The problem with the problem of free will
Assume that "X" refers to a real thing. Now assume that John defines "X" as being Y, that Jane defines "X" as being Z, and that the real thing referred to by "X" cannot be both Y and Z. In this context it makes sense to argue that either John or Jane are wrong in their account of what it means to be an X. John is wrong if the real thing referred to by "X" isn't Y and Jane is wrong if the real thing referred to by "X" isn't Z.
Now assume that "X" doesn't refer to a real thing. Does it make sense to argue that either John or Jane are wrong in their account of what it means to be an X? Given that there is no real thing referred to by "X", there is no fact of the matter.
To give a more meaningful example, consider free will. John defines "free will" in one way and Jane defines "free will" in a different way. Unless the term "free will" already refers to a real thing it doesn't seem to make sense to argue that one or the other is wrong in their account of what it means to have free will. The same is also true of the terms "choice" and "moral responsibility".
So if John defines "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" in such a way that they don't refer to real things, and if Jane defines "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" in such a way that they do refer to real things, what would John mean if he were to argue that Jane's account of what it means to have free will, choice, and moral responsibility are wrong? It's certainly not the case that her account fails to describe the real things referred to by these terms. Is it just that her stipulative definitions are not the lexical definitions (assuming that they're not, and that John's are)? If so then what makes the lexical definitions more significant than the stipulative definitions? Obviously there's the issue of successful communication, but given that this can be addressed by explaining the stipulative definitions ahead of time, it isn't really relevant.
Again to give a more meaningful example, assume that determinism is the case, that John is an incompatibilist, and that Jane is a compatabilist. John's stipulative definitions – which, for the sake of argument, are the same as the lexical definitions – are such that the terms do not refer to real things and Jane's stipulative definitions – which, for the sake of argument, are not the same as the lexical definitions – are such that the terms do refer to real things. Do we have free will? Do we make choices? Are we morally responsible for our actions? According to John, no. According to Jane, yes.
And if John were to say that Jane's "free will" isn't really free will, isn't he just saying that Jane's "free will" isn't what he (and, for the sake of argument, most others) mean by "free will"? If so, is this significant?
Now assume that "X" doesn't refer to a real thing. Does it make sense to argue that either John or Jane are wrong in their account of what it means to be an X? Given that there is no real thing referred to by "X", there is no fact of the matter.
To give a more meaningful example, consider free will. John defines "free will" in one way and Jane defines "free will" in a different way. Unless the term "free will" already refers to a real thing it doesn't seem to make sense to argue that one or the other is wrong in their account of what it means to have free will. The same is also true of the terms "choice" and "moral responsibility".
So if John defines "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" in such a way that they don't refer to real things, and if Jane defines "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" in such a way that they do refer to real things, what would John mean if he were to argue that Jane's account of what it means to have free will, choice, and moral responsibility are wrong? It's certainly not the case that her account fails to describe the real things referred to by these terms. Is it just that her stipulative definitions are not the lexical definitions (assuming that they're not, and that John's are)? If so then what makes the lexical definitions more significant than the stipulative definitions? Obviously there's the issue of successful communication, but given that this can be addressed by explaining the stipulative definitions ahead of time, it isn't really relevant.
Again to give a more meaningful example, assume that determinism is the case, that John is an incompatibilist, and that Jane is a compatabilist. John's stipulative definitions – which, for the sake of argument, are the same as the lexical definitions – are such that the terms do not refer to real things and Jane's stipulative definitions – which, for the sake of argument, are not the same as the lexical definitions – are such that the terms do refer to real things. Do we have free will? Do we make choices? Are we morally responsible for our actions? According to John, no. According to Jane, yes.
And if John were to say that Jane's "free will" isn't really free will, isn't he just saying that Jane's "free will" isn't what he (and, for the sake of argument, most others) mean by "free will"? If so, is this significant?
Comments (80)
The resolution of the undefinable term problem is to construct epistemological definitions of otherwise undefined terms like 'could have done otherwise'. But the libertarians do not accept such definitions.
As I see it, the compatibilist position is that a person 'could have done otherwise', based on an epistemological interpretation of that phrase and that, since that's the only interpretation that anybody has been able to suggest so far, that's the maximum sort of free will that anybody could imagine.
Are you sure? Compatibilism seems more like "a person is to blame for their choices, even though 'choice' doesn't exist".
"Could have done otherwise" doesn't mean anything under determinism. If "could" refers to anything real, then determinism does not hold at that point - i.e. either the laws of physics are wrong, or our understanding of them. I don't think compatibilists complain too much about physics.
