Does science make ontological or epistemological claims?
I understand an ontological claim to mean, roughly, a claim about what exists in and of itself. I understand an epistemological claim to mean a claim about whether or not one is justified to have a particular doxastic attitude (belief, disbelief, degree of belief, suspension of judgement, etc) toward a particular proposition.
Classical physics seems to make ontological claims, or claims of the form “a particular set of particles exist and move about through space-time in a particular way”. However we know that classical physics is incomplete in that it does not accurately describe reality at very small scales.
Quantum mechanics seems to make claims of the form (and please further my insight if I’m wrong) “if some particular measurement is taken, there is some particular probability that the value measured will be...” Heisenberg said of quantum physics “The notion of the objective existence of the elementary particles has evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of the particles but rather our knowledge of that behavior.” In light of this, one of my questions is whether or not quantum mechanics is an ontological theory or an epistemological theory.
Of additional relevance is the idea that science cannot reveal the underlying, fundamental nature of reality, but only its (mathematically describable?) structural relationships. I found this in Baggott’s book Farewell to Reality. I think I may have also seen referenced in a Chalmers paper. If you have any insight on these topics I would be very grateful to hear it.
Classical physics seems to make ontological claims, or claims of the form “a particular set of particles exist and move about through space-time in a particular way”. However we know that classical physics is incomplete in that it does not accurately describe reality at very small scales.
Quantum mechanics seems to make claims of the form (and please further my insight if I’m wrong) “if some particular measurement is taken, there is some particular probability that the value measured will be...” Heisenberg said of quantum physics “The notion of the objective existence of the elementary particles has evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of the particles but rather our knowledge of that behavior.” In light of this, one of my questions is whether or not quantum mechanics is an ontological theory or an epistemological theory.
Of additional relevance is the idea that science cannot reveal the underlying, fundamental nature of reality, but only its (mathematically describable?) structural relationships. I found this in Baggott’s book Farewell to Reality. I think I may have also seen referenced in a Chalmers paper. If you have any insight on these topics I would be very grateful to hear it.
Comments (52)
I think it’s overall safe to say that quantum physics casts doubt on scientific realism. But scientific realism itself is, historically, a relatively recent construct. Of course, Newton believed that science could elucidate the fundamental underlying laws of matter, but at the same time there was still a general presumption that those laws were the product of a guiding intelligence in his day. The idea that the visible world could be understood in its own terms without reference to the ‘invisible domain’ of Platonic forms and divine laws was to come later.
A crucial point in all of this, is the division by Galileo et al of nature into those elements which could be described precisely in terms of physics - mass, velocity, and so on - and the so-called ‘secondary qualities’ which were ascribed to the domain of the mind.
Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos pp. 35-36
This division has been remarkably successful in many respects but has been called into question by developments in physics itself, in particular the ‘measurement problem’ which remains the outstanding philosophical problem thrown up by quantum mechanics. And it remains an open question, which the above-mentioned books are describing or in some cases trying to rationalise.
I think that you misinterpret physics, to state that it makes ontological claims rather than epistemological, according to your definitions. Physics takes fundamental assumptions, premises, theories and hypotheses, like Newton's laws, and the theory of relativity, and demonstrates with evidence whether one is or is not justified in believing these fundamental principles.
Physics does not make claims about what exists in and of itself (ontological claims). Any claims that it makes of the sort "what is the case", or "what will occur" are restricted, qualified to "what is the case, or what will occur, if X principles, or premises are true". Following this, we can judge the truth or falsity of the fundamental principles according to their capacity to provide us with an accurate indication of "what is the case", or "what will occur". That is the scientific method.
Some people equate science (which is empirical/epistemological) with scientific realism (what is ontic). That said, a lot of scientists actually are scientific realists.
Mathematical models are descriptions of a system using mathematical concepts and language. As such they are, in the end, interpretations of reality. We tend to use the models that are most useful to us.
