On Successful Reference
There has been much said about successful reference. As I understand it, many a philosophical position diverge at this point. There is a fork in the road. The scope of consequences stemming from one path or another cannot be overstated nor can the knowledge of them be overvalued. I am of the very strong opinion that all actual cases of successful reference share the same core set of common denominators. That core, however, is unobservable. Rather, it can only be arrived at by virtue of careful strong groundwork and subsequent consideration. So...
Let's pave the way...
When a capable creature is referring to some thing, they are always doing so via common language use. There are no examples to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground. In order for successful reference to happen, a speaker must draw an other's attention to the same thing that their attention is already upon by some linguistic method or another. The thing being referred to by the language user must also be picked out by the 'listener' in order for successful reference to take place. If that does not happen, the method fails, and it is not a case of successful reference even if the same method could be used by the same speaker with a different listener and successful reference would happen. This is only to place shared meaning where it belongs in this discourse; at the level of existentially necessary for any and all cases of successful reference to happen. Think Witt's beetle. I would strongly caution the reader to remember that it does not follow from the fact that a method has failed to successfully refer that it always fails.
So, a speaker's attention is on some thing in particular, and s/he wants to draw an other's attention to that thing. S/he does so by virtue of common language use. That is always the case. Pointing is perhaps(arguably) the simplest known method. Describing that which has been previously named and described, and naming that which has been previously named and described are the most complex known methods. The different methods are all existentially dependent upon different things. Those differences will become more apparent, and obvious in many cases, in due time.
First we look to actual examples of successful reference with the sole intention of seeing what they all have in common that is relevant and/or germane to this particular endeavor. We're gathering actual examples and isolating the universally extant common denominators from that which is subject to individual, historical, familial, cultural and/or societal particulars. The results will be a well-grounded candidate for subsequent consideration. The strongest ground.
We have A.) naming practices, B.) descriptive practices and C.) both(some combination thereof). The following chronological possibilities are on order.
1.)naming without ever having used descriptive practices
2.)describing without ever having used naming practices
3.)naming that which had been only previously described
4.)naming that which had been both previously named and described
5.)describing that which had been only previously named
6.)describing that which had been both previously named and described
There are two rudimentary methods of successful reference; naming and descriptive practices. All actual examples include at least one of those two. The list above is a complete set of the six different chronologically possible combinations of successful reference. There are four logically possible combinations of the first two resulting in six different methods. So, actual examples show us two distinct methods and logical possibility leads to six logically possible different methods for successful reference. Purportedly, successful reference can be the result of any one of these 'methods'. I say "purportedly" because that is exactly what I'm attempting to take proper account of, and hopefully by doing so will be able to definitively determine whether or not all six suggested methods are actually capable of successful reference, as compared/contrasted to being just logically possible. So, which enumerated groups - if any - are supported by the available evidence, and which ones rest their laurels upon logical possibility alone?
Let's consider them individually...
The first method above is existentially dependent upon only naming practices. By definition enforced by coherence, this method cannot be existentially dependent upon any of the other possible methods. That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Logically speaking, a creature whose actively involved in naming without ever having used descriptive practices must not have ever used descriptive practices prior to that naming practice event. Failure to acknowledge and maintain that meaningful distinction renders the phrase "without ever having" meaningless. Furthermore, this line of thought gives the notion of "prior to" a much stronger foothold that traditional a priori notions. This foundation is a chronological one, which is intuitively obvious.
Actual cases of 1.) can not and will not include any of the other methods, lest it would not be a case of 1.). Are there such cases? Of course there are! We can look and see that happening for ourselves. There are everyday actual real life examples of people actively involved in naming practices without ever having used descriptive practices. So, there are cases of 1.). Thus, that group is grounded upon logical possibility and bolstered by correspondence.
Onto the next group...
