Why is racism unethical?
Quite obviously one of the rules that is imparted in the terms of using these discussion boards on "The Philosophy Forum" is to not use racist language which will ultimately get you banned. For the record, socially and politically speaking I'm against any forms of racism (that is disruptive and causes harm) whether if enacted out socially, politically, scientifically, and even psychologically. However every so often I like to play "devil's advocate" on these subjects. When referring to ethics in relation to racism we are talking about moral principles one lives by, and in the case of a racist, society for the most part considers racism wrong because it causes harm. Quite often I've heard arguments from nationalists concerning their beliefs and may believe their ideals do not cause harm therefore aren't (in their mind) unethical. Considering that many use the tribalism argument, many believe that racism is a byproduct of human behavior, that we inherently gravitate towards "our own" (whatever that means).
Of course this discussion is not to "out a racist" on these boards but to discuss why in society do we hold this to be unethical in your words of course. I'm curious.
Of course this discussion is not to "out a racist" on these boards but to discuss why in society do we hold this to be unethical in your words of course. I'm curious.
Comments (147)
We could take height. Anyone above or below a certain height is somehow lesser. Why is that? Well, because seven feet tall people should rule the world, because they can see farther. Or something.
That sounds dumb, but little people have faced discrimination. If you're under four foot something, then society has had a tendency to think less of you. And the seven footers were probably treated like freaks at some point (before modern sports).
Besides according to the modem people defending this principle say racism is when you offend a minority. The problem with this thinking it is subjective.
Racism is supposed to be unfair or unethical treatment based on genetics that you can't control.
So why it's unethical variety from person to person but are based in the idea that all people matter.
is it always the reason for racism? That one group is better?
I think it is more to do with feelings of hatred.
And I think some of the reasons can be found in the cross-race effect, which has the effect of making it harder to distinguish individuals in another group, from others in the group, which can lead to a feeling of distrust, in members of that group, and then those feelings of fear morph into feelings of hatred in some people's minds.
Let's say a postman is a member of race A. Someone on his delivery round is a member of race B...The member of B can't easily tell the difference between members of race A, which leads to a feeling that that the postman could be anyone from group A; are they even a real postman, or a fraud; is the postman someone who has been in the news for a crime, also committed by a member of group A?....this can lead to a feeling of distrust, paranoia and fear....whereas another regular postman who is a member of group B, is easier to recognise, creates a greater gestalt, in the person who is being delivered to, and so they find it easier to trust that person, and in general, easier to trust members of his own group.
Most of the time it is caused not by hatred as someone said but by ignorance. Hatred is caused by one group of people discriminating against another.
Many times the difference between the two groups is nothing more than the resources they possess, one group wanting what the other has can be a powerful motivator to hate someone. And it is even worse when the haves start to think that the havenots are coming to take away their possessions.
Think about it, what is the most discriminated racial group in the USA? What do people say about them? They are bring down the value of our neighborhood.
They want to steal our daughters.
You cannot leave your car outside without it being stolen.
They don't hate them for the color of their skin, they hate them because they think they are going to lose something.
I think that racism is a subgroup of a type of thinking which makes assumptions about people that are not only unsubstantiated in any acceptable way but are inherently detrimental. It's a hateful and ignorant way of looking at people which is based off nothing rational or reasonable, at least most of the time.
I think racism stands out above other categories of this way of thinking because of its destructive history.
The real question isn't whether racism is wrong but being able to decide what is and what isn't racism. For example, I don't dislike Chinese people but I seriously dislike mainstream Chinese culture. The collectivism, materialism, racism, shallowness and rigidness towards discipline and image over freedom, I hate it. If I said I didn't want any Chinese immigrants because there's a high probability of them subscribing to that detestable culture, am I a racist?
If people want to retain their nations previously unambiguous ethnic identity are they still racist if they associate that with the retention of their culture and national attitudes? Is it actually untrue that immigration from different cultures won't disrupt that? Is it unfair for them to feel that way? When ethnic minorities are celebrated for wanting to preserve their own cultures?
I have my own answers to these questions but I don't think others do and that makes it very difficult for them to actually argue against what they perceive as racism. Hypocrisy is rampant, we're encouraged to celebrate ethnic histories but told it's the worst thing possible for white people to want to defend their ethnic heritage. Ethnic groups are taught to be proud of their heritage but white people bringing it up is considered racist in of itself. Other ethnicities in other countries wanting to preserve their ethnic identity aren't criticised.
Was ist das?
Some people are obsessed with racism, sexism, various ------phobias, isms, diets, and what not without it improving their ethical framework, as far as I can tell. It's just their specialty. They could have been civil war buffs, or been fanatics about the Victorian novel, fungi, Nazi uniforms, raising orchids or canaries, or whatever. It just that raising canaries isn't much of a platform from which to pontificate, whereas racism or veganism and the like are superb soap boxes.
Marxism was my favorite platform from which to criticize other people, so I'd rather talk about class than race. Gender fluid sounds more like some sort of exudate than anything else. Here's a tissue - wipe it up. Actually, in the real world, most people do not go about their day obsessing over oppression, racism, sexism, homophobia, decolonizing science, straight white males, gender identity, the ethics of a lamb chop, or class warfare.