I hold the view that science is more of a method than something else. Hence it's not actually something ontological or epistemological. Those are more philosophical questions. If we look at the "scientific method" in a more general way, the method is also used in many non-mathematical subjects, like history to give one example. Yet if math isn't so useful (as historical events are quite unique), we still have to make interpretations and models to explain events.
I suppose the conversation collapses into an argument over scientific realism. Can any of you provide some sources to learn more about this debate? Also is it the case that the materialist/physicalist claim “All facts are grounded in physical facts” or “All that exists is the physical” is a scientific realist position?
I am interested in reconciling this discussion with the study of consciousness. For example Dennett has claimed an eliminative materialist model is correct “if materialism is true.” Does this committ to a scientific realist position?
What eliminative materialism eliminates is the reality of the subject as anything other than the output of a complex of inter-connected but, in reality, unconscious cellular processes. Thomas Nagel says in his review of Dennett's most recent book:
(Also reviewed by David Bentley Hart in The New Atlantis.)
In terms of the larger debate, Thomas Nagel himself published a very controversial criticism of 'neo-Darwinian materialism' titled Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False, 2012 - the title doesn't pull any punches. There's a NY Times column by him here, and a sympathetic review of the book and the hostile responses to it here. It is a pretty clear-eyed analysis in my view, by a philosopher who explicitly rejects any religious interpretation.
Books about philosophy of science and quantum mechanics - I thought Manjit Kumar's Quantum was very good, along with David Lindley's Uncertainty: The Battle for the Soul of Science.
There was a kind of mystical and idealist tendency amongst some of the pioneers of quantum physics, but that by and large fell by the wayside when the focus of physics switched from Europe to America after WWII. For a summary of that, have a look at Quantum Mysticism: Gone but not Forgotten. Of the more recent physicists to write on it from an explicitly idealist perspective, Bernard D'Espagnat (died 2015) is notable. See his Templeton Prize acceptance speech, What we call reality is just a state of mind.
Seems to me the focus of the debate has now moved to the reality of otherwise of the 'many-worlds interpretation' and the separate debate on whether string theory and the so-called 'multiverse' amount to a scientific theory or not. I don't see that debate being resolved anytime soon.
It seems that science in general makes no commitment to what really exists. Science deals in models, which only need to be good enough for the job. And if point masses or ideal fluids or spherical cows do the job in a given context, so much the better.
Now, what about epistemology? Does science have anything to say about ways of acquiring knowledge, and whether or not we are justified in believing something? The scientific method, in its general outlines, is basically an empiricist epistemology. If we are talking about science in general, rather than specific theories and discoveries, then we are mostly talking about epistemology. And the epistemological discussion doesn't stop at the general principles; it can get very specific, very detailed, and sometimes even very controversial (take, for instance, arguments over the use of different statistical methods in cladistics).
Quoting Bearden
This can be read either as an operationalization of the theory, which you can similarly do with classical mechanics or any other theory, or a particular philosophical interpretation of the theory (as in the following quote from Heisenberg). While individual scientists and philosophers of science will have different takes on metaphysics and ontology, I don't think they can be generalized to anything very specific, if we are talking about science in general.
As in many discussions of this sort, you pose a question about the philosophy of science, and then seamlessly slip into discussing physics (and only physics). Not all science is as abstract or heavily mathematized as is physics. Does, paleontology, for instance, make ontological claims? I would say almost certainly so: theories in that field postulate the existence of long-dead creatures who lived and interacted in a world every bit as "real" as ours.
I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is.
Quoting Arkady
You are conflating what it means to exist, with what it means to say that something has existed. The paleontologist makes no ontological claims (claims about what it means to exist). If it claims that certain things "existed", it assumes an ontological meaning of "exists" as a given, or as taken for granted.
No: my understanding of the use of the term "ontological" is in line with the very first sentence of the OP:
"I understand an ontological claim to mean, roughly, a claim about what exists in and of itself."
Paleontologists make claims about what exists (or did exist, anyway), not on the nature of the existence itself, hence they make ontological claims.
