On Logical Fictions
A logical fiction is the result of a valid argument. Thus, it warrants the name "logical". It is a fiction because it is not true. The simple arguments showing that validity is insufficient for truth ought be well-known.
I'm curious how many more complex examples of logical fiction can be discussed here. Actual ones abound, it seems to me. Imaginary ones aren't needed to bear any burden are they? Here's some...
All thought/belief are propositional in their content. All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, all thought/belief are existentially dependent upon language. Where there is no language, there can be no thought/belief.
A truth is propositional in content. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Truth is existentially dependent upon language. Where there is no language there can be no truth.
Meaning is propositional in content... well, you know the rest(as above).
Anyone care to discuss why and/or how these are logical fictions, or propose another?
I'm curious how many more complex examples of logical fiction can be discussed here. Actual ones abound, it seems to me. Imaginary ones aren't needed to bear any burden are they? Here's some...
All thought/belief are propositional in their content. All propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Therefore, all thought/belief are existentially dependent upon language. Where there is no language, there can be no thought/belief.
A truth is propositional in content. Propositions are existentially dependent upon language. Truth is existentially dependent upon language. Where there is no language there can be no truth.
Meaning is propositional in content... well, you know the rest(as above).
Anyone care to discuss why and/or how these are logical fictions, or propose another?
Comments (57)
Here the term "proposition" is mistakenly separated from language.
Different languages can say much the same thing because they can use different designators to pick out the same entities and/or draw the same correlations between these things.
Different names, same referent.
It does not follow from the fact that different languages can say much the same thing(express the same proposition) that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language.
I think that that is a mistake too. I mean, I'm not denying that that's how they are generally conceived/understood/thought about, but that that understanding is more of a misunderstanding.
That was referring to propositional truth(true statements).
That is answered by virtue of how the term is used.
Why think that I am? :yikes:
You're not really making the case for your conclusion though. If propositions were somehow dependent on language, then as I said you would be committed to the view that before language existed humans had no beliefs. You said beliefs are Propositional in nature in your OP ("All thought/belief are propositional in their content."), so I don't see how you are supposed to be avoiding the absurd conclusion that humans once lacked beliefs entirely.
If different designators can pick out the same entity, then the content of these terms are not linguistic in nature because they transcend any particular utterance as they can be picked out by any appropriate one. Whether "The Sun is red" or "Taiyo wa akai", the same meaning is expressed. Meaning is not identical to language. Language is a vehicle by which to communicate meaning.
Ok, I’ll give it a shot.
Quoting creativesoul
If I fall out of a tree, it is not true I will hit the ground, if I don’t tell anybody I just fell out of a tree?
Quoting creativesoul
If I fall out of a tree, I won’t think a pain is coming if I just say something?
Quoting creativesoul
A valid argument is not necessarily a logical fiction; it’s conclusion can be true.
Do I get a gold star??
I'm puzzled by what you mean by this? Why the discontinuity?
The OP sets out a few examples of logical fictions. That particular absurdity is one that I've not seen any common school of thought avoid without asserting that propositions are somehow independent of language. I've noticed you've taken that route as well.
I avoid the absurd conclusion while maintaining that propositions are existentially dependent upon language. I haven't put arguments for my position out in this thread. but they are in some of my others, if you'd like to look. That's not the purpose here so much as taking proper account of logical fictions, although it often becomes necessary depending upon progress.
Quoting MindForged
Yeah, that makes little to no sense to me. I mean, I acknowledge the issue that you're trying to avoid, but do not see how you have.
"The content of these terms"
What is that?
The referents? The meaning?
Are propositions equivalent to meaning?
I reject the last claim. There are all sorts of way to use language that are not communicating meaning.
Well, it could be if meaning were bound to language as compared/contrasted to "a" language.
Although, I do not hold such a position. At least not all meaning. Some meaning most certainly is bound to language. Such meaning transcends the individual speaker, but clearly does not transcend the regular language use itself.
Dead language is a dead culture. Colonialism and Jeeezus are adequate proof of that. Bibles translated into native tongues were often very useful tools in converting a community of speakers into English speakers. Where translation failed meaning was lost... entire cultures dead right alongside the last remaining speaker...
There are enough actual cases where something in one language cannot be effectively translated into another due to the unspoken contextual content bearing upon that meaningful expression. All of the correlations, associations, and/or connections therein(the unspoken context) combine to help create familial, cultural, social particulars... including idioms, colloquialisms, and that sort of thing. The literal translation cannot possibly account for the meaning in the original language. This is true of different dialects of the same language as well.