The phrase "could have done otherwise" can point to a human ability. Abilities are similar to dispositions. Dispositions exist (i.e. they are actual properties of things) even when they are not actualized. A sugar cube is soluble because it would dissolve if it were immersed in water. Even if you don't immerse it in water, it remains soluble. You don't say that it was insoluble during the time when it was dry. Even when the sugar cube is dry, it retains the disposition to dissolve in water.
Likewise, you can say of Sue, who got to work late, that she could have arrived at work on time to mean that she had the capacity and opportunity. That the capacity wasn't actualized when she got late doesn't entail that the capacity itself wasn't there. If Sue gets late to work while having the capacity and opportunity, then she can be blamed (unless she had a good excuse to arrive late intentionally). Only if she didn't have the capacity (e.g. being paralyzed by a stroke) or didn't have the opportunity (e.g. because her car had been stolen), or both, do we normally say that she could not have done otherwise.
They would likewise define "choice" in a manner compatible with determinism, and so argue that we do have and make choices. To argue that this isn't what a choice is doesn't make much sense unless "choice" already refers to a real thing, and that the compatabilist's description of this thing is mistaken. But, of course, that would entail that we have and make choices anyway.
Unless all they're arguing is that the compatabilist's definition isn't the lexical definition, but then why does that matter?
That's precisely the distinction that determinists argue is fallacious. Everything which occurs to make Sue late, including her 'choices', on this particular day is an incapacity equal to accidents and emergencies like those you describe. There is no point at which Sue can independently intervene in the course of events to change the inevitable outcome of her arriving after the appointed time. She can sit there all day saying she shouldn't have had that last sip of coffee or she should have had the right fare ready for the bus but she did and she couldn't not have.
This is what I don't get. Under determinism, what happens is a sensitive function of the initial conditions at the big bang, or if you prefer the conditions at any other time. Choice cannot exist, neither can "testability". Playing word-games to preserve moral responsibility seems utterly futile.
Why is it the compatabilist who's playing word games and not the incompatabilist? Why is it that the incompatabilist has the 'correct' definition of "free will", "choice", and "moral responsibility" and not the compatabilist?
How do you get from "what happens is a sensitive function of initial conditions" to "choice cannot exist"? What if the compatabilist defines "choice" in such a way that it, too, is a sensitive function of initial conditions? Then making choices can (and maybe does) occur even if determinism is the case.
What you seem to be suggesting is that the compatabilist's definition is wrong and that the incompatabilist's definition is right. What makes it so? Unlike something like "planet", you – as a hard determinist – can't defer to a real thing referred to by the word "choice" and argue that the incompatabilist successfully describes it and that the compatabilist doesn't.
All you can really do is argue that the compatabilist's definition isn't the lexical definition (assuming, for the sake of argument, that it isn't), but then why does that matter?
Well not all laws of physics are deterministic.
Determinism is often an interpretation more so than a necessary conclusion.
This is especially true of the foundations of quantum theory, which are by definition probabilistic.
Debates about free will often dissolve into debates about interpretations of physical laws and the nature of causality.
In fact I would say the thing that compatibilist and incompatibilist argue about the most is over how to interpret causality and not how to define free will.
God may know what I will choose tomorrow, but that does not mean I won't choose, because if I don't choose I'll be left standing at the end of the road forever. By contrast, I have no choice about where the roads lead, because my thinking does not change geography.
So even under determinism, one can distinguish having a choice from having no choice. One can similarly distinguish having a free choice from a coerced choice. The mad axeman slaughtering everyone who turns for the promenade coerces me to head for the headland rather than lose my head.
And what one can distinguish has meaning. My having a determined choice means that my choosing determines the event, and having no choice means that my choosing has no effect.
Whenever you are deliberating about what to do, you are making a principled and pragmatically justified distinction between those options that you either lack the capacity or opportunity to do, on the one hand, and those options (W, X, Y, Z, etc.) that are genuinely open to you, on the other hand. When you then settle for one of those options -- to do W, say -- and proceed to do it, it doesn't reveal the other options -- X, Y, Z, etc. -- retrospectively not to have been really open to you. It's not just because you do not chose to do something that you are thereby shown not to have had the opportunity or capacity to do it at all. That you merely didn't chose to do any one of those things only reveals that you didn't have a good reason to do them, or that you didn't engage in practical deliberation as well as you should have, maybe. The fault would thus lie within yourself (in your rational or moral character, say) rather than in the external antecedent physical circumstances of your action (where those "circumstances" include your own antecedent neurophysiological states).
