Truth shaping.
I feel as though a topic is needed on the pragmatic definition of truth shaping. You have the truth out there and you engage a listener or the speaker engages the audience in the endeavor to discover that truth. The Rogerian agreement, therefore, should be the goal or aim of every discussion with opposing views. A rogerian agreement is consensual and meaning is shared between participants. Therefore to shape truth is to engage in a democratic consensual discussion without prejudice or bias.
Does that sound overly simplistic? It seems elegant in its simplicity to want to engage a listener or speaker in truth shaping or discovery.
Does that sound overly simplistic? It seems elegant in its simplicity to want to engage a listener or speaker in truth shaping or discovery.
Comments (18)
If there is nothing much in particular at stake, then we can all gather around the campfire and sing Kumbaya. Differences of opinion can be shown to be ignorable accidents - a reflection of other essentially random points of view - and nothing more.
But there is a reason why philosophy of any depth finds itself polorised. The way to get to the bottom of things is to find the two reciprocal extremes that form the equally "true" limits on possibility.
It is the dichotomy itself which is the fundamental truth of any sufficiently deep inquiry, in other words.
If you say reality is discrete, then the best matching truth to oppose that is its precise inverse - the claim that reality is continuous. Then having identified the possible limits that must bound the issue in question, you have actually arrived at the issue that matters. And you can see that happy agreement then has to exist with the dynamic spectrum of possibilities now properly outlined. You can share the same metaphysical frame while also adopting for some reason some particular, purpose-suited, point of view.
The success of philosophy has been all about outlining the intelligible limits of Being. Through dichotomies, we agree to the reference frame for a productive discussion. Both horns of the dilemma are the truth in that sense.
But just to seek agreement - promoting a simplistic tolerance of "other viewpoints" - shouldn't be the main way of progressing philosophy.
Sure, that is the right attitude to take when you realise that nothing fundamental is actually at stake. If it doesn't make a difference that you believe X and they believe Y, then why not just spend time in another person's shoes. That is its own useful exercise.
However philosophy is dialectical for a good reason. What you have to see past is the division to the unity of opposites that is actually being uncovered when fundamental inquiry is doing its job.
"I think I hear you saying that Rogerian therapy methodology seems like a good, non-threatening way to discover truth, Mr. McPostface."
Getting a gay white supremacist (they exist) to agree about truth with a straight black supremacist would be very difficult, no matter what method of truth-discovery was used. Getting someone who held that the brain is the organ of intelligence, thought, and feeling to recognize the same truth as someone who thinks the mind is something apart from the physical brain and body would be a very freighted task.
Your idea isn't so much "overly simplistic" as an underestimate of difficulty. [Or to put it in very non-Rogerian terminology, "It's just fucking dumb!"] It's hard to get people with opposing viewpoints to find common ground (if there is, in fact, any common ground). People who think capitalism is GREAT! and people who are waiting for workers of the world to unite may not share enough common ground to agree that the sky is blue.
The best that one might hope for between some opposing people is recognition that each has a rational basis for their hopelessly mistaken viewpoints, and that neither side is outright insane.
But, what if an agreement is of higher value than truth itself? Is that a problematic position to hold? If I can't uphold my end of the bargaining stick, then so be it; but, at least I'll be satisfied in my curiosity even if the truth is neglected.
That's exactly what I'm saying. I'm also saying that truth becomes irrelevant if there's a no win situation. Someone always has to feel like they are right; but, what about agreeing to disagree?
I hear you. I was mimicking the way Rogerians talk.
Quoting Posty McPostface
"I'm afraid there's no doubt about it, Dave." **
"You will be assimilated. Resistance is futile. You will comply." ***
** So said Hal9000 in 2001.
*** The standard negotiation position of the implacable Borg in Star Trek: the Second Generation
I think I'm getting the drift here. But, we aren't collectively hallucinating here or anything. There are things out there that we can agree on. If this is a matter of professing the right attitude, then I'm not sure what can be done about that. Perhaps, a better education or upbringing?
So what are your grounds for agreement being of higher value - in the context of worthwhile philosophical debate?
As I said, I would have no problem with Rogerian reasoning in a context where conflict resolution might be the goal.
And really, if you think about it, it would be odd if you objected to my point that dichotomies reduce philosophical conflicts to their fewest number of possibilities. If you boil the choices down to two mutually opposing/jointly exhaustive alternatives, you have already agreed on the most important thing.
Once they discover that their neighborhood just got wiped out in the level 5 going on 6 hurricane, they will both quickly discover that long term economic planning doesn't matter much to them any more.
