Orders of Natural Phenomenon
Good morning,
In the introduction to his 1924 book, Outlines of Introductory Sociology, Clarence Marsh Case discusses sociology within the context of "Four Orders of Natural Phenomenon." He states, "The four orders are the inorganic, the vital organic, the mental organic and the super-organic, or social." (p. xvii). The corresponding four divisions of human knowledge of these orders are then the physical sciences, the biological sciences, the psychological/psychiatric sciences, and the social sciences.
I had (suprisingly) not heard this structure previously (or at least stated in this way, in high school a loooooong time ago, there were the 'hard sciences' and the 'soft sciences'), but it is intuitive, nearly axiomatic, and very useful to the argument I am forming in my work. I have been unable to locate the source of this structure, but I assume it comes from Philosophy of Science from sometime in the 17th to 19th Centuries.
Does anyone know the source of the four orders of natural phenomenon structure?
Unfortunately, this book is not available online, but some of his other books are available at http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=Case%2C%20Clarence%20Marsh%2C%201874%2D
Thank you,
Necuno (it's Interlinga).
In the introduction to his 1924 book, Outlines of Introductory Sociology, Clarence Marsh Case discusses sociology within the context of "Four Orders of Natural Phenomenon." He states, "The four orders are the inorganic, the vital organic, the mental organic and the super-organic, or social." (p. xvii). The corresponding four divisions of human knowledge of these orders are then the physical sciences, the biological sciences, the psychological/psychiatric sciences, and the social sciences.
I had (suprisingly) not heard this structure previously (or at least stated in this way, in high school a loooooong time ago, there were the 'hard sciences' and the 'soft sciences'), but it is intuitive, nearly axiomatic, and very useful to the argument I am forming in my work. I have been unable to locate the source of this structure, but I assume it comes from Philosophy of Science from sometime in the 17th to 19th Centuries.
Does anyone know the source of the four orders of natural phenomenon structure?
Unfortunately, this book is not available online, but some of his other books are available at http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/lookupname?key=Case%2C%20Clarence%20Marsh%2C%201874%2D
Thank you,
Necuno (it's Interlinga).
Comments (21)
Common observation would be my guess.
But in sociological terms, Auguste Comte's five great groups of phenomena (astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology) was a likely influence on subsequent sociologists.
Penchef, Esther H. 1947. The Sociological Thought Of Clarence Marsh Case; Its Origins, Development, Significance, And Its Relation To The Contributions Of Other Sociologists. Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). 64ff.
"The student of mathematics does not, as a mathematician, know anything whatsoever about the world of concrete reality. This is true because mathematics is not a body of knowledge with respect to any of the order of phenomena in the objective world. It deals with concepts and is a kind of quantitative logic, purely subjective in its essential nature. But that is not to say that it is not an immensely valuable discipline. Quite the contrary. While one who knew only mathematics, even if he mastered it all, would know nothing about the objective, phenomenal world, he would be in command of an incomparable mental equipment for the accurate explanation of natural phenomena if he were to turn his mathematically equipped mind to their systematic investigation. Thus it is that pure mathematics, far from being a single science, is no science at all. It is, however, the measure of accuracy for all sciences, or the 'standard of positivity,' as Comte expressed it." - Clarence Marsh Case, Outlines of Introductory Sociology (1924), p. xvi.
Thus, Mr. Case was familiar with Comte (but I am not) and you may be correct that he deduced the four orders from Comte.
I also did not know there was a book about Mr. Case. So I may take a look at the PDF. Mr. Case wrote mostly about non-violent resistance from what I gather, but I found his four orders fertile ground.
Thank you much :-)
My own classification is similar, but uses terms suitable to Cognitive Psychology, then Social Psychology, and finally Sociology, as follows:
1) Physical
a) Inorganic
i) Natural
ii) Artificial
b) Organic
i) Human Body
ii) Human Social Group
2) Mental
a) Human Mind
b) Human Culture
I read it, and then it disappeared.
Probably down to user error (yours and/or mine).
How is a classification of phenomena useful to your project?
How would you modify my classification to accommodate macrosociology (assuming that it already accommodates microsociology)?
Is this the Professor Elwell you are referring to:
Elwell, Frank W. 2013. Sociocultural Systems. AU Press, Athabasca University. Edmonton, AB.
Professor Emeritus Mary Jo Deegan also has a book from 2008 that I don't think is intended as a textbook per se, called Self, War and Society: George Herbert Mead's Macrosociology. Professor Elwell does not place Mead in his pantheon of founders of macrosociology (in fact, does not even mention him in the two books I have, word search is a great invention) and Mead has always been an issue because he is claimed as the founder of "American sociology."
I like Mr. Case's classifications because they are simple and intuitive and the audience can thus grasp them immediately. Artificial wasn't really a big issue in 1924, no one had yet thought of cloning, the technological singularity, even the atom bomb was just a theory, also, by definition, artificial can't be a 'natural phenomenon' and thus would not have a place in the four orders unless as a special extension of the fourth order (i.e. man made as a natural phenomenon of humanity).
There are many ways to slice the pie, it just depends on what you want at the end, I have had many times to decide how to slice the pie in my project. In your classification, the fourth order would simply become 1) b) ii) and 2) b) (or not to be...), I am not sure if you did that intentionally or not, but it's pretty clever.
Cheers!
Out of the three posted in this thread (Case's, Comte's and Galuchat's), I prefer Case's as well for pretty much the same reasons you provided.