Do you recognize the difference between exists (present), and existed (past)? To take presently existing evidence, and make claims about what existed requires temporal theory. Paleontology relies on such theory, just like physics and some other sciences rely on theories which relate present to future, to make predictions. These principles are not produced by paleontology, they are produced by ontology. So paleontology does not make ontological claims when it talks about what existed, just like physics does not make ontological claims when it predicts what will occur, they rely on an ontology which relates past, present, and future into some sort of continuous temporal existence.
Whether or not paleontological theories rely on a "temporal theory", they make claims about what does, or at least what has existed, ergo, they make ontological claims.
— Relativist
I think the issue here is that we must admit to, or assume, that space is real, in order to justify our measurements of length, distance, etc.. How we model space (geometry) may vary. This variance in geometrical models indicates that we don't really understand what space is.[/quote]
But we don't have to commit to the existence of quantum fields, just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions.
That's right, you don't have to commit to mathematical realism (Platonism), just because the math of quantum field theory makes good predictions. However, you ought to consider that there is a reason why mathematics is so useful in making predictions. Wouldn't you say that the reason for this is that mathematics is based in something real?
I was referring to scientific realism, and this does not entail platonism.
Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism.
"Mathematical fields are mathematics, no different in principle to "2+2=4". If you think that this refers to something real then you believe in platonic realism"
Right, and that's not entailed by scientific realism. Scientific realists can be physicalist. A physicalist rejects platonism, treating mathematics as purely descriptive. The abstraction "2" does not exist, rather there are objects having the property "two-ness". Physics formulae describe complex physical relations between objects.
So far as I understand it, scientific theories consist solely of models which are used to make predictions about the world. These predictions are then tested in experiments which would either confirm or falsify them. However, none of these models are, strictly speaking, tied to any particular sort of ontological view of the world in and of themselves. A good example of this would be with Quantum Mechanics and the many, many, different ontological interpretations that are often attached to the theory (though you'll also find the same sort of situation in other theories like Relativity to a lesser extent), some of which treat the world as indeterministic, and others as a multiverse, to name a couple. In that sense, they have no relevance to matters of ontology or epistemology. Any attempt to attach an ontological view to a scientific theory would thus be going beyond the model itself and into the realm of philosophy.
An object cannot have the property of "two-ness", because that requires two objects. Therefore "two-ness" is a relation between objects. I know that physics formulae are more complicated than "two-ness", but in the fundamental sense of describing relations between objects, how is there a difference? So if the relations described by physics are "physical relations", why is not two-ness a physical relation?
I think what's particularly interesting is the derivation from the present participle of the verb, to be, which is, as the passage notes, 'I am'.
Also of note is the use of the term in information sciences, namely:
The reason I mention this, is that I think there's a legitimate distinction to be made between the study of what exists and the study of the nature of being. The question, 'what kind of things exist' is, I think, a straightforward question of natural philosophy. But questions about 'the nature of being' (as for example in the writing of Heidegger) is a different kind of question. Likewise, questions about (for instance) the reality of the probability wave in quantum physics are metaphysical or ontological questions; as is well-known, it is not necessary to address such questions in order to successfully employ the theory, but the question is such that it has engendered considerable debate and speculation regarding the interpretation or meaning of quantum physics.
An oxygen molecule has two-ness. Two-ness is the relation of the parts to the whole. But groups are also things.
A family of 7 black swans is a thing (a state of affairs). 7 is a relation between one swan and the family. A group of 7 swans has a property in common with a group of 7 marbles: the universal "7".
7 exists, not in a platonic realm, but in states of affairs composed of 7 objects.
That's doubtful. So let's take this proposition, that a group is a thing, and see if we can validate it's truth. We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. Therefore it is impossible that "2" is a unity, one thing, without contradicting the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things. Therefore, that a group is a thing is impossible because it is contradictory.
Because of this contradiction, I suggest that we consider that the relation of the parts to a whole is something other than as a group. Furthermore, we ought to assume that numbers like "2', "3", "4', etc., refer to something other than a group, because this would result in that same contradiction.