Some people, though, live in an echo chamber where their private concerns get amplified. The amplification can be (isn't always) unhelpful. Excessive amplification (like, from one's marxist study group or the local antiracism club) can produce an unhealthy hyper vigilance, where one sees racism or predatory capitalists behind every tree and under every bush.
But in general racism is considered unethical because it's conflated with actions rooted in racial discrimination--actions of unfair treatment based solely on mistaken beliefs about "race."
most people just get on with life probably....
But this just leads them to develop very basic world views I would guess...a world view like a shed, partly made in a factory by the media...compared to something more fleshed out, strong and useful like a house.
Take the idea that too much salt in your diet, is bad for you. I read an article in Scientific America* which basically said this claim "has little bases in science"...based upon bad science, and a discussion about this on another forum someone said it was a myth that perpetuated because it was a simple thing to say, believe, and a simple thing to change about one's diet.... a nice simple message for politicians to preach etc...
most people are quite happy to parrot this myth, and it even gets to the point where major medical organisation pedal this myth, like the NHS.
To over turn this myth in the population there has to be some scepticism about how society is presented as working....how certain narratives in mainstream media perpetuate the idea that governments are actually competent; that democracy is somehow a real thing, rather than just another myth with hints of something real to them, that the media itself presents actually what is going on in the world.
If myths as simple as the salt one go unchallenged, and can't be overturned, because most people just get on with life..then what else can't be overturned?
The article(been a while since I read it all) states that too little salt can actually lead to heart attacks, and yet the NHS is quite happy to tell people to cut down on salt who every they are, without even an individual consultation.
*
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/its-time-to-end-the-war-on-salt/
Why wouldn't you say it's unethical?
The question is not for myself as I made this perfectly clear in the beginning.
Because in my view no beliefs or expressions of beliefs, preferences, etc. are unethical. I see that as a category error.
What do you mean by category error
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake
Ok, so why is the expression of racism a category error?
As something moral/ethical. Because morals/ethics aren't about people merely having beliefs or expressing things. They're about performing actions on each other, directly or indirectly, actions that "do something" to someone else (as in "physically" or practically affecting them) or their situation.
I get that but to put it in context, can you demonstrate here that the expression of racism is a category error? Can you give me an example in context please?
Again, I'm not saying that the expression of racism is a category error. I said that it's a category error to classify beliefs and expressions as subject to moral/ethical evaluations.
Dictionary result for racism
/?re?s?z(?)m/Submit
noun
prejudice, discrimination, or antagonism directed against someone of a different race based on the belief that one's own race is superior.
It's a belief too but obviously not just a belief, So, no category error, and no issue referring to it as unethical.
As Hakim Bey said, "I am awake only in what I love & desire to the point of terror - everything else is just shrouded furniture, quotidian anesthesia, shit-for-brains, sub-reptilian ennui of totalitarian regimes, banal censorship & useless pain."
There'e degrees to it.
Just having racist thoughts is one thing--you're probably hurting yourself more than anyone by being caught up in hate that way.
Racist words, epithets, etc. hurt people's feelings. It's wrong to hurt people's feelings. There's something doubly horrible about being told something nasty on account for something you can't change. If someone calls me lazy, that's either true or not, and I can decide to change if I want to. If someone calls me something that implies I'm less-than just because of my skin color, I can't do anything about it.
Racist actions are obvious unethical because you're treating people differently (mostly worse) on the basis of something they have no control over, and which should be irrelevant to how they are treated. There is no basis for treating black people as inherently dumber than others, as skin color simply does not affect brain function.
I dunno. The word just popped in my head. I googled it and Flomot is a town in Texas. It's a portmanteau word Floyd + Motley. Floyd born 1804 died 1836 and Motley born 1812 died 1836. By coincidence ''a defining moment in racism and slavery'' was the Haitian revolution 1804.
Also by coincidence Floyd means gray and Motely means variety of colors.
:lol:
I don't at all agree with this. And in my opinion, the person whose feelings are hurt is the person who needs to work on themselves more.
There are some things to consider. The factual and the moral or are the two related in some sorta way?
Factual: Racial differences can be physical and menal. Physical differences are there and racial ideology probably revolves around it. As for mental differences there's no proof of any race having higher/lower IQ.
So, are physical differences enough for a racist? If yes, then the racist must be a shallow person who is lacking in mental maturation, after all isn't s/he identifying him/herself with the body. I believe we're mental beings capable of complex thought and feelings. Are we simply bodies? So, no, there are no mental differences among the races.
Even physical differences are superficial. A species is identified in terms of its members being able to reproduce with each other. Inter-racial marriages don't seem to be a problem. We can also transplant organs among each other and the list goes on.
Therefore, physical/mental differences between races is a factual error unless you want to base your entire philosophy on color.
To say or demand superior status therefore has no real foundation. It's silly at best and mad at worst.
Moral: Every person is a morally relevant. Are we not all persons?
That's just victim-blaming and totally ignoring how humans work.
As social beings, we care about how others view us, speak to us, and treat us.
I do not think people need to grow insensitive because there are jerks in the world--it's the jerks who need to change.
it's not just colour though, is it..there are other physical differences that tend to go along with race.
eg: type of hair; curly and thick, or thin and straight.
facial differences, like the structure of the nose.
The hair type isn't so important, but facial structural differences lead to the cross-race-effect.
Is talking about race so fraught with sensitivities etc, that we can't discuss things like the cross-race-effect?
I'm not always sure that talking about the CRE will get us anywhere, but then again it might.
