What are the facts about?
I can only see one answer.
I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things. Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world.
I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things.
Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world.
This changes what is being talked about from the world itself to human understanding of it.
The statement should not say,
"The world is the totality of fact not things."
but,
"Our understanding of the world is the totality of the facts we have about it, not the things themselves."
We always come back to the same point, is the world real or is it a simulation we live in?
To accept that the world is real then one must have objects before one can obtain facts about them.
I am not sure about atoms not being things them selves, if you can smash and dismantle something it must be a thing. To say that they are not things because they are the basic blocks to build things with is akin to saying bricks are not things because they are just the basic parts of a house.
unenlightenedOctober 27, 2018 at 15:30#2228180 likes
To say that they are not things because they are the basic blocks to build things with is akin to saying bricks are not things because they are just the basic parts of a house.
No, it's to say bricks aren't houses. but that is not my point. It is not a mere matter of classification, but the discovery that 'thinginess' as in having a definite size, shape, position, these are emergent properties, not fundamental ones. But perhaps I'm exaggerating W.'s engagement with the frontiers of physics.
"The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both were right and both wrong; though the view of the ancients is clearer insofar as they have an acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained."
”
— Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.371-2
But perhaps you are right that his project with his 'atomic facts' is an attempt to reify thought, and hence his concern to dissolve or defuse solipsism.
It is not a mere matter of classification, but the discovery that 'thinginess' as in having a definite size, shape, position,
Like Banno's red mug(or was it a cup). It had a definite size, shape, color but not position. He sometimes left in the kitchen sometimes on the porch. Because it had those characteristics it was Banno's red cup, but the characteristics themselves do not make the mug. There has to be an object to describe.
these are emergent properties, not fundamental ones.
I am not sure about this, I would say that it was fundamental for that cup(mug) to have those specific properties or it would not be Banno's red cup. And if he did not have a mug there would be no properties of it.
Like Banno's red mug(or was it a cup). It had a definite size, shape, color but not position. He sometimes left in the kitchen sometimes on the porch. Because it had those characteristics it was Banno's red cup, but the characteristics themselves do not make the mug. There has to be an object to describe.
Not according to the coordinate space between Banno and the cup. Or even panpsychism,
I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things. Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world.
I heard the next big thing in science is string theory. So, it might strings all the way down.
Not according to the coordinate space between Banno and the cup. Or even panpsychism,
That would be the subject of another discussion, but I think that most of us have heard enough about Banno's red cup for this lifetime. No offense meant there Banno.
Reply to Posty McPostface The world is not a mere collection of things, but also consists in their relations to, and interactions with, one another. Those relations and interactions are states of affairs, which according to Wittgenstein, are synonymous with facts.
So, I don't read the statement as saying that the world is the totality of facts as opposed to things, but as asserting the inclusion of the relations and interactions along with the things. I think it also points to the fact that things are themselves concatenations of relations and interactions, and are only in a merely formal sense, identities that are transcendent of relations and interactions..
The world is not a mere collection of things, but also consists in their relations to, and interactions with, one another. Those relations and interactions are states of affairs, which according to Wittgenstein, are synonymous with facts.
So, I don't read the statement as saying that the world is the totality of facts as opposed to things, but as asserting the inclusion of the relations and interactions along with the things. I think it also points to the fact that things are themselves concatenations of relations and interactions, and are only in a merely formal sense, identities that are transcendent of relations and interactions..
Yes, the early Wittgenstein defined objects as the substance of the world.
The limits of our language are the limits of our world.
Facts are odd things; they are both of language, and of the world. There is a way of understanding a fact that is not given in saying that fact, but shown in using it.
Facts are odd things; they are both of language, and of the world. There is a way of understanding a fact that is not given in saying that fact, but shown in using it.
Yes, that much I understand. I just am having difficulty with the Principle of Bipolarity present throughout the Tractatus.
According to the Principle of Bipolarity, you can have negative states of affairs. Which makes sense to me given that Wittgenstein argued passionately that you can't disprove an elephant in a room.
That makes sense: for every positive state of affairs there is its negative counterpart. In the positive sense my identity consist in my being myself, and in its negative counterpart it consists in its not being anything else.
Reply to Posty McPostface The world isn't made up of things. The world is made up of a particular arrangement of things. Things don't tell us anything. So facts are the arrangement of things in a particular way. The world is the world because things are the way they are in a particular way - they form a picture, a particular picture. Propositions, according to the Tratatus, are pictures of these arrangements. The picture either correctly describes the world, or it doesn't.
Reply to Posty McPostface Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by Russell and Frege, especially in terms of the Tractatus. There is some influence of Schopenhauer and Kant, but, at least from my studies, it's not a heavy influence. Early in Wittgenstein's life (very early, probably as a teen) he accepted Schopenhauer's idealism, but later (probably early to late 20's) in his life he rejects it.
What are your thoughts on the Principle of Bipolarity and Wittgenstein?
I think it's a bit more complicated. Are there issues of bipolarity in Wittgenstein? Yes. I would say that ascribing a particular view of philosophy to Wittgenstein is a bit dangerous in terms of correctly understanding him. Also, when reading Wittgenstein it's best to not start with a particular interpretation in mind, look at him from many different views. If you look at him from a particular point of view, it's like looking at Mars through one telescope aimed at one particular area of Mars. It will give you some information, but not a complete or correct picture of Mars.
For some reason we love categorizing things, but especially people. He's this, or she's that, life is just much more complicated and diverse. I say generally resist this, in many of it's forms, especially when it comes to people.
One could make a good argument against bipolarity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Atomic facts are constituted by objects that make up the substance in the world (or logical space if you prefer the original terminology).
Keep in mind that objects, for Wittgenstein, aren't the same as things. Objects are simple, they are the simplest constituent part of a fact that occupy space, but nowhere does Wittgenstein give an example of an object. They are simply requirements of his logical analysis. They are not things like, apples, trees, cars, mountains, numbers, properties, etc.
The world isn't made up of things. The world is made up of a particular arrangement of things. Things don't tell us anything. So facts are the arrangement of things in a particular way. The world is the world because things are the way they are in a particular way
So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture?
So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture?
Both, I think. Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would say that the objects exist in logical space and their representation is what can be made apparent through their respective configurations in terms of atomic facts.
So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture?
