Reality as appearance.
We assume that there is appearances in one hand and in the other hand there is objective medium sourcing these appearances..but what are this so called objective medium but another appearance!.
Notice that what you got in reality is this phenomenal field of sensory perception. You are claiming that there's is stuff behined the scenes like the brain or the atoms ..but what are those but more of the same phenomenal field . Consciousness is not happening inside the brain..the brain is occurring within Consciousness. Phenomenon is not made out of atoms..atoms are phenomenon themselves. You have nothing but subjective appearances..that's the only thing that there is. There is no ultimate ground ..every ground must be grounded in something else forever =endless regress of appearances. This is why "dreams" are the perfect analogy for reality. Appearances with no ground.
Notice that what you got in reality is this phenomenal field of sensory perception. You are claiming that there's is stuff behined the scenes like the brain or the atoms ..but what are those but more of the same phenomenal field . Consciousness is not happening inside the brain..the brain is occurring within Consciousness. Phenomenon is not made out of atoms..atoms are phenomenon themselves. You have nothing but subjective appearances..that's the only thing that there is. There is no ultimate ground ..every ground must be grounded in something else forever =endless regress of appearances. This is why "dreams" are the perfect analogy for reality. Appearances with no ground.
Comments (118)
I think there are certain implications for your understanding which are wise to keep in mind but many interpretations of your idea lead to nothing but pain and disaster. So, is there something you think people should do differently or should think differently as a result of coming to the same understanding you have?
"But what is this so-called objective medium . . . from the reference frame of being a person observing it" do you mean? Because from a different reference frame, for example, the reference frame of the objective medium, how would it be an appearance in the same sense of "appearance"?
Please notice right now in your direct experience that the only thing you can ever encounter is this phenomenon appearances..atoms and molecules are also appearances..your materialistic objective world view is nothing but appearance.
What do you count as an empirical support of this?
There is direct experience of a lot of different things, including objective things. So that would suggest the opposite of your conclusion.
There is direct experience of a television set, say. Are you not familiar with this?
The first one will say:yes I do.
The second one:yes I do.
The third: yes I do.
Scientists call that an objective fact ..the sun exist .
But notice that (the three persons +the sun over there+the scientist's telling you of the objective truth ) is all occurring within your subjective experience!!
It can't be any other way any it will never be.
They're not saying something about people agreeing with "objective fact"
Again, are you saying you're unfamiliar with direct experience of things like TVs?
Interesting, so I'd have to wonder if maybe something unusual is going on with you medically.
Fundamentally correct; the human system is internally representative.
Fundamentally incomplete: there must be something external to be represented.
Maybe it's being self-centered. You see everything as you somehow? In my world, there's often just a TV or whatever. It's not a phenomenon of me perceiving a TV. Sometimes I have a phenomenon of me perceiving a TV, especially if something unusual is going on, like it gets blurry, but normally, no.
In my world, the experience is not normally of me watching a TV. There's just the TV.
You either have a medical problem or you're stuck in some juvenile theorizing.
In dreams, that which appears is the contents of consciousness.
In conscious awareness, that which appears are intuitions representing sensory impressions.
Isn't that theoretical?
Don't tell me the brain. The brain is just another appearance.
Yes.
(Weird. Did you see where the C & P included the time? Made it look like I said “....impressions seconds ago.”
Literally nothing. Reality is a hallucination. A dream. If you take DMT you will know.
Contents of consciousness are given from the human cognitive system, operating from the brain but are not the brain. Although advocates of modern neurobiology and cognitive neuroscience will shoot me if they find out I said that.
Why would we settle on representationalism as the theory rather than alternatives?
What is the ultimate ground of reality?!
"Literally nothing is creating it" is the appearance?
So where is the claim that literally nothing created it coming from if that's not an appearance?
But you had just said that it's not an appearance: "no. It is nothing not a something. Which means it is not created."
But my dreams look like something, not like nothing creating something.
You're saying that "they came from nothing" is an appearance. I'm wondering what that appearance looks like. It doesn't look like my dreams, because they look like something, not like "they came from nothing."
Because there are no basketballs in our heads, but we know all about basketballs. The thing we know merely represents the thing we know about.
A suitable alternative isn’t impossible, but it would have to be sufficient to overturn what it’s replacing.
