevance. You made a point which preaches to the choir, and does nothing else, except suggest a fallacious false equivalence, whether that was truly your intention or otherwise. Making that equivalence is either careless or deceptive. Either way, you still fucked up, and you still refuse to admit it.
His "And?" never got a proper response. I think that it is pretty clear at this stage that there never was a follow up, or that it is invalid. But you won't admit it. You just want to move on and talk about something else.
I just said, "Thoughts are the only things that have truth values." Obviously I think there is truth, then. It's a property of some thought. (But not moral stances (at least not when we're keeping this simple, when I'm avoiding what would have to be a huge tangent on truth theory).)
Just to make sure I understand correctly. This means some thoughts have truth value, but thoughts about moral stances do not have truth value. If I have that right, than what makes any thoughts about a moral stance any more than a preference by the thinker of one over another stance
Validity has to do with truth value. So no one's moral stance is valid on my view. Again this is because moral stances do not have truth values.
I again have no issue if one wants to have the view that morality is largely subjective, as long as they acknowledge this entails allowing the different moral views of others without any value judgments. You can have subjective but then all you can have is different not better not worse.
And no, almost no one--and definitely not me, would say that any arbitrary person's moral stances are just as good as other person's moral stances, because "just as good" is itself a value judgment that individuals make, and people--again including me--do not happen to judge all stances equally. Hence why I asked you earlier, "Equal from what perspective?"
I disagree that you can hold to individual moral judgments to be largely subjective, and impose a qualitative difference one to the other. They can only be different.
You are extremely predictable. Do you know that? You have chosen to respond with denialism and evasion. Who would've guessed? Well, at least you have now been well and truly exposed.
Forgot the part where no matter what the reality is, you, like trump will always declare victory.
I think I speak for both myself and Terrapin when I say that we object to your lack of explicit acknowledgement that you made a point which lacks logical relevance. You made a point which preaches to the choir, and does nothing else, except suggest a fallacious false equivalence, whether that was truly your intention or otherwise. Making that equivalence is either careless or deceptive.
And you have yet to actually make a coherent point in opposition.
And you have yet to actually make a coherent point in opposition.
My priority has for some time now been getting you to be honest in this debate. If you made a fuck up, be honest and own up to it. Just say, "You're right, I made a point which lacks relevance. I was preaching to the choir", or just say, "You're right, what I was suggesting was false or misleading". I shouldn't have to press you so damn hard. Your precious ego shouldn't require so much protection. Is your psych really so fragile? My goodness.
Reply to S if I thought any of that was true I would happily admit it. So take one of those, and in a complete though, that shows you actually took a second to understand the point I am making, show my error I will be happy to admit error if you show it.
If I thought any of that was true I would happily admit it. So take one of those, and in a complete though, that shows you actually took a second to understand the point I am making, show my error I will be happy to admit error if you show it.
Here's the problem: I am not your tutor in logic. If I am, I demand that you pay me for my time and effort. Especially since you are a pupil who demands that logical errors be shown and explained over and over again, in various different ways, until you finally grasp the error, which you might never actually do, because your psych is clearly interfering.
The irony is that these demands from you are themselves suggestive of a fallacy, namely an argument from repetition, which means that you repeatedly demand a demonstration or explanation that has already been provided, with the hope that your interlocutor just ends up sick and tired and gives up on you as a result.
Just refer to my previous replies, and look up the fallacies which I've identified, and compare them to what you've said, and use your brain. If that doesn't work, then too bad.
You make a claim, I challenge you to defend it, you dodge. Rinse repeat, normal interaction with you. Just stop with the tactics please.
I identify a logical error in something you've said, I show you the error and explain why it is an error, you deny the error or demand I do the same thing again or try to change the subject. I eventually get fed up and stop trying. Rinse, repeat, normal interaction with you. Just stop with the tactics please.
Refer back to the answer, use your brain. Don't demand that I repeat the answer until I get tired and give up trying to get you to see the error. You are a bad pupil. Try harder, and don't blame your tutor.
what I am saying is there is a truth about murder being good or bad, right or wrong.
Agreed. The statement has a truth value. There is a truth *about* any empirical concept which doesn’t concern the concept itself, but simply the origin of it.
——————-
We can disagree what the truth is, but it is important if both parties believe there is a truth.
Agreed. The disagreement presupposes something enabling it, and also indicates the presence of, not just parties, but, morally inclined parties. Otherwise, there would be no need for a truth value at all.
——————
If we don't believe there actually is a truth, it is just preference.
Not so agreed. The non-assignment of a truth value does not validate a preference. If I say I don’t hold with x being true or not true, doesn’t imply I prefer one over the other. I could just be logically indifferent, or, in some typically empirical cases, unknowledgable. Still, a moral agent will not be indifferent, even if the logical possibility exists.
———————
Then we can see if we think that truth is different than opinion.
We can, and it is. A logical truth, which is what we’re actually working with here because we are considering a relative truth vale of a simple proposition and not a objective reality, is predicated on both necessity and universality, regardless of the contents of the proposition being examined. Anything necessary and universal cannot be mere opinion, because opinions have no subjective validity, being possibly nothing more than a notion or an idea. And universal herein meaning given for any possible condition pertaining to rational humans. It may well be opinion, but even then only in the context of a dialectic, which decides good/bad, right/wrong with respect to the empirical concept contained in the predicate of the proposition, but that’s not what’s being asked. To a human moral agent, it is not opinion as to whether or not there is a good/bad, right/wrong value contained in the proposition itself.
And because we remain in the purely logical, hence a priori domain, we are still being subjective. It also explains why you were given an comment (it is true murder is good/bad, right/wrong) that didn’t properly refer to the antecedent (there is a truth about murder being good/bad, right/wrong).
Best paragraph I’ve had to work with in days, so......thanks for that.
For some reason you thought I said murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate
And you called that a false equivalence
My point was, and is.
There are somethings that are true
I propose it is true that murder is wrong
There are two people, like yourself believe moral judgments are mostly subjective
One says, to me, my moral relative thought is murder is wrong.
The other says, my moral relative thought is murder is fine.
Both tell each other they disagree with the other one.
If you believe there is a possible truth about the moral nature of murder they both
Can not be right. And if you believe in mostly subjectivity, there is no standard to judge
If wrong.
If it is not right or wrong, it is just different. Like the choice of vanilla or chocolate.
I have no issue with the moral relativist as long as they acknowledge they lose the right to judge the moral judgments of others.
If two people are having a debate about whether horses have wings, and the first person says "Horses have wings", and the second person says, "But horses have wings!", and the first person replies, "And?", and then a third person comes along and explains that the second person's reply lacked logical relevance, is it appropriate or reasonable for the second person to refuse to acknowledge that their reply lacks logical relevance, or to change the subject, or to demand a repeat of the explanation when they can easily refer back to it?
I think that the third person is being helpful, and the second person is being wrongheaded.
Not so agreed. The non-assignment of a truth value does not validate a preference. If I say I don’t hold with x being true or not true, doesn’t imply I prefer one over the other. I could just be logically indifferent, or, in some typically empirical cases, unknowledgable. Still, a moral agent will not be indifferent, even if the logical possibility exists.
The point I was going for, was if there is no truth value in opinion a or b, either choice is just preference. There is no truth value that vanilla is better than chocolate. It is just preference, chose as you wish. We don't have that luxury with is murder bad or good.
And because we remain in the purely logical, hence a priori domain, we are still being subjective. It also explains why you were given an comment (it is true murder is good/bad, right/wrong) that didn’t properly refer to the antecedent (there is a truth about murder being good/bad, right/wrong).
Best paragraph I’ve had to work with in days, so......thanks for that.
I am struggling with how we can believe that it is true that murder is either good or bad. And there can be a significant subjective judgment on which it is. Subjective and truth seem by their nature seem at opposition
Understandably so. They are no more the same than chalk and cheese, and it is already known that they are both considered preferences, so if that was your point, then it is a point which lacks logical relevance. You would actually need to take it somewhere logically relevant, otherwise it is not worth even making to begin with. That is why when you make a point like that, you get a response like "And?". I really shouldn't have to explain this.
I bet you a thousand dollars that whatever you say your point was and is, it has already been dealt with. The only problem here is your problem in understanding what the problem is. It is a meta-problem, and it is really only your problem, but it is also a problem for anyone who is trying to help you see what the problem is, and how it can be resolved. You have blamed me for trying to help you, but the resolution requires the ability to understand the problem and understand how it can be resolved. I cannot just simply give you that ability if you don't have it. It can be hard work, and there's no guarantee of success.
There are somethings that are true
I propose it is true that murder is wrong
That's already a problem for Terrapin, because he is a noncognitivist. And I'm guessing it will be a problem for me also, but for a different reason. It will be a problem for me because I go by a moral relativist interpretation of moral truths. But these are really not our problems at all, because you merely assume cognitivism and assume absolutism without warrant. So they're actually your problems.
There are two people, like yourself believe moral judgments are mostly subjective
One says, to me, my moral relative thought is murder is wrong.
The other says, my moral relative thought is murder is fine.
Both tell each other they disagree with the other one.
If you believe there is a possible truth about the moral nature of murder they both
Can not be right.
No, the logical fallacy you're committing there is one that has been pointed out before multiple times, and it is that of begging the question. It is begging the question because when you say that both can't be right, what you really mean is that both can't be right in accordance with moral absolutism. But the error in that should be obvious, because a moral relativist obviously doesn't accept moral absolutism.
Alternatively, you're just plain wrong, because in accordance with moral relativism, both can be right. To understand that, you would need to learn about moral relativism and learn about the law of noncontradiction. If you have a proper understanding of both, then you will know that they're compatible, and that there is no contradiction, no violation of that fundamental law of logic.
And if you believe in mostly subjectivity, there is no standard to judge
If wrong.
This has been shown to be a non sequitur. There is a standard, and it is subjective. The logical error you are making is once again that of begging the question, because by "standard" you really mean objective standard. You must realise that standards are not necessarily objective, and that it is fallacious to just assume an objective standard in this context.
If it is not right or wrong, it is just different. Like the choice of vanilla or chocolate.
It is right or wrong, so the antecedent is false and the consequent is irrelevant. You would be once again begging the question by saying that there is no right and wrong because of how you interpret right and wrong. Moral absolutists do not have copyright privilege to moral terminology. I must have seen that error a hundred times or more.
And the comparison to foodstuffs has already been exposed as misleading, so you should stop doing that unless you actually [i]want[/I] to look like a sophist. There is a right and wrong - no one here is denying that. Do not confuse moral relativism for moral nihilism. They are two distinct positions. And nor has anyone denied that moral preference or judgement or whatever you want to call it is of greater significance than preference or judgement or whatever you want to call it about foodstuffs, i.e. "mere" preference.
I have no issue with the moral relativist as long as they acknowledge they lose the right to judge the moral judgments of others.
No, you need to understand and acknowledge your errors, including non sequiturs like the above. But I am not a wizard, I can't magically make you understand. I am just in effect your tutor in logic without pay.
You are incapable of dialogue, because you exercise no effort in understanding the other opinion.
No, you are projecting. But take a break, and when you're capable of being reasonable enough to overcome your psychological issues, I suggest you slowly go back over my reply instead of being a knee-jerk reacting bad pupil.
By the way, anyone merely making the point that some moral statements are true should recognise that this point will be completely irrelevant to most of us here. I only know of one person in this discussion who would deny that. He is an emotivist. I am not, and neither is Isaac, and obviously neither is anyone on the moral realist side. We're all cognitivists, and we all believe that there are some true moral statements, with the exception of one person.
So please bear that in mind when making lengthy self-congratulatory posts, under the illusion that you're getting somewhere and building a good case against the opposition. Unless the opposition is Terrapin and no one else, you're not getting anywhere.
True, there is no truth value in opinion. Nevertheless, maybe it’s no more a problem than disconnecting moral dilemma from aesthetics. Choice of ice cream may be a practical preference grounded in opinion, and hardly compares to taking a life, whereas morality is a fundamental condition of being human, so shouldn’t be grounded by something so arbitrary as practical preference. Easier to see if one considers the differences in the consequences of choice of aesthetics as opposed to the consequences of choice of poor moral imperatives.
You’re struggling with it because you can’t see how arbitrarily taking a life could possibly be good, or that even assigning a truth value to a moral proposition which says taking a life could possibly be good. The best way to get over that struggle is to become the object of some other moral agent believing it is true that taking a life is good. Being that object doesn’t help you understand how someone could believe it, but you certainly will be forced to know they do.
I don’t struggle with it because I have determined it couldn’t possibly be good in fact and the proposition that contains it is morally bankrupt. It is my own morality with which I concern myself, and from there, I don’t care how someone can come to believe something I find abhorrent. You, on the other hand, are on your own. This is subjective relativism writ large and how it works is entirely metaphysical. How it originates in the beginning, and how it manifests in the end, is something else indeed, for these are both empirically conditioned. Morality itself is in the middle.
“......Subjective and truth seem by their nature seem at opposition....”
They seem so, but can be reconciled a priori by means of pure reason. It is these reconciliations from which distinct forms of morality arise, and makes objective morality as a doctrine, impossible.
Notice also, the things we agree on are not the root of the moral debate, but rather it is the things we disagree on. If the former is significantly greater than the latter, we have an ethical community. Where the latter does come to the fore, we have administrative justice to handle the disagreement. Morality, again, in the middle, describes how the differences obtain.
Ok, if you do not believe there are any truth statements we can make about the rightness or wrongness of murder, we just disagree.
Then whatever my personal judgment on the topic is, you can disagree with, but have to accept as just as morally valid as yours
There is no such thing as morally valid. There is nothing to judge. Are you seriously suggesting that you weighed the pros and cons of murder before deciding it was morally wrong? For me it's just obviously wrong.
Valid is a judgement of logic. It expresses that that the proposition has not transgressed any of the rules of logic. If you agree with those rules the judgment is important. If you don't agree with those rules it is unimportant. Most people agree with the rules of basic logic (though there is disagreement around the periphery).
If there are similar rules of morality, then propositions about whether certain actions meet those rules or not will have a truth value (of sorts). It will be true that the proposed action is outside of those rules. But this will only be of interest to those who agree with those rules. Unlike logic though, there is not such widespread agreement on the details of those rules.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 17:52#2658000 likes
If I have that right, than what makes any thoughts about a moral stance any more than a preference by the thinker of one over another stance
Nothing. I've said over and over that moral stances are simply preferences, utterances of approval and disapproval (about a particular subject matter, not just any preferences, of course).
How reason? Kant mapped this territory. If I suppose murder at all right, then implicitly I consent to murder. Ultimately as a matter of reason to my own murder. If I qualify that to exclude my own murder, then presumably everyone can make the same exception. In addition there are notions of stealing, and of taking life, equally non-reasonable. And so the argument spins. Is Kant water-tight on this all the way out to the edges and corners? This amounts to the question of whether anything underpins reason. Kant indeed has values. But I think his effort of tailoring the fit of values and reason is more than adequate.
The reason I said that the categorical imperative is a joke earlier on in the discussion is because it is merely a conditional about universalism. "Yeah, but if we willed that it became a universal law that"-- Well, let me just stop you there, because I don't. I simply do not form my moral judgements in that way, and your reply of "Well, you should do!" has no force.
I think that Kant's predecessor in Hume was a far greater moral philosopher.
In sum, reason can and does give us absolutes. At the same time reason makes rigorous demands in the expression of those absolutes. Thus, "You shall not kill," correctly seems problematic as over and against the more precise, "You shall not murder."
Well no, in sum it does no such thing. But you're free to deceive yourself otherwise.
I sum, I hold the argument against the possibility of moral absolutes as an argument against reason in favour of psychology. Psychology has its uses, but it's not reason nor a substitute for it.
Do you hold that 2+2=4 is absolutely true as a matter of reason?
No.
I've posted this a couple times in the last month or so, and I'm pretty sure I directed you to it already:
Mathematics is an abstracted way of thinking about relations, with some basis in external-world relations as we observe and think about them (which doesn't imply that any mathematics is identical to external-world relations, of course), but the bulk of it is extrapolated from that, creating a sort of construction/game upon that in an erector-set manner.
Because of that, there's no reason to say that any mathematical statement is universal.
As it is, no mathematical statement is universally constructed by humans, but we have very stringent socialization procedures in place to enforce conformity to the norms.
For you we'll go very simple. Do you hold that 2+2=4 is absolutely true as a matter of reason? Or true only as a matter of opinion, of psychology, and thus true for some folks and not true for others?
What if I do? You can't just pull a switcheroo and conclude that it must be so with morality also. Ethics and maths are two very different things.
Reply to Terrapin Station Good luck trying to get through to him. I really mean that. I want him to understand. But we have reached the point of him getting stuck on reoccurring problems. I think that the biggest problem is that he can't see things from within moral relativism or emotivism, or he refuses to do so. His moral absolutist spectacles seem glued on tight.
And note that earlier on he mentioned the possibility of an explanation of morality involving God. I know that he believes in God, and the kind of people who believe in God are known to be dogmatic and rigidly committed to a set of beliefs. Maybe he is fixated on the idea that he simply must reject moral relativism. Moral relativism is bad! Destructive even! It is no different to moral nihilism or amoralism! Everything would be equally acceptable! (Even though it wouldn't be, that's just a really bad misunderstanding). :scream:
But does all morality find its ground in morality? Morality as psychology? Or morality as reason? Clearly the expression of much morality is in such terms as to make it seem psychological. "Should" is a convenient and easy enough argument, and easy enough to swallow, if it must be swallowed. It seems to me, though, that it all originates in reason. Not temporally; not first reason then practice. People do not usually work that way. But as a matter of logically priority. Experience, then reflection on that experience to unearth basic principles, reasons. Thus, to Brett, (human) morality comes into being in man, but is grounded in reason.
Maybe a way to approach the matter is to look at the limits of psychology in a different context than the contrast of reason against the background of experience.
For example, Kierkegaard outlined the limits of psychology as the insufficiency of explanation in relation to the need to decide. If the parameters of some situation can be completely explained as an event, no decisions are needed. The diremption between the absolute and the relative concerns the use of language, as such, and framing it in those terms does not make the observation a new psychology.
I find Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics interesting in this regard because he points to a gap between expressions of "absolute" experiences and the other kind without explaining it. Or at least it can be said that language does not explain language.
Yes, I hold 2 + 2 = 4 is absolutely true. As a matter of reason. No, not as a matter of opinion, psychology, and whether others hold with it is up to them.
Yes, I hold 2 + 2 = 4 is absolutely true. As a matter of reason. No, not as a matter of opinion, psychology, and whether others hold with it is up to them.
Now what?
Now we wait for the inevitable switcheroo, even though it won't work because ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things.
I'm always one step ahead. I don't think that that's always appreciated. I think it wound Rank Amateur up. It's not my fault some people are predictable. :lol:
Reply to S "Ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things."
I assume it wouldnt surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed.
Terrapin StationMarch 17, 2019 at 20:04#2658510 likes
?S
"Ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things."
I assume it wouldnt surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed.
If only we could figure out exactly what it's supposed to have to do with that stuff. :joke:
"Ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things."
I assume it wouldn't surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed.
It would surprise me, in a sense, because I don't really venture into philosophy of mathematics or contemporary philosophy. But from what I know, and from my point of view, the two seem fundamentally different in rather obvious ways.
But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it.
“....For the metaphysic of morals has to examine the idea and the principles of a possible pure will, and not the acts and conditions of human volition generally, which for the most part are drawn from psychology. It is true that moral laws (...) are spoken of in the general moral philosophy. But this is no objection, for in this respect also the authors of that science** remain true to their idea of it; they do not distinguish the motives which are prescribed as such by reason alone altogether a priori, and which are properly moral, from the empirical motives which the understanding raises to general conceptions merely by comparison of experiences; but, without noticing the difference of their sources, and looking on them all as homogeneous, they consider only their greater or less amount. It is in this way they frame their notion of obligation, which, though anything but moral, is all that can be attained in a philosophy**** which passes no judgement at all on the origin of all possible practical concepts, whether they are a priori, or only a posteriori....”
(**psychologists, anthropologists, moral sentimentalists in general, re: Hume, THN, 1738)
(****psychology was still an informal philosophical doctrine at the time of this writing)
You’re struggling with it because you can’t see how arbitrarily taking a life could possibly be good, or that even assigning a truth value to a moral proposition which says taking a life could possibly be good. The best way to get over that struggle is to become the object of some other moral agent believing it is true that taking a life is good. Being that object doesn’t help you understand how someone could believe it, but you certainly will be forced to know they do.
Tried, can't get there. Understand some do, I just still get to they are objectively false.
I don’t struggle with it because I have determined it couldn’t possibly be good in fact and the proposition that contains it is morally bankrupt. It is my own morality with which I concern myself, and from there, I don’t care how someone can come to believe something I find abhorrent. You, on the other hand, are on your own. This is subjective relativism writ large and how it works is entirely metaphysical. How it originates in the beginning, and how it manifests in the end, is something else indeed, for these are both empirically conditioned. Morality itself is in the middle.
Understand, disagree. Not with the explanation, but that such a rationalization has any meaning in any evaluation of a truth.
They seem so, but can be reconciled a priori by means of pure reason. It is these reconciliations from which distinct forms of morality arise, and makes objective morality as a doctrine, impossible.
Notice also, the things we agree on are not the root of the moral debate, but rather it is the things we disagree on. If the former is significantly greater than the latter, we have an ethical community. Where the latter does come to the fore, we have administrative justice to handle the disagreement. Morality, again, in the middle, describes how the differences obtain.
Just can't get to point where I see this type of resoning has value
If we go down this path we need to allow for such things as relative truth and subjective truth.
Reply to Mww Quoting from your bible again? I know, I know, cat's got your tongue. You are trying to "rise above" one such as me, it seems. Giving me the cold shoulder.
we need to allow for such things as relative truth and subjective truth.
Either that, or condense it into subjective relative truth. That way, truth meets its logical criterion of a sound conclusion but with different premises. I mean, in effect, we’re doing that very thing right here. We agree the leaders of the Crusades understood their sojourns to save Jerusalem were moral.....but we wouldn’t do it in a million years. We might notwithstanding all that, disagree on how the Crusaders came by their moral justifications from which their actions developed.
You know, truth, per se, really doesn’t have much to do with a philosophical moral system. I use logical truth to signify how it is possible to arrive at non-contradictory subject/predicate propositions, which are required for explaining why one morally acts the way he does under the auspices of a particular moral theory. Truth explains how the theory works, but doesn’t enter into the moral actions themselves.
What do you think morality actually is? What can you reduce it to?
Really, this is just another chat room and the same people are here. It’s a shame.
No one is forcing you to be here. There are other "chat rooms", you know. The internet is a big place. If we do not meet your approval, then what's stopping you from discussing this with others?
Reply to S "But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it."
Maybe absurd, or maybe crucial to any truly fundamental understanding of the basis of mathematics and its relation to both science and ethics. Given your professed ignorance of philosophy, at this point open minded curiosity might be a more adaptive approach than cynicism.
"But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it."
Maybe absurd, or maybe crucial to any truly fundamental understanding of the basis of mathematics and its relation to both science and ethics. Given your professed ignorance of philosophy, at this point open minded curiosity might be a more adaptive approach than cynicism.
I did not profess an ignorance of philosophy (in general). I actually know quite a bit about the subject. Way more than the average person. I once had a friend who had just qualified from spending years studying philosophy at university who said that I knew more about it than him. I have never been to university, or college.
But sure, I have no qualms in being open about the areas in philosophy of which I am largely ignorant, and I can be open-minded and curious whilst having cynical suspicions which might or might not be confirmed.
And the quote is true. Not literally of course, but I'm sure you get that.
Reply to S It may not even be cynical to point to the absurdity of some contemporary philosophy, especially since its being absurd doesn't mean that it's not true.
It may not even be cynical to point to the absurdity of some contemporary philosophy, especially since its being absurd doesn't mean that it's not true.
Yes, it doesn't mean that in the looser sense. But it can often be an indication of a problem of some sort. It makes sense to be cautious.
Either that, or condense it into subjective relative truth. That way, truth meets its logical criterion of a sound conclusion but with different premises. I mean, in effect, we’re doing that very thing right here. We agree the leaders of the Crusades understood their sojourns to save Jerusalem were moral.....but we wouldn’t do it in a million years. We might notwithstanding all that, disagree on how the Crusaders came by their moral justifications from which their actions developed.
You know, truth, per se, really doesn’t have much to do with a philosophical moral system. I use logical truth to signify how it is possible to arrive at non-contradictory subject/predicate propositions, which are required for explaining why one morally acts the way he does under the auspices of a particular moral theory. Truth explains how the theory works, but doesn’t enter into the moral actions themselves.
What do you think morality actually is? What can you reduce it to?
Understand, so we have to make both truth and morality variable.
Let me test that perception against slavery.
For most, if not all, human history, many cultures have practiced slavery. These views, in my admittedly novice understanding would meet the criteria for a normative relative moral view that slavery was not immoral.
In the case of the United States, and I would think in most others, while the prevailing or controlling moral view viewed slavery as moral, others in the same culture held a different moral view that slavery was immoral.
So here are the available moral options as I see them for this actual situation.
1. Both truth and morality are culturally relative:
The slave holders have the majority cultural belief and therefore their moral view that slavery is not immoral is the correct moral view, and then the same people held the incorrect immoral view when the majority of the culture changed
The abolitionists while not the cultural majority at this time, had the incorrect moral view that slavery was immoral, until the cultural majority view changed, and then they had the correct moral view.
2. Some truths and moral judgments are not culturally relative they are to large measure objectively true regardless of situation or culture or individual views.
Slavery was always immoral, and the slave holders were always wrong and the abolitionists were always right.
3. The is no truth or moral statement that you can say about slavery
Slavery just is. It is neither true nor false that it is good or bad. There is no moral judgement anyone can make about slavery - it just is.
4. The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement.
All of us just make our own judgement - each as valid as the other.
5. Others I can't think of.
Of course my view is only 2 makes any practical sense to me, it is always true that slavery is wrong, and enslaving people is immoral.
How do the other options work with truth and morality ?
Reply to Terrapin StationReply to ChrisH each as true, real, meaningful, correct, right. I am not tied to the word, it is not specifically special. Just trying to convey the concept, the idea within the limits of language and my limited command of it.
I know definitions are often important, don’t think this is the case here. If you are going down that road lMO you are being semantic.
The morality or immorality of any situation is a product of individual judgement, and all individual moral judgements are equally valid, iff confined to each of those same individual perspectives.
Answering this for myself: valid in the sense of being valid, and from the "perspective" of what being valid is and entails, i.e., the rules and their consequences.
Reply to ChrisH I didn't offer any conclusion - i offered different moral view options for a specific situation. I can't beg the questions if there is no conclusion to beg.
what I am trying to say is -
if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, than the judgement of the slave owner and the abolitionist are in no way superior, better, more correct ( fill in a word you like) to each other - they are just individual moral judgments that are different.
if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, than the judgem noent of the slave owner and the abolitionist are in no way superior, better, more correct ( fill in a word you like)
If you mean there's no non-subjective standard by which to assess disparate moral judgements, then yes, you're right. But it does not follow from this that disparate moral judgements are all seen, in any sense, as 'equally valid' by any single individual.
Nice catch; it is indeed a tautology. And tautologies are the simplest versions of logical truth. If there is truth required in morality, a binding of it, so to speak, it should be as simple as possible in order to offset the ambiguity and indefiniteness of cultural anthropology or empirical psychology, which has no bearing on the origins of moral philosophy at all, but merely denotes practical examples of it.
The tautological reduction is useful to support the choice of #4, and that’s all it was supposed to do.
The problem is that on the " The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement" view, no moral stance is true, real (in the objective sense), or correct.
Moral stances are meaningful to their bearers, and "right," if we mean the moral sense (rather than simply a synonym for "correct"), is what the individual moral judgment is about to the bearer--"right conduct," it's someone saying that they feel that such and such is right conduct, basically.
Those latter two things have no implication for "needing to accept" anyone else's moral stance as anything but their moral stance, a la "It's a fact that John has M moral stance."
But it does not follow from this that disparate moral judgements are all seen, in any sense, as 'equally valid' by any single individual.
it is just one to the other -
i can't actually see how your caveat above is even possible - it would mean an individual would say the abolitionist and the slave holder have equal valid views according to his judgement -
well maybe possible - but he is an idiot then and his view is meaningless
Reply to Terrapin Station thanks - understand the view - and what i see that option as. I would just disagree - I would say it is objectively true that slavery is morally bad.
assume with your world view, you have no need to accept or reject my view. It is just a fact that Rank Amateur has that moral stance.
So here are the available moral options as I see them for this actual situation.
1. Both truth and morality are culturally relative:
The slave holders have the majority cultural belief and therefore their moral view that slavery is not immoral is the correct moral view, and then the same people held the incorrect immoral view when the majority of the culture changed
The abolitionists while not the cultural majority at this time, had the incorrect moral view that slavery was immoral, until the cultural majority view changed, and then they had the correct moral view.
And what about correct and incorrect? Is that relative, subjective, objective, absolute? That's important. What exactly are you trying to do here? As a build up to some sort of criticism, this just won't work if you merely assume that correct and incorrect are objective and/or absolute. You'd have to actually first demonstrate that.
You do realise that some people will only commit to correct or incorrect in a relative sense here? So it won't simply be correct. It will be correct for them, and incorrect for others.
4. The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement.
All of us just make our own judgement - [s]each as valid as the other[/s] and it's right or wrong in a relative sense, and some judgements are better or worse than others in a relative sense also.
Yeah, I've asked him that a few times, but we haven't managed to explore it at all yet.
Tell me about it! How many times do you think that it is going to take? When is it an appropriate time to give up? You can't say that we haven't tried.
Thanks, more interested in which view you support.
Cultural relativism, properly understood, and moral relativism, properly understood.
By cultural relativism, I can say that it's wrong to clink your glasses in a "cheers!" in Budapest, as I recently learnt, but it is fine here in England.
By moral relativism, I can say that whatever I morally judge as right or wrong is right or wrong for me. If you judge it differently, then you're wrong relative to my standard. Obviously I prioritise my standard over yours, and over that of others. I judge mine to be better. This is what you fail to understand for whatever reason. You are just stuck on some erroneous belief that everything must be equal or something.
Answering this for myself: valid in the sense of being valid, and from the "perspective" of what being valid is and entails, i.e., the rules and their consequences.
You're not understanding the question. Validity is a logical idea, and it obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true.
We can't be referring to that sense here, because moral stances aren't true or false (at least on the view in question). Hence, what sense of validity are we talking about? It can't be the logical sense.
Re perspective, the reason for the question is that there is no person from whose perspective all moral stances are "equal." So we must be talking about the perspective of someone other than an individual considering moral stances. So what perspective are we talking about?
Did cultural relativism as you understand it allow certain cultures to judge slavery as morally acceptable?
It is wrong to even use the word "allow" in that context. It doesn't "allow" or "disallow" anything. You appear to be deeply stuck in your own problematic way of looking at things. It is possible under cultural relativism for cultures to judge slavery as morally acceptable, as it is possible under every single other meta-ethical position.
i can't actually see how your caveat above is even possible - it would mean an individual would say the abolitionist and the slave holder have equal valid views according to his judgement -
Sorry but could you explain the logic of how you get from what I said to "it would mean an individual would say..."
It is wrong to even use the word "allow" in that context. You appear to be deeply stuck in your own problematic way of looking at things. It is possible under cultural relativism for cultures to judge slavery as morally acceptable, as it is possible under every single other meta-ethical position.
i am getting very tired of near every response on this board is becoming near pure semantics.
Reply to ChrisH not sure I can. It is very evident i have no ability at all to communicate effectively. And it is not important to the point I started this with. It was an aside. Just say OK I agree with you.
are any of those moral options close to your view ?
I am getting very tired of near every response on this board is becoming near pure semantics.
You don't seem to realise the significance of your wording. Your wording reflects your way of thinking, and your way of thinking is problematic. Do you want to understand cultural relativism or not? If so, you need to stop thinking in these terms, terms like allowing and disallowing, equally valid, mere preference, and just different. These are your obstacles in understanding.
?ChrisH not sure I can. It is very evident i have no ability at all to communicate effectively. And it is not important to the point I started this with. It was an aside.
But it is important! Your comment ("it would mean...") suggests a profound misunderstanding of the position you have been taking issue with throughout this discussion.
Can you tell me how your view of cultural relativism applies to slavery?
Fine, but avoiding your problems won't help, and if you refuse to confront them, then you'll be stuck with them. Do you want to be stuck on the same problems twenty pages from now if this goes on for that long?
It is like how you described, only without the problems. Slavery was right relative to the prevailing culture, and then it was wrong relative to the prevailing culture, but you don't get to say anything about correct or incorrect without being clear about what sense of correct and incorrect you're talking about. Every time that you fail to clarify your meaning on things like that, you are being a problem for everyone else in the discussion. Do you want to be a problem for everyone else in the discussion?
It is like how you described, only without the problems. Slavery was right relative to the prevailing culture, and then it was wrong relative to the prevailing culture, but you don't get to say anything about correct or incorrect without being clear about what sense of correct and incorrect you're talking about. Every time that you fail to clarify your meaning on things like that, you are being a problem for everyone else in the discussion.
Ok - i admit i am missing it, but in the thought that is in my head there is absolutely nothing different between your use of right and my use of correct. They are semantically equal to me.
That being as it is. Your view is there no truth statement we can make about the rightness or wrongness of slavery without the appropriate reference.
In that case I just disagree, which is fine. My view is slavery was always wrong, and the culture that allowed it was incorrect.
If you mean there's no non-subjective standard by which to assess disparate moral judgements, then yes, you're right. But it does not follow from this that disparate moral judgements are all seen, in any sense, as 'equally valid' by any single individual.
Multiple people have pointed this out, multiple times, and from very early on in the discussion. We're on page 27, and he is stuck on the same problem.
But it is important! Your comment ("it would mean...") suggests a profound misunderstanding of the position you have been taking issue with throughout this discussion.
Reply to ChrisH no it really is not - I am not making any argument so far either for or against any option, i just put them out as i understand them. I also gave an option of none of the above if i missed it or got it wrong.
I am interested in application of these stances against a real life issue.
So I ask you to pick one, or add your own and apply it to the issue of slavery.
Ok - i admit i am missing it, but in the thought that is in my head there is absolutely nothing different between your use of right and my use of correct. They are semantically equal to me.
That being as it is. Your view is there no truth statement we can make about the rightness or wrongness of slavery without the appropriate reference.
In that case I just disagree, which is fine. My view is slavery was always wrong, and the culture that allowed it was incorrect.
My use of "right" was such that it was synonymous with "moral", not such that was synonymous with "correct".
And it isn't fine to just disagree. You should concede that your position is unreasonable. That it is dogmatic. And then we can be over and done with this.
Or alternatively, attempt to reasonably argue in support of it, but I predict that that will just lead to bad logic from you for someone like me to pick apart and expose.
And it isn't fine to just disagree. You should concede that your position is unreasonable. That it is dogmatic. And then we can be over and done with this.
No, i will not admit my use of correct vs your use of right makes my position unreasonable. Especially since i didn't take any position in the options. And gave you an non or the above option to describe it yourself.
Do you think perhaps your adamancy over the wrongness of slavery is because you’ve never had the first hand experience of knowing differently? If you cannot judge from the persective of the culture that condones it, what makes you say with authority that it is wrong? I agree slavery is wrong, but if I grew up a plantation owner’s son in Mississippi in 1845, I would hardly think that. Or a Greek captain of a warship in the Aegean, in pursuit of those pesky Trojans.
. Slavery was right relative to the prevailing culture, and then it was wrong relative to the prevailing culture
still want to get back to this. Your view is there is no truth statement we can make about the rightness of slavery without a cultural reference. Is this correct ?
did i understand you right - would you agree this is your position?
Your view is that there is no truth statement that we can make about the rightness or wrongness of slavery without the appropriate cultural reference.
— Rank Amateur
(note just added "cultural")
you didn't get back to me on this one yet.
No, because I'm ultimately an individualistic moral relativist. I only accept cultural relativism as just another way of pointing out moral relations. It is useful, and it reflects a sort of truth. But I don't actually depend on any cultural reference, because I can just say, for example, that murder is wrong relative to my judgement. That's about me and my judgement. No culture is referenced there.
Reply to Mww Agree completely , the issue is, do you think that means, as S does, that there is no truth statement we can make about slavery without cultural context.
Turning this around, and using Reply to S word. Cultural norms are always right, the subject of their judgments are variable.
And does that mean that it is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are, are by definition right?
No, i will not admit my use of correct vs your use of right makes my position unreasonable. Especially since i didn't take any position in the options. And gave you an non or the above option to describe it yourself.
Empty words. You are a dogmatist, and you aren't being reasonable, whether you like it or not, unless you attempt to support the following:
No, because I'm ultimately an individualistic moral relativist. I only accept cultural relativism as just another way of pointing out moral relations. It is useful, and it reflects a sort of truth. But I don't actually depend on any cultural reference, because I can just say, for example, that murder is wrong relative to my judgement. That's about me and my judgement, not any culture.
Still want to get back to this. Your view is there is no truth statement we can make about the rightness of slavery without a cultural reference. Is this correct?
Agree completely , the issue is, do you think that means, as S does, that there is no truth statement we can make about slavery without cultural context.
Turning this around, and using ?S word. Cultural norms are always right, the subject of their judgments are variable.
And does that mean that it is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are, are by definition right?
If you want to boil things down, then no. The cultural is not the foundation of morality. This is what I was arguing about with T Clark earlier. The cultural is just a reference point. Ultimately morality is my morality, my moral judgement, my moral feelings. I can consider your morality, but mine is king.
It is my individual moral judgement, and it requires no support at all.
Moral judgement relates to right and wrong, not to correct and incorrect. You can judge correct and incorrect, but that's not a moral category of judgement. And if you're just saying that slavery has always been wrong relative to your moral judgement, then that's fine. It has always been wrong relative to my moral judgement also.
Moral judgement is right and wrong, not correct and incorrect. And if you're just saying that slavery has always been wrong relative to your judgement, then that's fine. It has always been wrong relative to my judgement also
ok - agree
now if I say relative to my judgement there is nothing wrong with slavery. Other than saying you disagree, and use whatever you can muster to attempt to change my mind. If I don't change my mind, and according to your moral view - I am just wrong relative to you, and right relative to me. And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery.
now if I say relative to my judgement there is nothing wrong with slavery. Other than saying you disagree, and use whatever you can muster to attempt to change my mind. If I don't change my mind, and according to your moral view - I am just wrong relative to you, and right relative to me. And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery.
It looks like you're finally getting it! If by no "real truth" you mean no objective or absolute truth to be found in moral statements, then yes! So it is either error theory, where all moral statements are false, or moral relativism, where truth and falsity is recovered.
Terrapin StationMarch 18, 2019 at 20:53#2661490 likes
But again, you haven't shown that your disagreement is reasonable. Can you demonstrate a "real truth"?
what would be the motivation for me to argue a truth statement to an individual moral relativist. No matter what I say, you can just always say - "not relative to me"
So unless i find some compulsion to change you relative view - why would i bother?
Ok - then we just disagree. Which is fine - I think there is a truth statement we can make about slavery.
No, it's not fine, because this is philosophy, and that's not being philosophical. That's more of a religious mindset. Urgh. Kill it with fire.
And to be clear, I assumed a translation of the above quote which maintains logical relevance. Meaning that you're talking about "real truth", i.e. objective or absolute truth, and in relation to moral statements. If you won't be clear about that, then I guess I'll have to be clear about it for you, although that's a bit of a pain.
Reply to S If there is some philosophical rule that says we have to agree - it has been widely ignored for a very long time. Understanding is important - agreement - not so much.
No, I think there are truth statements we can make about slavery. It’s true there was a time when slavery was prevalent, it’s true slavery is not now so prevalent. It is true slavery was deemed a necessary aspect of business, it is true slavery was a necessary aspect of war and it is true slavery was a necessary aspect of colonization. But those are obviously not moral truth statements.
No, I don’t assign truth values, or correctness, to cultural norms. I bitch a lot about the one I happen to be in, but that also is not a moral judgement on it.
what would be the motivation for me to argue a truth statement to an individual moral relativist. No matter what I say, you can just always say - "not relative to me"
So unless i find some compulsion to change you relative view - why would i bother?
No, we were talking about what you called "real truth" (in relation to moral statements), remember? What you call "real truth" can't be relative if it is absolute, and it can't be subjective if it is objective. Don't revert back to truth, as though they are one and the same. You seem to forget that there is truth and true statements under moral relativism, just of a different kind.
If you were to demonstrate such a moral "real" truth, then you would have refuted moral antirealism, which covers a whole range of ethical positions, including moral relativism, moral subjectivism, moral nihilism, emotivism, and error theory. So please, go ahead and try. I would love to see you give that a go.
If there is some philosophical rule that says we have to agree - it has been widely ignored for a very long time. Understanding is important - agreement - not so much.
We don't have to agree on the issue. Just admit that you're not being philosophical about it, and we can move on. Being philosophical about it does not consist in, "I just disagree, and I offer no explanation or attempt to support my position or anything of that nature".
Reply to S you have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point
Terrapin StationMarch 18, 2019 at 21:32#2661670 likes
Not so. "Validity" as a term of art from logic simply refers to the form of an argument. Plenty of invalid arguments have true conclusions. Plenty of valid arguments have false premises.
Yeah, it's a term of art from logic defined as impossibility that a conclusion is false and/or conclusions are true.
You have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point
I have explained the problem here already. You just aren't getting it and you're sending us around in circles.
You said that you believe that there is a "real truth" in relation to moral statements, did you not? By that, were you not suggesting that you believe that there is a truth in relation to moral statements which is absolute? If so, and if you can demonstrate that, then by doing so, you will have refuted moral relativism and a number of other ethical positions. I could not reply that it is relative without contradiction.
What part of that do you not understand? Do you claim that you can demonstrate that or not? Yes or no?
From your source:
"A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false."
I think you might gain from reading the article again, or at least once, and by noting the differences between what you copied and what it actually says. Sometimes differences make a difference!
What do you think the important differences are (between what you're quoting there and what I said)? (I know what you might answer, but that will give me a chance to explain other things to you that apparently you're not familiar with or never understood up to this point)
You have already said that all truth is relative to your view of it. Again unless I feel some need to change your views on the nature of morality, why would I argue truth with someone who says relative to him. There is no point
Also, you don't seem to recognise or appreciate how sophisticated my ethical position is. It is pragmatic and flexible, not rigid. If you want to talk about truth-values in relation to moral statements in an absolutist or objective sense, then we can do so. That leads to nonsense or falsity. I would be an error theorist, rather than a moral relativist, in that situation.
The important difference is that what you suppose to be about content (soundness) is actually about form (independent of content).
Say what? That wasn't a response I expected.
I didn't say anything about soundness. I didn't define soundness. So from where are you getting that I'm supposing something to be about content or soundness?
Terrapin StationMarch 18, 2019 at 22:13#2661760 likes
Here's what I said again: "Validity obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true."
You can break that up, make it simpler, so that we're saying that validity obtains in three cases:
(1) when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false
OR
(2) when it's impossible for premises to be true
OR
(3) both (1) and (2), or in other words, when it's impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false
Soundness, on the other hand, is defined as a valid argument with true premises.
The definition of validity doesn't imply true premises, as one situation wherein validity obtains is (2), when it's impossible for the premises to be true. If it's impossible for the premises to be true, then the premises aren't true, and the argument isn't sound. Nevertheless, it's valid.
(1) above can obtain when a conclusion is a tautology. In that case it's irrelevant what the premises are.
(2) above can obtain when the premises are contradictory. In that case it's irrelevant what the conclusion is. (And this is the source of the "everything follows from a contradiction" saying.)
(3) is only the case when the conclusion follows from the premises. Relevance logics require (3)--they require that the premises and conclusion have something to do with each other (hence why they're relevance logics), and dispense with the traditional interpretation of validity that allows (1) and (2).
Also, you don't seem to recognise or appreciate how sophisticated my ethical position is. It is pragmatic and flexible, not rigid. If you want to talk about truth-values in relation to moral statements in an absolutist or objective sense, then we can do so. That leads to nonsense or falsity. I would be an error theorist, rather than a moral relativist, in that situation.
If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:
Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.
I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well.
Re perspective, the reason for the question is that there is no person from whose perspective all moral stances are "equal." So we must be talking about the perspective of someone other than an individual considering moral stances. So what perspective are we talking about?
If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid.
Terrapin StationMarch 18, 2019 at 23:47#2661890 likes
If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid.
In other words, you'd have to be saying that "from the point of view of someone who has no moral preferences at all, but who is considering the moral preferences of others" . . . it's just that there isn't actually anyone who is conscious but who fits that description.
Yes. We've all done surveys of hundreds if not thousands of people, all of whom have moral preferences. None of us has yet found anyone (conscious) who does not.
In any case moral relativism (at least int the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal form that perspective.
On the other hand the overwhelming cross-cultural prevalence of certain moral stances can reasonably be used to justify the claim that some moral stances are indeed more valid than others on account of their greater efficacy for harmonious human community.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 00:17#2661970 likes
When we acquire survey data we don't have to do anywhere near 8 billion people. But it's far more survey data than the norm, because it's a survey we've all done.
On the other hand the overwhelming cross-cultural prevalence of certain moral stances can reasonably be used to justify the claim that some moral stances are indeed more valid than others
When we acquire survey data we don't have to do anywhere near 8 billion people. But it's far more survey data than the norm, because it's a survey we've all done.
If we want to rule out the possibility that there is someone who has no moral preferences we do. In any case you didn't address this: Quoting Janus
In any case moral relativism (at least int the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal from that perspective.
Your second sentence reads like gibberish to me, so I can't comment on it.
Reply to Terrapin Station Firstly, it should be obvious to you that I wasn't using the term 'validity' in the sense that pertains to formal logic.
And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective, response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony.
The very idea of a moral stance that promotes disharmony is invalid.
If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:
Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.
I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well.
No, your burden of proof is not mine. It is a fallacy to try to shift the burden of proof. Either concede or present your argument. Stop wasting time and be honest.
If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid.
Oh no, not you too. No, the disinterested observer would observe that on any given moral issue, there is a right or wrong in a relative sense, and also that with regard to moral standards, there is a better or worse in a relative sense. Your inference is not rational.
No, your burden of proof is not mine. It is a fallacy to try to shift the burden of proof. Either concede or present your argument. Stop wasting time and be honest.
i have no idea at all what you are talking about.
VagabondSpectreMarch 19, 2019 at 00:57#2662100 likes
You're the one rephrasing my argument to make it sound as if there's some question about whether or not I condone FGM. Do you even know what moral relativism is?
I know you don't condone FGM, and I think I know what relativism is...
The point I'm trying to make by harping on your reaction to my statement that "per our moral values, FGM is objectively immoral" is that within a given relative moral framework of starting values we can come to positions of reasonable confidence regarding the aptitude of possible actions toward values-service, and the only sensical way to communicate our reasonable conclusions is with language that reflects our epistemic confidence; relativism need not be extended to how we feel about the utility of possible actions because the kind of knowledge that results from empirical observation can be tested for objective strength. Once we've agreed upon starting values, there are no more meaningful relativist implications on moral debate/morality in practice. Again, when we forget morality as ever supposedly having to do with objective values in the first place, and just treat it as a realm of strategy pertaining to how to achieve our goals (note: there is a useful distinction between hedonism/individual utilitarian calculus and a calculus which actually considers the values of others, which is amorality vs morality, (conflict v cooperation, basically), then it is true prima facie that some moral strategies are better or worse than others, in exactly the same way that some moves in a given chess game are strategically inferior or superior toward achieving the desired outcome.
So, in a nut shell: I'm trying to say that we can have strong inductive knowledge that certain practices, such as FGM, do not serve human/social welfare. If accurate, this means that if someone condones FGM because they think it does serve human.social welfare, they're "incorrect" according to our best knowledge. I suppose you can say that this falls outside the realm of morality (if we define morality by its relation to "objective values", which don't seem to exist), but in practice and common parlance it never does.
I realize that morality in practice is different from the most broad possible definition of morality, but why must we define morality in relation to whether or not moral values can be somehow metaphysically/objectively true or not in the first place (which captures the entire relevant distinction of subjective relativism). If we both think that human values are merely physical happenstance, let's just accept that and give morality an ontological definition befitting what it is: sets of emergent, strategic, human-values-serving (cooperative) frameworks. This way we get a descriptive meta-ethical framework that can adequately capture the whole gambit of moral values and frameworks that exist in the wild, while also not exposing our epistemic throats to meta-ethical truth claims which define morality in fundamentally different terms (it can be simultaneously true that god exists, has a perfect "moral" plan, and the Mormon religion faithfully serves it, and that the Mormon moral framework, and other frameworks, are human-values-serving strateges that either do or do not effectively serve the fundamental values of humans).
What do you think I've been presenting (with regards to vaccines)? Reasoning as to why one might not want to immunise a child. What bit of my responses on the subject do not come under the category of 'reasoning'? It just comes down to the fact that you don't agree with my reasoning, not that I haven't presented an
You offered reasons as to why people might be reasonably ignorant of the merits of proven vaccines (once again using a kind of epistemic relativism, not one based on values). The desire to get into heaven can plausibly be framed as a value, but the existence of heaven (at least, our ability to have meaningful empirical indication about whether or not heaven exists) is firstly an empirical question; if I could prove or show it to be likely that heaven exists, we would also inherently desire to go there as well (it's not a values disagreement, it's a disagreement about facts in the external world).
Have you read anything about how "clinical trials' are conducted? I suggest Ben Goldacre's Bad Pharma, or just just read his blog, or the Statistical Society's, or AllTrials, or just about any reputable interest group. Ben's blog has got 37 articles about the misbehaviour of the pharmaceutical industry, and given his other work against homeopathy and and the anti-vax movement, he's hardly trying to bring civilisation down.
This is called cherry-picking. It's a kind of reasoning, it's just highly fallible. We cannot draw reliable conclusions about the amount of misbehavior in the medical industry at large by focusing only on grossest instances of negligence we can find. I know (I think) I don't need to explain this to you, but I guess my point comes out so mundane that you keep missing it.
How many though? For a parent, they want to know if the actual drug they are agreeing to inject into their child is going to be worth the risk. Their child, not the average child. So let's say I'm the parent of a five-year old. What epidemiological study should I be looking at to show the long-term benefits for a breastfed child, with a diet high in fresh vegetables, a low stress environment with only small isolated groups of children and good personal hygiene (all of which the WHO list as having significant effect on immune response). Show me a study following that specific group (or even one close to it) and I might be convinced, otherwise it's just about choosing risk categories. As I said, my chances of dying in a plane crash are zero, I don't fly, so why should I learn the safety procedure just because studies show it saves lives?
You can start with fundamentally basic statistical analysis that tracks the correlation of reduction in disease outbreaks with their corresponding vaccine usage and spread. There are plenty of epidemiological studies that can help us understand the nature and importance of "herd immunity", which can change how people look at the risks involved to begin with. It would actually be ideal for your child to be surrounded by immunized children, because then there is a far smaller chance of disease spreading through an immunized community. As one of the only non-immunized child, they would actually pose a threat to the others, because vaccines are not 100% effective, because we cannot give some of them to children who are too young, and because some people with compromised immune systems cannot get some of them at all; lacking vaccines increases the likelihood of an individual being the vector that spreads disease to others. As the anti-vax movement expands, we've started to see outbreaks of diseases in communities that have been almost entirely eliminated for decades (google "recent measles outbreaks"). Anti-vax hot-spots are seeing outbreaks, and the communities where the un-vaccinated travel to are also being put at risk. It's a straight up fact that if our densely populated cities consisted of mostly unvaccinated people, we would be dealing with massive outbreak after massive outbreak of the same diseases that killed so many in relatively recent history. There's kind of a game-theory catch-22: if vaccines do pose some risks to individuals, and if everyone else is vaccinated, then you don't really need to get vaccinated yourself (except if the odds of contracting disease from a natural source rather than from other people is greater than the risk of taking a vaccine), but if everyone tried to get away with that then it would become safer to actually get the vaccinations (given the inevitable outbreaks of known diseases we've been successful in "eradicating" (read: mitigating through vaccines)).
The medical science community is not at all divided about the importance of wide-spread vaccinations, and any quick glance at the available data strongly supports why. If you are unvaccinated, your chances of dying from vaccine related complications are zero (as opposed to a fraction of a fraction of of one percent if you were deemed healthy enough and received it), but your chances of dying from infectious disease drastically rises. You can ask me to prove this with scientific rigor for each and every individual case, but I can't. Medical doctors do take into account the strength of given immune systems before they administer vaccines, I just don't see the opinions of parents as being reasonable or reasonably persuasive when compared to the experience based knowledge of medical doctors (backed and informed by a plethora of experimental/real world evidence).
Maybe we should start a new thread about the risks and rewards of vaccinations (I'm not sure if you actually think they're based in sufficiently strong science or not). In any case, the relativity of ignorance is of no merit in a debate over empirical facts.
I have no problem with using evidence and reason. The trouble is, you seem to. I have been presenting evidence and reason as to why a parent might reject vaccination. I've not argued they might reject vaccines without any reasons, I've given reasons and you ignored them all because they don't give you the answer you decided on before the argument even began. A basic understanding of human psychology is all that's required.
You're trying to persuade me into thinking that reason and evidence are unpersuasive by using classically fallacious reasoning and evidence. There is some elegance to that, granted, but all you're really establishing is that reason and evidence, in practice, clash against a boundary of ignorance. My point though, is that better reasoning and better evidence (and better access to it) push back harder against that boundary. I don't know what your epistemological frameworks necessarily looks like, but mine does assume that the better our predictive models conform to existing and experimental evidence/observations, the more closely they tend to approximate reliable "truth". I'm not saying everyone needs to accept the evidence in regards to FGM and vaccines (as you say, psychological circumstance prevents it), I'm trying to make the point that better evidence leads to better predictive power, and under a meta-ethical framework of morality as predictive models pursuing relative values, founding them in better evidence also leads to better predictive power (more effective strategies; superior moral decisions, per the given values). I'm making a case for moral progress that makes sense regardless of the facts of meta-ethical relativism. We no longer tolerate lynch mobs, for instance, because we've managed to erect a more effective system of protecting and delivering what we think justice is. In our environment and given our values, lynch mobs are approximately objectively less effective, to the point of being dangerous toward the service of justice, than a well trained and publicly sanctioned police force and equitable court system. Habeus corpus is objectively a good thing relative to our values, unless social circumstances somehow change.
Under the constant application of relativism, you can say that whether or not lynch mobs are more effective is a matter of subjective perception and opinion, so how can we say they are less moral/immoral? Everything becomes amoral, and the entire pool of moral language (and anything it branches in to, such as empirical claims) is set upon the relative road to moral nihilism.
You're equivocating. You argue for the seeming uncontroversial "we should use reason and evidence to determine our actions", but what you're actually saying is that reason and evidence, once applied, provide us with a single correct answer, and that's a much more controversial claim which remains unsupported.
Single correct answer is not quite right. "directs us toward better answers" is more the point, and it is backed up by inductive reasoning and experimental evidence. The only apparent difference between our meta-ethical frameworks is that yours focuses on denying objectivity while mine highlights the only way in which our moral decisions can be "objective", which is higher on the spectrum of predictive reliability, relative to given moral values.
P.S I'm sorry for making such lengthy responses; I try to help it. Feel free to condense your response into paragraph form sans-quotation if you prefer.
In any case moral relativism (at least in the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal from that perspective.
Bad argument. It basically says that from an assumption outside of moral relativism, there's a problem with moral relativism. But the problem with that is that assumptions from outside of moral relativism are irrelevant to moral relativism. If you can demonstrate that morality works or makes sense without moral relativism, then go ahead. That carries a burden. It can't just be assumed. That'd be begging the question.
On the other hand the overwhelming cross-cultural prevalence of certain moral stances can reasonably be used to justify the claim that some moral stances are indeed more valid than others on account of their greater efficacy for harmonious human community.
That some moral frameworks lead to consequences you view as beneficial is not that those moral frameworks are logically sound. That's a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
And that's the question: which moral framework is logically sound. This is meta-ethics, not normative ethics.
And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony.
Your consequentialist views are only appropriate in normative ethics, which is not what this is. In meta-ethics, it is a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
Bad argument. It basically says that from an assumption outside of moral relativism, there's a problem with moral relativism.
Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences; and it doesn't say that is a "problem" for moral relativism, but on the contrary that that is its nature, for better or for worse.
That some moral frameworks lead to consequences you view as beneficial is not that those moral frameworks are logically sound. That's a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
Wrong again. The very purpose of mores is to engender social harmony. Whether or not there is social harmony has nothing to do with what how I view things.
Then you are pretty clueless. You tried to manipulate me into making an argument against something you haven't bothered to attempt to support. I rejected that and exposed it for what it is. The burden of proof is on you if you make that claim. And if you don't make that claim because you can't support it, then be honest enough to admit that. Do you know how the burden of proof works? Do you understand what intellectual honesty is, and why it is important? Or do I have to educate you about all of the basics in philosophy?
Reply to S Wrong again (you're not doing too well today!); what I said has nothing to do with consequentialism which is about the specific effects of moral actions as measured in terms of the "greater good".
It's very simple really; a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long.
You can't plausibly deny that the purpose of mores is to engender social harmony.
Oh no, not you too. No, the disinterested observer would observe that on any given moral issue, there is a right or wrong in a relative sense, and also that with regard to moral standards, there is a better or worse in a relative sense. Your inference is not rational.
Really? And on what basis would the disinterested observer "observe" (don't you mean 'judge'?) that "there is a right and wrong in a relative sense" or a 'better or worse in a relative sense"? Relative to what?
Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences; and it doesn't say that is a "problem" for moral relativism, but on the contrary that that is its nature, for better or for worse.
It is simply not true that under moral relativism, all moral arguments are equal, nor that that is "its nature". And under moral relativism, there [i]is no[/I] "apart from" individual preferences, if that's what morality is necessarily relative to. You can't break that connection from within moral relativism, and you can't do so from outside of it without begging the question.
Wrong again. The very purpose of mores is to engender social harmony. Whether or not there is social harmony has nothing to do with what how I view things.
That's not a relevant meta-ethical point. The question is which meta-ethical framework is true: moral relativism, moral absolutism, error theory, emotivism, etc.
That doesn't even address that, except as a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
It's very simple really; a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long.
The problem is that that's not logically relevant in the appropriate context of meta-ethics, except by connecting the dots as a fallacious appeal to the consequences. It doesn't validly lead to any logically relevant conclusion in the meta-ethical debate going on between meta-ethical moral relativism and other meta-ethical positions.
Whether what you say is true or false, given the context, it is either a fallacy of irrelevance or a non sequitur.
I say I have no interest in making such an argument to you. I have no need to change your view.
You ask again
I still say no
You say come on argue your point.
I say no, but if you want to argue I am wrong go ahead.
You call me names, and demand my unconditional surrender
It is always a special time dealing with you.
Jesus Christ. I just want you to be intellectually honest for once. You do not have to try to support your view. I am not demanding that. I am demanding that you be intellectually honest about why that is instead of constantly running away like a coward. You are not an honourable debater, and this is something I find deeply offensive.
A disinterested person can certainly observe, but if he doesn’t care about the observation, he would have no reason to judge it. The equality of the respective moralities would then be, equally insignificant. But he could still have an opinion.
It is simply not true that under moral relativism, all moral arguments are equal, nor that that is "its nature". And under moral relativism, there is no "apart from" individual preferences, if that's what morality is necessarily relative to. You can't break that connection from within moral relativism, and you can't do so from outside if it without begging the question.
This wrong for two reasons. Firstly there is no reason why moral relativism cannot be considered dispassionately, from outside it and 'apart from" individual preferences; that is it has no justifiable claim to be sacrosanct.
Secondly all moral arguments are, apart from their being individually preferred, all equal, simply because there can be, under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another.
The fact that individuals prefer one argument to another is irrelevant because that cannot be used to establish that one is in fact better than another, unless you were to use the preponderance of individual preference of one argument over another, but that would be to deny moral relativism and would hence be a performative contradiction if a moral relativist used it.
Reply to Mww I think that if a disinterested person observed a whole bunch of moral relativists expressing their different moral opinions and arguments, she would not, in fact could not, find that there is, within the very criteria with which the moral relativists justify their own positions (which is just that they happen to prefer them) any reason to prefer one over the other. And the obvious conclusion would be that they are all equal.
VagabondSpectreMarch 19, 2019 at 01:49#2662270 likes
Either: it's the same answer. Not immoral in itself, only immoral in the sense of moral relativism.
Moral relativism has a parallel in existential nihilism, so it might help to think about it in that way. There's no meaning in the world itself, the meaning stems from us.
If moral truth can only stem from subjective starting values (we agree on this) what purpose does the "amoral" descriptor serve beyond reaffirming our lack of objective metaphysical/existential foundation for our starting values?
Relativism only needs to rear its unfortunate head in the face of exclusive or competing values. And as we so often agree on those fundamental value, can't we carry on with an objective comparison of our proposed methods of serving those values?