Pictures, in this model, are of facts, or the possibility of facts. It would seem that you have to have the facts, or the possibility of those facts in order to create the picture. What is in the picture is a possible form, that form either matches reality or it doesn't. You can't have the picture unless there is something to picture, so the picture isn't first.
So objects are independent of their properties but the properties are dependent on the objects.
I'm not sure I see the connection between what you're saying, and what I said. Are you talking about Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., the objects of the Tractatus? You seem to be talking about objects like apples, trees, persons, etc. Your question may still be valid, but I'm trying to get clear on what you mean by objects.
Are you talking about Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., the objects of the Tractatus? You seem to be talking about objects like apples, trees, persons, etc. Your question may still be valid, but I'm trying to get clear on what you mean by objects.
Wittgenstein said, if I remember correctly from so long ago something about the world being described properly only when it is described down to its atomic components. So surely the whole of the world would be included. But I have not read him for a long time so I might be wrong.
Wittgenstein said, if I remember correctly from so long ago something about the world being described properly only when it is described down to its atomic components. So surely the whole of the world would be included. But I have not read him for a long time so I might be wrong.
Atomic facts are reflections of elementary propositions. Atomic facts can combine to form facts of any complexity, and as such, describe the world. So yes the whole of the world would be included.
Objects are simple, they are the simplest constituent part of a fact that occupy space, but nowhere does Wittgenstein give an example of an object. They are simply requirements of his logical analysis. They are not things like, apples, trees, cars, mountains, numbers, properties, etc.
So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc?
My temptation is to say that only things have ontological existence. Facts are generated by minds. Facts are a product of language, and language is dependent on the evolution of social animals like us.
My temptation is to say that only things have ontological existence. Facts are generated by minds. Facts are a product of language, and language is dependent on the evolution of social animals like us.
But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things. Facts are not mind-independent though. On a hard reading, you can designate facts as having ontological significance superior to things.
But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things. Facts are not mind-independent though. On a hard reading, you can designate facts as having ontological significance superior to things.
I don't understand what that means, at least not as a materialist.
It means that facts have a greater ontological significance than things. Atom facts that is. States of affairs are important too.
That sounds really difficult to square with a world made up of particles and forces. We can talk about atomic facts of .a table, such as it's color, solidity, constitution, etc, but it's the physical stuff which makes it what it is.
That sounds really difficult to square with a world made up of particles and forces. We can talk about atomic facts of .a table, such as it's color, solidity, constitution, etc, but it's the physical stuff which makes it what it is.
Atomic facts are those things and relations you talk about. Contrast this with sachlage and sachverhalten.
As far as I'm aware, Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a nominalist.
Problem being that nominalism is a bit hard to square with saying the world is a totality of relations and properties, since you're going to have a lot of the same properties and relations repeated all over the place.
Problem being that nominalism is a bit hard to square with saying the world is a totality of relations and properties.
Not really. Again, facts aren't mind independent. Which, gives me the suspicion that Wittgenstein still held onto Kantian transcendentalism in some sense of the Tractatus.
Not really. Again, facts aren't mind independent. Which, gives me the suspicion that Wittgenstein still held onto Kantian transcendentalism in some sense of the Tractatus.
In that case, the totality of the world is the categories of my mind coming into contact with the various sense impressions.
In that case, the totality of the world is the categories of my mind coming into contact with the various sense impressions.
I don't see what's wrong with that argument. I agree that if you read Kant it might help better understand the Tractarian ontology of facts existing in logical space.
So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc?
Language ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World
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Proposition ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fact
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Elementary Proposition --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Atomic Fact
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Name -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Object
Think of this as a mirror image. Moreover, don't think of names or objects like you normally think of these words, or you'll get confused. The smallest constituent part of a proposition is a name, and the smallest constituent part of a fact is an object. There is a one-to-one correspondence between an object in the world and a name in a proposition. Names form elementary propositions, which then form propositions. Objects make up atomic facts, which then form the facts of the world. Wittgenstein believed that there had to be this relationship between language and the world, so he constructed a logical (a priori) relationship.
Wittgenstein wasn't saying there aren't things like apples, trees, people, etc., how these are arranged would be the facts, but facts are broken down even further, into smaller parts (objects). You can think of objects as occupying a place in space.
It's much more complex than this, but what I'm trying to get across to you is that objects and names are not what you would think they are.
Here's something I posted on Quora. This was written to answer the following question:
What did Ludwig Wittgenstein mean by "the limits of my language are the limits of my world"?
To answer this question one needs to have a good understanding of the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish. There are three main ideas in the *Tractatus*, and these three ideas will help answer your question.
First, though, one must understand what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein’s goal is to investigate the essence of language, that is, how it functions, and how it is structured. Second, he assumes that the function of language is to describe the world, and he assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic. Why did Wittgenstein think that logic would reveal the structure of language, and reveal how language is connected to the world? We have hints here and there, but it seems that not only did he believe that logic lay at the bottom of all science, but he also believed that there was something universal about logic (his idea of logic has ontological implications), a peculiar depth (PI 89). In fact, logic is one of the three main ideas behind his work in the *Tractatus*, the other two are language and the world.
Wittgenstein starts his investigation in the *Tractatus* with the world. The beginning statements of the *Tractatus* can be thought of as conclusions, which are required by his theory of language. There are two components of Wittgenstein’s theory of language, *the picture theory* and *the truth-function theory*. Wittgenstein believed that if we can talk about the world, then propositions must be logically connected with the world. In this way, the truth of a proposition is not connected with other propositions, but connected with the world. He called propositions that are directly connected with the world, *elementary propositions*. So you have propositions (complex propositions), which are made up of simpler propositions called elementary propositions that are directly connected to the world. Two questions that naturally arise, how are elementary propositions related to complex propositions, and how are elementary propositions logically connected to the world?
First, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Thus, if a complex proposition is broken down into elementary propositions, then the truth-value of the proposition is determined by the truth-value of its component parts (seen in truth-tables), namely, the elementary propositions that make up the proposition. Second, elementary propositions connect with the world in that they are pictures of atomic facts, which are the smallest constituent parts of facts.
Wittgenstein believed that his process of analysis, in terms of the structure of a proposition, must come to an end, but “…what will the end be?” (Nb p. 46). Once we have completely analyzed the proposition, that analysis will have the same complexity as its referent (Nb p. 46). The referent being facts in the world.