You may then appropriately kick yourself for not having done the right thing. If you would rather hold the universe causally responsible for your not having made the right choice, owing to the past physical conditions required for you to make the right choice not having been realized, it may reveal that you are philosophically confused. You forgot that you are a part of the empirical/material universe and of its unfolding rather than the past physical "state" of the universe being external to you. On the former view, you are an embodied rational animal endowed with real cognitive abilities, whereas on the latter view you are just a temporally unextended node in a chain of physical events. The latter view portrays you has having fewer powers than a simple sugar cube is commonly held to have. Physical theory doesn't force this metaphysically extravagant picture of human beings upon us.
I have a very minority position on the issue in general. First, I think determinism is a mystery and pointless to debate: empirically there is no model imaginable that can demonstrate determinism to be present or absent, it is a prejudice we bring to the table with our thinking, often citing supposed 'laws' of this and that or 'principles' of sufficient whatever.
Second, I think 'free will' is an idea unrelated to determinism. Its history is theological and in contemporary debates it remains akin to theology, a way of relating a person's view of psychology to their view of ontology.
It is a good thing, even when one is a naturalist, that one's philosophy of mind not conflict with one's metaphysics or with one's ontological understanding of living beings. One's desire to avoid such conflicts need not be a covert attempt to save supernatural belief.
Quite so!
There is a converse, though: that people's claims about philosophy of mind maybe be covert claims about metaphysical naturalism. I am an ardent advocate of science as a method and a body of work but against metaphysical naturalism, and I think the two things are confused in determinism/freewill debates.
Naturalism has many guises, some of which are distinguished in the various essays collected in De Caro and Macarthur, Naturalism in Question, HUP, 2004. I am partial to the sorts of naturalism espoused by Hilary Putnam, John McDowell and Jennifer Hornsby (who each have an essay published in that volume). Can you elaborate a bit on what sort of naturalism you are labeling metaphysical naturalism?
I agree that compatibilists define "choice" in a manner that is determined by conditions that obtain at distant times. For example, I choose tea now, rather than coffee, because the big-bang determined that I would. Compatibilists define that as my choice despite it being pre-determined by the big-bang.
Fair enough. I should be judged for my decision to drink tea. I am guilty of drinking tea, and should be punished for it. I forgive you your bigotry, you are incapable of doing otherwise.
Which laws of physics are not deterministic?
Quoting m-theory
Both General Relativity and the Standard Model are time-symmetric theories.
At a less prosaic level, the removal of the free will axiom from QM renders all physical theories deterministic.
But even if it were otherwise, it seems a stretch to use laws derived from nature to prove the universal determinism of nature. My hammer is efficacious, therefore everything is a nail.
How can relativity, of which one consequence is time dilation, be time symmetric?
You can refer to the sources I provided.
Quoting tom
Thermodynamics is not symmetrical.
Surely you don't intend to suggest that the above listed theories can simply ignore thermodynamics?
Determinism is an interpretation of physical laws, it is not a necessary logical truth.
That is the point you are missing.
So when you ask "what laws are not deterministic" the answer may well be all of them.
Determinism is an assumption about the laws not a demonstrable fact about them.
Quoting tom
There is no axiom of free will in qm.
This applies regardless of what view one has on free will. or determinism.
So the question of whether one 'has a choice' or 'has made a choice' does not depend on one's philosophy on free will.
(The epistemological perspective saves the day yet again!)
And that is one of the reasons thermodynamics is *not* regarded as a fundamental theory. The fundamental theories *are* time reversible - both the classical and quantum versions - but the set of approximations - coarse-graining, scale-dependence, etc - renders the "macroscopic" theory of thermodynamics incapable of predicting the past. There are several well known paradoxes and problems relating to this issue.