So you're just being annoying by differing from me semantically? You have yet to learn that I'm always right, and that there should be a single unified meaning, namely my own meaning. One day I'll become a dictator and enforce my own unified meaning, like in 1984
:grin:
I'm saying you should accept the overwhelming utility of moral pragmatism, which in order to be persuasive, must commandeer the definition of "morality" (to allow us to make evidence based moral rebukes), in a way that also redefines "amorality".
From your perspective I'm ignoring the implications of relativism, but from my perspective you're ignoring the implications of pragmatism (what is true for us in practice or useful/necessary to serve our values). IF we want an effective or pragmatic moral framework, then being rationally persuasive matters, objectively.
Meta-ethics is firstly about what's the case, then what's the best way of speaking about it. (That's actually what most if not all topics in philosophy are about, or what they should be about). So I conclude moral anti-realism, but then conclude moral relativism over error theory or emotivism. The differences between the positions I mentioned have much to do with how we should interpret moral language, but also about what is actually the case.
I'm not an epistemological anti-realist so maybe this is why you see my distinction as trivial; I'm interested in whether or not moral strategies conform with predictive power to an external world; that's the only coherent way I can see to compare and evaluate them in the face of subjective starting values (aside from attacking the internal consistency of given values hierarchies). Yes there is no objective truth component to our fundamental values, but what matters to us still matters to us, and this has always impelled us forward into the world of applied ethics, uncertainty or no.
I really enjoy the comparison of normative moral frameworks and moral decisions to chess strategies and tactics. Uncertainty is inherent with any strategy, and chess is a particularly good way to show how many different strategic methods and tactical options there are across a range of situations, but it is also a good way to show how some strategies and methods are better or worse than others. Chess shows how statistically superior strategic decisions converge toward some strategies and away from others. It shows that some strategies and tactics, and hence moral frameworks and moral decisions, are objectively superior/interior (or or less effective at serving given values) than others.
Reply to S There is no meta-ethics; there is only ethics. Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, just as philosophy talking about itself is part of philosophy. Try not to be hoodwinked by the fashionable notions of 'meta" disciplines and your thinking should improve.
This wrong for two reasons. Firstly there is no reason why moral relativism cannot be considered dispassionately, from outside it and 'apart from" individual preferences; that is it has no justifiable claim to be sacrosanct.
That's fine, but then you have to explain the supposed logical relevance. It doesn't pose a problem internally for any moral relativist, and if you are trying to criticise moral relativism externally, then you must support your external premises, whatever they might be.
Secondly all moral arguments are, apart from their being individually preferred, all equal, simply because there can be, under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no "apart from" any subjective standard that makes any sense of morality. But there are evidently subjective standards of better and worse which can be appealed to in order to make sense of morality.
The fact that individuals prefer one argument to another is irrelevant because that cannot be used to establish that one is in fact better than another...
There is no "in fact better than another" beyond facts relating to subjective judgement. You need to justify that assumption.
Really? And on what basis would the disinterested observer "observe" (don't you mean 'judge'?) that "there is a right and wrong in a relative sense" or a 'better or worse in a relative sense"? Relative to what?
Yes, really. Descriptive moral relativism is pretty damn obvious, even to disinterested observers. Even Noah Te Stroete, who is strongly against meta-ethical moral relativism, accepted descriptive moral relativism.
Relative to a subjective standard. I don't appeal outside of myself to make value judgements about whose moral judgement is better or worse. That makes zero sense. It is in fact absurd.
And yes, it isn't really a matter of observation. It is necessarily a matter of evaluation.
I could care less if you do or do not make an argument. Suit yourself.
You've been exposed as evasive, manipulative, and intellectually dishonest. I want nothing more to do with you. But I hope you see the error in your ways.
Which has been the bane of the modern relativisitic paradigm, as opposed to......dare I say.......Enlightenment moral subjectivism, the judgements of which arises from entirely different conditions. If there is no favored disposition, in effect there is no morality at all. But we know this is false because there are harmonious communities, which presupposes a common favored morality. One must conclude some elucidations of modern relativism are incoherent, or, the tenets grounding pre-modern relativism are correct.
That's fine, but then you have to explain the supposed logical relevance. It doesn't pose a problem internally for any moral relativist, and if you are trying to criticise moral relativism externally, then you must support your external premises, whatever they might be.
Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more. The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no "apart from" any subjective standard that makes any sense of morality. But there are evidently subjective standards of better and worse which can be appealed to in order to make sense of moralit
Sure there are subjective standards, but as such they are all equal. If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred. This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality. And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints
Ethics talking about itself is part of ethics, just as philosophy talking about itself is part of philosophy. Try not to be hoodwinked by the fashionable notions of 'meta" disciplines and your thinking should improve.
Interestingly, despite appearances, that says nothing at all. You implicitly acknowledge meta-ethics, you just don't want to call it that because amusingly you think of calling it that as some sort of fad.
Relative to a subjective standard. I don't appeal outside of myself to make value judgements about whose moral judgement is better or worse. That makes zero sense. It is in fact absurd.
You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are.
Reply to S as you wish, will just add it to all the other questions you dodge and deflect with ad hominem. Man up, make an argument of your own for once. Give up your default comfort level of throwing stones at others views.
Here is my view once again.
Slavery is morally wrong without regard to situation, time period, or any individual evaluation.
If you wish to man up and take the challenge and present your argument that I am wrong I'll be here.
Reply to S No, it's all just talk about ethics, which is part of the domain of ethics; there is no coherent separation. In any case it doesn't matter what you call it, the point is that within the context of moral relativism there can be no normatively compelling reason to think that morally relativistic arguments and opinions are anything other than merely arbitrary. If this were actually true of moral thought then this whole argument is irrelevant and pointless.
The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought.
Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more.
Firstly, if it's not a problem for me, as a moral relativist, then why should I care?
Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember? That is one of the most important lessons to learn in moral philosophy, if not [I]the[/I] most important.
The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal.
That every single individual moral agent, irrespective of their meta-ethical or normative stance, fundamentally appeals to their moral feelings or subjective evaluation in reaching moral judgements or conclusions about what's better or worse [i]does not[/I] imply that all of these judgements and evaluations are all treated as equal in any sense which poses any problem for moral relativism. That "we're all in the same boat" and that "we're all equal" in the sense that we're all confined to subjectivity is precisely my point. I don't know why you'd be preaching to the choir or suggesting that that's somehow a big problem. It is not problem at all. It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional. It is functional so long as we are moral agents capable of moral judgement. Morality isn't functional based on misguided romantic notions about a "harmonious society".
If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred.
Merely? Arbitrary? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean.
"'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger".
This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality.
Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation.
And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints.
I can and do make consistent judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions.
You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are.
But they can and do. Just look around. That's how morality works. That's what it is. It is just people making judgements, approving and disapproving, expressing emotions and sometimes using reason to explain themselves, but often that isn't even part of it. The average person isn't much like a philosopher when it comes to ethics, and especially not a rationalist philosopher. And especially not like Kant! It is laughable to think of the average person reasoning in accordance with the categorical imperative!
Typically, you could probably get enough just from body language alone on things like cruelty to animals or child abuse. The foundation in moral feelings is very evident.
Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember.
I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security.
So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation.
It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional.
It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong. You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements.
Merely? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean.
If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against.
Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation.
No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria.
I can make consist judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions.
All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care?
Reply to S No, the reality is that people don't see themselves as isolated subjects preferring moral positions like they might prefer different foods. People don't see themselves that way and nor are they that way. Your view is misleadingly simplistic.
No, it's all just talk about ethics, which is part of the domain of ethics; there is no coherent separation. In any case it doesn't matter what you call it, the point is that within the context of moral relativism there can be no normatively compelling reason to think that morally relativistic arguments and opinions are anything other than merely arbitrary. If this were actually true of moral thought then this whole argument is irrelevant and pointless.
What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics.
The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought.
Lol. The normative is of significance in normative ethics, not meta-ethics.
You are making a very good example of why the distinction matters.
What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics.
This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles).
You obviously care enough to argue with others about it.
Boy, this is very "meta" now. Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem and respond with the results of my analysis, and then argue in support of my conclusion and so on.
I mean, we can take this to a meta-meta-meta-meta... level if you really want to. You keep ironically reinforcing the distinction you've explicitly denied.
I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security.
So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation.
And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context.
It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong.
But this is where meta-ethical beliefs are irrelevant. The distinction between what is the case meta-ethically, what people meta-ethically believe, and what people normatively believe in ethics, is very important and very useful. The key point is that morality functions in spite of the meta-ethics.
And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on. Again, this is a common misperception. It is just as functional as simplistic notions of morality per moral absolutism. Moral judgement doesn't lose any force, it doesn't mean that there's no right or wrong or better or worse. It actually interprets those terms in a way that makes them meaningful and true, unlike the nonsense and falsehood of moral absolutism and moral objectivism.
You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements.
No, you misunderstand and are not representing my position well. It is more about independence than isolation. I rectified these errors in understanding earlier on in my exchange with T Clark. I acknowledge external influential factors. They are not primary. Demonstrably so in many cases. T Clark weakly appealed to factors like the government and religion. He couldn't have been any more wrong if he tried in my case! I am strongly anti- the current government, and anti- much of the prevalent religion in my society, namely Christianity. These are not the primary determining factors in my morality. I know that better than you. You are on the outside trying to glimpse inside. That is pretty naive.
If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against.
But of course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is what we're weighing up moral considerations against. It is our compass. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings.
No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria.
Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.
Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.
And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings.
All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care?
You don't have to, but that's simply what morality is. We express our thoughts and feelings about the stuff of ethics, stuff we tend to care about a lot. Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something. It isn't. It is more like psychology. Rationalist interpretations of morality are categorically mistaken, and have been dead in the water since Hume.
Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem
But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken.
To discuss anything is to seek normative agreement, For anything to be worth arguing over is for it to be potentially subject to normative agreement, but that is impossible in the case of moral relativism.
So to answer what might be considered to be the meta-ethical question "What do moral judgements consist in?" with something like "They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual.
And further to that if they were nothing more than personal preferences based on feeling (and I am not denying that they are that, only that they are not nothing more than that) then they are not properly moral at all, since they would then have no moral significance. In other words you would just be acting, not morally, but as your feelings dictate, just as animals do. (This is not to deny that the instinctive behavior of animals towards their own kind is not normative and cannot be seen as a kind of quasi-morality).
And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context.
What "other (moral) priorities" could one who wishes to live in society have? The whole idea of morality consists in thinking of others. So if you had. for example, an "other priority" that consisted in exploiting others without consideration for their feelings or welfare, then that would amount to thinking only about yourself and your own feelings, and hence would not count as moral at all, but rather amoral. If someone acts against their own moral principles, then they are acting immorally. If someone has no moral principles, which would be the case if someone were to kill people without remorse, then they would be acting amorally.
And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on.
I may have been pointed out, but it is not compelling; it just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If moral relativism consists in saying that it is OK to believe whatever is in accordance with your feelings about how to act towards others, then that just is an amoral, morally nihilistic, anarchic view. In that sense the very idea of moral relativism is a contradiction in terms.
I don't believe that individuals are morally independent in any significant sense. I made this point before to Terrapin; an artist is not isolated from influence, but they may be creatively independent in the sense that they can produce an original synthesis. This is not the case with moral stances; there are no original stances when it comes to questions about the rightness of murder, rape, theft, deception and so on. There is really very little variation on those generic question other than for or against, and actually there is even less variation than that since almost everyone is against murder, rape, theft and deception.
Then go ahead and explain it. It is salient, but it us trivial in the sense that you're preaching to the choir with no clear point beyond that.
It is not merely that they are "equal in kind", but that they are equal insofar as on the presumption of moral relativism there is no rational reason to prefer one over the other. The fact that moral relativists do prefer one over the other does not indicate that there are any rational justifications for any of those preferences, because they are preferences based only on self-interest or feeling.
But if course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is the measurement. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings.
There is no need for rational justification if you are a moral relativist, because you are simply following your feelings. If those feelings happen to be kind, then good, but that does not make them moral. Animals have kind feelings towards their own; does that make them moral beings? Something more is needed, and that something more consists in thinking that it is important to care about your fellows, even if you don't naturally feel that way.
Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.
Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.
And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings.
necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's.
because if you are a consistent moral relativist you won't expect anyone to be interested in your reasons for your moral judgements since they are merely based on your feelings and not on any normative considerations. In fact it isn't possible for you, as a consistent moral relativist, to 'explain the truth in (your) claim that (your) moral judgement is better than someone else's" because any such explanation will necessarily appeal to normative values that you have no business appealing to. All you could consistently say is "I feel my moral judgement is better than yours, so there!" to which the other will likely retort "So what?".
Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something.
No, I don't treat it like that at all. As I said a few times moral philosophy is more an art than a science, and similarly as with aesthetics there are qualities which determine the value of works that are more than merely a matter of personal preference, even though, since art has no strict utility, it is even harder than it is with ethics to say precisely what those qualities are.
This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles).
No, [i]that's[/I] nonsense, and is the cause of much of your confusion. It is [I]about[/I] ethics. It has a different aim to normative ethics. It aims to explain what morality is, not what it is good for, which is that same mistake someone else made earlier. Saying that a particular meta-ethical framework is better or valuable or does more good than another because it leads to more beneficial consequences, given your [i]personal[/I] value about a harmonious society, will continue to be [i]fallacious[/I], given the context, which is not what is good, or most good, but rather [i]what is the case[/I].
I appreciate that you've put a lot of work into a lengthy response and somehow the few paragraphs I'm going to offer back does not seem to do it justice, but I think we've reached a point where we are just repeating ourselves, and mainly with paradigmatic statements, not arguments.
I get what you're saying, but I disagree. I think that, in the fields where moral decisions are made, the 'way the world is' is sufficiently complex that no single model stands out as being objectively best with the clarity you believe. Of course, there are models which are so bad they can be discarded from consideration, but that still leaves most options that normal adult humans consider, in play.
My reasons for this are;
Moral positions relate to the effect actions have on people. Fields covering the effects on people are mainly psychology, sociology and human biology. None of these fields has the rigour of basic physics (or even chemistry) and to treat them as such is a mistake. Models can, and frequently do, come completely undone as new information emerges, and multiple models exist simultaneously.
Models are devised and popularised by human beings and human beings are not perfect rational creatures, they are subject to bias, ignorance and error. Multiplying the number of people involved may limit error, but there is no good reason to believe it will limit bias because in many cases all those involved will share the same bias. All medical researchers, for example, have invested in a career in medicine. Every single one of them has a bias in favour of the value of a medical solution to a problem because they have dedicated their lives to that very thing.
Most models are complex. This means they rapidly become quite unpredictable over long periods of time. Even your sacred cow of the success of vaccination has only been measured over a few decades. What about 100 years, 1000 years? Do you think anyone has any hope of reliably predicting the effects on societies over those timescales?
Most models are multivariate and, given their complexity, this makes them extremely vulnerable to minor variations in starting conditions, especially over the long term. We can quite accurately predict the weather tomorrow. We can have a good guess at the weather next week. We haven't a clue what the weather will be this time next month. You keep referring to similar starting values, without taking proper account of the plural. If our only goal were dental health, then maybe brushing our teeth is objectively the way to go about it, but that is never our only goal. You use this nebulous concept of 'utility' but how do you define that, and what of the others who will inevitably disagree with your definition? What we want of a 'perfect' society, is actually a very broad collection of states.
Basically my feeling is that, in the face of such uncertainty, feeling good about one's decisions is more important than the extremely fragile result of some utilitarian calculus. That's not to say that these models are useless, far from it. I think it vitally important that when one's approach is overwhelmingly contradicted by the evidence, one is well advised to change it, but the key word here is 'overwhelmingly'. Not only is a preponderance of evidence not enough, but most of importantly, I personally must be overwhelmed by it, not others telling me I should be.
Reply to S Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. You seem to be confusing yourself by looking for a substantive nature of morality, instead of realizing it's nature is pragmatic.
Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for. You seem to be confusing yourself by looking for a substantive nature of morality, instead of realizing it's nature is pragmatic.
I conclude from that that you don't know what morality is, or you deliberately conflate two different things, which is illogical. The error is clear to see with an analogy. What you're doing is like answering the question of what a drill is by saying that a drill is good for making holes. That's absurd, as it clearly doesn't answer the question, it treats it as though it was a different question. A drill is not a "good for making holes": that's its purpose or design or a benefit of it. It is an object made of materials like plastic and metal.
Pattern-chaserMarch 19, 2019 at 12:37#2663450 likes
You're a fragment of the sociocultural awkwardly expressed through the mostly compliant body of an ape. Your perceived individualism and autonomy is largely formed of retroactive confabulations designed to make the marriage between the fragment and the ape less acrimonious. There's plenty you can't do but manage to convince yourself you don't want to.
:smile:
Pattern-chaserMarch 19, 2019 at 12:45#2663460 likes
moral truth. It has nothing to do with what makes you feel good. It has everything to do with living in a community and not causing harm where possible. One should not harm community members when we depend on the community for survival, wants, and needs.
Well put. I'm not convinced that the strictures societies place upon their members are moral laws, though. I think they're just pragmatic strictures, put in place because they were found (by society) to be necessary for social and co-operative living. I suppose we can call them what the hell we like, but I see more pragmatism than morality. YMMV, of course. :wink:
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 12:52#2663470 likes
If we want to rule out the possibility that there is someone who has no moral preferences we do
You seem to be conflating the idea of empirical evidence and "proof." You want certainty of the claim, not just evidence of it. But (a) we can't actually prove empirical claims, (2) surveying every single person wouldn't provide empirical proof even if it were possible (to prove empirical claims), because, for example (i) someone could be dishonest in their survey responses, and (ii) their view can change over time, so even if people couldn't be dishonest, we'd need to survey everyone all the time.
In any case moral relativism (at least int the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal from that perspective.
??? I did address that, I just didn't quote your text when I addressed it. Here's a copy/paste of my response to that:
"Both inherent properties and validity are category errors here, so that's hardly a criticism of moral relativism.
"But yeah, from a perspective that's completely irrelevant to morality, and completely irrelevant to any person's view, all moral stances are equal."
If that's what you're referring to re it seeming like gibberish to you, just clarify that.
Firstly, it should be obvious to you that I wasn't using the term 'validity' in the sense that pertains to formal logic.
That's the only sense in which I use that term. Hence, especially if folks are using a sense not related to truth (if the sense is related to truth it's a category error), my asking for clarification from others above re just what sense they're using.
And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective, response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony.
This simply ignores my comments about harmoniousness (if normative), re preferring harmoniousness, and the same thing would go for appropriateness and whatever non-truth sense of validity you might be using. You're talking about preferences that people have.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 12:59#2663500 likes
If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:
Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.
I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well.
It would simply amount to arguing over whether there is any evidence of the world, independently of persons, making a judgment (or whatever word you'd want to substitute that doesn't imply persons doing something) to the effect of "slavery is wrong."
Because aside from evidence of that, all we have is evidence of people telling us whether they feel that slavery is wrong or not, and some of them tell us that slavery isn't wrong. So their perspective is a circumstance in which slavery isn't wrong.
But if there's evidence that the world outside of persons makes such judgments (or whatever we want to call them), then we could at least say that the person who said "slavery isn't wrong" got what the world is like incorrect, assuming that's what they were trying to do, assuming they were trying to match what the world is like independently of them.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 13:31#2663620 likes
Once we've agreed upon starting values, there are no more meaningful relativist implications on moral debate/morality in practice.
That's really only going to work if the "starting values" are pretty specific. It wouldn't work if the starting value was something like "it's is morally wrong to harm people," because people are going to disagree on what amounts to harm with a normative connotation, they're going to say things like, "Where there are competing interests, someone is going to be harmed no matter what we do, so we need to invoke a caluculus" and then they'll disagree on the relative weights of things, and so on.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 13:36#2663640 likes
Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences;
I'd agree that all moral arguments are equal from any objective perspective, but I'd add that an objective perspective is a category error when we're talking about morality.
It's no different than saying something like "All flavors of ice cream are identical to the pavement." That's true in a sense, but only because pavement is the sort of thing that can't taste anything at all, so there are going to be no flavors to the pavement. Focusing on pavement when we're talking about flavors is a category error. When we're talking about flavors, we need to talk about the sort(s) of thing that are capable of taste.
"Talk about what ethics is ontologically," "talk about how we can know ethical stances," etc. is conventionally named "metaethics." If you don't like calling it that, that's fine, but conventionally that's what it's called.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 13:45#2663690 likes
a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long.
First, this is pure speculation, and it's dubious at that. But we can ignore that, and ignore the problems with a term like "harmonious" and just say as a given that it's a fact that a society in which murder was considered virtuous could not survive for long.
The question then is, "Well, so what?" How does that fact have any implication for anything?
under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another.
I have no idea where you'd be getting that idea from. Has any moral relativist ever said anything like that? Under moral relativism, normative criteria are relative (and subjective on the subjectivist brand of moral relativism).
I think that if a disinterested person observed a whole bunch of moral relativists expressing their different moral opinions and arguments, she would not, in fact could not, find that there is, within the very criteria with which the moral relativists justify their own positions (which is just that they happen to prefer them) any reason to prefer one over the other. And the obvious conclusion would be that they are all equal.
A hypothetical person with no preferences would indeed not be able to find a reason to prefer one moral stance over the other, no matter what the person were to look at. The very idea of that doesn't make any sense. We'd be wondering if a person who has no preferences in domain D might gain preferences in domain D as an implication or upshot of examining some set of facts (such as the fact that J prefers m, K prefers n, etc.), or the fact that A causes B. They wouldn't, because no set of facts implies any preference. That's just the point. So it's an argument in favor of the relativist position, not an argument against it.
The person might develop preferences based on simple exposure to something they weren't previously familiar with (if John never heard jazz before and then starts listening to a lot of jazz, he might develop (or learn he had) preferences for some of it), but that's a factor of how their brain works, and then it would turn out that it's not true that the person has no preferences after all.
Reply to Terrapin Station It seems to me the argument of relative morality vs objective morality is not being argued on the merits of one vs the other.
Your source argument is certainly the best argument against objective morality - but the argument is based a proposition that can not be shown to be true.
At its core, i think the entire argument for relative morality rests on one core proposition, that is not true.
The core of the relative moral arguments is -
P1 - there is no God
P2 - since there is no God - the source of morality is human
There is no support that P1 is true or false
So this is the core belief that leads to rather interesting points.
Things like truth is relative, murder is relative, Slavery is relative, etc etc
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 14:40#2663980 likes
It seems to me the argument of relative morality vs objective morality is not being argued on the merits of one vs the other.
In my view it has absolutely nothing to do with what the merits of one versus the other would be. It has to do with which one is the way the world really is.
Look at it this way: let's say that we make the argument over whether Jack is a multimillionaire versus being homeless and having to depend on handouts about the relative merits of one versus the other. Obviously "multimillionaire" is going to win out there (well, at least for most people). The problem is that it's not true that Jack is a multimillionaire. Jack is homeless. So why would we pretend that he's really a multimillionaire?
Your source argument is certainly the best argument against objective morality - but the argument is based a proposition that can not be shown to be true.
Do you mean that in the sense of "It can't be proved"? No empirical claim can be proved, period. That includes proving that Jack is homeless.
There's plenty of evidence that it's true, though, and no evidence that it's false.
I think it's a mistake to see this as being about God. But maybe that's the only way that you could imagine moral objectivism being the case.
However, if God does exist, isn't God's morality just one more set of mental preferences? Or is God's morality supposed to be something different than "things that God thinks"?
I've brought this up before, including in this thread, but a problem with value objectivism (so not just moral, but aesthetic, etc.) is this: let's say that somehow, maybe because God prefers it, maybe because it's embedded into the nonmental universe in some way, etc., it's an objective fact that Brahms was a better composer than Frank Zappa. That would have no impact on the fact that I prefer Frank Zappa as a composer, that I have lots of reasons that I prefer Frank Zappa as a composer, that I'll try to persuade other people to see the merits of Frank Zappa as a composer, etc.--in other words, there's no reason to believe that it would change anything about anyone's preferences, about the way that anyone behaves and interacts with others, etc.
That's because it being a fact that God, or the world itself, etc. has a preference for A over B is practically no different than it being a fact that any random person has a preference for A over B, where that might be different than your own preference. So if you're not going to conform to your parents', or your music teachers', or your political leaders', etc. preference to Brahms over Frank Zappa just because they have a different preference than you do, why would you conform to God's, or the world's preference to Brahms over Frank Zappa just because those things have a different preference than you do?
Morality isn't anything other than what's it's good for.
Exactly. Morality never was a “thing”, but always the condition of a thing, and, therefore, what morality is good for, is defining itself as a condition of the human thing, from its pragmatic, albeit a priori, ground of relating that self-defined condition to a corresponding practical welfare.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 14:53#2664060 likes
In my view it has absolutely nothing to do with what the merits of one versus the other would be. It has to do with which one is the way the world really is.
Actually no you don't, you believe it has to do with the way you think the world really is. Maybe, just maybe, your view of how the world really is, is not correct.
Do you mean that in the sense of "It can't be proved"? No empirical claim can be proved, period. That includes proving that Jack is homeless.
The argument you gave me originally is the source argument, it is, as you said, what could be the source of an objective morality? I say the core assumption under that argument continues to be,
there is no god, therefore the source is human, and since it is human it is contingent in one way or another.
I am happy to give up this line of reason - if you can come up with another argument against objective morality that is not the source argument. But I will not accept as convincing any argument that rests on a core proposition that has no real truth value.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 15:00#2664080 likes
Maybe, just maybe, your view of how the world really is, is not correct.
Sure. That's always the case (that it's possible for my view to be incorrect). It follows from the fact that we can't prove any empirical claim. So how do we proceed when someone is claiming that my view is incorrect? Well, I require the other person to provide evidence that something incompatible with my view is correct instead. If the other person won't provide evidence to the contrary, there's no reason for me to change my belief (which is always based on some evidence or other besides mere possibility).
(And of course, the mere fact that they consider something to be evidence isn't sufficient. The person the evidence is presented to has to assess it, has to agree that it's good evidence, that it supports the claim in question, etc.)
That's not actually my argument. As I pointed out earlier, there are plenty of objectivists who are atheists. Heck, there's even a very famous one that gets mentioned here sometimes--Ayn Rand.
I'm not going to make any assumptions about what the objective source might be. I'll leave that up to the objectivists at hand. It's their position. I don't want to put any limits on what their view might be. It's up to them to present whatever alternate view, and maybe they'll come up with something I could have never imagined. But they need to provide evidence of some objective source if they're going to make that claim (and they expect me to think the claim has any merit).
Understand - but all thought is not true, all thought is not correct, and we do not really know the source of all thought. I still say if you continue to peel the onion away - even this line of logic lead back to - there is no God, therefor it is human.
Not making a theist argument - just saying whether you realize it or not - that is the core proposition relative morality rests on.
Now - I am happy to get off that point and get to some more pragmatic approach. Happy to go down some road that says something along the lines of human nature, a shared consciences on many issues, or some such road. But here is where i can't get.
some people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was moral
other people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was immoral
Both times the people were correct, and the morality of slavery changed.
All this says is whatever one thinks is infallibly morally correct for you - that is nonsense.
Simplest: conditions themselves are merely states of affairs;
Technical Point: conditions themselves are non-entities;
Technically Finer point: condition in itself cannot be intuited:
Technically Finest point: understanding cannot assign a concept to condition itself.
At its core objective vs some form of relative moral view is, a theist/atheist argument - you can point to an exception here or there maybe, but it does not change this core reality.
And since this is the core, there is no correct answer to what is the right moral view.
All we can hope for is understanding each other, not agreement
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 16:19#2664240 likes
some people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was moral
other people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was immoral
Both times the people were correct, and the morality of slavery changed.
All this says is whatever one thinks is infallibly morally correct for you - that is nonsense.
It's just important to realize that a moral relativist is never going to say that any moral stance is "infallibly morally correct." That's pretty much the opposite of moral relativism.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 16:23#2664260 likes
Technical Point: conditions themselves are non-entities;
I don't know if "entity" is any clearer.
The other two points don't make much sense to me. I don't know why we'd be talking about if they can be "intuited," and "nderstanding cannot assign a concept to condition itself" just reads like gobbledygook/word salad to me.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 16:24#2664270 likes
I want to own slaves, because owning slaves will make me a bunch of money. And I really like money.
I think about it a sec, and then I decide, my moral view is slavery is morally permissible.
In your view or moral relativity, relative to myself, am I correct, slavery is morally permissible ?
I wouldn't say that you're correct relative to you. Correct/incorrect is a category error for this stuff. So you're neither correct nor incorrect. It's like asking if "slavery is morally permissible" is green or orange.
I would say that relative to your views, slavery is morally permissible, that it's morally acceptable, etc.
So how do you think we'd argue that relative to the person in question's views, slavery isn't morally permissible? Isn't that simply a statement of fact about what their views are? Even if you think that objectively, they're wrong, it's still the case that relative to their views, slavery is morally permissible.
Reply to Terrapin Station ok - but what if my conscience is really saying “slavery is bad you idiot “. But I like money so much, I just say “I think slavery is moral”
Did I just turn moral relativism from what I think into what i say ?
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 16:59#2664480 likes
ok - but what if my conscience is really saying “slavery is bad you idiot “. But I like money so much, I just say “I think slavery is moral”
In that case, you'd simply not be honestly reporting your moral stance. You're saying something different than your actual stance for some other motive.
But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken.
Oh god, not another bad analogy relating to foodstuffs. It's not impossible that I can be convinced otherwise. My morality isn't absolutely rigid, it can change. And one technique of convincing me otherwise about something would be to appeal to my moral feelings. Maybe I initially feel that I'm in the right, but you get me to change how I feel about it. That's not unheard of. It happens. And my meta-ethical relativism has no bearing on that. It would be exactly the same if I had almost any other meta-ethical position. It is a fallacy of the moral objectivist to think that an objective morality would make it easier to convince me otherwise. And this fallacy has already been noted by others in this discussion.
And besides, even preferences about food can change, in part due to emphasising the perceived merits or demerits.
To discuss anything is to seek normative agreement, For anything to be worth arguing over is for it to be potentially subject to normative agreement, but that is impossible in the case of moral relativism.
No, that isn't impossible, that's just the same gross misunderstanding.
So to answer what might be considered to be the meta-ethical question "What do moral judgements consist in?" with something like "They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual.
Oh dear. Mistake after mistake. You're not on top form today, Janus! I've explicitly acknowledged external influences, and rightly dismissed them as having much less of a primary role in determining my morality than other more fundamental factors.
And further to that if they were nothing more than personal preferences based on feeling (and I am not denying that they are that, only that they are not nothing more than that) then they are not properly moral at all, since they would then have no moral significance. In other words you would just be acting, not morally, but as your feelings dictate, just as animals do. (This is not to deny that the instinctive behavior of animals towards their own kind is not normative and cannot be seen as a kind of quasi-morality).
Well, if you intend to say something relevant about my position rather than someone's else's, then you should note that I talk about moral feelings. Other animals don't have moral feelings, or at least that's controversial to suggest. We are moral agents with moral feelings which are the foundation of our moral judgements. You can't rightly say that about chickens or budgies, or at least not without much controversy.
What "other (moral) priorities" could one who wishes to live in society have? The whole idea of morality consists in thinking of others.
That's a load of rubbish. Morality is not necessarily social or altruistic. They are merely positions in ethics. They contrast with individualism and egoism, which are equally positions in ethics. You are once again confusing your personal moral values for morality itself.
So if you had. for example, an "other priority" that consisted in exploiting others without consideration for their feelings or welfare, then that would amount to thinking only about yourself and your own feelings, and hence would not count as moral at all, but rather amoral.
I may have been pointed out, but it is not compelling; it just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If moral relativism consists in saying that it is OK to believe whatever is in accordance with your feelings about how to act towards others, then that just is an amoral, morally nihilistic, anarchic view. In that sense the very idea of moral relativism is a contradiction in terms.
Obviously it won't be compelling to anyone who is stuck in their own misunderstandings about it.
I made this point before to Terrapin; an artist is not isolated from influence, but they may be creatively independent in the sense that they can produce an original synthesis.
Their work is unique, and so is my morality, because it is uniquely mine, and founded on that which is unique to me, like my thoughts and feelings. An artist and an individual moral agent have this in common. Thanks for giving me a good analogy.
This is not the case with moral stances; there are no original stances when it comes to questions about the rightness of murder, rape, theft, deception and so on. There is really very little variation on those generic question other than for or against, and actually there is even less variation than that since almost everyone is against murder, rape, theft and deception.
Doesn't matter. Just because I have things in common with others, that obviously doesn't mean that I'm not unique, and uniqueness makes my point rather than your point about originality. I don't really care about your point about originality, and I needn't. That's the good thing about individualism. I forge my own path. I do not require your approval. Your judgement has no authority over me.
It is not merely that they are "equal in kind", but that they are equal insofar as on the presumption of moral relativism there is no rational reason to prefer one over the other.
It's not a matter of being rational. Feelings aren't rational.
The fact that moral relativists do prefer one over the other does not indicate that there are any rational justifications for any of those preferences, because they are preferences based only on self-interest or feeling.
If that's supposed to be a criticism, it is ineffectual. It is a category error to seek rational justification in something that isn't a matter of rationality.
Something more is needed, and that something more consists in thinking that it is important to care about your fellows, even if you don't naturally feel that way.
Yes, something more is needed: moral agency. The rest is just more personal opinion stemming from personal values, but stated as though it is something more than that.
...if you are a consistent moral relativist you won't expect anyone to be interested in your reasons for your moral judgements since they are merely based on your feelings and not on any normative considerations.
I'm just going to dismiss this. At this stage, I'm tired of trying to get sense out of it, when there probably isn't any sense to be found anyway.
In fact it isn't possible for you, as a consistent moral relativist, to 'explain the truth in (your) claim that (your) moral judgement is better than someone else's" because any such explanation will necessarily appeal to normative values that you have no business appealing to. All you could consistently say is "I feel my moral judgement is better than yours, so there!" to which the other will likely retort "So what?".
This is where psychology is handy, I think. Neitzche recognised the importance of psychology in relation to morality. It is handy as a tool, because although you're talking, I think that what you're actually doing and your reasons for doing it matter more. Your talking is actually kind of meaningless. It isn't about consistency at all, it is about you making a judgement about me on the basis that I am a moral relativist. You do not judge that I am deserving of "the right" to make moral evaluations, just because I am a moral relativist, and you disapprove of moral relativists for whatever reason. It doesn't have to be logical, and it probably isn't. You've basically already admitted to a guilt by association fallacy. Yours is a prejudiced and authoritarian judgement. Note the language: "You have no business!". The great irony is that you seem to think that you're being more rational than emotive, when in reality it is the opposite. "Boo moral relativism!".
No, I don't treat it like that at all. As I said a few times moral philosophy is more an art than a science, and similarly as with aesthetics there are qualities which determine the value of works that are more than merely a matter of personal preference, even though, since art has no strict utility, it is even harder than it is with ethics to say precisely what those qualities are.
Art isn't best made sense of by taking a rationalist approach either.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 17:18#2664540 likes
What I am getting out of this so far is that everyone non-critically accepts that some moral propositions are relative; that given such a moral proposition, P, some folks hold for P, some for not-P, and because of moral relativity, both are right, neither is wrong.
I don't agree with the last phrase. Right and wrong in this context are simply another way of saying whether someone holds moral position P or not-P. In other words, we have to be talking about moral right and wrong, and that's only a matter of someone thinking x is/should be morally permissible, y should be morally prohibited, etc. It's not the case that from any perspective, both P and not-P are right or wrong unequivocally.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 17:23#2664550 likes
But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken.
Not that I expect anyone to read the whole thread, but I addressed this above:
"Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect, though it is necessarily manipulative.)
"At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances. "
"They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual.
Well, or it's to note that the cultural and normative influences aren't themselves moral stances. In terms of literally, what they are on a physical level, they're sounds that other people make, motions they make, marks they make (writing), etc. They don't literally contain meaning, for example. As sounds, marks, motions, they're not identical to judgments/assessments.
Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? Because that's the way your argument sounds.
Basically I can only see two ways things that 'moral' could mean as a class of actions. Either it describes a feeling - actions which feel this way are those we're calling 'moral'. Or it describes a logical outcome - actions which bring about x are those we're calling 'moral'.
Being of a Wittgensteinian bent, I'm not of the opinion that one is right and the other wrong by virtue of their correspondence with the world. They're just words and they mean whatever we use them for. But...
This is the reason I asked the opening question. Would you really have no moral qualms at all about torturing an innocent child simply by virtue of someone having demonstrated to your satisfaction that doing so would bring about a harmonious society (ot whatever else we take x to be)? I ask, because I very much doubt either of you would. Which means that the term 'moral' is a term we apply to action which we feel a certain way about, not actions which bring about some end.
Than would you say moral relativism would require the individual moral judgements to be authentic and honest need to be in accord with one’s conscience
That's exactly what I asked. Reason is not a thing on its own. It does not, on its own provide answers. It is a means, not an end. To what end do you wish to apply reason? That is what I am asking.
How about moral as the result of a process of thinking, not of feeling - a difference there, yes?
Yes, the difference being that we generally speak of 'thinking' as a means to and end, and of 'feeling' as something which merely occurs to one unbidden. To what end should this 'thinking' be put? What are we 'thinking' for?
But none of that captures morality. If I wish to join two pieces of wood, I might make an argument that nailing them together would be a good move. This is a reasonable solution. What's that got to do with morality?
is there any moral proposition that is impervious to reason in the sense that reason cannot determine which view of the proposition is right/better/correct?
Not to correct, but to suggest........
......there are not moral propositions; there are propositions that determine, or are the expression of, morality. The moral quality of an expression is explicit in its compliance. All propositions are subject/predicate constructions, so if a proposition uses a principle of will for the subject and uses a logically relevant action conforming to the principle for the predicate, there is a moral determination contained in it, it is an expression of morality, and as a matter of mere convention, is inaptly called a moral proposition. It can now be said no proposition having moral implications is impervious to reason, because reason is absolutely necessary in its construction.
The subjective relativitism arises in the choice of the principle as the subject of the proposition, and by necessity of law, the action in the predicate. Morality arises in the compliance between the latter to the former, re: favorable treatment is always in my best interest (the principle), therefore I ought to treat others in their best interest (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself a moral agent proper. Similarly, the strong are naturally more apt to thrive (the principle), therefore, to thrive, even if I am not strong, I ought to prey on the weaker (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself moral proper.
Nothing whatsoever to do with feelings, and such sentimental emotivist tomfoolery, nosiree, bob!!
This debate is about what 'morality' is, so it makes no sense to use the term as having an assumed meaning within your argument. And what does 'pure of reason' even mean?
After all, one man's horror is just another man's just stretching out, yes?
Yes, obviously. Hitler clearly was not horrified by what he did, so it's pretty irrefutable that one man's horror is just another man's stretching out. Are you suggesting that Hitler was horrified by what he did?
No, I didn’t distinguish argument, imperative, or proposition as such, from each other, anyway. These certainly can be distinguished, depending on the philosophical/ethical domain one works from.
What you’re describing, I think, is relativism writ large, one’s anthropological or psychological view opposed to another’s, but moral relativism isn’t so large. Besides, there’s so many damn -ism’s and sub-ism’s and sub-sub-ism’s in relativism, it’s like those guys can’t figure it out wtf their talking about.
And part of this is establishing if morality means what anyone feels like saying it means, or it it has a backbone. And you're correct in this, I assume morality is a creature with a backbone, and more besides.
Right. This is why I asked the question in the first place. In in the scenario I described, I, a moral relativist, would not torture the child because to do so feels abominable. A feeling, not a rational conclusion to some calculus. Your argument seems to be that moral action is the 'correct' result of some calculus. So if the calculus came out with the result of torturing the child, would you do it? Or is there some feature of the world which prevents that from ever being the result, if so, what is it, and why is it impossible to remove?
Right, well that's moral relativism for a start. If you assign a value, not a value is pre-assigned. If you're doing the assignment of value, then what is to prevent others for assigning other values in the same circumstances?
Consider: to build a battleship or a spaceship to Mars you have to deal with things like "1" and "2"; but what do they have to do with battleships or spaceships?
Absolutely. One of the main reasons why I'm so opposed to utilitarianism. The calculus is far too complicated for anyone to have a chance of working it all out correctly.
As I said, I don’t hold with moral propositions per se, but rather with propositions expressing moral implications, and of a particular construction. So, with respect to your examples, I wouldn’t consider them moral expressions because, while, i.e., “slavery is bad” may be considered a subjective principle, it doesn’t have an action, or, if you wish, an imperative, associated with it.
Apodeitic means clearly established, indisputable. A priori means absent immediate experience, but possibly derivable from mediate experience. Given the latter form, an apodeitic, a priori moral expression might be, my suicide is contradictory to the purpose of Nature, therefore never permit the possibility of my own suicide.
If you’re looking for an expression suitable apodeitically to all humanity, I’m not so sure, simply from the nature of reason itself. Whatever one’s reason can think, another’s reason can re-think. One would have to reduce the substance so far as to become almost meaningless. If it be given reason is common to all human interests, then an objectively valid moral expression might be, all inter-personal connections aim towards community based on reason, therefore always reason in favor of an action as if it were universal law.
Relativism cannot stand up to that, but then......neither can humanity.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 20:00#2665260 likes
For one, it matters for an argument that morality is objective because it is based on reason. If reason isn't objective, then that doesn't work as an argument for the objectivity of morality.
It also matters for how we know whether some claim of reason is correct rather than just a statement of how some individual(s) happens to think. If reason is something aside from that, then when there's a dispute we can simply check the mind-independent stuff we're referring to to see who is right about it (assuming that people are really making a claim about mind independent stuff, and aren't simply making a claim about how they happen to think in the first place).
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 20:02#2665270 likes
Than would you say moral relativism would require the individual moral judgements to be authentic and honest need to be in accord with one’s conscience
Yes--it's simply a matter of whether something is really the judgment someone is making or not. We can't say it's their moral judgment if the utterance in question isn't really the judgment they make. (At least not ideally--again, they could be lying to us, and we might not have very good clues to tell us that they are . . . )
Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? Because that's the way your argument sounds.
Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so I cannot see that such a far out thought experiment has any bearing on what I have been arguing. As I see it morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people.
Society could not be harmonious if most of its members did not have such feelings. Those who don't have such feelings, if they want to participate in human communities, will still have to adhere in their actions to the mores which naturally evolve out of such feelings.
Of course fearful self-interest can undermine feelings of empathy; to imagine what a society where those feelings no longer predominate would look like, imagine what would happen if food supplies to supermarkets were radically disrupted due to curtailment of the fuel supply.
Reply to Terrapin Station Thanks. Wondering what your opinion would be if I posited this. No way i guess to argue or reason such a thing. But I would posit that with maybe an infinitesimally small number of exceptions, every human conscience on the planet would say slavery is immoral. Some may say they do, some may rationalize or justify they do, but I think that in their heart they know they are acting against their conscience.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 20:50#2665350 likes
Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society,
How would we know such things, unless you're just defining them tautologously to things like if a child is ever tortured . . . but then that wouldn't be telling us much besides how you're choosing to use a word.
Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so such a far out thought experiment has no bearing on what I have been arguing.
OK. So what is it about the world which makes this impossible? Is there some fact about the way the world is which prevents torturing a child, say in one generation, from being the start of a long chain of causative links which eventually end with an harmonious society which persists for the remainder of the earth's existence?
For me morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people.
If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'.
If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'.
It's normative because its the feeling or the kind of feeling that allows people to live together more or less harmoniously.
I've said all I'm going to say in this thread. I lack the time or energy required to continue responding unproductively to what appears to me as so many distortions and so much sophistry from some of those here.
Terrapin StationMarch 19, 2019 at 22:18#2665560 likes
I've said all I'm going to say in this thread. I lack the time or energy required to continue responding unproductively to what appears to me as so many distortions and so much sophistry from some of those here.
The "I can't actually address the objections brought up, but I'm not about to drop my spiel" tactic.
It's normative because its the feeling or the kind of feeling that allows people to live together more or less harmoniously.
But now we're back where we started. If a feeling that one should torture a child turned out (by some convoluted chain of events) to bring about an harmonious society later down the line, does that make it morally OK to do it?
If not, then making an harmonious society is clearly not what determines that which is moral. If it just wouldn't be possible, then what physical law prevents such a scenario?
It's a question, how can a question be distortion and sophistry?
I get what you're saying, but I disagree. I think that, in the fields where moral decisions are made, the 'way the world is' is sufficiently complex that no single model stands out as being objectively best with the clarity you believe. Of course, there are models which are so bad they can be discarded from consideration, but that still leaves most options that normal adult humans consider, in play.
Ultimately I agree with this, but I think you understate how much rationally persuasive wiggling room we can derive from comparing/discarding bad models alone (and remaining skeptical/waiting for evidence concerning "best" models; all we need is reasonably "better").
When we consider "what should we do next" by wondering what is the most optimal possible course of action, we run into severe problems of data gathering and computation, and there will always be possible courses of action we have yet to consider, which might be even more optimal for our given values. The most coherent way I think we can talk about these kinds of considerations is to put them on a spectrum of less morally praiseworthy to more morally praiseworthy (obligation flies out the window, because we're much more aligned about what we want to avoid than we are in our visions of a perfect future). Sometimes we can say with reasonable confidence that some positive (and complex) sets of actions are better than others, but by their very nature these positions are less certain and fundamentally tentative.
When we consider "what should we do next" by wondering first what courses of action we can rule out as sub-optimal (usually by comparing them to their absence) we can get much more rational confidence behind us given that we only need consider two courses of action and their possible outcomes (opposed to all possible courses of action). The resulting statements of negative moral obligation amount to things like "don't murder and torture people" and "don't gouge your eyes out". In practice this moral approach captures an arguably greater portion of moral conclusions at large: usually, but not always, moral arguments seek to forbid us from taking specific courses of action (a negative obligation stemming from a negative conclusion), but sometimes they seek to establish positive obligations from positive conclusions (e.g: worshiping god on Sunday is morally obligatory); the former sort of moral proposition is usually the more well founded (and testable)).
When it comes to actions like vaccines, it's fundamentally a harder argument to make (especially to say that vaccines are the best possible or morally optimal course of action), but if we focus on just comparing taking vaccines to not taking vaccines, we have a decent shot at coming to reasonable conclusions about which action is "better" in general (it was never really in contention for "best"). Strictly speaking, it would be more ideal if we had technology that could eliminate diseases in the first place; such a technology is probably possible, but we don't yet have access to it. Moving from the general case to the specific case, differing particular circumstances (such as compromised immune system and age) do change the calculus of whether or not vaccines are better than no vaccines, but here perhaps we can make an even more confident conclusion about which option is better because we can move beyond the general statistical assessment to become more precise. We will never know with absolute precision whether a given vaccination will be better or worse in the long run, but reasonable people can be convinced by reasonable evidence (maybe that's a naive mantra; I have to assume/hope that it's not). If I give you an unweighted dice with six sides, and all sides but one displays a value of 6, you would be remiss to bet on anything but 6, statistically speaking.
Moral positions relate to the effect actions have on people. Fields covering the effects on people are mainly psychology, sociology and human biology. None of these fields has the rigour of basic physics (or even chemistry) and to treat them as such is a mistake. Models can, and frequently do, come completely undone as new information emerges, and multiple models exist simultaneously.
It's actually very interesting that psychology and sociology should rank high on your list of considerations to make. High on my list are things like economics (which is in truth a lot more sophisticated than many people realize), medical science (which admittedly has it's weak areas), game-theory, complexity science (an interdisciplinary approach to heuristically modeling complex systems), and a spat of other useful perspectives that are typically related to moral quandaries.
It really reveals the way in which your perspective of morality is more focused on the relative and subjective way people feel about moral values,and also their actions, as opposed to the more strict empirical approach I take to the way actions conform to relative values in the first place. How people feel about actions can ultimately affect their values (hence the emergence of virtue ethics, which is in my view ultimately confusing an imaginary value inherent to actions with their situational utility), so in practice I don't expect to always manage to disentangle the two, but at some point I'm willing to depart from subjective feelings pertaining to actions or their outcomes in favor of an empirical (or our best effort at empirical) attempt to quantify whether or not actions comport with reported values in an objective sense (even if I need to meta-ethically disregard their virtues as value-utility-proxies). If someone wants to go on living as a primary moral value, but they believe that the actions, or lack of actions, required to stay alive are for whatever reasons are not really required for survival, as an observer we could say they have made a mistake (a statistically bad gamble) (and in hindsight, if they die because of it, we might even say so with approximate certainty).
To unite the semantic difference between us, we can imagine that how people feel about proposed actions is actually a values-report; that the way people feel about actions actually impacts their values hierarchy, such that relativism keeps it "true for them" that their actions serve their actual moral values. While this is a sensical interpretation, I can still make room for my position in so far as a given value-hierarchy might not actually be internally consistent, and also in so far as the way perceptions of actions actually affect people's values-hierarchies is malleable to reason based persuasion. We can challenge values hierarchies directly by exploring how one of their values (or the action which serves it) forseeably subverts one of their more fundamentally important values. We can also, and mainly, mitigate the subjectivity in how proposed actions are perceived by more objectively exploring the ramifications of proposed actions. So long as people believe we can say they are neither right nor wrong from the strict relativist standpoint, but in practice, if we can get people to change their mind then the statement "morally incorrect/immoral/morally inferior" actually does have relevant and consistent meaning within relativism.
Most models are complex. This means they rapidly become quite unpredictable over long periods of time. Even your sacred cow of the success of vaccination has only been measured over a few decades. What about 100 years, 1000 years? Do you think anyone has any hope of reliably predicting the effects on societies over those timescales?
Vaccines might be extraordinarily dis-eugenic, you're right, but these are risks of a different nature. The first vaccines took the form of crushed up scabs from people who survived the pox being snorted/blown into the nasal cavity. Back then they had no sweet clue what was going on, but the immediate benefits were apparent enough for them to assume a causal link. They indeed had no way of knowing that many generations down the line this practice might one day lead to a dependence on foreign intervention into our immune systems, but the costs of what you're describing are truly horrific. To ensure that future generations will have robust immune systems, we either need to let people die naturally from disease, or we would need to sterilize anyone deemed too weak to survive a disease without the vaccine. The price of eugenic progress (or even keeping our current eugenic health) is the hardhearted natural or artificial selection. Some people will fundamentally believe that the upward health of future generations is more important than any amount of happiness, including access to life, for ourselves and our more immediate descendants.
Most people just aren't willing to extend their sphere of moral consideration that far. Like anti-natalism, once self-consideration has been completely mitigated or removed from a moral equation, it becomes something else entirely: an incompatible set of moral values. Thankfully most people don't go that far, else we would not permit ourselves to thrive if it posed any risk to others.
Basically my feeling is that, in the face of such uncertainty, feeling good about one's decisions is more important than the extremely fragile result of some utilitarian calculus. That's not to say that these models are useless, far from it. I think it vitally important that when one's approach is overwhelmingly contradicted by the evidence, one is well advised to change it, but the key word here is 'overwhelmingly'. Not only is a preponderance of evidence not enough, but most of importantly, I personally must be overwhelmed by it, not others telling me I should be.
I would say that in the face of relative uncertainty we're forced to go with our guts, but the results of our evolving decision-making fields do tend to be more reliable than reading the portents from sheep-guts. By "utilitarian calculus" I'm trying to point to higher quality evidence based assessments (wanna-be calculations) of the outcomes of proposed actions in the first place. I realize that people will go with their guts, but it's also apparent that more experienced and well-informed guts make more reliable decisions. Magnus Carlsen or Bobby Fischer can only be trusted when they tell you what chess move you should make, but I'm not saying we're obligated to do what they say, or even that they're always right. The crux of my point is that it is most important for us to try to become experienced and informed, like them, that we too can make more reliable decisions (that we're sometimes impelled to trust preeminent experts on specific matters is not a complication we cannot use reason to assess). No matter what your values are, relatively speaking, being able to better serve them by avoiding the bad moves and tending toward better moves is in my view the most significant way to assess the meta-ethical quality of a framework or proposed action in an of itself (relative values aside).
It's not a perfect approach (or one that seeks perfection), but the vector of reason and evidence is hopefully a more persuasive method. If we have to redefine what we mean by some words in some contexts to expose more of that overwhelming persuasive power, that's what matters. In practical moral debate we just can't meaningfully bring the moral-epistemic implications of relativism without also neutering the persuasive power of our language; if and where we have fundamentally different starting values, to import relativism would be to give up an attempt to influence their values directly. If we don't need to influence their values because they are not in competition with our own, then we don't need relativism at all; we can focus on how our moral agreements empirically serve (or more easily: do not disservice) our mutually compatible values.
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Despite my addiction to verbosity and post length, I think I'm getting a clearer picture of the differences between our views as our discussion progresses. Thanks for your patience!
Reply to Isaac wondering your thought on this as well. Can you imagine, except for some incredibly minute exceptions, that any human being could actually be honest with their conscience, and say it would be moral to needlessly torture innocent children?
Despite my addiction to verbosity and post length, I think I'm getting a clearer picture of the differences between our views as our discussion progresses. Thanks for your patience!
I don’t even read your posts because they’re so long. I’m being lazy, though. I just read your opening few sentences, then skipped to this last part.
Reply to VagabondSpectre I just read a little more of your post but gave up again. I would find it more enticing to read if you mixed in some short sentences with your more complex ones. But, you don’t have to take my advice.
VagabondSpectreMarch 19, 2019 at 23:20#2665770 likes
It's not a perfect approach (or one that seeks perfection), but the vector of reason and evidence is hopefully a more persuasive method. If we have to redefine what we mean by some words in some contexts to expose more of that overwhelming persuasive power, that's what matters. In practical moral debate we just can't meaningfully bring the moral-epistemic implications of relativism without also neutering the persuasive power of our language; if and where we have fundamentally different starting values, to import relativism would be to give up an attempt to influence their values directly. If we don't need to influence their values because they are not in competition with our own, then we don't need relativism at all; we can focus on how our moral agreements empirically serve (or more easily: do not disservice) our mutually compatible values.
That one paragraph doesn't fully summarize the entire post though...
I've considered making TL;DRs, but all that would really do is to encourage laziness. If we could really compact all this communication into denser language without sacrificing precision and our ability to locate meaningful differences, we would probably be doing that in the first place.
At some point additional information becomes superfluous to the point of a post, but I would rather err on the side of too long and have a better shot at meaningful exchanges than err on the side of to short and risk passing (and speak past) each other like ships in the rhetorical dark.
Reply to VagabondSpectre I think it is more engaging to mix up sentence lengths. I find it cognitively exhausting to read many consecutive complex sentences.
VagabondSpectreMarch 19, 2019 at 23:31#2665820 likes
I find it cognitively exhausting to read many consecutive complex sentences.
I find it cognitively underwhelming to only read or write in curt and simplistic fashion :wink: .
To be fair I think my writing style has its moments, though the volume can be off-putting to some; my downright playful overuse of the semi-colon, for instance...
Reply to VagabondSpectre I finally read that post I was referring to in its entirety. I agree that choosing the “better” option is what normative ethics is based on, similar to my previous suggestion of choosing the “lesser of two evils”. That said, meta-ethically I believe that ethics is based on a duty to do no harm (instinctive avoidance of pain in conjunction with finding oneself living in a community). I think the positive duties (duties to perform some actions) are more problematic epistemically than the negative duties (duties to abstain from certain actions), as telling someone they MUST act in a certain way is not descriptive of the variations we see in different societies; and in order to have a moral truth, it is easier to know what all societies abstain from than what they all commonly do.
But now we're back where we started. If a feeling that one should torture a child turned out (by some convoluted chain of events) to bring about an harmonious society later down the line, does that make it morally OK to do it?
If not, then making an harmonious society is clearly not what determines that which is moral. If it just wouldn't be possible, then what physical law prevents such a scenario?
It's a question, how can a question be distortion and sophistry?
I haven't accused you of distortion and sophistry...yet...I had thought you are one of the more reasonable respondents in this thread.
Although the way you frame the question does distort the sense of what I said regarding the purpose of morality being to engender harmonious human community. I have been arguing that moral feelings and thoughts are always aimed at social harmony. Introducing a ridiculous thought experiment involving a scenario where somehow killing one baby is supposed to produce (what, endless?) social harmony somehow by magic has nothing whatsoever to do with what I had been saying.
It is not "making an harmonious society" (whatever that could even mean) that determines that which is moral; the intent to live well and harmoniously with others is what makes attendant thoughts and feelings moral thoughts and feelings. The intent to serve only your own interest is what makes attendant thoughts and feelings immoral or amoral.
As I see it, Terrapin is an unrelenting sophist, and I can't be bothered to respond to his posts. S is also tending that way, so I am done responding to him as well. To me both of these posters are more concerned with insisting ad nauseum on their own inadequate views and with winning arguments than with discussing any issue in good faith and with an open mind. I just can't be bothered with that kind of shit anymore; I've already wasted too much time on it.
The problem with all of these kinds of threads that consist in people basically shouting at one another "yes it is", "no it's not" "yes it is" "no it's not" etc. etc. etc. is that the interlocutors are starting from such basically incompatible assumptions that all that results is pages and pages of talking past one another. Such "conversations" are basically worthless shit, devoid of genuine insight, totally boring and unproductive and not worth wasting any precious time on.
The most coherent way I think we can talk about these kinds of considerations is to put them on a spectrum of less morally praiseworthy to more morally praiseworthy
I don't see how we can do this in the face of such uncertainty, without assigning an ordinal value to each option, we cannot order them, and if are admittedly unclear about the details, how can we be clear about the ordinal value we assign. Throwing out the nonsense, we agree on, the unreasoned and the insane, but all we have left after that is a pool of equally viable options. I don't se any logical reason why, in some areas, one option may not still rise slightly above the others. I see no logical reason why it might not be the case that all the options just happen to be very obviously ordinal. But I cannot see what worldy force would make this the case for all decisions.
Strictly speaking, it would be more ideal if we had technology that could eliminate diseases in the first place; such a technology is probably possible, but we don't yet have access to it.
This is an interesting example of the sort of long-term thinking which makes rational calculus complicated. I would say that, coming down a notch from from ideal, strictly speaking it would be more ideal if we had an easy, free medical intervention which made the complications which can sometimes arise from childhood diseases a trivial matter. A deep wound often used to be a death sentence, now it is an almost trivial matter because we have antibiotics. If complications like encephalitis were to go the same way as a result of better medicines, then there would be no need for vaccinations at all, no matter how small the risk. But that's not going to happen when the world's third largest industry is currently making billions out of an injection which they can sell to every child on the planet whether they need it or not. What CEO in their right mind is going to invest in a drug which only a small number of people will need, to replace a drug they currently sell to everyone?
If I give you an unweighted dice with six sides, and all sides but one displays a value of 6, you would be remiss to bet on anything but 6, statistically speaking.
Again, you're missing the point because you're simply assuming knowledge rather than taking account of uncertainty. You're presuming, in this situation, that you know the dice has six sides, five of which are a 6. Of course in that situation, you would be best off betting on six. But in the situation I'm describing, vaccination particularly, you do not know that the dice has five 6's, you are told that the dice has five 6's by a relatively small group of of people. A group who have a vested interest in you betting on 6, a group who have demonstrated themselves, at least in some instances, to be untrustworthy, and incapable of understanding statistics. And on top of that, they're not even talking about your dice, just dice in general. The situation no longer seems so obvious.
It really reveals the way in which your perspective of morality is more focused on the relative and subjective way people feel about moral values,and also their actions, as opposed to the more strict empirical approach I take to the way actions conform to relative values in the first place.
Not entirely, but it still highlights a difference between us. I don't see the point in keeping people alive if they're not going to be happy. It's people's happiness that matters to me. Why do people do risky sports? Because the increase in happiness is worth the reduced life expectancy. So psychology and sociology are important considerations. We can't just presume people want to remain alive for as long as possible at all costs, want to have as much wealth as possible at all costs. Clichéd though it sounds, this is just not the case.
We can challenge values hierarchies directly by exploring how one of their values (or the action which serves it) forseeably subverts one of their more fundamentally important values. We can also, and mainly, mitigate the subjectivity in how proposed actions are perceived by more objectively exploring the ramifications of proposed actions. So long as people believe we can say they are neither right nor wrong from the strict relativist standpoint, but in practice, if we can get people to change their mind then the statement "morally incorrect/immoral/morally inferior" actually does have relevant and consistent meaning within relativism.
I'm in agreement with this. In contrast to some relativist, I also think that it is possible for people to simply be incorrect about how they feel. It's possible for someone to report that they feel good in a society which, for example commits FGM, but for them to be mistaken about that, and that they would, in fact, feel much better in a society which doesn't. The difference between us is simply the fact that I stop a lot earlier than you in such determinations. You seem to think that you can continue to demonstrate internal inconsistencies right down to the level of fine decision-making. I think we lose certainty so rapidly as we get more complex, that only the very basics are approachable like this.
To ensure that future generations will have robust immune systems, we either need to let people die naturally from disease, or we would need to sterilize anyone deemed too weak to survive a disease without the vaccine.