Now..your dreams look like something..fine. But let me ask you :is there an objective external source to your dreams or No? The answer is no. Which means they are something which being sourced by nothing.
Don't tell me the brain..the brain is an appearance.
There's a difference between only being aware of a representation/a mental creation of a basketball and being directly aware of the basketball. The latter doesn't imply that a basketball is literally in your head.
You're rather not understanding because you want the discussion to go in a manner that you've already prepared for. I'm not arguing with you about "nothing creates appearances" being an appearance. I'm asking you what that appearance looks like (or sounds like, or whatever sense is appropriate).
Assuming perception itself to be a passive faculty, appearance is what I am directly aware of. The naturally occurring information impressed on sense as appearance is a different form than the procedural information in the brain that gives representation of the appearance. Even allowing the all-inclusive four fundamental forces, the medium is different, the mechanics are different, yet the results conform to the incidence.
That's the claim, isn't it? It's not a support of the claim.
Correct. The support is in the theory. Or, the support is the theory. And, as we all know, good theory must be falsifiable.
You could just as well posit a contradictory theory. Why not believe that one instead?
I was with you until this point. You have not even begun to justify this conclusion. Why do you think this is so? What evidence do you have to offer? Or is this just a feeling? [Nothing wrong with that, but say so! :smile: ]
Sure I could so posit, just by negating the tenents of the extant theory. First, I’d have to have a reason for so doing, then I would have to go about doing it, and after all that I would have to derive more satisfaction from doing so, I’d have to learn something, have my mind changed, conventionally speaking.
I haven’t got past having a reason yet, so the rest is moot. Which is merely a blatant cognitive prejudice, to be sure, but I’m ok with that.
Well, what was the reason for adopting the theory you adopted in the first place?
Two reasons: ego and intelligence. The first for thinking I might actually understand something so incredibly convoluted, and the second for thinking it actually makes sense to me.
It’s just speculative philosophy after all, which means it’s being correct is not a consideration, whereas it’s usefulness might be.
Interesting. I think it's something we can get correct.
Pretty hard to get philosophy of mind correct, when “mind” itself is rather abstract.
What would we get correct?
"Abstract(ion)" is a term for a specific mental activity we perform--formulating concepts to range over a number of particulars, via generalizing select features of particulars while ignoring unique details.
Mind itself is not that. That's just one thing that minds can do. And ontologically, they're concrete particuilars.
Mind isn't abstract. Minds are a subset of brain structure and function. You can get that correct by realizing this and get it incorrect by believing that minds are something else.
Agreed, in principle. Whatever is going on between the ears is under the auspices of natural law.
That being said, as long as we don’t know how something as apparently yet irrefutably real as an individual subject not yet derivable from natural law, can be present to our attention, and in fact *is* our attention, we are allowed to call the mind an abstraction of brain.
I’ve always thought, we know the brain operates on natural principles, by nameable characteristics, but our internal language is not of those principles or characteristics. One transposes to the other, sure, but, the difference is sufficient to authorize the speculative nature of thought itself. Besides, even if we prove how the brain is responsible for mind, we will still think we are thinking by means of mind. I can’t see any way possible to delete the physical mechanism from that which comes up with “thinking subject” to begin with.
This is a category mistake. You are confusing the stuff behind the scenes with our sensory experience of the stuff behind the scenes.
The grain of truth in your view is that the only thing we can be 100% certain of is that we experience appearances rather than what they are appearances of. But it does not follow that what they are appearances of are also appearances. To see this, consider the difference between the properties of the appearance and the properties of what it is an appearance of. Take, say, the top of a square brown wooden table looked at from various distances and angles. We can make two lists of properties, one of the appearance of the tabletop and another of the tabletop itself:
Properties of the appearance of the tabletop
1. Coloured brown
2. Size alters if we move away from or towards the table
3. Shape alters as we change the angle from which we view the table
4. Is continuous, i.e. not made up of discrete parts
Properties of the tabletop
1. Is not coloured, but rather reflects light of particular wavelengths
2. Size is fixed
3. Shape is fixed
4. Is discrete not continuous, because made of molecules.
It is evident that the corresponding properties in each list are mutually exclusive. That shows that the objects of which they are properties cannot be the same object, i.e. the appearance of the tabletop cannot be the same thing as the tabletop. Thus an appearance of a thing is not the same as the thing itself. Nor is the thing itself merely another appearance, as you suggest, because if it were, it would have properties of the sort we find in the first list, rather than, as it actually does, properties of the kind in the second list. Appearances have the sort of properties in my first list; the objects of which they are appearances have the sort of properties in the second. To take your own examples, brains and atoms have properties of the sort in my second list, and therefore are objects, not appearances.