Quoting m-theory
This is nonsense. All of science implicitly assumes the free will of the experimenter. In QM this is made explicit in Bell's Theorem and various similar theorems. Otherwise we are super-determined https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism
The idea of QM and GR being fundamental while thermodynamics would be merely contingent and derivative (e.g. dependent on a low entropy initial state of the universe) is a contentious proposal. Some physicists view thermodynamics to be fundamental (e.g. Fermi, Feynman or Penrose, if I remember). In any case, the proposition is more of a matter of the interpretation of physical theory than it is a scientific result. Even if it were merely contingently true in our actual universe that the laws of thermodynamics are valid (i.e. that they are valid in our branch of the "multiverse" that, as it happens, has a very low entropy early state) then there would still exist a definite arrow of time, however contingent, and the laws that govern the evolution of the observable/measurable states of matter would still be non-deterministic. Quantum indeterminacies would still rule the day. And this fact, again, would have very little bearing on the philosophical issue of incompatibilist/compatibilist regarding free will and responsibility since most philosophers regard the existence quantum indeterminacies to be irrelevant to the freedom of the will (excepting a few, such as the libertarian Robert Kane). If God throws dice to establish some of our brain states while we are making decisions, that doesn't makes us any freer than we would be if he would simply constrain the evolution of those states to obey deterministic laws.
You are running together the concepts of determinism and the concept of free will. Only if you assume the validity of a specific form of philosophical incompatibilism (i.e. the incompatibilism of free will with indeterminism at the level of physical law) are the two concepts coextensive. The only thing that is generally acknowledged by theoretical physicists in connection with the entanglement issue that you raise up is that the state of the measurement apparatus (e.g. whether is it set to measure some variable A or rather the conjugate variable B) and the ensuing measurement result, are not jointly predetermined -- i.e. there does not exist "hidden variables" which those states are pre-determined by and which we are merely empirically ignorant of. Those are the hidden albeit real "elements of reality" argued for by Einstein in the famous EPR paper. What the empirical verification of Bell's inequalities establishes is that Einstein was wrong about that. There are no hidden variables and an entangled electron (for instance) doesn't have a determinate momentum prior to a measurement having been effected either on this electron or on the other electron that it is entangled with. Hence, QM genuinely is indeterministic. Some physicists use the label "free will" to designate this lack of pre-determination. It merely amounts to a rejection of hidden variables. But it has nothing to do with the philosophical issue of the freedom of the will. Action, practical reason and personal responsibility are not concepts of theoretical physics at all.
Are you familiar with Quantum indeterminacy?
I think it's more likely that we are in control and responsible. And it seems to me that to deny that likelihood is to say "self-control and planning are pointless- I really have no control, no matter what I do it's just going to be what I was predetermined to do anyway."
I have never heard of any axiom of free will in quantum mechanics.
I think it is important to point out that no classical or modern theory gives us a good account of initial conditions of the past.
Not GR or the standard model.
If they did, then sure you could claim they were deterministic.
But GR and the standard model do not predict the past initial conditions, we still cannot claim to know nor do we have a complete account of the initial conditions.
So again, even if we take GR and SM to be fundamental theories, these theories are not sufficient to validate the claim that the universe is deterministic because these theories fall to predict what are the exact initial conditions of the past which have produced the universe and it's present state.
In Bell's ow words:
Often the Free Will Axiom is called the "free will loophole", or the "free choice of detector orientations".
Quoting m-theory
I think you are missing the point. Given the conditions now, the past can be calculated by physical laws. This is how we know the big bang happened. Both General Relativity and the Standard Model have time reversal operators.
Quoting m-theory
Umm, so why did we ever look for CMB?
You are misunderstanding Bell's statement. Bell's theorem is derived from the assumption of local hidden variables. Hence, if experiments show Bell's inequalities to be violate (as indeed Alain Aspect was the first to show experimentally) then it follows that either there a no hidden variables, or, if there are hidden variables, then measurement on one member of an entangled pair has a causal effect on the other element, and this causal effect is transmitted faster than light in violation of the special theory of relativity (and in violation of "local realism"). The assumption of superdeterminism -- that, somehow, the orientations of the measurement apparatuses as well as the measurement results all are predetermined in accordance with the statistical predictions of QM (an hypothesis rather akin to Leibniz's preestablished harmony) is one way to save local variables consistently with the predictions of QM, albeit a metaphysically extravagant and rather gratuitous way to do so.
Bell, like many physicists, also takes for granted that determinism and free will are incompatible and hence views the denial of determinism as being tantamount to the denial of human free will. He just assumes incompatibilism.
In summary, the "free will axiom" only is required provided "free will" is understood to mean "indeterminsm", which therefore excludes supercompatibilism. Since few physicists endorse superdeterminism (because they don't care for hidden variables or for local realism) they take QM to be an indeterministic theory, and, in this sense only, they are endorsing the "free will axiom" (a phrase that is almost never used in the literature).