However, we are not done with propositions. Elementary propositions, according to Wittgenstein, have more basic parts, namely, a nexus of *names *(T 4.22). Do not think of names like pencil, cup, chair, etc, these kinds of names are not what Wittgenstein had in mind. For Wittgenstein a *name* is a primitive sign, and he uses the symbols x, y, and z to refer to them. These names cannot be dissected any further. They are, in one sense, the end result of the analysis, in terms of the elementary proposition.
So how do propositions correspond to facts in the world? Keep in mind that in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy he holds to the traditional view of language, that is, a name’s meaning is directly associated with the object it denotes (T 3.203). Thus, this is carried over into his thinking in the *Tractatus.*
The totality of facts* *are what make up the world (T 1.1). Facts are divided into atomic facts, just as complex propositions are divided into elementary propositions. There is a direct picturing correlation between an elementary proposition and an atomic fact. The elementary proposition, which is made up of *names*, has its counterpart in the world of facts, because the smallest constituent part of a fact is an *object *(do not think of objects in the normal sense), objects for Wittgenstein are simple, just as names are simple.
The elementary proposition is in touch with the world via *names*, which are in direct contact with the world via *objects*. The arrangement of names in the elementary proposition must have the same logical structure as the arrangement of objects within the atomic fact. If it has the same arrangement, then it’s true, if not, it’s false.
Propositions show their sense by their logical structure, and if that sense is correct or true, then it matches the facts in reality, or it mirrors reality. Think of a picture, a picture has a sense, the sense is given by the arrangement of things in the picture, but that sense need not match reality (the way things are), the same is true of a proposition according to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy.
So how does all of this answer your question? Well, for early Wittgenstein language is completely descriptive, that is, it attempts to describe the world, either truly or falsely. The limits of language, or what can be said, is the limit of our world. Things that have sense happen only within the limits of language. Senseless propositions attempt to say something about the limit of language; and attempts to go beyond the limits of what can be said, result in nonsense. It follows from all of this that the limit of language is the limit of our world.
The logical positivists misunderstood Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* in that they thought his work was anti-metaphysical, on the contrary, he thought that philosophical propositions that try to go beyond the world were attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend language, and thus the world. And although Wittgenstein tried to set out what can and cannot be said (in terms of propositions), he did think that that which transcends our world was important; and although that which transcends the world cannot be stated, as Wittgenstein tried to show, the mystical could be shown.
Atomic facts are reflections of elementary propositions. Atomic facts can combine to form facts of any complexity, and as such, describe the world. So yes the whole of the world would be included.
So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from?
So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from?
Are you leading us to believe in idealism? There are some elements of idealism present in the Tractatus. Like what PMS Hacker calls 'transcendental solipsism'.
I'm not sure, I suppose that one can have facts that are mind-dependent. I wouldn't assert that facts are mind-independent.
In who's mind? Would it not go back to the brain in the vat creating its surroundings if facts are mind-dependent. Or actual physical objects appearing as you obtain the facts about them.
In who's mind? Would it not go back to the brain in the vat creating its surroundings if facts are mind-dependent. Or actual physical objects appearing as you obtain the facts about them.
In my mind, Wittgenstein was not professing mind-independent facts. This is central to his argument for solipsism.
So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from?
A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are?
A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are?
Sorry, I got that a bit mixed up. Retry:
So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?
If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist.
So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?
If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist.
Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is not pictures of the objects. In fact, it's not even clear what an object is. It is though, a picture of a fact, which is composed of atomic facts, and atomic facts are composed of objects.
A proposition, for Wittgenstein, is a picture. So, if we say the Earth has one moon, that proposition is a picture of the relationship between the Earth and the Moon. The words of a proposition stand in a certain relationship, just as a fact in reality mirrors a certain relationship. It mirrors reality, and many propositions are like this. However, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, he demonstrates that propositions do more than picture facts.
If a picture is a picture of a fact, then the fact has to exist first, i.e., if it is true. If the proposition is false, then it's a negative fact, i.e., one that has not obtained (it reflects a possible picture of reality), but one that is possible nonetheless. But strictly speaking pictures are only possible given certain facts. For example, if there were no people, then there would be no propositions, and without propositions there would be no pictures of facts. So pictures of facts (positive or negative facts) are dependent on the propositions and the people who express them. In this sense pictures are secondary and dependent or contingent.
You seem to be worried about the metaphysical implications of what Wittgenstein is saying. As if the picture implies some intelligence in back of reality, but you're stretching his ideas way beyond what they mean. Wittgenstein does believe in the mystical, but not in terms of propositions. Propositions for Wittgenstein are confined to the world, not the mystical, which is beyond the world. The mystical can only be shown, not expressed in terms of propositions. How is the mystical shown? One can show the mystical by certain actions (prayer, meditation, chants, etc).
Michael OssipoffOctober 30, 2018 at 14:12#2233910 likes
How do you define "fact" and "thing"? Here's my definitions:
Fact: true proposition
But then "proposition" needs a definition. I suppose, in that definitional-system, "proposition" could be defined as "statement" or "subject of a statement".
It's just as valid, and maybe better, to define "fact" directly, as a state-of-affairs, or as a relation among things. ...and a proposition as a thing that has truth-value, and is a fact iff its truth-value is "True", and which, if not a fact, would be one if its truth-value were "True".
But either definition-system is fine.
Thing: an existent
That's meaninglessly-vague, because "exist" isn't metaphysically-defined.
Things are what can be defined, described and referred to. It's a broad term.
So by my definitions, the statement is false. The world consists of things. Facts describe things, their properties, and relations between things.
Things can by hypothetical. Propositions can be about hypothetical things. Facts can by about hypothetical (not necessarily true) propositions.
There's no particular reason to believe that there are non-hypothetical, objectively-existent things.
Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.
I'm not sure I'm getting the drift here. Objects populate the world and can be called names, their relations are asserting a different kind of truth in a state space of sorts. Dimensionality is not captured by a 2D-image, you need to resort to a higher dimension. As you zoom out, you can tell the forest for the trees.
”But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations “— Janus
. ”Materialists assume that they are, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.
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No, not really.
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I merely point out that, as Michael Faraday said in 1844, that there’s no particular reason to believe that there are those “objects (or things) that are something over and above their relations”.
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That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact.
