libertarian free will and causation
The biggest obstacle to libertarian free will, it seems to me, is not physicalism, but the metaphysics behind causation. An intuitive belief about causation is that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence; thus, if there is a lightning strike, one expects that there is a cause for that lightning strike. However, if that metaphysical intuition is true, then whenever we have a thought, there must have been a cause to bring that thought about and this seems to deny libertarian free will.
The reason why I say that physicalism is not the biggest problem for free will is that we could even grant that physicalism is false and idealism is true, but if it is the case that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence, then libertarian free will is still false.
Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible?
Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will?
The reason why I say that physicalism is not the biggest problem for free will is that we could even grant that physicalism is false and idealism is true, but if it is the case that for every event that occurs, there is a cause for that event's existence, then libertarian free will is still false.
Is it necessary for uncaused causes to be possible for libertarian free will to be possible?
Can anyone here present a theory of causation that allows for libertarian free will?
Comments (112)
Quoting Walter Pound
If thoughts came about without causes, how would we experience that? Would these thoughts be unconnected to our previous thoughts, randomly popping up?
If you make a decision, that decision will be based on who you are. If it weren't, it wouldn't be your decision. But that obviously means the decision is not "uncaused", because whatever reasoning is behind the decision is determined by your personality, circumstances etc. Whatever a "free" will is, it's not based on making decisions that are uncaused.
Quoting Walter Pound
If you use a restrictive definition of libertarian free will then yes.
Quoting Walter Pound
I can present a theory of free will that allows for determinism. Causality is a human perception. Free will is a human experience. Neither can be said to be more real than the other.
When we look at the outside world, we organize it so that all future states are fully consistent with all past states. This is necessary for us to make predictions, which we need in order to be able to act. When we do act, though, we consider that action to be guided by the future goal, not the past state of our mind. This is also necessary to be able to act.
We simply use two different ordering principles for different functions.
From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics):
"Most events can be explained as the effects of prior events. When a tree falls, it does so because of the force of the wind, its own structural weakness, and so on. However, when a person performs a free act, agent causation theorists say that the action was not caused by any other events or states of affairs, but rather was caused by the agent. Agent causation is ontologically separate from event causation. The action was not uncaused, because the agent caused it. But the agent's causing it was not determined by the agent's character, desires, or past, since that would just be event causation.[25] As Chisholm explains it, humans have "a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and nothing – or no one – causes us to cause those events to happen."[26]
So the agent causes a thought to occur in his mind.
But nothing within the agent causes the agent to do that.
The fact that the thought comes about seems to be without any kind of explanation.
Even determinists will accept that an agent causes thoughts to occur in his mind, but the question is why does the agent do that and here is where the libertarian free willer has no explanation. It just happens. Why does the agent do anything? It sounds similar to an event that occurs in a quantum vacuum.
However, if dualism is allowed then the mind may not be causally bound. It could very well be free. Of course what of causation in the mind plane? Could it be that the mind also is subject to causality? While one can't answer that in the negative neither can we in the affirmative and that provides enough room for the possibility of free will. Do you accept?
However, I can't disprove the possibility of causality acting on the mind. Is it that the mind and where it dwells is also subject to causality just like the physical world is? Then we'd have to look at ways of accommodating free will in a causal context.
1.) Mind and matter are mutually interdependent within the realm of causation (perception/phenomena)
2.) Metaphysically, there is no cause and effect, we are simply particular wills determining ourselves and worlds as conscous concepts; whose apparent causality is attributed to the relationship of ideas within each concept which is our innate ideas of self and world.
I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally "random." I do this on purpose. Sometimes I use a "random number generator" instead, but I can do more or less the same thing without a random number generator, too.
That's basically just saying "ontologically we don't know what's going on, which one is correct."
You don't see the contradiction?
Quoting Walter Pound
God/Natural selection would be the cause for why some agent does anything.
Quoting TheMadFool
How would you explain your awareness of other minds without using causation?
You can randomize individual decisions, but aren't you just deciding to let the RNG decide? After all that you use a RNG for some decisions is part of your "personality". One might add additional layers of randomness to the decision and eventually claim that one's decisions are so influenced by random numbers as to no longer be decisions at all, but what would that prove?
