Popper's critique of Marxism's claim to being scientific
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wf-sGqBsWv4
In this short video, Popper's criteria for what is science is presented and, from it, it is concluded that Marx's theory of history was unscientific.
It seems to me that Popper was right to demand that any scientific theory be falsifiable and that seems to spell the demise for classical Marxism's insistence that it was "scientific socialism."
How could a Marxist, classical or not, answer Popper's critique?
Is Marxism a pseudoscience like freudianism?
In this short video, Popper's criteria for what is science is presented and, from it, it is concluded that Marx's theory of history was unscientific.
It seems to me that Popper was right to demand that any scientific theory be falsifiable and that seems to spell the demise for classical Marxism's insistence that it was "scientific socialism."
How could a Marxist, classical or not, answer Popper's critique?
Is Marxism a pseudoscience like freudianism?
Comments (36)
Living up to your name, eh?
There's absolutely nothing scientific, nothing engaging the scientific method about an erraneous theory that history has proven didn't happen anywhere and has allways lead to totalitarism, violence and economic failure when implemented. The way marxism puts people into classes that are somehow destined to be against each other, hence promotes a violent struggle and advocates totaliatarism (in order to get to communism) has nothing to do with science.
And before you think I would assume some political ideology would be more scientific, I would make the observation that none of them are scientific.
All political ideologies have nothing to do with such an objective method as science as they all are in the end normative endeavours. Science isn't normative: science doesn't make claims about how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, and which actions are right or wrong. Political ideologies do that and basically ought to do that.
Actually, the problem is that social sciences have all a normative element. Politics makes it so. If you say something about the society or it's economy, people will immediately jump to normative questions. Hence so many "natural" scientists are with the view that these humanities aren't science.
Quoting Joshs
In a way, there should be the possibility, but as usual there are a lot of problems. How accurately it can explain history, how accurately it can make forcasts. But I would note the word should. Something like the laboratory tests of the stem field we obviously cannot do.
The devil is allways on the premises.
If I remember correctly, even Marx himself said that the proletariat might not go after communism, but simply demand higher wages. (Which in fact would have been the more correct theory with historical development in the West)
Yet since we are talking about the scientific method, the premises have to be with reality. It's bad science if we assume a premiss for our model that isn't true.
I was just wondering whether politics can ever be aa rigorous as science. Why can't politics be a science? Is it because it's too complex or is the subject itself an unscientific one?
We can, if we want to, make observations of the populace and draw generalisations from the data. For example we can get insight into peoples' needs and their tolerance limits. This can be used, in the context of politics and economics, to make predictions about things like revolutions and other social changes. I guess there's too much variability and therein lies the difficulty.
""Of course, the question of "being-in-
time" is exciting, but it was also raised prematurely. The question is
exciting specifically with regard to natural science, especially with the
advent of Einstein's theory of relativity, which established the opinion
that traditional philosophical doctrine concerning time has been shaken
to the core through the theory of physics. However, this widely held
opinion is fundamentally wrong. The theory of relativity in physics does
not deal with what time is but deals only with how time, in the sense of
a now-sequence, can be measured. [It asks] whether there is an absolute
measurement of time, or whether all measurement is necessarily relative,
that is, conditioned.* The question of the theory of relativity could not
be discussed at all unless the supposition of time as the succession of
a sequence of nows were presupposed beforehand. If the doctrine of
time, held since Aristotle, were to become untenable, then the very
possibility of physics would be ruled out. [The fact that] physics, with
its horizon of measuring time, deals not only with irreversible events,
but also with reversible ones and that the direction of time is reversible
attests specifically to the fact that in physics time is nothing else than the
succession of a sequence of nows. This is maintained in such a decisive
manner that even the sense of direction in the sequence can become
a matter of indifference."
"If you ask a physicist, he
will tell you that the pure now-sequence is the authentic, true time. What
we call datability and significance are regarded as subjective vagueness,
if not sentimentalism. He says this because time measured physically can
be calculated "objectively" at any time. This calculation is "objectively"
binding. (Here, "objective" merely means "for anyone," and indeed only
for anyone who can submit himself to the physicist's way of representing
nature. For an African tribesman, such time would be absolute nonsense.)