It's funny how often I hear this type of argument in so many fields. People seem willing to believe we live in a world of remarkable, often unimaginable, technological marvelry, and yet, when you ask them to imagine an alternative to one single aspect of it, all they can come up with is the same world but just without the thing in question.
I'm not sure I talking about a hard-hearted eugenics. I'm talking about a better system. One in which taking a prophylactic drud at birth is not the only way we can think of to tackle social infections. And I'm not talking about the disadvantages to the immune system either. I'm talking about the disadvantages (in a potential future) of having a private company responsible for injecting something into every child in the world. Are you seriously suggesting you can't see a risk there?
The crux of my point is that it is most important for us to try to become experienced and informed, like them, that we too can make more reliable decisions (that we're sometimes impelled to trust preeminent experts on specific matters is not a complication we cannot use reason to assess).
We are agreed here, as I think we've now firmly established. Where we disagree is simply over the strength of evidence contradicting one's 'gut' that is required to make one change. For me it is very high, for you it seems to be merely a preponderance.
Can you imagine, except for some incredibly minute exceptions, that any human being could actually be honest with their conscience, and say it would be moral to needlessly torture innocent children?
Yes, unfortunately I can because people do torture children. They do so to greater or lesser degree all the time. The insane and the psychopathic may well believe it their moral duty to torture children. Right at the other end of the scale, but still very relevant, anyone buying products resulting from child labour (but arguing that it's "someone else's problem") is complicit in minor torture of innocent children. What about the swathes of religious nutters like Calvinists who (used to) beat their children on a daily basis to "beat the devil out of them". I'm afraid there are huge sections of society who think it is morally OK, sometimes even their moral duty, to beat innocent children.
Still not understanding this "first reason" thing. How can you reason first. You must have some objective first to reason toward. Can you give me an example of how someone might arrive at any conclusion with reason alone, no objective at all?
Is there nothing that you hold is plain wrong - or right - not because you feel that it is, but because it is?
Yes, but I'm a deflationist about truth claims. Something "just is" if and only if, when I treat it that way, it works. The desk in front of me "just is" solid because when I treat it as such it responds as I expect. In fact, physicists seem to be telling me that the desk is not 'really' solid afterall, but, not being a physicist, I don't care.
But "murder is wrong" is not a proposition similar to "this desk is solid" because there's no test I can think of which clarifies it. I treat the desk as if it were solid and so long as it responds appropriately I'm happy to believe it is in fact solid. What would be the equivalent with murder being wrong. I treat murder as wrong and then what response should I be expecting to see if I'm right about that? Every one I can think of has problems of the sort I outlined in my scenario.
?Isaac wondering your thought on this as well. Can you imagine, except for some incredibly minute exceptions, that any human being could actually be honest with their conscience, and say it would be moral to needlessly torture innocent children?
I can but even if we accept for the sake of argument that no such people exist, then all you have then is universal intersubjectivity. It doesn't get you an objective morality.
the intent to live well and harmoniously with others is what makes attendant thoughts and feelings moral thoughts and feelings.
Same problem still applies. If the intent is what makes it moral, then what of the situation where you may have to, for example, murder some innocent to save others. Your intent behind committing the murder is to save the others (the harmonious society), but that does not make you undertake the murder with relish, safe in the knowledge that it is best for the community. Something still tells you murder is wrong, even when your intention is purely the best interests of the group. If that something is not morality (because by intention, you've determined this action is, in fact, moral) then what is it?
To me both of these posters are more concerned with insisting ad nauseum on their own inadequate views and with winning arguments than with discussing any issue in good faith and with an open mind.
I disagree strongly here. I don't see how you can justify that kind of accusation. What does "good faith" even mean in this context, and what types of argument are you identifying as examples of "bad faith" As far as I read the discussion, it started out with Tim simply declaring, without argument, that some things were simply "wrong". Some relativist have tried to make their case and been met with just a repeated assertion that "some things are just wrong". I tried to explain my position with a thought experiment (a perfectly normal, common philosophical tool) and you took the hump and said you weren't engaging anymore.
How is that discussing with an open mind?
Terrapin StationMarch 20, 2019 at 09:36#2667630 likes
wondering your thought on this as well. Can you imagine, except for some incredibly minute exceptions, that any human being could actually be honest with their conscience, and say it would be moral to needlessly torture innocent children?
What bothers me about comments like this--and they tend to be legion--is the apparent assumption that it goes without saying that the popularity (or as others prefer, "prevalence," just to avoid Aspieish confusion) of something has some significance for its normative merit. Basically it seems to be an endorsement of an argumentum ad populum. Or it's an endorsement of conformity for its own sake--as if (almost) everyone doing, saying, etc. something is a good reason to have to follow suit.
Reply to Isaac the question was not do they, the question was, would they be acting in accordance with their conscience. I understand that we humans can rationize or justify just about anything, to others and to ourselves. Just because they do it, or say it, does not mean they are acting or talking in conflict with their conscience.
I can but even if we accept for the sake of argument that no such people exist, then all you have then is universal intersubjectivity. It doesn't get you an objective morality.
Other than the label you apply to it, is there some pragmatic difference between universal subjectivity and objectivity?
What bothers me about comments like this--and they tend to be legion--is the apparent assumption that it goes without saying that the popularity (or as others prefer, "prevalence," just to avoid Aspieish confusion) of something has some significance for its normative merit. Basically it seems to be an endorsement of an argumentum ad populum.
It was a question, not a comment. And I was just hoping for an honest response of what people truly think about it. Conscience seems an important concept in this discussion. Wondering if you, in your understanding of conscience and in your interaction with your own conscience, can you imagine that, without some very very small exceptions, many human consciences find needless children torture morally permissible. If your honest answer is yes, we can handle the popularity issue after that.
Terrapin StationMarch 20, 2019 at 10:00#2667710 likes
Reply to Terrapin Station how about, instead of wondering, guessing, or thinking tactically on what this does or does not do to your argument and position, you just honestly answer the question. It is just an opinion, it is not provable, just want to know what your honest thought is on it.
I added the "except" part because I have been on this board awhile and absolute statements would send me down 15 posts about absolutely instead of the concept at hand, thought would try and get it out of the way.
the question was not do they, the question was, would they be acting in accordance with their conscience. I understand that we humans can rationize or justify just about anything, to others and to ourselves. Just because they do it, or say it, does not mean they are acting or talking in conflict with their conscience.
My answer would be much as Terrapin's above. The incrediblely minute exceptions are what we're talking about from a meta-ethical position. And they're important because at one time, people who thought women should be allowed to vote were the incrediblely minute exception.
To be more specific to your question. Yes, I can imagine it because, without any (to me) unnecessary 'spooky stuff' I have no reason to believe that conscience is anything other than an activity of the brain an brains vary for all sorts of different reasons. So even if you bring it down to the very basic values (by which I mean values that are not derived inductively from other more basic ones), I see no factor in the world which would prevent some brains from developing some particular base value.
Other than the label you apply to it, is there some pragmatic difference between universal subjectivity and objectivity?
A proposition is subjective if its truth value is is dependent on personal feelings, tastes or opinions (i.e. existing in someone's mind rather than the external world)
A proposition is objective if it's truth value is independent of the person uttering it.
In other words if it's subjective it reflects how people feel rather than any mind independent reality. This was essentially what the OP and the ensuing exchanges have been about.
Terrapin StationMarch 20, 2019 at 10:14#2667770 likes
how about, instead of wondering, guessing, or thinking tactically on what this does or does not do to your argument and position, you just honestly answer the question. It is just an opinion, it is not provable, just want to know what your honest thought is on it.
Because it's a pet issue of mine. I see that appeal to the crowd, to the status quo, come up again and again, in all sorts of guises.
At any rate, there's no moral stance that I can't imagine someone sincerely having. I wouldn't be able to guess how common any stance would be, but I don't think that's relevant to anything. That irrelevance was just my point immediately above.
My answer would be much as Terrapin's above. The incrediblely minute exceptions are what we're talking about from a meta-ethical position. And they're important because at one time, people who thought women should be allowed to vote were the incrediblely minute exception.
Not all moral judgement are the same, and I am not saying that there is a morally objective answer to every question. Woman voting and torturing babies are not equal.
So even if you bring it down to the very basic values (by which I mean values that are not derived inductively from other more basic ones), I see no factor in the world which would prevent some brains from developing some particular base value.
and yet again - a non-answer - how many 10 in 7.6 billion ? 1 % (that's 76 Million by the way) a tenth of 1% ??
so tell me the pragmatic difference between 99 % of the people in the world would have the same moral judgement and there is a near objective truth about that judgement ??
so tell me the pragmatic difference between 99 % of the people in the world would have the same moral judgement and there is a near objective truth about that judgement ??
Simple, I already outlined this. It's simply not a way I recognise of using the term in a consistent manner. If one lived on an island full (for some reason) of psychopaths, all of whom felt that killing randomly was OK. If you were the only one who didn't and were unaware of the rest of the world, would that make it moral to kill randomly?
We can come up with any number of these examples, some, unfortunately are actually played out in communities in the real world. See the discussion I've been having with VagabondSpectre about FGM.
The idea that popularity is what defines actions as moral, just does not capture the way we actually feel about it. I don't have to check how popular my personal opposition to torture is before deciding whether to torture someone. I already feel it is wrong and would continue to do so even if the entire world disagreed.
A proposition is subjective if its truth value is is dependent on personal feelings, tastes or opinions (i.e. existing in someone's mind rather than the external world)
A proposition is objective if it's truth value is independent of the person uttering it.
In other words if it's subjective it reflects how people feel rather than any mind independent reality. This was essentially what the OP and the ensuing exchanges have been about.
Thanks for the definitions - and like I said label it as you wish, is there some pragmatic difference between 99% of the world having the same moral view about some action and a high degree of moral objectivity about that action ?
At any rate, there's no moral stance that I can't imagine someone sincerely having. I wouldn't be able to guess how common any stance would be, but I don't think that's relevant to anything. That irrelevance was just my point immediately above.
More tactic - very tiring - Of course you can guess, we all can guess - just asking for your honest guess. And, at least to me it would be a relevant point if 99% of the world held the same moral judgement on some specific issue. That would require some explanation.
if 99% of the world held the same moral judgement on some specific issue. That would require some explanation.
But you don't mean some explanation do you? You've been given some explanation - evolution. You're waiting for a particular type of explanation. One involving God.
is there some pragmatic difference between 99% of the world having the same moral view about some action and a high degree of moral objectivity about that action ?
The question makes no sense. Either a moral proposition is objectively true (true independent of anybody's "moral view") or it's not. The phrase "high degree of moral objectivity" makes no sense.
But you don't mean some explanation do you? You've been given some explanation - evolution. You're waiting for a particular type of explanation. One involving God
no - i am happy with human nature, evolution, take your pick -
But if you don't see that there are probably a few moral questions that 99% of the people in the world, if they honestly answered what their conscience said, would have the same moral view is not an argument against there are some things that are for all practical purposes objectively wrong - then you are wed to proposition in conflict with that - sounds like religion to me.
Comments (2226)
That is how many people feel about it. It has even been formalised as the ‘boo-hurrah’ theory of ethics - that ethical judgement is a matter of 'boo' - don't like it - and 'hurrah' - I do. It is a natural consequence of secular-scientific culture, first anticipated by Hume's famous 'is/ought' dichotomy - that what we can be certain about, is what can be measured precisely, whereas qualitative judgements - 'ought' statements - have no such mooring.
Quoting tim wood
And the problem is here you're implicitly judging it in evolutionary terms, against biological criteria. The whole, in fact the only, criterion in evolutionary biology is what is advantageous for propagation. So implicitly this amounts to a form of utilitarianism and/or pragmatism - greatest good for the greatest number, or whatever works.
Consider some humanistic alternatives - eudaimonic ethics, from Aristotle, the aim of which is flourishing, realising one's own purpose. I suppose you could argue that Abraham Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' is essentially eudaimonic in nature, in that he proposes a set of needs higher than the simply biological, of self-actualisation or realising your innate capacities and potential.
But ultimately, for ethical judgements to be grounded in something more than opinion or individual prerogative, I think there has to be some judgement about what constitutes a higher good or true good. But the dynamics of modern culture are such that any of those kinds of judgements are instinctively reviled - because they sound religious.
Have you read, or are you aware of, Alisdair McIntyre's After Virtue?
So, morality is a system of values. Values are necessary for human action. I remember a discussion a while ago about the necessity for emotion in order for people to make decisions or act. When certain parts of the brain associated with emotion are damaged, a person may be unable to make the simplest decisions - what to wear or eat. I guess some values are built in and some are learned or taught.
Which type of value makes up moraility? I guess both. I think some of what we think is right or wrong comes from our natural place as social animals who like each other. Some, especially the specific details of a particular morality, are developed and taught socially. Morality is a system of values which make it easier for people to live together in groups. Whether you like morality or a particular moral system or not is irrelevant to the fact that morality makes sense. If you don't like the morality that applies to your particular group, you'll have to face the consequences.
Of course, many people believe that morality is established absolutely by a god or other mechanism. That's not my personal belief.
I don't revile them, and certainly not because they sound religious.
The problem I have with them is the same problem I have with the notion of objective meaning (in the semantics sense, which has been the topic of a handful of recent threads): there is no evidence of extramental meaning/moral judgments/judgments about ("higher") good, etc., and a fortiori that's the case on my view as I don't buy realism for any abstracts whatsoever--I'm a nominalist.
I'm also a physicalist in general, and I have sort of a logical positivist disposition on metaphysical/ontological claims (although I'm not at all an orthodox logical positivist, I disagree with their "schematic," etc.--It's more just that my approach is that stingy/parsimonious/skeptical, and I tend to want to interpret everything in terms of observables/what actually is going on in reference to something in "practical," everyday terms of just what we're doing, just what we're observing, etc.)
Societies/cultures having values is really just a loose manner of speaking. It's individuals who have values. Individuals interact and can influence each other, which leads to social/cultural statistical tendencies, but the society or culture itself can't literally have values.
In my view, there are social systems, institutions, structures that are related to, but separate from, psychological factors.
I don't know, because I don't know the scope of the term "systems" in your usage. You'd have to detail that better.
But I do know that societies/cultures don't literally have values. That's a category error. Values are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occur in individuals.
So, there is no English language. Languages are mental phenomena, and mental phenomena only occur in individuals?
First, how in the world would you be going: X is only a mental phenomenon, therefore there is no x?
I take it you mean "evolved" in the sense that thinking over time approaches what is good and evil as they really are. The non-arbitrary element being considered is not going to mean anything to those who dismiss that sort of thing as illusion. The baby must be tossed out with the dirty water.
Wayfarer's observation regarding "humans" and the proposition that they have their own nature is germane. I would only add that models of "being a person" in the way Kant based his psychology are oddly less idealistic in that regard. His model was the encouragement to make many others.
So there is a big disconnect between looking at models to determine whether they provide accurate maps of the territory and the debate whether anybody should be making maps at all.
Evolution is propelled by natural selection. Nature was here before us, and it will be here after us thinking animals. Certain anthropocentric selective agents pretend to be natural selection and the difference between natural selection and anthropogenic selection tends to be where I apply morality (virtue is wiser than morality, however); humanism confuses anthropgenic selection (Anthropocene) with natural selection. Evolution occurs far slower than the life span of any one species. What will have happened if thought itself no longer exists? Evolution. Evolution, then, is far more encompassing than evolved thought.
He has company. In a practical, meaningful sense, that's more or less what it is.
Quoting tim wood
That's arrogant. Maybe you're the one who needs educating.
Quoting tim wood
There are two problems with this straightaway. Firstly, opinion is no more nothing than evolved thought is nothing. Secondly, your use of "mere" is an example of loaded language and a poor representation of the position that you're supposed to be criticising. A mere opinion makes me think of the opinion that salt and vinegar flavour crisps are better than cheese and onion flavour crisps. This is clearly not what was intended. Your characterisation is uncharitable.
Quoting tim wood
There's nothing there that explicitly contradicts the position you're supposed to be arguing against. You're expecting us to read between the lines in what you're saying? Okay. So you're just [i]assuming[/I] that morality is objective morality, and that there's an objective right and wrong, and that there are obvious examples of this. Yawn.
Both views can be simultaneously true, and even complimentary, with a bit of effort. Human preferences (especially shared preferences) (eg: the desire to be free and unmolested), can form the basis of our moral objectives, agreements, and actions, but at the same time empirical truth must also play a part in our determinations of what to do next. According to human preferences, some moral schemes are objectively inferior to others because they do not effectively serve those preferences.
But that would still boil down to preferences, so at the most fundamental level morality would be subjective.
We could say that "not molesting Billy serves Billy's (and whoever else's when it comes to Billy) preference to not molest Billy," but then if we're calling that morality, does morality no longer have to do with good/bad conduct, ways that we should versus shouldn't behave, etc.?
Furthermore, merely acting on personal preference lacks such a significant component of how most people conceptualize "morality" that it is basically antithetical. Under most definitions, morality only begins when we consider the preferences of others, whether for greedy, strategic, or empathetic causes. Impulsively acting on our hedonic urges (as "mere preference" might be boiled down to) seems antithetical to what it is we do when we do morality.
For most people, morality isn't fundamentally "personal preference", it's "personal preference in world of others' preferences, which pragmatically demand consideration".
I agree with much of that. It doesn't matter! It doesn't matter in the sense that morality would be no less important. The problem is getting the other side to see it that way. I see the same errors repeated over and again. They seem to see preference as some kind of affront, and try to trivialise it as "mere" preference. It's a quite ridiculous and unproductive way to react.
No one says it's personal preferences unqualified, as if whether someone prefers Cap'n Crunch to Count Chocula might be a moral issue.
They're preferences about interpersonal behavior that one considers more significant than etiquette.
It's simply that we base our ideas of what actions are "good and bad" (and thereby a way to derive oughts) around concepts like "Billy doesn't want to be molested" or "molestation is extremely harmful to health, and everyone wants to be healthy" in the first place. In this case we can actually use our shared preferences to make virtue or deontological moral arguments (general laws) that are very useful for creating a better (more preferable) world. We can also make consequentialist arguments by asking whether or not an action does physical or reasonable disservice to the preferences of anyone else. If it does not, then it cannot be an immoral action. And we don't need shared preferences to have consequentialist arguments to make sense. When preferences are actually mutually exclusive or in direct competition, things naturally become much more complex (morality can break down), but that's just the way the world is.
As soon as you introduce bad/good, better/worse, etc. you've left the objective realm, though.
So you can focus on something objective like "Doing x serves S's preference," bit then we're not actually talking about the stuff that we conventionally talk about with morality --good/bad, better/worse, should/should not, etc.
They're more important than etiquette because they concern the "preferences" which we value and seek to protect above all others (eg: the desire to go on living). Etiquette is about avoiding annoyance and petty confrontation, morality is about avoiding suffering and other existential threats.
Some moral practices are objectively worse than others from a given set or sets of moral preferences, and some are objectively better.
Child vaccination springs to mind: both parents prefer their kids to be healthy, but only one of them is actually achieving it.
Try telling a pediatric physician that vaccines amount to ettiquette ;)
Everyone thinks amorally from time to time: for the sake of sociology, anthropology, or any other time we examine people mechanistically. There is even ethical benefit from doing so. You're less like to delude yourself if you can look at yourself without judgement.
For those who say they think amorally 24/7, I think you'll find they're really no different from the rest of us in terms of behavior.
Try interviewing instead of flabbergasting. You may learn a new thing about your fellow human.
But four quarters making a whole is unquestionably quantitative. What about - ‘should I cheat in this exam?’ ‘Should I give this stranger a ride?’ ‘Should I report that infraction I observed?’ They’re ethical judgements; how could they be expressed in quantitative terms? They require value judgements by their very nature.
Quoting tim wood
There is famous and oft-repeated aphorism ‘If God is dead, then everything is permitted’, from Dostoevsky, which I think, dramatises the sense in which ethical maxims have been underwritten by divine law.
Quoting Wayfarer
Your first paragraph seems rather disdainful of 'boo/hurrah' ethical judgement, but the rest of your post seems to be advocating it. Which is it?
This is a really nice summary. Once you take into account the pragmatic necessity of dealing with other people's preferences, the statistical facts about those preferences (most common, range, average etc...) become necessary parts of the process, and those parts are facts about the world, not individual subjective feelings.
I don’t regard eudomianic ethics as being emotive. They’re grounded in the notion of telos, which is that individuals have an end towards which their efforts should be directed. I take the positivist approach to be basically meaningless.
I get that, which is why - having rejected moral objectivism as without warrant - I pragmatically opt with moral relativism, which means that moral statements, suitably interpreted or suitably qualified, are truth-apt, and some are true, whereas others are false. There [I]is[/I] truth to be found in or relating to morality. You just have to look it at in the right way.
The alternative would be error theory, which keeps the interpretation of moral objectivism, and simply accepts that all moral statements are false.
Or emotivism, which denies that moral statements are even truth-apt.
And moral objectivism simply isn't a viable option, because it is without warrant, and no one when put to the test ever proves themselves capable of providing warrant. Moral objectivism is for dogmatists.
Quoting tim wood
Presumably and seemingly make it okay with me. So it's just opinion which is itself considered to be progressive. I don't find that so objectionable. You might even have a lot of people on both sides agree with you on that point. Human rights certainly look like progress to me. But this is still all ultimately just a subjective matter. A huge number of people feel the same way, so we did something about it.
Quoting tim wood
Someone? Har har. You know full well that it was me. You named me earlier for that very reason.
Quoting tim wood
Yeah, yeah. Except that you knowingly used "mere" instead because of the connotations.
And you're still being uncharitable, I think. Did you ever bother to seek clarification about what exactly was meant by "nothing more than" in the context of what you were quoting? Or did you just assume your own interpretation? I think that Terrapin Station, who is presumably the author of the unattributed quote in your opening post, just meant something along the lines that it is not objectively true, rather than that it's not popular or useful or seemingly progressive.
... And this is exactly why the moral subjectivists do what they do, because of bullshit like this. Vaccinating your child (or not) is not an objectively moral action. To do so, you have to trust the medical establishment (where is the moral requirements that you do so?), you have to trust the pharmaceutical company (again, where is the moral requirement here?), you have to trust the statistics (no moral requirement), you have to trust that your child has the same health prospects as an average child (again, empirical, not moral data).
If, it were an absolutely incontrovertible fact that your child (not just the average child) were going to be more healthy as a result of vaccination, and you knew that with absolute certainty or had no cause to doubt any of the information you've been given, then it would begin to approach objectively moral to do so.
I think that what is 'moral' is not 'merely' personal preference, as @S has already mentioned, there's nothing 'mere' about it, but if entertaining a degree of moral objectivity means allowing people the tools to strong-arm others into feeling obliged to go along with their own personal world-view, and use their children's health as leverage, then I'm with the subjectivists.
Doesn't matter, its still someone's 'boo', and someone's 'hurrah'. It's still someone's 'rekon' about telos, and someone's feeling about what comes from it.
I don't think anyone of the 'boo/hurrah' camp think these preferences springs out of nowhere.
People can get wrong just will achieve some particular state, but that does no work to make the moral part more or less objective.
"It is right to promote the health of your child" might be at least a simplification of the moral part, and that's the part that's not at all objective.
"X does/does not cause autism," etc. is the stuff that one can get correct or incorrect. There is no moral aspect to that, though.
Plenty of people--almost everyone to some extent, values etiquette, too. The distinction from etiquette is simply because there are two different classes of interpersonal behavior we make these sorts of judgments about--one falls under the rubric of etiquette, and many consider it extremely important, and the other falls under the rubric of morality.
How can opinions in the sense of "I like cauliflower," "I prefer Evil Dead to Casablanca," etc. be wrong?
Or are you only talking about opinions in the sense of "It's Dr. Tata's opinion that garlic can help fight LDL cholesterol"?
If someone likes cauliflower, they're going to say that cauliflower is better than some food they don't like. "In my opinion, x is better than y" is another way of saying that one likes x (more than one likes y.)
So again, how can they be right or wrong about that? Don't just tell me they can be. Tell me how they can be.
It's true or false that they have that opinion, yes. It's not true or false that cauliflower is good, which is another way of stating the same opinion. It would be true or false that they think it's good, though.
Anyway, you're ignoring what I'm asking you.
Do you agree that it is either a good decision or a bad decision or vaccinate your child?
Yes, the truth of vaccine effectiveness can be difficult for laymen to behold, but the truth is out there. In reality, the statistical benefits of vaccines far outweigh any risks (the validity of statistical analyses are not a matter of personal preference). Refusing the empirically proven vaccines not only puts the child at greater risk, but it also threatens our "herd immunity" by giving pathogens a host/vector to infect more people (in the height of the anti-vax movement, there are a lot of recent stories about localized disease outbreaks being caused by unvaccinated children).
I accept that people don't automatically understand this stuff, and I even understand why they reject vaccines; they're just wrong about it. Anti-vax parents would not need to side with the subjectivists if they could actually address the content of the specific moral dilemma. Do vaccines lead to more disease and suffering, or less disease and suffering? We want to have less disease and less suffering as a moral prerogative, so which path should we choose?
Quoting Isaac
You're basically agreeing that, potentially, the only different between a moral doctor who supports vaccinations and an immoral and superstitious parent who is refuses to vaccinate their child is ignorance.
Again, the problem here isn't that people can be correct or incorrect about the effectiveness, the dangers, etc. of vaccination versus foregoing vaccination. It's that those facts aren't in themselves moral facts. Even having preferences about vaccinating versus not vaccinating is not sufficient for us to be talking about morality. We have to be talking about preferences about interpersonal behavior (that's more significant than etiquette). We can have such preferences with respect to vaccinations, but not any old preference re vaccinations would count, and the facts about it, in themselves, just don't have anything to do with morality.
Think about how often, in practice, someone promotes the opposite...
"It is right to undermine the health of your child?"
Physical and mental health are such basic necessities to well-being and happiness that in practice nobody ever disagrees with the idea that promoting the health of children is morally important/obligatory.
So yes, you can saw we have a preference-based or relativist/subjectivist-based moral value to protect children, but since nobody ever disagrees with this in practice we get to wield it as if it is an objectively true moral value.
People never disagree (reasonably anyway) with the idea that we should protect children, so we don't often have to worry about debating/negotiating our starting moral values, we can skip right to the factual empirical questions of how to actually achieve those values.
Even if literally no one ever felt otherwise, what would that have to do with the issue? Are you saying that it has something to do with how common a particular sentiment is?
When the facts change from our perspective, the moral status of the actions in question can also change from our perspective (to vaccinate or not to vaccinate).
Basically you could also argue that science itself amounts to personal preference about which empirical beliefs to adopt, but you would be focusing on the wrong thing. Yes preference plays a role (e.g: humans prefer precise and reliably predictive models), but once we set out with specific goals and tasks in mind, there are always better and worse possible methods and outcomes. In the case of science, better outcomes mean greater precision and predictive power (and while, like all knowledge, scientific understanding exists on a spectrum of certitude (it is inductive), it is so high on the spectrum that it's reasonable to say that science approximates objective truth).
Moral propositions are not too unlike scientific ones; they propose causal relationships that may or may not be universally true, and the more accurate or reliably predictive they are, the more useful to us, as tools, they become. If we agree about our starting moral goals (like the starting goals of science), then we can treat the dilemma of how to realize our moral goals as a purely empirical question, and we can even try to answer them using the scientific method (thereby eschewing preference for the remainder of the problem). Finding the right starting moral values (and negotiating different or competing values) can be important, but it's just the foothill of a much more pressing pile of moral dilemmas that need empirical solving, such as whether or not vaccines promote child health.
Quoting Terrapin Station
How common a particular sentiment is can be very important, or not at all. It depends on the nature of the sentiment (how strongly people value it, whether it is achievable, whether it competes with other values, etc...), the environment that moral agents find themselves in, and the landscape of other values.
If all humans valued erecting great pyramids over all else, including our own lives, (in other words: if pyramid building was our only significant source of happiness), then we would all be building pyramids at any cost. Consider that certain economic arrangements might be more or less conducive to pyramid building: a form of government which is organized to maximize pyramid construction by any means might be said to be the most morally praiseworthy form of government [possible (and not immoral to any degree, because it does not transgress on the preferences of any individual).
Now suppose that only most humans are into pyramid building while others are obelisk obsessed. A system of government which makes slaves of these unwilling in the name of pyramid building might be objectively less moral than a system which does not. Instead of allowing citizens a narrow range of freedom, diversity in existential values is generally better accommodated by a form of government which allows people to make their own decisions.
Yes these are massive simplifications, but with some issues things can indeed be simple. If we fleshed out real enough (or used real world) examples, then we could come to useful and highly accurate moral statements like "X form of government is morally inferior to Y form of government". Of course we have to take into account our starting value hierarchies, to what extend they are shared, differ, or directly compete. And yes, our "moral truths" only amount of inductive approximations, but so does all other truth; it's an epistemic limitation inherent to our limited information gathering capacity and our ignorance of the physical world.
If a) it is objectively true that subjective beings hold presence, if b) it is objectively true that all subjective beings share a grouping of core characteristics that thereby validly makes them subjective beings, and if c) it is objectively true these core characteristics entail common, or universal, core wants (e.g., that of living life with minimal dolor), then: it is objectively true that all subjective beings hold an implicit, if not also explicit, understanding of what is good for them, this being a core reality that is universal to all subjective beings.
A possible candidate for this core preference universal to all subjective beings: the preeminent, basic, and generalized want of not having one’s intentions, or context specific wants, obstructed or barred (to be barred from doing what one wants to do will arguably always lead to some degree of displeasure in the short term if not also in the long term); or, more succinctly, the minimization of dolor, of suffering.
Then, considering such core and universal preference: parents who hold child vaccinations to be good and parents that hold child vaccinations to be bad, for example, will both operate from the same core preference universal to all subjective beings: say, that of minimizing dolor, this then of itself being an/the objective good (which is just as much an objective truth as is the existence of subjective beings to which this universal core preference pertains).
Given the objective good of the here hypothesized universal preference of minimizing personal dolor among all subjective beings, there will then be an objectively better and worse means of optimally actualizing this objective good—in the given example, via either vaccinating children or not.
But in short, if there is an objective good, it will not be found outside of subjective beings (like rocks over there are) but, instead, it will be an invariant and intrinsic preference universal to all subjective beings, one that is as objectively true as is the very presence of subjective beings.
Devil’s in the details. Nevertheless, to deny such objectively true good is to deny that subjective beings share any core characteristics of want/desire/need which defines all of them/us as subjective beings. Again, such as the generalized, hence universal, want of minimizing personal dolor—a preference whose universality among subjective beings can well be argued to be an objective truth.
I’m not intending by this to prove the reality of an objectively true good. I’m only adding to what previous posters mentioned: that a preference based ethics is in no way contradictory to the presence of an objectively true good.
But all we'd have to do is point out that that's rather a matter of whether we're matching some objective state of affairs.
The problem with morality is that there is no objective state of affairs to match with respect to the moral part.
When you say "the moral part", you're appealing to a meta-ethical definition of morality as theoretical. When I say it, I appeal to morality as an applied [meta]-physics in service of human values.
I suspect we completely agree, which would be clear if we could be more specific about what we're each addressing (if we had better language).
First, I wouldn't say that anything is objectively true. I see that as a category error.
There are objective facts (states of affairs) in my view, but no objective truths. "Truth" isn't the same as "fact." Truth is a relation of a proposition to something else, and that relation is necessarily a judgment on my view. Judgments are mental phenomena. Hence truth isn't objective.
Aside from that, I unfortunately have no idea what "hold presence" might refer to. ("Hold presents," yes, just in case it's Christmastime. ;-) )
Quoting javra
Aside from the same comments about "objective true," I wouldn't use "valid" that way, but that might not matter for anything. "Subjective," by the way, I use to refer to mental phenomena. And that's it. I'm not implying anything else with that term.
Quoting javra
"Common" isn't the same as "universal," is it? I don't think that any wants are really universal, by the way. But plenty are statistically common.
Quoting javra
I don't buy the notion of "implicit understanding." Also, you seem to be using "what is good for them" so that it's referring to something other than whatever an individual's opinion is.
It's really laborious to go through a long post like this . . . the above was just about a sixth or seventh of your post.
What I agree with is neither here nor there. 99.9% of the world could agree with it and would still not make it morally right to believe certain facts as presented. Believing people is not a moral question, morality, as we generally speak of it, seems to be about intent, not belief, and it rather clouds the issues for you to start using it so differently now.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You may well be in the privileged position to have first hand access to the relevant information, in which case I don't doubt you could make an excellent moral choice. I, like most people, have only access to what an ultimately very small group of people have told me. Are you seriously suggesting that trusting the government is a moral obligation?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
If you had the slightest understanding of epidemiological statistics you would know that such a question cannot possibly be answered with any certainty, and even if it could, such a study could only be carried out by a few large organisations with access to the data. Again, is trusting the word of some organisation or other a moral obligation?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No, unless you have direct access to the actual data then it is trust, not ignorance.
I was making use of terminology previously used in this thread. The rest seems to also be about nitpicking semantics. Ignore what I said, then.
?? I'm referring to stances a la "x is good/right conduct," "x is bad/wrong conduct," "x is morally permissible," "x is morally obligatory" etc. So no, that's nothing meta-ethical.
"x is good/right conduct" and the like are what morality/moral stances are.
"x causes autism," "x doesn't cause autism" and the like are not morality/moral stances.
It's difficult to agree with something if I'm not sure what it's claiming, and I'm not sure if you're just using words in different ways than I would or if you believe that different things are the case than I do.
You're saying that moral "truth" has to not depend on human preference, because human preference is not objective. That's meta-ethical.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, but the stances we take on issues like these factual issues do impact our moral actions and arguments. In other words, whether or not it is true that X causes autism can determine whether or not an action is moral (especially when disagreement about objectives are neither here nor there).
In the bit we were just talking about, I was pointing out that the facts you're talking about have nothing to do with ethics. I wasn't saying anything about the requirements for moral truth etc.--at least not aside from the requirement that we're actually talking about morality "x is good/right conduct" etc. and not stuff that has nothing to do with morality "x causes/does not cause autism" for example.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Sure. That just doesn't enable us to say that any part of the moral stuff is objective (to any extent).
Quoting VagabondSpectre
It can't do that objectively. It can do that subjectively, relative to an individual's preferences, though, sure.
Yeah, it's probably too much to go through due to very different paradigms or something . . . but that's one reason I prefer to keep posts short.
I haven't brought the government into this. In fact, all I suggested was that there is indeed a correct answer to the question of whether or not vaccines are harmful/worth the risk. At first I didn't even give an explicit answer to the question, although I did allude to my own position. I was just using it as an example to make the point that some courses of action are objectively morally superior/inferior to others per our values, and that sometimes when we disagree about matters of fact, we disagree about which choices are best as a result.
Quoting Terrapin Station
In the same way that the scientific method "objectively" serves the subjective starting goal of acquiring predictive knowledge, morality can "objectively" serve the subjective starting goals of human beings. This makes moral truth relative to the values of interested moral agents, but there is obviously still an objective component to our moral arguments.
When people say morality is "mere" preference, they're ignoring the bulk of what it is we do when we do morality, which is figuring out how to best accommodate our existing values (a largely empirical question). This is why I'm accusing you of having a malformed meta-ethical definition: just because morality is not universal doesn't mean we cannot or need not strive for objectively better moral arguments for the situations/values we find ourselves in and with.
Quoting Terrapin Station
"Subjectively, relative" - No.
The fact itself is objective, and the way it relates to existing values is objective. Only the values are subjective.
In other words, if you know the starting moral values, and you know the matters of facts, then you can objectively evaluate the moral superiority/inferiority of moral arguments.
When I say that morality is mere preference, what I'm saying is that "x is good" and the like are mental phenomena and do not occur elsewhere. That's all that I'm saying. I'm not ignoring anything, I'm simply focusing on a very specific ontological claim.
Some people believe that "x is good" occurs in the world extramentally. It does not.
I agree. I hold that morality is an emergent property of living in a society. There are at least some knowable moral truths. For example, you don’t boil babies. This is a moral truth, not just mere opinion where individuals feel disgust.
It’s true or false that cauliflower is good for nutrition, just as it’s true or false that boiling babies is good for society. A psychopath might enjoy boiling babies, but it is still morally wrong.
That's fine, it didn't come across that way, but that must have been my misunderstanding.
I should add, however, that even on the understanding that you are not claiming we have a moral duty to trust some particular data source over another, I'm still not quite following how you got from the valuing of children's health to there being a fact of the matter about whether vaccines are 'good'.
To get there, even in a world in which we could all know personally that vaccines were safe and effective, you're still making a whole load of presumptions that others might legitimately disagree with.
For a start you presuming that safety and effectiveness are the only factors someone might like to consider. Someone might, for example, simply consider it an inadvisable risk to have a private company, overseen by a single government organisation, responsible for injecting every child in the county with a chemical mixture. Its current safety might not enter into it. Evil Kineval used to jump flaming buses on a motorbike and remain whole, doesn't make it safe or advisable, it just means he happened to get away with it.
Others might object on religious grounds such as the Amish, having their ethics based on the divine command.
People might hold strongly a virtue of 'do no harm' which would prevent them from ethically giving any kind of prophylactic drug, not because of a utilitarian calculation of harm, but on a principle designed to accommodate uncertainty.
Values (by which you seem to mean objectives) and facts together still are not enough to make a moral path objectively true, we're not all utilitarians.
How would it make sense to say that anything is good in respect to some criterion/criteria? That would never capture what "good" refers to. For example, say that one criterion is "Cauliflower is good if it's not moldy." If all that amounts to is that "good" is a synonym for "not moldy," then it doesn't at all capture the conventional sense of "good."
No, it's true or false that cauliflower has x effect on nutrition. Having x effect on nutrition isn't objectively good versus having not-x effect on nutrition.
Likewise, boiling babies might have x effect on society (a fact that would be much, much harder to establish than the fact that cauliflower has whatever effect on nutrition, by the way). But it's not objectively good to have x effect on society versus having not-x effect on society.
Objectively, there are just facts. All possibilities, if actualized, would make particular facts obtain rather than other facts. No facts are objectively preferable, better, worse, etc. than any other facts.
Why is it morally wrong?
Say what? How does this answer how anything is good with respect to some criterion, where we'd be at all capturing the conventional sense of what we're referring to with "good," rather than simply using the term as an "empty" synonym for some objective state?
Quoting tim wood
I'm definitely a relativist. Nothing destructive about it in my view, though.
Quoting tim wood
No, it isn't, but I don't want to go off on that tangent yet again. Let's stick to how it would make sense to link "good" to some criterion or other.
"good" in a moral sense amounts to the person approving of or preferring the (usually interpersonal) behavior in question, if not directly, then as a means to some other end that they approve of or prefer.
Yes, it's a term of approval or preference. "Yaying," accepting, sanctioning, etc. the thing in question.
I tend to think it is more than just approval. If the bones of the house are “good”, then they are also in a state that tends toward structural integrity. It’s a hypothetical imperative. If one wants a sturdy structure, then one would want it to have “good bones”. Just as there are hypothetical imperatives, there is the Categorical Imperative. One does not say “if one wants a working society” though. Society is a given to social creatures as ourselves. So, in order for society to continue (something that’s objectively in our biological and cultural DNA), there must be duties to act or abstain, such as the duty to not boil babies.
But that only follows if one prefers "bones" that tend toward structural integrity. Insofar as individuals do not prefer that, what would be good about that? The notion of "good" makes no sense outside of preferences, approval, etc.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
Right, and what one wants one prefers.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
There is nothing outside of our minds thatprefers society to continue rather than not continue. The world outside of us couldn't care less either way.
Obviously I disagree, because I just said that it's not possible to make any sense of that.
The challenge I proposed to you was to make sense of it.
So what criteria, for example, would you say "This orange is good" refer to?
If morality is based on doing what promotes the flourishing (health and happiness) of a society and all its members, and the basic requirements for such flourishing are established and universally acknowledged, then morality as an "if, then" set of principles can be established and universally acknowledged, and the problems with the "is, ought" divide circumvented.
Societies cultivate their citizens' moral dispositions. Modern democracies are largely founded on the notion of the competition of the individual against the rest, and the idea of the natural world as a mere resource to be exploited. Even human subjects are fair game to be exploited for individual gain within merely legal constraints. This means that they are not well suited to provide the best conditions for human and natural flourishing. The problem is how to fill the vacuum left by the (justifiable) rejection and (welcome) decline of organized religion.
Mores are shared values that unify societies and yield solidarity among their members. The more morally bankrupt, the more corrupt, a society is, the more laws will be required to protect each citizen from the predatory behaviors of the others. The US is a paradigm case of a society that is rotten to the core. It is not alone, but is just the most extreme exemplar of moral bankruptcy.
The gap does not require explaining why some do one thing and others do another in response to the question of what is arbitrary in moral judgements. The activity is either a process that is a perception of what is happening or it is not.
The phenomena is framed by one means or another. That one or another frame lets us hear and see a certain way either is involved with actual beings or they are dreams, projected against a screen.
Your results may vary.
This is a fair enough point. You're right; some people suppose morality is some tangible set of laws that exist in some kind of ultimate and universally applicable moral realm (see: God), and they're wrong.
Our starting moral values are not extramental, but they can be inter-mental and intra-mental. Even from an individually subjective starting point, one's value hierarchy can be more or less internally consistent. Objectivity is quite useful when we negotiate our own hierarchy of starting values. The fact humans tend to share so many fundamental starting values also adds a layer of cooperative opportunity that would not be there otherwise, and navigating these opportunities for mutual benefit is the bulk of the ethical work that lays before us.
I didn't expect any push back about the effectiveness of vaccines, so perhaps we could substitute the example for something else:
Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced for a myriad of confused reasons, and among them is the belief that it will improve the quality of life of victims. Ostensibly it is performed because it is believed to be good, and they don't happen to trust medical authorities who insist otherwise. From our enlightened ad-vantage point, it's clear to us that FGM does not actually improve the lives of victims (hence: "victim".)
So in what ways might we say FGM is objectively immoral? Well it objectively undermines the preferences of victims, and it also reasonably undermines the values of perpetrators as well (in some cases, villages can't remember why they started doing it, and can't say why they choose to carry on with it). When we look at the most fundamental moral values of everyone involved, it's quite clear that FGM undermines them, which is why not practicing FGM is an objectively-morally superior practice.
Quoting Isaac
Such people are confused, but thankfully these types of beliefs are assailable by science, logic, and an appeal to their human values.
Quoting Isaac
There's really not much difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalizations. What do you think causes such moral maxims as "do no harm" to evolve? Because they're useful.
We have many fancy calculi for navigating the many moral landscapes we inhabit (and the mix of moral games we play upon them), but ultimately, serving humans - utility- is the only real and reliable perspective to adopt. Where dilemmas become too complex for other frameworks to solve, we all intuitively revert to utilitarianism.
I want to point out that straight-forward utilitarian calculus often amounts to a vast oversimplification of moral dilemmas, which is why we have other frameworks which can account for contextual nuance (e.g: the broader implication that organ-harvesting the random hobo has on society, and on the very agreement that social moral cooperation is based on)
Quoting Isaac
As I keep stating, the values component is subjective, but the way they relate to others and the world is not subjective. Once we've settled on a definition of exactly what morality is supposed to do, we can assess whether or not the actions we propose will actually achieve our individual or communal moral goals.
How do you define "morality" exactly? In my view, boiled down, it amounts to a realm of strategic knowledge intended to help us make decisions (decisions which impact others, and in a way which considers their values). I think some moral strategies/choices are objectively better or worse than others for a given set or sets of subjective values, just like how some chess strategies/moves are objectively better or worse than others for given arrangements of the chess board.
I find that hard to believe, given the range of opinion on the matter, but I'm happy to go with another example.
With regards to FGM, I only know what the Who has to say on the matter, which is "for these women this is part of their identity and failure to undergo this procedure can lead to condemnation and ostracism within their own community". They also seem to suggest that in some cultures and there's a religious element, and in others women will be unable to find a husband without it, which, in extremely patriarchal societies, can seriously reduce their well-being, even their lifespan.
So again, the actual single individual carrying out this violence is not 'mistakenly' doing so for the woman's well-being, they very likely actually are doing so for the woman's well-being. They basically have a choice between complete social ostracisation and being mutilated. A brutal choice, but not one we 'enlightened' westerners can just sweep in and point out how the idiot natives are getting it wrong as if they'd made a mistake in their maths.
So when you say...
Quoting VagabondSpectre
... it tragically does not. Not unless their entire culture changes around them and not everyone, even victims of FGM, wants their whole culture changed.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
This seems to be closer to the thrust of what you're saying. The Amish believe in God and that certain practices here on earth (which may include the refusal vaccines) are necessary to ensure a good afterlife for the rest of eternity. How exactly do you propose to assail that belief with "science, logic, and an appeal to their human values."? Have scientists recently visited the afterlife and I missed the story? Has CETI just picked up some communication from God saying its OK?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
There's a massive difference between virtue ethics and utilitarian generalisations. It's just not one you can see because of your blind faith in the 'truth' of modern Western culture. The difference is in how they deal with uncertainty. Utilitarian calculus (or more properly consequensialist), no matter how complex, takes all the 'known' facts about a matter and uses them to work out the best strategy to achieve a goal. It takes no account of how small a proportion of all there is to know about a matter the amount we actually do know is.
Virtue ethics, by contrast, presumes (in some manifestations at least), that such calculations are so fraught with error, that it makes more sense to focus on doing what feels right, given that we will never fully establish whether it actually was right in the long term.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No. We absolutely cannot do this. It is arrogant beyond belief to suggest that the calculus that those in cultures practicing FGM can be mistaken, but our knowledge is so exhaustive and accurate that we can have this level of certainty about whether certain actions will achieve our goals in the long term. We can't even predict our own ecomony, let alone the long term consequences of every cultural and personal change in behaviour.
You're basically saying that it is very possible for ethnic cultures to have made a clear mistake in their calculus (which, just for the record, I agree they have, in case that's not clear), but that we in the 'enlightened' West are so unlikely to make a mistake in ours that we can claim our choices are practically 'objective fact'. You realise how that sounds?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Personally, I think of morality as that particular collection of subjective feelings about one's actions which relate to a potential negative effect on others. I'm not a moral relativist though, because I don't believe the subjective mental realm is a mystical, or supernatural place. It is amenable to science, it is subject to natural selection, sexual selection (and all manner of other selection pressures) and it responds in an (at least theoretically) predictable manner to environmental stimuli. All this put together makes these subjective feelings very homogeneous in large part and practically universal in some cases. These I take to be moral facts.
Quoting tim wood
First it was "mere" and "nothing". Now it is "destructive".
These are clear examples of loaded language. Maybe try to be more reasonable and less emotional. I know that that might sound ironic coming from me, given my position on the role of emotions in morality, but they're appropriate in normative ethics, not in meta-ethics. It's appropriate to appeal to emotion in judging whether or not slavery is wrong, but it's not appropriate to appeal to emotion in judging which meta-ethical position is true. The latter is fallacious.
I'm not getting notifications from your post for some reason, so apologies in advance if I miss a response.
Quoting Janus
A difficult question for sure, but I think that one would have to balance the advantages of people being more likely to be right about stuff, with the disadvantages of the power that authorities would then wield to manipulate events. In most areas of science, we have mechanisms in place to prevent such a misuse of power, mainly having a large enough number of people involved and an uncensored publishing industry, but that is only a pragmatic issue. If we start saying that the mere pragmatism of being able to trust our experts (because we have good safety measures in place) becomes a moral obligation to do so (which is what I was arguing against) then we run the risk of it becoming enculturated and we can't by any means guarantee the continued good functioning of our system.
Quoting Janus
In theory, yes. But I don't see how either of those 'if's are ever going to be the case.
Quoting Janus
True, but this presumes the law-makers are not also so afflicted, and the law-makers are just people. If society is morally bankrupt, then surely law-makers, scientists, experts in general, who are drawn from that society will be morally bankrupt too?
Oh but we can. FGM is indeed erroneous...
There's no good reason for anyone to ostracize a woman who had her clitoris forcibly removed at puberty. Basically, we get to call the people who do the ostracization "stupid" because their relevant beliefs are based in nothing but the dogma of tradition. A practice that is useful only when nested within anti-utility and stupidity isn't necessarily useful per se.
What if a society society expected mothers to sacrifice their first born children to Quetzalcoatl? Their well-being would be affected if they refuse, so who are we to scoff at such necessity?
The whole practice is based in ignorance, and your argument relies on the ignorant making the boons of FGM into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Inter-generational extortion isn't an adequate moral justification for the practice of FGM, me thinks.
If a drug addict believes a certain dose of drugs is the best amount they should take, but you know that to be a fatal dose, do you have no grounds upon which to convince them it is not a good decision?
The individuals being unwillingly extorted into carrying out FGM aren't who I'm calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened...
Quoting Isaac
I think we can safely say that removing clitorides doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.
Frankly I'm flabbergasted that you would try to put up any defense of FGM whatsoever. Sure, indigenous knowledge and all that; "spirits" too while we're at it, but genital mutilation? Really? You are aware that human stupidity has existed prior to western civilization right? That not every action humans have taken was in their own interest or the interest of others? That even hunter-gatherers, with all their ancient wisdom, didn't know some of the things that we now know? (That, for instance, deities aren't sitting around making good/bad things happen based on whether or not we pray at the right rock, or whatever; that superstition only works as a morale-boosting placebo because humans are so fallible).
Quoting Isaac
It's not clear at all that you agree FGM is morally errant. Why else would you object so profusely when I condemn the practice?
When did I say that the west is perfect? The west is "enlightened" in that we know better than to practice or tolerate FGM. From our vantage point, we can see why FGM is not good. Do you disagree? If not, what is your point? That I'm arrogant or racist? (If that is your point, why bother making it? It doesn't make my point wrong, and if you're right about my arrogance or racism, then it won't matter because I won't give a shit).
Quoting Isaac
The idea that god exists and has some intentions about how we ought behave is an empirical claim, and it can be tested with empirical science and evidence based reasoning (science isn't in the business of proving negatives with objective certainty, it's in the business of making what amount to statistically strong (inductive) predictive models. It turns out that with sufficient education people tend to abandon superstition. Not always, but it is observable that exposing people to evidence based reasoning and science tends to persuade them toward not possessing hard theological beliefs. I bet if I could catch an Amish person out for Rumspringa, in the right setting, I would have a very good chance of persuading them away from theology and toward a more secular set of beliefs (although, the Amish are so tight-knit that I think many children stick around due to familial ties alone).
In any case, I feel no qualms about telling Amish people that their beliefs are factually incorrect, just as I have no qualms telling a Buddhist or Hindu or Muslim or Mormon or Jew or Rasta or any other religious person. They certainly can't all be right, so statistically I'm in a strong position.
Your move Abraham.
Quoting Isaac
You've gone off the deep end... You just can't see it because of your blind resentment of western culture... (Does this ever work?)
Quoting Isaac
If you could do less grand-standing against your humble racist interlocutor, perhaps you would be able to address his point:
Virtue ethics is really only good so far as it is useful to the people who wield it. Yes, people have all sorts of highfalutin beliefs about where good comes from, but overtime, people with non-useful beliefs have tended to die off, and their beliefs forgotten, while people with useful beliefs (such as the "jesus said: do unto others" virtue) have tended to stay alive and pass on their useful ideas. Beliefs and practices which are useful to human well-being tend to perpetuate themselves while useless beliefs do not; harmful beliefs tend to destroy themselves. But beliefs that perpetuate are not always conducive to well-being. Sometimes beliefs that once had utility cease to be useful when the environment changes; sometimes a belief or behavior is harmful to some and beneficial to others; sometimes people do things for inexplicable and stupid reasons.
I don't respect magical, supernatural, or superstitious beliefs, even when they're useful; I like my utility without any junk in it.
Quoting Isaac
Ah Ah Ah, you said virtue ethics wasn't utilitarian! Where's the contrast? You've just described utilitarianism by intuitive guesswork.
Quoting Isaac
By defining morality as only a collection of subjective feelings about hurting others, you've gone into the relativist deep-end (where facts don't matter). Deep-end-relativists don't realize that when they broadly question and rhetorically undermine our general ability to gather facts about the external world and make objective predictions about the future (e.g: we can't even predict the eCoMoNy!!!), they simultaneously undermine their own ability to perform moral suasion. Consider how instinctively you leapt to the defense of genital mutilators and anti-vax parents (although the latter might be a bad example if you're ignorant of the science). You know FGM is wrong, but you won't allow yourself to cast judgment upon the practice because it's not universally "true" that FGM is immoral, 'cause subjective preference. Wouldn't it be better (morally, even) if you had an argument that could persuade the perpetrators of FGM that it is wrong? (Let's say, a utility-inclusive argument?)
Once you've undermined "morality" to such a degree, there's nothing useful left-over. Functionally, it's anarchic nihilism; if it's all subjective feelings, why not attempt moral suasion through interpretive dance?
We can value the same things (nominalism aside). And we can cooperate with each other. I'm not sure why that would need a special classification ( "inter" or "intra").
We're talking about your notion that those statements are about meeting some specific criteria, no? It's like all of a sudden you forgot the specific idea at issue, even though you brought it up and we'd been going back and forth about it for a few posts.
Quoting tim wood
So you're saying that rather than being an utterance of preference, approval etc. "X is good" utterances imply meeting a criterion that . . . x is good??? Seriously?
To not consider others at all differs from the common fundamental conception of what morality is supposed to do (otherwise it's just regular greedy planning). It's not just what I believe is best for me, it's what I believe is best for me while considering what is best for others.
The intra classification was just an over-fancy way of saying that we must also negotiate our own competing internal values in addition to negotiating the values of others.
If the very definition is that it's preferences of interpersonal behavior, why would we need to point that out again? And why would anyone think that it's not influenced by, in response to, etc. other people. Wouldn't that be obvious?
Because consideration in this case means more than just being aware of. A serial killer carefully considers the ramifications of their preferred interpersonal behavior, but they do not extend "moral consideration".
A hard moral relativist might conceptualize raw preferences (any behavior) as encompassing the moral sphere, but there's more to the equation: the way our preferences relate to others, the preferences of others, and our circumstantially available courses of action.
Behavior which extends no moral consideration toward others is not moral behavior.
That I don't at all agree with. They reach a different "conclusion" than most people. That doesn't mean that they're not reaching moral stances.
You can call them moral stances in so far as they are stances that impact others, but we can also say that such individuals are not "practicing morality" because they do not value or consider the needs of others.
Can you imagine a world without morality? Where nobody has the care or foresight to account for how their behavior impacts others? The way you frame morality, a world of psychopaths/sociopaths would still contain morality, but there would be no shareable or useful moral meaning; if how we affect others doesn't matter, then morality doesn't matter.
You're writing "consider the needs of others" but I'm guessing you have in mind something more like "acquiesce to the needs of others." There's no evidence that serial killers don't think about the needs of others. They simply reach different conclusions there.
In acquiescing to the needs of others, are you also acquiescing to the needs of serial killers, for example?
And no, I can't imagine a world without morality, because I don't believe it's possible given what human minds are like. Unless someone is a "vegetable," they're going to have stances on acceptable versus unacceptable interpersonal behavior.
That's irrelevant to morality. Whether it's immoral is what's relevant. You'd have to connect the two, but there's no necessary connection, and to say that this is an example where something is immoral because it is erroneous (according to some standard) is just to make a moral judgement founded in moral feeling. That we share the same judgement is not that we're correct in any kind of transcendent sense.
You've said [i]a lot[/I], but it isn't really doing anything. The same basic problems remain.
FGM is not a maths sum, it cannot be erroneous. A person committing it could be in error in thinking that doing so will lead to an outcome they desire/value, but the only way to check that would be to wait until the end of their life (including any afterlife, if they believe in such a thing) and tot up the total effect of the action. We can, and do, of course make predictions about the likely result of this calculus, but as with all predictions in complex systems they will vary depending on the model used. (and just pre-emting a possible "but some models are better than others" retort, just re-read this paragraph, my response would be the same. We can't possibly tell until the end of all time when we do the final count).
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Then who are you calling stupid/immoral/unenlightened (three very different accusations by the way)? Do you think the people in those societies doing the ostracising are somehow less constrained by their culture?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
There you go undoing exactly what you just said. So if removing clitorises "doesn't have any reasonably foreseeable positive ramifications which could sufficiently outweigh the pain (and deprivation) that it entails.", then which is true of the actual people who do it - are they stupid, immoral, or unenlightened? They must be one of those three because they are carrying out a practice where the damage does not outweigh the gain. They must either be cruel and want to damage their own children, or they are stupid and can't work out that the damage does not outweigh the gain. Yet you just said that you are not calling the people extorted into carrying it out stupid or immoral.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You have not condemned the practice, and I have not defended it. You claimed that it was objectively immoral, and I claimed it was subjectively so. Your claim is that it objectively causes more harm than good, even if we share values about what 'harm' and 'good' are. I'm saying that such calculations are not so simple in complex societies where a lot of things would have to change all at once to make that true for any given individual.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
What exactly do you think our 'vantage point' is? What data have we found out that we could provide to women who want their daughters to undergo fgm, that they, in their less advantageous position, are lacking? That it hurts? I suspect they already know that. That it's risky? Do you think they just hadn't noticed the infections and deaths? That it interferes will a woman's sex life? I think in many cases, that's the point. So, what bit of data do you think they're lacking that our enlightened culture has discovered?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Not even going to give this any credence. How on earth would science test the theory that you will not get into heaven if you've been vaccinated?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You're just not getting it are you? I'll try it in bold. How can you possibly measure useful when some people's idea of use extends to future generations and even the afterlife? How on earth do you intend to measure that? Are you going to just pop to the end of the world and see how it all worked out? Don't forget to drop in to heaven, valhalla, the spirit world and Mount olympus on your way back.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes. You've just answered your own question. Intuitive guesswork. I explained it perfectly clearly olin my last post. The consequences of any action are so complex to work out for anything but the immediate future that it is more important to feel right about your actions than it is to have calculated their consequences. It's not rocket science.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Firstly, I haven't leapt to the defense of anyone or anything. I'm saying that data is not sufficient to produce a moral duty even in a situation of shared moral values because data is inevitably limited. One cannot simply present the 'scientifically approved way' of getting x from y and then demand that everyone who wants to get x from y follow it.
You're treating really complex social and psychological issues as if they were maths equations. If a company wanted to build a bridge, they'd consult an engineer, but even in such a simple situation as bridge-building, they wouldn't necessarily just take the engineer's advice. They might need to think about the cost effectiveness, their business model, the advertising, whether the materials meet their sustainability policy, whether there's uncertainty about the design, whether their insurance will cover the risk. And that's just a bridge. You're suggesting the whole complex of social interaction and individual choice can be handed over to a few experts.
Quoting Isaac
He's got you there, @VagabondSpectre. I think your biggest problem is in not recognising the amoral as amoral, because your feelings get in the way of impartial judgement. That's why you seem to be misjudging others as condoning FGM. But they're not, they're just recognising that there's FGM, and there's relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", there are related factual and statistical matters, and then there's our moral feelings and judgement. There's no necessary connection linking them all together. There's no inherent moral quality in FGM, or relative standards of "correct" and "incorrect", or in related factual or statistical matters. You seem trapped into thinking that it's somehow more than what it is, without realising that you're projecting.
I think that you're making this much more complicated than it needs to be. It seems obvious to me that you're just making the same sort of classic mistake which is more apparent in saying that it's objectively immoral not to brush your teeth every day, because not brushing your teeth every day increases the risk to your dental health. There's nothing objective in the morality of that.
My point is that FGM is indeed morally erroneous per the fundamental moral values of the concerned victims and perpetrators. Shared or un-shared, FGM disservices their extant values (one could say that practicing FGM is itself a value, but in reality (usually) it is (erroneously) thought to serve more fundamental values that ultimately relate to well-being). If FGM is taken as a value unto itself (eg: by divine command), it can still be pitted against fundamental well-being related values, although we would be limited by our ability to undermine their faith.
Quoting Isaac
Every prediction we make is within a complex system, and we have no absolute certainty. According to this argument humans cannot know anything whatsoever about the future, so any predictive model, including science, is useless. That renders science kind of incoherent.
Quoting Isaac
There's a difference between a parent who is extorted into carrying out FGM and a parent who extorts their child to undergo FGM. As you said, society ostracizes them, so we can apply or diffuse the pragmatic moral guilt upon those agents in society who wantonly contribute to its perpetuation.
When a parent does carry out FGM because they believe it is best for their child, they've either made a factual error (and in this case a moral error, because it subverts their own primary values), OR, they're victims of an environment (an environment which includes pragmatically blameable others) which needlessly forced FGM upon them, which then becomes the pragmatically blameable party(s)).
We can call the perpetrators stupid or immoral (in this case it's stupidity leading to moral error/immorality), and we can call the entire practice of FGM unenlightened.
Quoting Isaac
Whether I establish an individual act of FGM as objectively bad per our shared values, or whether I establish the entire practice of FGM as objectively bad, it matters not. I chose it as an example because it isolates a practice that does not comport with the ultimate outcomes it is meant to bring about (this means the cultural-moral reasons for FGM as a practice, not the fact that individuals are being extorted into doing it).
