Quantum Indeterminacy and Libertarian free will
Quantum Indeterminacy and Libertarian free will.
In another thread, I presented the following thought experiment:
In the actual world, you are presented with a choice between X and Y. You deliberate on the options, weighing pros &cons consistent with your background beliefs and dispositions, and you ultimately choose X (possibly influenced by some sudden impulse). Is there a possible world with an identical history to this one, so that you have exactly the same background beliefs, desires and impulses at the point at which the choice is presented - but you instead choose Y?
If such a world is not possible, then the choice is determined and Libertarian Free Will (LFW) does not exist. This should not be controversial. Libertarians believe a choice is freely willed only if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is true.
Now consider the very real possibility that mental activity is partly influenced by quantum mechanics (it has been theorized that the energy associated with mental activity is stored at the quantum level). Where QM is involved, there is quantum indeterminacy. Quantum indeterminacy creates a truly random factor that results in alternative possibilities to a choice despite all other factors being fixed.
***edit* Most interpretations of quantum mechanics views the "measurement problem" as indicating there is true ontological indeterminacy. ***
The question for discussion: if quantum indeterminacy is the only actual source of alternative possibilities, is this sufficient to consider the choice a product of libertarian free will?
***edit** If a libertarian believes quantum indeterminacy is inadequate for LFW, despite it techincally meeting the terms of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), then please provide a re-worded PAP, or some other means of identifying LFW.
In another thread, I presented the following thought experiment:
In the actual world, you are presented with a choice between X and Y. You deliberate on the options, weighing pros &cons consistent with your background beliefs and dispositions, and you ultimately choose X (possibly influenced by some sudden impulse). Is there a possible world with an identical history to this one, so that you have exactly the same background beliefs, desires and impulses at the point at which the choice is presented - but you instead choose Y?
If such a world is not possible, then the choice is determined and Libertarian Free Will (LFW) does not exist. This should not be controversial. Libertarians believe a choice is freely willed only if the Principle of Alternative Possibilities is true.
Now consider the very real possibility that mental activity is partly influenced by quantum mechanics (it has been theorized that the energy associated with mental activity is stored at the quantum level). Where QM is involved, there is quantum indeterminacy. Quantum indeterminacy creates a truly random factor that results in alternative possibilities to a choice despite all other factors being fixed.
***edit* Most interpretations of quantum mechanics views the "measurement problem" as indicating there is true ontological indeterminacy. ***
The question for discussion: if quantum indeterminacy is the only actual source of alternative possibilities, is this sufficient to consider the choice a product of libertarian free will?
***edit** If a libertarian believes quantum indeterminacy is inadequate for LFW, despite it techincally meeting the terms of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), then please provide a re-worded PAP, or some other means of identifying LFW.
Comments (100)
Edit: A free agent would have to be able to consciously control quanta intentionally in order for the person to be a free “agent”.
OK, but any factor under the agent's control seems determinative, which falsifies LFW. Refer back to the thought experiment: It seems to be the case that there is such a possible world only if there is no reason for the choice.
Quantum indeterminacy is the apparent necessary incompleteness in the description of a physical system, that has become one of the characteristics of the standard description of quantum physics.
Prior to quantum physics, it was thought that
(a) a physical system had a determinate state which uniquely determined all the values of its measurable properties, and conversely(b) the values of its measurable properties uniquely determined the state.
So, all quantum indeterminacy is is the claim that all the MEASURABLE properties don't fully map out all of the characteristics of a physical system. I take this to meant that at least one thing QM is potentially concerned with are the UNMEASURABLE values that might determine that state or system. Call the object of that concern "X". At least one possible candidate for what "X" is, is an adequately defined conceptions of LFW. Consequently, not only is LFW compatible w/ QM, it could, in fact, be precisely what QM scientists are looking for.
That’s a very strange claim.
meh, I think it's actually quite similar to what Leibnitz said about monads back in the day
Although, yeah, it is pretty strange
My guess is "ouch..."
What I mean by free will is that I can make choices that are like rolling dice (where we assume that the dice outcome really is random), but where I'm also able to bias the roll, so that given four options, I can bias the probabilities to, say, 40%, 30%, 20%, 10%.
In my view this is a completely naturalistic phenomenon. I'm a physicalist. An identity theorist.
And I don't think that the natural mechanism would necessarily have to be quantum. Some macro phenomena could turn out to be random or probabilistic rather than deterministic.
Does one really do this? It seems that any deliberative choice is fully determined by brain states, and the only way choices are like rolling dice is that we don’t know the consequences of our choices until later. Or maybe I just don’t understand what you’re saying.