The second method above is existentially dependent upon only descriptive practices. Again, by sheer definition alone - that is enforced by pains of maintaining coherence - this method cannot be existentially dependent upon any of the other possible methods. That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Logically speaking, a creature whose actively involved in descriptive practice without ever having used naming practices must not have ever used naming practices prior to that particular event. Failure to acknowledge and maintain this meaningful distinction renders the phrase "without ever having" utterly meaningless. Furthermore, just as before, and by the very same standard of measure, cases of 2.) can not and will not include any of the other methods, lest it would not be a case of 2.).
But alas!
Much unlike the first method on the list, the second has never been seen. We've never watched that taking place! There are no actual cases of someone actively involved in descriptive practices without ever having used naming practices. Since there are no actual cases of 2.), there can be no actual cases of 3.), for naming that which had been only previously described, requires having been only previously described, and there are no such actual cases. Thus, everyday happenings lead us to realize that two of the six logically possible methods are nothing more than that. 2.) and 3.) are not well grounded, for both have an unacceptable emaciated justificatory ground. They beg for correspondence, but are found sorely lacking. Those two groups rest their laurels upon logical possibility alone. Logical possibility is insufficient for truth. When that logical possibility contradicts everyday events, well there are no stronger grounds for dismissal.
Time to revisit our thoughts by rearranging the list of methods.
1.)naming without ever having used descriptive practices
2.)describing that which had been only previously named
3.)naming that which had been both previously named and described
4.)describing that which had been both previously named and described
Methods 2-4 above are all existentially dependent upon both naming practices and descriptive practices. By sheer definition alone - that is enforced by pains of maintaining coherence - any and all cases of 2-4 must include at least one of the other methods.
Are there any examples, actual or logically possible ones that are not effectively accounted for?
Let's pave the way...
When a capable creature is referring to some thing, they are always doing so via common language use. There are no examples to the contrary. There is no stronger justificatory ground. In order for successful reference to happen, a speaker must draw an other's attention to the same thing that their attention is already upon by some linguistic method or another. The thing being referred to by the language user must also be picked out by the 'listener' in order for successful reference to take place. If that does not happen, the method fails, and it is not a case of successful reference even if the same method could be used by the same speaker with a different listener and successful reference would happen. This is only to place shared meaning where it belongs in this discourse; at the level of existentially necessary for any and all cases of successful reference to happen. Think Witt's beetle. I would strongly caution the reader to remember that it does not follow from the fact that a method has failed to successfully refer that it always fails.
So, a speaker's attention is on some thing in particular, and s/he wants to draw an other's attention to that thing. S/he does so by virtue of common language use. That is always the case. Pointing is perhaps(arguably) the simplest known method. Describing that which has been previously named and described, and naming that which has been previously named and described are the most complex known methods. The different methods are all existentially dependent upon different things. Those differences will become more apparent, and obvious in many cases, in due time.
First we look to actual examples of successful reference with the sole intention of seeing what they all have in common that is relevant and/or germane to this particular endeavor. We're gathering actual examples and isolating the universally extant common denominators from that which is subject to individual, historical, familial, cultural and/or societal particulars. The results will be a well-grounded candidate for subsequent consideration. The strongest ground.
We have A.) naming practices, B.) descriptive practices and C.) both(some combination thereof). The following chronological possibilities are on order.
1.)naming without ever having used descriptive practices
2.)describing without ever having used naming practices
3.)naming that which had been only previously described
4.)naming that which had been both previously named and described
5.)describing that which had been only previously named
6.)describing that which had been both previously named and described
There are two rudimentary methods of successful reference; naming and descriptive practices. All actual examples include at least one of those two. The list above is a complete set of the six different chronologically possible combinations of successful reference. There are four logically possible combinations of the first two resulting in six different methods. So, actual examples show us two distinct methods and logical possibility leads to six logically possible different methods for successful reference. Purportedly, successful reference can be the result of any one of these 'methods'. I say "purportedly" because that is exactly what I'm attempting to take proper account of, and hopefully by doing so will be able to definitively determine whether or not all six suggested methods are actually capable of successful reference, as compared/contrasted to being just logically possible. So, which enumerated groups - if any - are supported by the available evidence, and which ones rest their laurels upon logical possibility alone?