The fact that some expressions in one language have equivalent expressions in another doesn't bear the burden you need to carry the case. It's a bit more nuanced than that. It's all about thought/belief.
Meaning is not equivalent to a proposition to begin with. It doesn't follow from the fact that meaning transcends an individual speaker that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language.
That quote is a conclusion using the notion of propositional truth(true statements). I would agree that where there is no language there can be no true propositions/statements.
Your question doesn't quite make the parsing required to make sense of propositional truth.
If you fall out of a tree, then something has happened. If you hit the ground then something has happened. There need be no language for any of that to happen. However, the statement "I will hit the ground" is existentially dependent upon language. It cannot even be made, let alone be true/false where there is no language.
Quoting Mww
Not yet.
Agreed.
The point of this thread is/was to tease out positions which are based upon logical possibility alone. That requires coherence in the sense of "logical possibility" I'm using as opposed to just any ole meaningful statement/proposition.
Moreover, perhaps there's some commonality between being based upon definition alone and logical possibility alone, particularly in cases where we're taking account of that which existed in its entirety prior to our account(that is - when definitions can be misleading and/or downright wrong).
Then the entity is not equivalent to the designator. Then more than one language have named the entity. Then different languages can share the same referent by virtue of using different designators to pick it out. Then clearly our world is not equivalent to our language.
When a plurality of creatures draw correlations between the same things, then meaning is shared. The name "sun" has a referent that is not existentially dependent upon language. "Red" does as well. Different languages can and do use different names to pick out the same things as well as draw correlations between those things. Different languages do not share the same meaning, because the correlations are not drawn between the same things. The referent is the same. The designator is not.
It does not follow that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language. They most certainly are. I've given the argument.
For one, they all have false premises.
Quoting creativesoul
True enough. It is not a matter of language that when I fall out of a tree, hitting the ground follows necessarily. The physical part adheres to the principle of cause and effect, the conclusion adheres to the principle of inductive reasoning, both of which stand the test of truth whether or not speech or any other kind of language is involved.
The statement “I will hit the ground” itself does require language, of course, because it is merely objectified natural communication. But the necessary truth the statement represents, an a priori apodictic certainty, needs no communicable objectification, which would seem to affirm the logical fiction, “where there is no language there can be no truth”.
Now. About that star.......
Quoting Terrapin Station
Indeed.
Well yes, it's (probably) why many do not posit propositions as linguistic. Most don't, I suspect.
Quoting creativesoul
It's the meaning. They have the same content because they express the same proposition. Just because there are other ways of communicating meaning in language does not negate this view of propositions. After all, the standard view is that only decideable declarative sentences have a corresponding proposition.
Quoting creativesoul
I didn't say meaning was equivalent to a proposition, I said the content of a proposition is it's meaning. My argument in no way assumed that idioms and such are to be understood literally. However, the understanding of many idioms will translate to some proposition, and it's the meaning of those which is not dependent on language because it's not (necessarily) making a proposition regarding the language itself.
Well... "A truth is propositional in content" is not the logical fiction for it serves as a premiss. The logical fiction is the conclusion.
The principle of inductive reasoning is linguistic, as are each and every "test of truth"...
This presupposes that there are such things as "necessary truths" that evidently exist independently of language. Otherwise, it would make no sense to say that a statement can 'represent' such a thing.
:yikes:
I'm a bit puzzled here...
What exactly do these necessary truths consist in/of if not statements/propositions?
There are different acceptable uses of the term "truth". Typically in philosophy they boils down to one of two... Coherence and/or Correspondence. Some say it takes both.
I think we're better served here setting out the issues of logical fictions as it pertains to the notion one is working from.
Propositional truth is most certainly propositional in content. Denying that much is rather silly.
Roughly...
There's no need to count all the possible positions that would/could be based upon logical fiction. There are more than enough actual ones it seems to me to make quite an interesting discussion...
Are you taking the position that...
The content of a proposition is it's meaning. Different languages communicate the same meaning. That would be to communicate the same proposition in two different languages?
What's the difference between a proposition and it's meaning? Propositions consist of meaning, I suppose, according to the view you're putting forth. What does meaning consist of?
Are the two existentially independent? Is one dependent upon the other, or co-dependent, or something else???
I can effectively argue for meaning(rudimentary) that exists prior to language. Propositions not so much...