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The alternative explanation, that abstract implications are all that the describable world consists of, doesn’t require an assumption or a brute fact. No one denies that there are abstract implications, at least in the limited sense that they can be mentioned and referred to. Nothing new, controversial or un-supported, or brute-fact, is being posited by Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
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As I always disclaim, I can’t prove that Materialism’s objectively and fundamentally existent physical world doesn’t exist as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unparsimonious brute-fact.
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I’ve replied to those who claimed that there could have not been abstract implications.
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Michael Ossipoff
That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact.
Of course it is an assumption, and of course it would entail the brute fact, (if it were true) that objects are not anything over and above their relations. It would be a brute, i.e. inexplicable, fact either way.
bloodninjaNovember 01, 2018 at 05:53#2238140 likes
Are facts necessarily about things? What if things are defined by the facts about them?
Astute observation. I can't disagree with any of it, unfortunately. :)
Terrapin StationNovember 01, 2018 at 21:20#2240810 likes
It means that you can't just do an inventory of the "things"/objects in the world and have a complete picture of it. For example, you can't just list "cats, dogs, trees," etc. Relations and processes (dynamic relations) are necessary for a description of it, too. So you have "This cat is the parent of that cat," "This cat is to the right of that cat from perspective x," "That cat is running" etc.
Those things are facts.
So the world isn't just a totality of things, it's a totality of facts (things in (dynamic) relations).
[i]”But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations.” — Janus
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“Materialists assume that they are […that “things are something over and above their relations], but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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“Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.--Janus
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“That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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“Of course it is an assumption, and of course it would entail the brute fact, (if it were true) that objects are not anything over and above their relations. It would be a brute, i.e. inexplicable, fact either way.”—Janus
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Yes, I didn’t say what I meant.
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No metaphysics can be proved, because an unfalsifiable proposition like Materialism can’t, even in principle, be disproved. (...because that’s what “unfalsifiable proposition”means.)
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So yes, any claim asserting a metaphysics asks you to accept an assumption.
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That’s why I’ve repeatedly been admitting that I can’t prove that the physical world doesn’t have some unspecified “objective existence” or “objective reality” that isn’t had by the hypothetical logical system that I describe.
…and that’s why assert only that an assumption of that “objective reality” or “objective existence” of this physical world is an assumption of a brute-fact.
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But:
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It’s important to distinguish between an assumption implied by the assertion of a metaphysics (I’m not asserting one), as opposed to an assumption that a metaphysics itself makes or needs, or a brute-fact that it entails.
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Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism doesn’t have or need any assumption or brute fact.
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It has, as a premise, that there are abstract-implications, in the limited sense that they can be mention and referred to. I don’t make, and my metaphysical proposal doesn’t need, any assumption that the abstract-implications, or the complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications, or anything in the describable-realm, is “objectively-real” or “objectively existent”, whatever that would mean.
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…or that a complex system of inter-referring abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is real or existent in any context other than its own inter-referring context.
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I merely ask:
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1. What reason there is to believe that our physical world is other than such a system.
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2. …and, if you say that our physical world is “objectively-existent” &/or “objectively-real”, then what do you mean by that (…in a way that the hypothetical logical system that I propose isn’t those things)?
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3. …and in what context you want or believe this physical world to be real and existent, other than its own context and that of our lives.
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4. What physics experiment can a Materialist cite that establishes that the physical world is other than the system that I’ve described?
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5. What assumption do you think is needed by the metaphysics that I’ve been proposing? …and what brute-fact do you think that it entails…when it doesn’t claim the “existence” (whatever that would mean) of its abstract-implications, or anything else describable?
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[end of those 5 questions]
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None of the Materialist critics of my metaphysical proposal have answered those questions. Their silence has been conspicuous, to say the least.
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When I ask those questions, that’s when the discussion always ends. …angrily on the part of the Materialist.
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I don’t assert that Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism is true. …only that alternatives to it, such as Materialism, unparsimoniously depend on assumptions and brute-facts.
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I assert that the metaphysics that I propose, Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, is the parsimonious metaphysics.
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Michael Ossipoff
Michael OssipoffNovember 02, 2018 at 16:13#2242440 likes
Are facts necessarily about things? What if things are defined by the facts about them?
Exactly. Hypothetical things.
...with abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. There's no reason to believe that this phyisical world, and inf fact the whole describable world, consist of more.
Of course, to assert that that's all there describably is,, or to assert any metaphysics, would be to ask people to accept an assumption. It can't be proven, and no metaphysics can be proven.
But a metaphysics built on abstract-facts, such as abstract implications, is the unparsimonious metaphiysics, because it doesn't assume or claim the "existence" (whatever that would mean) of anything describable. There's no need for those abstract implications, and any inter-referring system of them, and this physical world, to be real or existent in any context other than their own.
We create things, facts aren't created. They exist prior to their discovery, or the possibility of their discovery, and cannot be altered by any creation subsequent to their discovery. Facts are unalterable, things are.
But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things.
Claiming no expertise here, but will bumble forward anyway...
Facts seem a very small business. Electro-chemical patterns in the minds of a single species on one planet in one of billions of galaxies. I'm not sure why we would call the world the "totality of facts", but it's quite likely I don't understand what's being discussed.
If I understand, and I probably don't, there seems to be some general agreement that things are an illusion created by the human mind. Given that, by this theory, separate things don't actually exist anywhere but in our minds, again seems a very small business, and not "the world".
I'm not sure what is meant by "the world" but, to me, there is a single unified reality and all apparent divisions contained within are a property of the observer and not what is being observed.
Terrapin StationNovember 02, 2018 at 16:41#2242600 likes
But a metaphysics built on abstract-facts, such as abstract implications, is the unparsimonious metaphiysics, because it doesn't assume or claim the "existence" (whatever that would mean) of anything describable.
How would those abstractions be undescribable? And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?
Michael OssipoffNovember 02, 2018 at 22:53#2243350 likes
And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?
Just its facts. Abstract implications in particular.
I propose that all that this physical universe consists of, is the setting of your hypothetical life-experience-story, which is a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
That universe, and your life, are real enough in their own contexts. In what other context would you like or believe them to be real &/or existent (whatever that would mean)?
I suggest that you're in a life because you're the protagonist in a hypothetical life-experience-story (as described in the paragraph before this one).
What you can be sure of is your experience. All you know about anything else is from your experience.
Your life is hypothetical. It starts with: "I'd have the experiences that I need or want if...". And then away it goes--your hypothetical life-experience-story consisting of a story of "If", set in a world of "If".