I think over hundreds of thousands of years, we evolved from forest dwelling chimp-type beings to the highly populated societies we have now.
In an older culture like the neolithic people may have had, one would live in a tribe..I don't know, maybe 100 people. Everyone would know each other and recognise each other, and that is the context of how the mind/brain developed.
You skip to the present and now, if you live in a town or city, if you go out you will see many people you have never seen before, and after that day, probably never see again.
So facial recognition is important in the way we interact...the inability to easily recognise someone, or get a gestalt from looking at them, I think can lead to people feeling alienated, and disconnected from society..it can lead to paranoia, fear, and then hatred..
This I think is one of the reasons for why racist behaviour arises in society; not the only reason, but an important one.
Plus it's a false dichotomy. Just because it's possible that people should learn to ignore racist words, doesn't mean that those spewing racist garbage should be let off the hook.
I don't think that one is a victim just because their feelings are hurt.
Quoting NKBJ
First, it's important to realize that no matter what you're like, no matter what you do, and no matter what we do as a culture, not everyone is going to like you, not everyone is going to respect you, be interested in you, etc. You need to be able to accept/deal with that.
Aside from that, people could be just giving their opinion, which can't be right or wrong, and you shouldn't get upset that people have different opinions than you do, or they're claiming something that can be right or wrong, in which case either they're right--and you shouldn't get upset that someone is saying something true, or they're wrong, in which case you can either try to help them not be wrong or if you realize that's hopeless, you can just let them be and move on to something else. They're going to be wrong and you can't teach them otherwise, at least not at that moment.
Quoting NKBJ
I wouldn't put anyone on the hook for anything they can say. People can say things that we disagree with or that we think is stupid or wrong. They should be allowed to do so.
Where racist views predominate, it's not so much that an expression of racism hurts anyone's feelings, it's that members of the oppressed race internalize those expressions and pass them on to their children, to some extent crippling their children in the process. A racist society creates a mindset in both races. Abraham Lincoln believed that mindset is damaging to both races in that it blinds people to their freedom.
But if we call a social structure of that kind immoral, we're calling the majority of human history immoral. The naturalist in me has to agree with you: a successful social system is like a successful species. It's there because it works, not because anyone had ill will. So a person would have to embrace racism specifically in order to hurt other people in order to be evil. I think there are people who do that, and they don't really count as racists in my view, because they'll pick up whatever is available to express their malice. They might claim the end of the world is near for the malice in it rather than because it makes any sense. If they pick up racism, it's just because it's handy.
Let me just make sure I understand your position:
1) hurting someone's feelings is never wrong.
2) since people say/do bad stuff, we should just let it go and learn to be tougher.
Sorry didn't realize people needed a definition of racism.
You don't need to apologize. For most, it's not at all confusing. A very few people might not understand what it means because they look at -ism words that are on the belief end of the spectrum, like 'atheism', and falsely generalize from those (forgetting -ism words like 'alcoholism', which are more on the behaviour spectrum). Of course, 'racism' as any dictionary will tell you covers both ends. Where a useful distinction could be drawn on actions and psychological states would be regarding 'prejudice' vs 'discrimination' where discrimination in the behaviour that expresses the attitude of prejudice. But anyway, you asked a clear question and are entitled to clear answers to it rather than confused word games.
Ok, so if I get this right, whites a getting cucked because we can no longer be sure that when we look at our neighbour if he is from good European breeding stock? :confused:
Re (1), it's not sufficient to be morally wrong (and certainly not sufficient to suggest social action, censure, laws, etc.). Re (2), learn how to parse it better. I explained that as succinctly as it can be explained. A shorter paraphrase isn't really going to capture the idea, and I didn't say anything resembling what I'd call "tougher."
What criteria would you put on what counts as morally problematic emotional harm? Would a person experiencing emotional harm in response to any arbitrary thing count? For example, say that Joe has an emotional problem with orange striped shirts, so that when he sees someone wearing one, he experiences emotional harm. Is it then morally problematic to wear an orange striped shirt around Joe?
Or does it have to be a common reaction to be a problem? Just how common?
Not agreeing with you, or not agreeing with some particular conventional view, doesn't amount to not understanding something.
The issue there was just that he was characterizing someone with hurt feelings as a victim. I was saying that I don't consider hurt feelings to qualify for victimhood. That bit isn't just about racism. I mean in general.
Right. "Hurt" is too vague. As if "suffering," "harm," etc,
It depends on what we're talking about.
And this is the case a fortiori because someone can be hurt--especially if we're including emotional reactions--by any arbitrary thing. No one is going to argue that any and every arbitrary thing is thus morally wrong. They're going to have some sort of more qualified/restrictive criteria.
I agree. Hurting someone's feelings is not inherently immoral. Racism is mostly about a certain social structure. Where a people have been through hell over the issue, there is a lot of sensitivity to the still existing sources of wounding and concern about revival of racism.
Look at you getting rude again :roll:
Nevermind, guess you're never going to be able to have a civilized conversation.
Digging a little pit so a previously pregnant woman can be tied face down in order to be whipped for killing her own newborn baby because she couldn't face allowing it to grow up in the world she inhabits: that's immoral.
Tying a man to a tree and cutting his penis off and subsequently burning him to death while you and your drunk buddies march around a burning cross: that's immoral.
Help me understand why we're talking about someone's feeling being hurt.