To find out more about the early universe. The account that is obtained by studying the CMB is neither complete, nor is it of initial conditions. Rather it is a coarse-grained - ergo incomplete - account of conditions around the time of last scattering, which is some time after the earliest modelled time.
Pure supposition on your part.
What are the axioms of Bell's Theorem?
That could be the case, but it could also be the case that x is both Y and Z, with John simply choosing to focus on Y in his concept and Jane choosing to focus on Z. (And by the way, for whatever reasons it became a trend, the convention is to use small letter x's, y's, etc. for individual entity variables, and capital letter Fs, Gs, etc. for property variables. But I'll stick with your letters so it's not confusing.)
Quoting Michael
I'd not say that they're wrong, but they could be departing from a convention. For example, there's no real Sherlock Holmes. But if John says Sherlock Holmes lives at 22 Main Street, John is departing from the fictional conventions about where Sherlock Holmes lives.
It's not wrong to depart from a convention, but it's also not the case that there are no conventions just because we're talking about something with no real extension.
And after all, moral stances, definitions of terms, concepts, and all sorts of things have no real extensions. (I'm using "real" in the scholastic sense of "extramental" here, by the way.)
Of course, John could be wrong about something like the following: if he says, "In A. Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes lives at 22 Main Street." In that case, he simply has a fact incorrect.
Likewise if someone were to say, "In most cultures, it is considered morally acceptable to commit murder."
In those cases, the proposition in question is about how someone thought or thinks about something, and there are facts about that.
Quoting Michael
So from what I said above, we can see that people can't be wrong about what a term "means" (I'd say "how to define a term," as in my view, we can't literally share meaning, but that's another issue). However, people can match or not match a convention about the definition of a term, and they can be wrong or right about what a particular dictionary gives as a definition, or how a particular person defines a term, etc.
In the free will debate, some people seem to clearly be arguing from a position that's based on a very unconventional definition of "free will."
Quoting Michael
Usually what people are getting at there is that the one person, so Jane in the scenario above, is using the terms unconventionally. Again, there is nothing wrong with using terms unconventionally, being unconventional, etc. It's just that in this case they'd be talking about different things, and Jane may not be engaging in the discussion as it had been previously established at all. She might basically be co-opting the terms to talk about something else instead (something that she believes is real contra views that she sees as mistaken).
Quoting Michael
So, if Jane is using the terms unconventionally, where the convention is to refer to things that are fictional, she may be using the terms to refer to real things, but it's important to note that she's not using the terms to refer to what they really refer to or something like that. That's because there is no real reference. Again, reference is one of those things that does not occur extramentally, so there is no real reference. Jane can't be right that the terms refer to such and such, whereas John is wrong about the terms referring to such and such. There is no right or wrong there. Just conventional and unvonventional.
Of course, I don't agree with Wittgenstein, and I think that what's usually going on in these sorts of discussions isn't simply using words in different ways, but disagreements about just what is real.
What makes the conventional sense of free will more important than the compatabilist sense? What makes the conventional sense of choice more important than the compatabilist sense? What makes the conventional sense of moral responsibility more important than the compatabilist sense?
And if the conventional sense of these things isn't more important than the compatabilist sense then why does it matter if we don't have the conventional sense of these things?
I had an interesting conversation the other day with someone who claimed to be a compatibilist, but after a rather uncomfortable exchange, he denied that we have free will. It was really strange. After my conversation with him, I feel I need to ask all compatiblists, "are you a compatibilist who accepts free will, or do you deny that we have free will?"
Harris actually makes it very clear that he believes free will is incompatible with determinism. Harris believes we are living in a strictly deterministic universe, and he clearly denies that we have free will (although he does suggest that all people need to act as if they have free will).
Care definitely should be taken when denying free will. I'm imagining someone who never had the courage to stand up for himself, and as an adult never moves out of his parent's house. He hears "we don't have free will", and thinks to himself, "oh, yeah, that explains it... where are those Cheetos?"
Bell's theorem just is the statement that the statistical predictions of QM are inconsistent with all local hidden variable theories. Since superdeterminism provides a loophole for the local hidden theorist who wants to hold fast to both QM and to local hidden variables, then you may say that the denial of superdeterminism is an axiom of Bell's theorem. What else you consider to be an axiom would depend how you are formalizing Bell's argument (in support of his conclusion) and what commonly agreed presupposition(s) you are attempting to question.