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes. But given the popular notion that free will is conclusively disproven by modern neuroscience, among other things, I don't think it's a trivial step.
This is why I don't like writing long posts. Sometimes it's clear I shouldn't write more than a sentence or two.
You had written:
"If you make a decision, that decision will be based on who you are."
I said:
"I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally 'random.'"
So in other words, I make a lot of decisions that are not "based on who I am." They're phenomenally random instead.
Then why use a random number generator if you can do more or less the same thing?
A random number generator isn't random at all. It uses a complex algorithm to create the illusion of randomness. So, if you can do more or less the same thing, then what you are saying is that you have a complex algorithm that you use to make decisions with that creates the illusion of randomness.
The outcomes are phenomenally random. Whether or not it makes sense to refer to the operation of the RNG as a "decision" is a different and mostly semantic question.
Does this relate to my overall point in some way?
Why are you mentioning an RNG?
I said "I make a lot of decisions that are phenomenally 'random.'"
That's all I said. Forget the earlier post.
Ok, had a bit of tunnel vision there, sorry.
I was arguing specifically against the notion that a free will requires "uncaused decisions". I am fine with accepting phenomenally random decisions as a possibility, I just don't think they are more "free" in some sense than phenomenally reasoned decisions.
It's not hard to propose a theory of causation which allows for libertarian free will. It is easily done with dualist principles, and a separation between efficient cause and final cause. Final cause is what you call the "uncaused cause", and efficient cause is when one event causes another event. So a final cause is not itself an event because according to dualist principles it is not physical, yet it may cause an event.
Sure. I'd just say that some part of the process--somewhere from the deliberation (when that's present) to the decision has to involve some ontological indeterminateness to some extent* otherwise I don't know what "free" would be referring to ontologically (which is kind of another way of saying that I don't agree that compatibilism makes sense).
*"to some extent"=it wouldn't have to be complete, it could just be something like a probability bias.
I don't know how ontological indeterminateness is supposed to get us to a meaningful concept of freedom. How does such indeterminateness make the brainstates we experience as decisions more meaningful? I know meaning is a vague term here, I am getting at the "why should I care" question. My decisions are my decisions because they are connected to my larger self and my reasons. I can make them "free" by basing them on nothing else other than internal states I have.
I know that it's not the primary focus of this thread, but a consequence of this view of causation is that there could be no first cause/first event, because, by definition of "first," it could not have been preceded by any antecedent causes. And this would imply that the universe is infinitely old.
Are you putting "free" in quotation marks there because it's not really ontological freedom?
Naturalistic views of the world haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now.
Mostly just to avoid a semantic debate on the definition of ontological freedom. What is ontological freedom, really? Is it ontological indeterminateness? Is the concept even coherent?
Yes, indeterminateness or randomness, as opposed to determinism.
I think it's worth bringing up, because we should know what we're even talking about if we're formulating positions featuring the term, no?
It's kind of hard to debate one side or the other with respect to a term like that if we don't even know what we're referring to.
Determinism is hardly a moribund view in philosophy. "Soft determinism" with regard to free will (a species of compatibilism) says that determinism is true, and that free will is compatible with it.
That could be (that it's still alive and well in philosophy) but it shouldn't be the case due to folks being naturalists, unless they haven't cracked a science book written in the past 100-150 years.
Assuming that you're talking about developments in quantum mechanics, of course philosophers are aware of them, and have responses to its supposed indeterminacy. Even some scenarios under Newtonian mechanics pose challenges to determinism, though, so I don't think it's simply a matter of philosophers not being up on the latest science or whatever.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#QuaMec
Right, so you think that philosophers are determinists due to thinking that contemporary science has things wrong because? What would they be basing their ontological traditionalism on there?
You could ask them. I am far from an expert, or even a particularly well-informed layman, with regards to modern physics, but I suspect, as with many things in philosophy, it hinges on philosophers' interpretations of the data from physics. Even physicists are not unified in their interpretations of what results in QM even mean. One is reminded of that quote, by Feynman, I think, that if you believe you understand QM then you don't understand QM, or something along those lines.