What is a proposition if not proposed? How does one propose without language?
You've claimed that the content of terms is meaning, and that the content of a proposition is meaning. How do you avoid that propositions are terms?
Quoting MindForged
I'm certain that there is a better way than that to avoid the absurdity... The notion of propositions existing independently of language is one of the banes of philosophy.
A logical fiction based upon gross misunderstandings of thought, belief, and meaning...
Well, it places the claim that propositions and/or the meaning they 'contain' exist independently of language in direct question... along with the reasoning and/or argumentative support you've supplied here.
It does not follow from the fact that "The sun is red" can be expressed in two different languages that the proposition and/or it's meaning is not existentially dependent upon language.
Two languages are not no language. In order for a proposition or propositional meaning to exist independently of language, neither can be existentially dependent upon language.
All of them are.
It's a core tenet of truth in analytic philosophy, at least, that truth is a relation between a proposition and something else. The relation isn't itself propositional. Propositions and the relation of a proposition to something else are two different things.
So, for example "The cat is on the mat," a proposition, is true because of the fact that a cat is on the mat, per correspondence theory (the proposition corresponds to the state of affairs). Truth in that case is the correspondent relation of the proposition "The cat is on the mat" to the fact that the cat is on the mat. Truth is not the proposition "The cat is on the mat" itself.
Perhaps...
Let's suppose that "the cat is on the mat" corresponds to fact/reality/states of affairs. Is that proposition a truth? Many call true propositions "truths". The content of those truths is propositional.
Saying "this proposition is true" is saying that it has the right relation to whatever one takes to be the "truthmaker" ( facts/states of affairs if correspondence theory, other propositions if coherence, etc.)
If I see a syllogism manufactured with a false major premise, I have a tendency to disregard the conclusion. Sorry.....just the way Mama tol’ me.
On the other hand, because a statement can be a fiction even if not part of a syllogism, it then becomes just a matter of understanding the subject/predicate relation, in order to determine how the fiction/illusion arises, if it does.
I gave examples of necessary truths, the certainty of which I know without ever saying a word, or even thinking any. Although I might bellow OHHHH CRAPPP on the way down. But you wouldn’t ever hear it, and it’s not a logically fictional proposition anyway, so who cares.
Quoting creativesoul
How is that not a logical fiction? If you think principles are linguistic.....how do you do arithmetic in your head? How can logical absolutes be possible? Just because we don’t consciously invoke a principle in order to arrive at a logical, consistent truth, we aren’t using one? It only becomes a principle after having been written down? We don’t operate by deducing our primary principles then see if our observations conform to them, which is blatantly circular and potentially self-contradictory; we reason from observation, then deduce the principles under which our reasoning should conform in order to be trusted as observation demands.
For some folk. That all depends upon one's framework, but that side-stepped the point. Some call true propositions/statements "truths". Such a framework must admit that the content of those truths is propositional.
Mama's advice, if taken to heart, may cause one to disregard true conclusions... lucky, invalid, but true none-the-less...
However, in this particular instance, the conclusion is a logical fiction, but that premiss holds good by my lights...
Hand-waving won't do here. A true proposition is called "a truth" in some circles. The content of those truths is propositional. Are you objecting to that? If so, upon what grounds exactly?
This seems patently false on it's face.
It presupposes that one can be certain that some statement or other is true without ever having been involved in linguistic practices...
Nah. That cannot be right.
You never answered the question I asked about your invocation of "necessary truths"...
Quoting creativesoul
That question deserves an answer.
Because it's true, that's how. Fictions aren't true.
Quoting Mww
Solely by virtue of knowing the rules of the language. Before that, it cannot be done 'in one's head'.
Quoting Mww
There's a saying about forests and trees...
All of the things you're talking about here are metacognitive. Metacognition is existentially dependent upon fairly complex written language replete with naming practices that begin taking account of that which existed in it's entirety prior to our account of it. Thought/belief is one such thing, amongst many others as well. Those are the things that we can get wrong on and/or at a basic elementary level. Seeing how our thought life grows in complexity over time with sufficient effort, if we take account of the basic stuff wrongly there's no hope of getting the more complex stuff right.
The notion that all belief is propositional in content is a logical fiction based upon conflating what our report of thought/belief is existentially dependent upon with what thought/belief is existentially dependent upon. It stems from a crevasse in academic epistemology; neglecting to draw and maintain the actual distinction between our thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief. I think it was an honest oversight.