Obviously the one requirement of your hypothetical life-experience-story is consistency. ...because there are no such things as mutually-inconsistent facts...even abstract ones.. That brings logic, and a system of mutually-consistent abstract-implications, into your experience of your "physical" surroundings.
How would those abstractions be undescribable? And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?
Comments (114)
Care to expand?
How do you define "fact" and "thing"? Here's my definitions:
Fact: true proposition
Thing: an existent
So by my definitions, the statement is false. The world consists of things. Facts describe things, their properties, and relations between things.
What are the facts about?
I can only see one answer.
Quoting Sir2u
I would say it is an attempt to come to terms with modern physics; substance dissolves under the microscope into fields, probabilities, relations. Things are made of atoms, but atoms are not things. Process and relation are the new 'substances', and so 'atomism' becomes a theory of human understanding (logic) rather than a claim about the world.
This changes what is being talked about from the world itself to human understanding of it.
The statement should not say,
"The world is the totality of fact not things."
but,
"Our understanding of the world is the totality of the facts we have about it, not the things themselves."
We always come back to the same point, is the world real or is it a simulation we live in?
To accept that the world is real then one must have objects before one can obtain facts about them.
I am not sure about atoms not being things them selves, if you can smash and dismantle something it must be a thing. To say that they are not things because they are the basic blocks to build things with is akin to saying bricks are not things because they are just the basic parts of a house.
No, it's to say bricks aren't houses. but that is not my point. It is not a mere matter of classification, but the discovery that 'thinginess' as in having a definite size, shape, position, these are emergent properties, not fundamental ones. But perhaps I'm exaggerating W.'s engagement with the frontiers of physics.
"The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.
Thus people today stop at the laws of nature, treating them as something inviolable, just as God and Fate were treated in past ages. And in fact both were right and both wrong; though the view of the ancients is clearer insofar as they have an acknowledged terminus, while the modern system tries to make it look as if everything were explained."
”
— Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 6.371-2
But perhaps you are right that his project with his 'atomic facts' is an attempt to reify thought, and hence his concern to dissolve or defuse solipsism.
I think that gets around the ambiguity in English.
For clarity, he does go on to further define fact. From The Tractatus:
Like Banno's red mug(or was it a cup). It had a definite size, shape, color but not position. He sometimes left in the kitchen sometimes on the porch. Because it had those characteristics it was Banno's red cup, but the characteristics themselves do not make the mug. There has to be an object to describe.
Quoting unenlightened
I am not sure about this, I would say that it was fundamental for that cup(mug) to have those specific properties or it would not be Banno's red cup. And if he did not have a mug there would be no properties of it.
Not according to the coordinate space between Banno and the cup. Or even panpsychism,
I heard the next big thing in science is string theory. So, it might strings all the way down.
That would be the subject of another discussion, but I think that most of us have heard enough about Banno's red cup for this lifetime. No offense meant there Banno.
Quoting Posty McPostface
Or tie itself in knots.
:lol:
So, I don't read the statement as saying that the world is the totality of facts as opposed to things, but as asserting the inclusion of the relations and interactions along with the things. I think it also points to the fact that things are themselves concatenations of relations and interactions, and are only in a merely formal sense, identities that are transcendent of relations and interactions..
Yes, the early Wittgenstein defined objects as the substance of the world.
So for him were objects not constituted by "atomic facts"? I'm not really that familiar with Wittgenstein, so please excuse my ignorance.
Atomic facts are constituted by objects that make up the substance in the world (or logical space if you prefer the original terminology).
Not by "objects" and their relations then?
Well yes, objects and their relations in logical space. Just that objects are an irreducible substance that comprises the world.
Facts are odd things; they are both of language, and of the world. There is a way of understanding a fact that is not given in saying that fact, but shown in using it.
Yes, that much I understand. I just am having difficulty with the Principle of Bipolarity present throughout the Tractatus.
??
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4290/principle-of-bipolarity
So, objects are not reducible to, but transcendent of, their relations?
I'm not sure if transcendent of their relations is the correct term. I'd say they constitute the world, and that's all.
But then the question seems to remain as to whether objects (or things) are something over and above their relations.
No, their relations are atomic facts. They themselves just are. This is part of the Tractarian ontology of "things"
That makes sense: for every positive state of affairs there is its negative counterpart. In the positive sense my identity consist in my being myself, and in its negative counterpart it consists in its not being anything else.
OK, but that still leaves the question as to how they could be anything at all apart from their relations.
Yes, and hence the world is the totality and non-totality of facts not things.
Yes, the things in themselves do seem to have a strange, shadowy existence; and yet we seem not to be able to do without them.
It goes without saying that Wittgenstein was heavily influenced by Schopenhauer and Kant.
Well, yes how don't you see the Principle of Bipolarity as something significant?
What are your thoughts on the Principle of Bipolarity and Wittgenstein?
I think it's a bit more complicated. Are there issues of bipolarity in Wittgenstein? Yes. I would say that ascribing a particular view of philosophy to Wittgenstein is a bit dangerous in terms of correctly understanding him. Also, when reading Wittgenstein it's best to not start with a particular interpretation in mind, look at him from many different views. If you look at him from a particular point of view, it's like looking at Mars through one telescope aimed at one particular area of Mars. It will give you some information, but not a complete or correct picture of Mars.
For some reason we love categorizing things, but especially people. He's this, or she's that, life is just much more complicated and diverse. I say generally resist this, in many of it's forms, especially when it comes to people.
One could make a good argument against bipolarity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
Keep in mind that objects, for Wittgenstein, aren't the same as things. Objects are simple, they are the simplest constituent part of a fact that occupy space, but nowhere does Wittgenstein give an example of an object. They are simply requirements of his logical analysis. They are not things like, apples, trees, cars, mountains, numbers, properties, etc.
It is a persuasive thought no?
If you're referring to bipolarity, my inclination is to say that it's not persuasive.
Have at the thread I started.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4290/principle-of-bipolarity
Just random musings on my part. Nothing too serious. Be easy,
So which came first, the picture or the thing that is made up in the arrangement described in the picture?
Both, I think. Wittgenstein of the Tractatus would say that the objects exist in logical space and their representation is what can be made apparent through their respective configurations in terms of atomic facts.