Quoting Isaac
The data comes from experience/observation in and with FGM-free societies. To persuade someone, first we isolate the underlying reasons that FGM is practiced, where they are known, and we challenge them. Depending on the reasons there is plenty of insight we could offer. FGM certainly interferes with sex life, and if someone morally values controlling the sex lives of others there may be nothing immediate we can do to sway them, but I suspect that controlling the sex lives of others is itself an errant proxy for more fundamental values or beliefs (e.g: the belief that too much sex is detrimental to well-being). If we can convince them that women are capable of sexual restraint despite an intact clit, or that sex isn't actually so harmful (i.e: the well being that FGM creates does not outweigh the well-being that it destroys), then we would have a good shot. If someone believes that clitorides should be removed for religious reasons, then we have to attack the religious beliefs directly.
They lack data which gives them perspective on the factual inaccuracy of superstition, or data concerning the effects of sexual liberty in society.
Quoting Isaac
By examining the evidence that reportedly indicates god or heaven or god's stance on vaccines and heaven. People tend to think they have good evidence for these kinds of things even when it's quite obvious they do not.
Quoting Isaac
We attack those beliefs (beliefs which concern matters of fact, and can be well supported, or not supported at all, by evidence) by examining the evidence supporting them.
If someone believes that heaven exists, hence the utility of not picking up sticks on Sunday, but it can be shown that their portrayal of heaven or god is unlikely or incoherent (if they can be persuaded that heaven or god might not or probably does not exist, or is entirely unknowable to us), then their perception of utility would change accordingly.
Quoting Isaac
But you tried to distinguish between virtue ethics and utilitarianism as the latter being consequentialist, while the former not necessarily so. My point was that ultimately virtue ethics is subject to utilitarian selection by evolutionary forces.
Quoting Isaac
There are some courses of action that are so clearly counter-productive to their purpose that in practice they cannot be reasonably justified. I'm not saying people should be blamed for not knowing better (though in practice we ought rebuke them), I'm saying that A) in a specific situation or context and specific goals, some actions are actually more/less productive than others, and that B) more data can help us better approximate which actions are more or less productive than others.
Let's go to my last resort example: imagine you and I are strangers in an elevator. We both want to go on living, and we're both carrying ice-picks. It would, for us, objectively, be "better" if we did not violently stab-each-other with our ice-picks. Alternatively, you are alone in an elevator with an ice-pick, and you want retain 20-20 vision. For you, objectively, gouging your own eyes out would be a worse course of action than not gouging your eyes out. Do you have any qualms related to data-insufficiency in either of these scenarios?
Quoting Isaac
As far as our nearly universal human values are concerned, FGM is the Tacoma Narrows of bridges.
What you don't seem to be getting is that when we make moral decisions from a consequentialist perspective (decisions based on our ability to predict outcomes) sometimes we can actually do so with reasonable confidence. When we don't ground our predictions in sound empirical inquiry, we get useless bridges.
I'm trying to envision a society which runs with a different ethos. It seems to me that the Enlightenment paradigm of a mechanical Nature, coupled with the Christian notion of the world as having been created for human use, and the Darwinian idea of survival of the fittest and the competition of all against all, and economic models based on the the idea of unlimited growth and "trickle down" economics" has led to a lack of moral sensibility in modern life.
I think the essence of moral sensibility consists in seeing ourselves as part of the seamless web of nature, and seeing our lives as inextricable threads of the social fabric. On that view what we do to nature and what we do to others we do to ourselves.
So, trusting experts presupposes that the experts we trust are not corrupt to the point that they cannot be trusted; in other words it presupposes general good will. Whether or not the actual experts in our actual society are corrupt to the extent that they are not trustworthy is indeed a difficult question.
What criteria could be used to answer such a question? Do we need specific criteria for all our judgements? Aesthetic and ethical judgements do not seem to be subject to rigidly determinable criteria. But we think in terms of the rigid mechanistic paradigm we have inherited from the early modern and Enlightenment thinkers wherein there is just one right answer to every problem. I think what's needed is more a change of paradigm than a change of criteria within the existing paradigm, a new worldview rather than specific answers to specific problems that are part of the problematic of our whole current general approach.
Quoting Isaac
I agree that they will never be the case within the current paradigm.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, exactly! But it's always a matter of degree and individual variation, of course.
In societies where FGM is broadly enforced for reasons pertaining to well-being, I wouldn't consider it amoral because it's motivated by the moral value of human well-being (Yes, this may only hold true under a meta-ethical definition of morality as a strategy in service of human moral values, and an ethical definition of human well-being as a fundamental human moral value).
Quoting S
It's objectively true that brushing your teeth has moral utility if personal dental health is of moral value, and it's also true that not brushing your teeth has less moral utility. What is morally obligatory might be a different question from what is more or less moral. What people will choose ultimately has to do with how they are persuaded by the perceived risks and rewards. If we can say that not brushing our teeth is objectively immoral per our values, we can also say that it is not severely immoral because the relative costs are not necessarily that high.
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The reason why I try to frame morality in this way is because in practice, various moral frameworks are almost always oriented toward serving basic human values (exceptions like divine commands themselves are often proxies for actually useful values. E.G: charity is useful for society not because it gets people into heaven, but because it strengthens the ability of individuals to contribute to society). What is persuasive is what matters most, and any objectivity we can get in the game of moral suasion is extremely useful.
This is nonsense. Why would a predictive model become useless just because it is not certain? We are not 'certain' it will be sunny tomorrow, just because the weather forecast said it will be. How does that make weather forecasts "useless". The point I'm arguing against is that you seem to be saying that if the weather forecast says it's going to be sunny tomorrow, anyone carrying an umbrella just in case is morally bankrupt, they should believe wholeheartedly in what the modal tells them and act accordingly. It like talking to a religious fanatic.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Have you really so little idea about how social groups function? There's not a small group of men sat in shed working out what their culture is going to be and then laughing maniacally about how cruel they've managed to make it. Cultures evolve over millenia as a result of thousands of individual choices and the complex interplay of social contracts, there's no one group to blame for it being the way it is. FGM is a result of a long history of bad decisions made under difficult circumstances. It needs to be dismantled with care, respect for the victims (including those who feel pressured into arranging it) and understanding that it is part of an interconnected Web of history of which we too are a part. This "enlightened westerner" telling the backward natives what they're doing wrong" shit is from the 50s, I had hoped we'd moved on from that.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Right. So
a) Which is it, and in what way are you qualified to judge?
b) In the case of the second option, in what way are you qualified to judge who exactly is to blame (as opposed to themselves being a victim of their environment). Where's your objective scientific fact about who is responsible for creating the environment in which some people feel forced to commit FGM?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
This (and that above it) is patronising bullshit. You started this off with the 'scientific facts' and even then, there's reasonable cause to doubt, but look how quickly it's descended into judgement masquerading as fact. They lack the data about the effects of sexual liberty in society? Are you seriously suggesting that what information we have about the effects of sexual liberty in society amounts to objective fact, like gravity, or the earth being round?
We don't like their cultural practices, they think they're for the best. That's all there is to it. I'm more than happy to use whatever rhetorical device works to actually get FGM to stop, including presenting cultural preferences as if they were objective fact. If it works, I'm on board with it. But this is a philosophy forum. We're discussing moral truths, not trying to convince anyone to abandon FGM.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Really. Had much luck with that? You still haven't answered my first question. What scientific evidence do you intend to present that heaven does not exist? Evidence that it might not is not good enough, because your claim is the people who did not vaccinate their children because they believe doing so will prevent them entry to heaven are "objectively wrong". Not "might be wrong". Nor even "probably wrong".
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The key word there being 'ultimately' in the case of atheist virtue ethics, that means at the very least several generations away, if not, the end of time. For theist virtue ethicists, 'ultimately' includes the afterlife, so the fact that both systems 'ultimately' are about consequences, is trivial, and meaningless to this discussion.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No, you're not. You're adding a third C) that we in modern Western society actually have that data and anyone who doesn't believe we do, in whatever field we claim to have it, is morally 'wrong'. You missed that. Without this last claim I entirely agree with you. There is a fact of the matter about whether vaccination is in the best long term interests of societal health. There is a fact of the matter about whether FGM is in the best interests of the victims within their current culture. There is a fact of the matter about whether attacking each other with ice picks is the best way to maintain a peaceful society. I'm not disputing that, I'm disputing your fanatical belief that 21st century wester society is in possession of all of those facts with such certainty that anyone who disagrees is just objectively wrong.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
What you don't seem to be getting is that 'reasonable confidence' does not translate to 'objectively right', and that the "soundness" of much scientific enquiry in the less physical sciences (like medicine, sociology, psychology) is justifiably moot.
Yes, this is key I think. I phrase it in terms of dealing with uncertainty. We don't know more than we do know, by which I mean that the proportion of all there is to know about a matter that we actually do know is very small. I think the bulk of what we call ethics actually revolves around how to make decisions in the face of this uncertainty.
The arguments about fundamental values are, in my opinion, misguided. I think there's enough similarity in the way people feel about the very basic human values that most groups (particularly within cultures) can have a meaningful discussion about ethics without having to worry about the fact that it is all relative deep down. That basic level of fundamental agreement has already been dealt with. No one (who we'd want to discuss ethics with) thinks boiling babies is 'good', and so the fact that our agreement is about subjective feeling is irrelevant.
What matters is how we decide what course of action best brings about the fundamental values we (mostly) already agree on, within our community.
How am I supposed to know? It was your idea. It's an idea that I don't agree with, hence why I was challenging it.
Quoting tim wood
What I'm explaining is that if "X is good" is saying that x matches some standard or criterion for x, so that it's simply a way of saying that x has some objective property, then that doesn't at all capture the conventional idea of the "good" assessment.
Your blind faith is quite astonishing. Yes, today the best evidence is broadly that. Up to 2016, the advice was to use toothpaste, until a systematic review showed toothpaste to be of no statistically significant benefit to plaque removal. Only a few years ago it was to brush your teeth after meals, until it was discovered that this wears away the softened enamel and actually makes matters worse. Then it was to use alcohol mouthwash, until it was discovered that this may slightly raise the risk of oral cancer in some people. Then it was to floss, until it was shown that this may cause more gum problems than it solves.
Triclosan in some toothpastes has been shown in animal studies to modify hormone regulation and may encourage antibiotic resistant bacteria.
SLS in toothpaste has been linked by double-blind trial to aphthous ulcers.
All this is just from Wikipedia. The aim is not provide a knock-out blow against toothbrushing, the point is to try and at least put a chip in the rose-tinted glasses through which you view modern medical advice. It's a lot more complicated than you're making it out to be.
Medicine is a field made up, like any other, of normal flawed human beings. Some are ignorant (particularly about statistics), some mean (promoting what sells over what works), some are stubborn (listed as one of the biggest block to getting advisory organisations to accept evidence based medicine), some too enthusiastic (new discoveries gain statistically significantly more support regardless of their long-term results), some are well-meaning, dedicated and intelligent. To take the results of this mileau as if it were gospel truth is ridiculous.
Okay, so you're a subjective relativist like me.
Well it is amoral. Let's be clear. Your evaluation is just that. There's no moral value inherent in anything, and your evaluation doesn't magically make it so. There is nothing reasonable in simply saying that something or other is a moral value in any other sense than that it is so relative to a standard, which is in turn relative to feelings. If I don't feel the same way about this standard, then it simply doesn't apply to any moral judgements or evaluations that I make. All you're really telling me is how you feel about something. Good for you?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Personal dental health is not of moral value. It's either morally valuable to you or it isn't. And there's nothing meaningful or relevant in saying that something has moral utility. That's not the issue at all.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
We can't. Obviously it is only so relative to our values, so that's obviously not objective.
That's a non sequitur.
Quoting tim wood
I think that it is fallacious. And it is doubly so if it is intended to represent what I'm doing. I've done the opposite by emphasising that morality is no less important under moral relativism.
Quoting tim wood
Why wouldn't I care? You're making an illogical connection here.
And I'm not a relativist, I'm a [i]moral[/I] relativist. I haven't claimed that [i]everything[/I] is relative.
If point was, why should we care about the opinion about morality - from a moral relativist, if he him/herself's core belief is the position only applies to them - than I don't see it as a non sequitur.
:up: And so we can conclude that morality is a matter of collective (social) preference, can't we? :chin:
I think the reason @S said it was a non sequitur was the conflation of normative with meta ethics. The opinion of a subjective relativist about what is' right' in some moral question may be of no consequence, but that doesn't mean their opinion with regards to meat-ethics is. Meta-ethical positions are argued by reference to shared standards like logic and reason. Normative ethical positions are argued from a position of shared values (although all too often, not even that, making such discussions hopelessly pointless).
To say that a relativist speaking of a variety of value positions must therefore also speak from an equally heterogeneous position with regards to logic and reason is the non sequitur.
Why shouldn't we care? Again, your reaction seems to indicate an illogical connection. You wouldn't care if I had the moral belief that black people are an inferior race, or that murder is okay? That's just how morality is - it is relative - and yet we evidently do care. We care because we live as part of a society, and our respective moral views matter socially.
No, because my personal moral views matter, irrespective of those of society as some sort of "collective". What if I was the only non-racist in a racist society?
The issue I was pointing to is not that the moral relativist shouldn't care, but why would he comment. My understanding of moral relativism would be something like this " that action is different than my moral belief, oh well, guess his is different ". I thought moral relativity encompasses an acceptance of the moral positions of others. So what would be the moral relativists standing - in passing a moral judgement on others be ? In that case he is no longer a moral relativist, he just thinks his moral view is right. That is not my understanding of moral relativism -
Aside - that is the most times I have ever used "moral relativist" in one paragraph in my whole life.
Why wouldn't he?
Quoting Rank Amateur
Then you have a very poor understanding of moral relativism. Unfortunately, these sort of misunderstandings are common. I don't accept that the moral beliefs of others are just different. Obviously I think that, for example, someone who has the moral belief that murder is okay, is wrong - wrong relative to my strong feelings against it. I'm no different to you in this regard.
Quoting Rank Amateur
You thought wrong.
Quoting Rank Amateur
No, of course he is still a moral relativist, because obviously he interprets his moral view being right in accordance with how a moral relativist would do so, and not in a contradictory way involving a different interpretation. You can't just smuggle in an outside interpretation and pretend that the moral relativist is being inconsistent.
Bingo.
certainly not the last time that will happen -
What you were describing is amoralism. Moral relativism is not amoralism. [B]Tim wood[/b] was making the same mistake. Like I said, these are common misunderstandings.
No, that's the trouble with a poor way of thinking about moral relativism.
Quoting tim wood
:rofl:
Kant's categorical imperative is a joke.
Quoting tim wood
What I think about everything else is entirely irrelevant in the context of this discussion. This discussion is about morality, and regarding that, I am a moral relativist. Relativism, more broadly, is a red herring.
Both. Just don't misinterpret the latter. Think about it how I would think about it, as a moral relativist would think about it, that is. I can help you out if need be, but I'm interested in what you can come up with on your own.
It's both.
If you were to say that you believe the history of scientific or technological understanding is a linear progression it would be difficult to deny that such a view would color what moral relativism means to you. It would certain distinguish your notion of moral relativism from that of someone who thought that scientific history is a relativistic genealogy rather than a progressive teleology.
On my view, by the way, "correct" is a category error there. We can say that each person feels their stance is morally right.
You're going to feel that a contradictory stance is morally wrong, of course.
This is just another way to say that each person has the preferences re interpersonal behavior that they do, and they don't prefer other preferences regarding interpersonal behavior than their own.
Quoting Rank Amateur
The subjectivist brand of relativism doesn't imply this, at least.
The problem understanding this usually stems from difficulties parsing the issue so that we do not defer to objectivity.
When you frame things so that we have to, or so that we should defer to objectivity, then either (a) there's an objective fact that people can get correct or incorrect, or (b) there is no objective fact, and since we have to defer to objectivity, we thus simply can't pass any sort of judgment at all.
But that's not how subjectivists look at it. We can and do pass judgments--we're just passing subjective judgments. At the same time we're not saying that others' moral stances are incorrect--because as I noted that's a category error.
Subjectively, we're going to have likes/dislike, preferences, etc., and that in no way implies that we're going to be okay with others likes/dislikes or preferences, especially when we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, which is what morality is. When we're talking about preferences of interpersonal behavior, those preferences don't just effect the bearer--they're about what someone wants to allow other people to do, too.
I hold no believe I have any expertise on this and could be all wet - but i can't see how you can be a moral relativist without an acceptance of the relative morality of others.
I just added some stuff to my post that's pertinent to this.
Again, since morality is preferences of interpersonal behavior, our preferences do not wind up only being our own business and that's it. By their very nature, moral stances are about what we are okay or not okay with other people doing. Obviously people are going to try to have an influence on that, especially since these preferences wind up codified into laws, they impact persons' abilities to do various social things, etc.
We're not deferring to what's objectively the case (where everyone's stance is on equal footing), beacuse that's irrelevant for morality. The arbiter is our own preferences.
In a discussion with a moral or subjective relativist, always first determine what exactly is relative to what.
I mean...the keyword here is, after all....relative.
My point continues to be you cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist.
I understand i am way out on my element on this topic - so I am learning here more than arguing, and trying to explain this logic log jam i have in my head on this point.
"You cant have your relative moral view, without allowing all the possible relative moral views of others and still be a moral relativist."
I want to quote a passage from one of the most notorious radical relativist philosophers, Jacques Derrida. Here he is defending deconstruction against charges that it denies the possibility of determining truth in any sense. What he is trying to say here is that while any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible, within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that arent.
I see his view here as consonant with other moral relativistic philosophers that i have read.
.
"For of course there is a "right track" [une 'bonne voie "] ,
a better way, and let it be said in passing how surprised I have often been, how
amused or discouraged, depending on my humor, by the use or abuse of the
following argument: Since the deconstructionist (which is to say, isn't it, the skeptic-
relativist-nihilist!) is supposed not to believe in truth, stability, or the unity of
meaning, in intention or "meaning-to-say, " how can he demand of us that we
read him with pertinence, precision, rigor? How can he demand that his own text
be interpreted correctly? How can he accuse anyone else of having misunderstood,
simplified, deformed it, etc.? In other words, how can he discuss, and
discuss the reading of what he writes? The answer is simple enough: this definition
of the deconstructionist is false (that's right: false, not true) and feeble; it
supposes a bad (that's right: bad, not good) and feeble reading of numerous
texts, first of all mine, which therefore must finally be read or reread. Then perhaps
it will be understood that the value of truth (and all those values associated
with it) is never contested or destroyed in my writings, but only reinscribed in
more powerful, larger, more stratified contexts. And that within interpretive contexts
(that is, within relations of force that are always differential-for example,
socio-political-institutional-but even beyond these determinations) that are relatively
stable, sometimes apparently almost unshakeable, it should be possible to
invoke rules of competence, criteria of discussion and of consensus, good faith,
lucidity, rigor, criticism, and pedagogy." Derrida, Limited, Inc.
Relativism or not, in what sense does anyone not "allow" others to have whatever moral views they have?
I'm not sure I know what sort of thing you're referring to there.
To Moral relativist A - action X is immoral
To Moral relativist B - action X is moral
If morality is relative to the individual they should ( pick a word you like accept, respect, not judge, fill in your own word) the relative moral judgement of each other. If they do not, than their adherence to moral relativity ( as poorly as I seem to understand it) seems questionable.
So where is the line between "any ultimate, universal, god-given grounding of truth, moral or otherwise, is not possible," and "within specific contexts, one must be able to make such moral determinations. That is , ,one must be able to choose from among "all the possible relative moral views of others" those which are on the 'right tack' and those that are not." and who is to judge?
you can't have your cake and eat it too. to me there is some continuum between relative and objective morality - and we all place ourselves somewhere on that continuum. Even Mr Derrida is hedging in his quote - seems to him morality is relative unless it is not - and he knows when that is.
Why not? Again, the idea of that only makes sense if you think we must defer to objectivity. You're focusing on the fact that objectively, both stances are on equal ground.
But subjectivists aren't advocating deference to objectivity. Objectivity with respect to morality is irrelevant. It's a category error.
Subjectively, both stances aren't on equal ground, are they?
What's your point? That is indeed how it works and how we think. You think you're right and I'm wrong, I think I'm right and you're wrong. To you, you're right and I'm wrong, and I accept that to you, you're right and I'm wrong. To me, it is otherwise.
As soon as you demonstrate that morality is anything other than subjective and relative, I will concede. Good luck with that.
no - we are not understanding each other - my point has nothing at all with objective morality at all - you are assuming something I am not saying.
Indeed you're not understanding me. Your framework here is that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. Objectively, the stances are on equal ground. You see that as being a trump card of sorts.
But subjectively, the stances aren't on equal ground, are they? (That's not a rhetorical question. I'm hoping you'll answer it.)
The other thing is that people are more or less deficient in moral feeling; and it really is feeling, not rules, that is key when it comes to morals, just as it is with the arts.
no i am only dealing with relative morality - the whole point is how a moral relativist interacts with a moral view different than his own. Nothing in this case is objective - objective reality in this example does not exist.
Okay, subjectively two competing stances aren't on equal ground, are they?
What you just said is too ambiguous for me to say whether or not I agree with it. I don't morally accept someone else's moral judgement if it doesn't accord with my own. I don't accept that murdering children is okay. And that's what matters. Some people seem to be blind to this. Again, I'm not an amoralist just because I'm a moral relativist. That connection is illogical.
Accept it how? Accept that they have a different judgment? Or accept it in the sense of saying, "Well, that's as good as my own judgment"?
I think competing stances between moral relativists are on completely equal ground - by definition
If moral stances are preferences, and you have preference A, how is preference ~A just as good to you?
There's no word game to this. I'm not hinging anything I'm saying on any particular words.
I'm trying to explain the point of view to you so that you can understand it. I'm trying to keep things very simple and ask very simple questions.
I don't at all agree with that by the way. (Given that you're implying that some judgments are better than others objectively, or that it's true that they are, etc.)
I understand it, but I'm trying to explain the conceptual framework issues that are causing your lack of understanding of the relativist view.
Look at it this way, with something that's less controversially a matter of preferences:
Say that Joe prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish.
Bob, though, prefers horseradish to pizza.
Is Joe going to say, "From my perspective, Bob's preference is just as good as mine"?
Wouldn't that imply that Joe doesn't actually have a preference between pizza and horseradish? If one preference is just as good to Joe as another from his perspective, then he shouldn't have a preference in the first place. This is pretty wrapped up in how preferences work/what they are.
The best subjective feelings per some individual's subjective judgment? (But likely not others?)
There's no "not in any particular individual's judgment 'better'," so that's a problem.
There's no "not in any particular individual's judgment" assessment of poison versus not poison.
Exactly. That's what I meant in my reply to him about what he said being too ambiguous.
If it's so clear, all you need to do is to point out how we'd observe/check/etc. the objective moral stances.
The answer, of course, can't be merely what anyone thinks/feels, because that wouldn't be evidence of anything objective. The answer would have to point to something independent of persons' opinions, the independent thing that their opinions can get right or match, versus get wrong or fail to match.
That's a good way of explaining it. Hopefully those who make the error you're explaining will see why it is an error, and why it makes no sense whatsoever.
More or less similar to the norm or the statistically common views, sure. You're not suggesting that something being statistically common makes it right, are you? Because that's simply the argumentum ad populum fallacy.
Anyone who obstinately persists in their own misunderstanding of what the other side is arguing should take a time out and consider the principle of charity.
Now go and sit on the naughty step.
But the explanation had nothing at all to do with whether anything is of equal consequence. That's a pretty serious misunderstanding of the gist of the analogy.
Yes, it is, if you're saying that something is correct because it's statistically common. That's the whole nut of what the argumentum ad populum fallacy is.
Re "healthy," if you're attaching any sort of value judgment to that at all, it's again subjective.
...are a figment of your imagination as far as I can reasonably tell. You're not a philosopher, you're a dogmatist.
Didn't Kant decry dogmatism, by the way?
Janus hasn't said anything about being statistically common being a reason for something valuable. In the posts I've read, they talked in terms of harm or well-being, which is defined on an individual's relation to everyone else.
I am certain that that is not at all what he was doing with the analogy. He has even explicitly stated that moral preferences aren't trivial in the way that other preferences are.
He was showing why it is unreasonable to reach the conclusion from an outside perspective that the one guy thinks - or should think - that his own preference is just as good as the other guy's. It makes no sense.
Again, if you're attaching any sort of value judgment of normative (in the "should" sense) to emotional AND physical health, you're engaging in something subjective for which there is no correct answer.
Objectively, there are simply different possible states--having cancer, living to 100 and being able to still run a marathon at that age, thinking that you're the incarnation of Napoleon and drooling all over yourself, being able to foster worldwide peace as a political leader--anything imaginable. Outside of individuals' judgments, none of those states are preferable to other states.
Are there some mental states that would preclude particular preferences? Probably, especially as we could basically set up definitions there so that we'd just be stating tautologies.
But one emotional state compared to another is not objectively preferred, and the fact that 99 or even 100% of everyone we ask says that they prefer mental or physical state A to B doesn't imply that they're correct--that would be an argumentum ad populum.
Again, if we're attaching any sort of judgment or normative to different objective states (and those terms typically have those sorts of connotations), we're doing something that's only individuals' preferences and that can't be correct or incorrect.
'Healthy' in the social context of subjective interaction, just means 'able to function harmoniously within the context of general subjective moral feeling'. Basically, we all value pretty much the same things. Almost no one thinks murder, rape or torture is a good thing; and someone who thinks those things are good will not be able to function harmoniously in interpersonal relations, if they are honest about their views, which means that their views are subjectively unhealthy.
You can just ignore "if you're attaching any sort of value judgment of normative (in the "should" sense) to emotional AND physical health (as well as "harmonious" etc.), you're engaging in something subjective for which there is no correct answer" I suppose.
There's not much I can do about that.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Here's an example: I'm not saying that there is a "correct" view, an objectively determinable right or wrong answer as there might be with an empirical claim. As I said before, moral philosophy is more an art than a science.
Do you disagree that most people value and dis-value pretty much the same things, and that this is on account of their natural human desire to live harmoniously with their fellows?
On that, prima facie, we agree, but in general you sure don't type as if you agree with it.
Are you trying to goad moral relativists into defending your own strawmen? Is there a moral relativist here who would say that? That makes it sound trivial, but you know that already, don't you? You're doing that on purpose. Again. It's another example of loaded language. They would much more likely say that it is extremely immoral.
Quoting tim wood
This is getting sillier and sillier. You show very little awareness of your own fallacies.
The point of morality is the presence of a normative judgement. When we engage in morality, we are identifying a normative meaning to ourselves which is whether or not an action is worthwhile.
In the case of this pyschopath, for example, their lack of care (or at least the actions and motivations which have gone with it in this case) are harmful to both the population at large and the pyschopath themselves. They are the difference between the people in question living in a world of this pain, conflict and strife or not. With any question of morality, it is these "subjective" (i.e. impact on a subject) which are at stake. It's never been about an "objective" command or rule.
Morality is about awareness of the impact of actions and things upon people. And the differences between when one is present or not.
Hence why I tried to clarify just what you were claiming. You explicitly said "No, not per any particular individual's judgement"
This isn't to suggest agreement or disagreement, but the point according to whom?
I will award a point to whoever can correctly name this fallacy.
I bet you thought that that sounded clever, but it is just an uncharitable and irrelevant attack on a person's presumed motive and their character, rather than any reasonable and substantive criticism of moral relativism.
Quoting tim wood
That doesn't even make sense when properly analysed. You know that I'm a moral relativist. Why on earth would you expect me to agree to that? Why don't you just admit that you have no real argument? You don't have to put on a show.
That's because the subjective impact has a logical independent from the desire or wishes of a subject.
I can desire or wish to smoke, but that doesn't mean it lacks harmful effects. I can desire or wish to take heroin all day, it's doesn't take away the harmful effects of heroin on my body or wider harm on people who interact or dependent.
The subjective harm may will be according to no-one at a given time. Everyone might think smoking is harmless. Everyone might think taking heroin all day is great and harmless.
But this doesn't mean the harm isn't there. Much like our beliefs about how the world came to be, our beliefs about what is harmful to ourselves and others can be terribly flawed. People do the equivalent of thinking orange juice will cure their cancer all the time.
I was making the point that we have some capacity to predict whether or not FGM is beneficial to a society's subjective moral values, and you went on a tirade about how it's impossible to know whether or not FGM would make a positive or negative difference without god-like knowledge. I haven't brought up moral obligations or called people morally bankrupt, where is this coming from?. I realize you want to defend the humanity of people who carry out FGM, but this discussion isn't the place to do it (I'm attacking values, ideas, and practices, not specific people). I'm not going to back off of FGM as morally errant just because the condemnation is somehow insensitive.
I'm glad you brought up weather models, because they're frightfully uncertain predictive models, but they still have some utility. We cannot be absolutely certain that NOT cutting off a girl's clit won't harm the girl or society (harm their subjective values), but the forecast certainly indicates this (care to make a pragmatic argument for the practice of FGM? Extortion doesn't count, obviously). If the weather forecast is 99% possibility of precipitation, it would be prudent to carry an umbrella. This doesn't mean we're obligated to believe and obey weather forecasts, but it does mean that they can be useful in helping us make decisions, just like how the foreseeable and observed ramifications of FGM are useful in helping us make decisions about whether or not it effectively serves relevant human values, and hence to do it or not.
When it comes to vaccines, statistical examinations of their usage overwhelmingly indicates their safety/health-improving quality (the value they serve). You might not know it, but we're more certain of the measurable benefits of proven vaccines than the weather, which is why if health and well-being are the goals being serviced by taking or not taking vaccines, it is, statistically, (and as far as statistics can be "objective"), objectively, a superior decision to acquire the vaccinations (note: I'm not saying you should be sent to hell for not taking vaccines, I'm in effect saying you're stupid for not taking vaccines, and that you would have fewer health risks if you took vaccines. It only becomes a relevant moral condemnation if we can agree that morality should be concerned with preserving our physical health. Note*: Yes it is a moral condemnation if we agree on basic starting values, but I'm still not calling you morally bankrupt/hell-bound). You can claim ignorance on the matter, and that's fine, but your immune system and the pathogens it fights don't depend on your belief or ignorance; whether or not vaccines benefit or burden the average immune system, and the ratio of risks to rewards to our immune systems, is a question about objective fact. (we cannot access objective facts directly, but we approximate them through experience and observation; a cumulative inductive process.
The point is what could dissuade someone who promotes FGM as moral or morally obligatory because it promotes well-being?. (also, we don't need a "scientific" predictive model to have a useful predictive model, nor do we need "established science" to discriminate between the predictive power of competing models; experience alone can help sort that out). IF someone is practicing FGM because they believe it promotes individual and societal health, that amounts to a predictive model that can be questioned or falsified with reason,evidence, and sufficient experience; and while it is indeed a complex behavior nested in a complex system, we're not roundly incapable of gaining that kind of knowledge. I am interested in the strategic soundness of moral systems with given moral goals, their strategic objectivity, not the inconvenient fact that some people have ridiculous or contrary starting values (we get around this by trying to appeal to more fundamental values that are shared or non-comeptitive, which is essentially to attack the values themselves), or that we can never access "objective and absolute certainty" directly.
Quoting Isaac
Ye Gods...
Some cultural practices are, in fact, morally superior to others in the context of those nearly universal human values which we all share (the desire to go on living, free, and unmolested, etc...). Thems just the breaks. I'm not trying to insult anyone or make people feel bad, I'm just pointing out that from the perspective of basically every human that has ever lived, and will ever live, some social systems/cultural practices/moral laws are more or less desirable than others. How can we hope to make any progress unless we're willing to point out mistakes and problems? FGM is a long history of bad decisions in difficult circumstances; you said it! How can we fix it? By pointing out in what way the decision to do FGM is "bad" and by changing the difficult circumstances that perpetuate it (which happens to be sufficiently wide group belief that FGM is good, for whichever reason, which creates pressure on individuals and families to carry it out).
I used a single word "enlightened", and it colored your perception of me as racist from the get go. So let's go back and look at my actual usage:
"Female genital mutilation (FGM) is practiced for a myriad of confused reasons, and among them is the belief that it will improve the quality of life of victims. Ostensibly it is performed because it is believed to be good, and they don't happen to trust medical authorities who insist otherwise. From our enlightened ad-vantage point, it's clear to us that FGM does not actually improve the lives of victims (hence: "victim".)"
I said that the reasons for FGM are "confused" (is that so objectionable?), and I said "from our enlightened ad-vantage point". I did a kind of pun, you see, our enlightened vantage point (concerning FGM) is the result of circumstantial advantage. I was in-fact trying to be sensitive and nuanced, but I guess it wooshed right over your head... Only because you weren't expecting nuance from a racist of course!
"Enlightened westerner" are your words, not mine...
In any case, "sensitivity" in practical approach to dealing with the moral problem of FGM is neither here nor there, we're supposed to be debating the moral and meta-ethical implications of what it means to say "FGM as a practice is objectively morally inferior to not practicing FGM".
Quoting Isaac
Now you're just being obtuse. I remember saying that all or nearly all predictive models are assailable, according to their merit, by science, logic, and evidence, I never said we needed lab-work to make well informed decisions. You're trying to hold me to some ridiculously high standard of certainty where all I'm after are relatively strong inductive arguments.
P.S Applied statistics is a science (or at least highly objective when done well).
Quoting Isaac
But if your beliefs don't make for effective moral suasion, what use is your moral framework? If you have to say things you don't believe are true to get people to behave in ways you believe are moral, what makes you think your moral position is any better than theirs? If it's not any better than theirs, then why try to persuade them to stop in the first place?
I posit that persuasive moral arguments correlate with strong predictive models, and that assuming our starting values are nearly or sufficiently aligned, more persuasive and effective predictive models should eventually bridge any remaining gap of moral disagreement. I don't need to persuade a group practicing FGM using cutting edge science, I just need to make a better argument than their current one which appeals to their fundamental values (while obviously confronting the circumstantial and complex social forces which keep them converged around the practice of FGM).
Quoting Isaac
Yes I have had luck with that actually.
To answer your question, I don't need to present any "scientific" evidence because that which is presented without evidence can often be dismissed with only ridicule (it doesn't have to be hurtful ridicule). Using hypothetical analysis alone, and given the right subject, I can do a fine job indeed of making the idea of "god" seem absurd and even detestable (to the point where their doubt exceeds their belief), but unless they're also given some kind of existential (and perhaps moral) replacement framework, it won't stick (happiness and welfare, for instance). Some people are so emotionally dependent on their religious beliefs that they cannot be persuaded by reasonable methods, and to do so would deprive them of too great a part of their identity, possibly leading to depression, and so I don't attempt to disabuse them of their delusions. If this is the kind of person I am confronted with, I'll have to weight my options. What is the moral cost of manipulating or otherwise intervening in the behavior of others versus the cost of not doing so? If a religious person attempted to perform FGM in a country where it is is not culturally enforced, I would physically try to stop them if I could not dissuade or otherwise manipulate them to stop. The point here, I guess, is that we can actually use reason and evidence to engage in moral suasion; it's not one big values craps shoot.
Quoting Isaac
I don't understand what you mean with this end of time stuff. Specific virtues (or even entire virtue frameworks) can be naturally selected over a finite time-span. I realize that if heaven is real then pascal was right, but I don't see how this colors my statement that extant virtue ethics have been selected over long histories for their utility? We're having several discussions, so please be more specific, is this not relevant to my meta-ethical point about what moral frameworks ought to do, based on what they overwhelmingly do? (they are strategies in service of human values, and they tend to serve those nearly universal human values which my use of "utility" approximates).
Quoting Isaac
I think it's obvious enough that the widespread practice of FGM is not beneficial even to the values it purportedly serves. I didn't exactly make this about the "west", I tried to make it about the advantage of being able to learn about many cultures and ways of life, and to compare them, that is afforded individuals in contemporary western society. FGM is the unique result of, as you say, a series of bad decisions and unfortunate circumstances. We don't even know where it originated or why, exactly, with the best guessed being potentially ancient Roman and Egyptian sources where it was likely used to control female slaves.
I don't know why you're demanding a rigorous study of why FGM is not beneficial as a practice. If I were to condemn slavery as objectively immoral per that set of nearly universal human values, would you wonder if sometimes people are or were better off as slaves? Would you say that we cannot possibly know the factual matter of whether slavery is beneficial or harmful as a practice because [insert appeal here]?
Question: if it is indeed true that FGM is detrimental to the victims and the society, or that vaccinations are beneficial to individual and group health, and we happened to know with certainty, would you then feel comfortable stating that FGM and not vaccinating is morally inferior to doing otherwise?
Quoting Isaac
From our perspective, we can never be certain. I've never proposed "objective moral certainty". The kind of objectivity we can have from our perspective is not unlike when a sound preponderance of sufficient evidence strongly indicates one conclusion over another, it would be "objective" to say that one conclusion is much more likely to be true than the other. Hence, from our perspective, all we can do is weigh the options and make the moral decisions we think are superior, more reliable (more likely to be true). This is why we can say with high confidence (highly reasonable confidence), that stabbing each-other with ice-picks as a matter of course is objectively morally inferior to not doing so. In practice it would be so detrimental to our shared values that we would say the ice-pick-stabbing practice is immoral.
Maybe the only miscommunication between us is that you assumed I'm proposing we can have "objective certainty" in the classically slippery sense. I'm not proposing that. Soundness and inductive strength (which is the kind of truth science deals in) is the more usefully persuasive of the two.
Above, when I wrote " if we're attaching any sort of judgment or normative to different objective states (and those terms typically have those sorts of connotations), we're doing something that's only individuals' preferences and that can't be correct or incorrect," what happened when you read that?
Terms like "harmful," "healthy," "harmonious" etc. typically have those sorts of connotations. You can just ignore it, I guess, but that doesn't make the terms not typically have those sorts of connotations, and it doesn't make those states, with those sorts of connotations, obtain independently of an individual's preferences.
Well, I'm saying they are more than just connotations about things people care about.
The harms in question are facts of that subject, whether the subject cares or not. A cancer patient is harmed by using just orange juice as a treatment option, whether they care about it or not. Impact on the subject is not determined by what they want , wish, believe or care about, but how they actually exist and are affected.
Lol. Do you believe your own bullshit?
Quoting tim wood
That's not an argument. You don't have one, do you?
That's simply contradicting what I wrote. They're not facts of that subject, not insofar as any sort of value judgment or normative is attached to it.
I have no problem stating it that way as long as we recognize that "collective (social) preference" is not a simple thing. It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions.
“....This critical science is not opposed to the dogmatic procedure of reason in pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must rest on strict demonstration from sure principles a priori...”
(CPR, Bxxxv)
Critical dogmatism, in the pursuit of truth, but dogmatism nonetheless.
I get what you're saying, but I think amoral isn't the right word. Essentially you're saying that everything is amoral (right?) but that would render the term "moral" useless. I would use the term amoral to describe decisions that fall outside the realm of moral decision making entirely (which do not concern, or consider, extant moral values).
Quoting S
Brushing has sound moral utility given the moral value of dental health. This reflects a major part of the point I have been trying to make.
I guess so. I just happen to also think that more often than not it is the matters of fact which drive moral disagreement, not disparate or competing values.
Sorry the delay - real life got in the way
What I would say is joe has no right to make any kind of value judgment about bob preference at all and still hold that he believes in relative food judgements. The minute joe utters any qualitative word at all about joe's relative preference- it is no longer relative. Because all value judgments imply against some standard, and if you are applying them against a standard they are now objective.
Joe can say nothing at all to bob about his presence other than OK.
“Right” doesn’t have much to do with it; he is going to make a value judgement because it’s a circumstance calling for him to do it, otherwise he couldn’t think it opposed to his own. But he no right to act on it. He might say, as you did.....OK.
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Quoting Rank Amateur
It is still relative, it has merely become a public comparison of preferences. He could have kept it to himself, but he didn’t. Saying OK is itself a relativism.
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Quoting Rank Amateur
If the judgements are acted upon the actions are objective manifestations of the value standard. The standard itself remains internal, hence subjective. Even if the culturally-relative value system is instilled, as opposed to, say, chemically enforced, or even if the agent is a deontologist, he still has the choice of adhering to it. What is now objective is the volition judgement has authorized.
You’re doing fine. Tough subject matter, to be sure.
Let's look at this part first.
So, first off, "I prefer pizza to horseradish" is a value judgment. Comparing and preferring one thing to another is making a judgment about them, and it has a valuation included--"I like A more than B" is valuing A more than B.
So, per your theory above, Joe's value judgment that he prefers the taste of pizza to the taste of horseradish "imply against some standard." What standard would you say it "implies against"?
Which both bob and joe can make individually relative to how they individually feel. They just can't make any value judgments on what anyone else values and still believe in relative food judgments
This point I am trying to communicate is not that hard to grasp. lf you want to have relative morality for yourself, you have to allow relative morality for others.
I can't see how such a thing as that is possible.
You are muddying the waters by trying to draw an analogy, which is inevitably simplistic and inadequate, between moral values and culinary tastes.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
Uh, oh. I was sure I was right when I said I would boil three babies if the aliens promised not to destroy earth to build their galactic bypass (not sure how boiling 3 babies helped them, but it saved earth!)
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
What would Kant have concluded on the above situation? It is clearly a wacky scenario, but shows at least one example of that "objective" moral being untrue...is there anything you can come up with that I cannot add "unless under threat of something worse" to? Are they still "objective" morals if they need qualifiers? With enough qualifiers they eventually just become facts, right?
Which leads to...
Quoting Janus
This is the only type of objective morality I could ever get behind. However, the series of if-then statements would end up being infinite to account for any situation that could ever exist...right? Does that make it an impractical method?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Where did someone defend FGM? Saying it is not objective does not mean they are in favor, or even remotely suggest they are in favor.
Just because you choose the lesser of two evils doesn’t make boiling babies morally right. It is still evil. It is still an objective moral truth. Common sense says you should boil three babies to save humanity from the aliens, as sometimes it may be expedient to choose a lesser evil. That said, I would rather die and take others with me than boil even one baby. Never mind that it is the alien race who are committing an evil act.
So you are unwilling to sacrifice your spiritual enlightenment (never doing anything "wrong") for the lives of billions? Doesn't seem so moral anymore?
I get what you are saying otherwise.
Just being honest and nothing to do with spiritual enlightenment. I wouldn’t blame others for saving humanity in this way, although it would still be an evil act. I just don’t have the stomach to harm a baby.
I do wrong shit all the time. It’s unavoidable in this life. However, I know WHEN I’m doing wrong.
You [i]should[/I] have a problem stating it that way, unless you're okay with being wrong. My morality need not involve any "complex interaction" with "religious institutions". It need not be about "collective preference". I have no intention of "recognising" your flawed view of what morality is.
You're simply talking about something else and calling that morality. Morality is broader than what would better be called something like social or cultural morality. That Christianity is prominent in the morality of my society is not that it is prominent in my morality. I don't judge right and wrong by thinking about the ethical lessons in the Bible.
Yes, strictly speaking, in a very literal sense, everything is amoral, just like everything is meaningless. But switching back to the ordinary way of speaking, there are things which are moral and immoral, and there are things which are meaningful. A strict interpretation leads to nihilism, but that's not the end point. Nihilism is why you should interpret things pragmatically, like I do. This pragmatic interpretation is why "moral" and "meaningful" are not useless.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The issue is not about "moral utility", so your point misses the point. You're just saying that it's useful to brush your teeth every day if you value your dental health. Lots of people value their dental health, so generally, brushing your teeth is useful. Who cares? No one is going to disagree with that, and it doesn't effect the wider issue.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
If you're a subjective moral relativist, you kind of sound like you're weirdly in denial or something. Morality is subjective and relative, [i]but[/I]... !
Cleaning your teeth is objective and matters! It's useful if you value your dental health!
(There's no need for the "but").
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You see, this is the problem I have with your position. You talk accurately about epistemological when pushed (I've bolded the relevant sections), but then you reveal this authoritarian undercurrent with the likes of...
Quoting VagabondSpectre
We're just going round in circles on this one so I don't see the point continuing, you've brought up vacancies again (despite not even a glancing recognition of my arguments as to why people might legitimately doubt the statistics). You keep insisting that the models held by current academic, research, and government institutions in the developed countries are absolutely beyond question. That there are no legitimate grounds to doubt that they are the best models we have.
In order for it to be morally 'right' given shared values about children's health, for a parent to vaccinate a child, they would have to...
1. Trust the pharmaceutical company to have performed their tests accurately and to have used ingredients which are in the best interests of the child.
2. The trust the government agency to accurately test the ingredients against the possibility of long and short term harm.
3. Trust the academics to have properly conducted and properly understood the statistical significance of any epidemiological studies designed to show the net benefits of vaccination.
4. Trust that the epidemiological statistics relate to the particular ingredients they are about to inject their child with, and not some similar but significantly different set.
5. Trust that the widespread agreement on safety and effectiveness is the result of repeated independent analysis and not 'groupthink' and other well-known cognitive biases related to the tendency for ideas to coagulate. And again, trust that any agreement relates to the exact ingredients they are about to inject, not just the general idea.
6. Trust that, given these uncertainties, the statistics showing the risk of not vaccinating relate to their actual child in a statistically significant manner, ie that their child, and that child's environment, are sufficien6tly close to the average for the risk factors to apply to them.
All six of these issues have legitimate, documented and widely agreed upon reasons for doubt.
1. Pharmaceutical companies do not consider the health of their customers above other considerations. It is written in black and white in their company articles that their objective is to increase the value of the company for their shareholders. Its not tin-foil hat wearing conspiracy, it's written in every public companies articles. Not only that, but pharmaceutical have been directly caught manipulating test results to suit product sales.
2. Do I even need to argue the documented cases of collusion, inefficiency and plain incompetence in government agencies? I can prepare you a list if you like, but I might need a whole thread for it.
3. Again, I'm sure I don't need to insult your intelligence by pretending that you do not already know that there is a massive problem with scientists being able to correctly interpret the statistical significance of their data. Most now work with statisticians for this very reason, which has reduced the problem, but it has not by any means eliminated it.
4. Ingredients change all the time as cheaper, or more efficient options become available. A parent has no way of knowing that statistics related to the methods used 40 years ago have any bearing on the safety of the method they are considering.
5. Once more, I can produce evidence if you're really naive enough to not know this already, but when first produced, 90% of research papers wee positive about the effectiveness of type 2 antidepressants. A few years later only 10% supported them, now its up to 60%. Have the effectiveness changed? No, it was simply the 'thing to say' when they were new and exiting, it became more fashionable to dismiss them when they were old, now they're being 'rediscovered'. Scientists are not superhumans, they're prone to the same biases and social pressures as any other human.
6. The average chance of dying in a plane crash is 1 in 14,000,000. But that is not my chance. My chances of dying in a plane crash are zero, because I don't fly. The chances of complications from childhood viruses for the average child are not the same as the chances for a healthy child (in terms of diet and exercise) living in a relatively isolated rural area.
All of this legitimate uncertainty is on top of the fact that you are talking only about the current (and maybe a few future) generations. Who knows how far into the future someone's legitimate values might extend. Is it a good idea to be reliant on private companies to maintain the health of our children? Is it a good idea to steer investment into necessary prophylactic solutions rather than investing in responsive cures? Can we always rely on having the money and resources to deal with the problem this way?
I'm not an anti-vaxxer. I'm too old for it to even be an issue and it just wasn't questioned at the time. I could, just as easily present a similar list of reasons why someone might legitimately not trust any number of models apparently showing the 'objective truth' of the matter. These thing are graded and you're treating them as black and white. I'd think anyone insane if they seriously thought the earth was flat, or that the sea was made of gold, but that's not the kind of data we're dealing with here.
I've posted this particular line of argument separately so that it can be easily deleted if anyone thinks the level of detail is too far off topic. I may be way off the mark with what you are saying, but you keep treating the word of the scientific community as if it were gospel truth and I can't think of any reason why you would do that other than that you are blind to these problems.
Lol. Unless that standard is subjective, which it is. How about you [I]demonstrate[/I] an objective standard? Then I'll begin to take you seriously.
Quoting Mww
Encouragement can be good, but he's not doing fine. He's struggling with fundamental flaws in understanding and in reasoning.
Indeed, it is not hard to grasp. Anyone familiar enough with common objections to moral relativism will recognise this. And it is easily refuted. You're making the illogical argument that if you're a moral relativist, then you must be an amoralist. I pointed that out ages out. Sorry, but you're not doing fine. You're still not getting it.
It didn't muddy the waters for me. You could say a similar thing about my analogy with meaning and an orange, but that would be to massively miss the point. In fact, this actually happened. It is what Banno did. He thought that I was suggesting that meaning is a thing like an orange. "Darling, grab me an orange from the fruit bowl. And whilst you're at it, could you pick me up a meaning? It's in the cupboard on the left". :lol:
When someone says that it will rain tomorrow, because I like custard, it is "just toxic" to reply that that's a non sequitur.
This is just more silliness from the estimable Tim Wood. He is quoting me out of context to make me look bad. That's another fallacy. Go ahead: quote me saying, "This is just more silliness from the estimable Tim Wood", as if your silliness has nothing to do with it.
I dismissed Tim Wood bringing up the categorical imperative because he merely asserted that it had answered relativism. Hitchen's razor.
Your bias is showing. I haven't resorted to simplistic name calling like that. I did call him a dogmatist, but that's in another league from calling him a moron. I wasn't calling him that to insult him, I was calling him that because it seems to me to be an accurate term to describe his position here. It is dogmatic. We must simply accept that there is an absolute moral standard, because Tim Wood says so.
I acknowledge that I have said things which didn't need to be said, but that was very clearly a response to Tim Wood's playbook. He set out to make moral relativists look bad from the very beginning, but you seem to be blind to that because of your antagonism towards me and towards moral relativists in general. You're as bad as him, if not worse.
And these childish attempts to trivialise moral relativism and make it superficially appear to be so obviously wrong are frankly pathetic. And yes, in a sense, I don't need to point out that I think that it is childish and pathetic, and perhaps I shouldn't, but fuck it. I've said it, and I don't regret doing so.
Does your idea of what is morally wrong have anything to do with anything other than personal disgust? If so, then enlighten me please. Perhaps you can persuade me to your way of thinking?
Everyone else not doing it. Same thing as persuades most people to do most things. Have you looked at society lately? See much rational decision making going on? The largest ecomony in the world just voted in a clown for a leader because of a wave of 'popular opinion'. Since when has rational argument made any difference?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No, you're not, you're additionally telling us all which ones they are, and telling anyone who disagrees that they are 'objectively wrong'.
As I said before, given similar starting values, there are more or less correct courses of action to achieve them. There are definitely arguments to be had about those courses of action, and those arguments should be had using reason and evidence because I think most people agree these are good thinking techniques. One of the competing arguments may well come out looking so much more reasonable and well-supported than the other, that anyone would have to be stupid to reject it (again, given the same starting values). I don't disagree with any of that.
I disagree with your repeated return to the idea that you can 'objectively' pick any activity you personally approve of (such as vaccination) and claim it to be such an argument, purely on the grounds that it is the model most scientists in the field currently agree on. That is not anywhere near a good enough reason to consider that model to be so far above the others.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Saying that someone is morally wrong requires a high standard of certainty, in my opinion. Maybe this is our sole point of contention. You're happy to throw around accusations of immorality on the basis of a belief that your modal is 'probably' better. I'm not.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I don't understand this line of argument. You seem to be suggesting that I should believe something other than what seems to me to be the case, because what I currently believe is not very useful in persuading people to do what I want them to. That seems like a really weird argument. Maybe I've misunderstood so ill wait for some more clarity before going into it.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes. That is basically the difference between the class of virtue ethics I'm talking about and utilitarian consequentialism. Virtue ethics does not require a fixed point in the future for its calculus, utilitarianism does. With virtue ethics you are comparing the way actions make you feel about yourself right now. With utilitarianism you are comparing the net utility of actions, but to do so you must use a fixed timescale, otherwise one would advise an action which made the whole population ecstatically happy, but wiped out all future generations (not far off our current attitude). The decision you make will depend on the timescale over which you wish to maintain maximum utility.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Exactly. And you think it's obvious enough that one should vaccinate their child, and you think it's obvious enough that we should brush our teeth, and you think it's obvious enough...
The trouble is, other people disagree, and they do so with perfectly rational arguments of greater or lesser strength. The vaccination issue is exactly the reason why I so strongly disapprove of your approach. It seems to you like it fits right in with not committing FGM, or not killing each other with ice picks, but to me, it stands out a mile as being something which transfers a hell of a lot of trust to organisations which have absolutely shown themselves to be untrustworthy.
This is the problem in a nutshell. If you were arguing for a moral framework which condemned FGM as objectively immoral, for some reason which applied only to those sorts of barbaric actions, then I might well disagree on logical grounds, but I would not have bothered with such an impassioned response. What really bothers me is that you're advocating a system which basically gives moral weight to current scientific opinion with no consideration at all for how vulnerable some fields of science are to fashion, government influence, corporate influence, or plain human greed and bias. You're giving over decisions about what is fundamentally 'right' to a system which has proven itself to be morally questionable at times by the very standards you're using it to uphold.
It's alright, I forgive you, because I'm a good little Christian and I want to get into made-up Heaven.
I don't know. I wasn't listening to a word you were saying. :grin:
Anyway, enough jokes and throwing shade. Back to business.
How can you explain morality in a sensible way without a foundation in moral feelings? I doubt that you can.
That is meaningless without any moral feeling about it. Why should anyone care? The caring is why it matters. This is basic and obvious.
Moral truths in what sense? In a meaningless sense? I reject that way of thinking for obvious reasons. But yes, it is a moral truth in a sensible sense.
Moral feeling is a necessary condition. Harm to society is a necessary condition. I think both of them together is sufficient.
Sufficient for what? What are you talking about? Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing with me? Be clearer. :brow:
Moral feelings and what they're about suffice for moral truth. Harm to society is just one particular thing which a moral truth could be about, depending on how you morally feel about it.
Yes, I am a moral relativist. I have made that known. Look that up if you don't know what that entails.
Shit. You've caught me out. Now I'll have to look up the philosophical jargon. I'm a little rusty on that one. I think I'm both, but await my confirmation. :grin:
But they taste great with mashed potato and vegetables. They taste heavenly, in fact. Just be careful not to overcook them. :ok:
Yeah, I'm both.
Oops, too many consecutive posts. Sir2u is going to have a field day. Still, I'm closer to getting that prized 10k and becoming the new Agustino, only funnier, wiser, better looking, more humble, and less ironic.
Amen.
Quoting Isaac
Yes, and Tim Wood thinks that it's obvious enough that there's an absolute moral standard. We had better follow suit, I suppose, even if that means throwing reason out of the window.
Dogmatism is the order of the day.
Thanks, I’ll do a few hours of research today. It would have been easier if you just directly pointed to the lack of logic. Understand how demeaning it might make you feel to engage the point directly to such an ignorant person as myself. I will crawl back down the mountain master S.
"'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger" - Hume.
The old rationalist conception of morality is as dead as God.
Odd. It certainly looks otherwise. Are you sure you're not just in denial?
Quoting Rank Amateur
I try to help. You can reproach me for not being all nice and cuddly about it, but I do try to help. That I'm arrogant and insensitive doesn't make me any less right or logical.
I thought that pointing out the logical error seemed appropriate. Must I construct a logical argument [i]for you[/I] as well? What would I need [i]you[/I] for in that case? The way I see it, it's on you to put forward an argument for whatever it is that you're claiming, and I will then analyse it and inform you of any problems I detect, and then we can either work on them or you can just close it down as you sometimes do when it gets a bit too much for you.
You have tried. I will give you that much. But I'm not going to lie and call it a big success.
We cannot argue that morals are objective because there is no means for them to be, but we must somehow account for the fact that, of the 7 billion people on the planet, the vast majority of them prefer not to kill each other on a whim, or boil babies, or torture for fun etc.
The statistics are way beyond statistically significant, in some localised situations, maybe even 100%. This widespread agreement does not make their values 'right', I'm absolutely a moral relativist, but it does demand an explanation. Whether you argue for evolved biology, random selection, cultural homogeneity or God's will... Ignoring the fact is what often makes the moral relativist argument sound bizarre. Likewise, ignoring the utility of this fact as an explanation is what makes the absolutist argument sound unnecessarily mystical.
I think the question of whether there exist objective morals is a pseudo question. It depends entirely on what criteria we are going to allow to constitute existence. The more important question is - to what extent are we going to allow the consistency of certain preferences in a majority of the population to act as a justification for imposing those on the remainder? That's basically what I see as the job of normative ethics.
Quoting Isaac
The explanation is that pleasure is good and pain is bad, and this fact is understood by everyone except extreme moral relativists.
Quoting Isaac
No-one has done it so far, but that doesn't prove that it can't be done.
Quoting S
And I stopped believing something just because some old dead fart said it when I was 14.
Right, that's that one nailed. Move on shall we everyone?
One of many pseudo-questions in philosophy. Have you checked out the discussion on ancient texts? If we apply the criteria of moral objectivism, it results in error theory. How pragmatic is error theory? Not as pragmatic as moral relativism in my assessment.
Yes, let's. We've had the last thread on abortion, and now we've got morality sorted. What next, Tim Wood? :lol:
And now you're fourteen-and-a-half and brimming with wisdom. Step aside, Hume. Behold, Herg!
(That [i]itself[/I] was a joke. There's never enough jokes and throwing shade. Even [i]this[/I] is itself a joke. But the biggest joke of all is philosophy. Or am I just joking? I can't even tell anymore, and neither can you. Just cave in to the absurdity and everything will work out just fine. Either that or it will be our biggest downfall. It's one of the two, anyway).
Yes, I briefly paid a visit. "If I define everything to mean exactly what I say it does, does {insert thing here} mean exactly what I say it does?" seems to be about the jist of it, I just left him to it.
Quoting S
I agree. If we are to make any progress at all on those moral matters where there is widespread agreement (but significant disagreement), those of us who agree are not going to make much inroads by first positing that our agreement is somehow objectively right, having it shown that no single moral statements conforms to that standard and so being sent away muttering.
I'd much rather turn up and say "we prefer things to be this way, and there's more of us than there are of you (and we've got guns)". At least it's honest.
Quoting S
I believe the question regarding the colour of Tuesday was mentioned...
No, no, no. It's [i]serious philosophy[/I]. (Don't ruin the illusion with your blasted logical analysis!).
Quoting Isaac
We very much see eye-to-eye.
Quoting Isaac
:rofl:
"With luck, the last thread on the colour of Tuesday".
It's blue, obviously.
Damn, you spoiled it. We could have gone for pages on that question before we reveal the answer that everyone obviously knows.
(although it's yellow, of course. I presumed you were joking about it being blue)
It's alright. Don't worry. There's still the question of where it's located.
It's in Bordeaux, France, obviously.
Ah shit, I've just ruined it again, haven't I?
Not at all, Bordeaux is huge (plus the fact that that's its in Burgundy... as well you know)... Damn... No, wait, it was a double bluff, its not in Burgundy at all. Phew, philosophy is hard isn't it.
I love the idea of a blue Tuesday being located in Burgundy of all places. :lol:
Or is it yellow? And in Croydon? Who knows? Thank goodness we have philosophy to work these things out.
You'll never guess what's in Greenland.
Maddie McCann?
Then your morals would be out of step with your community. That would put you 'in the wrong'. Unless you think there's some kind of natural law that defines racism to be wrong?
It wasn't overnight. Some of us have the common decency to be English.
:up: Definitely. :smile:
this is the issue i am struggling with - happy to be schooled on my errors -
If morality is completely subjective to the individual, than it is equally subjective for all other individuals as well.
for any action - X
person A - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is moral
person B - makes a subjective moral judgement that X is immoral
They are both subjectively right in their individual judgments.
So both must admit the others subjective judgement is correct or
give up the position that all moral judgments are subjective.
Wow. Really? You think that it's either cultural relativism or natural law? The funny thing is, I accept cultural relativism, but I don't accept that it is the whole story when it comes to morality. Yes, I'm wrong relative to them. But they're wrong relative to me, and my morality is better. And yes, better in accordance with my own standard on what's better and worse, obviously. Not in accordance with an imaginary absolute moral standard which makes no sense, and for which there is zero evidence.
If I may. They only must admit that the other's subjective judgement is correct for them (the other person) it is still incorrect for the person thinking about it and so still requires action to remediate (or not, depending on the degree).
The realisation that one cannot make objective ones preferences, does not prevent one from acting to further them. Afterall, you're invoking a kind of 'fairness' here, that it would be somehow 'unfair' if we were to impose our moral preference on another knowing that they feel just as justifiably right as we do.
But what is 'fairness' but another subjective moral preference?
People who think that "out of step with their community" amounts to "wrong" in any manner are the last people I want to be spending time around.
The part in bold is the problem. Who has committed to an absolute sense of correctness in this context? Is the relativist a relativist, or an absolutist?
If the relativist is a relativist, which he obviously is, then there is no internal contradiction, and your criticism is therefore ineffective. Both are correct in a way which does not violate the law of noncontradiction, [i]nor[/I] logically imply a [i]normative[/I] acceptance of the others moral judgement.