It seems to me like I can (and often do) make random-but-unequally-probable choices.
Sure. What program to watch from my DVR while eating lunch.
And the program you did ultimately choose was not fully determined by your brain states? Your memory, beliefs, mood, and particular desires at the time of choosing?
Right. Phenomenally, I randomly chose it, albeit while not biasing all of the options completely equally. I do this for things I choose all the time.
Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics does seek to explain the indeterminacy. I am aware of only two interpretations that are consistent with strict determinism:
1) Bohmian - which assumes there are non-local variables that determine the discrete state of the system; I don't believe this is well accepted.
2) Many Worlds - which assumes all possible measurements of the system actually exist as a branch of a meta-universe. This has more acceptance (and also vehement rejectors), but even if true - the world we find ourselves in is random (there's a copy of us in each world).
For purposes of the discussion, consider quantum indeterminacy to entail ontological indeterminacy, not just a measurement problem. This is consistent with all interpretations except Bohmian.
Does quantum indeterminacy satisfy your assumption of randomness. It is REALLY random, unlike dice throwing. Do you think this randomness is sufficient to meet the assumptions of Libertarian Free Will?
Quoting Relativist
OK, how does that change anything I said?
Not so much. See this. Of particular relevance is footnote 41, which refers to a 1968 journal article that proposes the energy for neuronal activity is stored at the QM level - which is intrinsically indeterminate.
What do you mean by "ontological" here? "Ontological" in the sense of modern physics seems to explicitely mean to describe the things as they appear. Schroedinger's cat for example "is" alive and dead at the same time as an observer of the box cannot distinguish this. The cat was never asked....
All interpretations of QM are consistent with what is measured, but make assumptions about what exists. e.g. many Worlds Interpretation assumes these worlds actually exist, even though it is impossible to access (or measure) them.
I don't think we know what is and isn't really random. But sure, maybe quantum phenomena are the key.
It is widely recognized that there are two main aspects to free will: alternative possibilities and agent control. Most of those who affirm free will are obliged to account for both of these aspects, and libertarian free will advocates are no exception.
That's the problem here: Where shall be the difference?
Refer back to the thought experiment I described in my opening post. If I make a choice based on my prior beliefs and dispositions, isn't that choice under my control? That seems to be the case irrespective of whether our free will is libertarian or compatibilist. The point of divergence is the principle of alternative possibilities, not control.
If you say that the alternative possibility must be under the libertarians control, then what exactly is the libertarian controlling that is not determinative? Why is he choosing Y instead of X? If there's a reason, that reason is determinative. If there's no reason, it's random - and QM indeterminism seems to fit that bill.
You earlier referred to Schroedinger's cat. A cat is not both alive and dead; it is one or the other - that is the ontological nature of the experiment. Until we open the box to see the cat's state, we're in a state of ignorance - which is epistemological.
Prior to the cat's death, it was indeterminate as to when the cat would be killed. That is ontological indeterminism. It's also epistemologically indeterminate, but that is not due to mere ignorance - it is due to the quantum uncertainty - the time is not predictable in principle.
This is what one might think - if the cat was anything else beside what we observe. But that would mean that it was more than it's worldly being, it's state in the world and how it affects the world. Hence it is said not to be epistemological, and the cat equally alive and dead. You see the ontological problem?
Yes, this edit is an important addendum. Compatibilist philosophers who are impressed by so called Frankfurt cases hold that compatibilist freedom and responsibility are possible despite PAP being false. However, it's not only libertarian philosophers who endorse PAP, since not all compatibilist philosophers agree that Frankfurt cases show alternatives possibilities not to be a requirement for freedom. So, you are right that such compatibilist philosophers thereby have the burden of explaining in what sense there might be alternative possibilities open to free agents in the context of determinism. The most common way of discharging this burden (which is a step in the right direction albeit not entirely successful, in my view) is to develop a dispositional account of the "can" (or agential power) that is relevant to alternative possibilities.
The main idea is that, in the circumstances where an agent actually does A, although she could (counterfactually) have done B, the fact that the 'conditions' (where those 'conditions' include the agent's own mental states and dispositions) were such that she was determined to do A doesn't entail that she didn't have (at that time) the power to do B but merely that this power wasn't actualized. It is a tempting fallacy to infer from the fact that circumstances are such that an agent is determined to do A that, in those circumstances, the agent doesn't have the (unactualized) power to do something else. One good insight of compatibilism is the acknowledgement that some of the 'circumstances' (so called) that are 'internal' to the agent's own agential powers don't constitute constraints on her behavior at all but rather reflect (and enable) her own power of agency: that is, her power to choose which one among several options is, by her own lights (rational and moral) the right one to pursue. Hence we may say that the alternative possibilities that are genuinely open to the agent, at any given time, are the possibilities that are consistent with her general abilities, and her opportunities, such that it is only the agent's own power of practical reasoning that is responsible for one of them, in preference to another, being pursued.