The presupposition or supposition of such an assertion by a physicist
is that physics as a science is the authoritative form of knowledge and
that only through the knowledge of physics can one gain a rigorous,
scientific knowledge. Hidden behind [this presupposition] is a specific interpretation
of science along with the science's claim that a specific form
of viewing nature should be authoritative for every kind of knowledge.
[The scientist has not asked] what this idea of science itself is founded
upon nor what it presupposes. For instance, if we talk about time with
a physicist sworn in favor of his science, there is no basis whatsoever to
talk about these phenomena in an unbiased way. The physicist refuses to
"In physics, a theory is proposed and then tested by experiments to see
whether their results agree with the theory. The only thing demonstrated
is the correspondence of the experimental results to the theory. It is
not demonstrated that the theory is simply the knowledge of nature.
The experiment and the result of the experiment do not extend beyond
the framework of the theory. They remain within the area delineated
by the theory. The experiment is not considered in regard to its correspondence
to nature, but to what was posited by the theory. What is
posited by the theory is the projection of nature according to scientific
representations, for instance, those of Galileo.
Yet today even pioneers in physics are trying to clarify the inherent
limitations of physics. It is still questionable whether physics, as a matter
of principle, will ever succeed in doing this."
"The projection of nature in natural science was enacted by human beings.
This makes it [a result of] human comportment. Question: What aspect
of the human being appears in the projection of things moving through
space and time in law-governed fashion? What character does Galileo's
projection of nature have? For instance, in the case of the falling apple,
Galileo's interest was neither in the apple, nor in the tree from which
it fell, but only in the measurable distance of the fall. He, therefore,
supposed a homogeneous space in which a point of mass moves and falls
in conformity to law.
What then does Galileo accept in his supposition? He accepts without question:
space, motion, time, and causality.
What does it mean to say—I accept something like space? I accept that
there is something like space and, even more, that I have a relationship
to space and time. This acceptio* is not arbitrary, but contains necessary
relationships to space, time, and causality in which I stand. Otherwise I
could not reach for a glass on the table. No one can experiment with
these [a priori] assumptions. That there is space is not a proposition of
physics. What kind of proposition is it? What does it indicate about the
human being that such suppositions are possible for him? It indicates
that he finds himself comported to space, time, and causality from the
beginning. We stand before phenomena, which require us to become
aware of them and to receive-perceive them in an appropriate manner.
"It is no longer up to the physicist, but only to the philosopher to say
something about what is accepted in this way. These assumptions are out
of reach for the natural sciences, but at the same time they are the very
foundation for the very possibility of the natural sciences themselves."
"At the beginning of our last seminar our question was: What does
"nature" mean to modern natural science? We called upon Kant for
its determination. He gave us the definition: Nature is the conformity
to the law of phenomena. This is a strange proposition. Why have we
bothered to ask about "nature" in the natural sciences at all? Because
natural science does not expressly think about this determination of
nature. Galileo developed this projection of nature for the first time. In
doing so, did he simply make a "presupposition" ? What
kind of presupposition would it be? It is a supposition .
What is the difference between a presupposition made to reach logical
conclusions and a supposition? The difference is that we can derive
something else from logical presuppositions through inferences—that
a logical relationship exists between presupposition and conclusion. In
contrast, in a supposition, the scientific approach to a specific domain
is grounded in what is supposed. Here we are not dealing with a logical
relationship, but with an ontological relationship.
To what does modern natural science make its supposition? As a
natural scientific observer, Galileo disregarded the tree, the apple, and
the ground in observing the fall of the apple. He saw only a point of
mass falling from one location in space to another location in space in
law-governed fashion. In the sense of natural science, "nature" is the
supposition for the tree, the apple, and the meadow. According to this
supposition, nature is understood only as the law-governed movement
of points of mass, that is, as changes in location within a homogeneous
space and within the sequence of a homogeneous time. This is natural
science's supposition.