If we take a whole, and designate it as an object, then we cannot designate its parts as objects as well, without creating this contradiction. By designating the parts as objects, we assign to them a form of independence, which negates what is necessary of them in order to be the parts of a whole. This independence annihilates the whole, rendering the parts as wholes, as does the act of division. So either the original unity is the whole (the object), or the parts are the wholes (objects), but it is impossible that both, at the same time, are wholes (objects).
Now when we take these numbers, "2", "3", "4", etc., in mathematics, we assume that they signify a whole, we do not assume that they signify groups of individual things. Each of these units, objects, "2", "3", "4', etc., have various rules about how they may be multiplied, divided, and other functions, in relation to other numbers. So "2" does not signify "two-ness" in mathematics, because "two-ness" refers to the concept of two distinct objects, whereas "2" in mathematics refers to one object with many functions.
Quoting Relativist
So here you have given an example of that condition. Let's say that the family is an object. We can describe this object as a group of black swans which have a particular relationship to each other, validating the notion of "family", and this relation validates the claim that there is an object called "the family". The group of seven marbles on the other hand has no such validating principle, it is not an object. You have described it as seven distinct and independent objects, and any claim that it is an object is arbitrary and unsupported. You need principles, spatial relations, whatever, whereby you designate them as "a group".
Now the family, as an object has specific boundaries, which are somewhat arbitrary and unsupported in the description of your example. But let's talk about the individuals of the family now. Let's assume that each of the seven swans are objects. From this perspective we have seven objects, not one object (the family). If we want to make these seven objects into one object (a family) we need to establish some relational principles. The claim of "a group of marbles" was arbitrary and unsupported, it required some principles of relations to establish the reality of "a group". Here, we require some relational principles to establish the reality of "the family".
Here's the key point, so please pay attention. When we describe the seven swans as having familiar relations, those familiar relations are principal, or essential to the descriptions of the individuals. Therefore we are not describing the so-called individuals as individuals, we are describing them as members of a group, as parts of a whole. They cannot be understood as wholes, individuals, or objects, themselves, because the very description of them, which makes them members of a whole, negates the description of them which makes them independent, individual objects. Either we describe the swans as individual objects, or we describe them as parts of a whole (an object, the family), but we cannot do both at the same time without contradiction.
We're talking past each other due to using different semantics. I'll be more precise. I'm basically presenting the physicalist ontology developed by D.M. Armstrong (see this).
In Armstrong's ontology, everything that exists is a State of Affairs (which I've been referring to as a "thing"). A SOA has 3 types of constituents: a (thin) particular, properties, relations. None of the constituents exist independently of states of affairs. A SOA is a (thick) particular. ("thin" refers to the abstract consideration of that constituent of a SOA that is neither a relation nor a property; "thick" particular equates to a SOA, and "thick" is usually omitted).
Anything that exists is a state of affairs, and that includes the simplest objects (the "atomic states of affairs") and complex objects (higher order [molecular] states of affairs and conjunctions of states of affairs). If we treat the standard model of particle physics as describing the most fundamental objects of existence, then the atomic SOAs are those particles (the various quarks, leptons, etc). Even these fundamental ontic objects have properties (electric charge, color charge, spin, mass...).
A neutron is thus a second order SOA composed of those ASAs, while an atom is a third order SOA composed of neutrons, protons and electrons. The properties of the higher order SOAs are determined by the properties of their constituents (i.e. Armstrong is a reductionist).
A gaggle of 7 geese is a state of affairs as well - it has properties (such as mass, volume of air they displace,...).
Armstrong accounts for universals: they are multiply instantiated properties and relations. Multiple objects can have a -1 electric charge (e.g. each electron that exists), so "-1 electric charge" is a universal. Similarly, multiple states of affairs can have the property of being a conjunction of 7 lower order states of affairs. "7" is the property they have in common, and this is a universal.
Your statement, "We have "2", and we claim that it is a thing, a unity, one. In doing this, we deny the meaning of "2", that it refers to two distinct things, not one entity. " has no apparent meaning in this ontology. A state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing - that would imply that only atomic states of affairs exist.