Exactly. Which is what I was getting at above re his framework being that we have to defer to what's objectively the case. (And since what's objectively the case to a subjectivist is that there is no objective preference, then we have to defer to that and have no preference, too.)
Right. Its a form of question begging, I think. The hidden premise is {we must defer to what is objective when we make demands on the actions of others}. So then the argument goes "objectively there are no rules, therefore you cannot ask anyone to abide by a rule" . But take away the hidden premise and the argument fails.
This is a good point. It can be a worrying way of thinking, as my example involving racism conveys. Good luck trying to tackle institutional racism by talking about the racists being right, and me being wrong.
agree
Quoting Isaac
fine - but must now give up the the believe that all moral judgments are subjective. Because now you are comparing subjective judgement - how can it be possible to compare them subjectively - that is impossible - they must be compared in measure of objectivity.
Quoting Isaac
no issue - but all such arguments must be prefaced with " from my perspective" any other argument is some measure of objectivity
that is exactly what I am saying - don't see how that begs the question
subjectively you are both right, if you do not allow some level of objectivity into the judgment you can not compare them, other than saying they are different
Right relative to our respective subjective standards, yes.
Quoting Rank Amateur
What you're saying is illogical. I don't need to go outside of myself for any reason, and I cannot do so anyway. My own judgement is all I have, and all I need. He is wrong in this way - the only way that matters as far as I'm concerned. He should change his judgement.
Even if there was an objective standard, it wouldn't matter to me. If we somehow discovered that boiling babies is objectively right, do you think that I'd change my judgement and behaviour accordingly? Hell no! Would you? :brow:
There's that scary link between notions of an objective moral standard and divide command theory. Is it good because god willed it? Genocide is good? Saying that genocide is good for some guy and his bad judgement is no where near as scary. It's very much not good for the rest of us. The rest of us do not accept his judgement in any normative sense. We accept [i]that[/I] it is his judgement. It is not [I]our[/I] judgement. Our judgement is that it is [i]wrong[/I].
It's not the moral relativists you should be worried about, in spite of the negative propaganda.
Is it a coincidence that Noah is a Christian? Is it a coincidence that you are also a theist, if I'm not mistaken? Perhaps there's a correlation. Religious and theological thinking can infect thinking on other matters. The best solution is to kill it at the roots.
I don't understand what you're thinking here.
Say that my view is that it's not okay to rape others.
I run into someone who thinks that it's okay to rape others.
Per what you're saying above, I can't subjectively compare "not okay to rape others" and "okay to rape others," But I don't know why. It seems like it would be easy to compare them, especially since I already have a view about it, that view being "It's not okay to rape others." When I consider "It's okay to rape others" I reject that, because I don't agree with it.
I'm not comparing subjective judgements. I'm comparing his actions to my subjective judgement, not comparing his subjective judgement to my subjective judgement. I don't care about his judgement, its his actions that bother me.
Quoting Rank Amateur
It begs the question because it presumes the hidden premise. Take that away and the argument does not stand without further support.
It's not logical. It must be psychological. His drive for objectivity is psychological, and it is of such force that it overrides logic for him. This makes even more sense when you consider his background: his desire that there be a god.
Well, but we can do that. I don't get why someone would think that we can't.
Yeah, that could be.
What is your argument than to person b who has a different subjective judgement that he is incorrect, other than - "in my opinion" any other argument you chose must be adding a degree of objectivity.
and as an aside - i am not championing any morality over another on this point -
my argument is just pointing to what i think is a logic flaw.
If all judgments are subjective - than all judgments are subjectively correct - I see no way around this
go ahead and make the argument please - tell me why my subjective judgment that rape is not immoral.
you have missed the point - neither person A or B have done the action - person A and B are making subjective judgments on the same action X - than someone else did
It's a subjective judgment comparing two stances. It's not an argument about it in the sense of premises leading to a conclusion. What I explained is all that needs to be involved.
Are you not saying that we can't make a subjective judgment comparing two different stances?
Opinion, if you call it that (I prefer the term "moral judgement" as it conveys the importance better), is all I have. It is founded on moral feelings. I would try to get him to empathise with my feelings on the matter. This can and does work in some cases. It is very evident when a child realises that they've behaved badly by, for example, snatching a toy out of another child's hand. At first, they judge that what they did was morally acceptable, but then you get them to empathise with the victim.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Relative [i]to[/I] those individual subjects. Relativists are relativists, remember? Not absolutists.
So what? This is not a problem in itself. It is not a problem for me. There is no internal contradiction. The only logical error here is your own. It is a problem for you. (It's ironic when this happens, because it's the same sort of error in not understanding moral relativism).
In that instance I refer you to what @Terrapin Station said above with regards to judging stances.
Quoting S
no issue at all with that - that is my point - as long as the basis of every argument you make is your own subjective judgement. Any plea to anything else adds some degree of objectivity.
this is very hard - we can all make whatever subjective judgments we want, you can even say your subjective judgement of my subjective judgement is wrong.
But if you are committed to subjectivity - there is no way to compare subjective judgments. Each attempt is just one more subjective judgment.
Some degree of objectivity doesn't make any real difference. That I feel a certain way about something is itself factual, not opinion. That's a degree of objectivity. That still doesn't mean that morality is objective. There is no objective standard, as feelings differ. We don't accept that different beliefs about the moon indicate an objective standard. The moon can't both be made out of cheese and not made out of cheese, and relativism doesn't help here. Morality isn't like that. It's different. And relativism is useful for making sense of it.
maybe this is a better way of me making my point.
My subjective moral judgment is that Hitler did nothing that is morally wrong.
Assume your subjective moral judgement is Hitler did lots of stuff that was morally wrong
Make an argument - absent of any objective moral standard to change my mind
getting closer - my view is there is no such thing as either absolutely subjective or absolutely objective morality - it is a continuum and we place ourselves somewhere on that continuum.
Are you like a child who has just snatched a toy out of the hand of another child? No, I don't believe that you are, so no argument from me is necessary. I've already explained what I would try to do. You don't need to see me act it out with you. You are more intelligent than that.
that is a non answer to a direct question -
Sure, and I'm not saying that it's anything more than a subjective judgment.
I just don't get saying that there's no way to compare them. We're comparing them subjectively.
You didn't ask me a question, you gave me a challenge which I refused on the basis that it isn't necessary. Don't pretend to be unintelligent.
and now we enter semantics - and ad hominem - seems the discussion is nearing an end
No one, as far as I'm aware, has claimed that there's an absolute subjective morality. Moral subjectivism can acknowledge aspects of objectivity relating to morality, but these aspects are not of any logical significance in the broader context of what the debate is about. You can't kick a puppy if there is no puppy. That there is a puppy is factual, objective. But that's insignificant in proper context.
Rather than trying to make an argument for that--because it would take a lot of time, take a lot of steps, etc. I'll explain how I'd go about doing it.
Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect, though it is necessarily manipulative.)
At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances.
It's very relevant that you seem to be feigning ignorance in order to get me to do something which I judge to be unnecessary. It is no fallacy for me to point that problem out. You are choosing not to progress past this problem by returning sensibly to what we were talking about. You have a bad habit of blaming other people when a discussion doesn't go your way. I make no apology for refusing to let you wrap me around your finger.
If it's all becoming a bit too much for you, then you're free to do what you usually do. The door is over there.
fine with all that - your right I don't change my mind. And it leaves us with two different subjective options about the morality of Hitler and no objective way to resolve our differences.
that does not seem a good endpoint to such a moral judgment to me.
If you have understood that I posted a personal moral verdict, I have miscommunicated, and I apologise. I merely note that any community would consider the views of one of its members who disagreed with every other member as "wrong", wouldn't they? :chin:
Well, but isn't it clear to you that no matter what we do, whatever we believe about meta-ethics, we're left with people with diametrically opposed moral stances? That's hardly a new situation, and it's hardly the result of there being a bunch of meta-ethical subjectivists or relativists.
If we're all objectivists we don't magically arrive at a scenario wherein we all have the same moral stances. We just believe that the folks with other stances are incorrect, that they're unreasonable, etc. That doesn't help change anyone's mind.
My meta-ethical views are not not supposed to be a solution to everyone having the same moral stances. It's just aiming to get right what's really going on ontologically when it comes to morality.
Depends on the community and who we ask. But sure, it's not unusual that a lot of people are pro-conformist enough that they think that.
That's fine, so long as you don't twist what I say and walk away with a misunderstanding which you perhaps don't even realise is a misunderstanding. That some degree of objectivity is required to make sense of morality is completely irrelevant. Moral subjectivists are not solipsists. It would be foolish to treat them as though they were, by interrogating them about the objectivity involved which no reasonable person would deny.
If we truly agree, then fine. But I object to fake or illusory agreement.
I'm not convinced that 'pro-conformist' is a position one would choose. Societies (communities) are quite demanding of their members. Conformity is one general requirement that communities make of their members, although specific and individual non-conformities might be tolerated, up to a point. Don't you think this is how societies work in the real world? It seems so to me. :chin: [ I offer no moral judgement, only my observations of how the real world seems to be, to me.]
Here's an interesting link I just found today. It's not about this specific issue, but it's about culture and societies, and the effect they have upon us and our lives. I've never read anything like it, although I have had vague feelings in this direction for some time. Worth a read, I found. :up: :smile:
I will leave here subjectively believing what I darn well please and there is nothing subjectively you can say to change my mind :)
Exactly. There are so many common misconceptions in this topic. I've seen this one before, and I'm sure you have.
I can deal with that. It's not an uncommon experience for someone to have. No technique is guaranteed to succeed, and that is completely irrelevant as Terrapin rightly argued. But remember that in your task, you're the one who believes that Hitler did nothing morally wrong. I wouldn't even want to associate with you if that was really your view.
I thought that was odd, too. I suspected he mixed up his two statements.
I don’t know S personally, but maybe he’s bad at sports and was always picked last in gym class. Philosophy is his forum for defeating others and winning. At least in his mind.
Whoosh.
I clearly wasn't accusing you of actually having that view.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
And of course, you have to get in on the act as well. I didn't go to sports. I bunked off and smoked weed and played videogames with friends. But apparently I'm not allowed to talk about how much of a cool rebel I am. @Baden
ok - no worries - enjoy the rest of the day
And there they are! I was just waiting for those words. I knew you wouldn't be able to resist.
I couldn’t help myself.
Quoting S
How I wish I was still fourteen-and-a-half. But if anyone in this forum thinks they can move their case forward by quoting edicts from a dead philosopher rather than by advancing cogent arguments, they are in the wrong place. These are not the foothills of Mount Sinai, and no-one here is Moses.
I am not Moses, but I AM Noah, father of humankind. :razz:
Alright then, fourteen-and-three-quarters. I had already made several related points. That quote just puts it in a way that hits home for many people. That's why it stands out amongst his writings. It has utility.
Your reply, on the other hand, only stood out for the wrong reasons.
Ah, but you are not just Noah, father of humankind. You are Noah Te Stroete, father of humankind who spends all day rolling around in a marsh. :snicker:
Well, here I may diverge from TS and S, but I would argue one of three ways.
1. Everyone else thinks Hitler is a monster (only works if it's true, but can be very effective, especially with the easily led)
2. I think Hitler is a monster and look how cool I am. Not as facetious a line of argument as it sounds. Basically you sell your way of doing thing by the outcome on you. It's the way brave people who risk their lives for others sell it.
3. You're a human being, and my knowledge of psychology/anthropology indicates that humans don't generally like people like Hilter (in the fullness of time), so if you think you like Hitler, your probably wrong. I know TS and I have disagreed about this, but I believe it is possible to be wrong about your own self-reported feelings.
How's that? Convinced yet?
no - sorry as a moral relativist i appreciate that is your subjective moral view, but it is not my subjective moral view. And as one believer in subjective morality to another we both know there is no objective answer on if Hitler was moral or immoral - so we will happily have to go on acknowledging that we are both right subject to our own views of morality.
(and of course - hope it does not need to be said that IRL I know Hitler was an abominably immoral man)
No, he's not, because he is just playing a role to make a point which is actually trivial, which is why I'm glad I didn't go all out by throwing myself into a role like he wanted me to. The trivial point is that some people won't be convinced, no matter what. And the illogical connection is that moral objectivism somehow magically has the answer.
In real life, the role that he is playing is only a reflection of some, but not all, cases. In other cases, people are persuaded to change their mind. And again, this has nothing to do with moral subjectivism or moral objectivism.
I hope he's actually listening and absorbing this, instead of doing his "okay, whatever, have a nice day" thing.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Indeed, it still doesn't need to be said, and yet you've now said it on two separate occasions. Relax, no one thinks that you're a supporter of Hitler. We understand what role play is.
Rank - Me and a few million other relative morality believers all seem to hold 2 of the same subjective beliefs - the first one is we think Hitler is a monster, and the second one is we subjectively believe we are going to hang anyone who doesn't subjectively think he is a monster too.
Now I am convinced.
Wish there was kind of name we could use for such a widely and commonly held belief.
Right, but how does objectivism help us with this kind of problem? If I was an objectivist about morals, you could just disagree with my reasoning. I mean, just take a glance over any of the posts on this website, are people being regularly persuaded by rational argument, or are people sticking to almost exactly what they started out saying regardless of any argument to the contrary?
I agree - the difference is now it is not 2 subjective moral views in opposition - now it is one moral view aligned with an objective norm and one not. I can still chose, as many do, to be outside the objective norm, but that is a very different position than I hold a different - but equally valid subjective view.
Absolutely.
Quoting S
To be honest I think subjectivism has the edge here and people are using it despite claiming to oppose it. Look at Tim's argument, or VS's. It's basically saying "I think x is wrong and I'm very clever, wouldn't you like to sound clever like me?"
Yes to the first part (by my particular view of moral subjectivism), but in the second, you're adding terms to the argument that no one (to my knowledge) has added. No one said the two subjective moral stances were equally valid. Go back over what @S or @Terrapin Station said about judgement. In the sense you're using the term 'valid', it is not the claim that subjectivists are making
that is my position that i have been arguing - not theirs.
How can one subjective moral view be better than any other subjective moral view - if the basis for both is purely the subjective view of the person who holds it? Any judgment on either view that does not employ some degree of objective morality as a standard to measure against is just one more subjective view.
If all moral views are subjective, by definition none can be objectively better than any other.
There is a name for that. It's called a popular belief, and it does nothing to support moral objectivism. Boy, it turns out you were easy to convince. You would've been convinced that slavery was a good thing back in the day.
Yes--that's exactly right.
The thing is that "objectively better" is a category error in the first place.
So competing views are not better or worse than each other objectively--but the objective realm is the entirely wrong place for doing that sort of work. It's akin to noting that a dog has no category number as a hurricane. Dogs aren't the right sort of thing for that--they're not hurricanes, so it's not going to make sense to talk about a dog having a hurricane category number.
But that doesn't at all imply a problem with making judgments about competing moral stances. Judgments, by their very nature, are things that occur in the subjective realm, not the objective realm. Judgments are indeed just one more subjective view--they can never be anything other than that. The trick is to recognize and deal with them as what they are.
Predictable, ain't he?
Quoting Isaac
Oh yes. And Tim has used all the tricks in the book! They might've worked on me if I hadn't taken the time to learn about logical fallacies and develop my skill in being able to identify them.
[U]Argument 1[/u]
Moral relativism: boo! Moral objectivism: yay!
[U]Argument 2[/u]
It's obvious.
Therefore, moral objectivism.
That was Tim's tactic in a nutshell. Vagabond Spectre's was more like: "I agree with everything you say, but brushing your teeth is handy, therefore objective morality".
We've got some stiff competition on our hands.
can you give just one example of anything that is subjectively better than anything else, in any sense of the word better, that is not just an opinion/view.
Quoting Terrapin Station
In your view - that in no way is any kind of a truth statement
It muddies the waters because it is a false, or at least weak, analogy. We don't tend to care much what others like to eat, provided it doesn't smell too bad. When it comes to morals almost everyone agrees about the basic principles, and those principles are based on what makes for a harmonious community.
Kant was basically right: there would be a contradiction in saying that you want to live harmoniously with others, but that you think it is OK to lie, cheat. steal, exploit, rape and murder. If you are honest and say that you don't really care about living harmoniously with others, but that it suits you to remain in society because you don't like being alone, you wouldn't be able to survive alone, you need others to exploit and torture lest you be bored, and so on; then there would be no contradiction. But would such a person be moral, immoral or amoral?
(What I don't like about Kant's CI is the notion of duty).
You've been arguing it? Are you sure about that?
Quoting Rank Amateur
So an argument from incredulity. You don't see how it is possible, so it's not possible. We've all tried to explain it to you. You can lead a horse to water...
Quoting Rank Amateur
Moral subjectivists don't claim or accept that, so it doesn't work as a criticism at all. That's like saying to a solipsist that the existence of other people means that they can't be the only one who exists. It's kind of silly when you think about it.
Do you also object to the notion of moral law?
yes, that is my entire point - there is no meaningful value judgement that can be made about competing moral views if you hold to subjectivity - they can only be different - there is no meaningful subjectively better or worse.
Quoting S
then please show me how it is possible, before you invoke the fallacy - show it applies please.
Quoting S
and they are welcome to their view, but it has no real meaning to anyone else -
This is true if you are holding to a notion of individual subjectivity. If you hold to a notion of collective subjectivity or inter-subjectivity, then not so much.
I still don't agree that it muddies the waters. I think that you're throwing mud into the water and blaming it on the analogy.
What supposed relevance is a harmonious community in the very specific context of this discussion, as opposed to the context of morality in general? I care about a harmonious community to some extent, but so what? I would steal from a rich corporation if I could get away with it, whether we assume that that's immoral or otherwise. I wouldn't rape or murder, even if I could get away with it. None of this seems relevant in terms of the debate that's going on.
there still is no better or worse, you can have more or less widely agreed - inside or outside the predominate view, even the overwhelming predominate view - but if you hold to subjectivity - still can't get to better or worse. You can add comparative terms, but you still can't add qualitative terms and hold to subjectivity.
How would you justify that to yourself?
Quoting S
As I see it "the debate that's going on" is itself a litany of irrelevancies and category errors.
I know what your conclusion is. I was questioning this supposed argument you referenced.
Quoting Rank Amateur
But I think that you need to go back and reconsider the explanations already given, not that I need to repeat them. It should go without saying that without a contradiction, then it is possible. And there's no contradiction. That a contradiction results from one of your premises that we don't accept is in itself trivial.
Quoting Rank Amateur
That's not true, because people [i]become[/I] moral subjectivists. They're not born that way. I became one myself, because I found it convincing enough. But yes, obviously if you're not convinced by it, and that can't be changed, then it is meaningless in a sense. That's not unique to moral relativism, it is true in general. How do you suppose we see your position?
I can't see why you would say that. If the vast majority of people agree, that is feel the same way, about the broader moral issues: theft, deception, murder, rape, pedophilia, and so on, then there is a shared cultural set of morals. To say that you wish to live harmoniously with your fellows and yet hold contrary views about those matters, would be to contradict yourself. You would be a liar or a fool in that case.
non answer to the response to your question
Quoting S
non answer to my challenge to your claim of fallacy
Quoting S
nothing at all to do with the point - but thanks for sharing
A command of pure practical reason. Without acceptance of the Kantian notion of duty, however, moral law, and by association, the notion of imperatives, becomes irrelevant, along with the entire deontological rational philosophy.
Which is fine. There are plenty of others.
tell me any meaningful difference between what you propose as subjective, and those beliefs are to a high degree objectively immoral. Just some coincidence that the vast majority of subjective moralist all view them the same way ?
Here's what I conclude:
1. You have no argument, or at least no valid argument.
2. You aren't willing to help yourself out of your own incredulity. Rather, you want us to repeat our earlier attempts [i]ad neaseam[/I], even though there is little evidence that you'll get it this time instead of repeating the same problems.
3. You don't realise that your criticism of moral relativism as meaningless is not uniquely a criticism of moral relativism, but applies in general and can easily be turned back on you.
“....litany of irrelevancies and category errors....”
Agreed.
Thanks for showing up.
Those beliefs are objectively immoral if you count universal inter-subjective agreement as being objective. But I would see that agreement as being socially evolved, not as given from on high.
The distinction seems trivial, since a collective is made up of individuals. So what if lots of us have in common a moral judgement. The topic is meta-ethics, not normative ethics. All I can think of are normative points or more value judgements. Where's the supposed relevance, given the confines of the topic?
Either way, the better and worse is relative, it's not that everything is equal. What's not to understand about that? Better or worse by my standard, better or worse by the popular standard...
no issue - don't care very much on the basis of the objectivity - just there has to be some degree of objective standard in order for their to be some value judgement.
And again, what's the supposed significance of that, given the strict confines of the topic?
you of course realize that relative to my point of view all of equally applies to you. Ironic
So this was what you were getting at. Well no, I don't, because it isn't. It's not universal for starters, and it isn't objective. It is subjective.
You of course realise that I have not committed to relativism in general, just moral relativism. Ironic indeed. We can swap around for this part if you want to. You're wrong, irrespective of what you think. Reason is objective, not subjective. Facts are certainly not subjective. Nor rocks. Nor meaning, as I conceive of it.
That should be obvious; I am talking about the context of inter-subjectively shared values being the overarching context within which, perhaps even against which, individuals define their own sets of moral values. How do you think it is not significant?
On the broader issues it is, for all intents and purposes, universal. The fact that there might be some deviants who think that what most people consider to be heinous acts are actually good is what is morally and subjectively irrelevant.
I’m not sure he said duty was a moral imperative, but rather a principle which justifies the possibility of moral law. No reason for positing a law if one feels no sense of being bound to it. Stronger and more fundamental than the alleged “moral feeling”, but serving the same purpose, at the root of moral worthiness.
Well, for a start, it wasn't clear to me what you were getting at, so why would you ask me that as though I actually knew exactly what you were getting at and was denying the significance of it? Just saying that it should be obvious is naive. Just be clearer next time. It's not difficult. If you had simply said that the last time, I would've understood.
Anyway, now that you've explained yourself properly, I'm not saying that I don't see the supposed relevance. But I don't agree. Primarily, my morality is founded individualistically. My moral feelings are [I]my[/I] moral feelings, not those of all of the other subjects. Whether they happen to share my feelings or not is neither here nor there. I appeal within myself, not outside of myself to others.
This is just smoke and mirrors. It simply isn't universal. Full stop. Adding "for all intents and purposes" completely undermines your claim. We could all just say "for all intents and purposes" morality is objective, or universal, or absolute, and be done with this debate. But it's deeper than that.
Quoting Janus
I agree that it's irrelevant normatively, but normative ethics is itself irrelevant in this context, so you aren't saying anything relevant in making that point. I don't share the moral judgements of the deviants in terms of all of the big stuff, like rape and murder, so in that sense they don't matter, but that sense is relative and subjective. Still no objective morality.
Clearly, any aspect of human behavior to which standards, laws and prohibitions are applied cannot considered morally relative in an absolute sense. A word like murder, as opposed to killing, presupposes the intentional violation of a standard.
But its important to see that there are different kinds of moral relativisms. Maybe the easiest way to approach 'relativism' to start from meaning relativism, since morality cannot be determined without first having a theory of truth, since any understanding of morality and ethics begins from what truth is taken to be. So lets see how the notion of truth relativism has evolved with regards to the understanding of science.
It could be argued that Descartes was the first relativist in that he recognized that humans construct theories of truth rather than simply directly observing it in the world as earlier philosophers believed. So Descartes was the first to realize that truth is relative to a model of the world.But Descartes still believed that scientific and moral truth were a function of mirroring, through cognition, the way things are in the world. Kant radicalized Descartes by arguing that not only is truth a function of our constructions and concepts, but that those concepts can never get at a final exhaustive truth (we cannot reach the thing in itself). So for Kant truth is relative to our evolving schemes. In science we can disprove but never exhaustively prove any theory. The truth of any scientific theory is contestable. But we can assymptotically approximate ultimate truth. He modeled his moral theory on this idea of universal truth that we have to assume but never see directly.
This is Kant's moral relativism. Hegel did Kant one better by seeing truth as relative not only to our holistic schemes but sees those schemes and categories themselves as evolving. So Hegel introduced the idea of cultural relativism. Each culture's moral standards are on the way to something true in a totalistic sense but they havent arrived there yet. Marx took Hegel's idealist dialectic of moral truth and put it in the material plane of human economic arrangements. Marx kept the idea of morality as a cultural becoming, however. We become morally better through the dialectical development of economic arrangements.
Nietzsche was among the first to throw out this idea that becoming is an improvement toward some ultimate telos, challenging us to think beyond good and evil. For him there is no moral progress or progress of truth, only contingent perspectives that cannot be arranged according to conformity with an ultimate reality.
So Nietzsche gives us a relativism from top to bottom, with no grounding or telos. People often ask, how does one keep one's own philosophy of radical relativism from being itself a morality in claiming itself as a truth? The answer is that the terms of such a philosophy are meant to be contestable and internally self-reflexive. SO Nietzschean truth is not truth in the traditional sense. It is more a being-in-transformation.
With repect to "not just an opinion/view," no, because that's what "better" is. It simply amounts to preferring one thing over another, often because of some goal that one has.
Quoting Rank Amateur
That's a fact (that that's what judgments are). It's the way the world is ontologically.
Bill of Rights, Magna Carta, the Boy Scout Pledge.....whatever the KKK uses....objective shared set of standards or mores, represented by an object. Any cultural code of conduct.
Those to be taken as objective morality is the categorical error.
It's all but universal, and that's what matters. The anomalies of a deviant few are irrelevant.
Quoting S
Ah, the romantic fantasy of the individualist! You're not the first to indulge it, and you won't be the last; but it's a woefully simplistic view.
I'd just want the money. I wouldn't care about the moral status of the act.
Quoting Janus
Not so different from other debates then. The key debate, as I see it, has been about meta-ethics, and has been moral subjectivism vs. moral objectivism, with some trying and failing to argue for a sort of "third way" whereby they have their cake and eat it.
Of course they are not really "objective" they are inter-subjective. And we might judge them according to their efficacy in promoting harmonious relations. The individualistic ethos of capitalism is arguably not going to lead to the most harmonious communal life or to sustainable future for humankind.
So, you'd do the same to an individual as you would to a corporation then? Just for the money?
As to meta-ethics; I don't believe there is any such coherent thing distinct from ethics; so perhaps that is where the disagreement really lies.
But it doesn't matter that it's all but universal in terms of my morality, because that's not where my morality stems from. My morality has pride of place in any consideration of morality whatsoever. If murder being good was part of my morality, then that would be of greater importance to me than an almost universal judgement that it was not good.
The anomalies of a deviant few if they are other than me are irrelevant either way, because it is my moral judgement that matters to me. I'm not appealing to theirs or anyone else's. You are fundamentally mistaken about where morality stems from. It stems from the individual, from their moral feelings. I would stand by my moral judgement that murder is wrong, even if everyone else in the world judged it to be right.
Quoting Janus
It's just the truth, plainly spoken by yours truly. The fantasy is yours. Universal my arse.
No, you know that I didn't say that, and you're bright enough to pick up that I specified a corporation for a reason.
In practice, though, your morality is not going to differ form the vast majority unless you're one of the deviant few; so it is not uniquely yours, and you never would have had it in the first place if you were not enculturated into it.
Of course, on the other hand, I am not saying that an individual's moral principles are not what matters most to them.
Quoting S
Yes, and I suspect that would be because you don't consider corporations to be morally justified in their practices, and therefore feel justified in taking whatever you can from them. But you declined to spell that out.
:up:
Quoting Janus
:up:
Quoting S
And where does the individual stem from? Hint: It begins with "S". You didn't choose your moral system so much as it chose you.
Whether it is uniquely mine or not, in the sense of whether or not it matches up to the moral judgements of others, is a difference which makes no difference.
Quoting Janus
That's true to some extent. But I've also knowingly done bad things in the sense of popular or traditional morality, and in the sense of being in two minds about something, perhaps feeling that it is wrong in a sense, but also right in a sense, yet doing it nevertheless. I am indeed an amoralist at times. It is quite liberating. You know, just steal the wallet and don't even worry about it. Morality is what we make it and nothing more. Life is what we make it and nothing more. There are no rules which we simply must follow, absolutely. And being categorised as a rapist or murderer really only matters insomuch as it matters to me.
How's that for radical thinking? Does that make me a deviant? Even if it does, does it matter to me? It's just another box to be put in.
Except that I'm autonomous and it is fully within my power to override whatever influence that the morality of society has over me. Do you think that I would let that stop me if it mattered that much to me? If, for example, I really thought that murder was good, and worth the very high risk of going to prison?
I haven't seen a good response to this. Just name calling. Ugh! Deviant! You're irrelevant! You don't matter! You're an anomaly!
You're a fragment of the sociocultural awkwardly expressed through the mostly compliant body of an ape. Your perceived individualism and autonomy is largely formed of retroactive confabulations designed to make the marriage between the fragment and the ape less acrimonious. There's plenty you can't do but manage to convince yourself you don't want to.
Trying to play psychologist, are you? I can do that too. You're just rationalising your own deep-seated aversion to confronting the dark side of our human nature.
It goes for almost all of us to a large degree except for true deviants like sociopaths where through some combination of environment (often abuse) and genetics, enculturation is seriously short-circuited.
Quoting S
Nothing you've come up with here is particularly dark compared to what goes on in the real world daily.
The popularity of a view is irrelevant to it being correct.
Quoting Janus
Aside from just what counts as harmonious relations being a matter of individual judgment, lest you be suggesting yet another argumentum ad populum, the notion that harmonious relations are preferable is yet another individual judgment (or argumentum ad populum that you'd be forwarding)
True as that might be, there's a trend in ethics to dismiss anything too different or radical as some kind of illness, even though they almost certainly aren't qualified to make that judgement, given that they're most likely a) not a psychiatrist, and b) even if qualified, have not performed a proper assessment.
It paints a neat little picture, but that's all it really is. And the irony is that [i]I've[/I] been called a romantic and a fantasist.
We are human, all too human. Being human is not an illness, is it?
Quoting Baden
And the irony here is that you actually know very little about me and my life. Certainly not enough to rule out that I'm part of the dark goings on in the real world which occur on a regular basis.
The difference between prevalence and popularity is?
Not important, I'm more interested in the general point, which is that we're all apt to overestimate our moral autonomy and when it comes to the crunch, fall mostly in line, often inventing some reason why we 'had' to.
Sure, that's true. Except when it isn't. And there's also a popular psychological mechanism to deny or underplay the darker side of our nature. Even though, like you say, it goes on every day. There have been hundreds of wars, barbaric torture, genocide, slavery, rape, and this continues into our modern times. There are still wars, crimes are committed all of the time, there's modern slavery, stoning to death, cutting off of heads, and so on. That is just part of human nature. Wherever there are humans, there are these sort of things.
You can't be non-autonomous when it comes to your ethics, because no one else can make a judgment for you.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/example/anglais/degree-of-autonomy
How do you think socialization works? How do you think society works? If we were all lone wolves fighting for territory, this might make sense. As the human world is, it doesn’t make any sense.
The way you constantly misunderstand English is irritating. Look up a dictionary on this too and if you still can't figure it out, I'll tell you. But make an effort.
Not near as irritating as your attitude. Presumably I'm challenging that there is any difference in this context, right? So how about supporting the notion that there's a difference?
My main issue in the debate is not that morality purely objective, as you can see above I have already conceded such a thing is not possible. As well as no such thing as purely subjective morality is possible. We as individuals and as a culture and as a society place ourselves somewhere on the continuum between those exteams. What ever particular label you place on the points in between I am not that concerned with.
My issue is if you chose as best you can to place yourself close to subjective end, you are forgoing the right to evaluate the moral judgment of others. It can't just be subjective for you. Nietzsche has to assume the guy stabbing him in the back with a knife is just listening to his particular truth, and his personal morality based on that truth
You're either drifting off topic or making an illogical connection. The functioning of society has nothing to do with the point that I was making. Why do people keep confusing normative ethics and meta-ethics? The issue is not what the goals of society should be and how we should best achieve them or anything of that sort. The topic isn't whatever you imagine or would like it to be.
And you're completely wrong on all of those points.
I'm not "choosing" to place myself somewhere on the scale, I'm making an honest assessment and reporting that assessment.
I'm not forgoing "the right" to evaluate the moral judgement of others. Rights are just a useful fiction anyway, and I most certainly can and do evaluate the moral judgements of others.
It can indeed be subjective for me, and it is so.
There's not much that Nietzsche can do about a guy stabbing him in the back with a knife, unless he is equipped to defend himself and manage his knife wound, if it isn't fatal in a matter of minutes. But he certainly doesn't have to accept it with indifference as you have persistently asserted with no reasonable support whatsoever, and it makes no sense to anyone other than to you, in your own mind, with your own blinkered assumptions. So it is completely ineffectual as a criticism.
Would you say that morality is something other than judgments/assessments of behavior? Or is it that you think that judgments or assessments can occur outside of minds somehow?
Quoting S
The difference is?
It comes from a variety of sources. One is religious belief ('the gods have told us what to do, so we ought to do it'), another is social programming ('our leaders have told us what we should do, so we ought to do it'), and a third is the one I mentioned earlier, the recognition that pleasure is good and pain bad, and the entirely reasonable inference from this that we ought to promote pleasure and reduce pain. It's in this third area that the basis for a degree of objectivity in moral truths is to be found. For example:
Proof that intentionally boiling babies is morally wrong
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
2. Pain is bad.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
If anyone wants to disagree with 1, 2 or 4, I'd be interested to know their reasons. I'd also be interested to know from moral relativists here how they would go about persuading someone else not to boil a baby.
Of course none of the above shows that every deontological principle is based on an objective truth, and I wouldn't want to claim that it was; my view of morality is that some of it is based on objective truth, and some of it is relative.
BTW, I'm quite a bit older than fourteen and three quarters, but it's nice to have it noted that I have a fresh and youthful approach.
I already gave my views of the extra-mental in I believe it was the “Horses are Cats” thread. Nothing we can speak about is truly extra-mental. Are you asking me if judgments or assessments can occur in the material realm? That seems silly.
So then how is morality not of individuals? Are you positing some sort of communal mind?
Ah, someone else who is giving off the impression that they've never heard of Hitchen's razor. Like for like is perfectly permissible. As for arguments, you go first, and then maybe I'll respond. But understand that your assertions can simply be dismissed or met with counter-assertions.
Quoting Rank Amateur
The difference is that of doxastic voluntarism and doxastic involuntarism. It is about your controversial use of the word "choice" in this context.
I would argue that all of these except for pleasure and pain come from society. Pleasure and pain are the foundation of moral feeling I think. I said to S that both together are sufficient for the moral truths. As a descriptive moral relativist, I know that minds can differ on morality, but I am not a meta-ethical moral relativist. There are “objective” moral truths. Whatever “objective” means to people. Cold-blooded murder, rape, child molestation are all examples of morally wrong moral truths.
Again, if morality is a judgment or assessment of behavior, how can someone else make a judgment for us? If you're saying that we literally receive a judgment from someone else, how does that work?
Sorry, but I'm not interested in a bunch of bare assertions strung together like that, as though they're a real argument. I already addressed some of this earlier, so you should start from what I said before, not from scratch.
Quoting Terrapin Station
It was only for my third category that I was claiming objectivity, not the first two. They were just anthropological notes, and I don't wish to defend them at all.
To refer to commonalities in morality as 'popular' rather than 'prevalent' suggests a relatively irrelevant meta-level of judgement of judgements. Morality consists primarily in how people's judgements are borne out in action not how much people like or admire those judgements. Ergo, referring to moralities as 'popular' rather than 'prevalent' is imprecise and inapt as Janus pointed out.
E.g. we don't say that in modern society the prohibition of rape is 'popular', we say that the prohibition of rape is 'prevalent'.
Through shared meaning, communication, socialization.
I don't see anything worth taking seriously in that. It is just dogmatism. You need to actually explain, as though speaking to a sceptic, why your reader should accept that it is as you say. Why not, alternatively: in accordance with my moral judgement pain is bad as far as I'm concerned? You don't seem to have put any real effort into defending your stance against obvious objections.
Quoting S
And you have put no effort at all into making any.
That's not how the burden of proof works, and I asked you why not, alternatively: in accordance with my moral judgement, pain is bad as far as I'm concerned? You merely assume or assert controversial premises and reason from that point onwards, which is the fallacy of begging the question.
It is not valid to suggest that it is the case that they're true unless proven false. And you can't shift the burden. That would be an argument from ignorance.
So how about you take this criticism seriously and try again?
Nietzsche could conclude, for instance, that the man stabbing him in the back was operating on the basis of an assessment that not only the man, but Nietzsche himself, could accept as justified given the man's understanding. The act, then could be thought of as akin to a shark attacking me. I don't blame the shark ,any more than I would blame wind for knocking a tree onto me.
So here we have the assessment of unpleasantness without the attribution of blame or guilt or evil to the perpetrator of that unpleasantness. IS this still a moral issue or a pragmatic issue of figuring out how to defend myself against back-stabbers, shark attacks and falling trees?
Quoting S
Very well, since you evidently lack the energy to discuss whether my premises are true or false, I will present my reasons for believing them to be true. You will find that I am not, in fact, begging the question.
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
Babies have a similar enough physiology and behaviour to mine and yours for it to be reasonable for us to infer, from the fact that you and I experience pain when boiled, that babies do too.
2. Pain is bad.
If you went to a doctor and said, 'doctor, this pain is bad', you would have good reason to be annoyed if his reply was, 'ah, so you have a personal dislike of pain, do you?' Everyone whose views have not been tainted by bad philosophy knows that pain is bad - this is a truth we learn by experiencing pain. If you wish to pretend that you aren't aware of this truth, then of course that is up to you.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
Entailed by 1 and 2.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
'Wrong' here is simply the equivalent of 'bad' when applied to actions: that we happen to say 'wrong' rather than 'bad' is an accident of linguistic history. The material point is that the badness of the intended result of an action necessarily infects the intention with which the action is performed. The two cannot be reasonably separated, and therefore if an action is intended to have bad consequences, the action itself must be a bad action.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
Entailed by 4 and 5.
1. Boiling babies causes them pain.
2. Pain is bad.
3. Therefore the effect of boiling babies is bad.
4. Intentionally performing an action whose effect is bad is morally wrong.
5. Therefore boiling babies is morally wrong.
Justifying moral truths on the basis of syllogisms runs into the same difficulty as grounding truth in general in syllogisms. Formal logic is only as 'true' as the underlying presuppositions grounding the thinking of objective causality. There's a history to this thinking, which gets itself into trouble after Godel, Putnam and Quine. There was the discovery that language gets in the way of grounding logical assertions. An assertion has to be communicated, and there is no interpretation -free communication of an assertion about the world.
If morality came from the individual, there would be no need for socialization.
There is a need for socialization.
Thus, morality doesn’t come from the individual.
Okay, so you're just talking about pain being bad in a sense that is not in itself morally relevant, in spite of the superficial appearance given the shared terminology of "bad". In that context, "bad" means something like severe or painful. The lack of relevance is obvious if you swap "bad" for "immoral". How do you think the doctor would react if I said that the pain is immoral? It's easy to make an obvious point, but you also need to make it relevant to the topic.
Quoting Herg
All that that is really saying, given your explanation of the meaning of "bad", is a misleading repetition of your first premise: that boiling babies causes them pain, or severe pain. So it is just a truism. No logical relevance yet.
Quoting Herg
If "wrong" is simply an equivalent of "bad" in accordance with your previous usage, then you're just making an irrelevant tautology: intentionally performing an action whose effect is severe pain is causative of severe pain.
That says nothing of morality. You are equivocating your terms, hoping that nobody will really notice.
Quoting Herg
You haven't reached that conclusion without committing a number of key errors, so it doesn't really count.
This has to be a category error or something fallacious. He isn’t saying that “pain is immoral”. He is saying that by our very nature, pain is something we instinctively avoid.
Or , more specifically, since we already know how we have traditionally thought about our attempts to deal with our being bothered by interhuman violence, how could one understand a community that successfully minimizes interhuman violence without a traditional moral system?
The way that post modern, poststructuralist radical relativist discourses answer this is that interhuman violence is connected with the inability to relate to an other who appears alien to us. We dont do violence to ourselves generally, and those who we identify with as like ourselves(generally family and friends). Good and Evil have been replaced for poststructuralists by the opportunity recognized within any era of culture to encourage the ability to see the other as not alien. Their morality is not about enforcing a belief system , it is about encouraging the multiplying of belief systems. It is an ethic of diversification, which is what deconstruction is about. Radical relativism sees the protection from hating each other to death as freeing individuals and communities from being stuck in any given system of truth. If there is an evil for them it is the interruption of movement and transformation in thinking in general. 'Evil' for them is no longer something bound up with the content of particular beliefs, laws, actions but the very settling for any specific content as THE TRUTH.
He didn’t say that. He is saying that the action is MORALLY wrong.
That was my point, which you seem to have paradoxically both missed, and yet stolen. Of course it doesn't make sense and is a category error. He is saying something else that is not morally relevant. It's not morally relevant to say that cheese puffs taste bad or that my toothache hurts real bad. It is morally relevant to say that murder is immoral. The fallacies are his, not mine. And the relevant fallacy is equivocation, as I pointed out.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
Which again, lacks moral relevance in itself. You'd have to make it relevant with one or more additional premises.
This misses the point in a similar way to the earlier point about brushing your teeth.
Pain is bad. (a given)
Pain is instinctively avoided. (another given)
Causing pain in other people is bad. (from the first given, and the fact that we live in a society as social creatures)
Causing pain in other people should be avoided. (From the second given and the third premise)
Things that should be avoided are wrong.
Causing pain in other people is wrong.
You are being careless and jumping to conclusions. I know exactly what he said. And I know exactly what I'm doing. My point was that he is switching from one meaning to the other without proper justification. And I was demonstrating that by consistently applying his meaning instead of covering it up with the terminology which he is exploiting. He himself said that "wrong" is just "bad" applied to actions, and his explanation of "bad" was not morally relevant, it just meant something like severe or painful. Simply adding the word "moral" in front of that doesn't magically make his argument work.
Think before you react.
Yes, pain hurts and is undesirable. That's what you're saying there, I take it? That's trivial. Or are you going to do what a sophist would do, and exploit the ambiguity of terminology?
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
Nothing morally relevant. Just sophism.
Brushing your teeth is good for your health. Cheese puffs taste bad. Pain hurts.
We act relative to goals and values and desires.
Who gives a fuck? The topic is morality. Say something relevant to the topic.
And equivocation is a fallacy.
[I]A feather is light.
What is light cannot be dark.
Therefore, a feather cannot be dark.
All jackasses have long ears.
Carl is a jackass.
Therefore, Carl has long ears.[/I]
The first premise is obviously false, so the argument is unsound. This is child's play.
I added another premise followed by the conclusion.
Also:
Society is the necessary conclusion of social creatures with linguistic meaning and communication.
Society has the goal of survival and flourishing of the community.
In order for this survival and flourishing, moral laws must be formed.
Moral laws are also grounded in moral feeling.
That moral feeling has as its basis the avoidance of pain.
Moral laws dissuade the inflicting of pain, which also helps to ensure the survival and flourishing of society.
If moral laws didn’t exist, then society would not have lasted this long.
Society has lasted.
Hence, MORAL LAWS EXIST.
Why is it false?
You begin with premises about society as if it is taken for granted that morality is all about society, which you know that I reject from the get go.
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
No, you don't get to do that. You haven't demonstrated that it is true, and I'll retract my claim that it is false until you bother to attempt to support your own argument properly instead of deflecting.
I don't do:
[I]P1. Blah blah
P2. Blah blah
P3. Blah blah
Now prove me wrong![/I]
So stop trying, people. Do not take me for a fool.
It seems we are at an impasse. I believe my premises are true. You don’t. Oh well.
Only if you think that they're brute facts. Do you? Otherwise the burden is on you and you should stop making excuses.
If morality came from the individual, then there would be no need for socialization.
Socialization ensures the smooth working of society.
Society is the necessary conclusion of social creatures with shared linguistic meaning and communication.
Followed by:
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
I don’t know how to prove to you that we are social creatures sharing linguistic meaning other than ...
That doesn't contradict anything that I've claimed. I don't think that engaging with you further is going to be productive. You probably have something else entirely in mind to what I have in mind when you say that morality comes from the individual, because otherwise there is no logical link whatsoever to that somehow preventing socialisation altogether. I have not got the energy to draw out all of these problems. It's horses are cats, and I'll just end up really annoyed when it's finally revealed that you're talking about cats when I'm talking about horses.
As I said, morality is taught just as any other linguistic knowledge. Socialization teaches the shared moral norms of a society. Any other function of socialization is secondary to and meaningless without the teaching of morals.
I don't care. You haven't given me any reason to. You're getting way ahead of yourself. My advice would be to slow down, try to regain relevance in relation to something I've actually said, and make explicit any key differences in interpretation. Otherwise this is going to be very unproductive, like my example in "Horses Are Cats".
I don’t know what else I can say. I thought I laid it out before you.
No, we're still stuck at the very first hurdle. Namely, the question of why morality can't stem from the individual in the sense that I meant that, and not any different sense which you might mean in place of that. If I assume my sense, then there's a giant logical gap between that as the antecedent, and no possible socialisation as the consequent, in the conditional of your very first premise.
Like I said, I suspect you aren't doing it right, because I suspect that you're probably talking past me. To avoid that, you should clarify key statements where I've indicated a problem, or seek clarification from me in order to check whether you mean the same thing as I do.
But all of this is time consuming and requires effort, and you've already wasted so much time and effort getting way ahead of yourself typing up formal arguments full of problems, and drifting off to bring up different points which don't help with the first problem, but only add to the number of problems you expect me to sort through and analyse and work on.
Evil is a tremendously loaded word that I would think has no place in a rational discussion of morality...but I will try. So boiling babies is evil. So is killing all humans. But given a choice between the two, one choice seems better in any measurable way. And based on your description, I think I would view most important morality as "picking between the lesser of two evils."
For example, there was only one war with a Hitler. Most of the rest are nothing but moral ambiguities.
Oh, and sorry for the Spiritual Enlightenment bit, I was half-joking based on your description sounding very much like a Buddhist monk who seeks to achieve enlightenment, but this requires that they are disconnected from the world and its problems. Good for them, but I sure hope they don't think the world would be better off if everyone thought like them.
I don’t know why you would say that other wars were “nothing but moral ambiguities”. But maybe you know more about the history of warfare than I do. For what it’s worth, Sun Tzu once said that no protracted war ever benefited a country. Were other wars not also evil? Sorry, “morally wrong”.
Have a look at the page number at the bottom of the page. I make it sixteen. That's about 200 posts. No one here is a relativist regarding logic, no one a solopsist. "Moral realism" brings up 203,000 results on Google Scholar.
So please, what blind faith leads you to believe that if all moral views are objective, one can be shown to be better than the other?
And if that is not possible (as it evidently is not), then in what way do you imagine the fact that it is also not possible with moral relativism serves as an argument against it?
In your view morality is about sentiments? If so, I disagree if that’s all there is to it, and I can see how you would not have socialization as the consequent. I believe in rationalism if by “innate knowledge” one means instinct. I believe in empiricism if one believes that the blank slate is a really complex and convoluted matrix that experience “writes on”. Moral sentiments are more than just feelings, though. One has to learn what one is feeling about. One learns through experience that pain is bad. It may also be instinctual or at least partly? Socialization (reports from elders or peers) teaches us that hitting someone causes pain in them, and this is reinforced when someone hits us and we feel pain. We learn through experience (also part of the socialization process) what pain feels like. In this way, we learn that hitting people unprovoked is bad. Now, you might feel that hitting someone unprovoked is satisfying, but socialization (reports from elders and peers that it causes pain) and experience should tell you it is bad. If with this you still feel that hitting someone unprovoked is good, then you are simply mistaken about a moral truth. It has nothing to do with what makes you feel good. It has everything to do with living in a community and not causing harm where possible. One should not harm community members when we depend on the community for survival, wants, and needs. If one harmed a community member unprovoked, then one should expect to be harmed in return. This is neither good for the individual (pain sucks), nor is it good for the community. One harm can lead to two. Two harms can lead to three, etc. Usually, the loved ones feel through empathy the harm done to the harmed party. This can lead to further aggression, and soon large parts of the community are at strife. This is not good for individuals or the community (remember how individuals rely on the community for survival, wants, and needs) because cooperation soon breaks down and it becomes more difficult to survive and satisfy wants and needs. I would then conclude that harming someone unprovoked is morally wrong. “Objectively” wrong. Whatever “objective” really means.
I will say more if you have objections or questions.
You've got to be kidding me. "Popular," in context, is about admiration you'd say? The argument ad populum fallacy has something to do with liking or admiring the claim in question? lol
Isn't "frequently encountered or widely accepted" a common definition of "popular"?
Re shared meaning, for example, is your view that people are literally given meanings from others, kind of like you might hand a football to them, say, so that you share that same football with them?
Nice attempt to shift the goalposts from the original point in question, i.e. the inaptness of the term 'popular' as opposed to 'prevalent' in context and the difference in senses between the two words. @Janus originally used the term 'all but universal' and you switched that to 'popular' so you could use the argumentum ad populum to undermine his position. But that doesn't work because you misrepresent what he was saying by using an inapt synonym. 'Prevalence' and 'universality' share the meaning he intended whereas 'popular' muddies the waters. Deliberately.
So, I'll explain again in more detail, not so much for you, but for those actually interested in having a real conversation on the issue: What people tend to feel and do in terms of interpersonal behaviour cross-culturally, what's prevalent taking a holistic view, is constitutive of what's moral because it reflects commmonalities in the human condition unbeholden to the local, i.e. it's an appeal to the broadest level of intersubjectivity. Classifying as an argumentum ad populum the claim that that appeal to a broad level of intersubjectivity is evidential re morality by playing with the word 'prevalent' and turning it into 'popular', which has different implications, misses the mark. For example, that pain is generally felt as a bad thing is evidential of the general truth of the moral precept 'We ought not to inflict unnecessary pain', and that can't be effectively challenged by claiming we're only appealing to what people popularly believe concerning the feeling of pain (as if there was some kind of free choice involved). No. Pain in itself, its nature, its prevalence, and its effects, not popular notions concerning it, is what's morally salient here and moving away from that is misleading. Or at the very best, inapt. Which was the specific charge made, and that I'm supporting.
But then this type of wordplay is probably the only slim chance you have of getting any mileage of your utterly confused and self-contradictory position re morality where you've stated yourself you recognize pain and harm as salient, but only when it's inflicted physically, refuse to acknowledge all sense of degree re other forms of pain, refuse to offer any justification and then immunize yourself against any possibility of a rational challenge by claiming there's no recourse to reason possible and the only justification for moral claims is what we feel about them. Now that sequence of silliness is worthy of a lol. In short, you have zero of sense to offer on the subject and when that's pointed out you retreat into the usual nonsense, 'it's just an opinion' etc. That is literally all you've got.
Nice attempt to cover not understanding context.
Quoting Baden
This amounts to forwarding an argumentum ad populum. Basically, "It's the answer because it's popular."
Quoting Baden
Some sort of language expert you are when you're not even familiar with ""frequently encountered or widely accepted" as a definition of "popular."
Quoting Baden
Yeah, it can, because your argument, particularly in light of the word "truth," is simply an argumentum ad populum. You might not understand that, or maybe you do and you'll just deny in the vein of a political strategy, but that doesn't change the fact that it's an argumentum ad populum.
Quoting Baden
To not be an argumentum ad populum, the prevalence of pain, and either the mention of opinions about it, or an analysis of it in terms of preferences about it (a la "it's not pain if someone likes it"), can't be presented as if it has something to do with "pain is morally bad" being a "moral truth."
Quoting Baden
What is the P that I'm both asserting and denying?
Quoting Baden
Even when "physical" (in quotation marks because "as if anything is not physical"), I don't frame any moral stances simply on the notions of pain or harm.
Quoting Baden
Ultimately there can be no rational challenge for morality, as moral foundations can't be rationally derived.
Quoting Baden
Too bad you don't feel it's worth a counterargument that holds water and that isn't simply a bunch of posturing and attitude.
Quoting Baden
And here you don't even understand the most basic things I'm claiming. My metaethical views are not at all "just opinions." They're reporting the objective facts of what ethics/morality is.
Quoting Baden
*"Popularly believe" means "widely accepted". I've covered that. But you saying that pain is "popular" because it is "frequently encountered" will rightly result in people laughing in your face, and your language will be inapt. Do you get it yet?
This underscores your philosophical Achilles' heel. You formulate views based on popular belief, popular behavior. Conformity to the norm, to the status quo, is your arbiter.
Is pain popular?
Yes.
Maybe you should trying learning more than one sense of a term?
It doesn't matter if there's one sense that overlaps. Your language use is inapt. Do you know what I mean by 'inapt'? Check out the whole area of collocations concerning the apt use of language. For example, 'exhibit' and 'display' are synonyms when talking about something in a museum, but not when talking about computer screens. My computer screen is a 'display', but it would be inapt to call it an 'exhibit'.
Is my computer screen an exhibit?
So does argumentum ad populum refer to claims that people like or admire?
The expert on apt language usage thought that liking and admiring things might be what we're talking about in this context:
"Morality consists primarily in how people's judgements are borne out in action not how much people like or admire those judgements."
Here's another one. 'Heavy' and 'massive' are synonyms, but saying 'the rain is 'massive' today' rather than 'the rain is 'heavy' today' would be inapt.
"Morality consists primarily in how people's judgements are borne out in action not how much people like or admire those judgements."
When you use inapt / imprecise language you can infect your claim with meanings unintended, which was the point I intended to make and which you've proven rather comically with your claim that "pain is popular". In any case, I've tried to make things clear enough by elaborating:
Quoting Baden
So that's it in detail.
So the reason I don't usually write long posts, especially to particular people, is exemplified here. I addressed all of that, but you just ignored it.
If you’re a descriptive moral relativist, all your moral qualifiers are *is* statements, in the anthropological, re: objective, domain, which presupposes a cultural or social regimen. If you’re a normative relativist, your moral statements are *ought* statements, in the rational, re: subjective, domain, which has no cultural presuppositions.
Morality is not taught, it is self-determined. What is taught is the actionable requirements of individual members consistent with a given social structure. Morality is the personal justification as to whether or not to so act, the ground from which *ought* statements arise, under certain necessary conditions.
There are moral laws, and even if they replicate a particular civil code, their derivation and their consequences are completely different. The civil law from inter-subjective agreement the means with order and harmony its ends, the true moral law from a freely determinant autonomous will the means with conforming non-contradictory volitions its ends. Civil law makes no amends for tolerance at all; moral law permits tolerance in other rationalities but not of itself. All law integrates a consequence; the consequence of disobedience to civil law is inconvenience, the consequence of disobedience to moral law is shame.
Humans *desire* socialization, they do not *need* it, as witnessed by homesteaders or “mountain men” in 1800’s American western frontier, “ronin” of feudal Japan, and any kind of social outcast. To say that socialization is the cause of morality, or that morality is the consequence of socialization is not supported by either descriptive or normative moral relativism, nor any established meta-ethical moral theory. (That I know of)
Pain and pleasure are feelings, and no feeling is a cognition. All moral predicates are cognized, hence cannot be derived from feelings. But feelings are nonetheless inescapable for otherwise rational agents, so must be accounted for as a possible influence on moral dispositions, and determined as to whether or not it is possible to negate such influence by positing a greater influence. The only rational method for negating a feeling is with a principle, and a principle sufficient to negate a feeling absolutely must be undeniable, otherwise we can never justify our own morality. The principle in its turn, is predicated on the moral doctrine abiding in the agent, of his own choosing, all of which sustains the theory of moral rationalism.
Morality, one of two fundamental human conditions, the other being reason, can never be given from examples, which merely demonstrate what morality may or may not do, but not what it is.
Rhetorically speaking......
I'll get back to the rest of your earlier post later (after you answer whether you are going to persist in the mistake of insisting that language use such as "pain is popular" is apt. We won't even be able to communicate if that's how you insist on speaking).
Quoting S
You're right, there is an equivocation in step 4 of my argument between experientially bad and morally bad. Should have spotted that. I concede.
Good game.
Ciao. :)
No, I don’t think meaning is a thing. It’s a relation between the associated mental thought and the referent given how a word or symbol is used (I think).
Perhaps I will start having to give @S more credit. He’s good at philosophy.
To me that seems like you're positing something additional to what I posit. Because on my view the relation in question is a property of the "associated" mental event. In other words, the "associated" mental event and the relation in question are the same thing. So I have the mental event, the referent, and the behavior (how the word or symbol is used). And you have all of those things plus a relation that's apparently something more than those three whatever-you-want-to-call-thems (I'd say "things" but people often seem to use "thing" in a technical way)
Well, we should note that I’ve never actually studied or read anything on meaning.
No problem. It's a vast wonderland to get lost in once you go down the rabbit hole . . . as are most philosophical topics.
MORE COFFEE!!!!!!!!
Fo sho :smile:
My sole remaining vice. And the only one of all, I’d recommend, it’s only requisites being sufficient funds and proximity to a bathroom.
Well, if that’s your only vice, then you are a much more moral person than I am. I argue morality, but I don’t always follow it. I know what I should do. However, doing it is another matter.
Yeah, I guess I would agree my sense of morality has.....er, evolved.....since the 60’s. The “ought” becomes clearer when “fun” becomes “stupid”.
Is this a fact? Because I see morality as more than just a “personal” justification. It is a collective justification determined by social pressures as well.
Quoting Mww
This presupposes that people are not social creatures meant to cooperate in a society. I would argue that the outcasts or Ronin are deviants or have some sort of pathological illness.
Quoting Mww
Is this also a fact? Why should people care about morality if they do not feel the pain of morally wrong behavior?
Quoting Mww
This seems to me to be in contradiction to the previous quote. But maybe I misunderstand.
Quoting Mww
I was just illustrating how morality works, I think, not saying with the examples what it is.
I still do “stupid” shit.
Philosophy well done. As in all philosophy, subject to critique.
Brace yourself.
I agree. Good job.
Although you copied my quote directly, you misquoted me in what you wrote. I said "It involves a complex interaction of societal, governmental, religious, and cultural institutions." Do you really think you created your morality out of nothing but your own self? Your parents had nothing to do with it? Do you really believe you created your mind and heart without being influenced by the society and culture around you. To me, that shows a profound lack of self-awareness.
I do think, although I didn't mention it, that a lot of our morality does come from "human nature" whatever that means, I guess it means some sort of genetic predisposition, to behave in a way that makes it easier for us to live together. As I've said many times, we are social animals. We are born to like each other.
There are a number of problems here:
(1) You're treating "morality is relative" in the manner of "everything is relative." The two claims are not the same.
(2) "Relativism is relative" is redundant in one sense. Ontologically, if something is relative, then of course it's the case that ontologically the thing in question is relative.
(3) "Relativism is relative" could refer, on the other hand, to the belief of relativism being relative. And again, that's certainly the case, as there are people, like you, who believe that morality is not relative.
(4) People often say "Everything is relative" can't be true, because they see truth as necessarily being "absolute" and usually objective. Of course, not all truth theories have truth as absolute or objective. Part of the issue there is if we're conflating truth with facts. If we look at "Everything is relative" as being something like "the name of a fact," then there's only a problem if one insists that facts are some sort of real (objective) abstract. Otherwise, we're back to (2), and there's no issue with relative ontological things being relative. They wouldn't be relative ontological things otherwise.
Quoting tim wood
I'm not sure what that would be saying. For one, as you said above that part, "absolute" would need to be defined. That would help in figuring out what you're saying there.
You might just be asserting identity--A is A (from perspective x, at time T, etc.)
Thinking that relativists might be denying the above would be a straw man.
I unequivocally agree.
I'm not sure that anyone here has ever unequivocally agreed with me before. Let's see what @S has to say. He's a stubborn bastard.
Would you say that the Beatles created the White Album by themselves?
Quoting T Clark
That’s a shame.
Sure, but they didn't develop their musical tastes, knowledge, understanding, and vision by themselves. They heard all kinds of music all through their lives. They've acknowledged the influence other musicians have had. They used standard western chord structure and musical formulations. Their music was played on regular AM radio stations and they had to tailor their music to their listeners.
Right, but there's a manner in which it makes sense to say that the Beatles created the White Album themselves, rather than saying that what created it was a complex of societal, cultural, artistic, musical, etc. institutions, as if the complex of societal, cultural, etc. institutions should be getting the royalty/publishing/licensing payments.
The sense in which people (like me) say that individuals create morality is the same sense. We're not denying influences and such, but the influences aren't the same thing as the stuff we're saying that individuals create.
I don’t think he is saying that. That’s a straw man.
Even if it is, a collective presupposes individuals belonging to it. If morality applies to the collective, what applies to the individual.
—————————-
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
People should care about morality only insofar as they care about the conditions which make it possible to even have those feelings to begin with. If feelings come after the behavior, then feelings cannot be causality for them.
——————————
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
Feelings are part of our natural human composition; principles we dream up on our own. They do not contradict themselves on that account.