But you are ducking my main point that the denial or affirmation of superdeterminism has very little bearing on the issue of the freedom of the human will when you consider that there are compatibilist accounts of free will, on the one hand, and also that quantum indeterminacies are commonly regarded not to provide the sort of leeway that ascription of human freedom and responsibility require, on the other hand. Human freedom from predetermination isn't the freedom to behave in accordance to the result of God's dice throws on almost all accounts (if you would except accounts such as Robert Kane's quite sophisticated QM dependent version of libertarianism).
Since you refuse to provide the axioms of Bell's theorem, allow me:
1. Freedom of choice. The freedom to choose which experiment to perform independently of the object to be measured. i.e. The Free Will of the Experimenter
2. Measurement Independence. Future outcomes do not influence past settings - i.e. causality.
3. Locality.
4. Counterfactual Definiteness.
You are paying no attention whatsoever to the ongoing argument or to the philosophical issue about free will and determinism. Merely using bold characters doesn't validate your assumption of a crude equivalency between the affirmation of free will and the denial of superdeterminsm. What is assumed in order to derive the validity of Bell's theorem is that superdeterminism is false, not that human beings have free will. But the falsity of determinism just is generally assumed to be part of the standard understanding of QM; and if determinism is false then, a fortiory, so is superdeterminism. Superdeterminism just is an extravagant metaphysical doctrine devised as a loophole in order to save QM together with local hidden variables. What is assumed -- your so called "free will axiom" -- in order for Bell's argument to go through merely is that the setup of the measuring apparatus (e.g. the determination of which of two conjugate variables are being measured) together with the result of the measurement aren't predetermined.
In summary again, (1) since most physicists don't care at all for local hidden variables, they don't care for superdeterminism either. And (2) since the question of the compatibility of free will and determinism is central to the philosophical debate you can't crudely equivocate between "free will" and "indeterminism" without begging the question.
I'm confused by this. Isn't Bell's theorem supposed to show that 1., 3., and 4. cannot all be true?
Not quite. It is rather supposed to show that those assumptions are jointly incompatible with the statistical predictions of QM. If you then accept the conclusion of "Bell's Theorem" (i.e. this statement of incompatibility) and wish to save the empirically verified predictions of QM (as you probably should) then you have to question at least one of those assumptions. (And keep in mind that "free will" in Tom's statement of the first "axiom" only refers to the lack of predetermination of the setup of the measurement apparatus.)
Yes it is confusing because Bell's theorem isn't a theory but rather a statement of incompatibility between a set of assumptions. Physicists who endorse the empirical and theoretical validity of QM seldom endorse assumptions (3) and (4) in Tom's table. (Those rather are consequences of local hidden variable theories that aim at reconciling QM with the intuitive "realist" assumptions of classical physics). So, to suggest that (1) is an "axiom" of QM just because it is an "axiom" of Bell's theorem is not just misleading, but confused.
As I have pointed out more than once, the free will axiom is implicit in all of science, and is made explicit in quantum mechanics, particularly Bell's theorem and the various other no-go theorems. It is just as much an axiom of QM as are states in (projective) Hilbert Space.
The simple fact is that of the four axioms of Bell's theorem that I gave, the first two are regarded as unquestionable by the majority of physicists, therefore it can *only* be the last two that provide the contradiction.
There are notable exceptions to this view. Gerard 't Hooft (if you don't know him, he is a Nobel Prize winning physicist, father of the Standard Model, and of the same stature as Hawking) takes the view that freedom and counterfactual definiteness are wrong. Here's a book he wrote on the subject:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.1548v3.pdf
A more accessible blog on the matter is by Sabine Hossenfelder.
http://backreaction.blogspot.co.uk/2016/01/free-will-is-dead-lets-bury-it.html
Now, counterfactual definiteness can be a surprisingly slippery notion. My view is that when it is expressed in terms of possible measurements, then that statement is incompatible with the absence of free will.
So, what Bell's theorem purports to show is that local counterfactual definiteness is forbidden by quantum mechanics, while the axioms of freedom and causality are protected.
There is of course another way of rendering Bell's theorem impotent - the Everett Interpretation.
There is a contradiction produced by accepting the 4 axioms. The solutions are:
1 Axiom 4 is wrong, leading to Copenhagen or Many Worlds.
2. Axiom 3 is wrong, leading to bizarre non-local contrivances.
3. Axiom 2 is wrong, leading to Transactional interpretation??????
4. Axiom 1 and 4 are wrong, leading to Superdeterminism or Many Worlds
Quantum field theory is explicitly local. Copenhagen is local. Many Worlds is local. As a matter of fact it has been proved that QM is a local theory. No sane physicist gives up (3)(or 2)!