In fact the tabletop is a hypothesised external object. The hypothesis (that there is an externally existing tabletop with the properties in the second list) is a good one, because when coupled with the fact that we experience appearances, it explains why the appearances have the properties in the first list. Without the objective existence of the tabletop, there would be no explanation for the appearance having these properties, i.e. there would be no explanation for our sensory experience being the way it is. This, of course, is the flaw in idealism; by removing the objective world, it removes the most plausible explanation for our experience being as it is.
I hope this is helpful.
Those would be appearances too, within the range of experiences that we use to call imagination. You visualize that object somehow, but you're still involved in the act of visualization.
Here's the problem: you were making sense right up until you denied the objectivity necessarily implied in what you said before your denial. If you remove that, then what you said becomes nonsense on stilts. Even a position lacking evidence is better than nonsense. You're not even wrong!
It makes sense to say that there's an object, the orange, that I'm perceiving. If you say that what I'm perceiving is an appearance, then what's it an appearance of? Kicking the can down the road won't help you. You need a fundamental reality, otherwise you're not making any sense.
It's the orange which appears to you a certain way. The orange is not an intuition [i]full stop[/I]. I don't eat intuitions. It's a particular object. An orange. These are what I eat. There must be an orange for it to appear to you a certain way. If you deny the orange, then you cease making sense. If you accept the orange, but say that it's an intuition, then you cease making sense.
It's nonsensical. Literally.
No, reality is the ultimate ground of everything, including you and your perceptions. You can be a sceptic about what exactly there is beyond your perceptions, what it consists of, and so on, and still be reasonable to some extent. You can't deny that there is anything there at all and still be reasonable, not even close.
:rofl:
Yeah, that's a real good argument. I actually have taken LSD, on multiple occasions, yet I see that you've got it wrong, not right.
No, they came from me. I am not nothing. And I couldn't exist if I didn't exist in the world. My dreams resemble my experiences, and my experiences are of the world and the many things which make it up, like people and cars, which are subjects and objects. My explanation makes sense and works, yours, if it can even be called that, doesn't and fails. It has problematic gaps, and filling the gaps with literal nonsense won't help you.
There is Plato’s ideality of forms, there is Berkeley’s subjective idealism, there is Wolff’s pluralistic ontological idealism, there is Hegel’s Phenomenological idealism, there is Kant’s Transcendental idealism, and a host of other sub-denominations. It is worthy to note that none before Wolff categorized “idealism” as a class of philosophical thought, adding the monist/dualist sub-strata to it, and none before Kant actually admitted to being, or in fact called themselves, one. As well, none but the most extreme branches of it outright denied the existence of an objective material environment, an absolute non-materialism, but rather, idealists varied in their respective rationalities for describing their approach to the form such objectivity would have or would be given.
Nonetheless, there indeed were flaws in most forms of subjective or absolute or immaterial idealism, which is probably why no one seriously considers them as theoretically useful these days. But they do stand in good regard for how far we’ve advanced in our speculative epistemological philosophy.
You want to be a special philosophy-type with a special insight? And Kant's philosophy is useful for that?
Even though it fails outside of that little context, where realism and ordinary language philosophy succeed.
:100:
The mashed is the potato! @Mww
Quoting Herg
:clap: :clap: :clap:
You're right.
As I've been pointing out, the words "Exist", "There is...", and "Real", when used with objective, absolute, unqualified, noncontextual meaning, are uindefined. People who use those words here haven't been able to say what they mean by them.
Metaphysics and ontology are based on those words, and that's why I don't believe in a metaphysics or ontology.
So yes, for the things of the logically-interdependent realm, there's no objecive reality or existence, because those terms are undefined and have no meaning.
As a truism, a set or system of abstract implications (abstract if-then facts) that are sometimes about eachother, or about the same propositions, and the same hypothetical things, are an inter-referring system of abstract implications.