The reason here is a motive, a motive that governs why one would choose one alternative over the others. But the motive itself is not any of the alternatives, which are instead means toward some end that the motive intends. Unless one can find an epistemic certainty for any alternative being best, all alternatives contemplated will hold likelihoods of being best means of obtaining the given end. The decision of which alternative to pursue, this as resulting effect, is then directly originated from the momentary constituency of the being in question as cause. The choice is then neither random—for it is guided/limited by the motive and the sum of alternatives one is aware of—nor is it determinate, for probabilities (i.e. some measure of uncertainty) are intrinsic to that which one willfully chooses. If no uncertainty in what to do is present, then neither will there be present the activity of making choices between alternatives--one here instead simply does what is deemed best.
For example, imagine a line segment with point A and C at the ends and point B at the center. The agent is at point B and intends to arrive at point C. But there’s an obstacle in the way. The alternative of going to point A is, in this situation, an invalid alternative—so it is rejected by default. Say that what one is left with is whether to go a long distance to the right of the obstacle—where there’s a risk of getting lost—or a short distance to the left of the obstacle—where there’s the danger of falling off of a cliff. What one chooses will be governed by the intention of obtaining the end pursued, but deciding which way is best is of itself, in this case, an effect directly caused by the agent at point B.
No better simple example currently comes to mind. But one result is that one here is metaphysically responsible for the choice one makes—and that the choice is neither random nor determinate.
A non-physicalist compatibilism affirms that a) no choice is possible in the complete absence of preexisting constraints—e.g. intentions and viable alternatives—that determine limitations of what can be and b) that the decision itself is neither determined via infinite chains of causation nor random—but is instead an effect directly originated by the agent.
Why does your agent want to go to C? Did he choose so? Is this just "given"?
It’s only a simplified example. The moment we choose our intentions is also when then become to us competing alternatives—themselves governed by other motives that, in this scenario, serve as meta-motives/intentions. This does lead into the question of whether or not there are metaphysical constraints on what we as sentient beings can intend—these then encompassing all of our worldly intentions. I believe that there are—and that, in so being, these metaphysical alternatives are for all intended purposes existentially predetermined. Evidencing this, however, is not an easy thing to do. But, otherwise, I’d imagine it would be turtles all the way down, so to speak.
If you are addressing motives, my previous posts address how motives and choice are compatible.
Yes. From today's point of view I am.
I wanted to present the perspective I've mentioned since its uncommon today though very much accordant to positions held by David Hume—who, to my knowledge, was among the first (if not the first) to propose the stance of compatibility between determinism and metaphysically valid free will ... but this clearly not in the form it takes today wherein, as you say, "free will" merely implies acting in non-coerced ways.
Regarding traveling on a long path or next to a cliff, both getting lost on the path and falling off of the cliff would be detrimental to arriving at C—which is the end that one wants to obtain. Which alternative best facilitates the obtaining of the desired end is then governed by the end pursued.
Where one to want to wander off for the fun of it instead of reaching C, then getting lost on the long path would then become the alternative that best facilitated the wanted end. Etc.
However, because no alternative is known to be better than the rest with epistemic certainty, the uncertainty that results in due measure facilitates an indeterminacy in what one chooses, making the choice directly determined by the will of the agent—this in attempts to best arrive at the intended end.
E.g. maybe descending down the cliff would be a better way of wandering off for the fun of it.
This just expressed view does not however of itself prove the position of freewill here mentioned—for one can always get bogged in the many details of what is and what isn't determined.
Addressing how all aspects of mind are not determinate is also not in keeping with my views. Imo, some aspects of our minds are determinate, some have been acquired via our former choices in life, some are mutable by further choices we make, etc.
What I was addressing is only a perspective on the very activity of choice making. One in which there being a reason, i.e. a motive, for the choice does not in and of itself entail that the choice is thereby fully determinate.
That is a reasonable clarification of the PAP. But isn't this still consistent with compatibilism? How could the agent have made a counterfactual choice through his own powers of reasoning? What rational factor is indeterminate?
I made a case for moral accountability under compatibilism here.