One positive aspect of super-determinism is that it brings QM into compatibility with General Relativity.
What about last year's loophole-free Bell test that apparently supports quantum nonlocality?
Does it really? How?
Huh? How can a statement forming part of the exposition of the argument of a notional third party (in this case an extreme determinist) be a supposition on my part?
That's why I gave the axioms I listed earlier their proper name - axioms! Unfortunately the term "loophole" is used in two ways - to refer to the axioms themselves and to refer to the experimental difficulties.
The importance of the experiment you refer to, is that it closed two loopholes - i.e. two experimental difficulties were overcome. They were able to guarantee no-faster-than-light-communication (i.e. they closed the locality loophole) and they closed the "detection loophole", which is an experimental loophole relating to photons.
The experiment does not "support quantum nonlocality".
It does support non-locality, as Dr. Hanson says:
Non-locality is not the same as faster-than-light communication. I'm sure you know that, which is why I don't know why you equated them above.
Yes it does, but the mention of an "action at a distance" is misleading. Nonlocality has long been seen as a consequence of QM (ever since Niels Bohr replied to the paper by Einstein, Podolski and Rosen) and is commonly seen as having been demonstrated by the empirical verification of the violation of Bell's inequalities. However, this non-locality of QM must be understood merely as the denial of local realism and it doesn't entail "action at a distance" where such a phrase is meant to imply that there is a causal interaction taking place at a speed exceeding the speed of light.
See also the first answer to the question How to understand locality and non-locality in Quantum Mechanics?
Agreed, though "realism" had a special technical meaning referring to the determinateness of quantum measurements before they are effected. As for "action at a distance" check my short references, especially the last one.
You are saying that although she might think she could have done otherwise, that she in fact could not have done otherwise, correct?
If this is correct, and I have read you right, then I am saying that your assertion that she could not have done otherwise is a purely baseless supposition on your part.
Hanson's experiment rules out local hidden variable theories but not local realism. In particular, it doesn't rule out Many-Worlds since Many-Worlds doesn't involve any action or communication between entangled particles.
He's right that MW is local, but he's wrong about the rest, so I think my point stands.
Feels a bit like going round in circles, but no experiment ever performed closes the "freedom loophole", so single-world realist theories that are absolutely deterministic are not ruled out by this or any other Bell-type experiment.
Quoting Andrew M
Yes! Many worlds is a local realist theory that cannot be ruled out by any Bell-type experiment, because of the fifth axiom which I omitted:
5. The uniqueness of outcomes.
Which is not true under Many-Worlds.
What about Anton Zeilinger's 2010 experiment?
Third Bell loophole closed for photons:
OK, let's take the Copenhagen Interpretation and Quantum Field Theory in turn. We can then move onto String theory if you like.
The CI is a local anti-realist theory. Due to it's purely epistemic nature, it survives any experiment that refutes both local realism and non-local realism.
For example this famous experiment refutes non-local realism:
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v446/n7138/full/nature05677.html
You could ask yourself what it means for an epistemic theory to be non-local? The wavefunction, including the combined wavefunction of entangled particles, is not an element of reality. What does it add to say that something that does not exist here, also does not exist over there? CI is able to maintain the desirable features of locality and respecting special relativity by abandoning realism.
Also, there's this: Non-locality in Quantum Field Theory due to General Relativity
The simple fact is that, contrary to your claim, experiments have supported nonlocality and sane physicists do reject locality.
Those are experimental loopholes to ensure that Axiom 3. is maintained. You can't claim that locality is being tested if there are conceivable ways in which different parts of the experiment might influence each other.
But again, if you give it a moment's thought, do you really think Zeilinger thinks he was unable to set up his apparatus as he wished? Did he close *that* loophole?
In fact Zeilinger is on record as stating his belief in free will.
Non-locality at the Planck scale? Are you for real?
According to this, yes.
But, again, I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. There are experiments that demonstrate non-locality and sane physicists reject locality. What you said earlier was wrong.
It's worth pointing out that distance inevitably means time. Not a mediated travel (e.g. the sun travels 8 or so minutes through space to get to Earth), but a point of the world. In this respect, non-locality has a similar relationship as our own limited observations of the world.
In the universe of my room, I do not observe other people or computer link to other parts of the world. Within an instant, a message appears out of nowhere, from a place which cannot be assigned to anything in my locality. Something without presence in my space has acted upon my screen. Spooky. The world is bigger than my locality.