And no one suggested as much, but the widespread consensus for a long time now is that determinism is not supportable any longer. The Laplacean view is seen as a comical historical quirk, akin to a belief in phlogiston.
The point, by the way, isn't that one view or another is right or wrong.
It's that the only way that one can wonder "how can someone be a naturalist and not a determinist" is to be almost completely unfamiliar with recent science. You'd wonder "how can someone be a naturalist and not a determinist" if the widespread consensus in the sciences was that determinism is correct and Laplace's view was right on track.
You said "Naturalistic views of the world haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now," and when I pointed out that's not true, you shifted to saying something like "Naturalistic views of the world shouldn't haven't had the world as a place with anything like Laplacean determinism for over 100 years now, based on the results from modern physics."
So, you are taking a position on the question of determinism, and insisting that the results of science underwrite your views. And some very smart people just as vehemently disagree with you. So, I don't know what to tell you there, except that, unlike debates in pure science, metaphysical debates (such as the one which concerns us here) are not so readily resolved.
If you claimed it's not true, you're wrong.
I wasn't making a claim about every single person and however they self-identify.
I didn't say anything even remotely resembling the second sentence you put into quotation marks.
That's false as well. I was making a claim about the widespread consensus in the sciences. Disagreeing with that would only reflect ignorance of what most scientists have been saying for over 100 years now.
So, Laplacean determinism isn't wrong? Or it's just not part of your increasingly elusive point?
It is per the widespread consensus in the sciences for well over a century. Hence, it's ridiculous to wonder how someone could be a naturalist and reject determinism.
So, the rightness or wrongness does seem to be rather salient, wouldn't you say?
Nope. Soft determinism re: free will is one such thesis.
Not at all. What I was commenting on was that it's ridiculous to wonder how someone could be a naturalist and not a determinist. That shouldn't be a mystery to you unless you're completely unfamiliar with recent science. That you might think the consensus view is wrong is irrelevant to understanding how the two can coincide.
Not many philosophers are determinists.
I'm not sure what this is based on. Most are compatibilists, which at least allows for determinism.
But I'd never say that I can't understand how belief in a multiverse could be consistent with being a physicist. I very well understand how beliefs in a multiverse can and often do coincide with being a physicist. I just think that the beliefs are very misconceived.
I don't know at all that "most are compatibilists" is true. What survey data are you basing that on?
At any rate, compatibilists aren't determinists. They're compatibilists.
You might as well say that compatibilists go with the freedom side of the freedom vs determinism debate.
But that wouldn't be right, either. They're compatibilists. Saying that they're determinists misses the whole point. (unless you're claiming that they don't really buy the freedom side . . . personally I don't think that compatibilism can be made coherent, but that's another discussion)
This survey data. https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl
I wouldn't say that "compatibilists go with the freedom side of the freedom vs determinism debate" because they don't see freedom as being opposed to determinism.
Well, I know perfectly well what freedom of will is as a psychological fact. What I don't know is how to go from the experience of being a free actor to ontological freedom. I can make sense of the words "ontological indeterminateness", and I can see why it seems relevant to the question "is freedom of will an illusion". But I cannot see how, exactly, the connection between an ontologically indeterminate reality and the experience of a free will works.
So in your understanding of the debate, what are we debating? You're arguing that everyone is really a compatibilist and there is no debate?
No: my position remains, as it was when we started this exchange many posts ago, that determinism is not a moribund thesis in philosophy. You essentially said that modern science has somehow disproved determinism, and I'm saying that there are some who disagree with that interpretation of the science.
Basically the same question I asked above--what do you think the issue is, then, if we parse the "free" part of "free will" as simply the psychological phenomenon?
C'mon, man. Read what I said instead of putting words in my mouth. if you were to ask me if science proves anything, I'd emphatically say "No."
I like, by the way, in post after post you're simply ignoring that the point is that it's ridiculous for you to wonder how someone could be a naturalist and not buy determinism.
Fair enough, then.
Again, the point wasn't that one position or another is correct. It's that it's ridiculous to wonder how someone could be a naturalist (or a physicalist, etc.) and not buy determinism.