Let's consider them individually...
The first method above is existentially dependent upon only naming practices. By definition enforced by coherence, this method cannot be existentially dependent upon any of the other possible methods. That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Logically speaking, a creature whose actively involved in naming without ever having used descriptive practices must not have ever used descriptive practices prior to that naming practice event. Failure to acknowledge and maintain that meaningful distinction renders the phrase "without ever having" meaningless. Furthermore, this line of thought gives the notion of "prior to" a much stronger foothold that traditional a priori notions. This foundation is a chronological one, which is intuitively obvious.
Actual cases of 1.) can not and will not include any of the other methods, lest it would not be a case of 1.). Are there such cases? Of course there are! We can look and see that happening for ourselves. There are everyday actual real life examples of people actively involved in naming practices without ever having used descriptive practices. So, there are cases of 1.). Thus, that group is grounded upon logical possibility and bolstered by correspondence.
Onto the next group...
The second method above is existentially dependent upon only descriptive practices. Again, by sheer definition alone - that is enforced by pains of maintaining coherence - this method cannot be existentially dependent upon any of the other possible methods. That which is prior to something else cannot be existentially dependent upon that something else. Logically speaking, a creature whose actively involved in descriptive practice without ever having used naming practices must not have ever used naming practices prior to that particular event. Failure to acknowledge and maintain this meaningful distinction renders the phrase "without ever having" utterly meaningless. Furthermore, just as before, and by the very same standard of measure, cases of 2.) can not and will not include any of the other methods, lest it would not be a case of 2.).
But alas!
Much unlike the first method on the list, the second has never been seen. We've never watched that taking place! There are no actual cases of someone actively involved in descriptive practices without ever having used naming practices. Since there are no actual cases of 2.), there can be no actual cases of 3.), for naming that which had been only previously described, requires having been only previously described, and there are no such actual cases. Thus, everyday happenings lead us to realize that two of the six logically possible methods are nothing more than that. 2.) and 3.) are not well grounded, for both have an unacceptable emaciated justificatory ground. They beg for correspondence, but are found sorely lacking. Those two groups rest their laurels upon logical possibility alone. Logical possibility is insufficient for truth. When that logical possibility contradicts everyday events, well there are no stronger grounds for dismissal.
Time to revisit our thoughts by rearranging the list of methods.
1.)naming without ever having used descriptive practices
2.)describing that which had been only previously named
3.)naming that which had been both previously named and described
4.)describing that which had been both previously named and described
Methods 2-4 above are all existentially dependent upon both naming practices and descriptive practices. By sheer definition alone - that is enforced by pains of maintaining coherence - any and all cases of 2-4 must include at least one of the other methods.
Are there any examples, actual or logically possible ones that are not effectively accounted for?
Comments (69)
[quote= Lao Tzu]The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao;
The name that can be named is not the eternal name.
The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth.
The named is the mother of ten thousand things.
Ever desireless, one can see the mystery.
Ever desiring, one can see the manifestations.
These two spring from the same source but differ in name;
this appears as darkness.
Darkness within darkness.
The gate to all mystery.[/quote]
:joke: Is Lao Tzu trying to describe the nameless?
You don't seem to have ever actually defined "successful reference", but I see no reason to conclude that this can only be done through common language. Even your own (later) example, of pointing, is not an instance of using language. By common definitions of "point" and "language". pointing is not an instance of using language. Your entire thesis appears to be based in this faulty premise. In reality, pointing is neither an instance of naming, nor an instance of describing, and neither is successful reference, it is simply a matter of directing one's attention. So you have actually produced a representation of "successful reference", which completely excludes what successful reference really is, and that is, an instance of directing one's attention.