In this supposition, that is, in this assumption of "nature" determined
accordingly, there lies simultaneously an acceptio. In such a supposition,
the existence of space, motion, causality, and time is always already accepted
as an unquestionable fact. Here accepting and taking mean immediate
receiving-perceiving. What is accepted in natural science's supposition
is a homogeneous space."
As to Marx. I'd like to point out that there isn't such a thing as "Marxism". Marx himself didn't expect a "revolution" by the end of his life and if he did, he expected it to happen in more agrarian societies. Marxism in its broadest sense is economic theory, which isn't science to begin with.
Marx has never offered a definition of "capitalism", instead talks about the capitalist mode of production.
I think the most important thing to take away from Marx is that the capitalist mode of production means a) private owner ship of the means of production b) wage labour c) increased mechanisation of the means of production and d) value extraction from the labourer to the capitalist. If I see the socio-economic development of, for instance, the Netherlands I think this is largely true.
What I see is despite increased GDP and profits that these benefits are not shared with everyone, especially low-schooled labour, which is also increasingly under pressure due to mechanisation. It was only 40 years ago that a lot of labourers used to be able to support a family on their own, nowadays both mom and dad need a job. And even then it's hard to get by when sickness or (partial) disability kicks in. Many families are one crisis away from poverty. I don't think that's acceptable for a civilised society.
In that sense I fear for those people and the development of robotics, that will probably be able to replace a lot of labourers such as painters, brick layers, cleaners etc. etc. The reality is not everyone has the necessary talents or don't get the opportunities to do something else than the simplest of tasks.
The value we put in capital in relation to labour is schewed in my view. Having money as opposed to having skill is worth more and this doesn't seem correct to me. Yes, the capitalist risks his money but the labourer risks his livelihood and his family. If the company he works for goes belly up, he doesn't just lose money (that most capitalists can afford to lose); he loses his kids' college tuition or his membership to the local football club.
I think we need to move to some sort of dynamic equity system in which labourers not only receive wages but also build up equity over time based on the value they add to a company. As the value grows, the initial capital investment shrinks from a relative point of view and therefore gets a diminished portion of the profits over time. The longer a labourer works at a company the higher his share becomes (but it's diminished relative again to other labourers putting in hours). Then when the robots are bought, they own a share of the profits the robots will produce.
[quote=Marx, from "The Ruthless Criticism of All That Exists"]I am therefore not in favor of our hoisting a dogmatic banner. Quite the reverse. We must try to help the dogmatists to clarify their ideas. In particular, communism is a dogmatic abstraction and by communism I do not refer to some imagined, possible communism, but to communism as it actually exists in the teachings of Cabet, Dezamy, and Weitling, etc. This communism is itself only a particular manifestation of the humanistic principle and is infected by its opposite, private property. The abolition of private property is therefore by no means identical with communism and communism has seen other socialist theories, such as those of Fourier and Proudhon, rising up in opposition to it, not fortuitously but necessarily, because it is only a
particular, one-sided realization of the principle of socialism...
Nothing prevents us, therefore, from lining our criticism with a criticism of politics, from taking sides in politics, i.e., from entering into real struggles and identifying ourselves with them. This does not mean that we shall confront the world with new doctrinaire principles and proclaim: Here is the truth, on your knees before it! It means that we shall develop for the world new principles from the existing principles of the world. We shall not say: Abandon your struggles, they are mere folly; let us provide you with true campaign-slogans. Instead, we shall simply show the world why it is struggling, and consciousness of this is a thing it must acquire whether it wishes or not.[/quote]
Eh, if you have a theory of history, if you make it constraining you'll be accused of being reductionist and unrealistic, if you make it loose you'll be accused of being unscientific. Marx is seen as having both sins for both reasons, depending upon the interpreter and sometimes the period of his writing. There are some predictions in his accounts though; like the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and the increased mechanisation that causes it. It's difficult to operationalise his theories - to take a concept and measure it with numbers -, but there have been lots of attempts to do so.