I agree than an individual swan is not identical with the group to which it belongs. Each swan is a constituent of the state of affairs that is the group of swans. We can consider the mathematical relation that exists between one swan constituent and the group. This doesn't entail equating the two states of affairs as you seem to be inferring. Simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist.
You don't have to accept the ontology, but at least understand that it comprises a coherent physicalist ontology - and Armstrong explicitly rejects Platonism. If it SEEMS incoherent to you, it's due to the brevity of my discussion.
This seems very confused, and unrealistic. A molecular state of affairs would also contain atomic states of affairs. So atomic states of affairs would have dual existence. And if we go to larger states of affairs and smaller states of affairs, we could get triple, quadruple, and so on existences. How could a simple thing, a fundamental particle have numerous existences at the same time, being involved in numerous SOAs? Do you see what I mean? If an SOA is an object, then a fundamental SOA exists as such, and also exists as an atomic SOA, and as a molecular SOA, and so on all at the same time. Therefore a single object has numerous existences all at the same time. Isn't that contradiction, to say that a single object has multiple existences at the same time?
Quoting Relativist
See where the contradiction lies? You say "a state of affairs (a "thing") is not necessarily one thing". The problem is that logically,a thing is necessarily one thing. If it is more than one thing, then it is "things" plural. But you are claiming that a thing is more than one thing. And this of course, is contradictory.
Quoting Relativist
The point I was making is that if you describe a specific swan as a member of, or part of a group, then the object here is the group, and the individual swan is attributed to that group, as a property of that group. Therefore the individual swan is not an object in this description, it is a property of an object. If you make the swan the object, and try to claim that being a member of this group is a property of that swan, you lose the necessity required to make that swan part of the group. Any property that the swan has will not necessitate it being the part of a group until you allow that the group itself is an object. Then, and only then, can the individual swan be part of this group. But it is so by being a property of this group, not vise versa.
You can say "simultaneously, the single swan exists and the group of swans exist", as you do, just like you can say that simultaneously the sky exists and the blue of the sky exists, one is the object and the other the property. But you cannot say that they both exist simultaneously as objects. Either the single swan is your object, or the group of swans is the object and the single is a member (property) of this object. Likewise, either we are concerned with "2" as an object, or we are concerned with the meaning of "2". If the meaning of "2" is our concern, then we are necessarily talking about two distinct objects. But if "2" as an object is our concern, then we are talking about one object. We cannot claim both as this is contradictory, to say that one object is two objects. This is the nature of unity, it necessarily negates the identity of the parts as individual objects, giving them a completely different identity, as a part rather than as a whole. An object is a whole.
Quoting Relativist
It is not coherent, because it does not get beyond the problem of contradiction which I referred to, because it is inferred that one object is simultaneously a multitude of objects..
This seems to be your fundamental error:
"This seems very confused, and unrealistic. A molecular state of affairs would also contain atomic states of affairs. So atomic states of affairs would have dual existence."
Then you are aren't understanding, because it does not entail this at all. Oxygen molecules exist, and so do each of the oxygen atoms that comprise the molecule. This is not "dual existence" - it is simply a consistent mereological account.
If you want to try to understand Armstrong's ontology, you have to let go of your current ontological commitments and accept his account. Consider it a stipulation that everything that exists is a state of affairs. Every object of experience (e.g. your computer, your chair, yourself) is a state of affairs. Each is composed of smaller parts, but each part is also a state of affairs. It's states of affairs all the way down, but stopping at the atomic states of affairs. Once you understand it, you could perhaps try to find something incoherent - but you'll never understand it if you just dismiss the basics because it doesn't fit your preconceived model of reality.
This is inconsistent with the account you gave. According to that account, what exists, as "objects" are states of affairs. And accordingly, if the same oxygen atom is involved in an atomic state of affairs, and also a molecular state of affairs at the same time, it has a dual existence, existing in two distinct objects at the same time. Therefore an oxygen atom has multiple existences, existing in many states of affairs (objects) at the same time.