There is no issue with my premisses. I said "perhaps". Originally I included "arguably"... It doesn't matter unless pointing alone is sufficient/adequate for a case of successful reference.
Did you read the OP?
Yes I read the op, and it seems to me that "reference" is to direct someone's attention, with language or otherwise. The op directs my attention toward naming and describing, neither of which is essential to reference. So I'd say that the op is a failed attempt at directing my attention toward the concept of "reference".
So there appears to be all sorts of problems with your lay out. First, 1) is impossible, because I cannot direct your attention to something simply by naming it. This would require that you already know the name of it. And how would you know the name of it, if I am the one naming it. My act of naming a thing will not direct your attention to it. Next, 2) is highly unlikely, as you say. So we get to the others, 3-6 which are various combinations of naming and describing, and this is what language use generally is, acts which combine naming and describing. But by distracting us into the subject of language use, you have completely avoided the issue of what is prerequisite to, and what constitutes a successful reference, i.e. a successful act of directing one's attention.
What produces a successful reference is a type of compatibility between the two individuals involved. This is not a correspondence, nor is it a coherency, but it is a type of consistency. Therefore analyzing the different ways in which language is used will not reveal to you the nature of successful reference, because successful reference is a function of consistency which is understood through principles of sameness, or similarity, rather than through these principles of difference.
If you have an example of successful reference which does not include what I've set out, I'd like to se it. If you do not, then all you've done is gratuitously assert a contrary position... and a groundless one at that.
"Pointing", it's your example, but you seem to think pointing is "sign language". So consider taking one's hand and placing it somewhere to feel something, or holding one's head and pointing it in a particular direction, like my father used to do when I was a child, to show me where to look to see what he was talking about. You see, talking about something (describing), and directing one's attention to the thing being talked about, are two distinct things. And, simply naming the thing being described will not direct a person's attention to it. Directing one's attention (successful reference) involves showing one where to look.
That's the example needed.
Talking about something does not qualify as successful reference. That's the point Reference is to direct one's attention. So the "successful reference" was carried out by pointing my head toward the thing, not by talking about it..
Funny... we're talking about something, and by virtue of that I've directed your attention to conceptions of reference.
This goes against everyday observable events...
I didn't say that you cannot reference through language, I said that language is not necessary.
No it does not, because someone can be talking about something and the other person have no idea of what the thing is which is being talked about. So talking about something does not, in itself, qualify as successful reference.
For any and all?
Give me an example of successful reference that uses neither naming practices nor descriptive ones.
Our issue here, as always with you, is a difference in our notions of reference.
I already did, pointing, touching, taking one's hand and guiding that person, etc.. I could list more, but there's no use. Instead of recognizing that these are instances of referencing without language, you just widen your definition of "language" to include these things into your notion of language, as "sign language". But the point is that these things are neither naming, describing, nor a combination of these. So you calling them language doesn't help your case. The fact remains that referencing is something distinct from naming, describing, or a combination of these.
Quoting creativesoul
No, there is actually very little difference between your and my notion of referencing. This is from your op:
Quoting creativesoul
Replace "speaker" with "person", and this is exactly the same as my notion of reference. The only difference being that you add the unwarranted qualification "...by some linguistic method or another." So you appear to be making the claim that in order for one to successfully draw another's attention to the same thing (reference), that person must use language.
Once you realize that a person can draw another's attention to the thing that their own attention is already on, without the use of language, then we'll have common ground for a discussion of successful reference.
This needs more than gratuitous assertion. It seems to be a divergence between our views.
Who is right?
How do we determine that?
I say that successful reference is different from showing. Showing another my cat is not referring to the cat.
What say you?
I think that "refer" is a complex word with a lot of different uses. It is most commonly use in relation to a subject matter, rather than a physical thing. So for instance you say something to me, and if I am not clear as to what you are talking about, I ask you what are you referring to. What you would be directing my attention to, would be the subject of your talk.
