Name that fallacy
I just learned that I won the lottery last night. Although on the surface, one would think that my chances of winning were the same as everyone else, it's not true. I am a 65 year old male of Czech ancestry. The odds are massively against a 65 year old male of Czech ancestry winning because we only comprise .03% of the US population - so my chances of winning were .03%* the average American's chances.
Obviously, I still had the exact same chance as every American at winning, so my reasoning is problematic. What is wrong with this reasoning? Is it a formal fallacy?
Obviously, I still had the exact same chance as every American at winning, so my reasoning is problematic. What is wrong with this reasoning? Is it a formal fallacy?
Comments (10)
You can visualise the first probability statement as randomly drawing people who purchase tickets from the total population - winners who are Czech are less likely.
You can visualise the second probability statement as stating your chances of winning given that you've purchased a ticket - which are the same as a non-Czech holding a ticket.
where P(a|b) = the probability of a, given that b is true
C=being Czech
W=winning
P(W|C)=P(W|~C)=P(W)
Yep. And the lessened probability of being a Czech and a winner from the general population of ticket buyers would be P(W & C)=P(W)P(C) and P(C)<1.
BTW, congratulations! How much did you win? :)
I didn't actually win, and obviously it's because I'm a 65 year old, male Czech.
Dunno about a logical fallacy, because as soon as you won, it’s all moot anyway, the rationale for not winning becomes irrelevant.
It's further complicated by the fact that the % Czech population in the US is somewhat irrelevant to the likelihood of a Czech winning the lottery. It doesn't tell us what percentage of lottery ticket buyers are Czech. It's possible that it's a similar stat, but it's also possible that Czechs buy or don't buy lottery tickets at greater rates than other parts of the population.
Also, it's a fallacy of division: attributing to a part what is true of the whole.
For the entire Czech population the chances may be X to win, and for all the winners there may be x percent chance of being Czech, but you can't attribute those statistics to any individual participant. Like, if I won, my chances of being Czech are nil, because I'm not Czech. The chances of me winning the lottery are also nil (even if I were Czech), because I don't play.
The fact of your nationality (and age) is irrelevent as regards your chance of winning a lottery, so this statement is wrong. The chance that the winner would be a Czech (any Czech) may be .03% of the chance that it would be an American (any American), but your chance as an individual is the same as any other individual's.
For the record, this pertains to a discussion I'm having about the so-called fine-tuning argument.