Non-locality is an really an affirmation of both realism and localities. The world I observe is not all of it. Other things are so, not local to me, there beyond what I experience or observe, and they sometimes affect me. And I will never be able to predict them.
[quote="An experimental test of non-local realism" ]Most working scientists hold fast to the concept of ‘realism’—a viewpoint according to which an external reality exists independent of observation.[/quote]
The mistake is in bolded. Independent of what observation? Mine? Anyone?
Non-locality only precludes observation from my locality. I cannot measure what is not local to me. This doesn't necessarily hold for other localities. We might say the following: something non-local to me could well be local to someone else. No existing state is independent of a locality and the world which might be observed. Yet, non-locality is expressed everywhere, for the world is always more than any one locality.
Fair enough, but this may just be a semantic difference over the meaning of "locality".
The SEP page on Action at a Distance in QM says, "Yet, the question of whether the EPR/B correlations imply non-locality and the exact nature of this non-locality is a matter of ongoing controversy."
However "locality" is defined, Hanson's experiment doesn't imply "action at a distance".
Quoting tom
I agree.
Actually initial conditions of the past cannot be determined with any current models.
You cannot reverse time to determine the initial conditions precipitating the big bang.
And in fact there are many things that current models simply cannot account for like dark matter, dark energy, the matter/antimatter asymmetry, etc.
Your point that the current laws of physics are deterministic is a failed point.
They do not give us a complete account of the past and they do not give us a full account of all the phenomena of nature.
You want to argue that GR and the standard model are deterministic, they are not.
Each fails and breaks down taking into account a description of the complete past.
So no, none of the current laws are deterministic and consistent.
So, why did scientists look for the CMB?
Are you suggesting that the CMB is a prediction about the initial conditions of the universe or that the prediction of CMB is a complete account of natural phenomena?
It is not.
Any truly deterministic model would be able to give us the answer as to what are the initial conditions precipitating the big bang.
If GR and the standard model cannot produce consistent and non-contradictory accounts of the initial conditions of all of causality then it can not accurately be called deterministic.
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1) the certainty of what will happen in the future is in no way contradictory to our freedom in the present. in theology, we would make a distinction between "foreknowledge" and strict predestination. foreknowledge of the future does not violate free-will in the present. rather, foreknowledge only has meaning if it is truly predictive of free choice. otherwise, it is not true "foreknowledge" (in the theological sense), but is rather simply mathematical deduction.
2) the naturalistic, atheistic, reductionist worldview absolutely rules out any semblance of free will. for a person to have the ability to make choices that contradict material precursors requires a transcendent, supernatural ability. the mere natural cannot rise above material cause and effect. for this reason, our experience of free-will should give us all very deep pause when considering the origin of this freedom.. not that we possess something great in ourselves, but He who created us in His own image - He is great.
According to this argument, considering the questions of moral and amoral autonomy collectively - as opposed to considering them singularly - effectively constitutes a conflation of unrelated questions. The proposition of the argument is that, in that each of these theoretical capacities would proceed from unrelated principles, so the possibility of neither concept is necessarily contingent on the other and therefore that the validity or invalidity of either amoral or moral autonomy is logically co-reconcilable. The possibility of amoral autonomy is regarded by the argument as being contingent on the nature of the nexus existing between the brain and the psychology and that of moral autonomy as contingent on the entirely unrelated possibility of a capacity to acquire objective moral knowledge (assuming for the purpose of the argument the validity of the idea of an objective morality in the first place). The argument postulates that the conception of such knowledge, in being objective and in that respect like say the conception of scientific knowledge, would accordingly not in principle be subject to psychological qualification and therefore that it would be independent of the brain-psychology nexus referred to as being relevant to the consideration of amoral autonomy.
The central tenet of this argument then is that a philosophic enquiry regarding free will should properly be framed by the question of moral knowledge, a matter unrelated to the causal arguments that are in turn proposed as being exclusively appropriate to what is considered to be the purely scientific question of amoral autonomy.
Incidentally, specifically with regard to the concept of moral autonomy, this argument potentially provides a straight forward solution to the age-old paradox regarding the apparent incompatabity of a concept of irreducible autonomy with the logical idea that every event must perforce be preceded by a determining cause – the required causal element in the case of moral autonomy being supplied by the role of individual personal experience which, it is proposed, acts to confer such autonomy on an individual in an a posteriori manner.