The issue is that making the question of the ontological reality of free will one of determinism vs. Indeterminism seems ill conceived to me. I am a compatibilist in the sense that I don't think indeterminism is a necessary basis for freedom of will.
I'm not asking your opinion. I'm asking what it is that you think that people are doing in the debate, from their perspective? (So an answer would attempt to accurately describe what they're doing from their perspective, it wouldn't be giving your approval or disapproval of what they're doing) No one is wondering whether there's the psychological phenomenon of making choices, decisions, etc.
This still really, really sounds like you are appealing to the results of modern science to underwrite one particular view of the world (i.e. indeterminism), though you insist otherwise.
It's about understanding why someone would have the views they have.
I think they're trying to figure out whether freedom of will is an illusion, that really they could not have choosen any other option.
You'll look forward, and all the time you're looking forward your eyes are taking in what is in the foreground, automatically, and there is rapid eye movement, as what we experience is given to us rather than us taking it.
However, the observer is always taking experience from the mind, it is not solipsism.
Because the notion of free will is metaphysical, the derivation of its origin should be as well.
Enter the notion of freedom in the metaphysical sense.
If there is a casualty that spontaneously instantiates a series of events, therefore not under the constraints of time necessary for antecedent cause, then there exists the notion of an uncaused cause, which disinterests will from determinism. If it is conceivable that the natural constraints of time relative to cause and effect can be replaced with the concept of spontaneity, then it follows the sequence of willful volitions is possible without a determistic naturalism.
All that’s required is the recognition that humans actually do act without thinking, and without willing themselves to do so. If acting without thinking is acting spontaneously, then the notion of spontaneity as a uncaused cause is justified, and the assignment of the denomination “freedom” does nothing to contradict the notion itself.
Right. But, re your opinion, so you just don't feel that that issue is worth bothering with?
I don’t think a theory of spontaneous causality is indeterministic. Freedom doesn’t determine anything, it is the condition by which the will is enabled to determine.
Still, it does presuppose an ontological dualism which empirical determinists don’t embrace.
What will make or break libertarian free will is the mechanics behind causation that rules over that immaterial mind.
A theory predicated on spontaneity isn’t going to have any mechanics behind it’s causality. The mechanics follow from it, re: will, maxims, imperatives, volitions, and so on.
Ehhhhh.....it’s just a theory.
I think the issue is very interesting, but the specific questions asked are impossible to answer. First of all it's not possible to know the configuration of objective reality and secondly it's not clear to me how either ontological determinism or indeterminism answers the question.
Let's say the entire universe is a dream of me, and my will is actually the only thing that changes it. How can I change my decisions without also changing myself?
That, my friend, is the million dollar question. We can't answer that question but that doesn't mean free will is impossible does it?
I've been thinking about explaining free will within a causal framework but I'm unable to do it. The problem with causation is there's always something that precedes everything in a cause-effect sense.
How about this for possibility of free will: Our brains and thus our minds are isolated, sealed off, from the rest of the causal web. I mean, yes, we are effects of the great chain of causation that extends back to the Big Bang but once we're born our minds are put inside a cranium that prevents any external influences and thus the choices we make are ours alone. Of course our proclivities are decided beforehand by our genes which connect back to the Big Bang itself but we can and do make decisions that we don't like, which is an ability to override our constitution. Free will?
Remember using causation to explain things is really just invidious selection to provide an explanation, this is not the same thing as 'the cause'.
And what are the required circumstances for that to happen?
It can happen at anytime to anyone however it is usually brought out in extreme situations where the agent is 'out of their depth' and can no-longer rely on their experienced based knowledge.
When we act in character we are following deterministic influences, when we act out of character or make acts of true greatness I believe we are acting from freewill.
Hmm, why would you believe that?
Quoting Echarmion
That depends on whether you're thinking of your decisions as constitutive of yourself. In other words, if you on a complete whim choose rye bread over whole wheat, does that mean you've changed yourself merely because of that fact?
The standard arguments on how we do not have any way to establish the objectivity of our experience.
Quoting Terrapin Station
But the choice of bread is either based on reasons, or it random. If it's based on reason, those reasons cannot change without something about the person having those reasons changing with them. If it's random it's not attributable to the person making the (apparent) decisions, so it doesn't serve as an example of their will.