Such an inter-referring system of course needn't be claimed to be existent or real.
Inevitably, there (in its own context) is such an inter-referring logical system whose structural relations are those of your experience. It's your hypothetical experience-story. Its setting has the structural relations that are those of your surroundings.
Undeniably, there is this physical world in its own context.
Physicist Michael Faraday pointed out that what's observed and known about our physical world consists of logical and mathematical structural-relation, and that there' s no reason to believe that it's other than that. ...no reasons to believe in the "stuff" that the relation is about. That "stuff" is the stuff of metaphysical theory.
Maybe that's why Nisargadatta said that, from the sage's point of view, nothing has ever happened.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1728 UTC
Whatever you know about your physical surroundings is from your experience. Your experience is primary for your physical world and its "objective" things.
Would you like to be the one who tells us what you'd mean by "objective things" or "objective existence"?
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1741 UTC
That's handwaving, unless you can name a flaw (...in subjective idealism itself, not just one version.)
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1751 UTC
You evidently believe in the "stuff behind the scenes", which, as I said, is the stuff of metaphysical theory.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1753 UTC
You're wrong.
As I've been pointing out, the words "exist", "there is...", and "real", are rarely used non-contextually, and they don't need to be defined in order to be understood. This is self-evident, so doesn't need an argument. But note that the contrary would be absurd. Plenty of people clearly indicate such an understanding when these words are used in conversation. They both implicitly and explicitly confirm that they've understood through what they do and say. Without good reason to suggest otherwise, it's implausible that you're so extraordinarily unique that you are unlike other people who do understand the meaning. Hence, it is more plausible that you're deluded or pretending. But I expect that I'm wasting my breath on you. You'll probably just keep on repeating this copypasta of yours like a spambot.
[I]S
Some nonsense from a calendar that no one cares about.[/I]
Fine. I'm talking about when they are so used. ...as when people in this thread say that this physical world is objectively existent.
We've been over (and over and over) that, in your previous thread that was closed.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1758 UTC
No, that's a context. And people understand what's meant, at least roughly.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
True, but you keep respamming your copypasta without learning from your mistakes.
What’s a po’ boy to do, huh? Hand-waving if he doesn’t, overstating the obvious if he does.
:D
Well, he could try telling us what he means by "Exist", "There is..." or "Real", when he uses those terms with (supposed) absolute, objective, context-less, unqualified meaning.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1808 UTC
And "photocopier"! Don't forget that one. He must define that term as well. Because I pretend not to understand what he says when he uses that term, and he simply must play along with me.
Quoting S
I'm not going to repeat my answer to that, which was amply given in your thread that was closed for good reason.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1818 UTC
Over the years I’ve been accused of over-analyzing the bejesus out of stuff, so I’m pretty sure I make my intentions with respect to those terms either explicit or otherwise contextually obvious. If you know of a opposing instance, remind me of it?
Until you define all of those words, I have no idea what you're asking. So what you're asking must in fact be meaningless.
I was just referring to:
Quoting Mww
Yes, it's true that you said "most" and not "all", so maybe my comment wasn't necessary.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
1824 UTC
So really, I was replying to something that you hadn't said.
It’s all good. I don’t mind being corrected, should the occassion arise.
In order to say that everything that appears is "of my experience," I have to do something theoretical. Phenomenally, many things are not of my experience. They're just doors and computer monitors and sidewalks and so on.
That they're objective just means that they don't depend on being experienced in order to exist. Nothing you've said there explicitly contradicts that. Saying that experience is primary suffers from ambiguity. Primary in what sense? What does that mean in this instance? It could mean a number of things. This is ironic for someone who constantly criticises others in this respect.
That I know a whole bunch of things through experience doesn't mean that I don't know that there are rocks in other distant galaxies that I've never experienced. And that one claim, if justified and true, is sufficient to refute any idealism of a kind which denies this.
What you know about the physical world, you know from your experience.
From your experience, you can infer other things not directly observed by you, but implied by your experience. Ultimately, you know about the physical world from your experience.
You've experienced articles by or about scientists who reported their discoveries of such things as electrons, quarks, radiation evidently from the Big-Bang, etc.
If you say that there objectively are the physical world and its things, then I'll ask you what you mean by "There objectively is...".