Pictures, in this model, are of facts, or the possibility of facts. It would seem that you have to have the facts, or the possibility of those facts in order to create the picture. What is in the picture is a possible form, that form either matches reality or it doesn't. You can't have the picture unless there is something to picture, so the picture isn't first.
Quoting Sam26
So objects are independent of their properties but the properties are dependent on the objects.
But would there not be need of a set of facts in order to make something? Or is it possible for things to just appear?
I'm not sure I see the connection between what you're saying, and what I said. Are you talking about Wittgensteinian objects, i.e., the objects of the Tractatus? You seem to be talking about objects like apples, trees, persons, etc. Your question may still be valid, but I'm trying to get clear on what you mean by objects.
Wittgenstein said, if I remember correctly from so long ago something about the world being described properly only when it is described down to its atomic components. So surely the whole of the world would be included. But I have not read him for a long time so I might be wrong.
Atomic facts are reflections of elementary propositions. Atomic facts can combine to form facts of any complexity, and as such, describe the world. So yes the whole of the world would be included.
I'm not sure, I suppose that one can have facts that are mind-dependent. I wouldn't assert that facts are mind-independent.
So early Wittgenstein actually thought reality consisted of atomic facts and not things like apples, trees, people, etc?
Both. They aren't mutually exclusive.
My temptation is to say that only things have ontological existence. Facts are generated by minds. Facts are a product of language, and language is dependent on the evolution of social animals like us.
But, after all the world is the totality of facts, not things. Facts are not mind-independent though. On a hard reading, you can designate facts as having ontological significance superior to things.
I don't understand what that means, at least not as a materialist.
It means that facts have a greater ontological significance than things. Atomic facts that are. States of affairs are important too.
That sounds really difficult to square with a world made up of particles and forces. We can talk about atomic facts of .a table, such as it's color, solidity, constitution, etc, but it's the physical stuff which makes it what it is.
Atomic facts are those things and relations you talk about. Contrast this with sachlage and sachverhalten.
And what's the difference between atomic facts and hylomorphism? Was he unwittingly committed to a form of universals?
As far as I'm aware, Wittgenstein of the Tractatus was a nominalist. That's all I can figure out on the matter. @Sam26 might have to chime in.
Problem being that nominalism is a bit hard to square with saying the world is a totality of relations and properties, since you're going to have a lot of the same properties and relations repeated all over the place.
Not really. Again, facts aren't mind independent. Which, gives me the suspicion that Wittgenstein still held onto Kantian transcendentalism in some sense of the Tractatus.
In that case, the totality of the world is the categories of my mind coming into contact with the various sense impressions.
I don't see what's wrong with that argument. I agree that if you read Kant it might help better understand the Tractarian ontology of facts existing in logical space.
https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-facts-in-logical-space-a-tractarian-ontology/
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.724.9022&rep=rep1&type=pdf
What are some thoughts about this idea derived from Libenitz?
Language ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- World
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Proposition ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Fact
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Elementary Proposition --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Atomic Fact
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Name -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Object
Think of this as a mirror image. Moreover, don't think of names or objects like you normally think of these words, or you'll get confused. The smallest constituent part of a proposition is a name, and the smallest constituent part of a fact is an object. There is a one-to-one correspondence between an object in the world and a name in a proposition. Names form elementary propositions, which then form propositions. Objects make up atomic facts, which then form the facts of the world. Wittgenstein believed that there had to be this relationship between language and the world, so he constructed a logical (a priori) relationship.
Wittgenstein wasn't saying there aren't things like apples, trees, people, etc., how these are arranged would be the facts, but facts are broken down even further, into smaller parts (objects). You can think of objects as occupying a place in space.
It's much more complex than this, but what I'm trying to get across to you is that objects and names are not what you would think they are.
What did Ludwig Wittgenstein mean by "the limits of my language are the limits of my world"?
To answer this question one needs to have a good understanding of the *Tractatus* and what Wittgenstein was trying to accomplish. There are three main ideas in the *Tractatus*, and these three ideas will help answer your question.
First, though, one must understand what Wittgenstein is trying to accomplish in the *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein’s goal is to investigate the essence of language, that is, how it functions, and how it is structured. Second, he assumes that the function of language is to describe the world, and he assumes that the structure of language is revealed by logic. Why did Wittgenstein think that logic would reveal the structure of language, and reveal how language is connected to the world? We have hints here and there, but it seems that not only did he believe that logic lay at the bottom of all science, but he also believed that there was something universal about logic (his idea of logic has ontological implications), a peculiar depth (PI 89). In fact, logic is one of the three main ideas behind his work in the *Tractatus*, the other two are language and the world.
Wittgenstein starts his investigation in the *Tractatus* with the world. The beginning statements of the *Tractatus* can be thought of as conclusions, which are required by his theory of language. There are two components of Wittgenstein’s theory of language, *the picture theory* and *the truth-function theory*. Wittgenstein believed that if we can talk about the world, then propositions must be logically connected with the world. In this way, the truth of a proposition is not connected with other propositions, but connected with the world. He called propositions that are directly connected with the world, *elementary propositions*. So you have propositions (complex propositions), which are made up of simpler propositions called elementary propositions that are directly connected to the world. Two questions that naturally arise, how are elementary propositions related to complex propositions, and how are elementary propositions logically connected to the world?
First, complex propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Thus, if a complex proposition is broken down into elementary propositions, then the truth-value of the proposition is determined by the truth-value of its component parts (seen in truth-tables), namely, the elementary propositions that make up the proposition. Second, elementary propositions connect with the world in that they are pictures of atomic facts, which are the smallest constituent parts of facts.
Wittgenstein believed that his process of analysis, in terms of the structure of a proposition, must come to an end, but “…what will the end be?” (Nb p. 46). Once we have completely analyzed the proposition, that analysis will have the same complexity as its referent (Nb p. 46). The referent being facts in the world.
However, we are not done with propositions. Elementary propositions, according to Wittgenstein, have more basic parts, namely, a nexus of *names *(T 4.22). Do not think of names like pencil, cup, chair, etc, these kinds of names are not what Wittgenstein had in mind. For Wittgenstein a *name* is a primitive sign, and he uses the symbols x, y, and z to refer to them. These names cannot be dissected any further. They are, in one sense, the end result of the analysis, in terms of the elementary proposition.