It's true that the agent couldn't, counterfactually, have made a different choice if the antecedent material conditions had been the same. But that doesn't guarantee determinism if determinism is understood as the doctrine that everything that happens (and not merely what happens at the physical level of description) is uniquely determined by the antecedent conditions and by universal laws of nature. What it is that happens may be an intelligible action. If this action is being materially realized by specific bodily motions (and specific neurophysiological processes, etc.), then part of what happens is that those low level processes happen to realize (or materially constitute) an intelligible action form of a specific type (which may, on different occasions, be materially realized differently).
But even if there are laws of nature that uniquely determine what low level material events follow from given antecedent material conditions, it doesn't follow that there also must be deterministic laws that determine what (kinds of) intelligible action forms it is that the consequent material events are instantiating. In fact, there can't be any such laws, or so would I be prepared to argue. From the standpoint of the laws of nature (or from the 'physical stance', as Dennett would say), the fact that an agent is performing an intelligible action of type A (keeping a promise to pay back a loan, say) rather than an action of a different intelligible type isn't something that can be determined by laws of nature even if the intelligible event (i.e. the action) supervenes on its material constitution base (i.e. the specific bodily motions, etc.) What the deterministic laws of nature dont specify at all is what (low level) material processes constitute what (high level) intelligible actions. It is rather an agent's reasons for acting that specifies what her bodily motions are intelligible exemplifications of (from the 'intentional stance', as Dennett would say).
You gave one possible answer in your preceding paragraph:
Quoting Relativist
That is indeed the line pursued by some libertarians. You control your choices in virtue of them being your choices. Control, according to this view, is not causal control.
As I mentioned in my post, you're controlling the unequal probabilities.
We want to know whether choices are even possible. So focus on choices that have no moral implications, and whether we can make choices that don't have a bunch of reasoning behind them (because that confuses the issue, too).
What does that mean? Describe the process you have in mind.
You've got four options. If the probabilities are equal, each has a 25% chance of being chosen. If the probabilties are unequal, there might be a 40% chance of A, a 30% chance of B, a 20% chance of C and a 10% chance of D.
It seems like we can bias probabilities in that way. So it's not just random, there's some element of control.
But you have mentally assigned the probabilities based on prior beliefs, and this determines your choice.
You can do this where the probabilities are not the result of reasoning.
I’m sure this is logically possible, but I have just never done it that I can remember. Perhaps I have some kind of deficiency because I am always driven by my mental motivators when choosing. Does anyone else here experience what Terrapin Station experiences? I’m curious to know how many of you there are.
This conclusion is in direct contradiction to risk taking: from buying lottery tickets to deciding what to do when one falls in love with someone they hardly know and could get badly burnt by … with this list of risks being very long.
Even when in theory everything is composed of infinite causal chains and is thereby perfectly determinate, in practice uncertainties abound and, along with them, indeterminacies in respect to the choices we make. And this irrespective of the amount and quality of reasoning we make use of.
Still, I acknowledge, the issue is at base a metaphysical one, directly pertaining to the existential nature of causation. Belief in a stringent causal determinism will always presuppose the impossibility of any causal process that is not itself a link in one or more infinite chains of efficient causation.
I’ve at times chosen between ice-cream flavors without any deliberation—hence in manners devoid of at least conscious reasoning. The choice was still mine and not any others.
A reason as such.
Quoting Heiko
Then my answer is "no: choice is yet possible" ... with what I've stated in my previous posts as justification for this answer.
In the case of the placebo effect, it seems that a predisposition or belief actually has the opposite effect. Say for example you give a patient a placebo that you assure you will cure her headache, which it does, although it reality it was just a sugar pill. So in such cases (which are very widely documented) causation seems to flow 'downward' from belief to physical symptoms, rather than from physical causes to symptoms.
By what?
Quoting Noah Te Stroete
And what science describes those? You've noted elsewhere that you've broken from the physicalist account; the physicalist view is such things are determined by genetics and neuroscience, or at least things that can be understood in those terms. But if you realise the falsehood of that, which you say you have, then what is the alternative explanatory paradigm for 'beliefs, memories, moods and needs'? If they're not explainable in physicalist terms, then what terms?
That thought-experiment, though, of you being the same person in a different world and making a different choice - I can easily imagine that. One interesting analogy here would be twin studies. As you probably know, twins often share very many elements of their life-stories, even when they’ve been separated at birth. But it’s still not hard to envisage cases in which one twin makes a decision that causes their life to diverge wildly from that of their twin - like, kill someone, or something. So what is that kind of choice being ‘determined’ by?
But I’m very suspicious of the concept of ‘supervenience’. It still relies on the idea that mind is ontologically dependent on the brain even if not fully dependent on it. (There’s a word that comes to mind in this context which I’m not entirely sure of the use of, which is ‘under-determination’.)