As I said, there are, in their own context, systems of inter-referring abstract implications about propositions about hypothetical things.
I only said "...in their own context". I make no claim about their objective existence or reality.
No one denies that this physical world exists in its own context.
There's one such system of inter-referring abstract implications whose logical structural relations are those of your experience.
If you want to claim that this physical world has a kind of existence that the setting of such a hypothetical experience-story doesn't have, then you'd need to be more specific about that.
If you say that the difference is that this physical world is objectively real and existent, then you should be able to define those terms.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
2140 UTC
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The point is that to say this, I have to be doing something theoretical.
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…in order to what? :D
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Ok, they’re objectively existent if they exist observer-independently (objectively). You won’t get much argument on that.
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We get what “objective” means, but you didn’t define objective “existence”. (…except in terms of itself).
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That’s right, I didn’t contradict that irrelevant truism.
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As the basis for all that you know about the physical world. And no, that doesn’t prove that the physical world isn’t objectively existent, whatever that would mean.
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I’ve repeatedly admitted that I can’t prove that Materialism isn’t true, as brute-fact, an unfalisifiable unverifiable metaphysical theory,
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But there’s more to say than that: Your unfalsifiable proposition uses a term that you can’t define , and so it isn’t even validly-expressed.
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So, if you knew what you meant, and could say it, then I can’t, at this time, prove that (whatever it is) it wouldn’t be true.
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(Look, in your closed thread, we agreed to disagree about that, when I acknowledged that you believe that you know what you mean, and agreed to leaves it at that. I hope that you aren’t going to keep this up again until this thread gets closed too, for the same reason.)
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See above.
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The scientific reports that you’ve experienced imply that there are likely (in the context of your direct and indirect experience) to be rocks in other distant galaxies.
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I’ve already said that your direct observational experience (of scientific reports, in this case) is the basis for your indirect experience of more than you’ve directly observationally experienced.
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Are you going to go into another endless loop?
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Michael Ossipoff
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10 Su
2208 UTC
Reports of the work of theoretical physicists are part of your direct observational experience too.
Are you yourself doing something theoretical? Of course. You're theorizing about a metaphysics that you can't define.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
2217 UTC
I'm not sure I understand either of those comments in context.
1. I don't know how else to word this: You've directly observationally experienced (in a magazine, a tv show, a book of descriptive physics or astrsonomy, etc.) reports of the work of theoretical physicists.
2. I was referring to my earlier statement that Materiaiists haven't been able to define certain terms that they use when expressing their Materialist metaphysical belief.
...and another earlier statement that the objectively-existent (whatever that means) "stuff" that Materialists believe in is the stuff of metaphysical theory.
If there's a particular word, phrase, sentence term, etc. that you don't understand, then you should feel to specify it.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
2224 UTC
Right. But in context, what does that have to do with anything?
Either you or S. was saying or implying that what we hear about the world outside of your direct observational experience means that it objectively exists (whatever that would mean).
Specifically, I was replying to this:
Quoting Terrapin Station
If you didn't mean what I thought you meant, then feel free to clarify what else you did mean.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
2231 UTC
I'll have to resume this discussion tomorrow, because there are household tasks to be done.
Michael Ossipoff
10 Su
2234 UTC
Some appearances are not of experiences per se. In other words, not everything appears as "this is an experience I'm having." Some appearances are simply of "things" like doors and sidewalks and so on.
Quoting leo
This is a double confusion. First, you're confusing the imagined properties of an imagined object with the actual properties of an actual external object. Second, you're confusing appearance in the imagination with appearance to the senses.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
As I said, the reason to believe in the stuff is that it explains why our sensory experience is the way it is. There are other possible explanations (e.g. the Berkelian explanation that God puts these sensory appearances into our minds), but these invariably involve hypothesising the existence of something for which there's no evidence.
You're kidding, right? Are you ever going to allow yourself to proceed past this disingenuous and feeble excuse not to address the real issue? Or are you going to forever play this game until people just grow tired and ignore you?
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
But that's not relevant. What makes you think that that's relevant? The topic is not about the basis of our knowledge, but rather where we can take it. You're just missing the point.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Yes, that's more or less what I said, minus all of your pointless qualifications which I edited out of the above quote for sake of clarity.
There are rocks in distant galaxies. (That's not implying absolute certainty, so of course it's a matter of likelihood).
