Argument of theological fatalism
A number of philosophers have given arguments that prove that if God has for knowledge of human actions then free will could't possibly exist. The basis of these arguments are simply: If God is omniscient, God cannot be wrong about what human agents will do.
So now if God has a belief about your future, say the fact that you will eat carbs tomorrow, then you will eat any carbs tomorrow. The only way you can avoid carbs tomorrow is if you have the power to make God's belies false or change the past, which you do not. What's the theistic defense o this argument?
This argument is outlined with the following premise:
1. If yesterday God believed that you will eat carbs tomorrow, then you can refrain only if
a. You can make this omniscient God’s belief is false, or
b. You can change the past and make make God never have this belief yesterday
2. You can’t do either of those things.
3. God believed yesterday that you will eat carbs tomorrow.
4. So, you cannot avoid eating carbs tomorrow.
5. So, you are not free with respect to your carb consumption.
So now if God has a belief about your future, say the fact that you will eat carbs tomorrow, then you will eat any carbs tomorrow. The only way you can avoid carbs tomorrow is if you have the power to make God's belies false or change the past, which you do not. What's the theistic defense o this argument?
This argument is outlined with the following premise:
1. If yesterday God believed that you will eat carbs tomorrow, then you can refrain only if
a. You can make this omniscient God’s belief is false, or
b. You can change the past and make make God never have this belief yesterday
2. You can’t do either of those things.
3. God believed yesterday that you will eat carbs tomorrow.
4. So, you cannot avoid eating carbs tomorrow.
5. So, you are not free with respect to your carb consumption.
Comments (9)
However this objection doesn't stand. Suppose I say that there is an overhead wave coming and then my friend catches an overhead wave right after. He will say I was right , but how could my statement have been right if it was never true (denying the bivalence)? So this objection can be further refuted.
Also there are evidence for claims made in the Bible explicitly stating that God does in fact know the future.
The if in premise 1 is a set up for premise 3 which states God does have beliefs about your future
You are not "free" in one narrow sense, but that sense has little relevance to what we usually think of as exercising free will. Case in point - your own example. Everyone would agree that if you have the luxury to choose what you eat, and no one intervenes to limit your choice, then your choice is free. Now, this is an empirical fact. The task of the philosopher is to make her account of free will consistent with that fact.
Is it a empirical fact or quite possibly an illusion? That’s my whole argument.
And yeah it’s proving no free will in a narrow sense but this argument can be repeated for every action
It is an empirical fact.
You are going at it backwards. The first thing you need to do is to ask: What is free will? And think very carefully about how you are going to answer that question. Instead, you kind of assume that you know what it means, based on how the words sound to you. And as a result, you end up talking about some simplistic artificial concept that doesn't apply to anything in the world.
So you proved that "free will" in your sense does not exist. But so what? It's an absolutely useless result, since your sense does not concern anyone but yourself.
Is this a matter of belief? If God is omniscient then it means He is intelligent in the absolute sense. Doesn't that mean He knows how free-will works and wouldn't bother wasting energy on needless attention? God is omniscient, He knows you will choose what to eat tomorrow or you won't. Either way, there will be a tomorrow with or without you. That is basic God-wisdom. I call it the way things are.