If there is an issue with Marx, it's that it's sometimes hard to tell his political engagement from his academic work. I tend to find his analyses more interesting and usable than his predictions, because the latter changed over time. At the same time, the few predictions stemming directly from his analysis (like value extraction) seem to hold true and also necessary conclusions from the system he's describing. To then seeing that happen means the basis of his analysis is probably correct. The billionaires just got 12% richer in 2018. The lower half of the world population saw their wealth shrink by 11%.
https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/public-good-or-private-wealth
And this is happening in the US, UK and other European countries as well, if in less extreme forms on the poverty side.
Thanks for the reference!
I'd have to wonder what that person would think that science is, what its methodology is, etc.
The qualification, however, is neither here nor there as it tells us nothing of the value (not necessarily utilitarian value either) of social sciences but it often used as a value judgment of social sciences.
That's trying to paint Marx as doing anything in the vein of contemporary social science, which isn't the case. I'm not saying that as a knock on Marx. He just wasn't at all doing the same thing.
It's primarily philosophy.
While we're at it, Adam Smith? His economic theories, economics or primarily philosophy? David Ricardo, economics or primarily philosophy?
I'm not familiar enough with Smith's writing, and I'm not at all familiar with Ricardo, to comment on that.
First, aren't you familiar with the fact that Marx is studied primarily, if not exclusively, via philosophy departments? (And do you think that when we talk about Marx here, we're not actually talking about philosophy? If so, it should be in an off-topic subforum, no?)
No. First, is answering my question first: What did Marx do or not do to put it apart from other economics, history or sociology and instead gets qualified as philosophy?
That's part of the answer. It's the first step in answering it (hence "first," announcing that I'm starting there with you, but thats not the finish.)
Is Smith primarily studied as part of economics or philosophy? And Ricardo? Your loaded question wasn't even the beginning of an answer. Also, I can handle more than one liners but I suspect that if you're not familiar with Smith and Ricardo, you haven't read any Marx either which makes your opinion on this issue just that: an opinion. Hence your dodging of the question. I will now go out of my way to pointily ignore your opinion. Thank you for participating. Bye!
Smith is studied some in philosophy, but he's not generally a big focus. Ricardo, again, I'm not familiar with.
I've read Marx--because my educational background includes philosophy degrees.
So are you aware that Marx is primarily studied via philosophy departments? If you disagree that he is, that's fine. That could be your answer, and then we'll go from there.
His historical materialism isn't my strong point at all but it was widely studied in the history department of Leiden university as some of the students I was living with studied Marx extensively. From what I picked up, Marx attempted to get to something regulated by "laws" or principles in order to predict and describe specific socio-economic outcomes but still depending on the actual historic context. I think however, he was quite aware of the limitations of his methodology which might explain his reluctance in stating universal truths. I don't think that's an attempt to formulate a scientific theory but perhaps more a categorisation of facts to have an understanding of historical development. Much like how histoire totale is also an exhaustive and exhausting method of describing historical developments. They both have their uses in understanding history and Marx had a specific interest in understanding economic history hence the aspects included in his methodology.
But I digress, I'll just say what I said before: Quoting Benkei
What we can do is apply scientific methods in the study of politics. This can be simply using statistics or sometimes more advanced models. First and foremost, we can start from the study of history, and try to get the picture of what has happened as correct as possible. Even that is very important to us.
In a way, politics or any social science is inherently different from natural sciences. We can see just how different things come to be in physics when a measurement effects on what is measured. There is a similar issue with the study of societies and people in societies: every historian understand that every moment in time, would it be now, the start of the 20th Century or middle of the 14th Century or whatever, is unique compared to other times. And nothing is as difficult for science as something being unique.
And lastly, the difficulties in social sciences don't make them less important or less advanced... as if telling something with a mathematical formula is somehow better than telling it in English. English is too a very useful language to portray reality.
The history of politics is an experiment in governance. Autocracy, oligarchy have failed. Democracy has prevailed and communism has had to morph into pseudo-communism as in China.