Sounds like a false dilemma fallacy there. Things can be more or less immoral. The examples you gave are extremely immoral due to the physical violence done. A white man walking up to a black child and shouting "nigger" in their face may by contrast "only" hurt the child's feelings, but anyone who thinks that's moral is living in a very perverse ethical universe. And no, @Terrapin Station, I don't care what shirt you wear.
But I explained this already. Someone can be hurt, especially emotionally, by any arbitrary thing.
Right, but someone could be emotionally hurt by that. So, is it immoral? If not, then we'd need to qualify things better.
You will never reach an exhaustive qualification of criteria. And there's little point in trying. The point is there are cases like the one I gave that (I claim) are clearly immoral. And there are other cases like the one you gave that (I claim) are clearly not (without further detail given). Then there are grey areas where a more granular analysis would need to be done. I recognize that. You seem not to, and, if so, you'll need to justify why you think the behaviour in the example I gave is not immoral. Can you do that?
I presume most of us do. And it's easy to back my claims up by pointing to scientific evidence of the very real psychological harm non-physical violence can do. The idea that hurting someone is only bad when it's physical, without any consideration taken of context or degree or intention, is absolutely unsupportable. And that does not imply in any way that just because someone is hurt, the one who hurt them necessarily did anything immoral.
General:
https://rsds.org/physical-pain-emotional-pain/
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/what-causes-chest-pains/
https://ideas.ted.com/why-we-need-to-take-emotional-pain-as-seriously-as-physical-pain/
Scholarly:
https://www.pnas.org/content/108/15/6270.short
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2006-08705-001
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4613-2892-6_10
If morality is about intention to do harm and actual harm done, the distinction between the physical and emotional is not at all decisive in judging it.
The point is simply that you're not actually using a "it's immoral just in case someone's feelings are hurt" criterion then. You're also not using a simple "it's immoral just in case someone is hurt (period)."
I'm not either. I was just explicit that I'm not using that as a criterion.
I don't feel that hurt feelings is ever sufficient to make something immoral. Some examples of hurt I do think are immoral--such as frank's examples. I just don't consider hurt feelings sufficient, and I wouldn't frame it as hurt being immoral unqualified aside from that, because that would be misleading.
"You will never reach an exhaustive qualification of criteria."--I agree with that, and it's a reason that I think that "principle-oriented" approaches aren't the way to go.
Re justifying why we find anything in particular moral or immoral, as I've stated many times, it simply comes down to what we feel should or shouldn't be allowed re interpersonal behavior that we consider more significant than etiquette.
Somewhere along the journey of the oppressed, there comes a time when the down trodden needs to come up with an alternative to bitterness, and that's going to involve forgiveness and understanding. There are other reasons a person of mixed race needs to come to terms with things, but it ends up in the same place.
When we think about some cold hearted monster who committed atrocities, we might just start out with no understanding at all, but just holding out the possibility of learning more. Then little clues come along, and we'll build a working scenario that is open to revision as needed.
This is mine: people don't start off evil. They just start off with needs and a tendency to express the life within them. Sometimes it's explosive. There are some environments that turn innocent children into monsters. Getting a sense of how that happens will enhance ones understanding of evil. And there's a lot more to that issue than would fit in a thread like this.
When we think of an historic crime, say from the days of slavery in Brazil, we can see that there were many reasons it happened. Racism was one component of it. So saying that the crime itself is racism doesn't help. Seeing racism as a mindset that contributed to the emergence of the behavior: that does help because we're now in the process of understanding: not judging.
If someone says that the crime we've been talking about is racism, I understand what they mean. If someone says the crime was motivated by racism, I understand what they mean.
When someone says the crime was partly motivated by racism: I say they're right.
It's possible to emotionally torture someone to the point where they commit suicide. And you are saying you wouldn't consider that immoral? Simply because there is no physical contact? What about punching someone in the stomach (adult on adult)? Is that immoral? And which do you think is the more harmful?
Yes, I wouldn't consider that immoral. For one, they could choose to leave the situation before it gets to that point.
Re punching someone, that's not sufficient to be immoral either. It depends on just how hard someone is punching the other person, the injury sustained if any, etc.
Not necessarily. So, I posit they can't.
Quoting Terrapin Station
OK, so morality is about degree of harm then?
What would be the reason for that?
Quoting Baden
Degree of "physical" harm in my view, yes.
Quoting Terrapin Station
But this doesn't answer my question as to why you feel emotional harm should be bracketed out in terms of not being allowed re interpersonal behaviour that we consider more significant than etiquette.
If all you want to say is it's just that you feel it should be allowed and are not willing to answer why then your position has no support and no value. I thought you might want to say more than that. But, OK, fine.
For everyone, including you, for any moral stance they have, it's either foundational or not in this sense:
If a moral stance a la "one should/shouldn't behave in such and such way," "It is morally good to do x," etc. is a consequence of another moral stance that person holds, the first-stated moral stance isn't foundational.
If a moral stance (a la the same sorts of examples) isn't a consequence of another moral stance that person holds, then the moral stance is foundational for that person.
Moral stances can not be the consequence of non-moral stances, because of the is/ought issue. No moral stance, no value judgment (a la good/bad, better/worse, etc.) follows from any non-evaluative fact.
So ALL moral stances, if foundational, per your comment above, would have to "have no support and no value."