I don't believe that any of those work. I'm a direct/naive realist. Which ones do you find convincing?
Quoting Echarmion
Sure it is. It's not someone else making the random decision. That would be like saying, if we were talking about a random number generator, that it's not the random number generator producing the random numbers. I don't know how that would make sense. What would you think is producing the random numbers in that case (and could we then say that it's that thing that's producing the random numbers, or would we have to say that something else is)?
(None of which is to argue whether anything is "really random," by the way, but if we're characterizing things that way . . .)
Quoting TheMadFool
Of course we can answer it. The answer is, "You can't - at least not without redefining what "awareness", and "other" mean."
Quoting TheMadFool
As usual with many philosophical debates, the terms that we are discussing are often obscure and incoherent in light of other knowledge that we have. Integrating our knowledge shines a light on these inconsistencies in our definitions. What do you mean by "free will"? What is the "will" and what makes it "free"?
Quoting TheMadFool
Quoting Jamesk
You seem to be claiming that we are both causes and effects, which plants us firmly within the causal chain - as part of it - not external to it.
Think about it. Do other people's decisions have an effect on you? Do your decisions have an effect on other minds? Maybe not all of them, or maybe in degrees depending on what the choice was about, but there is still a causal chain where it takes time to make decisions, execute them, and then observe the consequences to know if you made the correct decision.
Your reasons are the causes of your decisions. Your goals (ideas about the future in the present - like being content) are the causes of your decisions. Being content, or suffering, are the effects of your decision, which can then lead to other kinds of decisions being made, and so on.
Quoting Jamesk
So the difference between a pine cone falling on your head from a tree limb and a person throwing a pine cone at your head is just the explanation for why a pine cone hit you in the head?
Nevertheless, we can analyze, in terms of rationality, our preferences and then pick from them what is reasonable and discard what isn't. The fact that we can do that points to free will of some kind doesn't it?
Of course not all our preferences can be so dealt with. There are some things about our personality beyond our control. Whether this is significant or not is debatable. If you ask me, I think our ability to change/add/delete our preferences indicates free will. That there are unchangeable parts to the code that makes us who we are is irrelevant because we've already proved that we can alter our personality.
And no these alterations to who we are aren't necessarily coded beforehand because we can make choices against our preferences.
As for causality and free will I propose a gedanken experiment. Imagine a pool table. There are balls on the table subject to causality. At the center of the table is a box with some balls inside it. The box has an opening with a valve that only allows balls to exit the box and not enter it. Now, despite balls moving, hitting in all possible combinations on the table they can't cause anything for the balls inside the box due to the walls of the box. However, the balls inside the box have access to the balls outside through the opening in it (remember there's a valve that allows exit but no entry). Our minds could be like that - protected from causality from without by the skull and other mental barriers but capable of initiating a causal chain both within and without. Free will?
Doesn't that require ontological freedom in the first place? If there's no ontological freedom, you can't actually pick one thing and discard another. You're predetermined to pick one thing and discard another. Then it would just be a matter of whether the predetermination happens to coincide with "what you think you want," so that you don't notice that you really don't have any choice.
That's a problem with the Dennettian approach to free will in general.
Isn't it sufficient to observe (heh) that we have no criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? Any such criterion would run into the problem of an infinite regress (the objectivity of the criterion itself, and so forth).
Quoting Terrapin Station
It's not someone else making a decision, there just isn't a decision. It's not a case of asking "which entity did this result originate from". That question does not allow us to differentiate between results of a free will and results of e.g. an algorithm. What you call a "random decision" might phenomenally originate from me, but it's not indicative of my will. It doesn't get us any closer to explaining how indeterminism leads to a meaningful concept of free will.
In saying that it is rational, are you not saying that it was deterministic as well? Can you give an example of something that is non-deterministic AND rational, or something that is deterministic AND irrational?
Quoting TheMadFool
But why would we ever change/add/delete our preferences? There must be a reason (cause), no? And in pointing to that cause, are you not explaining the rationality of your decision?