——————————
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
You must be tired. The only way to illustrate is with examples. Theorizing, hypothesizing, or just claiming, how morality works doesn’t require examples, although examples can make the theory or claims clearer after its exposition. One can illustrate moral behavior, but moral behavior says nothing about how the behavior becomes morally authorized.
Point/counterpoint. Nothing more, nothing less. No right/wrong, good/bad intended.
You mean that he was saying in conjunction with individuals? Yeah, I meant that. I wasn't being that persnicketty about the wording there, I was just more or less copying the way he phrased it. The point is that we don't say that society, earlier musicians, etc. were just as much the creators of the White Album as the Beatles were.
That's the same sense in which folks like me are saying that individuals create morality. We're not denying social influence. But social influence isn't the same thing. Just like musical influence isn't the same thing as any particular tune/piece on the White Album.
Okay. I appreciate your viewpoint even if I don’t totally agree with it. I am tired, and I probably shouldn’t be posting right now. I think I will just let it stand there. :smile:
But doesn’t that suppose by the regression of causality that the Beatles created themselves? I’m not saying that society should also be paid for the album, but what does that say about morality?
? No. You mean to tell me that you don't understand what people are referring to when they say that "the Beatles created the White Album"? Hopefully when people say that you understand at least roughly just what they're saying the Beatles did and didn't do, and you don't respond with, "By regression of causality the Beatles created themselves" or "The Beatles didn't create the White Album. It was actually a complex of societal, cultural, musical, etc. institutions interacting with the Beatles that created it."
I understand what that means, and I agree with it in the conventional sense. But in a metaphysical sense? Never mind. It doesn’t matter much.
I don't think you "create" morality. I think you make moral decisions based on a complex set of social and personal psychological factors.
This is just semantics, but "amoral" really is not the right word. What you're saying is that there's no absolute and universal objective moral truth (the kind of objective truth that must apply in all cases), you're not saying that "there are things which are apart from morality" (which is the etymological meaning). I get how you're using the term, but it's stupendously misleading:
Rocks are "amoral", but FGM is a human practice which presumably nearly always concerns operant moral values on the part of humans. Under the definition of morality as a strategy or set of strategies, FGM would indeed fall within the realm of morality. The practice itself is amoral in the sense that it is not sentient (like rocks) but we don't usually anthropomorphize things in that way. When I frame the issue of FGM as an inherently moral question, what I'm saying is that it concerns our starting moral values, and can therefore is subject to whichever moral calculus. In every possible case of FGM I can imagine, values-considerations are a part of the decision making process, which is why the "amoral" descriptor fails in practice. If FGM didn't have anything to do with human values, then it might make sense to call it amoral (like flying kites or jogging), but in practice it always does.
Maybe I'm not a subjectivist-relativist after-all, I'm a full-blown moral pragmatist. "Ultimate moral truth" is incoherent from the get go because moral truth can only come into existence in physically realized circumstances where strategy conforms to extant moral values and the situation it is to be employed in. Just as there is no "best" strategy in Chess, different circumstances may alter the specific action required to bring about the desired outcome. "Moral truth", under this view, only exists as moral frameworks pragmatically serve human values, where more pragmatic frameworks are considered better.
I guess I'm refusing to even begin to use the language of moral objectivism (by assenting to the phrase that everything is amoral, which rebukes it). In the exact same way people misunderstand the "objectivity" of the scientific method (they equivocate scientific knowledge with objective certainty), people misunderstand the objectivity of moral strategies in general, and in specific cases of its application.
Quoting S
The example simplifies the structure of moral truth in practice. The wider question is "in what sense can moral decisions be 'true' or 'objective'". The answer is in whether or not they conform to values and circumstance; this is how we improve our existing moral decisions, and but for mutually exclusive values, this is how we actually reach moral propositions that in practice "no one is going to disagree with": the objectivity of empiricism.
Quoting S
If we agree on a specific meta-ethical definition, morality is not subjective (though in the case of our definition, moral "values" are subjective). Reason and evidence can sometimes do nothing to sway values where subjective feelings dominate, but feelings about "how best to achieve those values" can be factually inaccurate.
I've said this many times before, but humans share a set of fundamental values that are nearly universal to all of us. Most of our moral thinking is concerned with how to mutually serve these basic values in a complex environment. Take socialized healthcare for instance. It might be objectively true that it would greatly benefit the U.S (given the strength of examples set by other nations). We all want to be healthy, just like we want dental health, but there is severe disagreement about how to best achieve the desired end result. Appeals to feelings have no place in the debate about private vs public healthcare systems, which for America is one of the most important moral questions they face.
Setting our disagreement about specific social issues aside for a moment, you're misinterpreting the point I'm making. By "in fact" I meant that there is actually an objective truth pertaining to empirical claims, I never said we can or must always have direct access to that objective truth. What I'm trying to say is that we should, with objectivity, try our best to approximate objective truths (akin to science, not "exactly science" (which is incoherent)), because they help us make more effective decisions.
I only used the examples I did because I thought they would not garner evidence-based resistance (in other words, I thought that the superior values-serving answers to these questions are obvious enough, or, that we are able to gather sufficient data on the matter). You went out of your way to explain why parents might be ignorant of vaccine related statistics and why they might be extorted into carrying out FGM, but you did not make any good argument as to why FGM as a practice could actually net any individual benefit (beyond not suffering from extortion) or why we cannot be reasonably informed by evidence as to whether or not taking vaccines is beneficial to health, and therefore a superior decision. You explained why individuals are forced into perpetuating FGM as a practice (a utility based argument) but you did not defend the utility based argument wielded by those who actually do the extortion. You explained why anti-vax parents can be filled with doubt, but you did not enter into an evidence based debate about the empirical question (good empirical evidence is the best way to convince an anti-vax parent who believes vaccines are harmful to health to believe otherwise; this is where feelings matter less than evidence, reason, and the "truth" they seek to help us approximate). Furthermore, you are conflating my condemnation of FGM as the direct assigning of moral guilt upon individuals who are involved in its perpetuation (and unnecessarily opening up a tangential discussion about whether or not I'm morally/racially insensitive). Personally I think the idea of absolute moral guilt is incoherent (per tentative determinism/lack of hard free will), and that only pragmatic moral guilt is relevant. Pragmatic moral guilt is basically where we intervene to remedy the moral problem. Intervening in the actions of the extorted parents with arguments or force won't do anything (they will be unpersuaded or punished by the community as a result), but by intervening with arguments against the supporting empirical beliefs of the broader community (e.g: that it is healthy for women and society) we CAN actually make a difference.
Put yourself in the shoes of somebody who believes FGM is good for practical utility reasons (the person who would extort others into doing it). Are you incapable of being persuaded by empirical evidence? How can you say it's merely "subjectively true" that FGM (as a practice, not as an individually extorted act) serves the values of human and social health, when we both know that there is an objective truth to the matter? Yes people have perspective, bias, and ignorance, but if we cannot mitigate their effects through reason and evidence, this whole "philosophy" thing is a big waste of time.
Quoting Isaac
No, in order for a parent to feel confident that it is morally right, they need to have those things. It is either morally right, or wrong, per the given values, regardless of how they feel about it.
Re: my faith in scientific consensus. I'm a student of many things, and I have seen so much evidence pertaining to the issues I've mentioned that my trust doesn't spring from faith, which might better frame the point I'm trying to make with these examples. Sacrificing virgins to increase crop yields might be a better example. As a strategy to maximize utility, it absolutely sucks (unless you're performing an inconsiderate calculus, where fewer people means greater shares (which is ostensibly amoral, or more specifically, a breakdown of morality)). It's almost certainly true that sacrificing virgins doesn't have any direct causal relationship with crop yields (maybe it causes farmers to work harder to ensure that their lives aren't wasted, but any placebo could achieve that). Your objection will be that I don't know whether or not gods exist, and that's true, but the probability of a deity intervening on the basis of prayer or sacrifice is so low from an empirical stand-point that we can say with approximate certainty the proposition is false (at the very least, evidence and reason persuade the reasonable away from the proposition).
Rational arguments very well might make zero difference, but whether or not we are able to recognize and accept them does make a difference (because the external reasons-centric "objective" worldis the way it is, not the way we want or believe it to be. Ultimately we learn this by experience.
To answer your question about when rational argument has made a difference, just look around you. Notice the absence of hay, of candle-light, of the distinct smell of manure, human shit, and body-odor. Notice the many medical institutions that surround and serve you, without which you might be a lot worse off than you are now. Notice your legal rights which we do our best to protect; maybe there is a ginger jester in the hot seat, but notice how it's just a seat and not a gilded throne that claims to own you. Notice the moral progress that the west has made in such a relatively recent period since the enlightenment era; how society is no longer fundamentally driven by superstitious religious beliefs, and how much better off we are for it all.
Collective thought turns very slowly, but it is inexorably turned by an accumulation individual arguments, and it turns more accurately when more of our arguments are rational and evidence based.
Quoting Isaac
To be specific, I'm saying that either FGM as a practice does benefit individual and social health, or it doesn't; that either its proponents or their antipodes are "objectively wrong". Again, I chose the example because I thought the answer was as obvious as not gouging your own eyes is useful for retaining your eyesight.
Quoting Isaac
Does it matter if I'm attacking a practice and not a person? It's not as if I'm trying to establish legal culpability by arguing that any reasonable person ought to know better (I'm well aware of how circumstance and inaccess to information can warp perspective).
Do you at least assent to the statement: "gouging our own eyes out is an objectively morally inferior course of action IF retaining our eyesight is of moral value"? (need I flesh out that specific argument?).
Quoting Isaac
I know it seems strange, and it is: It's essentially a part of my meta-ethical framework states that rationally persuasive arguments are more useful (and that rationally persuasive arguments are more reliably accurate). If we're after a pragmatic moral framework (one that effectively serves the values that matter to us), then being persuasive to others actually becomes a derivative measure of its overall utility (and happens to represent a major component of how moral frameworks are naturally selected in the first place).
I'm not actually asking you to change your beliefs, all you really need to do is alter the language of your moral framework. To better persuade someone to assent to your moral views (to stop promoting FGM, for instance) you cannot approach them with language like "however you feel about it defines for you what is morally right, so who am I to insinuate that FGM is an immoral action?". You should be able to tell them that FGM is a morally inferior practice per the values of human and social health even if you're not absolutely certain. Reasonable certainty is certainty enough, and when the stakes are very high we're forced to scramble for the best and most rational evidence/arguments/conclusions we can find (the nature of all dilemmas) If you do believe that FGM does not effectively serve its purported values, how little epistemic respect must you have for your own beliefs/understanding that you object to its moral condemnation on epistemic grounds? The more epistemic doubt you cast on our ability to understand that FGM is harmful to given moral values, the more room you make for it as a morally acceptable/tolerable practice, and that's the over-skeptical mistake I'm challenging. If you are trying to say that FGM isn't actually perpetuated because people believe it has utility, I would understand, but in practice it IS perpetuated because of widespread belief in its utility. Convincing a group of people to change has to start somewhere.
If your moral framework doesn't help you to realize your values in the world because it lacks the form required to act persuasively on others, then for the sake of what matters to you, learn the common moral tongue. You don't need to compromise your values or specific moral beliefs to forgo the "all moral truth is subjective" rigamarole. We already live in a world dominated by compatible or aligned fundamental values; by focusing on the ontological nature of moral values as subjective (something that is indeed not obvious to everyone), instead of trying to work directly with and on our existing compatible values or the empirical arguments concerning how to serve them, you're just subverting the overall persuasive power of your subsequent arguments. If there is moral truth out there at all to be had, relative to our subjective values though it may be, we need to have an objective discussion about which methods are better than others (and how we should order and consider our own values and the values of others). Once foolish mysticism is eliminated from our moral debates (a largely separate labor to most moral suasion), we're in fact left with a rather straightforward series of propositions. We have moral values, we have an uncertain future, and we have more and less reliable predictive models which indicate "moral" courses of action. FGM isn't your typical calculus, but supporting it does amount to a prediction, an inevitably empirical claim, about how well it serves given values. We might have limited ability to solve these kinds of questions given their complexity, but in many cases we have more than adequate predictive power (I think in the case of FGM you also agree).
Quoting Isaac
My point was that specific virtue ethics are causally selected for their utility, over any time-span. The longer the time-span the more opportunity there is for specific "virtues" which promote long-term utility to evolve. This is following a different kind of meta-ethical viewpoint: a proponent of virtue ethics might use how they feel immediately about their actions as a guide for decision making, but because they have evolved over given periods of time, how they happen to feel actually tends to correlate with the future utility that their decisions generate. (I.E: at some point we moved away from "eye-for-an-eye" to "do unto others as they would do unto you" because as principles of virtue or deontological codes the latter is more useful). We are emotionally repulsed by death and senseless violence (especially to the innocent) because biological and cultural evolution has deemed it useful, and it has necessary ramifications on any moral framework, including virtue ethics.
[i]"Exactly. And you think it's obvious enough that one should vaccinate their child, and you think it's obvious enough that we should brush our teeth, and you think it's obvious enough...
The trouble is, other people disagree, and they do so with perfectly rational arguments of greater or lesser strength"[/i]
Do you see the contradiction in the bolded text? Maybe I'm reading into a colloquial use of the word "perfectly", but it seems like you're undermining the idea that rational arguments can have greater and lesser strength.
Quoting Isaac
I get that you have trust issues with government and the pharmaceutical industry, I do too, but the alleged risks of taking "proven" vaccines (vaccine formulas for which there is ample clinical trial data, real world data, and statistical analysis showing the decline of related diseases) are really quite overblown. I'm aware that it's a complicated subject, and I fully understand why people have their doubts, but it's a question that has been asked and answered by the field of medical science at large. It's like climate change due to the greenhouse effect; hard to understand because of the complex physics, and easy to doubt because of widespread misinformation and a lack of physics understanding.
When confronted with either a climate change denier, an anti-vaxer, or an FGM supporter, I will try to dissuade them by introducing them to evidence and rational arguments, thereby generating positive moral ramifications. Under your approach, we linger in moral and epistemic agnosticism with the assumptions that the evidence is too hard to come by and that rationally interpreting it is too difficult.
Quoting Isaac
I'm not appealing to science as absolute, I'm appealing to science as better or the best we have (and not all science is equal; to know how confident we should be in a given "scientific" truth, we need to be introduced to the specific "science" that underlies it, else our faith in it amounts to black-box induction). The good news is, good science trends toward more and more reliable truth, just as better reasoning, more evidence, and more comprehensive analysis trend toward more reliable conclusions, which is why I'm so stoked to make them a part of moral discussion, debate, and frameworks.
Well, but in the metaphysical sense, the point is that the music you're hearing on the album is a creation of the Beatles and not simply something they're a conduit for, where the identical thing existed outside of them or prior to them. That's not to say, of course, that they didn't have lots of musical influences (and some pieces on the album are pretty clearly kind of a variation on something else, like "Revolution 9" being very similar to John Cage's Rozart Mix), but in a very literal sense, they're creating that music rather than something else creating it.
You're creating it for yourself in the sense of you making the judgments or decisions. Morality is those judgments. You can't literally receive them from elsewhere.
I don't understand this response, unfortunately, especially in context.
Quoting tim wood
If it's individual judgments it's going to be relative to the individual making the judgment.
Quoting tim wood
I've posted my truth theory here a handful of times over the years:
‘P’ is true for S iff S judges ‘P’ to have relation R to either S’s phenomenal P, and/or S’s stock of previously adjudged true propositions, depending on the relation R. Relation R is whatever truth theory relation S feels is the appropriate one(s)—correspondence, coherence, consensus, pragmatic, etc.
So in other words, what it is for some proposition, 'P' (quotation marks denoting the proposition literally as a sentence), to be true to some individual, some S, is for the proposition to have the relation R to S's phenomenal P (their phenomenal perception etc. of some state of affairs) or their stock of previously adjudged true propositions, in S's judgment.
That's all that truth value is.
The point is the moral significance is distinct from our act of judgement.
It works much the same way as our accounts of empirical objects. Every time we observe a state of the world, we are making a judgement. We judge what we are looking at, how it relates to other things, etc. to from our description or theory of what's occurring.
Yet, our judgment is not the things we are talking about. The tree isn't in my backyard because I make the judgment its present. My judgments about it are just reporting something else (i.e. not my judgement) present in itself (the object of tree).
Morality is posited in the same way. When we encounter it, we are always engaged in a judgment (our experience of what is valuable, moral,. etc.), but that judgment is not how the morality true. Like the tree in my backyard, the moral significance is an independent thing my judgement is reporting.
Just as with "opinion," there are different senses of "judgment," and you're conflating them.
At any rate, we can just ignore that and pretend they're the same sense of the term. So what's any evidence of something extramental matching a moral judgment?
But they aren't different.
When we make an empirical observation, all the external evidence is only given if our judgements are correct. If the phenomena I point at isn't actually a tree, then it doesn't matter how much a scream about the presence of a tree in my experience, I will be mistaken. We make judgments to form our accounts of external evidence.
I am not deriving these judgements from an external thing or evidence.
I cannot use the appearance of an empirical object in my experience to ground this judgements about what it is and how it relates to other things. I only have "external evidence" for it if these judgements are correct.
External evidence allows me to show the presence of something only if I understand it, only if my initial judgements about it and its relations are correct. Without those, I don't have any account of what something is or what I would encounter if it were present.
We can further show the issue by examining this question. Anything I encounter in my experience, by virtue of being my mental state, is mental insofar as it is my judgment.
We can ask exactly the same question of our empirical accounts: where is the external evidence that there is anything extramental matching my judgement of the treeing my backyard? All I have is my experience, my mental judgement, a tree is present. Are we to take this as a reason to conclude there is nothing extramental?
@Baden already answered your last question to me, and clearly and eloquently said pretty much what i would have said, so i won't go over that again. Of course you didn't take that on board, and I have no doubt the same will happen in regard to what I have written here; any sophistry will do apparently for you to avoid admitting that your position is explanatorily inept.
Everyone has one. The nuance will vary accordingly.
I would agree with this much, but then, in finding common ground on this we've reduced your claim to something trivially true "finding facts out about the world helps you achieve your goals". True, but who wouldn't agree with that?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I thought I had. I precse them again. I don't know why FGM came about, but I find it unlikely that it was a result of a cabal of child molesters, who the rest of the community had mysteriously put in charge, coming up with a new way of mindlessly injuring innocent children. So I simply presume they had a reason. By what I know it's an aboniable practice, the difference is, I'm prepared to accept that I don't know all the facts. Vaccination has the additional problem that I never can have all the fact, not even a small proportion of them. Every single piece of information I have on the matter comes from sources I have good reason to doubt. I literally listed all the reasons why we "cannot be reasonably informed by evidence", but to save me listed them again, I could summarise them as - we cannot access the evidence we actually need.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No, that comes from the fact that every example you picked paints non-westerners (or detractors) as stupid and/or immoral. Any reason you didn't pick someone driving a 4 litre car (which objectively hastens damaging climate change). An arms dealer making a profit out of warmongering (which objectively causes thousands to suffer). A banker whose risky investments cause thousands to lose their jobs (objectively making their lives harder). No, you picked examples where modern Western civilisation has some moral superiority to claim over non-westerners. Maybe you didn't even realise you were doing it, but from the middle of a culture whose everyday activities are literally damaging the future of humanity, the fact that you looked further than just out of the window for your examples of objective, scientifically proven moral wrongs is telling.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
So you have personally conducted research? Looked at the actual data set for the trials of the latest vaccine? Personally checked the records on which the epidemiological data is based? Because if not, then your trust in the people delivering you this information is faith.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Yes. Which is why no one sacrifices virgins anymore (or at least does not do so to increase crop yields). Because broadly everyone agrees that it doesn't work. Hopefully, with some good luck and sensitive influencing, we'll be in a place where no one thinks FGM is in their culture's best interests too (things certainly seem to be heading that way). This is a constant refrain from the moral absolutist - "but isn't boiling babies obviously wrong", "isn't it obviously wrong to gouge one's eyes out", isn't it obviously wrong to sacrifice virgins". No one is dealing with those moral questions. We're dealing with much harder ones where the facts of the case or the complex social/political circumstances make the way forward difficult to see. It doesn't help to come along claiming to have the answer like it was a maths sum.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
And here we go again with the tiresome flag-waving for Western civilisation. Have you noticed the continued reliance on fossil fuel despite the fact that scientific consensus is that it is destructive to our society? Have you noticed that micro-plastics are now in every environment in the world and the scientific consensus is that they could be harmful? Have you noticed that careers continue to become more stressful despite the fact that the World Health Organisation consider stress to be a major factor in 80% of all disease? Any of that sound particularly rational?
We've got where we are because of a series of improvements whose short-term benefits could be directly seen and whose long-term consequences were barely given a moment's thought. That's not rational argument, that's seeing money in the minefield and going to pick it up and hang the consequences.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
No, this goes back to what I said above about certainty. I completely agree that rational arguments have greater or lesser strength (for those who have already agreed to use rationality as a thinking tool). But I strongly disagree with the granularity, the exactness, you claim is possible when such arguments become complex. My position can be summed up as;
Given the complexity of the physical and social environment in which decisions have to be made, the vast majority of calculations can only be assessed so broadly that we end up with a very large group of options for all of which the most we can say is "yes, that broadly makes sense".
Your argument is like claiming to judge which is the higher mountain to the micrometer without any measuring equipment. We can all see the difference between a mountain and a hill, but from there it's just guesswork as to which is tallest.
Of course not. I'm not denying any outside influence whatsoever. I'm rejecting any suggestion that factors such as the prevalent religion in my society are a primary determinant in my morality. They're simply not. And I know that better than you or anyone else, because I know myself better than you or anyone else. My morality is, as I say, determined primarily by my moral feelings, and [i]not[/I] those of society, or of the Tory government, or of the Anglican Church. I am not a sheep, I am an individual.
And it's [I]"parent"[/I] - singular. My biological father hasn't earned that title. He deserted me before I was even born and has played no role in my life. He certainly didn't play the role of a sort of "moral tutor".
Quoting T Clark
Yes, we are animals: humans. And we don't have to resort to the mindset of sheep. We don't have to give herd morality pride of place.
Yeah, they are. And just in the same way. One refers to making an evaluation--stating how you feel about something, whether you like or dislike it, whether you prefer one thing to another, etc.
The other amounts to trying to get right, via stating a proposition, some state of affairs.
I'll leave it at that for the moment.
Ah, re "creation." Why would creation be any more of an issue there than it is for music or the other arts?
That's because you probably have an incorrect ontology of meaning, too. You're thinking that someone says to you, "Murder is wrong," for example, and you're simply for it, against it or indifferent to it at that point. But that's not how it works.
You have to understand the sounds you hear or text marks you read first. That involves doing something unique in your own brain. Part of that involves meaning assignments, which is also doing something unique in your own brain. These unique things do involve original syntheses. Then, in order for you to have a moral stance on anything, you have to make a judgment about it, a la making an evaluation--stating how you feel about something, whether you like or dislike it, whether you prefer one thing to another, etc. Otherwise it's not a moral stance for you at all.
That's still missing the point. :eyes:
It can be the case that not [i]everything[/I] is relative, yet morality [I]is[/I].
Right. What was his response there anyway? I didn't understand what he wrote.
Actually, in hindsight, I think I might have misinterpreted what he meant there. But if so, it was badly worded. Given the rest of his post, which I've just briefly gone over, it seems he might have meant that not everything [I]about morality[/I] is relative. But then, that still misses the point. And it is different from what he was claiming before, where he clearly confused moral relativism for relativism simpliciter, which he has been rightly called out for doing.
It is easy to miss the point if you don't understand what it is that a moral relativist is actually claiming. I for one am only suggesting that morality is relative in the relevant sense which I've explained in this discussion. I'm not suggesting that every single aspect relating to morality must be relative to something in some way. I'm not, for example, suggesting that rocks are relative, whatever that means, just because the judgement that it is immoral to throw rocks at people is obviously relative.
It isn't helpful that a number of people in this discussion do not have a good understanding of moral relativism, yet they nevertheless think that they're somehow qualified to criticise it.
Morality, unlike rocks, only makes sense if you apply an interpretation inline with moral relativism. The interpretation of moral absolutism only [i]appears[/I] to make sense [i]on the surface[/I], but it crumbles under analysis. No one has succeeded in [i]reasonably[/I] demonstrating the supposed existence of any objective or absolute morality. Instead, predictably, we just get dogmatism and bad logic. Even if this discussion were to continue over another twenty pages, my prediction is that that would still be all that we get from them.
Cocaine?
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
:rofl:
You would probably agree that the sea is the sky, so long as whoever said that said it in disagreement with me.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Exactly.
FGM is amoral [I]except[/I] in the sense of moral relativism. So you either agree with me about moral relativism, or you're saying something false about FGM.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You still don't seem to realise that what you're doing is lose-lose.
You either describe something subjective, like my values, in which case we agree, even though at times you seem to act as though we don't. This would just be to preach to the choir.
Or you describe something objective, but which lacks meta-ethical relevance. Comments of the sort about brushing your teeth are not in themselves meta-ethically relevant. You only make them relevant because of your own moral evaluation, which again is subjective. It is not correct to confuse [i]that[/I] for objectivity, and it is not correct to confuse objectivity which [i]lacks[/I] meta-ethical relevance for objectivity which [i]is of[/I] meta-ethical relevance.
That our decisions are explainable in terms of our values, and that they are either in our interest or not in our interest, does not in itself say anything meta-ethically relevant. Do you understand what meta-ethics is about, and what it is not about? It is not simply about values, it is not simply about what's useful to us, it is not simply about what is or isn't in our interest. It is about morality. You need an additional connection, and you can only do that subjectively. Nothing is moral or immoral in itself. That makes no sense.
You must not have properly read what you just quoted me saying. Look again. I said that it can be the case that [i]not[/I] everything is relative, yet morality is relative.
That's why your point misses the point. You need to argue specifically against moral relativism.
I hope you get this, because it is basic level logic.
Quoting tim wood
That's clearly an argument from ignorance, which is a fallacy.
And I feel just as strongly about murder as you do, so don't even try to suggest otherwise. But that still doesn't make it a moral absolute in a meta-ethical sense. On the contrary, it suggests moral relativism.
But you haven't explained how murder is an absolute wrong yet, you just declared it to be the case. Why are you asking @S to explain how murder isn't an absolute wrong for his argument, but you don't see it necessary to explain how it is for yours?
I'll answer that: because he's illogical and because his position is untenable.
Good points.
But it's just such a cliché of a bad argument. "X is the case, now you prove it isn't otherwise I've won"
Ah, Jeez Rick. I already said you are good at philosophy.
An emphasis on individual action and decision making and rejection of societal, especially religious, influence is your wont. I think that approach is unrealistic, but I don't see any chance of changing your mind. What I do like about the individualistic approach is it's focus on individual responsibility for one's actions. I certainly would never claim that societal influences are all that matter.
The moral significance is a proposition or a status claimed in a truth context. A world where an action is moral is different to one in which it is not. Which is in turn different from a world without normative significance. In posing these concepts, we are trying to get something right.
These are concepts about the relations of normative meanings. They aren't "just what someone likes" any more than our sun is "just something we think is there."
Murder committed by someone who thinks it is all right.
To qualify - your question doesn't actually make any sense, I've tried to parse it in as best a way as I can as something like "what circumstance could someone use the expression 'this murder was not wrong'".
Otherwise you're asking me to presume absolutism within your question because without doing so, the idea that I have to accept some murders are OK does not make sense.
So again, the challenge to you would be to present any evidence whatsoever of moral stances, normative stances, etc. being anything other than preferences that people have about interpersonal behavior.
Nothing is absolutely right or wrong. Things are relatively right or wrong, and one of the things that's relative to is individuals. (It's also relative to time, context, and other things, depending on the individual in question).
So as mentioned above, murder isn't wrong to someone who has the opinion that it's not wrong.
Because moral stances are only opinions that individuals have, that makes any particular moral stance not absolute.
Yes. If my position were that some murder was all right, then the kind of murder that might be would be murder committed by someone who thought it was all right. I'm not sure what more we could ask of someone committing a murder that was all right. Do you understand what moral relativism is? It doesn't mean that I think everyone else's behaviour is right. It means I think what I think about it. They think something different.
I just meant that was the one example where we can come close to blaming it 100% on one party. Even that situation had additional factors.
I can comfortably say that no war ever fought NEEDED to be fought. But that is far different than claiming them to be objectively morally wrong. Are the defenders as culpable as the attackers? Did everyone involved even have a choice? What if the attackers are fighting against an injustice (perceived or real)?
How very humble of you.
If someone offered to cut off your daughters clitoris, would you be interested to know about the boons and benefits she would receive as a result?
FGM isn't unique to any one ethnicity, nor is it a culturally dominant practice in any of the major ethnic categories. I can't possibly be attacking non-westerners specifically because it's not a western/non-western distinction. It is a practice with varying prevalence across some parts of north Africa, some Middle Eastern countries, one South American country, and a few Asian countries.
As I revealed to you before, It is practiced out in the world for a myriad of confused reasons ranging from "because the elders demand it", to "it will benefit their health and correct their behavior". In some cases they literally have no record or recollection of why they ever began doing it (they might as well be doing it for aesthetic reasons alone). You don't know all the facts, but at what point do the facts you do know become sufficient? (for instance, the fact that female circumcision is painful, dangerous, performed on a child incapable of giving consent (and who usually resists), and limits their ability to have a gratifying sex life as an adult).
What more data are you waiting for? Do you think it slows the spread of STI's or something? That victims of genital mutilation are made more subservient to their future husbands, which justifies the initial harm? Is it that we have to respect a parent's right to decide how and why to raise their children, because a parent knows best?
Give me something that will help me understand why you're not willing to condemn the practice of FGM as immoral. I get the "amorality à la -S" angle, but given that we're discussing FGM in the moral context of agreed upon values (individual health and social health), from our perspective, why can you not morally condemn FGM?
Quoting Isaac
The anti-vax movement is a western movement led by mostly middle aged stupid white people whose actions are immoral (their race, age, and nationality doesn't matter to me, it is merely happenstance). (I thought that went without saying). The first example I brought up was vaccines, which you rejected, so I moved on to FGM because I thought you wouldn't deign to question our ability to know whether or not is is a harmful practice. (After that I moved on to eye gouging and human sacrifice, where you finally caved).
Your attempt to portray me as racist (or what? fantastically arrogant? I think I'm better than everyone else or that I'm morally flawless?) is quite unreasonable, which makes me wonder whether or not you are arguing from emotion instead of reason. Perhaps you feel that it is too mean for me to condemn the culturally significant practice of FGM, because what does that say about the human beings who practice it? So you've convinced yourself I must be even more than arrogant... (I guess this is my fault for thinking that condemning the mutilation of a child's genitals is an "enlightened" thing to do. By using that one contentious word, I showed my entirely racist hand). It's a good thing I didn't bother condemning MGM as well, else I'd also be an anti-semite! (Did you know hundreds of male babies die every year due to circumcision related complications?)
I might be wrong about vaccines and FGM, that's true, but in so far as my detractors share my starting values, and in so far as they have no evidence/reasoning showing the utility of their moral decisions which I show (with evidence/reasoning) to be harmful (contain anti-utility), I get to carry on as if I'm right, even to the point of arrogance, until someone offers be better evidence and/or better reasoning. I'm not interested in being absolutely right, I'm interested in being usefully right. In the case of FGM all the good evidence points in one direction.
Quoting Isaac This clearly factually inaccurate. My original example was against anti-vax parents. Please discontinue this disingenuous line of attack, else I'll turn up the petty psycho-analysis in kind.
Quoting Isaac
How in the world could you ever expect me to guess that you understand (or "trust"?) climate science if you don't even trust the statistics showing the boons of proven vaccines (or if you think it's too complicated for most people to learn about)?
Something is very backwards here... Climate change is more controversial than vaccines. I avoided climate change specifically because of the enduring denial that comes out of conservative camps (which would despoil the context of my example, much as your anti-vax and pro-FGM (pseudo)rhetoric has achieved). If you want to take this particular tangent in an anti-modernity, anti-western, anti-industrial, or even anti-enlightenment direction, that's perfectly fine, but you'll have to clarify the point you wish to make. Are you saying that modernity/industry isn't worthwhile given the effects we've had, and will continue to have, on the climate?
Quoting Isaac
A careful read of my posts will reveal that I've only ever lauded the benefits of "proven" vaccines, which means vaccines that have undergone clinical trials. When it comes to vaccines that have been in widespread use for long periods of time, we have real world experience to go by (data gathering and statistical analysis has to be trusted on some level, but it can also be "tested" through repetition, which mitigates our need for faith based trust).
The specific science of vaccines is well beyond me, but the science of statistical analysis is not, which indicates with overwhelming strength that those well-known vaccines we use to fight once common and deadly diseases actually work.
Quoting Isaac
Framing it closer to a maths sum is probably more usefully persuasive (for change) than framing it closer to a sacred cultural artifact which we would be racist to condemn. In any case, I'm saying we can use evidence and reason to rationally appeal to their existing values as a means of persuasion. I don't have any grand illusions that everyone can easily be persuaded; I'm just identifying what I believe is the most effective vector of persuasion.
Quoting Isaac
I don't exactly see why I should have to defend the whole of western society. I'm happy with the goal posts at "better off now than we were before". We have new problems, but that's life; we solve one problem and it creates a new one or a new one just emerges on its own. Relatively speaking we're better off than before by almost every measurable metric (lifespan, health, comforts). Maybe the west will bring about the destruction of all humans, but until that happens we're in the utilitarian black.
Quoting Isaac
I get what you're saying, but I don't agree it reasonably applies to FGM and vaccines. From where I stand, they're both clearly foothills, and I can even see/fathom why the crowds gathered at their base mistake them for a high peak.
Asking "what should we do" in the context of all possible actions is overwhelming. But in comparing just two specific actions, or even comparing one action against its negation, we can still make useful relative statements about "superior and inferior decisions". It is far easier to say (to persuade) that something is morally superior than to say it is morally obligatory, (positive moral obligation might be incoherent) because we would have to establish that one particular action has a higher utility than all other possible actions, but often times we can quite confidently say that something is immoral (morally inferior), because all we need to do is show that not doing it has higher relative utility than doing it.
It's not that i think non FGM and being pro-vaccine are of extraordinary utility; I think that FGM and intentionally avoiding vaccines are direct or sufficiently proximate sources of harm, which directly controverts our fundamental moral values.
Are you talking about the practice/concept of FGM or the act of FGM? I'm not following why we need relativism to escape the amoral descriptor. I thought what is or isn't amoral was a meta-ethical distinction.
Quoting S
It's my meta-ethical definition which describes in what way moral decisions can be objective, relative to values.
I'm eschewing subjective feelings about what morality is from a meta-ethical standpoint (by defining it as values serving strategies) so that we can have a consistent/objective discussion about how to compare and evaluate competing moral decisions or frameworks. It can't just be subjective feelings all the way up and all the way down; reality needs to be inserted somewhere.
If I've given you the impression I'm defending any sort of meta-ethical absolutism then I have miscommunicated. I am however, though not overtly, defending a kind of meta-meta-ethical distinction that I don't yet have the right language for: ethical frameworks are all in service of some sort of value, but predominantly they are arranged to serve a certain range of nearly universal human values, and they continuously adapt toward more optimal values-service. The broad "convergence" of moral decision making which is oriented toward the same ends induces us toward the idea that some ethical and meta-ethical frameworks are more universally applicable than others; it implies that there are some moral frameworks that will be more agreeable and persuasive to our moral decisions and intuitions at large. Broadly speaking, ethical frameworks which account for methods, costs, and results (empirical matters) tend to be the most widespread and communicable. Reason based moral arguments might not always persuade individual proponents of X, Y, or Z moral framework, but they have stuck around because they're objectively effective at promoting human welfare per our environments, and they transmit well because they are based in shareable empirical fact-checking behavior rather than subjective whim.
Your meta-ethical definition focuses on the very fact that there is no "objective moral 'truth'" as a starting point that defines it ontologically as a realm of relative subjective truth (where truth conforms to values and beliefs). My own meta-ethical definition focuses on what it is moral activity is attempting to do more holistically: it's not just serving values, it's trying to serve them well. Under my view also, moral "truth" doesn't necessarily point to anything meaningful beyond the existence of relative values. And like any proposition designed to navigate uncertainty (any strategy), there are no "true or false" decisions to begin with, only "statistically better and worse decisions" (though there is an objective truth to the ramifications of our decisions, even when we're lucky we can only approximate it with strong induction). Even if a decision is 100% guaranteed to be the worst decision, it could only be "false" if we went out of our way to frame it as a truth statement (it is false that X move will create the desired outcome)., Though we cannot access truth with objective certainty (as Isaac will never let me forget), we can indeed often approximate it with objectivity. (e.g:if Isaac was "objective" and gathered facts, then he would come to realize that FGM has no meaningful benefit to individuals or society.)
That is a terrible argument which confuses normative ethics and meta-ethics. This error has been pointed out multiple times, and yet you still make it.
You're asking me normative ethical questions about murder, so obviously I'm going to answer from my perspective, and I've already told you that I feel just as strongly about murder as you do. Nope, no murder is okay or alright. That is obviously my moral judgement, as you're asking me, and not someone else. It is relative and subjective. Not absolute, not objective.
If you ask a murderer, you might get a different answer. And moral relativism just words that as saying that murder is okay for him.
And yes, morality is not absolute. Murder is wrong, just not absolutely wrong in a meta-ethical sense. Before asking me a silly question about murder, remind yourself that I feel just as strongly about it as you do. But I am capable of distinguishing between normative ethics and meta-ethics.
You need to be a lot clearer about the context in which you're asking whether murder is okay. The context matters, and my answers vary depending on the context. I make sense of ethics through moral relativism. If you ask me to set that aside and interpret as per moral absolutism, then the question is either nonsensical or implies a falsehood. It's a bit like asking whether the present King of France is bald.
Quoting Isaac
Exactly. I typed up my reply before having read yours, yet we both point out some of the same key problems. Great minds think alike.
It is a real shame that Tim's reply completely ignores your explanation and jumps straight into a question about your answer full of his own implicit misguided assumptions. What he's really asking is, "Do you really believe that, given all of my misguided assumptions, and completely disregarding the explanation you've put time and effort into producing?". Isn't philosophy supposed to encourage critical thinking and open-mindedness? Some people on this forum do not display these qualities to anything close to the standard that I would like to see. It's like in that other discussion on political correctness, where some people just showed up to reinforce the simplistic view that political correctness is good, without sufficient application of critical thinking, without thinking outside of the box. Maybe this forum should be more like an academy, and members should display suitable ranks, with members who merely parrot simplistic views uncritically being of a lower rank.
Some people here should go off and spend some time reading the moral philosophy of Nietzsche and Hume, even if only as a task to encourage thinking outside of the box.
Quoting tim wood
I’m in agreement with you here.
Just because people act in terrible ways does not mean the above isn’t true. The evolution of morality exists to hold communities together because it was the moral factor that constructed them, that they were based on.
No, but I am already absolutely convinced that doing so would be monstrous. I don't need a rational argument either way. I'm not slightly inclined towards mutilating children and standing in need of an evidence-based argument to the contrary. The thought doesn't even enter my head.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I'm not waiting for anything. I'm not making the decision, and if I knew anyone who was, I'd do anything within my power to prevent it. I don't understand why, in a debate about moral relativism, you've started asking me questions as if I support continued practice of FGM. I'd happily stop it right now, but I'd do so because I think it's wrong, not because I think everyone else must think that.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
You're the one rephrasing my argument to make it sound as if there's some question about whether or not I condone FGM. Do you even know what moral relativism is?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
What do you think I've been presenting (with regards to vaccines)? Reasoning as to why one might not want to immunise a child. What bit of my responses on the subject do not come under the category of 'reasoning'? It just comes down to the fact that you don't agree with my reasoning, not that I haven't presented any.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Exactly. People turning against modern Western culture. I may have only used the term 'non-westerners' here, but I clearly added 'or detractors' in my previous mention, so it's disingenuous to act as if I'm not including those in the West who reject part of it from your target group.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
The point was that you had a load of equally 'objective' harms on your doorstep but you chose to condemn groups that are anti-western. It reveals the major problems with so called objective 'wrongs' someone will always twist them to suit their personal agenda. It doesn't get any more basic than that. "All the things I don't like are objectively wrong, all the thing I benefit from a I'll let slide, even if they are objectively shown to cause more harm". Which do you think kills more children, child labour products bought by everyday western consumers or parents who don't vaccinate? But who did you target as immoral?
I'm not accusing you of anything. I'm pointing out that the problem with claiming objective moral laws is that your biases inevitably cloud them. They just become your own set of personal bugbears anyway, only with an undeserved gloss of objectivity over them. Quoting VagabondSpectre
Now who's willing to sacrifice virgins? Thousands will be displaced, many die, species become extinct, communities wiped out, but its OK because we've invented the cheeseburger out of it.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Have you read anything about how "clinical trials' are conducted? I suggest Ben Goldacre's Bad Pharma, or just just read his blog, or the Statistical Society's, or AllTrials, or just about any reputable interest group. Ben's blog has got 37 articles about the misbehaviour of the pharmaceutical industry, and given his other work against homeopathy and and the anti-vax movement, he's hardly trying to bring civilisation down.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
How many though? For a parent, they want to know if the actual drug they are agreeing to inject into their child is going to be worth the risk. Their child, not the average child. So let's say I'm the parent of a five-year old. What epidemiological study should I be looking at to show the long-term benefits for a breastfed child, with a diet high in fresh vegetables, a low stress environment with only small isolated groups of children and good personal hygiene (all of which the WHO list as having significant effect on immune response). Show me a study following that specific group (or even one close to it) and I might be convinced, otherwise it's just about choosing risk categories. As I said, my chances of dying in a plane crash are zero, I don't fly, so why should I learn the safety procedure just because studies show it saves lives?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I have no problem with using evidence and reason. The trouble is, you seem to. I have been presenting evidence and reason as to why a parent might reject vaccination. I've not argued they might reject vaccines without any reasons, I've given reasons and you ignored them all because they don't give you the answer you decided on before the argument even began. A basic understanding of human psychology is all that's required.
You're equivocating. You argue for the seeming uncontroversial "we should use reason and evidence to determine our actions", but what you're actually saying is that reason and evidence, once applied, provide us with a single correct answer, and that's a much more controversial claim which remains unsupported.
Yes, but we should all be able to agree on that, and it completely misses the controversy, making no ground whatsoever towards resolving it, which is why saying, "Next", after making that point is full of comic irony. Sometimes it's like you and MU are battling for the position of best inadvertent comedian.
In my assessment, moral relativism makes much better sense of the nuance than moral absolutism.
That's the key question, really. A lot of these objections can be solved simply by the objector learning about what moral relativism is.
I agree. I think if we had to explain the striking degree of homogeneity with people's moral judgement, evolved mechanisms to keep communities together would be top of my list of reasons. But I'm not seeing how you're moving from the existence of a cause for moral judgement being the way it is, to the existence of a moral absolute. There's an evolutionary reason why we tend to like junk food, and tend to turn our noses up a boiled veg. It's because we're programmed to seek out high energy return foods. Now, does that make eating junk food mandatory? Is it now the case that we 'must' eat junk food, because we've identified the biological cause of the general preference for it?
I've not doubt that there is some biological basis behind our feelings on moral matters. But there's some biological basis behind all of our feelings and motivations, but that doesn't mean they're all the same, any more than we all have blue eyes.
Either: it's the same answer. Not immoral in itself, only immoral in the sense of moral relativism.
Moral relativism has a parallel in existential nihilism, so it might help to think about it in that way. There's no meaning in the world itself, the meaning stems from us.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Because moral relativism implicitly acknowledges that it's about our moral judgement in relation to the thing, whereas if you don't do that, then it leads to the absurdity of things being moral or immoral in themselves, independently of our judgement. And that makes no sense.
This [i]is[/I] a meta-ethical distinction. I am a meta-ethical moral relativist. We're doing meta-ethics here, or at least we're supposed to be, aren't we? Some people here seem to be getting confused about the appropriate context.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
[I]Your reply is too lengthy![/I] :rage:
So you're just being annoying by differing from me semantically? You have yet to learn that I'm always right, and that there should be a single unified meaning, namely my own meaning. One day I'll become a dictator and enforce my own unified meaning, like in 1984.
I do think that we're talking past each other to an extent, and I blame you for that more than I blame myself. In a nutshell, you seem to be saying something like that there are some moral frameworks which are generally more useful than others, and which generally serve our interests better than others. But to me that is beside the point. It doesn't matter whether it is true or false, because the problem is that it is irrelevant. It is actually fallacious if you're appealing to the consequences in a meta-ethical context. For example, if you were to suggest that we should all believe that morality is objective, because if we do, then that would serve our interests better. That's appropriate in normative ethics, but inappropriate in meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is firstly about what's the case, then what's the best way of speaking about it. (That's actually what most if not all topics in philosophy are about, or what they should be about). So I conclude moral anti-realism, but then conclude moral relativism over error theory or emotivism. The differences between the positions I mentioned have much to do with how we should interpret moral language, but also about what is actually the case.
Quoting Isaac
That is a big question, and probably entails more work than I can be bothered with to try and explain. It’s not that I can’t be bothered addressing your question, it’s just that it’s a complicated area, and after all, I’m not out to reshape our thinking, nor do I necessarily have the skills.
But, the incest taboo is an interesting area to think about. Why is it there?
The support is the fact that morality is simply an expression of individuals' preferences of interpersonal behavior. There's zero evidence that it's anything else.
Quoting tim wood
I care because the whole point of doing philosophy is to get right what the world is like.
Excellent points.
So is the moral relativist using words with a high degree of objective meaning to declare their position?
And if that itself is not inconsistent, how can such words have any meaning at all, if they can be used interchangeably by anyone about anything. Can one event be both good and bad, and if so what does that do to the concept of truth?
If moral relativists disagree about if an action is right or wrong, does that mean that both are true? That neither are true? That there is no such things as truth in moral judgments?
This is easily resolved in favour of the sceptic of moral absolutism, rather than the proponent of moral absolutism. One could just retract the stronger claim that nothing is absolutely right or wrong, and instead just point out that there seems to be no credible evidence or reasonable argument in favour of moral absolutism, only dogmatism and bad logic.
You would be just as guilty as he is with your own bare assertion that his argument is unsound because the second premise is not true. You haven't shown that it is not true, and you also just keep assuming absolutism, which renders your criticism trivial and ineffective.
Moreover, whether or not everyone benefits from his argument is irrelevant. Why do you keep confronting people like myself and Terrapin Station with irrelevancies, as though they are not irrelevancies? Are you so eager to attack our position that you're not thinking things through properly? It has seemed that way from the very beginning. You seem to have few qualms about throwing the logic rulebook out of the window if it seems to you that by doing so you'll gain the upper hand over your moral relativist opponents.
So, for me, first you might have noticed that I don't buy that meaning is objective.
And I've stated a number of times, including in this thread, and I'm pretty sure in response to you, that moral stances are not the sorts of things that are true or false.
In a moral context, "x is wrong," " x is bad" or "one should not do x" is an expression of disapproval by the utterer. The utterer doesn't like people doing x, it doesn't sit well with them, or they don't think that doing x is a good idea, because they don't like the notion of the sort of world that they believe allowing x will produce. That's the conventional "meaning," per functional analysis, of "is wrong/is bad/should not do."
So yes, the same thing can be right/wrong, good/bad to different people. That doesn't affect the conventional meaning of right/wrong or good/bad.
I'm basically an emotivist, and that provides a good analogy here. It's easy to understand that people might yay or boo the same thing--supporters of a team are going to yay them as they score, supporters of the opposing team will boo the first team as they score. We're not mystified in that situation what yaying or booing mean (otherwise you'd not be able to figure out who in the crowd supports which team).
Is it true that yay Red Sox? That should seem like a nonsensical question. It's the same with morality. That doesn't imply that yay Red Sox is meaningless, that it's not important to people, etc.
Completely irrelevant given the context. The context is about what morality is, not what morality is good for. Why is it that so many people in this discussion seem blind to what the discussion is supposed to be about? A subtle red herring or a subtle missing of the point are still problems.
Quoting Isaac
I think we eat junk food because it’s easy. We dont need junk food to give us a high energy return when we gave other food that we’ve eaten for years.
If instead of junk food you said morality, and that our survival and successful evolution was dependent on ideas of morality that evolved and held together our co-operative communities, then yes, we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.
What morality is? Don’t be so arrogant. If it doesn’t have a purpose, what it’s good for, then why would it exist?
I'm very much a 'meaning is use' person when it comes to language, so the problem you're outlining doesn't even arise. 'Good' when used of a moral type of action, simply doesn't mean the same thing as 'good' when used of a lawnmower, or 'good' when used of an answer to a maths sum. We use words to make something happen in the world and that varies with circumstance.
To give an example, I might say "murder is wrong" to someone about to kill a non-combatant in my platoon. By that I would really mean something like "I'm betting you think murder is wrong too and I'm reminding you that killing a non-combatant is technically murder".
Alternatively I might say "raising interest from loans to poverty strike nations is evil" by I which I mean "I'm in the camp of people who think this is evil and I want people to know it"
Like most language, it depends on the circumstances.
As far as truth is concerned, I'm pretty much a deflationist when it comes to truth values too, so the statements, of the form above, don't really have any bearing on 'Truth'. The truth they express (small 't' truth) is simply that of reporting my state of mind.
Evolutionarily, we have a physiological response that produces positive feelings in response to foods with high fat content, etc., because it wasn't easy to acquire such foods for most of our history, and it's a substance that's important to have, especially when we're doing a lot of exercise, which we routinely did when we were nomadic and had to forage and hunt for food.
No, not arrogant. Logical. Don't make irrelevant personal remarks about my character.
Yes, what morality is. That's a different issue to the issue your following questions get at. It is not about purpose, what it is good for, or why it would exist. That's a red herring.
In general, not just re morality, because it can, and there's nothing (namely a survival-until-procreation disadvantage) to effectively deselect it.
So you think you can work out what morality is with no context?
Why "no context"? Who is proposing anything like that?
Firstly, you've just repeated Moore's open question argument without showing how you resolve it. You've argued "we must keep morality intact today, because without it we would lose the glue that holds communities together.", but now you need an argument to show why we must keep communities together.
Secondly, and I think most importantly here, what makes you think our survival was dependent on one single morality. It certainly wouldn't appear to have been reliant on one single personality type, or physical type. In fact, there's a very good argument in favour of the evolutionary advantage of neurodiversity within communities. So what makes you think one set of moral rules would be right for everyone, even from a purely biological point of view?
Clearly he has trouble making the right logical connections and keeping on point.
But you do understand why, really. The explanation is that other people are not as logical as we are.
Quoting Isaac
Yes! Tim Wood and Banno are perfect examples of this.
Because, from my point of view, morality is inherent in man. It had a purpose that enabled him to evolve successfully. Otherwise there would be no communities as we know them. That’s the context.
Would you say "There's no truth value in 'Yay Red Sox,' so why root for them? Red Sox or Yankees--it makes no difference"?
With your flavors analogy, you don't figure that people just buy any arbitrary flavor because it's not objectively the case that one flavor is better than another, do you?
And so far no one has been able to say what morality is, despite all the contorted formulations I’ve read.
We've said, but you don't agree.
Why make them? That doesn't even make sense. I don't start off with a blank slate and then 'decide' whether I think mutilating babies is OK. Do you? I already feel mutilating babies is monstrous. There's no choice in the matter. It's like asking why judge whether you like being hit in the face or not.
Because you deny relevance to me looking at the why of morality as irrelevant in an effort to determine what it is, and yet there is nothing in the posts but disagreement. Why is your approach better than mine, why is it irrelevant?
I think we need to go back to the basics with anyone who makes a comment like that in this discussion:
Do you understand the distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics? Do you understand which category your above comment falls under? And do you understand what the topic of this discussion is supposed to be about?
Sure. And when there's no truth to Yay Red Sox or Yay vanilla, it's not a mystery to you why people care about it--sometimes very passionately--is it?
Go on...
I’m responding to the op. I don’t have to look at things your way.
Say what?
Whether one agrees with a claim is irrelevant to whether someone is saying what something is.
If Mr. Jones says that water is H2O, but I don't believe him/don't agree with him, has Mr. Jones not said what water is?
Obviously. Your problem seems to be me not agreeing.
I had no problem with it. I'm simply pointing out that you not agreeing with a claim isn't the same thing as someone not saying what something is.
@Rank Amateur, I'm with him on that. It makes way more sense to me to interpret moral statements as stemming from moral feelings, and moral feelings are evidently subjective and evidently vary. Moral relativism is a way of making sense of moral language which doesn't end up translating it to "Yay!" and "Boo!" which are not truth-apt. I would translate it to something which [I]is[/I] truth-apt, and which stems from moral feeling, like "I disapprove of murder". That's not necessarily what they mean, or at least, they don't necessarily realise that that's effectively what they're doing, but alternatives are nonsensical or false, and I don't see models which lead to nonsense or falsehood as being particularly helpful.
And there are no contradictions between different claims under moral relativism because of the relativism part. The law of noncontradiction has not been violated. And your self-made contradictions are your problem, not mine.
I think you’re saying I’m not saying anything and that I think disagreeing is saying something.
I was disagreeing with my posts being called irrelevant.
???
I was simply pointing out that it's not true that "no one is saying what morality is."
What's true is that you don't agree with what we're saying morality is.
You will do. Just you wait until I'm dictator.
I'm a pragmatist, so I'm actually less concerned than some here about 'the way things actually are'. I think moral relativism is 'the way things actually are' on account of a complete lack of evidence to the contrary, but that's not something I'm bothered to argue over.
The pragmatic point, however, is important to me. The idea of objective moral 'truth' requires that one construct an argument, based on evidence and logic, in order to try to get other people to behave the way you think is right. You're saying that the arsonist can carry on as he is unless you can 'prove objectively' that he is causing more harm than good. And he'll disagree with you, and bring his own reason and evidence to bear, just like we're doing here on the meta-ethical question. And just like we're doing here, the whole judgment will get bogged down in disagreements over the validity of the evidence, the validity of the logical steps, the epistemic status of any answers we get...
I'm just not seeing why people think objectivism is of any greater pragmatic use.
Good points again, and I pointed that same thing out earlier. If we're all objectivists, that doesn't help us to agree. As you point out, we're all objectivists on meta-ethics, after all, and we're certainly not in agreement about that.
Aside from fields where there are formal proof procedures that are pretty well-entrenched, to persuade anyone of anything requires mastering techniques that have nothing to do with whether anything is really subjective or objective.
Good points.
Sweet Jesus. You are very much back at square one, as if twenty pages of correcting errors in understanding has achieved nothing.
Then you are probably blind. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Brett has trouble with logical relevance. I group him with creativesoul and Metaphysician Undercover in that regard.
* Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion by Robert B. Cialdini
* Exactly What to Say: The Magic Words for Influence and Impact by Phil M Jones
* Conversational Intelligence: How Great Leaders Build Trust and Get Extraordinary Results by Judith E. Glaser
* Why People Don't Believe You: Building Credibility from the Inside Out by Rob Jolles
* The Art of Persuasion: Winning Without Intimidation by Bob Burg
* Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People by G. Richard Shell
I think I would rather be hit in the face than put up with this nonsense.
Yes, it's almost as if using logic and evidence to get someone to see the truth of some matter doesn't work... Oh well.
Damn. If only everyone was more like me...
Or buy a gun.
It isn't, and thinking otherwise is a common misperception. One of many that we've seen in this discussion. I try to stamp them out, but sometimes it can be in vain, again, as we've seen.
Perhaps I should come back with a gun. :chin:
Yea, I still see a logic flaw, you don't. Does it matter? Is one of us right and the other one wrong? Is there a truth about the nature of morality that we both may be unaware of? Nothing any of you has said effectively answers this point.
I understand there are circumstances and norms, and situations that effect moral judgments. But they are branches from a trunk. There is enormous unity regardless of culture or situation on many things most humans would consider morally wrong. Now you can chalk up that near universal consistency to evolution, God, or something else, but it exists and it is not coincidence.
What is the difference then between near universal agreement and nearly objective?
'Universal' doesn't necessarliy mean 'objective'.
No, you are quite literally back at square one. You do realise that the following was quoted in the opening post:
[I]"Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behaviour that they consider more significant than etiquette."[/I]
And it was also clarified about a million years ago that it is similarly considered more significant than preferences about foodstuffs, yet the same idiotic false equivalence is being repeated.
Look at what I said in my very first reply back on page one:
[I]"There are two problems with this straightaway. Firstly, opinion is no more nothing than evolved thought is nothing. Secondly, your use of "mere" is an example of loaded language and a poor representation of the position that you're supposed to be criticising. A mere opinion makes me think of the opinion that salt and vinegar flavour crisps are better than cheese and onion flavour crisps. This is clearly not what was intended. Your characterisation is uncharitable".[/I]
I am not allowed to disagree with that?
Sweet Jesus. No one here is crazy enough to equate the two, so you have a fundamental misunderstanding. Big surprise.
I prefer cheese and onion flavour crisps and raping babies to ready salted flavour crisps. How about you?
I undersatand that, but it does not answer how we as human beings have near universal moral judgments on many things, if there is not some things with a high degree of objectivity- do you have a theory?
There is near universal agreement about what we feel. Most people feel that they shouldn't murder someone and they feel that they should ostracise, or somehow discourage anyone who seems like they should murder people. So our feelings on many matters of moral judgment are similar. That means it is 'close to' an objective fact that most people feel that way.
So, for the one person who doesn't feel that way, what bearing does this objective fact (that most people think otherwise) have on your objective judgement of his moral feeling? All you can say objectively is that it is at odds with the majority. That doesn't require him to act any differently without some further link which you have not provided. I dread the day that being at odds with the majority position places on us a duty to change our behaviour accordingly.
I addressed the point. I identified the logical error, namely a false equivalence, and I just added the obligatory satirising of it, but I think that I was a little too late in adding that, so...
So anyway, I prefer cheese and onion flavour crisps and raping babies to ready salted flavour crisps. How about you?
"Objective" doesn't have anything to do with commonality or agreement. "Objective" simply refers to whether something occurs independently of persons.
I don't think that anyone is arguing the relative commonality of any stances. No one disagrees that the vast majority of people think it's wrong to murder, for example.
Quoting Isaac
Agree
Quoting Isaac
If, as I do, believe there is a high degree of objective truth that murder is wrong, I would say that person is objectively wrong.
If you believe there is a high degree of subjectivity, you can only say to him, that most people find your judgment that murder is ok incorrect. And try to change his mind, but if he chooses not to, you have no standard to value his judgment against, and must accept it as his subjective moral judgment, you can disagree - but that is all. It is now reduced to just preference.
Human beings nearly universally have noses, don't they? But no one is saying that our noses aren't something that our bodies make.
In order to think that the fact that humans have something or other in common, where (almost) all of us have whatever it is, somehow suggests that the thing in question can't be of us, would only make sense if one thought that either humans are as they are more or less randomly or they have to be constituted/arranged/put in order by something outside of themselves. I don't know why on Earth anyone would think something like that, though.
I think that is my point. Believing in high degrees of subjectivity in moral judgments reduces them to preference
And?
Therefore, false equivalence. Cheese and onion flavour crisps, raping babies.
I'm won over by that argument. Aren't you?
You've lost me. What does "it" refer to above?
In any event, there's not much 'universal' about attitudes to abortion, homosexuality, animal rights, social welfare, health provision etc, etc. Doesn't seem to me to be any evidence of an objectively correct solution to these thorny moral issues.
It's frustrating that you can't get folks to follow through on a line of questioning about this stuff, because that could help them understand the other view. It seems almost like they're afraid to "go down the rabbit hole" though. So whenever it looks like they're getting too close to the rabbit hole, they back off.
The question was why is there such unanimity, and is there some pragmatic difference between near universal agreement and objectivity.
It seems what you really want to argue is if morality has a is a human or supernatural origin. I am not arguing that, I am happy to say that you can have a very large degree of objective morality without any supernatural origin.
Yes, it is annoying. They just leave it down to others to connect the dots out in the open.
It. Means your point universal does not have to mean objective
Quoting Brett
(Raising hand from back of the room)
Hellloooo!!! see page 17. I said, “Morality, one of two fundamental human conditions, the other being reason....”
Somebody did say what morality is, and happens to coincide nicely with your “inherent in man”. Problem is, everybody wants to jump from “inherent in man” as a “fundamental condition” out into the objective world of circumstance, without doing the work of grasping what happens in between.
I also said, pg 5 fercrissakes.......“In a discussion with a moral or subjective relativist, always first determine what exactly is relative to what.”, but people would rather dismiss the obvious than exploit it, so we end up with 20 pages of, as @Janus so aptly put it, “....litany of irrelevancies and category errors....”.
Everybody wants to be right; nobody wants to be laughed at, so nobody does real honest-to-farginggawd-philosophy, because doing so is never right and is often laughable. But some questions cannot be addressed any other way, and all answers are wrong if the questions are irrelevant.
Carry on, and good luck.
(Puts hand down and continues with idle doodling)
First, I don't look at it as anything about supernatural stuff, because there are a lot of objectivists who aren't positing anything supernatural.