Now consider your example, your cat. Imagine you are telling me something about your cat "tigger", You say "tigger is ...". I, not knowing that you have a cat named tigger, say "what are you referring to?". In reply, you could either say "my cat named tigger", or you could point to, or hold up the physical object, your cat. Each is an instance of "showing" me. In the former your words show me a grammatical subject, in the latter, your actions show me a physical object.
Notice that in the former, there is the possibility of no physical object corresponding to the named subject, "my cat named tigger" (the scenario might be imaginary). Nevertheless, you have successfully referenced the subject. When successfully referencing a subject, there is no necessity for a corresponding physical object, and whether or not there is such a corresponding object is irrelevant to the success of the reference.
Therefore I propose to you that there are two very distinct forms of "successful reference". What is proper to language, as "successful reference", is to direct one's attention to a subject for discussion, and whether or not there is a corresponding physical object or situation is irrelevant. But there is another, completely different form of "successful reference", which is to direct one's attention toward a physical object, or physical occurrence, and this is not a linguistic matter at all, it's a matter of showing the physical object, or occurrence, referenced.
Do you think it is possible to discuss "successful reference" without equivocating between these two distinct forms of "successful reference", each of which I hope has been successfully referenced, individually, as distinct subjects.
Which means I referred prior to showing. The showing helps to fix the referent. That is to say that my showing you the cat allows you to draw the same meaningful connections between the name and it's referent. Successful reference requires this(shared meaning).
What I'm questioning here is whether or not pointing alone, and/or showing alone is referring...
I don't think it is the same at all really. Related. Connected. Not the same.
Yes, you referred to a subject, "your cat" without physically pointing to anything, or physically showing anything. But we never physically point at anything when we refer to a subject. In fact, it makes very little difference whether there's a corresponding physical object or not when we reference a subject. For all I know. or care, you have no cat. The referent, as the matter referred to, is conceptual. So you have not successfully referred to any physical object named "my cat", you have proposed a subject "my cat" as a matter for discussion, and in doing so you have successfully referenced that subject..
Quoting creativesoul
As I said, there's two very distinct forms of referencing. One is to refer to a physical object, the other to refer to a subject. Until we disentangle the two this question is pointless. Seems you didn't read my post, or at least didn't understand it.
I was referring to Cookie. Cookie is my cat. "Cookie" is not. I would not refer to "Cookie" unless I was wanting to draw your attention to the name itself and not the referent. Cookie is the referent of "Cookie".
That is two different kinds of referents. It is not two different kinds of referring.
OK, let's look at it from that perspective then, one type of referring, but two types of referent. How would we determine a "successful reference"? Suppose I refer to "my cat". I have successfully referenced a subject for discussion, "my cat". However, you do not know whether I have a cat or not, so I have not successfully referenced a physical object named "my cat". It is impossible by the law of non-contradiction that the same act of reference can be both successful, and not successful.
Therefore, we must separate these two as two distinct acts of reference, according to the reality of two distinct referents. However, the act itself, referring to "my cat", is just one act. Therefore, I propose that to resolve this contradiction, we allow that this one act, referring to "my cat", fulfills the criteria of one type of referencing, but not the criteria of the other type of referencing. Therefore it is a successful reference of one type of referencing, but not the other type. And so, to avoid such contradictions which would arise from assuming that the two distinct types of referents are referenced by one type of referring, we ought to assume that it is two different kinds of referring
:yikes:
Do you agree?
"My cat" is not Cookie. My cat is Cookie. "My cat" is a linguistic expression. Cookie is not.
I do not show you "my cat" if I bring Cookie into your presence. I show you my cat. My showing you my cat does not reference Cookie. My saying her name aloud does. That is true regardless of whether or not she is present, or you are present.
This is neither true, nor fact.
No I disagree. In the appropriate context, showing someone your cat is referring to your cat.
You're claiming otherwise.
Need we look at the consequences?