Quoting TheMadFool
The walls of the box are part of the causal chain. The balls outside of the box react differently than if the box wasn't there in the first place, and the balls inside increase the density of the box which has an effect on how much the box moves when external balls hit it. In other words, you cannot escape causation unless you completely remove yourself from the world. The world, in essence, is a causal event.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I wonder: What would the phenomenal difference be between being free to pick one thing and discarding another and being predetermined to pick one thing and discard another?
It seems that in both cases one is aware of multiple options but chooses only one while discarding the others. What determines whether or not the choice was predetermined or not? What does it mean for a choice to be predetermined?
I don't even really understand the idea of that. Why would you need a criterion to judge the objectivity of an experience? That sounds like we're starting from an assumption of idealism.
Quoting Echarmion
It's a will phenomenon--we're talking about a conscious phenomenon, and it's free because we're not forced to go with one thing or the other.
It's a decision because we're picking one of two or more options.
Phenomenally, there may be no difference. Hence, the issue is whether what it seems like is what it really is. What it means for a choice to be predetermined is that only one option was ever possible, even if appearances suggest otherwise. If it's not predetermined, at least two choices were possible (again, even if appearances suggest otherwise).
This would've made sense but what about the choices you made before engaging reason. The pre-reason choices sometimes don't match the post-reason ones do they? If all our preferences were determined from before we wouldn't be able to change our minds. People regulalry do after some reflection don't they?
Suppose determinism is true. What about irrational people e.g. the insane? Aren't they part of the causal web? So, deterministic and irrational.
As for non-deterministic and rational that's what I'm trying to prove.
Yes, rationality can be construed to be a cause but we have control over it. We can always opt out of it and choose to be irrational but then we would lose touch with reality.
Yes, good example. Their irrationality is caused by a neurological anomaly.
Quoting TheMadFool
When we say that someone is irrational, what we're really saying is that the person isn't behaving as if they have common sense or knowledge. From the irrational person's perspective they are acting on their knowledge which is skewed, or limited for some reason. It's not that they are acting randomly. They are acting on their knowledge or perception of the world, just like you and I are doing. It's just that that perception is actually a delusion, or the cause of some kind of amnesia or lack of information that the person labeling the other as "irrational" has. If you know something that someone else doesn't know and you see that that lack of knowledge causes changes in their behavior, those changes would appear to be irrational from your perspective.
So it's not that the irrational person is just behaving in a way that has no cause. It's just that they're acting on an inaccurate or limited information.
For a statement to have a truth value, there needs to be a criterion to determine truth from falsehood, correct? It follows that we can only make true statements about objective reality if we have a criterion that gives different answers for statements that refer to objective reality vs statements that do not.
Since statements can refer to subjective realities, objectivity must be one of the things this criterion establishes.
Quoting Terrapin Station
You have smuggled a subject into these statements. In the first sentence you're talking about us, the two people who write in a forum.
In your following sentence, you're now introducing a subject "we" that is picking options and is or is not forced. But in order to have a subject that is doing these things, you need to be able to attribute them to that subject. You need an immanent connection between the subject and the process that results in a phenomenal decision. What could provide that immanent connection?
No, of course not.
Say that it's not predetermined that Joe chooses rye bread instead of whole wheat when he orders his sandwich. Well, pumpernickel could be available, too, but Joe might not be aware of this--he didn't look at the menu very carefully, maybe he's never even heard of pumpernickel, etc.
If choices are predetermined, however, then presumably choices you're not aware of are never the predetermined choices, since no one seems to have the experience of choosing pumpernickel when they've never heard of it before or when they weren't aware that it was available.
Just to be clear, I'm on the "there is ontological freedom/there is free will" side of this issue. I'm criticizing compatibilism a la Dennett, as I believe that he doesn't even really deal with the issue. He says, "Okay, I'm just going to call this 'freedom' instead," while ignoring the traditional issue, but the traditional issue is still present in the underlying assumptions being made. That was the gist of my comment that you had quoted.
And yeah, people do change their minds often.
I'm not sure that you are using "choice" consistently here.
Is pumpernickel a kind of choice, or a kind of bread? Don't choices only exist inside of minds? Isn't a choice the act of making a decision, or does everything have a characteristic of choice. Are you a choice?