Quoting Relativist
As I said, I dismiss it because it's quite clearly contradictory, just like saying that "2" refers to two distinct objects, and one object (the number 2) at the same time.
Do you want to try and understand it, or are you hell bent on finding some reason to dismiss it? I don't mind spending time explaining it to you, but not if you're going to be combative. David Armstrong was a well-respected Australian metaphysician, not a crackpot whose framework is a house of cards that falls with a faint breath.
Whereas, there are very many mathematical physicists who are indeed Platonist of some variety, with some of them adopting such views because of the discoveries associated with quantum mechanics in the 1920’s. Typical of those is Werner Heisenberg, whose Physics and Philosophy argues for a broadly Platonist interpretive framework for modern physics.
I think the decisive argument against Armstrong’s type of naturalism, is the transcendental nature of mathematics itself. As is declared in the SEP article, Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics:
Consequently, there have been elaborate arguments developed about ‘the indispensability of mathematics’ [e.g. here) which attempt to reconcile this rather inconvenient truth with the naturalism that indeed depends on mathematics for its basic methodology. The fact that such an argument has to be made in the first place speaks volumes in my opinion.
His materialist theory of mind was only a component of his comprehensive metaphysics. Indeed it "stands or falls" with materialism - his comprehensive metaphysics aims to show that materialist metaphysics is coherent.
Not really. It's consistent with atomism, but it's also consistent with quantum field theory.
Since when did physicists become good at metaphysics? A Platonic interpretation of mathematics is a consequence of the way it's conceptualized - it's an intellectual convenience.
How does the platonic entity "6" become get involved in the building of a collection of 6 objects, from smaller collections? Physicalist account: Collections having the property 3 can be merged into a collection having property 6. The 3 (or 6) property is inherent in the states of affairs; the 6 property is necessitated by two collections with property 3.
Some platonist accounts treat equations (which are abstract objects) as causally efficacious. That seems problematic. Causal efficacy is more easily understood by physicalist account.
Mathematics is essential to understanding much of the world (i.e. physics), but that doesn't change under physicalism. Physicalism just implies that the things that exist stand in relation to one another in ways that are describable mathematically. It seems more parsimonious than to think equations exist apart from the physical things they describe. Which brings up another of set of Armstrong's contributions: his theory of universals and his theory of natural law.
BTW, I'm not claiming Armstrong's metaphysics is necessarily true. I'm just claiming it's coherent and sufficiently complete in its accounts.
The problem here, as I see it, is treating a number - 6, in this case - as ‘an entity’ in the same sense that an object is an entity. However, a number is not an entity in the sense that the objects are; its reality is purely intellectual or noetic. But it can be said to be an object in a metaphorical sense, i.e. an 'intelligible object'.
But I think it’s a widespread mistake to mis-conceptualise the notion of the ‘domain of numbers’ as a literal ethereal domain or place, or of numbers as existing in the sense that phenomena exist. This mistake arises because the modern attitude is almost exclusively, but unconsciously, oriented towards the objective domain. Instead, number (and the like) has to be understood in terms of them being the organising principles of the mind. So to count and to abstract requires the ability to grasp numerical, syntactical and logical relationships; that is the only domain in which numbers ‘exist’. And I use the quotations deliberately, because numbers don’t exist in any sense other than as operations of thought, or relations of ideas. Yet at the same time the ability to grasp those ideas is fundamental to science itself.
Nowadays it is widely assumed that evolutionary science and neurobiology have an in-principle grasp of how the brain might do this; indeed a naturalistic account must provide such an account. But I argue that there's a very deep problem of recursion in any naturalistic account, as we must already be able to count and to reason in order to even begin to develop such an account. That is the sense in which number (and the like) transcends a strictly empiricist account; as the grasp of number is required to organise and make sense of experience, so in that sense must always precede the empiricist explanation (which is essentially a Kantian argument).
Quoting Relativist
I think it's more the case that so-called natural or scientific laws again belong to a different order, to that of the phenomena which they explain. I mean, for example, if you look at the Laws of Motion, they are clearly efficacious within the very wide range in which they apply. So science can use those laws to explain all manner of phenomena. But I don't think science actually explains the laws themselves; however many people seem to think it does. That is the subject of Wittgenstein's aphorism, 'the whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are explanations of nature' (TLP 6.371).