Until you either recognize, or disprove, my claim that there are two distinct types of referring, your propositions remain meaningless and nonsensical.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/249720
The same standard applies to the OP and your objections to it.
That's what I'm talking about right now Meta...
You've yet to offer an argument for the assertion that pointing alone is adequate and/or sufficient for referring. By "alone" I mean something very specific. Pointing by one who has yet to have been involved in either naming or descriptive practices and the result be successful reference(drawing another's attention towards the same thing that the pointing person's is already upon).
That is what it would take to counter the OP.
The entire OP delineates successful reference. The best reason to conclude that successful reference is existentially dependent upon common language is because there are no actual examples to the contrary.
When one's notion of successful reference includes, admits, and/or allows it to happen where there has never been naming practices and/or descriptive practices, then one carries an unbearable burden. There are no actual examples of a one creature drawing an other's attention to the same thing when dealing with language less creatures.
If that does not constitute adequate reason to think/believe that successful reference is existentially dependent upon common language then nothing can...
It certainly depends upon shared meaning.
Successfully drawing another's attention to the same thing that one's is already upon is something that happens long before we begin taking account of those everyday events. Successful reference consists of things that exist in their entirety prior to our account of it.
You've gotten that wrong.
Your notion draws a false equivalence between showing and referring. Some cases of successful reference most certainly involve naming, describing, and showing. We can observe that as it is happening. You deny what actually takes place, by definition alone.
I could walk into the room, cat tucked under arm thoroughly enjoying her ears being scratched, and say "Hey Meta, wanna see my cat Cookie?"
Your notion denies that that is a case of successful reference.
Cookie is not under my arm...
There is more than one conception of reference. Your disagreement does not render the conception in the OP mistaken. The fact that you work from a different notion than I has no bearing upon the explanatory power and/or verifiability/falsifiability of the one I'm presenting in the OP.
Your OP conflates with ambiguity, two distinct types of referring, referring to a subject and referring to an object. Until you separate these two, providing the necessary distinction between them, (and I demonstrated that this is necessary), your thread will be full of equivocation and confusion. What's the point in proceeding without making clear this distinction?
Referring is referring. A subject is not an object. Subjects and objects are referred to in the manner laid out in the OP. That is two distinct names for different 'kinds' of referent, not different kinds of referring. A referent is what is picked out of this world by the designator/sign/symbol. Names and descriptions are designators.
Objects are named and described, as well as subjects.
Poisoning the well and/or fortune telling aren't acceptable here. If I use the same term in two different senses in the same argument, then we''ll address it accordingly. The baseless charge that it may happen if I do not use your framework is not at all compelling.
The subject/object distinction is utterly incapable of accounting for that which consists of both, and is thus neither... meaning is one such thing. Successful reference is existentially dependent upon shared meaning. Thus, the object/subject distinction cannot properly take account of successful reference for it consists of both, and is thus neither.
First claim is false. The second provides how.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of both objects and subjects...
Do you realize how self-defeating this is?
I cut you off here, because that's a lot of very drawn out, mundane rambling on for I don't know what purpose.
Is there some "puzzle" or "mystery" you're trying to solve in all of this? What puzzle or mystery?
No puzzle or mystery...
Rather, just a whole lot of incommensurate positions involving meaning, sense, and/or reference, and all that those entail...
Different people have different positions, yes. I wouldn't worry about trying to reconcile them. Let's just tackle issues when they arise.
The problem I explained to you, is that the same name refers to two kinds of referent. The name "Cookie" might refer to an object, a creature you hold on your lap, or it might refer to a subject, a cat. In this thread, you use "Cookie" to refer to a subject, a cat. You have not used "Cookie" to refer to an object, because you have not shown me that a creature who bears that name even exists, so it is impossible that you have successfully referenced an object named "Cookie".
Quoting creativesoul
So tell me, how were you using "Cookie"? Does this name refer to a subject, as you have successfully referenced a subject, or were you using it to reference a real physical creature, in which case your reference has been unsuccessful.