Wouldn't your lack of knowledge be a pre-determined factor for your decision? If you are hindered from making other choices, or being aware of them, then doesn't that affect what decisions you can make?
What? It would be possible to choose pumpernickel if it's available, if one were to know about it, and if the choice ("choice" really) of some other type of bread isn't predetermined. You were asking me about possibility.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No, as it's not predetermined.
If you're asking whether someone is going to choose something they're not aware of then no (and I noted that we don't experience that phenomenon in the latter part of the post). That doesn't mean that the other choices aren't possible. It's not impossible to know that pumpernickel is available, it's not predetermined that you don't know it's available, it's not impossible to choose it if you know about it, etc.
Can you elaborate on Dennett's version? If you have the time...
Do you have a brain anomaly because there really is no one who hasn't ever been irrational?
I guess logic does have an influence on our beliefs but let's think why. Logic is a guarantee for truths and knowing truths, truths being facts of our world, keep us alive and well. However, that's the extent of logic's influence. By itself it doesn't cause us to believe/disbelieve stuff. It's a tool and tools aren't as important as the one who wields them in a causal sense. Right?
This is eleven pages (and note that it's a pdf), so it's not short, but it does a better job than I could do:
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://www.informationphilosopher.com/books/scandal/Dennett.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwizgpmXhtLgAhXsUt8KHWAYChYQFjAAegQIARAB&usg=AOvVaw1r1kYNkO3806RmdNo-sIod
I don't see how it would be possible for pumpernickel to be chosen if they arent aware of it.
At any given moment of decision you have a limited time and limited options. If you're not aware of an option, then it isnt really an option. You can only choose what you are aware of at that moment. Some other moment might be different with different options coming to mind.
I'm guessing because you're conflating possibility and actuality. Is it impossible for the person to know about pumpernickel/to know that it's available? In actuality, contingently, they may now know about it, may not know that it's available, but is it impossible for them to know?
This was the example you gave:
Quoting Terrapin Station
In this moment of decision, Joe isn't aware of pumpernickel for some reason or another. Is it possible for Joe to choose pumpernickel in this moment of decision?
Your possibilities are just "what-ifs" for that particular moment, which isn't the case at that particular moment. What is the particular case at that moment is that Joe isn't aware of pumpernickel, and therefore it would be impossible for him to choose pumpernickel in that moment of deciding.
Is it possible for the waiter to interrupt his decision-making and recommend the pumpernickel bread? Sure, but that would still be BEFORE Joe actually made his decision, and would make him aware of pumpernickel and then it would be possible for Joe to choose pumpernickel. My emphasis is on what you are aware of at the moment you decide.
Once something from the set of possibilities is actualized, then the other possibilities are no longer possible with respect to that particular actuality, sure. None of that has anything to do with determinism, by the way.
Wikipedia:
Determinism, in philosophy, theory that all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes.
Your decision is determined partially by the choices you are aware of at any given moment. Of course there are other factors (like time available). Like I said, it's a complex algorithm you're using when making decisions.
You just asked if other possibilities are available at the moment a decision is made.
Again, that has nothing to do with determinism.
Why not?
Well, say that we have four possibilities, a, b, c and d, and a completely random, acausal mechanism for selecting them. Once one is selected, the others are no longer a possibility for that particular iteration. But this has nothing to do with determinism.
So that the occurrence of a decision precludes all other possibilities has nothing to do with determinism.
This is just more of your unnecessary mental gymnastics.
What I asked was if someone could choose something that they aren't aware of, and if not, then your limited knowledge, just like your limited time are determining factors (along with others) in the outcome (your decision). You only seemed concerned about what label we use to refer this causal process.
Actually, the way you phrased it was this: "If not pre-determined, then are the only choices that are possible are the ones we are aware of?"
The answer to that question is "No," There are other choices possible. It can be the case that someone isn't aware of them, but that doesn't imply that those other choices aren't possible. Say that Pete's Diner offers five different types of bread for sandwiches. Joe isn't aware of all of them. The fact that Joe isn't aware of all of them doesn't imply that the other choices aren't possible.
Then you changed to focusing on the moment of decision: "In this moment of decision, Joe isn't aware of pumpernickel for some reason or another. Is it possible for Joe to choose pumpernickel in this moment of decision?"