So how do propositions correspond to facts in the world? Keep in mind that in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy he holds to the traditional view of language, that is, a name’s meaning is directly associated with the object it denotes (T 3.203). Thus, this is carried over into his thinking in the *Tractatus.*
The totality of facts* *are what make up the world (T 1.1). Facts are divided into atomic facts, just as complex propositions are divided into elementary propositions. There is a direct picturing correlation between an elementary proposition and an atomic fact. The elementary proposition, which is made up of *names*, has its counterpart in the world of facts, because the smallest constituent part of a fact is an *object *(do not think of objects in the normal sense), objects for Wittgenstein are simple, just as names are simple.
The elementary proposition is in touch with the world via *names*, which are in direct contact with the world via *objects*. The arrangement of names in the elementary proposition must have the same logical structure as the arrangement of objects within the atomic fact. If it has the same arrangement, then it’s true, if not, it’s false.
Propositions show their sense by their logical structure, and if that sense is correct or true, then it matches the facts in reality, or it mirrors reality. Think of a picture, a picture has a sense, the sense is given by the arrangement of things in the picture, but that sense need not match reality (the way things are), the same is true of a proposition according to Wittgenstein’s early philosophy.
So how does all of this answer your question? Well, for early Wittgenstein language is completely descriptive, that is, it attempts to describe the world, either truly or falsely. The limits of language, or what can be said, is the limit of our world. Things that have sense happen only within the limits of language. Senseless propositions attempt to say something about the limit of language; and attempts to go beyond the limits of what can be said, result in nonsense. It follows from all of this that the limit of language is the limit of our world.
The logical positivists misunderstood Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* in that they thought his work was anti-metaphysical, on the contrary, he thought that philosophical propositions that try to go beyond the world were attempts to say what cannot be said. They are attempts to transcend language, and thus the world. And although Wittgenstein tried to set out what can and cannot be said (in terms of propositions), he did think that that which transcends our world was important; and although that which transcends the world cannot be stated, as Wittgenstein tried to show, the mystical could be shown.
Hope this helps.
Sure did!
What about your thoughts on Tractarian ontology? I can't shake the suspicion that Wittgenstein was some monist in the Tractatus.
Because logical positivism is essentially an extension of a Leibnizian ontology of logical relations, in my mind.
There is a very definite undertone of metaphysics to what Wittgenstein is saying, and as such, it does have ontological implications.
As far as him being a monist, I don't believe this to be the case. Why would you think so?
Can you expand on that?
I'm keen on learning better the metaphysics of the Tractatus.
Quoting Sam26
It just seemed natural in my mind. Logic, the totality of facts, the principle of bipolarity all seemed to point in that direction for me.
Oh, that's interesting. Hope you keep us posted.
So if the picture is basically describes how to make an object, then the the picture must have existed before the object. So where did the picture come from?
Are you leading us to believe in idealism? There are some elements of idealism present in the Tractatus. Like what PMS Hacker calls 'transcendental solipsism'.
In who's mind? Would it not go back to the brain in the vat creating its surroundings if facts are mind-dependent. Or actual physical objects appearing as you obtain the facts about them.
In my mind, Wittgenstein was not professing mind-independent facts. This is central to his argument for solipsism.
No, I'm not leading in any direction. But if one had to explain where the picture came from, creationism would be an easy answer I think. That sucks.
Quoting Posty McPostface
I am going to look for the audio book I got and listen to it. It might shake up my memory.
A picture describes how to make an object? What? Where did you get this from? What do you think objects are?
Quoting Sir2u
You're chasing the boogie man.
Sorry, I got that a bit mixed up. Retry:
So if the picture basically describes the make up of an object, then would it have existed before the object? Is it necessary for the object to exist before the picture is created?
If the first then facts are independent of the mind. If the second, it would seem that the world needs us to exist.
Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is not pictures of the objects. In fact, it's not even clear what an object is. It is though, a picture of a fact, which is composed of atomic facts, and atomic facts are composed of objects.
A proposition, for Wittgenstein, is a picture. So, if we say the Earth has one moon, that proposition is a picture of the relationship between the Earth and the Moon. The words of a proposition stand in a certain relationship, just as a fact in reality mirrors a certain relationship. It mirrors reality, and many propositions are like this. However, in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, he demonstrates that propositions do more than picture facts.
If a picture is a picture of a fact, then the fact has to exist first, i.e., if it is true. If the proposition is false, then it's a negative fact, i.e., one that has not obtained (it reflects a possible picture of reality), but one that is possible nonetheless. But strictly speaking pictures are only possible given certain facts. For example, if there were no people, then there would be no propositions, and without propositions there would be no pictures of facts. So pictures of facts (positive or negative facts) are dependent on the propositions and the people who express them. In this sense pictures are secondary and dependent or contingent.
You seem to be worried about the metaphysical implications of what Wittgenstein is saying. As if the picture implies some intelligence in back of reality, but you're stretching his ideas way beyond what they mean. Wittgenstein does believe in the mystical, but not in terms of propositions. Propositions for Wittgenstein are confined to the world, not the mystical, which is beyond the world. The mystical can only be shown, not expressed in terms of propositions. How is the mystical shown? One can show the mystical by certain actions (prayer, meditation, chants, etc).
But then "proposition" needs a definition. I suppose, in that definitional-system, "proposition" could be defined as "statement" or "subject of a statement".
It's just as valid, and maybe better, to define "fact" directly, as a state-of-affairs, or as a relation among things. ...and a proposition as a thing that has truth-value, and is a fact iff its truth-value is "True", and which, if not a fact, would be one if its truth-value were "True".
But either definition-system is fine.
That's meaninglessly-vague, because "exist" isn't metaphysically-defined.
Things are what can be defined, described and referred to. It's a broad term.
Things can by hypothetical. Propositions can be about hypothetical things. Facts can by about hypothetical (not necessarily true) propositions.
There's no particular reason to believe that there are non-hypothetical, objectively-existent things.
Quoting Sir2u
State-of-affairs, or relation among things (which can be hypothetical).
As I said above, there's no reason to believe that there are objectively existent things, things that are something other than hypothetical.
Quoting Janus
Materialists assume that they are, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.
Michael Ossipoff
This. Fact's exist relative to an observer. It's a fact.
Idealists would say they are not, but it's just an unsupported assumption of a brute-fact.