I sense that you’re trying to flesh out a worldview, or interpretive framework, which accommodates the spiritual experiences you refer to, which have caused you to reject the physicalist views that you previously had. Any hot leads? Any books, philosophers, gurus, movements, that you think might be promising?
But they occupy different spaces and aren’t treated the same and will necessarily have different experiences, shaping each of their respective constitutions.
I have been trying to flesh out a worldview that accommodates my spiritual experiences. I’m learning more everyday from the people on this forum, but no outside leads yet. Any suggestions?
So my general orientation is contra scientific materialism, although one of the things I have learned in ten years of forum discussions, is that there really aren’t that many hardcore materialists. But on the other hand, a lot of people have incorporated at least some core ideas from that mindset into their worldview even if they don’t think through all the implications. For most people, it’s part of their cultural background.
I have a Bachelor of Science in philosophy degree, and I have read Genesis, the Gospels, and Revelation a few times each. I have also read the Bhagavad Gita, the Upanishads, the Tao Te Ching, and a book called The World’s Religions by Huston Smith. I have also read Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance but only once. I really love Shakespeare’s Hamlet, and someone once told me that I have a Hamlet complex. I took that with a grain of salt, though.
Anything in particular you recommend that I read next?
As I said, I'm also very drawn to classical philosophy. What has happened, through my reading, even though it's been a bit scattershot, is that I am seeing these - how to say - it's like seams of gold, running through the ancient lore. The three that most interest me are Christian Platonism, Mahayana Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta. (And I suppose Tao, as well, although I really think you have to know Chinese to understand it properly.)
The two most recent modern philosophical books I have most valued, are Thomas Nagel, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, and a book by an English science writer, James le Fanu, called Why Us? It's hard to bring anything else particular to mind. Just read Adam Becker's What is Real which is another review of the interpretations of quantum physics; three stars. But I'm constantly reading snippets, essays, reviews, and articles. So, nothing in particular, or revelatory, at this point in time!
The problem is that mental disorders tend to be underlying just waiting to get out. It is very possible that even if you had a perfect time as a student, good neighborhood, enough money to study without going into debt etc you still could have ended up in the same condition.
For sure, there are many cases in which an agent acts badly and in which, because of the specificity of the circumstances, we hold her responsibility to be attenuated. This is why, for instance, the law provides for mitigating factors (or extenuating circumstances), which mitigate personal responsibility. The recognition of such circumstances constitutes an acknowledgement that the agent's action were, at least in part, determined by circumstances that were outside of her control.
But there also are cases where we hold that, although external circumstances account causally for the agent having made a bad choice, this influence on her action isn't best construed as a factor that severely diminished the agent's ability to do the right thing but rather is better construed as having provided an occasion for the agent to display a character flaw for which she remains responsible. Oftentimes, it is a matter of ethical (or legal) judgement whether the agent's responsibility for her irrational, unethical or illegal action is better construed as being mitigated, or not, by the specific circumstances (including features of her life history) that led her to make this wrong choice.
So we are responsible for our character? What is character? I know the traditional sense, but what does it mean philosophically?
I am using the term in a sense that's intended to closely match the ordinary use, but I can make it a bit more explicit, or philosophical, thus: The (rational and/or moral) character of a person is the set of her dispositions, habits and intellectual skills, which account for her ability to make (rationally and/or morally) good practical choices. You are thus responsible for your own character inasmuch as it has been molded by your own past efforts and decisions, and it is also currently being maintained or reshaped by your present ongoing efforts and decisions.
I think Aristotle's recommendation would be to try an emulate who appear to you to be wise people and take up good habits, which may be harder at first, but becomes easier over time as virtue (good character) and phronesis (practical wisdom) grow hand in hand.
It's good that people don't all agree on what's best (or ideal). But there is some truth to the aphorism that the best is the enemy of the good. If someone feels stuck into a character that is bad in some respect (such as having a smoking habit) then it is usually clear enough to that person in which direction her character might be improved (in the direction of kicking out this particular habit, say). This is true even if not everyone agrees that smoking is bad.
So, we can agree that someone may be smoking because (in a causal sense of 'because') of some feature of her character (viz. her smoking habit) and, nevertheless, this person isn't powerless to quit smoking. She may or may not quit, and will reasonably be held (and hold herself) responsible for the decision.
Just to be clear, I never intended to suggest that your taking your medications constitutes a habit that you ought to kick. The opposite may very well be true. I am only arguing that habits in general (and other features of character) aren't things that we are powerlessly straddled with.