People can state either foundational or non-foundational moral stances initially. If they state a foundational moral stance, then there isn't going to be any sentential support or justification of the stance. If they state a non-foundational moral stance, we can work back to the foundational moral stances they've built the non-foundational stance upon, if we're interested in that, but there's nothing preferential about non-foundational stances.
Everyone gets to foundational stances rather quickly. If they don't start with them, it's almost never more than a step or two back until they get to one.
Are physical differences a sound basis to establish superiority/inferiority? In what terms would you say a particular race is physically superior than another ? I'm curious.
Minds are bodies, yes, but are minds just bodies? Is mental experience not rich enough to deserve its own domain separate from mere physicality?
I'm not talking about those aspects of how racism presents itself.
I'm talking about some of the things which lead to racism. Facial and other characteristics, can lead to some people not really getting a gestalt when they see another person.
A gestalt is an event where the brain/mind forms a whole impression of something, from the components of that thing, rather than seeing those components separately.
This isn't even confined to any specific race...the cross-race-effect itself is even a misnomer, as for example a person adopted by a family of another race, will develop to recognise more easily people of their adopted families more easily than their own. A child may get the 'cross race effect' later in life when they see people of their own race.
that's an odd interpretation of my post.
The Cross-race-effect is partly about facial recognition.
Facial recognition is an incredibly powerful part of how humans interact, and how society functions.
A lot of people take it for granted, I think.
Say you step out onto the street, and you see some guy walking down the pavement...'oh, hi Bob; how you doing?', might follow from seeing him, but if you couldn't tell Bob, from John Major or any other male in the world, that simply quite ordinary interaction would be quite different, wouldn't it?
Yes. :grin:
[Quote] Is mental experience not rich enough to deserve its own domain separate from mere physicality?[/quote]
Why rag on physical stuff like that?
If you say you dislike olives, but then, on trying one some years later, you find them to be delicious, at some point in the intervening years you must have been wrong about your liking olives, right?
I think you give too much credence to what you think are your foundational morals and not enough to arguments which might reveal them to be other than what you thought.
No. That's not the sort of thing you can be wrong about. Whether you like olives is a mental state that you're in at present. (And in my view there is no reason to believe that there are unconscious mental states.)
What you could be wrong about is a prediction a la, "If I were to try an olive at future time x, I wouldn't like it."
And of course, whether you like olives can change over time--and it could change many times, in many subtle to not-so-subtle ways.
Re moral stances, sure, your feelings might not be so clear to you, and there might be various things you haven't considered that would change how you feel, or you might otherwise change how you feel over time. But moral stances can't be correct or incorrect in the first place, and you can't get wrong how you feel in terms of however you feel at time Tx being how you feel at time Tx.
This seems like rather a controversial point of view given the advances in neural imaging, what reason do you have for persisting with it in spite of the evidence to the contrary? Add tasteless red food colouring to white wine and people who claim they don't like white wine are fooled into thinking they're drinking red. I'm not one to treat psychological evidence as if it were gospel, but the evidence of the sort above is sufficiently overwhelming for one to need a pretty good reason for ignoring it. We fairly clearly do not know our own likes and dislikes.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Again, as above many decades of psychological experiment seem to have, at least very strongly indicated, that you very much can get wrong how you think you feel. You might accurately report something simple like anger, fear etc, but claiming that you are always accurately reporting something as complex as that you feel people's expression should not be curtailed and that there is no other stance informing this position from your deeper subconscious, or even just unnoticed conscious connections...
Seems to me that you're drawing a hard line in the sand without justification and in the face of a significant amount of evidence to the contrary. This suggests to me some hidden motive, but I suppose you can't be wrong about that either?
Quoting Isaac
What would you take to be evidence to the contrary? (In other words, detail some evidence and explain what you think that evidence shows.)
Well, the evidence I gave directly below, as an example. People who claim not to like white wine can be fooled into saying they like the white wine they're drinking by the addition of a tasteless red dye. The substance they think they don't like (the taste of), they actually do like, or at least don't mind.
Now, granted you could argue that the entire experience of drinking white wine includes the colour, and so they're giving an honest account, but that's exactly the point I'm making about complexity. Should one of these people simply say "I don't like white wine" then maybe the experiment proves nothing, but should they say something more complex - "I don't like white wine, it's because of the taste which just a foundational dislike for me", then the experiment proves that they gave an incorrect account of their own tastes. It was not the taste that was the foundational dislike, it was the colour.
(What does that have to do with neural imaging?)
At any rate:
(1) "I like/don't like F" isn't about whether they're identifying some particular x as F correctly per either convention or per how the person in question would identify x (as F) in different circumstances/given different information. It's made true or false by them liking or disliking the thing in question, whatever it really is/whatever someone calls it.
(2) If someone says "I don't like white wine," but you give them white wine and they like it, whether it's disguised to them or not, one thing that can be going on is that their tastes have changed.
(3) If someone says "I don't like white wine," but you give them white wine where it's alternately disguised and not disguised, in a kind of extended blind A/B test, where they consistently say they like the disguised stuff, whatever you call it, but they say they do not like the non-disguised stuff, then what's going on is more complex than simply liking the taste or not. That doesn't make them wrong, because it's not possible to get this sort of thing wrong.
Re your other comments, you'd have to argue that there's no way that other factors can't influence their perception of taste, but there's no way to argue that.