I'm not sure I'm getting the drift here. Objects populate the world and can be called names, their relations are asserting a different kind of truth in a state space of sorts. Dimensionality is not captured by a 2D-image, you need to resort to a higher dimension. As you zoom out, you can tell the forest for the trees.
So, no observer no facts, therefore nothing exists unless it is observed. I like that. :up:
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No, not really.
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I merely point out that, as Michael Faraday said in 1844, that there’s no particular reason to believe that there are those “objects (or things) that are something over and above their relations”.
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That isn’t an assumption, and it’s supportable and supported, and it doesn’t entail a brute-fact.
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The alternative explanation, that abstract implications are all that the describable world consists of, doesn’t require an assumption or a brute fact. No one denies that there are abstract implications, at least in the limited sense that they can be mentioned and referred to. Nothing new, controversial or un-supported, or brute-fact, is being posited by Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism.
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As I always disclaim, I can’t prove that Materialism’s objectively and fundamentally existent physical world doesn’t exist as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unparsimonious brute-fact.
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I’ve replied to those who claimed that there could have not been abstract implications.
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Michael Ossipoff
Of course it is an assumption, and of course it would entail the brute fact, (if it were true) that objects are not anything over and above their relations. It would be a brute, i.e. inexplicable, fact either way.
Can either of you please suggest a good book in the secondary literature as an introduction to Wittgenstein?
Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy by K. T. Fann - you can get it used for a few dollars.
Astute observation. I can't disagree with any of it, unfortunately. :)
Those things are facts.
So the world isn't just a totality of things, it's a totality of facts (things in (dynamic) relations).
Welcome back!
I agree; but, think that facts stand above things also.
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Yes, I didn’t say what I meant.
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No metaphysics can be proved, because an unfalsifiable proposition like Materialism can’t, even in principle, be disproved. (...because that’s what “unfalsifiable proposition”means.)
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So yes, any claim asserting a metaphysics asks you to accept an assumption.
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That’s why I’ve repeatedly been admitting that I can’t prove that the physical world doesn’t have some unspecified “objective existence” or “objective reality” that isn’t had by the hypothetical logical system that I describe.
…and that’s why assert only that an assumption of that “objective reality” or “objective existence” of this physical world is an assumption of a brute-fact.
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But:
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It’s important to distinguish between an assumption implied by the assertion of a metaphysics (I’m not asserting one), as opposed to an assumption that a metaphysics itself makes or needs, or a brute-fact that it entails.
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Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism doesn’t have or need any assumption or brute fact.
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It has, as a premise, that there are abstract-implications, in the limited sense that they can be mention and referred to. I don’t make, and my metaphysical proposal doesn’t need, any assumption that the abstract-implications, or the complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications, or anything in the describable-realm, is “objectively-real” or “objectively existent”, whatever that would mean.
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…or that a complex system of inter-referring abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is real or existent in any context other than its own inter-referring context.
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I merely ask:
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1. What reason there is to believe that our physical world is other than such a system.
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2. …and, if you say that our physical world is “objectively-existent” &/or “objectively-real”, then what do you mean by that (…in a way that the hypothetical logical system that I propose isn’t those things)?
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3. …and in what context you want or believe this physical world to be real and existent, other than its own context and that of our lives.
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4. What physics experiment can a Materialist cite that establishes that the physical world is other than the system that I’ve described?
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5. What assumption do you think is needed by the metaphysics that I’ve been proposing? …and what brute-fact do you think that it entails…when it doesn’t claim the “existence” (whatever that would mean) of its abstract-implications, or anything else describable?
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[end of those 5 questions]
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None of the Materialist critics of my metaphysical proposal have answered those questions. Their silence has been conspicuous, to say the least.
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When I ask those questions, that’s when the discussion always ends. …angrily on the part of the Materialist.
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I don’t assert that Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism is true. …only that alternatives to it, such as Materialism, unparsimoniously depend on assumptions and brute-facts.
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I assert that the metaphysics that I propose, Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism, is the parsimonious metaphysics.
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Michael Ossipoff
Exactly. Hypothetical things.
...with abstract-implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. There's no reason to believe that this phyisical world, and inf fact the whole describable world, consist of more.
Of course, to assert that that's all there describably is,, or to assert any metaphysics, would be to ask people to accept an assumption. It can't be proven, and no metaphysics can be proven.
But a metaphysics built on abstract-facts, such as abstract implications, is the unparsimonious metaphiysics, because it doesn't assume or claim the "existence" (whatever that would mean) of anything describable. There's no need for those abstract implications, and any inter-referring system of them, and this physical world, to be real or existent in any context other than their own.
Michael Ossipoff
Claiming no expertise here, but will bumble forward anyway...
Facts seem a very small business. Electro-chemical patterns in the minds of a single species on one planet in one of billions of galaxies. I'm not sure why we would call the world the "totality of facts", but it's quite likely I don't understand what's being discussed.
If I understand, and I probably don't, there seems to be some general agreement that things are an illusion created by the human mind. Given that, by this theory, separate things don't actually exist anywhere but in our minds, again seems a very small business, and not "the world".
I'm not sure what is meant by "the world" but, to me, there is a single unified reality and all apparent divisions contained within are a property of the observer and not what is being observed.
Count me out of that general agreement. ;-)
How would those abstractions be undescribable? And do you mean this system would be the one where the universe is defined as the totality of its things or facts?
They wouldn't.
Just its facts. Abstract implications in particular.
I propose that all that this physical universe consists of, is the setting of your hypothetical life-experience-story, which is a complex system of inter-referring abstract facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
That universe, and your life, are real enough in their own contexts. In what other context would you like or believe them to be real &/or existent (whatever that would mean)?
I suggest that you're in a life because you're the protagonist in a hypothetical life-experience-story (as described in the paragraph before this one).
What you can be sure of is your experience. All you know about anything else is from your experience.
Your life is hypothetical. It starts with: "I'd have the experiences that I need or want if...". And then away it goes--your hypothetical life-experience-story consisting of a story of "If", set in a world of "If".
Obviously the one requirement of your hypothetical life-experience-story is consistency. ...because there are no such things as mutually-inconsistent facts...even abstract ones.. That brings logic, and a system of mutually-consistent abstract-implications, into your experience of your "physical" surroundings.
Michael Ossipoff
Abstractions are moot. Facts remain supreme.
That was my question earlier. What came first, the facts or the objects?
Both. You can't discern facts without objects and the other way around.