The answer to that is "no" (which you agree with), because it's a truism for actualizing something versus the possibilities for that occasion. As I pointed out, this has nothing to do with determinism. Part of the reason why is that what's actualized could even be random.
Now you're focusing on this instead: "if someone could choose something that they aren't aware of."
I wouldn't say that would be impossible, but it would be very bizarre. So "no," practically. (Which again you agree with.) That doesn't imply that the choice is determined if there's a choice, just that for that particular chooser, it's limited to the options one is aware of.
Quoting Terrapin Station
LOL. Well, I guess I did say "NOT pre-determined", and then asked a question that could be seen as circular.
What we are trying to do is determine if determinism is the case or not. I'm saying that it is because you can only choose options you are aware of. You are also faced with a limited amount of time. These factors, along with many others depending on the situation and the person deciding, determine the choice. When we point to a reason for our decision, we are pointing to the cause of our decision, and our decisions are ultimately based on the pleasure and suffering predicted as the outcome, even those for which we can't really seem to point to some reason, or may not want to admit it to ourselves.
I don't know what sort of determinism that's supposed to be. It seems odd to call making a choice from a pool of many thousands of things things, say (if one is choosing an album to listen to, for example), "determinism."
As I've pointed out many times, I make some choices that are phenomenally random--no reason for them, just pure whim.
Are you aware of all the options within the given amount of time? If you were, then how could you ever make the wrong choice?
Quoting Terrapin Station
I don't see how that is possible. It's easy to just make that claim without really exploring an example, isn't it?
Make a wrong choice about something like what bread you're choosing or what album you're putting on? I wouldn't say I could make a wrong choice about things like that. The only choices I'd call wrong would be something like an answer in a multiple choice quiz, where there's a correct answer.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Weird (that you wouldn't see how that's possible).
A very simple example: I'm riding my bike. I come to point where I need to make a choice to go right or left. I pick on a whim, doing the mental equivalent of "flipping a coin."
...guided by the future goal, not the past state of our mind.
What a fantastic definition for 'free will', I thought at first. Then I realized it's not excluded those future goals be in fact determined by the past state of mind. The circle closes and we conclude no free will.
But what other possibility is there? If the future goals are determined by anything but the past state of mind, the freedom of intention is that much more restricted.
What often motivates a commitment to libertarianism about free will is the idea that, to be free, we need to be the ultimate explanation of why we made one decision rather than another. If my decisions are caused by events, then because I am not an event I will therefore not be the originator of my decision. Thus, to be the originator I - I, a thing rather than an event- need to be the cause of my decision. Substance causation - whose existence can be independently motivated - allows for this to be true and is this is why so many think free will requires it.
So I do not yet see a problem for the substance causal libertarian.
This response was intended less as a definition of free will and more as a baseline for such a definition. The idea I was trying to communicate is that "causality" and "freedom" are both human perspectives on the world. We don't know whether, and to what extent, either perspective is "objectively real". This, as the first step, opens up the possibility of freedom.
Quoting Zelebg
I think the problem when searching for a mechanism for free will is that the very question presupposes a deterministic perspective. Outside of such a perspective, the question is meaningless, there are no fixed processes of how things work, events are not structured according to causes and effects within time.
You simply have actors, and the reasons they have for acting.
I'm searching for new definition of 'free will' since I realized "ability to choose otherwise" doesn't really cut it. The more I think about "setting future goals" the more certain I am to not have heard it before in the context of 'free will', and to me it feels very much like it.
Ability to set future goals, is this not free will in itself?
I think it's close. I would add some notion of self-actualisation, i.e. free will is the ability to set future goals in accordance to a set of self-given rules.
Yeah, sounds good to me.
I think actions must be self-caused in order to allow free will. This is where the debate around free will gets murky for me, because it always leads me to think the notion of free will is a 1-to-1 ratio with the body, and it becomes more a problem of identity. if it isn’t me causing my heart to beat, then what is causing my heart to beat? In the sense that my body—me—is regulating every process therein, from the heart beat to the secretion of hormones, it could be said I am controlling, “willing”, each and every action I perform.