So again, the platonist attitude is that such laws pertain to a different level or mode than the domain of phenomena; that being the 'formal realm', although that is not an expression that is in wide circulation. They don't exist - in a sense, they 'subsist' or underlie and inform the phenomenal domain, although the sense in which they are real is difficult to express in the current lexicon of philosophy.
That's not done in Armstrong's metaphysics. Remember that what exists is a state of affairs. 6 doesn't exist distinct from a state of affairs that has the property "6" .
How about as an "abstraction?" That fits the bill. The only possible point of contention is how we consider abstractions. If we treat them as mental objects, produced by the way of abstraction, that's consistent with physicalism. When we start treating them as existing apart from minds, that's platonism.
I don't see the problem. The only "transcendence" I see is that universals exist, and relations between universals exist. This seems transcendent, but doesn't really entail true transcendent existence. We could explore this further.
Agreed, and that's where metaphysics comes in. A lot of anti-physicalist analysis just counters the Humean tradition. The modern tradition (exemplified by Armstrong, Tooley, and Sosa) isn't subject to those problems.
The attitude you express seems consistent with physicalism. We kind of pretend "4" and equations exist, but they don't ACTUALLY exist apart from the states of affairs in which they are instantiated.
My argument is that Armstrong's, as described by you, is an incoherent form of mereology. Instead of producing an acceptable explanation of the relations between part and whole, it provides a description which does nothing to resolve the contradiction involved with saying that a whole exists and its parts exist, simultaneously. To give existence to the individual parts requires dividing the whole, and this annihilates the unity which makes it a whole.
An oxygen molecule does not consist of two distinct oxygen atoms, because of the way that the atoms are bonded with electron sharing. The atoms within a molecule are not distinct, that's what a molecule is. So either there is two separate oxygen atoms, or there is an oxygen molecule, but there is not both at the same time. The description of an oxygen molecule is not the same as the description of two independent oxygen atoms, so the existence of an oxygen molecule is not the same as the existence of two oxygen atoms.
The way I express it is that the natural numbers (and the like) are the same for anyone who can count - hence, they exist apart from minds - but they can only be grasped by intelligence that is capable of counting. So they're real, but intelligible - hence, 'intelligible objects'. That is why Armstrong has to reject real abstractions - because if they're real, then his philosophy fails. I'm arguing they are real, and that it does fail, because it fails to account for them.
As Jacques Maritain explains:
So much of modern thinking is like this. It doesn't even understand itself! It is what physicalism is doing - it draws on the relationships of ideas, which are not themselves physical, to even establish what is 'physical'! And then it says - tah dah! - physical. What we're actually doing is still incorporating the traditionalist understanding of the Platonic intelligible forms, without realising, and then denying, that this is what is happening.
That is why strictly physicalist philosophies of mind, like Dennett's, must deny that there actually is any mind. The very existence of mind defeats their philosophy. (Which is why Dennett's critics called his first book 'Consciousness Ignored'.)
Quoting Relativist
Right!
Quoting Relativist
The laws of motion, Pythagoras' theorem, and so on, are discovered. They're not simply mental conventions or projections, they enable us to know things that we otherwise wouldn't be able to. And we can be wrong about them, or fail to understand them (as I mostly do.) In which case, we're failing to understand something real.
Incoherent. Existence isn't "given". Consideration of parts doesn't entail dividing it. The universe exists. Does that preclude YOU existing? The universe has parts, and you are one of them.
I see that you don't actually want to understand, so we're done.
[Quote=Wayfarer]The way I express it is that the natural numbers (and the like) are the same for anyone who can count - hence, they exist apart from minds [/quote]
What exists apart from minds are the properties "1", "2", "3",... but that doesn't imply they exist detached from the states of affairs that have these properties. 7 marbles exist, 7 forks exist, and we can abstract out the property "7" from each of these states of affairs. There's a logical relation between the abstracted properties of "7" and "4", but that doesn't entail the existence of numbers except as mental entities.