Re (near-)unanimity on some things (even though I think that tends to be exaggerated), the stuff about almost all of us having noses wasn't rhetorical or facetious. How and why most aspects of the human body develop as they do isn't very controversial. We don't see it as a big mystery that we almost all have noses, that we all have circulating blood if we're alive, and so on. We don't see many people believing that the only way we all have noses and circulating blood is because something outside of ourselves gave those things to us wholesale and we just took delivery of them. So it shouldn't be a mystery that the vast majority of people think that murder is wrong, either, that the vast majority of people agree that 2+2=4, that the vast majority of people don't like drinking hydrochloric acid, etc.
Re "there (being) some pragmatic difference between near universal agreement and objectivity," it depends on what the pragmatic goal is, but what is the pragmatic value of near-universal agreement in the first place? That's simply a fact about the way things are. It doesn't imply anything normatively.
It seems that way to me too. It's probably because there isn't any. That's why some have resorted to dogmatism, and others try and fail to be logical about it.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Universal, near universal, a majority, evenly split, a small minority, one person... Doesn't make any real difference, meta-ethically. To believe otherwise is a moral delusion, a fallacy.
I am happy to go down any rabbit hole you want.
I am not sure either you or s even understand the point I am making. And I have yet to see it addressed in a complete thought.
Most of what I am hearing is you are wrong and you don't understand.
I keep asking what I think is a reasonable and logical issue, That either you can not, or will not address reasonably and logically.
If you're talking about the unanimity thing, we have addressed it. Our bodies don't develop randomly, do they? You're not addressing that. You're not supporting the notion that there shouldn't be widespread commonalities if moral stances only occur in individuals.
Validity has to do with truth values, and in what perspective would different moral stances be equal?
It is imperative to my point for you to try and identify why we all feel that way, and not just keep dismissing it. Why do we all feel that way ?
Your point that I addressed was your false equivalence. But you seem to be in denial that I even addressed your point. What don't you understand about why your point was fallacious?
Your last point didn't even go anywhere logically relevant, as Terrapin picked up on. That's a fallacy called missing the point.
If you're logically incompetent, then what tends to happen is that the discussion becomes about that rather than the wider issue.
I've addressed it a bunch of times.
First, human bodies do not develop randomly.
Do you agree with that?
We are taking past each other, I see nothing in this that addresses my point.
Can you take a second to tell me in your words what you understand my point to be?
You believe, for some reason unbeknownst to me, that if morality is simply something that we do as individual human beings, there shouldn't be widespread commonality on some moral stances.
No I obviously do not see the false equivalence- Can you explain it in a complete thought please.
He's in denial. I'm surprised his other coping mechanism hasn't kicked in yet. You can tell when it has, because he'll close down and go, "Okay, have a nice day!".
No my point was what is the origin of this commonality, is it coincidence, evolution, God, something else?
Where does it come from.
Usually in response to your ad hominem. Which is your default.
So you genuinely believe that my feelings about cheese and onion crisps are just like my feelings about raping babies, in every sense, respect, and degree?
Why on earth would you believe that?
Well, obviously. If you believe that murder is objectively wrong (by which you mean someone committing murder is objectively wrong to do so), then is is simply a re-wording of your belief to say that a person who commits murder is objectively wrong to do so.
What we haven't heard from you yet is your reason for believing that. You have so far shown that most people feel murder is wrong, now show what logic or mechanism makes it the case that the few who disagree must also feel that way.
It sounds like you are saying that wrong, by definition, simply means those behaviours which the majority of people think are a certain way. But if that's the case, then what is that certain way? You can't use the word 'wrong' again because otherwise your definition is self-referring.
That has nothing at all to do with my issue.
I don't care if you want to wiggle out of my criticism and talk about something else. This is what I am calling you out for:
"It just turns all such judgements to preference. Murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate".
They are your own words. You can either concede or foolishly attempt to defend them. Or, you know, just revert to one of your coping mechanisms because you can't handle being wrong about something.
Ok
Quoting Isaac
Because I believe there are things that are true. I believe you can make a truth statement about murder. And my argument to the person above, because his view on murder is not true
So we can argue that my view on murder is not true, or there is no truth about murder.
Can you separate truth from moral? Can one be mostly subjective and one be mostly objective?
So (1) our bodies, due to (2) genetics and environment, and if you want you can explain at least the genetics part by (3) evolution.
That should have been clear from the responses I already posted.
You know darn well it was about the commonality of some moral judgments not where our bodies came from.
Well, obviously not God. It's no more God than the Flying Spaghetti Monster or Russell's Teapot.
The commonality in our moral feelings are just a result of human nature, like many other commonalities. But human nature includes variance, so naturally there is a variance in moral feelings.
And none of that does anything at all for moral objectivism, which foolishly goes further and makes the additional claim that the commonality represents an objective standard. Ockham's razor.
Moral judgments are something that our bodies do in other words. So with respect to my view, you're asking about a commonality of our bodies. (Which is why I brought up the stuff about noses, blood (circulation), etc.)
I realise this was an aside (hence the parentheses), but I wanted to highlight the point you're making.
The degree to which we all seem to agree is very broad... Murder is wrong, torture is wrong, that sort of thing. But this is almost never the actual moral dilemmas people seek an understanding of the which are things like - should we give money to beggars and if so how much, should it be related to my income or their needs, do I take their demeanour into account....
Any vague homogeneity here is virtually useless, if it even exists at all ,so the fact that we broadly agree murder is wrong, may well be interesting from an evolutionary point of view, but is completely useless, even to the objectivist, when judging real moral dilemmas.
So we all as humans, by our very nature, have some near universal moral views, but that has nothing at all to do with that being to a high degree objective.
We are getting semantic now.
Don't worry. I know how your psych works better than you do. You are predictable. What would happen is that I'd explain that your comment suggested a false equivalence, and you'd simply deny whatever I said rather than concede, blaming me for misinterpreting your comment. That way, you're right and I'm wrong. That's how it has to be for you, because you can't cope with the alternative prospect.
Another non answer. No one is keeping score. Do you want to tag along with S and call it human nature?
Fine, well accept that for the time being.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Why? This is precisely the contested point and instead of providing an argument to support it you've just re-asserted your belief. I understand you believe there is a truth value about murder. I gather you're religious, so obviously the fact of such a truth value is an article of your faith, but what purpose has it here? This is a philosophy forum, I'm not sure I see the purpose in our just declaring articles of faith and leaving it at that.
If there's a reason why you think there's a truth value about murder I'm interested to hear it. If it's just an article of faith then that's fine with me, but there's nothing left to talk about.
It is exactly the point. And they are linked. You can only have it your way if you tell me that you believe that there is no truth statement you can make about murder
You are asking me make an argument to prove 2 + 2 = 4 without using math.
It makes no sense to me why this wouldn't count as an answer to you.
Do you understand that on my view, moral stances are something that our bodies do? So if you're questioning my stance critically, you're questioning the origin of our bodies doing something, questioning why our bodies would do something where there can be such widespread commonality.
I think your base point is all judgments are thought, they only exist as individual human thought. And as such have to be subjective to that person.
See? There it is again. Denial. No, of course you don't see it. That's the problem. But it is quite amusing from an outside perspective who clocks on to how your psych manifests itself in how you respond to me.
My point should be crystal clear, as it is no doubt crystal clear to others, but you are so in denial that you spin this as a refusal on my part to spell it out for you in the most obvious of ways. Okay, here goes, although I doubt that it will work on you, as you'll likely just respond in one of your usual ways:
I think that your comment suggested a false equivalence. It equated two very clearly different things, namely murder/not murder and vanilla/chocolate. You said that they're "the same". Of course, they're both preferences, according to the view in question, but that's it. That in itself does nothing at all logically (a fallacy of irrelevance) and the additional suggestion (which I'm sure you'll deny, because that's what you do: you deny what you can't cope with confronting) is also fallacious.
Any reasonable person will clearly see that that is either plainly false or highly misleading. It shouldn't even have to be explained to this extent. I think that you're just buying time and trying to avoid having to confront being wrong about something.
Yes and thought is our bodies doing something. It's something our brains do. (Hopefully, at least. :razz: )
Instead of this, you have not responded to this yet
Quoting Rank Amateur
What do you say?
Do thoughts have any truth value? Are all your biological thoughts as true as my biological thoughts?
Yes, I know that you want to wriggle out of my criticism instead of conceding, so you're trying to manipulate me into talking about something else.
Remember, I am more conscious of your psych than you yourself are. And it does you no favours when I expose it. So maybe consider just conceding?
By "truth statement" I'm presuming you mean something like "murder is..." where this corresponds to reality, yes. In which case I can say "murder is unpopular", "murder is the intentional killing of another in illegal circumstances", "murder is a six letter word"...
All those are truth statements about murder. I'm really not sure what you're asking for.
Quoting Rank Amateur
In a way, I guess you could say I am (metaphorically). If I don't agree with the axioms of mathematics, and you want to prove to me that 2+2=4, then you would be in such a situation. But, to continue the analogy, we'd be arguing, on this thread, about the axioms of mathematics. So the fact that you can't prove your point unless we agree with your axiom, is irrelevant.
You lack of taking any time to actually understand what people say to you before you argue back is amazing. That is exactly my point, they are not equivalent. But if there is no underlying truth in the choice then it is just a preference. I say there is some truth that murder is or is not bad. There is no truth statement beyond mere preference if vanilla is better than chocolate
It isn't "just" a preference. It isn't "mere" preference. That's back to square one again!
Obviously an emotivist like Terrapin [i]already[/I] accepts that both are preferences, and that there is no truth to them, so you are not doing anything logically relevant by pointlessly pointing that out. Like some of the others in this discussion, you struggle with logical relevance.
That is why he replied with, "And?".
What else could there be to that pointless point, unless, as suspected, you are suggesting something fallacious beyond a fallacy of irrelevance, like a false equivalence or an appeal to emotion by using loaded language in a superficial attempt to trivialise or smear your opponent? Are emotivists guilty by association with murderers or something? What's your bloody point? It still seems like you're dancing around the truth that you don't have a relevant or valid point.
No, what I am saying is there is a truth about murder being good or bad, right or wrong. We can disagree what the truth is, but it is important if both parties believe there is a truth. If we don't believe there actually is a truth. It is just preference. Then we can see if we think that truth is different than opinion. And if we believe there is a truth and that truth is more than opinion, we have left subjectivity.
Yes. That's what I said about six or seven different ways above. Mentality period is just biology on my view. It seems so obvious to me that sometimes I forget that it wouldn't simply be understood without having to be explicit about it.
And yes, thoughts are the only things that have truth values. Propositions are thoughts.
I thought we'd pretty thoroughly established this. Asking whether murder is right or wrong non-subjectively is like asking whether walking is right or wrong, or whether Birmingham is right or wrong. It's just not a question that makes any sense.
Only after we've sorted out your point that I was originally addressing. I want either a concession from you or proper non-evasive reply.
You need to admit that your point lacked logical relevance or explain what the supposed logical relevance was. I've connected the dots for you out in the open, but you just deny it without actually saying what your point was, except by repeating a point which lacks logical relevance.
Ok, if you do not believe there are any truth statements we can make about the rightness or wrongness of murder, we just disagree.
Then whatever my personal judgment on the topic is, you can disagree with, but have to accept as just as morally valid as yours
No, that's your denial kicking in again. This comment of yours was from page 20:
Quoting Rank Amateur
I'm still awaiting a concession or a proper explanation from you. And I'm persevering through your many attempts at evasion.
I just said, "Thoughts are the only things that have truth values." Obviously I think there is truth, then. It's a property of some thought. (But not moral stances (at least not when we're keeping this simple, when I'm avoiding what would have to be a huge tangent on truth theory).)
Validity has to do with truth value. So no one's moral stance is valid on my view. Again this is because moral stances do not have truth values.
And no, almost no one--and definitely not me, would say that any arbitrary person's moral stances are just as good as other person's moral stances, because "just as good" is itself a value judgment that individuals make, and people--again including me--do not happen to judge all stances equally. Hence why I asked you earlier, "Equal from what perspective?"
My request stems back to something you said on page 20, which you still haven't properly dealt with. You are referring to something different, and which cropped up pages later. My request preceded yours and has priority. You are being unbelievably evasive, and unbelievably making it out as though I am in fact being the one who is being unbelievably evasive. Your psych makes for an interesting case study.
Quoting Rank Amateur
I said
Quoting Rank Amateur
And you have not commented on this yet
Not to speak for S, but I don't know what there would be to say to that. Is anyone disagreeing with it?
Because my request has priority. It relates to something that you said which precedes what it is that I said in reply to you about a tangent. You need to deal with what you said first.
You are crazy if you think that I'm dodging instead of just holding you to my request which has priority over your request. You haven't explained why your request should have priority. You are the one dodging, and I am the one holding firm, but your psych has reversed this in your mind. You have an interesting psych.
Sure, take your time. :up:
And maybe stop by your therapist. :lol:
And I am only answering your request in this single reply here, and then it is on you to answer my request, not to continue on this digression of yours. Is that understood?
Here goes:
Quoting Rank Amateur
Yes, and so what? (That's a rhetorical question - you shouldn't actually answer it unless you want to continue this digression and be exposed). The word "objective" obviously doesn't normally mean "near universal", and this is very easily demonstrated with examples. It wasn't the case that it was objectively true that the Earth was at the centre of the solar system, even when that was nearly universally believed.
So you can take your idiosyncratic and counterproductive semantics and stick them where the sun doesn't shine.
Now you must either deal with my request properly and immediately or face exposure as a sophist. Which is it to be? Let me know when you're back from seeing your therapist.
If you decide to do the right thing, then this is what you must properly address:
Quoting Rank Amateur
Quoting Rank Amateur
Quoting S
I think that you, Tim, and Vagabond Spectre have been suggesting [I]ad hominems[/I] throughout this discussion, but sometimes in a subtle way so that it has a better chance of going undetected. Some of the key fallacious suggestions from you three have been that us moral relativists are trivialising important matters, condoning things like murder or female genital mutilation, treating different moral judgements as not different but equal, being destructive, and thinking like an adolescent. Therefore, we're wrong, even though these suggestions are a steaming pile of bullshit and are nothing more than fallacy-laden propaganda.
Interesting to counter a claim of semantics by making yet another semantic argument. None of that addressed the concept addressed and you know it.
Maybe instead of making up rules for this forum, you should find a debate site, you are very good at it. Or if that falls through Trump may need another press secretary soon, he can use someone who never gives an inch and has no interest in answering questions, is always right, and has an indifferent attitude about the nature of truth.
That was my answer to s, that he has yet to answer
You are extremely predictable. Do you know that? You have chosen to respond with denialism and evasion. Who would've guessed? Well, at least you have now been well and truly exposed.
I think I speak for both myself and Terrapin when I say that we object to your lack of explicit acknowledgement that you made a point which lacks logical relevance. You made a point which preaches to the choir, and does nothing else, except suggest a fallacious false equivalence, whether that was truly your intention or otherwise. Making that equivalence is either careless or deceptive. Either way, you still fucked up, and you still refuse to admit it.
His "And?" never got a proper response. I think that it is pretty clear at this stage that there never was a follow up, or that it is invalid. But you won't admit it. You just want to move on and talk about something else.
Just to make sure I understand correctly. This means some thoughts have truth value, but thoughts about moral stances do not have truth value. If I have that right, than what makes any thoughts about a moral stance any more than a preference by the thinker of one over another stance
Quoting Terrapin Station
I again have no issue if one wants to have the view that morality is largely subjective, as long as they acknowledge this entails allowing the different moral views of others without any value judgments. You can have subjective but then all you can have is different not better not worse.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I disagree that you can hold to individual moral judgments to be largely subjective, and impose a qualitative difference one to the other. They can only be different.
Forgot the part where no matter what the reality is, you, like trump will always declare victory.
And you have yet to actually make a coherent point in opposition.
My priority has for some time now been getting you to be honest in this debate. If you made a fuck up, be honest and own up to it. Just say, "You're right, I made a point which lacks relevance. I was preaching to the choir", or just say, "You're right, what I was suggesting was false or misleading". I shouldn't have to press you so damn hard. Your precious ego shouldn't require so much protection. Is your psych really so fragile? My goodness.
Here's the problem: I am not your tutor in logic. If I am, I demand that you pay me for my time and effort. Especially since you are a pupil who demands that logical errors be shown and explained over and over again, in various different ways, until you finally grasp the error, which you might never actually do, because your psych is clearly interfering.
The irony is that these demands from you are themselves suggestive of a fallacy, namely an argument from repetition, which means that you repeatedly demand a demonstration or explanation that has already been provided, with the hope that your interlocutor just ends up sick and tired and gives up on you as a result.
Just refer to my previous replies, and look up the fallacies which I've identified, and compare them to what you've said, and use your brain. If that doesn't work, then too bad.
I identify a logical error in something you've said, I show you the error and explain why it is an error, you deny the error or demand I do the same thing again or try to change the subject. I eventually get fed up and stop trying. Rinse, repeat, normal interaction with you. Just stop with the tactics please.
Refer back to the answer, use your brain. Don't demand that I repeat the answer until I get tired and give up trying to get you to see the error. You are a bad pupil. Try harder, and don't blame your tutor.
Also, you will get the bill in the post.
Agreed. The statement has a truth value. There is a truth *about* any empirical concept which doesn’t concern the concept itself, but simply the origin of it.
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Quoting Rank Amateur
Agreed. The disagreement presupposes something enabling it, and also indicates the presence of, not just parties, but, morally inclined parties. Otherwise, there would be no need for a truth value at all.
——————
Quoting Rank Amateur
Not so agreed. The non-assignment of a truth value does not validate a preference. If I say I don’t hold with x being true or not true, doesn’t imply I prefer one over the other. I could just be logically indifferent, or, in some typically empirical cases, unknowledgable. Still, a moral agent will not be indifferent, even if the logical possibility exists.
———————
Quoting Rank Amateur
We can, and it is. A logical truth, which is what we’re actually working with here because we are considering a relative truth vale of a simple proposition and not a objective reality, is predicated on both necessity and universality, regardless of the contents of the proposition being examined. Anything necessary and universal cannot be mere opinion, because opinions have no subjective validity, being possibly nothing more than a notion or an idea. And universal herein meaning given for any possible condition pertaining to rational humans. It may well be opinion, but even then only in the context of a dialectic, which decides good/bad, right/wrong with respect to the empirical concept contained in the predicate of the proposition, but that’s not what’s being asked. To a human moral agent, it is not opinion as to whether or not there is a good/bad, right/wrong value contained in the proposition itself.
And because we remain in the purely logical, hence a priori domain, we are still being subjective. It also explains why you were given an comment (it is true murder is good/bad, right/wrong) that didn’t properly refer to the antecedent (there is a truth about murder being good/bad, right/wrong).
Best paragraph I’ve had to work with in days, so......thanks for that.
Ok let me see if I can guess at one
For some reason you thought I said murder or not murder is the same as vanilla or chocolate
And you called that a false equivalence
My point was, and is.
There are somethings that are true
I propose it is true that murder is wrong
There are two people, like yourself believe moral judgments are mostly subjective
One says, to me, my moral relative thought is murder is wrong.
The other says, my moral relative thought is murder is fine.
Both tell each other they disagree with the other one.
If you believe there is a possible truth about the moral nature of murder they both
Can not be right. And if you believe in mostly subjectivity, there is no standard to judge
If wrong.
If it is not right or wrong, it is just different. Like the choice of vanilla or chocolate.
I have no issue with the moral relativist as long as they acknowledge they lose the right to judge the moral judgments of others.
I think that the third person is being helpful, and the second person is being wrongheaded.
The point I was going for, was if there is no truth value in opinion a or b, either choice is just preference. There is no truth value that vanilla is better than chocolate. It is just preference, chose as you wish. We don't have that luxury with is murder bad or good.
Quoting Mww
I am struggling with how we can believe that it is true that murder is either good or bad. And there can be a significant subjective judgment on which it is. Subjective and truth seem by their nature seem at opposition
Because that [I]is[/I] what you said. Word for word. Sweet Mary mother of Jesus, does your denialism know no bounds?
Quoting Rank Amateur
Understandably so. They are no more the same than chalk and cheese, and it is already known that they are both considered preferences, so if that was your point, then it is a point which lacks logical relevance. You would actually need to take it somewhere logically relevant, otherwise it is not worth even making to begin with. That is why when you make a point like that, you get a response like "And?". I really shouldn't have to explain this.
Quoting Rank Amateur
I bet you a thousand dollars that whatever you say your point was and is, it has already been dealt with. The only problem here is your problem in understanding what the problem is. It is a meta-problem, and it is really only your problem, but it is also a problem for anyone who is trying to help you see what the problem is, and how it can be resolved. You have blamed me for trying to help you, but the resolution requires the ability to understand the problem and understand how it can be resolved. I cannot just simply give you that ability if you don't have it. It can be hard work, and there's no guarantee of success.
Quoting Rank Amateur
That's already a problem for Terrapin, because he is a noncognitivist. And I'm guessing it will be a problem for me also, but for a different reason. It will be a problem for me because I go by a moral relativist interpretation of moral truths. But these are really not our problems at all, because you merely assume cognitivism and assume absolutism without warrant. So they're actually your problems.
Quoting Rank Amateur
No, the logical fallacy you're committing there is one that has been pointed out before multiple times, and it is that of begging the question. It is begging the question because when you say that both can't be right, what you really mean is that both can't be right in accordance with moral absolutism. But the error in that should be obvious, because a moral relativist obviously doesn't accept moral absolutism.
Alternatively, you're just plain wrong, because in accordance with moral relativism, both can be right. To understand that, you would need to learn about moral relativism and learn about the law of noncontradiction. If you have a proper understanding of both, then you will know that they're compatible, and that there is no contradiction, no violation of that fundamental law of logic.
Quoting Rank Amateur
This has been shown to be a non sequitur. There is a standard, and it is subjective. The logical error you are making is once again that of begging the question, because by "standard" you really mean objective standard. You must realise that standards are not necessarily objective, and that it is fallacious to just assume an objective standard in this context.
Quoting Rank Amateur
It is right or wrong, so the antecedent is false and the consequent is irrelevant. You would be once again begging the question by saying that there is no right and wrong because of how you interpret right and wrong. Moral absolutists do not have copyright privilege to moral terminology. I must have seen that error a hundred times or more.
And the comparison to foodstuffs has already been exposed as misleading, so you should stop doing that unless you actually [i]want[/I] to look like a sophist. There is a right and wrong - no one here is denying that. Do not confuse moral relativism for moral nihilism. They are two distinct positions. And nor has anyone denied that moral preference or judgement or whatever you want to call it is of greater significance than preference or judgement or whatever you want to call it about foodstuffs, i.e. "mere" preference.
Quoting Rank Amateur
No, you need to understand and acknowledge your errors, including non sequiturs like the above. But I am not a wizard, I can't magically make you understand. I am just in effect your tutor in logic without pay.
No, you are projecting. But take a break, and when you're capable of being reasonable enough to overcome your psychological issues, I suggest you slowly go back over my reply instead of being a knee-jerk reacting bad pupil.
So please bear that in mind when making lengthy self-congratulatory posts, under the illusion that you're getting somewhere and building a good case against the opposition. Unless the opposition is Terrapin and no one else, you're not getting anywhere.
True, there is no truth value in opinion. Nevertheless, maybe it’s no more a problem than disconnecting moral dilemma from aesthetics. Choice of ice cream may be a practical preference grounded in opinion, and hardly compares to taking a life, whereas morality is a fundamental condition of being human, so shouldn’t be grounded by something so arbitrary as practical preference. Easier to see if one considers the differences in the consequences of choice of aesthetics as opposed to the consequences of choice of poor moral imperatives.
You’re struggling with it because you can’t see how arbitrarily taking a life could possibly be good, or that even assigning a truth value to a moral proposition which says taking a life could possibly be good. The best way to get over that struggle is to become the object of some other moral agent believing it is true that taking a life is good. Being that object doesn’t help you understand how someone could believe it, but you certainly will be forced to know they do.
I don’t struggle with it because I have determined it couldn’t possibly be good in fact and the proposition that contains it is morally bankrupt. It is my own morality with which I concern myself, and from there, I don’t care how someone can come to believe something I find abhorrent. You, on the other hand, are on your own. This is subjective relativism writ large and how it works is entirely metaphysical. How it originates in the beginning, and how it manifests in the end, is something else indeed, for these are both empirically conditioned. Morality itself is in the middle.
“......Subjective and truth seem by their nature seem at opposition....”
They seem so, but can be reconciled a priori by means of pure reason. It is these reconciliations from which distinct forms of morality arise, and makes objective morality as a doctrine, impossible.
Notice also, the things we agree on are not the root of the moral debate, but rather it is the things we disagree on. If the former is significantly greater than the latter, we have an ethical community. Where the latter does come to the fore, we have administrative justice to handle the disagreement. Morality, again, in the middle, describes how the differences obtain.
There is no such thing as morally valid. There is nothing to judge. Are you seriously suggesting that you weighed the pros and cons of murder before deciding it was morally wrong? For me it's just obviously wrong.
Valid is a judgement of logic. It expresses that that the proposition has not transgressed any of the rules of logic. If you agree with those rules the judgment is important. If you don't agree with those rules it is unimportant. Most people agree with the rules of basic logic (though there is disagreement around the periphery).
If there are similar rules of morality, then propositions about whether certain actions meet those rules or not will have a truth value (of sorts). It will be true that the proposed action is outside of those rules. But this will only be of interest to those who agree with those rules. Unlike logic though, there is not such widespread agreement on the details of those rules.
That's not part of what the world is like?
Great point.
Nothing. I've said over and over that moral stances are simply preferences, utterances of approval and disapproval (about a particular subject matter, not just any preferences, of course).
Quoting Rank Amateur
What entails that? Or it's entailed by virtue of what?
Quoting Rank Amateur
Better and worse are subjective judgments. So why can't you have that?
All that really amounts to is saying that the people who don't agree with you are unreasonable. Not much of an argument.
The reason I said that the categorical imperative is a joke earlier on in the discussion is because it is merely a conditional about universalism. "Yeah, but if we willed that it became a universal law that"-- Well, let me just stop you there, because I don't. I simply do not form my moral judgements in that way, and your reply of "Well, you should do!" has no force.
I think that Kant's predecessor in Hume was a far greater moral philosopher.
Quoting tim wood
Well no, in sum it does no such thing. But you're free to deceive yourself otherwise.
Quoting tim wood
Reason is the slave of the passions.
No.
I've posted this a couple times in the last month or so, and I'm pretty sure I directed you to it already:
Mathematics is an abstracted way of thinking about relations, with some basis in external-world relations as we observe and think about them (which doesn't imply that any mathematics is identical to external-world relations, of course), but the bulk of it is extrapolated from that, creating a sort of construction/game upon that in an erector-set manner.
Because of that, there's no reason to say that any mathematical statement is universal.
As it is, no mathematical statement is universally constructed by humans, but we have very stringent socialization procedures in place to enforce conformity to the norms.
What if I do? You can't just pull a switcheroo and conclude that it must be so with morality also. Ethics and maths are two very different things.
And note that earlier on he mentioned the possibility of an explanation of morality involving God. I know that he believes in God, and the kind of people who believe in God are known to be dogmatic and rigidly committed to a set of beliefs. Maybe he is fixated on the idea that he simply must reject moral relativism. Moral relativism is bad! Destructive even! It is no different to moral nihilism or amoralism! Everything would be equally acceptable! (Even though it wouldn't be, that's just a really bad misunderstanding). :scream:
Maybe a way to approach the matter is to look at the limits of psychology in a different context than the contrast of reason against the background of experience.
For example, Kierkegaard outlined the limits of psychology as the insufficiency of explanation in relation to the need to decide. If the parameters of some situation can be completely explained as an event, no decisions are needed. The diremption between the absolute and the relative concerns the use of language, as such, and framing it in those terms does not make the observation a new psychology.
I find Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics interesting in this regard because he points to a gap between expressions of "absolute" experiences and the other kind without explaining it. Or at least it can be said that language does not explain language.
I wanna play!!!!
Yes, I hold 2 + 2 = 4 is absolutely true. As a matter of reason. No, not as a matter of opinion, psychology, and whether others hold with it is up to them.
Now what?
Now we wait for the inevitable switcheroo, even though it won't work because ethics and maths are two fundamentally different things.
I'm always one step ahead. I don't think that that's always appreciated. I think it wound Rank Amateur up. It's not my fault some people are predictable. :lol:
I assume it wouldnt surprise you if I suggested that for a number of contemporary approaches in philosophy maths and ethics do indeed fundamentally interpenetrate. It has something to do with the dependence of math on propositional logic and the dependence of propositional logic on conditions of possibility and the ground of conditions of possibility in perspective and the dependent relation between perspective and will.
Indeed.
If only we could figure out exactly what it's supposed to have to do with that stuff. :joke:
I'm happy to give my take on it, but don't know if I'm up for the massive headaches and hostility it will trigger.
It would surprise me, in a sense, because I don't really venture into philosophy of mathematics or contemporary philosophy. But from what I know, and from my point of view, the two seem fundamentally different in rather obvious ways.
But then it wouldn't surprise me, in a sense, because there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it.
(**psychologists, anthropologists, moral sentimentalists in general, re: Hume, THN, 1738)
(****psychology was still an informal philosophical doctrine at the time of this writing)
This should be on the home page. Or better still, the site strap line -
"The Philosophy Forum - there is nothing so absurd that some philosopher hasn't said it"
Tried, can't get there. Understand some do, I just still get to they are objectively false.
Quoting Mww
Understand, disagree. Not with the explanation, but that such a rationalization has any meaning in any evaluation of a truth.
Quoting Mww
Just can't get to point where I see this type of resoning has value
If we go down this path we need to allow for such things as relative truth and subjective truth.
Agreed. Cicero would've approved, I reckon. And maybe, "Anything that can be said at all can be said clearly" - Wittgenstein.
Either that, or condense it into subjective relative truth. That way, truth meets its logical criterion of a sound conclusion but with different premises. I mean, in effect, we’re doing that very thing right here. We agree the leaders of the Crusades understood their sojourns to save Jerusalem were moral.....but we wouldn’t do it in a million years. We might notwithstanding all that, disagree on how the Crusaders came by their moral justifications from which their actions developed.
You know, truth, per se, really doesn’t have much to do with a philosophical moral system. I use logical truth to signify how it is possible to arrive at non-contradictory subject/predicate propositions, which are required for explaining why one morally acts the way he does under the auspices of a particular moral theory. Truth explains how the theory works, but doesn’t enter into the moral actions themselves.
What do you think morality actually is? What can you reduce it to?
No one is forcing you to be here. There are other "chat rooms", you know. The internet is a big place. If we do not meet your approval, then what's stopping you from discussing this with others?
Maybe absurd, or maybe crucial to any truly fundamental understanding of the basis of mathematics and its relation to both science and ethics. Given your professed ignorance of philosophy, at this point open minded curiosity might be a more adaptive approach than cynicism.
I did not profess an ignorance of philosophy (in general). I actually know quite a bit about the subject. Way more than the average person. I once had a friend who had just qualified from spending years studying philosophy at university who said that I knew more about it than him. I have never been to university, or college.
But sure, I have no qualms in being open about the areas in philosophy of which I am largely ignorant, and I can be open-minded and curious whilst having cynical suspicions which might or might not be confirmed.
And the quote is true. Not literally of course, but I'm sure you get that.
Yes, it doesn't mean that in the looser sense. But it can often be an indication of a problem of some sort. It makes sense to be cautious.
Understand, so we have to make both truth and morality variable.
Let me test that perception against slavery.
For most, if not all, human history, many cultures have practiced slavery. These views, in my admittedly novice understanding would meet the criteria for a normative relative moral view that slavery was not immoral.
In the case of the United States, and I would think in most others, while the prevailing or controlling moral view viewed slavery as moral, others in the same culture held a different moral view that slavery was immoral.
So here are the available moral options as I see them for this actual situation.
1. Both truth and morality are culturally relative:
The slave holders have the majority cultural belief and therefore their moral view that slavery is not immoral is the correct moral view, and then the same people held the incorrect immoral view when the majority of the culture changed
The abolitionists while not the cultural majority at this time, had the incorrect moral view that slavery was immoral, until the cultural majority view changed, and then they had the correct moral view.
2. Some truths and moral judgments are not culturally relative they are to large measure objectively true regardless of situation or culture or individual views.
Slavery was always immoral, and the slave holders were always wrong and the abolitionists were always right.
3. The is no truth or moral statement that you can say about slavery
Slavery just is. It is neither true nor false that it is good or bad. There is no moral judgement anyone can make about slavery - it just is.
4. The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement.
All of us just make our own judgement - each as valid as the other.
5. Others I can't think of.
Of course my view is only 2 makes any practical sense to me, it is always true that slavery is wrong, and enslaving people is immoral.
How do the other options work with truth and morality ?
Yeah, I've asked him that a few times, but we haven't managed to explore it at all yet.
I know definitions are often important, don’t think this is the case here. If you are going down that road lMO you are being semantic.
#4.
The morality or immorality of any situation is a product of individual judgement, and all individual moral judgements are equally valid, iff confined to each of those same individual perspectives.
But this is begging the question (it assumes as fact the very thing that's in dispute).
That "individual [moral] judgements" are the kinds of things that can be "true" or "correct" is what, I thought, was in question here.
Sorry, but I'm struggling to make sense of this.
what I am trying to say is -
if the morality of slavery is an individual moral judgement, than the judgement of the slave owner and the abolitionist are in no way superior, better, more correct ( fill in a word you like) to each other - they are just individual moral judgments that are different.
If you mean there's no non-subjective standard by which to assess disparate moral judgements, then yes, you're right. But it does not follow from this that disparate moral judgements are all seen, in any sense, as 'equally valid' by any single individual.
Nice catch; it is indeed a tautology. And tautologies are the simplest versions of logical truth. If there is truth required in morality, a binding of it, so to speak, it should be as simple as possible in order to offset the ambiguity and indefiniteness of cultural anthropology or empirical psychology, which has no bearing on the origins of moral philosophy at all, but merely denotes practical examples of it.
The tautological reduction is useful to support the choice of #4, and that’s all it was supposed to do.
The problem is that on the " The morality or immorality of slavery is an individual judgement" view, no moral stance is true, real (in the objective sense), or correct.
Moral stances are meaningful to their bearers, and "right," if we mean the moral sense (rather than simply a synonym for "correct"), is what the individual moral judgment is about to the bearer--"right conduct," it's someone saying that they feel that such and such is right conduct, basically.
Those latter two things have no implication for "needing to accept" anyone else's moral stance as anything but their moral stance, a la "It's a fact that John has M moral stance."
it is just one to the other -
i can't actually see how your caveat above is even possible - it would mean an individual would say the abolitionist and the slave holder have equal valid views according to his judgement -
well maybe possible - but he is an idiot then and his view is meaningless
assume with your world view, you have no need to accept or reject my view. It is just a fact that Rank Amateur has that moral stance.
And what about correct and incorrect? Is that relative, subjective, objective, absolute? That's important. What exactly are you trying to do here? As a build up to some sort of criticism, this just won't work if you merely assume that correct and incorrect are objective and/or absolute. You'd have to actually first demonstrate that.
You do realise that some people will only commit to correct or incorrect in a relative sense here? So it won't simply be correct. It will be correct for them, and incorrect for others.
Quoting Rank Amateur
I fixed your error for you. You're welcome.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Tell me about it! How many times do you think that it is going to take? When is it an appropriate time to give up? You can't say that we haven't tried.
Cultural relativism, properly understood, and moral relativism, properly understood.
By cultural relativism, I can say that it's wrong to clink your glasses in a "cheers!" in Budapest, as I recently learnt, but it is fine here in England.
By moral relativism, I can say that whatever I morally judge as right or wrong is right or wrong for me. If you judge it differently, then you're wrong relative to my standard. Obviously I prioritise my standard over yours, and over that of others. I judge mine to be better. This is what you fail to understand for whatever reason. You are just stuck on some erroneous belief that everything must be equal or something.
You're not understanding the question. Validity is a logical idea, and it obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true.
We can't be referring to that sense here, because moral stances aren't true or false (at least on the view in question). Hence, what sense of validity are we talking about? It can't be the logical sense.
Re perspective, the reason for the question is that there is no person from whose perspective all moral stances are "equal." So we must be talking about the perspective of someone other than an individual considering moral stances. So what perspective are we talking about?
It is wrong to even use the word "allow" in that context. It doesn't "allow" or "disallow" anything. You appear to be deeply stuck in your own problematic way of looking at things. It is possible under cultural relativism for cultures to judge slavery as morally acceptable, as it is possible under every single other meta-ethical position.
Sorry but could you explain the logic of how you get from what I said to "it would mean an individual would say..."
i am getting very tired of near every response on this board is becoming near pure semantics.
are any of those moral options close to your view ?
You don't seem to realise the significance of your wording. Your wording reflects your way of thinking, and your way of thinking is problematic. Do you want to understand cultural relativism or not? If so, you need to stop thinking in these terms, terms like allowing and disallowing, equally valid, mere preference, and just different. These are your obstacles in understanding.
I will try again see if this is better.
Can you tell me how your view of cultural relativism applies to slavery ?
But it is important! Your comment ("it would mean...") suggests a profound misunderstanding of the position you have been taking issue with throughout this discussion.
Fine, but avoiding your problems won't help, and if you refuse to confront them, then you'll be stuck with them. Do you want to be stuck on the same problems twenty pages from now if this goes on for that long?
It is like how you described, only without the problems. Slavery was right relative to the prevailing culture, and then it was wrong relative to the prevailing culture, but you don't get to say anything about correct or incorrect without being clear about what sense of correct and incorrect you're talking about. Every time that you fail to clarify your meaning on things like that, you are being a problem for everyone else in the discussion. Do you want to be a problem for everyone else in the discussion?
Ambiguity is a problem.
Yep. You've hit the nail on the head.
Ok - i admit i am missing it, but in the thought that is in my head there is absolutely nothing different between your use of right and my use of correct. They are semantically equal to me.
That being as it is. Your view is there no truth statement we can make about the rightness or wrongness of slavery without the appropriate reference.
In that case I just disagree, which is fine. My view is slavery was always wrong, and the culture that allowed it was incorrect.
Multiple people have pointed this out, multiple times, and from very early on in the discussion. We're on page 27, and he is stuck on the same problem.
Yes!!!
I am interested in application of these stances against a real life issue.
So I ask you to pick one, or add your own and apply it to the issue of slavery.
Quoting Rank Amateur (note just added "cultural")
you didn't get back to me on this one yet.
My use of "right" was such that it was synonymous with "moral", not such that was synonymous with "correct".
And it isn't fine to just disagree. You should concede that your position is unreasonable. That it is dogmatic. And then we can be over and done with this.
Or alternatively, attempt to reasonably argue in support of it, but I predict that that will just lead to bad logic from you for someone like me to pick apart and expose.
No, i will not admit my use of correct vs your use of right makes my position unreasonable. Especially since i didn't take any position in the options. And gave you an non or the above option to describe it yourself.
Do you think perhaps your adamancy over the wrongness of slavery is because you’ve never had the first hand experience of knowing differently? If you cannot judge from the persective of the culture that condones it, what makes you say with authority that it is wrong? I agree slavery is wrong, but if I grew up a plantation owner’s son in Mississippi in 1845, I would hardly think that. Or a Greek captain of a warship in the Aegean, in pursuit of those pesky Trojans.
still want to get back to this. Your view is there is no truth statement we can make about the rightness of slavery without a cultural reference. Is this correct ?
No, because I'm ultimately an individualistic moral relativist. I only accept cultural relativism as just another way of pointing out moral relations. It is useful, and it reflects a sort of truth. But I don't actually depend on any cultural reference, because I can just say, for example, that murder is wrong relative to my judgement. That's about me and my judgement. No culture is referenced there.
Turning this around, and using word. Cultural norms are always right, the subject of their judgments are variable.
And does that mean that it is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are, are by definition right?
Empty words. You are a dogmatist, and you aren't being reasonable, whether you like it or not, unless you attempt to support the following:
Quoting Rank Amateur
well if this is your view on moral judgments
Quoting S
then my answer to this
Quoting S
Is is my individual moral judgement, and it requires no support at all.
Quoting Rank Amateur
If you want to boil things down, then no. The cultural is not the foundation of morality. This is what I was arguing about with T Clark earlier. The cultural is just a reference point. Ultimately morality is my morality, my moral judgement, my moral feelings. I can consider your morality, but mine is king.
Moral judgement relates to right and wrong, not to correct and incorrect. You can judge correct and incorrect, but that's not a moral category of judgement. And if you're just saying that slavery has always been wrong relative to your moral judgement, then that's fine. It has always been wrong relative to my moral judgement also.
ok - agree
now if I say relative to my judgement there is nothing wrong with slavery. Other than saying you disagree, and use whatever you can muster to attempt to change my mind. If I don't change my mind, and according to your moral view - I am just wrong relative to you, and right relative to me. And if that is the case than there is no real truth statement we can make about slavery.
It looks like you're finally getting it! If by no "real truth" you mean no objective or absolute truth to be found in moral statements, then yes! So it is either error theory, where all moral statements are false, or moral relativism, where truth and falsity is recovered.
No true statement of morality that we can make. Correct.
Yes!
Thanks and thanks - that is fine, we just disagree then.
But again, you haven't shown that your disagreement is reasonable. Can you demonstrate a "real truth"?
what would be the motivation for me to argue a truth statement to an individual moral relativist. No matter what I say, you can just always say - "not relative to me"
So unless i find some compulsion to change you relative view - why would i bother?
No, it's not fine, because this is philosophy, and that's not being philosophical. That's more of a religious mindset. Urgh. Kill it with fire.
And to be clear, I assumed a translation of the above quote which maintains logical relevance. Meaning that you're talking about "real truth", i.e. objective or absolute truth, and in relation to moral statements. If you won't be clear about that, then I guess I'll have to be clear about it for you, although that's a bit of a pain.
No, I think there are truth statements we can make about slavery. It’s true there was a time when slavery was prevalent, it’s true slavery is not now so prevalent. It is true slavery was deemed a necessary aspect of business, it is true slavery was a necessary aspect of war and it is true slavery was a necessary aspect of colonization. But those are obviously not moral truth statements.
No, I don’t assign truth values, or correctness, to cultural norms. I bitch a lot about the one I happen to be in, but that also is not a moral judgement on it.
Quoting Rank Amateur
I don’t agree with defining by right-ness, either. It is objectively true, that the prevalent cultural norms, whatever they are......are just that.
Have you ever thought about benefit, as a criterion for moral decisions, and morality in general?
No, we were talking about what you called "real truth" (in relation to moral statements), remember? What you call "real truth" can't be relative if it is absolute, and it can't be subjective if it is objective. Don't revert back to truth, as though they are one and the same. You seem to forget that there is truth and true statements under moral relativism, just of a different kind.
If you were to demonstrate such a moral "real" truth, then you would have refuted moral antirealism, which covers a whole range of ethical positions, including moral relativism, moral subjectivism, moral nihilism, emotivism, and error theory. So please, go ahead and try. I would love to see you give that a go.
We don't have to agree on the issue. Just admit that you're not being philosophical about it, and we can move on. Being philosophical about it does not consist in, "I just disagree, and I offer no explanation or attempt to support my position or anything of that nature".
Yeah, it's a term of art from logic defined as impossibility that a conclusion is false and/or conclusions are true.
See for example: https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
I'll move on after we straighten this out.
I have explained the problem here already. You just aren't getting it and you're sending us around in circles.
You said that you believe that there is a "real truth" in relation to moral statements, did you not? By that, were you not suggesting that you believe that there is a truth in relation to moral statements which is absolute? If so, and if you can demonstrate that, then by doing so, you will have refuted moral relativism and a number of other ethical positions. I could not reply that it is relative without contradiction.
What part of that do you not understand? Do you claim that you can demonstrate that or not? Yes or no?
This isn't about me, it is about you.
What do you think the important differences are (between what you're quoting there and what I said)? (I know what you might answer, but that will give me a chance to explain other things to you that apparently you're not familiar with or never understood up to this point)
Also, you don't seem to recognise or appreciate how sophisticated my ethical position is. It is pragmatic and flexible, not rigid. If you want to talk about truth-values in relation to moral statements in an absolutist or objective sense, then we can do so. That leads to nonsense or falsity. I would be an error theorist, rather than a moral relativist, in that situation.
Say what? That wasn't a response I expected.
I didn't say anything about soundness. I didn't define soundness. So from where are you getting that I'm supposing something to be about content or soundness?
Here's what I said again: "Validity obtains when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false and/or impossible for premises to be true."
You can break that up, make it simpler, so that we're saying that validity obtains in three cases:
(1) when it's impossible for a conclusion to be false
OR
(2) when it's impossible for premises to be true
OR
(3) both (1) and (2), or in other words, when it's impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false
Soundness, on the other hand, is defined as a valid argument with true premises.
The definition of validity doesn't imply true premises, as one situation wherein validity obtains is (2), when it's impossible for the premises to be true. If it's impossible for the premises to be true, then the premises aren't true, and the argument isn't sound. Nevertheless, it's valid.
(1) above can obtain when a conclusion is a tautology. In that case it's irrelevant what the premises are.
(2) above can obtain when the premises are contradictory. In that case it's irrelevant what the conclusion is. (And this is the source of the "everything follows from a contradiction" saying.)
(3) is only the case when the conclusion follows from the premises. Relevance logics require (3)--they require that the premises and conclusion have something to do with each other (hence why they're relevance logics), and dispense with the traditional interpretation of validity that allows (1) and (2).
If you want to do some of the heavy lifting, feel free to make an argument against my position that:
Slavery is morally wrong in all circumstances, in every time, and no matter the individual that is evaluating it.
I would be interested in hearing your argument. If you feel no compulsion to change my mind, I am fine with that as well.
If moral relativism were true, then from the point of view of the disinterested observer all moral positions on any issue would be equally valid.
In other words, you'd have to be saying that "from the point of view of someone who has no moral preferences at all, but who is considering the moral preferences of others" . . . it's just that there isn't actually anyone who is conscious but who fits that description.
Yes. We've all done surveys of hundreds if not thousands of people, all of whom have moral preferences. None of us has yet found anyone (conscious) who does not.
Out of what...8 billion?
In any case moral relativism (at least int the way you frame it) carried to its logical conclusion means that no moral stance is inherently any more valid than any other, which entails that they are all equal form that perspective.
On the other hand the overwhelming cross-cultural prevalence of certain moral stances can reasonably be used to justify the claim that some moral stances are indeed more valid than others on account of their greater efficacy for harmonious human community.
When we acquire survey data we don't have to do anywhere near 8 billion people. But it's far more survey data than the norm, because it's a survey we've all done.
Quoting Janus
Both inherent properties and validity are category errors here, so that's hardly a criticism of moral relativism.
But yeah, from a perspective that's completely irrelevant to morality, and completely irrelevant to any person's view, all moral stances are equal.
Quoting Janus
Again, validity is a category error.
Quoting Janus
X is harmonious, where there's any normative connotation to that
It's better to be harmonious than otherwise
X is more prevalent than y, where there's any normative connotation to that
Are all subjective preferences.
If we want to rule out the possibility that there is someone who has no moral preferences we do. In any case you didn't address this:
Quoting Janus
Your second sentence reads like gibberish to me, so I can't comment on it.
Firstly, it should be obvious to you that I wasn't using the term 'validity' in the sense that pertains to formal logic.
And secondly if a moral stance promotes harmonious human community (which is the whole reason behind morals) then it is a more valid, that is a more appropriate and effective, response than a moral stance that promotes disharmony.
The very idea of a moral stance that promotes disharmony is invalid.
No, your burden of proof is not mine. It is a fallacy to try to shift the burden of proof. Either concede or present your argument. Stop wasting time and be honest.
Oh no, not you too. No, the disinterested observer would observe that on any given moral issue, there is a right or wrong in a relative sense, and also that with regard to moral standards, there is a better or worse in a relative sense. Your inference is not rational.
i have no idea at all what you are talking about.
I know you don't condone FGM, and I think I know what relativism is...
The point I'm trying to make by harping on your reaction to my statement that "per our moral values, FGM is objectively immoral" is that within a given relative moral framework of starting values we can come to positions of reasonable confidence regarding the aptitude of possible actions toward values-service, and the only sensical way to communicate our reasonable conclusions is with language that reflects our epistemic confidence; relativism need not be extended to how we feel about the utility of possible actions because the kind of knowledge that results from empirical observation can be tested for objective strength. Once we've agreed upon starting values, there are no more meaningful relativist implications on moral debate/morality in practice. Again, when we forget morality as ever supposedly having to do with objective values in the first place, and just treat it as a realm of strategy pertaining to how to achieve our goals (note: there is a useful distinction between hedonism/individual utilitarian calculus and a calculus which actually considers the values of others, which is amorality vs morality, (conflict v cooperation, basically), then it is true prima facie that some moral strategies are better or worse than others, in exactly the same way that some moves in a given chess game are strategically inferior or superior toward achieving the desired outcome.
So, in a nut shell: I'm trying to say that we can have strong inductive knowledge that certain practices, such as FGM, do not serve human/social welfare. If accurate, this means that if someone condones FGM because they think it does serve human.social welfare, they're "incorrect" according to our best knowledge. I suppose you can say that this falls outside the realm of morality (if we define morality by its relation to "objective values", which don't seem to exist), but in practice and common parlance it never does.
I realize that morality in practice is different from the most broad possible definition of morality, but why must we define morality in relation to whether or not moral values can be somehow metaphysically/objectively true or not in the first place (which captures the entire relevant distinction of subjective relativism). If we both think that human values are merely physical happenstance, let's just accept that and give morality an ontological definition befitting what it is: sets of emergent, strategic, human-values-serving (cooperative) frameworks. This way we get a descriptive meta-ethical framework that can adequately capture the whole gambit of moral values and frameworks that exist in the wild, while also not exposing our epistemic throats to meta-ethical truth claims which define morality in fundamentally different terms (it can be simultaneously true that god exists, has a perfect "moral" plan, and the Mormon religion faithfully serves it, and that the Mormon moral framework, and other frameworks, are human-values-serving strateges that either do or do not effectively serve the fundamental values of humans).
Quoting Isaac
You offered reasons as to why people might be reasonably ignorant of the merits of proven vaccines (once again using a kind of epistemic relativism, not one based on values). The desire to get into heaven can plausibly be framed as a value, but the existence of heaven (at least, our ability to have meaningful empirical indication about whether or not heaven exists) is firstly an empirical question; if I could prove or show it to be likely that heaven exists, we would also inherently desire to go there as well (it's not a values disagreement, it's a disagreement about facts in the external world).
Quoting Isaac
This is called cherry-picking. It's a kind of reasoning, it's just highly fallible. We cannot draw reliable conclusions about the amount of misbehavior in the medical industry at large by focusing only on grossest instances of negligence we can find. I know (I think) I don't need to explain this to you, but I guess my point comes out so mundane that you keep missing it.
Quoting Isaac
You can start with fundamentally basic statistical analysis that tracks the correlation of reduction in disease outbreaks with their corresponding vaccine usage and spread. There are plenty of epidemiological studies that can help us understand the nature and importance of "herd immunity", which can change how people look at the risks involved to begin with. It would actually be ideal for your child to be surrounded by immunized children, because then there is a far smaller chance of disease spreading through an immunized community. As one of the only non-immunized child, they would actually pose a threat to the others, because vaccines are not 100% effective, because we cannot give some of them to children who are too young, and because some people with compromised immune systems cannot get some of them at all; lacking vaccines increases the likelihood of an individual being the vector that spreads disease to others. As the anti-vax movement expands, we've started to see outbreaks of diseases in communities that have been almost entirely eliminated for decades (google "recent measles outbreaks"). Anti-vax hot-spots are seeing outbreaks, and the communities where the un-vaccinated travel to are also being put at risk. It's a straight up fact that if our densely populated cities consisted of mostly unvaccinated people, we would be dealing with massive outbreak after massive outbreak of the same diseases that killed so many in relatively recent history. There's kind of a game-theory catch-22: if vaccines do pose some risks to individuals, and if everyone else is vaccinated, then you don't really need to get vaccinated yourself (except if the odds of contracting disease from a natural source rather than from other people is greater than the risk of taking a vaccine), but if everyone tried to get away with that then it would become safer to actually get the vaccinations (given the inevitable outbreaks of known diseases we've been successful in "eradicating" (read: mitigating through vaccines)).
The medical science community is not at all divided about the importance of wide-spread vaccinations, and any quick glance at the available data strongly supports why. If you are unvaccinated, your chances of dying from vaccine related complications are zero (as opposed to a fraction of a fraction of of one percent if you were deemed healthy enough and received it), but your chances of dying from infectious disease drastically rises. You can ask me to prove this with scientific rigor for each and every individual case, but I can't. Medical doctors do take into account the strength of given immune systems before they administer vaccines, I just don't see the opinions of parents as being reasonable or reasonably persuasive when compared to the experience based knowledge of medical doctors (backed and informed by a plethora of experimental/real world evidence).
Maybe we should start a new thread about the risks and rewards of vaccinations (I'm not sure if you actually think they're based in sufficiently strong science or not). In any case, the relativity of ignorance is of no merit in a debate over empirical facts.
Quoting Isaac
You're trying to persuade me into thinking that reason and evidence are unpersuasive by using classically fallacious reasoning and evidence. There is some elegance to that, granted, but all you're really establishing is that reason and evidence, in practice, clash against a boundary of ignorance. My point though, is that better reasoning and better evidence (and better access to it) push back harder against that boundary. I don't know what your epistemological frameworks necessarily looks like, but mine does assume that the better our predictive models conform to existing and experimental evidence/observations, the more closely they tend to approximate reliable "truth". I'm not saying everyone needs to accept the evidence in regards to FGM and vaccines (as you say, psychological circumstance prevents it), I'm trying to make the point that better evidence leads to better predictive power, and under a meta-ethical framework of morality as predictive models pursuing relative values, founding them in better evidence also leads to better predictive power (more effective strategies; superior moral decisions, per the given values). I'm making a case for moral progress that makes sense regardless of the facts of meta-ethical relativism. We no longer tolerate lynch mobs, for instance, because we've managed to erect a more effective system of protecting and delivering what we think justice is. In our environment and given our values, lynch mobs are approximately objectively less effective, to the point of being dangerous toward the service of justice, than a well trained and publicly sanctioned police force and equitable court system. Habeus corpus is objectively a good thing relative to our values, unless social circumstances somehow change.
Under the constant application of relativism, you can say that whether or not lynch mobs are more effective is a matter of subjective perception and opinion, so how can we say they are less moral/immoral? Everything becomes amoral, and the entire pool of moral language (and anything it branches in to, such as empirical claims) is set upon the relative road to moral nihilism.
Quoting Isaac
Single correct answer is not quite right. "directs us toward better answers" is more the point, and it is backed up by inductive reasoning and experimental evidence. The only apparent difference between our meta-ethical frameworks is that yours focuses on denying objectivity while mine highlights the only way in which our moral decisions can be "objective", which is higher on the spectrum of predictive reliability, relative to given moral values.
P.S I'm sorry for making such lengthy responses; I try to help it. Feel free to condense your response into paragraph form sans-quotation if you prefer.
Bad argument. It basically says that from an assumption outside of moral relativism, there's a problem with moral relativism. But the problem with that is that assumptions from outside of moral relativism are irrelevant to moral relativism. If you can demonstrate that morality works or makes sense without moral relativism, then go ahead. That carries a burden. It can't just be assumed. That'd be begging the question.
Quoting Janus
That some moral frameworks lead to consequences you view as beneficial is not that those moral frameworks are logically sound. That's a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
And that's the question: which moral framework is logically sound. This is meta-ethics, not normative ethics.
Yes. And that's the problem. It's like saying all of that, or like saying, "If I beg the question, then there's a problem with moral relativism".
Your consequentialist views are only appropriate in normative ethics, which is not what this is. In meta-ethics, it is a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
Not at all; it says that the essence of moral relativism as Terrapin frames it (and I'm not saying that is the only possible framing) is that all moral arguments are equal apart from individual preferences; and it doesn't say that is a "problem" for moral relativism, but on the contrary that that is its nature, for better or for worse.
Quoting S
Wrong again. The very purpose of mores is to engender social harmony. Whether or not there is social harmony has nothing to do with what how I view things.
Then you are pretty clueless. You tried to manipulate me into making an argument against something you haven't bothered to attempt to support. I rejected that and exposed it for what it is. The burden of proof is on you if you make that claim. And if you don't make that claim because you can't support it, then be honest enough to admit that. Do you know how the burden of proof works? Do you understand what intellectual honesty is, and why it is important? Or do I have to educate you about all of the basics in philosophy?
It's very simple really; a society in which murder was considered virtuous could never be a harmonious one and would not even survive for long.
You can't plausibly deny that the purpose of mores is to engender social harmony.
Really? And on what basis would the disinterested observer "observe" (don't you mean 'judge'?) that "there is a right and wrong in a relative sense" or a 'better or worse in a relative sense"? Relative to what?
It is simply not true that under moral relativism, all moral arguments are equal, nor that that is "its nature". And under moral relativism, there [i]is no[/I] "apart from" individual preferences, if that's what morality is necessarily relative to. You can't break that connection from within moral relativism, and you can't do so from outside of it without begging the question.
Quoting Janus
That's not a relevant meta-ethical point. The question is which meta-ethical framework is true: moral relativism, moral absolutism, error theory, emotivism, etc.
That doesn't even address that, except as a fallacious appeal to the consequences.
The problem is that that's not logically relevant in the appropriate context of meta-ethics, except by connecting the dots as a fallacious appeal to the consequences. It doesn't validly lead to any logically relevant conclusion in the meta-ethical debate going on between meta-ethical moral relativism and other meta-ethical positions.
Whether what you say is true or false, given the context, it is either a fallacy of irrelevance or a non sequitur.
We finally get to a point where we understand each other's view. I say great I understand and disagree.
You don't like that and ask me to argue my view of morality to you
I say I have no interest in making such an argument to you. I have no need to change your view.
You ask again
I still say no
You say come on argue your point.
I say no, but if you want to argue I am wrong go ahead.
You call me names, and demand my unconditional surrender
It is always a special time dealing with you.
Jesus Christ. I just want you to be intellectually honest for once. You do not have to try to support your view. I am not demanding that. I am demanding that you be intellectually honest about why that is instead of constantly running away like a coward. You are not an honourable debater, and this is something I find deeply offensive.
A disinterested person can certainly observe, but if he doesn’t care about the observation, he would have no reason to judge it. The equality of the respective moralities would then be, equally insignificant. But he could still have an opinion.
This wrong for two reasons. Firstly there is no reason why moral relativism cannot be considered dispassionately, from outside it and 'apart from" individual preferences; that is it has no justifiable claim to be sacrosanct.
Secondly all moral arguments are, apart from their being individually preferred, all equal, simply because there can be, under the assumption of moral relativism, no normative criteria by which one can be assessed to be better than another.
The fact that individuals prefer one argument to another is irrelevant because that cannot be used to establish that one is in fact better than another, unless you were to use the preponderance of individual preference of one argument over another, but that would be to deny moral relativism and would hence be a performative contradiction if a moral relativist used it.
If moral truth can only stem from subjective starting values (we agree on this) what purpose does the "amoral" descriptor serve beyond reaffirming our lack of objective metaphysical/existential foundation for our starting values?
Relativism only needs to rear its unfortunate head in the face of exclusive or competing values. And as we so often agree on those fundamental value, can't we carry on with an objective comparison of our proposed methods of serving those values?
Quoting S
:grin:
I'm saying you should accept the overwhelming utility of moral pragmatism, which in order to be persuasive, must commandeer the definition of "morality" (to allow us to make evidence based moral rebukes), in a way that also redefines "amorality".
From your perspective I'm ignoring the implications of relativism, but from my perspective you're ignoring the implications of pragmatism (what is true for us in practice or useful/necessary to serve our values). IF we want an effective or pragmatic moral framework, then being rationally persuasive matters, objectively.
Quoting S
I'm not an epistemological anti-realist so maybe this is why you see my distinction as trivial; I'm interested in whether or not moral strategies conform with predictive power to an external world; that's the only coherent way I can see to compare and evaluate them in the face of subjective starting values (aside from attacking the internal consistency of given values hierarchies). Yes there is no objective truth component to our fundamental values, but what matters to us still matters to us, and this has always impelled us forward into the world of applied ethics, uncertainty or no.
I really enjoy the comparison of normative moral frameworks and moral decisions to chess strategies and tactics. Uncertainty is inherent with any strategy, and chess is a particularly good way to show how many different strategic methods and tactical options there are across a range of situations, but it is also a good way to show how some strategies and methods are better or worse than others. Chess shows how statistically superior strategic decisions converge toward some strategies and away from others. It shows that some strategies and tactics, and hence moral frameworks and moral decisions, are objectively superior/interior (or or less effective at serving given values) than others.
That's fine, but then you have to explain the supposed logical relevance. It doesn't pose a problem internally for any moral relativist, and if you are trying to criticise moral relativism externally, then you must support your external premises, whatever they might be.