(Do we have any actual examples of reasonably controlled experiments a la what I described in (3), by the way?)
Sorry, nothing whatsoever. There's some interesting work being done on tracking markers of taste preferences with neural imaging and I was going to give an example and then I thought of a better way.
With regards to the rest of your points. At 1) I'd agree, but I'm specifically targeting complex explanations such as - that moral principles (preferences) are foundational rather than based on other principles. I'm claiming that such a level of self-awareness is simply not justifiable. I've no problem with accepting that if someone shows/expresses an aversion to a thing, that means they genuinely don't like it. What I don't accept is that they can give an honest account of why they don't like it. They say its because of the taste but it's clearly because of the colour (or some other colour-related factor).
Quoting Terrapin Station
Here's quite a classic. The Pepsi Paradox. People actually prefer the taste of Pepsi in blind trials, but claim to prefer the taste of Coke when they're able to see the brand. This interesting experiment takes people with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex in an area where other influences on preference judgement get made. Those with damage did not express the normal brand bias when reporting their taste preferences.
The experiment with the red wine is also pretty famous, but I can't seem to track it down right now. It was done by Frederic Brochet at Bordeaux.
There are tons more, but to be brutally honest, I'd rather you think I'm a complete charlatan who's making stuff up to suit their argument than spend my afternoon finding we links. I mean, you're totally right to ask, it's just not what I want to do with my time. So, happy to provide a couple, but if that's not enough then so be it.
Quoting Terrapin Station
As above, I'm not arguing that they can be wrong about their final reaction (like/dislike) but they clearly can be wrong about which of the "ever-changing factors" has influenced it.
So to bring things back to the OP, for you to claim that your 'line in the sand' re physical/emotional harms is simply a foundational moral principle (by which you mean a preference) and not influenced by some other factors is a claim that I don't think you can reliably make.
Quoting Isaac
They have to be because you can't derive an ought from an is. You can't derive a value statement from a factual statement.
Not when it comes to hurting people's feelings, because I don't think that's a moral issue.
When it comes to things that I believe are moral issues, sure. I think we should pay attention to intent, motivation, etc.
I was born in 1962. I've seen plenty of people have their feelings hurt. My feelings have been hurt. I don't think it's a moral issue.
What fact makes it true that you ought to achieve what you want?
It's hurting people, for one. That's something, isn't it?
Who ever came up with that saying must have thought that words have power; and it this specific case the power to empower victims of words that can hurt...
You seriously just wrote that. lol.
It's not true or false that you ought to achieve what you want.
It can be the case that x is a precondition/prerequisite or requirement for y--that y can't obtain unless x obtains. That can be true or false.
It's not true or false that you ought to achieve y if you want y. Its not true or false that you ought to pursue some prerequisite first if you want something (iow, it's not true or false that you ought to achieve x if you want y). That's simply a preference that most people have because they want to achieve things they desire, they want to achieve the necessary prerequisites for that first, etc.
That something is hurting people. (The question seems predicated on not knowing how English conventionally works.)
Apparently you want some sort of other classification scheme. But I have no idea what you're looking for there. You'd have to be more explicit about your concepts.
So why ought you pursue x if you want y, just in case x is a prerequisite for y?
Hurting people is not categorically, morally wrong, no.
Only certain actions that fall under that heading are things that I consider morally wrong.
I mean other moral principles. You can hold that it is morally wrong to steal, not because you find stealing repugnant, but because you find the thought of living in a world where everyone steals repugnant and you think that avoiding stealing yourself might help avoid this.
This is the basic principle by which we sacrifice some pleasures for greater gains, surely we don't disagree on that?
But, in the scenario above, you could well be mistaken about many aspects. You could fool yourself into think the reason you have an aversion to stealing is because you dislike the kind of world it might bring about, but actually it's just that you're scared of getting caught. As I've tried to demonstrate above, we can be wrong about why we don't like things, and if morals are just a category of dislike, then we can be wrong about why we see them as morals.
You said (in the post I first responded to) that some morals may be foundational, whilst some might be built out of others, presumably by logical inference (if I do x it will cause y and I don't like y).
The case I'm trying to build is that a) you claiming a moral is foundational (not built on others) may not be an accurate report, and that b) morals built on others from logical inference can be objectively wrong because the inference can be wrong (x does not in fact cause y).
Put these two points together, and any moral point becomes worth discussing as you may find what you thought was a foundational moral was actually built from one by logical inferences and those inferences are wrong. Hence it is entirely possible to be wrong about any moral position.
I didn't say that I don't consider any hurting of other people wrong. In fact, I explicitly said otherwise.
Again, "hurt/harm" etc. are too broad/vague in my opinion.
And yeah, I'm sure I hurt some people's feelings. No one can avoid doing that, especially as there are some folks around with unusual quirks, whose feelings will be hurt by things that most other folks would never imagine would hurt someone's feelings.
How would that work where we avoid positing unconscious mental content?
What? That's a value judgment. Not an "is."
That's where we started, with your rather controversial claim that there was no such thing as unconscious mental content (or, in fact a gradation of conscious awareness of mental states). The evidence seems overwhelmingly to show that there is sub- or un- conscious mental content. What do you think was going on in the damaged part of the brain such that those for whom it was removed no longer showed a brand bias they were consciously unaware of?