That's not a problem. It's a feature of common language, of name usage. "Apple" refers to several different kinds of things. All of them are referents. "Meta" is the same.
Pay closer attention. I've been answering this question thoroughly throughout our discussion here.
"Cookie" is the name of my cat. It's also the name of my favorite treat. It's not a cat treat, although Cookie has her favorites too.
This mistakenly presupposes that you must see Cookie in order to focus your attention on her. You haven't and yet you have.
Actual life trumps haphazard notions Meta... or at least, it should.
It's impossible according to your notion. It's actually happening though. Are the actual events mistaken, or your notion? I'd definitely go with the latter.
Now you're getting to the point. I have not focused my attention on any physical creature named "Cookie". You don't seem to be getting that. I actually don't even believe that you have a cat named "Cookie". I think you've just brought this idea up, "my cat named Cookie", as a subject for discussion.
That's why we need to distinguish reference to a subject from reference to an object in any attempt to define "successful reference". As I've been telling you, you've successfully referred to a subject (a cat named Cookie) but you have not successfully referred to any real living creature.
And yet you speak of her!
Your belief isn't necessary... clearly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Now you're equivocating the term "subject". That's unacceptable.
If that's what you call "successful reference" then I strongly disagree. I can speak about a cat named Cookie till the end of my life, but that doesn't mean I'm referring to any real living animal.
And, if you think that I am referring to a real living animal, your cat, you're delusional because I've already told you that I don't believe you have a cat named Cookie. Sorry if I'm being harsh, calling you a liar, but that's reality.
The problems you speak of are the consequence of the framework you're using.
Not all successful reference by naming practices picks out living animals Meta. Cookie is my cat though; one of them...
Well, if you want your reference to be successful, I suggest you convince me that you do, in fact, have a cat which you have named Cookie. At this point, I truly believe that this is imaginary, so your reference is far from successful.
You have successfully directed my attention to a subject, a matter for discussion, (an imaginary cat named Cookie) but you have not directed my attention toward any physical object or living creature.
Do you have an actual example of a language less creature successfully referring by virtue of pointing alone?
If not, there's no reason to continue this charade. Nothing you've said here is a problem for the OP.
You need not believe that I have a cat named Cookie in order for you to be referring to her by name. You may think/believe that my cat is an imaginary one. You're still talking about my cat.
I told you what I'm referring to, a subject, a matter for discussion, an imaginary cat name Cookie.
Quoting creativesoul
Let me get this straight. You claim to have named something. I claim that the thing named is non-existent. Now you claim that you have successfully directed my attention toward this thing which I do not even believe exists. How do you propose that I have focused my attention on something which I do not even believe exists?
What's the name of the thing you're talking about here?
Oh, yeah!
"Cookie"...
Sorry, but I'm not talking about a thing. I'm talking about an imaginary cat. When are you going to get that through your head? I refer to a subject, you refer to an object. You think I'm referring to an object, and I think you're referring to a subject. Neither of us is successful in our reference.
Quoting creativesoul
Right, I've demonstrated that your framework is inadequate and perpetuates confusion, yet you appear to be uninterested. So be it.
The reference has clearly succeeded. You believe Cookie is an imaginary thing. You're mistaken about that, but you do use the name "Cookie" to pick out my cat, nonetheless...
You've not used the framework in the OP. Rather, you've used your own. It has been shown problematic by both of us...
Many folk will conclude that names(and thus naming practices) are not necessary for successful reference, because some actual and many written examples do not include names or obvious naming practices. Such cases are actual examples of descriptive practices being used for successful reference. Many of these - particularly the arguments here - are steeped in naming practices. That would be to successfully refer to that which had been already named and described.
Our notions of successful reference.
If the criterion for what counts as being "not necessary" is satisfied merely by virtue of what a written report of an actual example does not include, then then it would only follow that no description used for successful reference is existentially dependent upon it's referent.
That cannot be right.