We operate, in the beginning of our thought life, by virtue of much simpler means. We do not begin thinking in propositional terms nor structure. Knowledge of pre-lingual thought/belief trumps logical rules when it comes to being forced to accept one or the other. You're opting for higher value and/or greater importance being placed upon the rules we determined, and I'm opting for what we've discovered to be true about those rules and what underwrites them all.
Logic takes account of pre-existing thought/belief. It presupposes truth as correspondence solely by virtue of our assuming it in premisses. Logic is the rules of correct inference, with "correct" meaning something alone the lines of being 'mistake-free'. They are metacognitive 'rules'. They are the rules deemed worthy of use for arriving at true conclusions. The rules of logic are not without flaw. It would behoove us all to remember that they are meant to preserve truth.
Ahem...
Gettier and 'logical' entailment show that one can follow the rules of logic and arrive at different truth conditions. Case A is a prima facie example of this mistake when Gettier moves to "the man" after beginning with "I". Some may not understand that brief summary, for it is not a commonly taken approach to Gettier. Nonetheless, The point being that we are well advised to take extreme caution in overvaluing a product of our own imagination - the rules of correct inference are one such thing.
At conception, there is no such thing as the thought/belief of the creature.
Thought/belief begins simply and grows in it's complexity. Human knowledge shows this nicely. All knowledge is thought/belief. All. It is only after we've named our own mental ongoings with terms like "reason", "understanding", "thought", "belief", and all of the others used daily that we begin to think about our own thought and belief(that we begin metacognitive endeavors).
You're offering products thereof, and neglecting the fact that that's not how it begins. Knowing how it begins provides the standard by which to 'measure' metacognitive assertions about human thought/belief. That includes, but is not limited to, all notions meant to take account of our reasoning processes.
The principles you speak of were arrived at - via written language - as a means to reduce the likelihood of error in thought/belief. Thought/belief had long since been being formed. You've opted to place great importance upon the rules of correct inference, and other products of metacognition. I've opted to use knowledge of what all metacognition is existentially dependent upon. Seems that the justificatory power is not at all equal here. One makes a much stronger basis than the other.
2+2 always equals 4 quite simply because we won't let it be(mean) anything else. Numbers are names of quantities. Those have the most rigid meaning by virtue of our not allowing the name(number) to pick out any other referent(to pick out any other quantity;to have any other accepted meaning/use).
:yikes:
Coherence is.
We then "test" our 'models' by virtue of observational applicability and explanatory power. Done right, prediction is improved automatically.
All of that "truth testing" is existentially dependent upon language. Being existentially dependent upon language is exactly what being called "linguistic" means here.
All logical principles and all truth-testing are linguistic. Not all thought/belief are. Some pre-linguistic thought/belief are true by virtue of correctly presupposing their own correspondence to fact/reality. Correspondence is prior to language or true belief does not need truth. Take your pick.
Inadequate context...
Premisses could be rightfully called "propositions" but not "conclusions". If I wrote "conclusion" I was talking about conclusions, not premisses. I've no idea what you're getting at?
The point was that just because an argument has a false major premiss it does not follow that the conclusion isn't worth considering... differently of course. Mama's advice neglected to take that into proper consideration. Following such advice could lead one to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
Well... yup. Exactly. It becomes a principle when we name it such.
So, we don't deduce and observe. Rather, we observe, then deduce and observe with the former being blatantly circular and potentially self-contradictory, but the latter is not?
:roll:
Clear as mud.
Validity is about the truth preserving form of an argument. Once we have the correct form, all substitution instances of the form, whether fiction or real, are valid arguments.
Different perspectives are always good, so.....thanks.
“...preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet....”
(Ryle, 1929, in Hutchinson 1971)
I agree with that, but it would take some work (and it might not be possible) for them to try to make much sense out of that if you were to press them just what truth amounts to in those cases.
Perspective, if it amounts to bald assertion, isn't always good in my book.
Prosecuting fallacious reasoning like false analogies isn't good either, and will continue to happen if we neglect to consider method. That is not something to aspire towards.
Not all things we call "principles" are on equal footing. We cannot parse them solely as a result of the namesake, however. Some principles have been found wanting and/or lacking. Others, it seems to me, have yet to have been 'found' by the reasoning processes in common use.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
So, these are commonly held statements of belief. Another is that propositions exist independently of language. Yet one more is that the content of belief is propositional. All are logical fictions.