I have no problem with people holding opinions which are contradicted by the evidence, evidence is rarely that good, but I'm always interested in why people choose to.
It's annoying that people don't understand that everyone's ground is simply their feelings about interpersonal behavior.
Wait--how would they have a brand bias that they're not aware of? You mean that people aren't aware that they're preferring one brand to another (when they know what the brand is)?
I just pointed out to you that for one, this has packed into it the claim that "You ought to achieve what you want."
I'm not sure I'm following your objection. We're talking about what factors people are consciously aware of affecting their likes/dislikes. In the study, people claimed that they preferred the taste of Coke. When blinded to the brand, they preferred the taste of Pepsi. So they were wrong about preferring the taste of Coke, what they actually preferred about Coke was the brand. The second study showed that when a part of the brain responsible for things like brand preferences was removed, people no longer preferred Coke at all, they simply prefer whichever brand tastes best.
What this strongly suggests is that people can be wrong about the reason why they prefer things and that such reasons can be delivered by very specific parts of the sub-concious brain.
It's just a matter of what we're able to enact or not. Factors include how much power each of us has, how common the views are, what our persuasive abilities are like, etc.
I already discussed this part (hence why I dislike doing longer posts and like to focus on one thing at a time until it's settled):
You're reading this situation as "I prefer the taste of x" where packed into that is a claim about what x really is objectively, so that if one gets the objective identification wrong (per whatever metric), then one's statement re "I prefer the taste of x" can be wrong.
I'm saying that "I prefer the taste of x" is about the person's experience, qua their experience, qua their understanding, etc.--so that whatever is really the case objectively is irrelevant, their identification is irrelevant, etc., and where it's either a present or historical claim. (Because otherwise it's a prediction--"I will prefer the taste of x," and I'd agree that they can get the prediction wrong (even on x as their experience, understanding, identification, etc.)
We were supposed to be talking about the idea of unconscious mental content here, though--specifically anything that would count as evidence of the same, and this has nothing to do with that.
The thing about "wrong for the reasons" presumably assumes that people are explicitly making statements like "I prefer x for reason y alone," and for some reason we're assuming that the statements are 100% accurate (and we're ignoring all of that stuff we were discussing before about meaning, etc.) and there isn't anything else going on consciously in their minds that they're not expressing or that they can't articulate very well?
What's wrong with anything morally is that someone disapproves of it as interpersonal behavior.
Do you understand this?
OK, so firstly, it's not about what x really is, but what the reason really is. I don't think that entirely matters for what you're saying, but I thought I ought to get it clear. Taste is a specific identifiable type of sensation which can identified. The gustatory complex, if removed, leaves one with no sense of taste, its not something that people can feel in different ways. The information is taken from there to the orbitofrontal cortex which combines it with other factors to make decisions about preference. Again, we know this because if that part of the brain is wired removed, it simply doesn't happen. A report is then sent to the pre-frontal cortex about the decision (which is the first 'concious' thought we have about it. Again, we know this because if we block those pathways with chemicals it just doesn't happen.
So I understand you're saying a person's "experience" of a sensation of preference, as they report it can't be wrong in that sense and I'm happy to go with that, but the point I was originally making was that it can be of value to a person to discus morality even though they are just likes/dislikes because there are factors affecting likes/dislikes which are not well reported to the conscious brain and becoming aware of them can help a person achieve what it is they actually like.
That, and what @tim wood is saying about x causing y where y is something one likes. It is possible to be wrong about causation and that is often relevant to non-foundational moral positions.
Basically, to re-iterate I think you can be wrong about whether a moral stance is foundational, your pre-frontal cortex may report it that way, but the actual preference it is based on my not be revealed accurately by the orbitofrontal cortex. Given that we are preference seeking creatures, I think finding such a thing out is of value.
No disagreement with this.
But it's simply the case that one can state a foundational ethical stance, where there's not some other sentential reason behind or beneath it. It's not always the case that there's some other sentential reason behind every stance we state. There can't be because that's obviously an infinite regress. And people can start at the bottom so to speak. There sometimes seems to be an assumption that one never would, but that makes no sense.
Quoting Isaac
Whereas I do not agree with this, because I don't believe that there is any good reason to buy the notion of unconscious mental content, and you've not presented any good reason to buy that idea yet.
I think you and I must have different definitions of unconscious mental states. I mean by it a state in which the brain can be which affect behaviour/decisions but which the subject, by self-reporting or location, is unaware of. There is literally direct a pretty incontrovertible evidence for this.
For it to be an unconscious mental state, it can't be just any brain state. It has to be a mental state, just one that the subject is unaware of. It has to be akin to a thought, desire, idea, concept, etc.--anything mental.
Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic.
Seems odd to say that evidence for such states existing unconsciously is problematic epistemically but you seem fine with the existence of them conciously. Can you easily define a thought, desire, idea, concept in a way that there is clear evidence for the existence of such things?
I can understand something like 'desire", for example, as a disposition to act toward a certain goal, but such a definition causes no problems at all for identifying it sub-conciously.
And this seems like an odd comment when I had just said, and you just quoted "Evidence for this is problematic (epistemically), because even third-person evidence of conscious mental states is problematic."
The important difference for conscious mental states is that the bearer has clear epistemic evidence of them. But we don't have that for unconscious mental states.
Quoting Isaac
That suggests defining it behavioristically and ignoring the conscious aspect when it's conscious. (It also doesn't capture conscious desires very well, because lots of people have desires that they never or almost never act on.)