Quoting Janus
To the best of my knowledge, there is no "apart from" any subjective standard that makes any sense of morality. But there are evidently subjective standards of better and worse which can be appealed to in order to make sense of morality.
Quoting Janus
There is no "in fact better than another" beyond facts relating to subjective judgement. You need to justify that assumption.
Yes, really. Descriptive moral relativism is pretty damn obvious, even to disinterested observers. Even Noah Te Stroete, who is strongly against meta-ethical moral relativism, accepted descriptive moral relativism.
Relative to a subjective standard. I don't appeal outside of myself to make value judgements about whose moral judgement is better or worse. That makes zero sense. It is in fact absurd.
And yes, it isn't really a matter of observation. It is necessarily a matter of evaluation.
You've been exposed as evasive, manipulative, and intellectually dishonest. I want nothing more to do with you. But I hope you see the error in your ways.
Which has been the bane of the modern relativisitic paradigm, as opposed to......dare I say.......Enlightenment moral subjectivism, the judgements of which arises from entirely different conditions. If there is no favored disposition, in effect there is no morality at all. But we know this is false because there are harmonious communities, which presupposes a common favored morality. One must conclude some elucidations of modern relativism are incoherent, or, the tenets grounding pre-modern relativism are correct.
Whether it poses any problem for moral relativists doesn't matter to me, it's irrelavnat to what I am arguing. Their criterion for a particular moral standpoint should only be what they prefer and nothing more. The point is that since that is also equally, and equally validly (within the assumptions and context of moral relativism) the sole criterion for any morally relativist argument; there can be no reason whatsoever (apart from individual preferences) to prefer one argument over another, and therefore they are all in the same boat, that is they are all equal.
Quoting S
Sure there are subjective standards, but as such they are all equal. If an individual moral relativist's subjective standards of better and worse are merely based on personal preference, then all individual moral relativist's moral opinions are arbitrary beyond the fact that they are preferred. This means that there is no need to appeal to standards of better and worse in order to make sense, on the presumption of moral relativism, of morality. And standards of better and worse cannot consistently be appealed to in order to judge morally relativistic arguments or standpoints
Oh come on. You can't be serious.
Quoting Janus
Interestingly, despite appearances, that says nothing at all. You implicitly acknowledge meta-ethics, you just don't want to call it that because amusingly you think of calling it that as some sort of fad.
You can make judgements, but your judgements can carry no normative weight at all, and hence they are merely arbitrary, just as the judgements of all the other moral relativists are.
Here is my view once again.
Slavery is morally wrong without regard to situation, time period, or any individual evaluation.
If you wish to man up and take the challenge and present your argument that I am wrong I'll be here.
The simplest way to introduce a normative significance to moral arguments is to acknowledge that the purpose of mores is to bring about social harmony. It is then easy to see that moral positions that support actions that are engendered by fear, hatred, envy, and so on are not up to the task which is the foundational purpose of moral thought.
Firstly, if it's not a problem for me, as a moral relativist, then why should I care?
Secondly, it all boils down to "preference", or rather, moral feelings. Reason is but the slave of the passions, remember? That is one of the most important lessons to learn in moral philosophy, if not [I]the[/I] most important.
Quoting Janus
That every single individual moral agent, irrespective of their meta-ethical or normative stance, fundamentally appeals to their moral feelings or subjective evaluation in reaching moral judgements or conclusions about what's better or worse [i]does not[/I] imply that all of these judgements and evaluations are all treated as equal in any sense which poses any problem for moral relativism. That "we're all in the same boat" and that "we're all equal" in the sense that we're all confined to subjectivity is precisely my point. I don't know why you'd be preaching to the choir or suggesting that that's somehow a big problem. It is not problem at all. It is the way things are, and morality is no less functional. It is functional so long as we are moral agents capable of moral judgement. Morality isn't functional based on misguided romantic notions about a "harmonious society".
Quoting Janus
If all you're saying is that they're all equal in kind, like how we're all equally human, then that is obvious and trivial.
Quoting Janus
Merely? Arbitrary? I'm not suggesting that reason has no role, I'm suggesting that it is subservient. I am a Humean.
"'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger".
Quoting Janus
Of course there is. It is necessary to explain the truth in my claim that my moral judgement is better than someone else's. That truth relies on relativism and subjectivity. It is made sense of as an evaluation.
Quoting Janus
I can and do make consistent judgements. That's all that matters. Any opinion from outside which overlooks things like that are missing something important as far as I'm concerned. I don't care about your assumptions about a dispassionate observer. Morality is of the passions.
But they can and do. Just look around. That's how morality works. That's what it is. It is just people making judgements, approving and disapproving, expressing emotions and sometimes using reason to explain themselves, but often that isn't even part of it. The average person isn't much like a philosopher when it comes to ethics, and especially not a rationalist philosopher. And especially not like Kant! It is laughable to think of the average person reasoning in accordance with the categorical imperative!
Typically, you could probably get enough just from body language alone on things like cruelty to animals or child abuse. The foundation in moral feelings is very evident.
You obviously care enough to argue with others about it.
Quoting S
I agree that moral feelings are the foundation of moral stances; or at least that feelings are. If someone cares about others and about living harmoniously with them, then they will not promote moral thoughts such as that murder, or rape, or theft, or deception is good. If someone cares nothing for others; they probably still will not promote such moral thoughts since to do so could jeopardize their security.
So, if one wants to have genuine loving relationships with others, then one would be better served by moral thoughts that are based on that love. That is an objective observation.
Quoting S
It is functional because people by and large are not moral relativists; most people I know think that it is not merely a matter of opinion as to whether some acts are right or wrong. You are treating individuals as if they are isolated islands of feeling; this is wrongheaded; people are not like that at all. Most people are heavily influenced by the mores around them, and almost no one is immune to normativity. So the romantic isolated individual model that underlies moral relativism is not true to the actual conditions under which people make moral judgements.
Quoting S
You can try to dismiss this point, which is so uncomfortable for what you want to believe, by calling it "trivial", but it remains a salient point.
Quoting S
If reason is not normatively motivated then it really is a mere slave to the passions, and as such, irrelevant. Rationality suggests 'ratio' which is basically referring to weighing or measurement, and in moral relativism there is nothing to weigh or measure reasons against.
Quoting S
No it isn't; not if you are merely arguing that it is better because you prefer it. And under the presumption of moral relativism you are not justified in arguing from any other criteria.
Quoting S
All this asserts is what your preferences and beliefs are; why should I care?
What is or isn't normatively compelling is completely irrelevant in meta-ethics.
Quoting Janus
Lol. The normative is of significance in normative ethics, not meta-ethics.
You are making a very good example of why the distinction matters.
This is nonsense, since ethics is essentially a normative discipline, and so-called meta-ethics is nothing if it not a part of that. Don't be relying on your incoherent distinction to avoid trying to argue cogently for a position which cannot be argued cogently (since all arguments are normatively motivated and assessed according to normative principles).
Boy, this is very "meta" now. Yes, I care enough to at least analyse whether or not what you're raising is genuinely a problem and respond with the results of my analysis, and then argue in support of my conclusion and so on.
I mean, we can take this to a meta-meta-meta-meta... level if you really want to. You keep ironically reinforcing the distinction you've explicitly denied.
Quoting Janus
Okay. On that we agree at least.
Quoting Janus
And if one has other priorities, then it will be different. But either way, this doesn't get to the heart of the issue. This is not the objectivity that I am rejecting. I do not see that as meta-ethically relevant, though it is relevant in some other context.
Quoting Janus
But this is where meta-ethical beliefs are irrelevant. The distinction between what is the case meta-ethically, what people meta-ethically believe, and what people normatively believe in ethics, is very important and very useful. The key point is that morality functions in spite of the meta-ethics.
And besides, as has been pointed out before multiple times, it is not correct to associate moral relativism with amoralism, moral nihilism, or anarchy in the sense of chaos and disorder, indifference, everything being equal, and so on. Again, this is a common misperception. It is just as functional as simplistic notions of morality per moral absolutism. Moral judgement doesn't lose any force, it doesn't mean that there's no right or wrong or better or worse. It actually interprets those terms in a way that makes them meaningful and true, unlike the nonsense and falsehood of moral absolutism and moral objectivism.
Quoting Janus
No, you misunderstand and are not representing my position well. It is more about independence than isolation. I rectified these errors in understanding earlier on in my exchange with T Clark. I acknowledge external influential factors. They are not primary. Demonstrably so in many cases. T Clark weakly appealed to factors like the government and religion. He couldn't have been any more wrong if he tried in my case! I am strongly anti- the current government, and anti- much of the prevalent religion in my society, namely Christianity. These are not the primary determining factors in my morality. I know that better than you. You are on the outside trying to glimpse inside. That is pretty naive.
Quoting Janus
Then go ahead and explain it. It is salient, but it is trivial in the sense that you're preaching to the choir with no clear point beyond that.
Quoting Janus
But of course there is. There are our feelings and values and suchlike. That is what we're weighing up moral considerations against. It is our compass. Reason is just a handy tool to connect things and to rationalise. But it's all fundamentally about feelings.
Quoting Janus
Isn't what? I'm not sure what you're referring to there.
Anyway, when I say that it is better, obviously I mean that it is better in accordance with my standard. That's what everyone effectively means, whether they realise it or not.
And what is my standard upon analysis? It is subjective. It is feelings.
Moral objectivism doesn't have a leg to stand on.
Quoting Janus
You don't have to, but that's simply what morality is. We express our thoughts and feelings about the stuff of ethics, stuff we tend to care about a lot. Your error is to treat it as though it is like mathematics or science or something. It isn't. It is more like psychology. Rationalist interpretations of morality are categorically mistaken, and have been dead in the water since Hume.
But if your morality were based only on your personal preferences, and you were satisfied with that then nothing anyone raises could be a problem for you, then no argument could be against your position and hence would not be worth arguing against. It would be like arguing that your preference for beef over lamb was somehow mistaken.
To discuss anything is to seek normative agreement, For anything to be worth arguing over is for it to be potentially subject to normative agreement, but that is impossible in the case of moral relativism.
So to answer what might be considered to be the meta-ethical question "What do moral judgements consist in?" with something like "They are nothing more than personal preferences", is to ignore the reality of cultural and normative influences on the individual.
And further to that if they were nothing more than personal preferences based on feeling (and I am not denying that they are that, only that they are not nothing more than that) then they are not properly moral at all, since they would then have no moral significance. In other words you would just be acting, not morally, but as your feelings dictate, just as animals do. (This is not to deny that the instinctive behavior of animals towards their own kind is not normative and cannot be seen as a kind of quasi-morality).
Quoting S
What "other (moral) priorities" could one who wishes to live in society have? The whole idea of morality consists in thinking of others. So if you had. for example, an "other priority" that consisted in exploiting others without consideration for their feelings or welfare, then that would amount to thinking only about yourself and your own feelings, and hence would not count as moral at all, but rather amoral. If someone acts against their own moral principles, then they are acting immorally. If someone has no moral principles, which would be the case if someone were to kill people without remorse, then they would be acting amorally.
Quoting S
I may have been pointed out, but it is not compelling; it just doesn't stand up to scrutiny. If moral relativism consists in saying that it is OK to believe whatever is in accordance with your feelings about how to act towards others, then that just is an amoral, morally nihilistic, anarchic view. In that sense the very idea of moral relativism is a contradiction in terms.
Quoting S
I don't believe that individuals are morally independent in any significant sense. I made this point before to Terrapin; an artist is not isolated from influence, but they may be creatively independent in the sense that they can produce an original synthesis. This is not the case with moral stances; there are no original stances when it comes to questions about the rightness of murder, rape, theft, deception and so on. There is really very little variation on those generic question other than for or against, and actually there is even less variation than that since almost everyone is against murder, rape, theft and deception.
Quoting S
It is not merely that they are "equal in kind", but that they are equal insofar as on the presumption of moral relativism there is no rational reason to prefer one over the other. The fact that moral relativists do prefer one over the other does not indicate that there are any rational justifications for any of those preferences, because they are preferences based only on self-interest or feeling.
Quoting S
There is no need for rational justification if you are a moral relativist, because you are simply following your feelings. If those feelings happen to be kind, then good, but that does not make them moral. Animals have kind feelings towards their own; does that make them moral beings? Something more is needed, and that something more consists in thinking that it is important to care about your fellows, even if you don't naturally feel that way.
Quoting S
Isn't what? Isn't
Quoting S
because if you are a consistent moral relativist you won't expect anyone to be interested in your reasons for your moral judgements since they are merely based on your feelings and not on any normative considerations. In fact it isn't possible for you, as a consistent moral relativist, to 'explain the truth in (your) claim that (your) moral judgement is better than someone else's" because any such explanation will necessarily appeal to normative values that you have no business appealing to. All you could consistently say is "I feel my moral judgement is better than yours, so there!" to which the other will likely retort "So what?".
Quoting S
No, I don't treat it like that at all. As I said a few times moral philosophy is more an art than a science, and similarly as with aesthetics there are qualities which determine the value of works that are more than merely a matter of personal preference, even though, since art has no strict utility, it is even harder than it is with ethics to say precisely what those qualities are.
No, [i]that's[/I] nonsense, and is the cause of much of your confusion. It is [I]about[/I] ethics. It has a different aim to normative ethics. It aims to explain what morality is, not what it is good for, which is that same mistake someone else made earlier. Saying that a particular meta-ethical framework is better or valuable or does more good than another because it leads to more beneficial consequences, given your [i]personal[/I] value about a harmonious society, will continue to be [i]fallacious[/I], given the context, which is not what is good, or most good, but rather [i]what is the case[/I].
I appreciate that you've put a lot of work into a lengthy response and somehow the few paragraphs I'm going to offer back does not seem to do it justice, but I think we've reached a point where we are just repeating ourselves, and mainly with paradigmatic statements, not arguments.
I get what you're saying, but I disagree. I think that, in the fields where moral decisions are made, the 'way the world is' is sufficiently complex that no single model stands out as being objectively best with the clarity you believe. Of course, there are models which are so bad they can be discarded from consideration, but that still leaves most options that normal adult humans consider, in play.
My reasons for this are;
Moral positions relate to the effect actions have on people. Fields covering the effects on people are mainly psychology, sociology and human biology. None of these fields has the rigour of basic physics (or even chemistry) and to treat them as such is a mistake. Models can, and frequently do, come completely undone as new information emerges, and multiple models exist simultaneously.
Models are devised and popularised by human beings and human beings are not perfect rational creatures, they are subject to bias, ignorance and error. Multiplying the number of people involved may limit error, but there is no good reason to believe it will limit bias because in many cases all those involved will share the same bias. All medical researchers, for example, have invested in a career in medicine. Every single one of them has a bias in favour of the value of a medical solution to a problem because they have dedicated their lives to that very thing.
Most models are complex. This means they rapidly become quite unpredictable over long periods of time. Even your sacred cow of the success of vaccination has only been measured over a few decades. What about 100 years, 1000 years? Do you think anyone has any hope of reliably predicting the effects on societies over those timescales?
Most models are multivariate and, given their complexity, this makes them extremely vulnerable to minor variations in starting conditions, especially over the long term. We can quite accurately predict the weather tomorrow. We can have a good guess at the weather next week. We haven't a clue what the weather will be this time next month. You keep referring to similar starting values, without taking proper account of the plural. If our only goal were dental health, then maybe brushing our teeth is objectively the way to go about it, but that is never our only goal. You use this nebulous concept of 'utility' but how do you define that, and what of the others who will inevitably disagree with your definition? What we want of a 'perfect' society, is actually a very broad collection of states.
Basically my feeling is that, in the face of such uncertainty, feeling good about one's decisions is more important than the extremely fragile result of some utilitarian calculus. That's not to say that these models are useless, far from it. I think it vitally important that when one's approach is overwhelmingly contradicted by the evidence, one is well advised to change it, but the key word here is 'overwhelmingly'. Not only is a preponderance of evidence not enough, but most of importantly, I personally must be overwhelmed by it, not others telling me I should be.
I conclude from that that you don't know what morality is, or you deliberately conflate two different things, which is illogical. The error is clear to see with an analogy. What you're doing is like answering the question of what a drill is by saying that a drill is good for making holes. That's absurd, as it clearly doesn't answer the question, it treats it as though it was a different question. A drill is not a "good for making holes": that's its purpose or design or a benefit of it. It is an object made of materials like plastic and metal.
:smile:
Well put. I'm not convinced that the strictures societies place upon their members are moral laws, though. I think they're just pragmatic strictures, put in place because they were found (by society) to be necessary for social and co-operative living. I suppose we can call them what the hell we like, but I see more pragmatism than morality. YMMV, of course. :wink:
You seem to be conflating the idea of empirical evidence and "proof." You want certainty of the claim, not just evidence of it. But (a) we can't actually prove empirical claims, (2) surveying every single person wouldn't provide empirical proof even if it were possible (to prove empirical claims), because, for example (i) someone could be dishonest in their survey responses, and (ii) their view can change over time, so even if people couldn't be dishonest, we'd need to survey everyone all the time.
Quoting Janus
??? I did address that, I just didn't quote your text when I addressed it. Here's a copy/paste of my response to that:
"Both inherent properties and validity are category errors here, so that's hardly a criticism of moral relativism.
"But yeah, from a perspective that's completely irrelevant to morality, and completely irrelevant to any person's view, all moral stances are equal."
If that's what you're referring to re it seeming like gibberish to you, just clarify that.
Quoting Janus
That's the only sense in which I use that term. Hence, especially if folks are using a sense not related to truth (if the sense is related to truth it's a category error), my asking for clarification from others above re just what sense they're using.
Quoting Janus
This simply ignores my comments about harmoniousness (if normative), re preferring harmoniousness, and the same thing would go for appropriateness and whatever non-truth sense of validity you might be using. You're talking about preferences that people have.
What is (at least an example of) my disagreement with it a la a quote that I'm disagreeing with?
The last post of mine addressed to you prior to this was simply a service, a more complete/detailed explanation of the ideas.
Quoting tim wood
Again, I said nothing suggesting otherwise.
It would simply amount to arguing over whether there is any evidence of the world, independently of persons, making a judgment (or whatever word you'd want to substitute that doesn't imply persons doing something) to the effect of "slavery is wrong."
Because aside from evidence of that, all we have is evidence of people telling us whether they feel that slavery is wrong or not, and some of them tell us that slavery isn't wrong. So their perspective is a circumstance in which slavery isn't wrong.
But if there's evidence that the world outside of persons makes such judgments (or whatever we want to call them), then we could at least say that the person who said "slavery isn't wrong" got what the world is like incorrect, assuming that's what they were trying to do, assuming they were trying to match what the world is like independently of them.
That's really only going to work if the "starting values" are pretty specific. It wouldn't work if the starting value was something like "it's is morally wrong to harm people," because people are going to disagree on what amounts to harm with a normative connotation, they're going to say things like, "Where there are competing interests, someone is going to be harmed no matter what we do, so we need to invoke a caluculus" and then they'll disagree on the relative weights of things, and so on.
I'd agree that all moral arguments are equal from any objective perspective, but I'd add that an objective perspective is a category error when we're talking about morality.
It's no different than saying something like "All flavors of ice cream are identical to the pavement." That's true in a sense, but only because pavement is the sort of thing that can't taste anything at all, so there are going to be no flavors to the pavement. Focusing on pavement when we're talking about flavors is a category error. When we're talking about flavors, we need to talk about the sort(s) of thing that are capable of taste.
Quoting Janus
The purpose according to whom? Or are you going to make a category error there, too? People are the only sorts of things that have purposes.
"Talk about what ethics is ontologically," "talk about how we can know ethical stances," etc. is conventionally named "metaethics." If you don't like calling it that, that's fine, but conventionally that's what it's called.
And would you claim that reason is something that occurs independently of persons?
(I don't want to ignore the rest of your post, but I don't want to overlook the question I just asked you above, either)
First, this is pure speculation, and it's dubious at that. But we can ignore that, and ignore the problems with a term like "harmonious" and just say as a given that it's a fact that a society in which murder was considered virtuous could not survive for long.
The question then is, "Well, so what?" How does that fact have any implication for anything?
Quoting Janus
I have no idea where you'd be getting that idea from. Has any moral relativist ever said anything like that? Under moral relativism, normative criteria are relative (and subjective on the subjectivist brand of moral relativism).
Quoting Janus
A hypothetical person with no preferences would indeed not be able to find a reason to prefer one moral stance over the other, no matter what the person were to look at. The very idea of that doesn't make any sense. We'd be wondering if a person who has no preferences in domain D might gain preferences in domain D as an implication or upshot of examining some set of facts (such as the fact that J prefers m, K prefers n, etc.), or the fact that A causes B. They wouldn't, because no set of facts implies any preference. That's just the point. So it's an argument in favor of the relativist position, not an argument against it.
The person might develop preferences based on simple exposure to something they weren't previously familiar with (if John never heard jazz before and then starts listening to a lot of jazz, he might develop (or learn he had) preferences for some of it), but that's a factor of how their brain works, and then it would turn out that it's not true that the person has no preferences after all.
Quoting Janus
As if anyone prefers anything for a reason other than preferences.
Your source argument is certainly the best argument against objective morality - but the argument is based a proposition that can not be shown to be true.
At its core, i think the entire argument for relative morality rests on one core proposition, that is not true.
The core of the relative moral arguments is -
P1 - there is no God
P2 - since there is no God - the source of morality is human
There is no support that P1 is true or false
So this is the core belief that leads to rather interesting points.
Things like truth is relative, murder is relative, Slavery is relative, etc etc
In my view it has absolutely nothing to do with what the merits of one versus the other would be. It has to do with which one is the way the world really is.
Look at it this way: let's say that we make the argument over whether Jack is a multimillionaire versus being homeless and having to depend on handouts about the relative merits of one versus the other. Obviously "multimillionaire" is going to win out there (well, at least for most people). The problem is that it's not true that Jack is a multimillionaire. Jack is homeless. So why would we pretend that he's really a multimillionaire?
That's the way I look at this issue.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Do you mean that in the sense of "It can't be proved"? No empirical claim can be proved, period. That includes proving that Jack is homeless.
There's plenty of evidence that it's true, though, and no evidence that it's false.
I think it's a mistake to see this as being about God. But maybe that's the only way that you could imagine moral objectivism being the case.
However, if God does exist, isn't God's morality just one more set of mental preferences? Or is God's morality supposed to be something different than "things that God thinks"?
I've brought this up before, including in this thread, but a problem with value objectivism (so not just moral, but aesthetic, etc.) is this: let's say that somehow, maybe because God prefers it, maybe because it's embedded into the nonmental universe in some way, etc., it's an objective fact that Brahms was a better composer than Frank Zappa. That would have no impact on the fact that I prefer Frank Zappa as a composer, that I have lots of reasons that I prefer Frank Zappa as a composer, that I'll try to persuade other people to see the merits of Frank Zappa as a composer, etc.--in other words, there's no reason to believe that it would change anything about anyone's preferences, about the way that anyone behaves and interacts with others, etc.
That's because it being a fact that God, or the world itself, etc. has a preference for A over B is practically no different than it being a fact that any random person has a preference for A over B, where that might be different than your own preference. So if you're not going to conform to your parents', or your music teachers', or your political leaders', etc. preference to Brahms over Frank Zappa just because they have a different preference than you do, why would you conform to God's, or the world's preference to Brahms over Frank Zappa just because those things have a different preference than you do?
Exactly. Morality never was a “thing”, but always the condition of a thing, and, therefore, what morality is good for, is defining itself as a condition of the human thing, from its pragmatic, albeit a priori, ground of relating that self-defined condition to a corresponding practical welfare.
Why wouldn't conditions be "things"?
Actually no you don't, you believe it has to do with the way you think the world really is. Maybe, just maybe, your view of how the world really is, is not correct.
Quoting Terrapin Station
The argument you gave me originally is the source argument, it is, as you said, what could be the source of an objective morality? I say the core assumption under that argument continues to be,
there is no god, therefore the source is human, and since it is human it is contingent in one way or another.
I am happy to give up this line of reason - if you can come up with another argument against objective morality that is not the source argument. But I will not accept as convincing any argument that rests on a core proposition that has no real truth value.
Sure. That's always the case (that it's possible for my view to be incorrect). It follows from the fact that we can't prove any empirical claim. So how do we proceed when someone is claiming that my view is incorrect? Well, I require the other person to provide evidence that something incompatible with my view is correct instead. If the other person won't provide evidence to the contrary, there's no reason for me to change my belief (which is always based on some evidence or other besides mere possibility).
(And of course, the mere fact that they consider something to be evidence isn't sufficient. The person the evidence is presented to has to assess it, has to agree that it's good evidence, that it supports the claim in question, etc.)
Quoting Rank Amateur
That's not actually my argument. As I pointed out earlier, there are plenty of objectivists who are atheists. Heck, there's even a very famous one that gets mentioned here sometimes--Ayn Rand.
I'm not going to make any assumptions about what the objective source might be. I'll leave that up to the objectivists at hand. It's their position. I don't want to put any limits on what their view might be. It's up to them to present whatever alternate view, and maybe they'll come up with something I could have never imagined. But they need to provide evidence of some objective source if they're going to make that claim (and they expect me to think the claim has any merit).
Quoting Rank Amateur
I'm not saying that's not what this is about. The issue is solely one of "where do moral stances occur?" So that's a source argument.
Understand - but all thought is not true, all thought is not correct, and we do not really know the source of all thought. I still say if you continue to peel the onion away - even this line of logic lead back to - there is no God, therefor it is human.
Not making a theist argument - just saying whether you realize it or not - that is the core proposition relative morality rests on.
Now - I am happy to get off that point and get to some more pragmatic approach. Happy to go down some road that says something along the lines of human nature, a shared consciences on many issues, or some such road. But here is where i can't get.
some people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was moral
other people at some time, and for some reason believe slavery was immoral
Both times the people were correct, and the morality of slavery changed.
All this says is whatever one thinks is infallibly morally correct for you - that is nonsense.
Simplest: conditions themselves are merely states of affairs;
Technical Point: conditions themselves are non-entities;
Technically Finer point: condition in itself cannot be intuited:
Technically Finest point: understanding cannot assign a concept to condition itself.
At its core objective vs some form of relative moral view is, a theist/atheist argument - you can point to an exception here or there maybe, but it does not change this core reality.
And since this is the core, there is no correct answer to what is the right moral view.
All we can hope for is understanding each other, not agreement
It's just important to realize that a moral relativist is never going to say that any moral stance is "infallibly morally correct." That's pretty much the opposite of moral relativism.
But states of affairs are some way that things are. Some arrangement of things.
Quoting Mww
I don't know if "entity" is any clearer.
The other two points don't make much sense to me. I don't know why we'd be talking about if they can be "intuited," and "nderstanding cannot assign a concept to condition itself" just reads like gobbledygook/word salad to me.
Of course, I don't think there's any doubt that there is no God, so I'd say there's a correct answer there, but I realize you don't agree with that.
Maybe someday when we leave this broke down palace we will know, or not.
Right, as no empirical claim is provable, period. That includes claims like "There is a refrigerator in my kitchen."
If the rest is word salad then “some way things are” is good enough.
Ok, different question.
I want to own slaves, because owning slaves will make me a bunch of money. And I really like money.
I think about it a sec, and then I decide, my moral view is slavery is morally permissible.
In your view or moral relativity, relative to myself, am I correct, slavery is morally permissible ?
I wouldn't say that you're correct relative to you. Correct/incorrect is a category error for this stuff. So you're neither correct nor incorrect. It's like asking if "slavery is morally permissible" is green or orange.
I would say that relative to your views, slavery is morally permissible, that it's morally acceptable, etc.
thanks - just to be clear - the "correct" was asking you if my understanding was correct.
Okay re "correct."
So how do you think we'd argue that relative to the person in question's views, slavery isn't morally permissible? Isn't that simply a statement of fact about what their views are? Even if you think that objectively, they're wrong, it's still the case that relative to their views, slavery is morally permissible.
Did I just turn moral relativism from what I think into what i say ?
In that case, you'd simply not be honestly reporting your moral stance. You're saying something different than your actual stance for some other motive.
Oh god, not another bad analogy relating to foodstuffs. It's not impossible that I can be convinced otherwise. My morality isn't absolutely rigid, it can change. And one technique of convincing me otherwise about something would be to appeal to my moral feelings. Maybe I initially feel that I'm in the right, but you get me to change how I feel about it. That's not unheard of. It happens. And my meta-ethical relativism has no bearing on that. It would be exactly the same if I had almost any other meta-ethical position. It is a fallacy of the moral objectivist to think that an objective morality would make it easier to convince me otherwise. And this fallacy has already been noted by others in this discussion.
And besides, even preferences about food can change, in part due to emphasising the perceived merits or demerits.
Quoting Janus
No, that isn't impossible, that's just the same gross misunderstanding.
Quoting Janus
Oh dear. Mistake after mistake. You're not on top form today, Janus! I've explicitly acknowledged external influences, and rightly dismissed them as having much less of a primary role in determining my morality than other more fundamental factors.
Quoting Janus
Well, if you intend to say something relevant about my position rather than someone's else's, then you should note that I talk about moral feelings. Other animals don't have moral feelings, or at least that's controversial to suggest. We are moral agents with moral feelings which are the foundation of our moral judgements. You can't rightly say that about chickens or budgies, or at least not without much controversy.
Quoting Janus
That's a load of rubbish. Morality is not necessarily social or altruistic. They are merely positions in ethics. They contrast with individualism and egoism, which are equally positions in ethics. You are once again confusing your personal moral values for morality itself.
Quoting Janus
The same comment I made above applies here also.
Quoting Janus
The antecedent suggests an unwarranted assumption. I wouldn't be acting against my own moral principles. So why are you talking about that?
Quoting Janus
Again, why are you talking about this? This says more about your own unwarranted assumptions than anything that I've said.
Quoting Janus
Obviously it won't be compelling to anyone who is stuck in their own misunderstandings about it.
Quoting Janus
Well, good for you, but they demonstrably are.
Quoting Janus
Their work is unique, and so is my morality, because it is uniquely mine, and founded on that which is unique to me, like my thoughts and feelings. An artist and an individual moral agent have this in common. Thanks for giving me a good analogy.
Quoting Janus
Doesn't matter. Just because I have things in common with others, that obviously doesn't mean that I'm not unique, and uniqueness makes my point rather than your point about originality. I don't really care about your point about originality, and I needn't. That's the good thing about individualism. I forge my own path. I do not require your approval. Your judgement has no authority over me.
Quoting Janus
It's not a matter of being rational. Feelings aren't rational.
Quoting Janus
If that's supposed to be a criticism, it is ineffectual. It is a category error to seek rational justification in something that isn't a matter of rationality.
Quoting Janus
There can be rational justification on a level, but not at the core. It would be naive to seek one from the core.
Quoting Janus
You have no authority to make that announcement. But if you're just expressing your own personal opinion, then that's fine.
Quoting Janus
Other animals aren't moral agents.
Quoting Janus
Yes, something more is needed: moral agency. The rest is just more personal opinion stemming from personal values, but stated as though it is something more than that.
Quoting Janus
What isn't isn't what? Isn't it? Or is it?
Wait, what?
Quoting Janus
I'm just going to dismiss this. At this stage, I'm tired of trying to get sense out of it, when there probably isn't any sense to be found anyway.
Quoting Janus
This is where psychology is handy, I think. Neitzche recognised the importance of psychology in relation to morality. It is handy as a tool, because although you're talking, I think that what you're actually doing and your reasons for doing it matter more. Your talking is actually kind of meaningless. It isn't about consistency at all, it is about you making a judgement about me on the basis that I am a moral relativist. You do not judge that I am deserving of "the right" to make moral evaluations, just because I am a moral relativist, and you disapprove of moral relativists for whatever reason. It doesn't have to be logical, and it probably isn't. You've basically already admitted to a guilt by association fallacy. Yours is a prejudiced and authoritarian judgement. Note the language: "You have no business!". The great irony is that you seem to think that you're being more rational than emotive, when in reality it is the opposite. "Boo moral relativism!".
Quoting Janus
Art isn't best made sense of by taking a rationalist approach either.
I don't agree with the last phrase. Right and wrong in this context are simply another way of saying whether someone holds moral position P or not-P. In other words, we have to be talking about moral right and wrong, and that's only a matter of someone thinking x is/should be morally permissible, y should be morally prohibited, etc. It's not the case that from any perspective, both P and not-P are right or wrong unequivocally.
Not that I expect anyone to read the whole thread, but I addressed this above:
"Basically, one needs to ferret out other stances that the person has, and then try to appeal to them via those stances. In other words, it's a matter of "trying to talk them into something" using things that they already accept/that they're already comfortable with, to try to lead them to a different conclusion. Or, this is similar to the traditional sense of what an ad hominem argument is--it's a matter of appealing to views the person already has, appealing to their biases, to push them to a different view. (But in this case, the ad hominem approach isn't a fallacy, because we're not even dealing with things that are true or false, correct or incorrect, though it is necessarily manipulative.)
"At that, it might not be possible to persuade the person to a different position. "Hitler didn't do anything morally wrong" might be foundational for them, for example, so that it doesn't rest on any other views they have. Or their stances might be so situation-specific that there's not a sufficient way to generalize that would lead them to different stances. "
Quoting Janus
Well, or it's to note that the cultural and normative influences aren't themselves moral stances. In terms of literally, what they are on a physical level, they're sounds that other people make, motions they make, marks they make (writing), etc. They don't literally contain meaning, for example. As sounds, marks, motions, they're not identical to judgments/assessments.
Speaking of reason, I didn't see you answer if you were claiming that reason exists independently of persons.
Just a question. If, in a future world, some evil genius had arranged things such that torturing an innocent child brought about a harmonious society, would that make torturing the child morally right? Because that's the way your argument sounds.
Basically I can only see two ways things that 'moral' could mean as a class of actions. Either it describes a feeling - actions which feel this way are those we're calling 'moral'. Or it describes a logical outcome - actions which bring about x are those we're calling 'moral'.
Being of a Wittgensteinian bent, I'm not of the opinion that one is right and the other wrong by virtue of their correspondence with the world. They're just words and they mean whatever we use them for. But...
This is the reason I asked the opening question. Would you really have no moral qualms at all about torturing an innocent child simply by virtue of someone having demonstrated to your satisfaction that doing so would bring about a harmonious society (ot whatever else we take x to be)? I ask, because I very much doubt either of you would. Which means that the term 'moral' is a term we apply to action which we feel a certain way about, not actions which bring about some end.
Than would you say moral relativism would require the individual moral judgements to be authentic and honest need to be in accord with one’s conscience
I can get very very close to that.
Did you even read my post?
That's exactly what I asked. Reason is not a thing on its own. It does not, on its own provide answers. It is a means, not an end. To what end do you wish to apply reason? That is what I am asking.
Yes, the difference being that we generally speak of 'thinking' as a means to and end, and of 'feeling' as something which merely occurs to one unbidden. To what end should this 'thinking' be put? What are we 'thinking' for?
But none of that captures morality. If I wish to join two pieces of wood, I might make an argument that nailing them together would be a good move. This is a reasonable solution. What's that got to do with morality?
Not to correct, but to suggest........
......there are not moral propositions; there are propositions that determine, or are the expression of, morality. The moral quality of an expression is explicit in its compliance. All propositions are subject/predicate constructions, so if a proposition uses a principle of will for the subject and uses a logically relevant action conforming to the principle for the predicate, there is a moral determination contained in it, it is an expression of morality, and as a matter of mere convention, is inaptly called a moral proposition. It can now be said no proposition having moral implications is impervious to reason, because reason is absolutely necessary in its construction.
The subjective relativitism arises in the choice of the principle as the subject of the proposition, and by necessity of law, the action in the predicate. Morality arises in the compliance between the latter to the former, re: favorable treatment is always in my best interest (the principle), therefore I ought to treat others in their best interest (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself a moral agent proper. Similarly, the strong are naturally more apt to thrive (the principle), therefore, to thrive, even if I am not strong, I ought to prey on the weaker (the action), whereby compliance is met and I am authorized to call myself moral proper.
Nothing whatsoever to do with feelings, and such sentimental emotivist tomfoolery, nosiree, bob!!
What?
This debate is about what 'morality' is, so it makes no sense to use the term as having an assumed meaning within your argument. And what does 'pure of reason' even mean?
Quoting tim wood
This is just garbage.
Quoting tim wood
Yes, obviously. Hitler clearly was not horrified by what he did, so it's pretty irrefutable that one man's horror is just another man's stretching out. Are you suggesting that Hitler was horrified by what he did?
No, I didn’t distinguish argument, imperative, or proposition as such, from each other, anyway. These certainly can be distinguished, depending on the philosophical/ethical domain one works from.
What you’re describing, I think, is relativism writ large, one’s anthropological or psychological view opposed to another’s, but moral relativism isn’t so large. Besides, there’s so many damn -ism’s and sub-ism’s and sub-sub-ism’s in relativism, it’s like those guys can’t figure it out wtf their talking about.
But 'horrified' is not a state of reason, it is an emotion. So why can a relativist not be horrified?
Quoting tim wood
Right. This is why I asked the question in the first place. In in the scenario I described, I, a moral relativist, would not torture the child because to do so feels abominable. A feeling, not a rational conclusion to some calculus. Your argument seems to be that moral action is the 'correct' result of some calculus. So if the calculus came out with the result of torturing the child, would you do it? Or is there some feature of the world which prevents that from ever being the result, if so, what is it, and why is it impossible to remove?
Right, well that's moral relativism for a start. If you assign a value, not a value is pre-assigned. If you're doing the assignment of value, then what is to prevent others for assigning other values in the same circumstances?
Quoting tim wood
Absolutely. One of the main reasons why I'm so opposed to utilitarianism. The calculus is far too complicated for anyone to have a chance of working it all out correctly.
Quoting tim wood
So which is it in this case, and why?
As I said, I don’t hold with moral propositions per se, but rather with propositions expressing moral implications, and of a particular construction. So, with respect to your examples, I wouldn’t consider them moral expressions because, while, i.e., “slavery is bad” may be considered a subjective principle, it doesn’t have an action, or, if you wish, an imperative, associated with it.
Apodeitic means clearly established, indisputable. A priori means absent immediate experience, but possibly derivable from mediate experience. Given the latter form, an apodeitic, a priori moral expression might be, my suicide is contradictory to the purpose of Nature, therefore never permit the possibility of my own suicide.
If you’re looking for an expression suitable apodeitically to all humanity, I’m not so sure, simply from the nature of reason itself. Whatever one’s reason can think, another’s reason can re-think. One would have to reduce the substance so far as to become almost meaningless. If it be given reason is common to all human interests, then an objectively valid moral expression might be, all inter-personal connections aim towards community based on reason, therefore always reason in favor of an action as if it were universal law.
Relativism cannot stand up to that, but then......neither can humanity.
So thoughts, desires? They don't need mind to exist?
Quoting tim wood
For one, it matters for an argument that morality is objective because it is based on reason. If reason isn't objective, then that doesn't work as an argument for the objectivity of morality.
It also matters for how we know whether some claim of reason is correct rather than just a statement of how some individual(s) happens to think. If reason is something aside from that, then when there's a dispute we can simply check the mind-independent stuff we're referring to to see who is right about it (assuming that people are really making a claim about mind independent stuff, and aren't simply making a claim about how they happen to think in the first place).
Yes--it's simply a matter of whether something is really the judgment someone is making or not. We can't say it's their moral judgment if the utterance in question isn't really the judgment they make. (At least not ideally--again, they could be lying to us, and we might not have very good clues to tell us that they are . . . )
Torturing an innocent child could never bring about a harmonious society, so I cannot see that such a far out thought experiment has any bearing on what I have been arguing. As I see it morality is based on moral feeling, a feeling which most basically consists in the empathic desire not to hurt others, and that moral feeling is normative insofar as it is shared by most people.
Society could not be harmonious if most of its members did not have such feelings. Those who don't have such feelings, if they want to participate in human communities, will still have to adhere in their actions to the mores which naturally evolve out of such feelings.
Of course fearful self-interest can undermine feelings of empathy; to imagine what a society where those feelings no longer predominate would look like, imagine what would happen if food supplies to supermarkets were radically disrupted due to curtailment of the fuel supply.
How would we know such things, unless you're just defining them tautologously to things like if a child is ever tortured . . . but then that wouldn't be telling us much besides how you're choosing to use a word.
OK. So what is it about the world which makes this impossible? Is there some fact about the way the world is which prevents torturing a child, say in one generation, from being the start of a long chain of causative links which eventually end with an harmonious society which persists for the remainder of the earth's existence?
Quoting Janus
If it is a feeling, why must those who don't feel it, feel it. Why is it normative simply because it is shared by most people? I'm not seeing the link between 'shared by most people' and 'everyone must feel this way'.
It's normative because its the feeling or the kind of feeling that allows people to live together more or less harmoniously.
I've said all I'm going to say in this thread. I lack the time or energy required to continue responding unproductively to what appears to me as so many distortions and so much sophistry from some of those here.
The "I can't actually address the objections brought up, but I'm not about to drop my spiel" tactic.
But now we're back where we started. If a feeling that one should torture a child turned out (by some convoluted chain of events) to bring about an harmonious society later down the line, does that make it morally OK to do it?
If not, then making an harmonious society is clearly not what determines that which is moral. If it just wouldn't be possible, then what physical law prevents such a scenario?
It's a question, how can a question be distortion and sophistry?
Yes. The irony of accusing us of sophistry.
Ultimately I agree with this, but I think you understate how much rationally persuasive wiggling room we can derive from comparing/discarding bad models alone (and remaining skeptical/waiting for evidence concerning "best" models; all we need is reasonably "better").
When we consider "what should we do next" by wondering what is the most optimal possible course of action, we run into severe problems of data gathering and computation, and there will always be possible courses of action we have yet to consider, which might be even more optimal for our given values. The most coherent way I think we can talk about these kinds of considerations is to put them on a spectrum of less morally praiseworthy to more morally praiseworthy (obligation flies out the window, because we're much more aligned about what we want to avoid than we are in our visions of a perfect future). Sometimes we can say with reasonable confidence that some positive (and complex) sets of actions are better than others, but by their very nature these positions are less certain and fundamentally tentative.
When we consider "what should we do next" by wondering first what courses of action we can rule out as sub-optimal (usually by comparing them to their absence) we can get much more rational confidence behind us given that we only need consider two courses of action and their possible outcomes (opposed to all possible courses of action). The resulting statements of negative moral obligation amount to things like "don't murder and torture people" and "don't gouge your eyes out". In practice this moral approach captures an arguably greater portion of moral conclusions at large: usually, but not always, moral arguments seek to forbid us from taking specific courses of action (a negative obligation stemming from a negative conclusion), but sometimes they seek to establish positive obligations from positive conclusions (e.g: worshiping god on Sunday is morally obligatory); the former sort of moral proposition is usually the more well founded (and testable)).
When it comes to actions like vaccines, it's fundamentally a harder argument to make (especially to say that vaccines are the best possible or morally optimal course of action), but if we focus on just comparing taking vaccines to not taking vaccines, we have a decent shot at coming to reasonable conclusions about which action is "better" in general (it was never really in contention for "best"). Strictly speaking, it would be more ideal if we had technology that could eliminate diseases in the first place; such a technology is probably possible, but we don't yet have access to it. Moving from the general case to the specific case, differing particular circumstances (such as compromised immune system and age) do change the calculus of whether or not vaccines are better than no vaccines, but here perhaps we can make an even more confident conclusion about which option is better because we can move beyond the general statistical assessment to become more precise. We will never know with absolute precision whether a given vaccination will be better or worse in the long run, but reasonable people can be convinced by reasonable evidence (maybe that's a naive mantra; I have to assume/hope that it's not). If I give you an unweighted dice with six sides, and all sides but one displays a value of 6, you would be remiss to bet on anything but 6, statistically speaking.
Quoting Isaac
It's actually very interesting that psychology and sociology should rank high on your list of considerations to make. High on my list are things like economics (which is in truth a lot more sophisticated than many people realize), medical science (which admittedly has it's weak areas), game-theory, complexity science (an interdisciplinary approach to heuristically modeling complex systems), and a spat of other useful perspectives that are typically related to moral quandaries.
It really reveals the way in which your perspective of morality is more focused on the relative and subjective way people feel about moral values,and also their actions, as opposed to the more strict empirical approach I take to the way actions conform to relative values in the first place. How people feel about actions can ultimately affect their values (hence the emergence of virtue ethics, which is in my view ultimately confusing an imaginary value inherent to actions with their situational utility), so in practice I don't expect to always manage to disentangle the two, but at some point I'm willing to depart from subjective feelings pertaining to actions or their outcomes in favor of an empirical (or our best effort at empirical) attempt to quantify whether or not actions comport with reported values in an objective sense (even if I need to meta-ethically disregard their virtues as value-utility-proxies). If someone wants to go on living as a primary moral value, but they believe that the actions, or lack of actions, required to stay alive are for whatever reasons are not really required for survival, as an observer we could say they have made a mistake (a statistically bad gamble) (and in hindsight, if they die because of it, we might even say so with approximate certainty).
To unite the semantic difference between us, we can imagine that how people feel about proposed actions is actually a values-report; that the way people feel about actions actually impacts their values hierarchy, such that relativism keeps it "true for them" that their actions serve their actual moral values. While this is a sensical interpretation, I can still make room for my position in so far as a given value-hierarchy might not actually be internally consistent, and also in so far as the way perceptions of actions actually affect people's values-hierarchies is malleable to reason based persuasion. We can challenge values hierarchies directly by exploring how one of their values (or the action which serves it) forseeably subverts one of their more fundamentally important values. We can also, and mainly, mitigate the subjectivity in how proposed actions are perceived by more objectively exploring the ramifications of proposed actions. So long as people believe we can say they are neither right nor wrong from the strict relativist standpoint, but in practice, if we can get people to change their mind then the statement "morally incorrect/immoral/morally inferior" actually does have relevant and consistent meaning within relativism.
Quoting Isaac
Vaccines might be extraordinarily dis-eugenic, you're right, but these are risks of a different nature. The first vaccines took the form of crushed up scabs from people who survived the pox being snorted/blown into the nasal cavity. Back then they had no sweet clue what was going on, but the immediate benefits were apparent enough for them to assume a causal link. They indeed had no way of knowing that many generations down the line this practice might one day lead to a dependence on foreign intervention into our immune systems, but the costs of what you're describing are truly horrific. To ensure that future generations will have robust immune systems, we either need to let people die naturally from disease, or we would need to sterilize anyone deemed too weak to survive a disease without the vaccine. The price of eugenic progress (or even keeping our current eugenic health) is the hardhearted natural or artificial selection. Some people will fundamentally believe that the upward health of future generations is more important than any amount of happiness, including access to life, for ourselves and our more immediate descendants.
Most people just aren't willing to extend their sphere of moral consideration that far. Like anti-natalism, once self-consideration has been completely mitigated or removed from a moral equation, it becomes something else entirely: an incompatible set of moral values. Thankfully most people don't go that far, else we would not permit ourselves to thrive if it posed any risk to others.
Quoting Isaac
I would say that in the face of relative uncertainty we're forced to go with our guts, but the results of our evolving decision-making fields do tend to be more reliable than reading the portents from sheep-guts. By "utilitarian calculus" I'm trying to point to higher quality evidence based assessments (wanna-be calculations) of the outcomes of proposed actions in the first place. I realize that people will go with their guts, but it's also apparent that more experienced and well-informed guts make more reliable decisions. Magnus Carlsen or Bobby Fischer can only be trusted when they tell you what chess move you should make, but I'm not saying we're obligated to do what they say, or even that they're always right. The crux of my point is that it is most important for us to try to become experienced and informed, like them, that we too can make more reliable decisions (that we're sometimes impelled to trust preeminent experts on specific matters is not a complication we cannot use reason to assess). No matter what your values are, relatively speaking, being able to better serve them by avoiding the bad moves and tending toward better moves is in my view the most significant way to assess the meta-ethical quality of a framework or proposed action in an of itself (relative values aside).
It's not a perfect approach (or one that seeks perfection), but the vector of reason and evidence is hopefully a more persuasive method. If we have to redefine what we mean by some words in some contexts to expose more of that overwhelming persuasive power, that's what matters. In practical moral debate we just can't meaningfully bring the moral-epistemic implications of relativism without also neutering the persuasive power of our language; if and where we have fundamentally different starting values, to import relativism would be to give up an attempt to influence their values directly. If we don't need to influence their values because they are not in competition with our own, then we don't need relativism at all; we can focus on how our moral agreements empirically serve (or more easily: do not disservice) our mutually compatible values.
---
Despite my addiction to verbosity and post length, I think I'm getting a clearer picture of the differences between our views as our discussion progresses. Thanks for your patience!
I don’t even read your posts because they’re so long. I’m being lazy, though. I just read your opening few sentences, then skipped to this last part.
I'm well aware of contracting attention spans in the era of click bait. You would be better off having read the second to last paragraph:
Quoting VagabondSpectre
That one paragraph doesn't fully summarize the entire post though...
I've considered making TL;DRs, but all that would really do is to encourage laziness. If we could really compact all this communication into denser language without sacrificing precision and our ability to locate meaningful differences, we would probably be doing that in the first place.
At some point additional information becomes superfluous to the point of a post, but I would rather err on the side of too long and have a better shot at meaningful exchanges than err on the side of to short and risk passing (and speak past) each other like ships in the rhetorical dark.
I find it cognitively underwhelming to only read or write in curt and simplistic fashion :wink: .
To be fair I think my writing style has its moments, though the volume can be off-putting to some; my downright playful overuse of the semi-colon, for instance...
Not what I was saying at all.
I know, I'm only joshing ya!
Quoting Isaac
I haven't accused you of distortion and sophistry...yet...I had thought you are one of the more reasonable respondents in this thread.
Although the way you frame the question does distort the sense of what I said regarding the purpose of morality being to engender harmonious human community. I have been arguing that moral feelings and thoughts are always aimed at social harmony. Introducing a ridiculous thought experiment involving a scenario where somehow killing one baby is supposed to produce (what, endless?) social harmony somehow by magic has nothing whatsoever to do with what I had been saying.
It is not "making an harmonious society" (whatever that could even mean) that determines that which is moral; the intent to live well and harmoniously with others is what makes attendant thoughts and feelings moral thoughts and feelings. The intent to serve only your own interest is what makes attendant thoughts and feelings immoral or amoral.
As I see it, Terrapin is an unrelenting sophist, and I can't be bothered to respond to his posts. S is also tending that way, so I am done responding to him as well. To me both of these posters are more concerned with insisting ad nauseum on their own inadequate views and with winning arguments than with discussing any issue in good faith and with an open mind. I just can't be bothered with that kind of shit anymore; I've already wasted too much time on it.
The problem with all of these kinds of threads that consist in people basically shouting at one another "yes it is", "no it's not" "yes it is" "no it's not" etc. etc. etc. is that the interlocutors are starting from such basically incompatible assumptions that all that results is pages and pages of talking past one another. Such "conversations" are basically worthless shit, devoid of genuine insight, totally boring and unproductive and not worth wasting any precious time on.
I don't see how we can do this in the face of such uncertainty, without assigning an ordinal value to each option, we cannot order them, and if are admittedly unclear about the details, how can we be clear about the ordinal value we assign. Throwing out the nonsense, we agree on, the unreasoned and the insane, but all we have left after that is a pool of equally viable options. I don't se any logical reason why, in some areas, one option may not still rise slightly above the others. I see no logical reason why it might not be the case that all the options just happen to be very obviously ordinal. But I cannot see what worldy force would make this the case for all decisions.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
This is an interesting example of the sort of long-term thinking which makes rational calculus complicated. I would say that, coming down a notch from from ideal, strictly speaking it would be more ideal if we had an easy, free medical intervention which made the complications which can sometimes arise from childhood diseases a trivial matter. A deep wound often used to be a death sentence, now it is an almost trivial matter because we have antibiotics. If complications like encephalitis were to go the same way as a result of better medicines, then there would be no need for vaccinations at all, no matter how small the risk. But that's not going to happen when the world's third largest industry is currently making billions out of an injection which they can sell to every child on the planet whether they need it or not. What CEO in their right mind is going to invest in a drug which only a small number of people will need, to replace a drug they currently sell to everyone?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Again, you're missing the point because you're simply assuming knowledge rather than taking account of uncertainty. You're presuming, in this situation, that you know the dice has six sides, five of which are a 6. Of course in that situation, you would be best off betting on six. But in the situation I'm describing, vaccination particularly, you do not know that the dice has five 6's, you are told that the dice has five 6's by a relatively small group of of people. A group who have a vested interest in you betting on 6, a group who have demonstrated themselves, at least in some instances, to be untrustworthy, and incapable of understanding statistics. And on top of that, they're not even talking about your dice, just dice in general. The situation no longer seems so obvious.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
Not entirely, but it still highlights a difference between us. I don't see the point in keeping people alive if they're not going to be happy. It's people's happiness that matters to me. Why do people do risky sports? Because the increase in happiness is worth the reduced life expectancy. So psychology and sociology are important considerations. We can't just presume people want to remain alive for as long as possible at all costs, want to have as much wealth as possible at all costs. Clichéd though it sounds, this is just not the case.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
I'm in agreement with this. In contrast to some relativist, I also think that it is possible for people to simply be incorrect about how they feel. It's possible for someone to report that they feel good in a society which, for example commits FGM, but for them to be mistaken about that, and that they would, in fact, feel much better in a society which doesn't. The difference between us is simply the fact that I stop a lot earlier than you in such determinations. You seem to think that you can continue to demonstrate internal inconsistencies right down to the level of fine decision-making. I think we lose certainty so rapidly as we get more complex, that only the very basics are approachable like this.
Quoting VagabondSpectre
It's funny how often I hear this type of argument in so many fields. People seem willing to believe we live in a world of remarkable, often unimaginable, technological marvelry, and yet, when you ask them to imagine an alternative to one single aspect of it, all they can come up with is the same world but just without the thing in question.
I'm not sure I talking about a hard-hearted eugenics. I'm talking about a better system. One in which taking a prophylactic drud at birth is not the only way we can think of to tackle social infections. And I'm not talking about the disadvantages to the immune system either. I'm talking about the disadvantages (in a potential future) of having a private company responsible for injecting something into every child in the world. Are you seriously suggesting you can't see a risk there?
Quoting VagabondSpectre
We are agreed here, as I think we've now firmly established. Where we disagree is simply over the strength of evidence contradicting one's 'gut' that is required to make one change. For me it is very high, for you it seems to be merely a preponderance.
Yes, unfortunately I can because people do torture children. They do so to greater or lesser degree all the time. The insane and the psychopathic may well believe it their moral duty to torture children. Right at the other end of the scale, but still very relevant, anyone buying products resulting from child labour (but arguing that it's "someone else's problem") is complicit in minor torture of innocent children. What about the swathes of religious nutters like Calvinists who (used to) beat their children on a daily basis to "beat the devil out of them". I'm afraid there are huge sections of society who think it is morally OK, sometimes even their moral duty, to beat innocent children.
Still not understanding this "first reason" thing. How can you reason first. You must have some objective first to reason toward. Can you give me an example of how someone might arrive at any conclusion with reason alone, no objective at all?
Quoting tim wood
Yes, but I'm a deflationist about truth claims. Something "just is" if and only if, when I treat it that way, it works. The desk in front of me "just is" solid because when I treat it as such it responds as I expect. In fact, physicists seem to be telling me that the desk is not 'really' solid afterall, but, not being a physicist, I don't care.
But "murder is wrong" is not a proposition similar to "this desk is solid" because there's no test I can think of which clarifies it. I treat the desk as if it were solid and so long as it responds appropriately I'm happy to believe it is in fact solid. What would be the equivalent with murder being wrong. I treat murder as wrong and then what response should I be expecting to see if I'm right about that? Every one I can think of has problems of the sort I outlined in my scenario.
I can but even if we accept for the sake of argument that no such people exist, then all you have then is universal intersubjectivity. It doesn't get you an objective morality.
Well then please ignore my last comment.
Quoting Janus
Same problem still applies. If the intent is what makes it moral, then what of the situation where you may have to, for example, murder some innocent to save others. Your intent behind committing the murder is to save the others (the harmonious society), but that does not make you undertake the murder with relish, safe in the knowledge that it is best for the community. Something still tells you murder is wrong, even when your intention is purely the best interests of the group. If that something is not morality (because by intention, you've determined this action is, in fact, moral) then what is it?
I disagree strongly here. I don't see how you can justify that kind of accusation. What does "good faith" even mean in this context, and what types of argument are you identifying as examples of "bad faith" As far as I read the discussion, it started out with Tim simply declaring, without argument, that some things were simply "wrong". Some relativist have tried to make their case and been met with just a repeated assertion that "some things are just wrong". I tried to explain my position with a thought experiment (a perfectly normal, common philosophical tool) and you took the hump and said you weren't engaging anymore.
How is that discussing with an open mind?
What bothers me about comments like this--and they tend to be legion--is the apparent assumption that it goes without saying that the popularity (or as others prefer, "prevalence," just to avoid Aspieish confusion) of something has some significance for its normative merit. Basically it seems to be an endorsement of an argumentum ad populum. Or it's an endorsement of conformity for its own sake--as if (almost) everyone doing, saying, etc. something is a good reason to have to follow suit.
Other than the label you apply to it, is there some pragmatic difference between universal subjectivity and objectivity?
It was a question, not a comment. And I was just hoping for an honest response of what people truly think about it. Conscience seems an important concept in this discussion. Wondering if you, in your understanding of conscience and in your interaction with your own conscience, can you imagine that, without some very very small exceptions, many human consciences find needless children torture morally permissible. If your honest answer is yes, we can handle the popularity issue after that.
So what's the point of drawing attention to "except for some incredibly minute exceptions" as if that's of no importance for imagining this?
I added the "except" part because I have been on this board awhile and absolute statements would send me down 15 posts about absolutely instead of the concept at hand, thought would try and get it out of the way.
My answer would be much as Terrapin's above. The incrediblely minute exceptions are what we're talking about from a meta-ethical position. And they're important because at one time, people who thought women should be allowed to vote were the incrediblely minute exception.
To be more specific to your question. Yes, I can imagine it because, without any (to me) unnecessary 'spooky stuff' I have no reason to believe that conscience is anything other than an activity of the brain an brains vary for all sorts of different reasons. So even if you bring it down to the very basic values (by which I mean values that are not derived inductively from other more basic ones), I see no factor in the world which would prevent some brains from developing some particular base value.
A proposition is subjective if its truth value is is dependent on personal feelings, tastes or opinions (i.e. existing in someone's mind rather than the external world)
A proposition is objective if it's truth value is independent of the person uttering it.
In other words if it's subjective it reflects how people feel rather than any mind independent reality. This was essentially what the OP and the ensuing exchanges have been about.
Because it's a pet issue of mine. I see that appeal to the crowd, to the status quo, come up again and again, in all sorts of guises.
At any rate, there's no moral stance that I can't imagine someone sincerely having. I wouldn't be able to guess how common any stance would be, but I don't think that's relevant to anything. That irrelevance was just my point immediately above.
Not all moral judgement are the same, and I am not saying that there is a morally objective answer to every question. Woman voting and torturing babies are not equal.
Quoting Isaac
and yet again - a non-answer - how many 10 in 7.6 billion ? 1 % (that's 76 Million by the way) a tenth of 1% ??
so tell me the pragmatic difference between 99 % of the people in the world would have the same moral judgement and there is a near objective truth about that judgement ??
Simple, I already outlined this. It's simply not a way I recognise of using the term in a consistent manner. If one lived on an island full (for some reason) of psychopaths, all of whom felt that killing randomly was OK. If you were the only one who didn't and were unaware of the rest of the world, would that make it moral to kill randomly?
We can come up with any number of these examples, some, unfortunately are actually played out in communities in the real world. See the discussion I've been having with VagabondSpectre about FGM.
The idea that popularity is what defines actions as moral, just does not capture the way we actually feel about it. I don't have to check how popular my personal opposition to torture is before deciding whether to torture someone. I already feel it is wrong and would continue to do so even if the entire world disagreed.
Thanks for the definitions - and like I said label it as you wish, is there some pragmatic difference between 99% of the world having the same moral view about some action and a high degree of moral objectivity about that action ?
More tactic - very tiring - Of course you can guess, we all can guess - just asking for your honest guess. And, at least to me it would be a relevant point if 99% of the world held the same moral judgement on some specific issue. That would require some explanation.
you do realize that point supports objective truth don't you ?
But you don't mean some explanation do you? You've been given some explanation - evolution. You're waiting for a particular type of explanation. One involving God.
Quoting Rank Amateur
Yes, of course. Whatever gave you the impression that I was opposed to the entire concept of objective truth?
The question makes no sense. Either a moral proposition is objectively true (true independent of anybody's "moral view") or it's not. The phrase "high degree of moral objectivity" makes no sense.
no - i am happy with human nature, evolution, take your pick -
But if you don't see that there are probably a few moral questions that 99% of the people in the world, if they honestly answered what their conscience said, would have the same moral view is not an argument against there are some things that are for all practical purposes objectively wrong - then you are wed to proposition in conflict with that - sounds like religion to me.