However, I think "artificial" is more of a traditionalist term that originated from the anthropomorphic idea that human's are special creations, or separate from nature. Humans are the outcomes of natural processes and anything that they create, or invent, is as natural as the process of more complex elements being created inside of star and then littered across the galaxy when the star dies. Birds make nests. Beavers make dams. All species change their environment. It is just a matter of degrees that seems proportional to their morphology. The degree to which humans can manipulate their environment is a result of their unique (special) morphology (bipedalism which leaves two appendages for evolving hands - which have opposable thumbs - and of course large brains).
1) By 1924, intellectuals and scientists understood that astronomy, chemistry and physics were all part of the same continuum. Stars have chemistry, astronomy makes and bows to physics, and there was a whole lot going on there, but it was all in the same 'spectrum'. Thus, Comte's first three categories collapsed into the first order of natural phenomenon in Case's structure.
2) Mr. Case makes clear in the introduction that the mental sciences were just recently becoming members of the "elite circle" (formerly occupied exclusively by physics and biology) and modern psychology was not yet ready during the time of Comte - Comte died the year after Freud was born. So in Case's structure, the mental sciences in 1924 were added into the third slot (i.e. the third order of natural phenomenon).
Are there natural kinds, or are classifications merely cultural and/or linguistic conventions?
And if there are natural kinds, does that imply artificial kinds?
There are natural phenomenon and interpretations. One cannot claim that natural phenomenon are themselves cultural/linguistic conventions, e.g., the Sokal Hoax. But we have interpreted them in different ways - as history shows - that are suitable for the milieu of the times, compare Aristotle to modern physics. Part of the issue is that interpretations have not been accepted as equally factual, instead they have been dismissed as non-objective, illusion, human fallacy.
The fallacy has been to try to treat them as facts within the first order, whereas they are actually facts within the fourth order. The same fallacy occurs in reverse when you try to deny that first order facts are facts within the fourth order - i.e. treating physical facts as cultural/linguistic constructs - again, the Sokal Hoax. There is not exactly a symmetry in this arrangement, facts of lower orders cannot be denied by higher orders, but facts of higher orders are not facts in lower orders. It's sort of like the way time flows in only one direction (I hadn't actually thought of it this way before I typed this). Time is then probably - is definitely - related to - is probably even the 'cause of' - emergences in all the orders.
I'll give your second question some thought.
So, Sociology reduces to Psychology, then Biology, then Chemistry, then Physics?
This conflates interpretation and fact, whereas; interpretation is an attempt to explain fact(s).
So, the orders (or levels of abstraction) are incommensurable?
So, learning how to play the violin, or dealing with culture shock can be explained in terms of quantum mechanical interactions between elementary particles?
I think it would be silly to deny facts at any order (level of abstraction). But, this suggests that I cannot describe quantum mechanical interactions between elementary particles in terms of learning how to play the violin, or dealing with culture shock; which I agree with.
I will try to respond in order to your objections (rather than embedding quotes in quotes):
1. You misread my previous. Comte's astronomy chemistry and physics became Mr. Case's first order of natural phenomenon because they are all part of a continuum in the non-living physical world. This continuum was perhaps not clear in Comte's time, but was clear by 1924 (Einstein, the Curies, Planck did their major work in the late 19th century to the early 20th century, it was becoming clear that the physical universe was a continuum running from the sub-atomic to the stars and galaxies, with different frames of reference, i.e. that the rules of Newtonian physics applied to stars and galaxies but not to the atomic or sub-atomic, and so on).
However, it is also true in Mr. Case's structure that physics, biology, psychology and sociology form a continuum through the first through fourth orders of natural phenomenon, for example, if you connect physics and biology via abiogenesis.
2) I do not believe I am conflating interpretation with fact. Within the first order of natural phenomenon, interpretation is not fact, as you said, in that framework, an interpretation is an attempt to explain facts. Within the fourth order of natural phenomenon, and even the third, it must be regarded as fact to humanity but not fact to the first order of natural phenomenon.
3) I believe it in implicit in Mr. Case's four orders of natural phenomenon that the orders are incommensurable. This also does not seem to be incorrect in observation.
4) I understand that there is considerable interplay between quantum interpretation and metaphysics and that it is often dismissed in the scientific community as 'quantum mysticism' (which is not exactly the same, but sometimes relates).
As you seem to have answered your last question on your own, I agree to the extent of your answer and will not delve further in quantum metaphysics except to say that one should not confuse emergent with quantum interactions in all cases; e.g., a snowflake is often used as an example of emergent behavior in the first order of natural phenomenon and video games are often written to intentionally generate emergent narrative during play by humans, because that is what humans do.
Thanks for your clarifications.
I am a 'tendentious pedant' - a phrase I picked up from Norman Spinrad a few years ago (I highly recommend reading The Void Captain's Tale (1982) - a challenging read but quite a bit of philosophy in it - and Science Fiction in the Real World (1990)).
And thank you all, this has been a good discussion I think, and it has clarified some points and brought to the fore some questions I had not thought of previously. :smile:
I was out for awhile yesterday and so was not on the forums, but began thinking of an outline of the argument that I have made from Mr. Case's four orders of natural phenomenon (both here and in my project), and I have been busy tapping away at it this morning. :flower:
Not at all.
I look forward to reading more from you, as my current interests also lie in the Social Sciences.