The bottom line, though, is that if you believe there's good evidence of unconscious mental states, present it and I'll look at it. Otherwise I'm not about to think that's there's good evidence of unconscious mental states.
I guess this is the point of our axiomatic disagreement. I don't accept that my knowledge of my mental states extends to being able to describe them with a shared language, so all I know that can be shared is that I feel/think something.
When it comes to shared language, such as is required in discussions like these, I think we simply have to resort to the best objective evidence we have to define and categorise brain states. There's little point in me saying I have a desire x if we're going to define 'desire' as that thing I'm feeling that I so call, but could not define objectively.
We do have some perfectly serviceable objective definitions for many of the brain state equivalents of mental sensations. We can verify from self-reports that these states correlate well with those people experience, it might not be perfect, but to dismiss it as useless seem rash.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I wouldn't define it entirely behaviouristically, it's just one tool. We're trying to correlate things which can be objectively verified with subjective experience. Behaviour is one tool, neural imaging is another, psychological experiment a third, examining the consequences of brain damage a fourth. It is nonsense to dismiss all this as "no evidence".
Quoting Terrapin Station
The evidence is basically the whole of modern neuro-psychology. If you're genuinely interested, I'd start with the work of Vilyanur Ramachandran. He has written some very approachable books for non-specialists and works with brain damage victims. As I said, I'd rather you think me a fantasist than spend my time finding citations, but his work would be a start.
In my opinion, sure.
But that is a weak argument concerning the existence of racism however, because as many scientist have stated, it's (racism) a social construct. Was James Watson correct when he premised the idea that different races of humans exist and that their inborn (genetic) qualities determine their intelligence and ability to create and sustain great civilizations? Watson stated that there are some dogs more intelligent than "negroes" was he right? That to me isn't neolithic tribal thinking, that to me is a learned idea founded by him living in a segregated society that had a certain mentality and a way of thinking not based on reality.
There are only individual opinions in this realm. There are no moral/ethical truths with respect to particular stances. Various people can have the same opinion, of course, a la there being many people who feel one shouldn't put ketchup on hot dogs versus many people who feel it's okay to put ketchup on hot dogs. Opinions in this sense can't be correct or incorrect.
It's a construct based on appearance. And the fact that a genetic merging between whites and blacks eliminates whites is one of the sources of racial angst.
Let's not pretend that social constructs can't be incredibly powerful.
well, if it is a social construct,then what motivates its construction?
I think one of the things is facial recognition, which is part of the so called 'cross-race effect'.
The cross-race effect isn't just about facial recognition, it is about being tuned into one's own culture, and not so tuned into another culture.
Within your own culture, you may notice nuances in things, like ideas, perspectives, tastes in music, and more basic stuff like accents.
With a different culture, which is often associated with different races, people are less tuned into those things...think of some strong accent, like German..it might be harder to tell people with a German accent apart, which is part of the inability to form recognition and differences between people.
The inability for people to be differentiated leads to paranoia and fear I think, which then leads into some forms of dislike of other groups of people.
That doesn't justify it, it simply explains the natural tendencies it emerges from.
You keep conflating these two things when you talk about ethics, I don't know if it's just shorthand, or if you actually mean it, but on the face of it, there clearly are ethical truths. It is "true" that most people abhor extreme violence toward innocent children. That is an 'ethical truth'. Specific parts of our brains have a strong tendency to respond in measurable and predictable ways to certain images on 'moral' topics. That is a moral truth, in that it is a true fact about morals.
I can't see why you're are dismissing statistical facts from your category 'facts'.
Hence why I specified ethical/moral stances. I also said "opinions in this sense.". Those words aren't just decorations. They're there for a reason.
"Most people abhor violence towards children" is not an ethical/moral stance.
"Violence towards children is wrong" is an ethical/moral stance.
As I thought then, just a shorthand. To me, the statistical facts (average, most common, range...) are truths with respect to moral stances, but we're equivocating about the different meaning of "with respect to" and "about". The point is, I get what you mean now.
Yeah, "With respect to" -- in other words, "when it comes to," versus sentences that aren't themselves moral stances but are just about them in some way.
OK, with you there.
It seems uncontroversial to say that sub-Saharan Africans have dark skin or that north Europeans have fairer hair than their southern counterparts. The problems arise when we ascribe relative value to difference. This seems a shame. If the descendants of the Celts have a better sense of smell or the Arabs have higher IQs, I, for one would like to know. Sadly there are some discussions that current multicultural dogma prevents us from having.
In my view a lot of the actions were immoral. What that refers to is the fact that I disapprove of the actions, that I "Boo" them.
I'm not the only person to feel that way, of course. But all of us who feel that way are simply (in terms of what's really going on ontologically) reporting our disapproval.
I don't want to get into mathematics because I don't see how that wouldn't turn into a big tangent about a different subject. (If you're really interested in my view on the mathematical question, I posted a couple times in this recent thread: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/5244/is-2-2-4-universally-true)
Morality isn't anything other than how people feel, whether they approve or disapprove, etc. of interpersonal behavior that they consider more significant than etiquette.
Has been used as tool for, yes, undoubtedly. Ultimately a tool for, no.
If there are differences between historically isolated groups of humans, I'm interested to know what they are.
No.
I don't understand your use of 'meaningful' here.