Not that we need more hurricanes to resolve disputes.
Dichotomistic thinking is the bane of philosophy. I wanted to purchase a book presenting philosophy in terms of a dialectical manner progressing from Plato onwards. But, if you really think about it, it would be an effort in futility to present philosophy as a progression in terms of dichotomies.
This is an interesting point you raise. Reagan spoke about the need for little green men to exist to unite the world against a common enemy.
Why hasn't this thinking applied to climate change boggles my mind?
What makes you say that? Is this a prejudice you can support? Why would you disparage the ability to discover unity in opposites?
Because it oversimplifies things to simple binary states, which you of all people know that's not how nature operates in practice. (Human nature).
Modelling is about maximising simplicity. You've been going on about bipolarity. Why do you think logic relies on reducing possibilities to crisply counterfactual choices?
It's basic information theory. If you want to separate signal from noise, you arrive at the ultimate simplicity of a binary code. To model an analog world, you find that a digital representation is the most universal machinery.
And speaking of human nature, the nervous system itself is a hierarchy of dichotomies. That is how we process reality. It is the optimal solution that evolution uncovered.
Our brain is divided according to the unity of opposites. Physically - in the design of its pathways - it separates the what from the where, the focus from the fringe, the active from the passive, the event from the context, the novel from the familiar.
So it is nuts to complain about over-simplifying. The world is complex. The job of a model is to simplify it in the most effective possible manner. Nothing can be simpler than breaking things down into a choice of two options - two options that meet the logical requirement of being mutually exclusive AND jointly exhaustive.
So your choices are either a) no analysis at all, or b) founding analysis on its optimal case. Philosophy and logic arose when folk realised that was the game. The principle of bivalence or bipolarity is the method that yields the most information about reality. That's a mathematically proven theorem. Ask Shannon.
But, you're mistaking the forest for the trees here. Dimensionality is not captured in a single image. You need multiple overlaying images at different angles and degrees to do that. Eventually, dimensionality is captured when going to a higher dimension.
Well take the next step and realise that the duality of dichotomies speaks to the triadicity of hierarchies. The ur-dichotomy - in a world with complex development - is one divided by the distinction between the local and the global, the particular and the general.
So you mention the forest and the trees. The phenomenon in question is united in the sense that it has both the particular and the general. It is composed by its individual trees. And constrained by the general fact of being "tree-ed".
Thus the hierarchical view that can see both these things at once is capturing the phenomenon in a single image. It captures both its essential ontological dimensions. It sees that the forest is both composed of its trees and that being part of the forest is a constraint on the identity of the trees.
Quoting Posty McPostface
Correct. But we only need to count up to three - as CS Peirce showed.
We start with one - but logically a oneness is a vagueness, a chaos, a symmetry lacking any distinctions. It is a world without intelligibility.
Then we have two - the breaking of a symmetry, the separation of a dichotomy, that now introduces a primal distinction into the picture. We can have hot because we have cold, left because we have right, good because we have evil, stability because we have flux. A counterfactual comparison has arisen.
Then we have three - the arrival at the limit of a symmetry breaking in terms of a maximal asymmetry. We have the ultimate kind of division that is the local separate from the global, the particular separate from the general. There is a stratification in scale and causality. There is the parts that compose and the whole that constrains.
Now we have an image of an actual system, an actual world. A complete description. Ontically, we don't need to count any further. Adding a fourth or fifth ontic dimension is redundant.
Quoting Posty McPostface
But you are just expressing a standard prejudice. The history of thinking provides us with a foundational dichotomy - that of the one and the many. Either we must argue for monadic unity or unlimited plurality - so it seems.
But reducing your philosophical options to a binary either/or is what is the big mistake. Instead you should recognise the unity of opposites - and how their unification results in the irreducible triad that is a hierarchy - is what is really being said.
If the one and the many are a convincing dichotomy then that must be the output of some wiser metaphysical understanding.
Sure, your over-arching unity would be of the kind that would contain multiple angles and degrees. That is the point. It is a single general co-ordinate space that then definitely contains all these particular different slices across it.
So plurality is possible because there is a unity large enough to contain its individuated variety. Before that dichotomy arises, there would only be the featureless monadicity of a vaguess. Dichotomies begin the making of the distinctions that are the basis of any intelligibility. And then hierarchies are the terminus. They are intelligible order fully expressed.
You might want to revive my old thread to continue this discussion:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/3739/monism-pluralism-and-instrumentalism-in-logic