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
What a convoluted way of wording things you have. Sheesh.
No, I haven't experienced rocks in different galaxies in any way, shape or form. They're too far away. It would be physically impossible. And I haven't seen a photo of every single rock in every distant galaxy, and even if I had, that would just be an experience of photos, not of rocks. Photos of rocks are obviously not rocks, you'd just be equivocating.
So what?
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Not quite "what we hear" - which is a subjective wording - but besides that: yeah, so what? If you can't logically connect the two in the right way, then you don't have an argument.
Define, "There are...".
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Just speaking of conscious experience, if you notice something, you experience it. If you don’t notice it, you don’t experience it. If you notice those doors and sidewalks, that’s experience.
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A car drives by, and I ask you what its license-number was. But you were reading the bumper-sticker, not paying any attention to the license-number. The car was close enough to read the number, and the license-number was in your field-of-view. But you didn’t consciously notice it at all.
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You didn’t consciously experience the license-number.
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You’re the protagonist and center of your life-experience-story. It’s entirely about your experience. That’s the sense in which I meant that experience is primary with respect to our physical world.
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Are all systems of inter-referring abstract implications experience-stories? Of course not. In their own contexts, there are infinitely-many systems of inter-referring abstract facts, infinitely-many of which are far too simple to be an experience-story or physical-world-story.
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Obviously, there are, in their own contexts, Tegmark’s non-subjective MUH Ontic-Structural Realism world-stories too.
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Then why my emphasis on experience-stories? Simply because, as a truism, that’s obviously what we experience. A selfish life-chauvinist bias, of course.
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Your experience can’t be inconsistent or contradictory without mutually inconsistent facts, an impossibility.
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So what you experience must, for one thing, be consistent with your own existence with respect this physical world. For example, because your body is physical, there had to be some physical mechanism for its physical coming-into-being. Not surprisingly, then, you find that have parents, and grandparents. …and a population in which they live and were themselves generated.
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Your experience of what you hear from scientists about the formation of the Earth, solar-system and galaxies, etc. is consistent with your life. People used to say that the Earth is only 6000 years old, but that turned out to not be physically-consistent with our lives, because it was found that the mechanisms theorized to be able to make life, and then humans, wouldn’t have time to operate. And, consistently, the evidence in the rocks supports an older Earth.
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You’ll never find incontrovertible proof that you had no grandparents, because experience can’t be genuinely inconsistent.
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Michael Ossipoff
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11 M
1942 UTC
Not all appearances are of us experiencing something though. Not all appearances are of us, as subjects, experiencing something. I'm just talking about appearances there, not what's really going on.
What would be an example?
Things like that license plate when it's in someone's field-of-vision but they don't notice it?
Michael Ossipoff
11 Tu
0157 UTC
It's easiest to understand if we add theoretical stuff to it. But it's important to remember that the theoretical stuff is just that. So from that perspective, a popular way of accounting for it is to say that it's things we experience/that we're aware of without experiencing/being aware of it being an experience or without there also being an attendant phenomenon of us being an individual who is aware of something, who is in a relation with something else, something not us.
The point is that for these phenomena, to arrive at "well this is really just an experience I'm having" or "this is me experiencing something that's not me, filtering it through my perspectival apparatus, where what I'm really experiencing is a representation that my mind is creating," or anything like that, we have to be doing theoretical work. For these phenomena, the stuff in quotation marks above are not the phenomena that appear. The phenomena that appear are just the sidewalk, just a computer monitor, or whatever.
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I didn’t mean to add anything theoretical. In these matters, I do my best to not theorize anything. That’s why I say that my non-metaphysics isn’t a theory. …just some uncontroversial statements.
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But yes of course there’s a humungous amount of theorizing going on at these forums.
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I use the word “experience” much more broadly than you do. ...encompassing what you mean by those other terms.
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When you say, “experience”, you’re referring to what I’d call “overthinking things”.
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Buddhists and others have pointed out that when people pursue a descriptive or evaluative narrative about an experience, that isn’t the experience—it’s a fabricated substitute that’s about the experience.
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You say something similar in your message, using different terms, and I agree with what you say.
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I agree that that way of living isn’t authentic or desirable.
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Michael Ossipoff
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11 Tu
1803 UTC