The Philosophical-Self

It's abstruse without some context. I say this because the final phrase is an apparently unrelated thought, something unlikely for W, and which I doubt he intended to be dangled as it appears...without the context shown here.

Perhaps that the questionative figure one has is equivalent to that of a metaphysician which thinks of the most abstract concepts the world will ever deal with.

Well, that statement is made at a point of transition between claiming what can be said and then making some claims after addressing those issues. The pointed objections made by Wittgenstein to Frege and Russell is not separable from the discussion of logic and its limits. So my reading suggests to me that the "self" in question keeps having to deal with a certain problem:

5.5303
[i]Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are
identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is
identical with itself is to say nothing at all.[/i]

Quoting Wallows

how would you phrase it otherwise into more ordinary language

The philosophical self deals with itself only as subject in itself, the empirical world merely incidental; the psychological self deals with itself as object in the world, the transcendental self merely incidental.

Philosophy the doctrine belongs to metaphysics the science, psychology the doctrine belongs to anthropology the science.

Relevant discussion you might like.

Reply to fdrake

Subject as “office”......I like it!!! Quite apropos, actually.

When you say Kant was anti-philosopher in the first critique and philosopher in the second, I take you to mean by the second, practical reason. As opposed to two versions of the first, that is. Yes? No?

Quoting Wallows

What does this quote mean to you, and how would you phrase it otherwise into more ordinary language, if you had to?

"Philosophy encompasses psychology. I said it so it must be so. Help Mummy!"

Perhaps philosophy is the art of trying to ignore oneself?

Reply to Wallows

I addressed this a couple of days ago in my post on section 5 of the Tractatus in the topic on the Tractatus. There has been no response. I would like to hear your thoughts since you had been active on that topic.

I feel that he is saying that the self is everything we know. Knowledge is part of the self and new knowledge is contained in the self.

Maybe he is saying "Objectivity is a viewpoint from nowhere" Thomas Nagel.

I don't like Wittgenstein's statement style of writing.

But personally I think it is impossible to have knowledge without knowing that you exist (Cogito Ergo Sum)

Yes, but is this knowledge of a 'you' a knowledge of something that resists its own moment-to-moment transformation? Descartes needed to postulate a notion of consciousness partially independent from the world of contingent change in order to nail down the objectivity of science in certain knowledge.
But if the 'you' of self-consciousness is of something always other than itself, then Descarte's certainly turns into contingency, and knowledge is no longer knowing THAT you exist but the knowing of particular WAYS that you exist.