3+4=7 because any state of affairs with property "3" when combined with a state of affairs with property "4" will necessarily result in a state of affairs with property "7". This fact does not depend on 3, 4, and 7 existing independent of states of affairs. It just means properties can have relations to other properties, and these relations obtain irrespective of which states of affairs they are instantiated in.
[Quote]That is why strictly physicalist philosophies of mind, like Dennett's, must deny that there actually is any mind. The very existence of mind defeats their philosophy. [/quote]
Physicalist theory of mind needn't deny the existence of mind. Certainly Armstrong didn't, nor do Jaegwon Kim and Michael Tye.
Reason is easy to reconcile with physicalism: computers can be programmed to reason. Physicalist theory of mind is not without problem (in particular: consciousness) but every theory of mind has problems.
The principle of parsimony applies to ontology: we should assume no more types of existent than necessary to account for that which we intuitively know exists, and which we infer exists. Alleged platonic entities are explainable as constituents of states of affairs, so there's no good reason to claim they actually exist independent of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated. We shouldn't be fooled by our intellectual powers of abstraction.
Which abstraction will be true in all possible worlds. Impressive, eh?
Quoting Relativist
I've just be re-reading Manjit Kumar's book Quantum, which I mentioned above, and I noted that when Bohr came up with the equation which describes the orbits of electrons, one of the factors is always an integer. Mathematical qualities seem deeply implicated in the structures of physics.
The constituents of pure mathematics have nothing to do with 'states of affairs', but by extrapolating on the basis of mathematics, physicists have been able to predict 'states of affairs' which otherwise could never have been known (such as Dirac's discovery of anti-matter which literally 'fell out of the equations').
And were you not able to count or to reason, then you wouldn't know if there were 7 or 4 of anything, nor that these were represented in any 'state of affairs'. Again, you're using, or rather, looking through the very faculty which you're purporting to explain, to create the explanation!
Quoting Relativist
But they all say that the mind can only be understood in terms of neurobiology, which amounts to almost the same. Sure the 'eliminativists' are more apparently radical, but all materialism must deny the primacy of mind - that's what makes them materialist, after all!
Quoting Relativist
Computers are instruments of the human mind. They can indeed be programmed to emulate the processes of logic - that is fundamental to computation, after all - but they're artifacts.
"Esixtence" is a word. It is assigned to things, we say that they exist. Therefore existence is given. Whenever we say that this or that exists, we give existence to that thing. My whole argument has been concerning the way we apprehend things. To say that existence is not given is what is incoherent.
We apprehend "2" as signifying one object, the number two, or we apprehend it as signifying two objects, but both at the same time is contradictory. We apprehend one family of swans as an object, or we apprehend seven individual swans as objects, but both at the same time is contradictory. To say that both, the one unity, and the multitude of individual parts, "exists" at the same time would require different definitions of "exists". Therefore the contradiction can only be avoided through equivocation.
Quoting Relativist
Right, now you're starting to catch on. To consider a part as a part is to recognize the necessity of the whole. To consider the part as an independently existing object is to deny the whole of which the part is a part of, such that the part is not actually a part in this consideration. To call it a "part" is contradictory.
Therefore a part cannot be considered to be an independently existing object, It is dependent on the whole for its existence. It is given existence from the whole.
It would be overstatement to say the mind can only be understood in terms of X, for x=physicalism OR dualism (OR any other theory of mind). Some aspects of mind are easier to account for under physicalism, others are easier to account for under dualism. Being easier to account for doesn't make it true.
[quote=Wayfarer]
computers can be programmed to reason. — Relativist
Computers are instruments of the human mind. They can indeed be programmed to emulate the processes of logic - that is fundamental to computation, after all - but they're artifacts.[/quote]
Are you arguing intelligent design? My point is that the mental process can be accounted for under physicalism. The evolutionary development of a mind is another matter, but I don't see why that would be a problem. Traits that have a survival value are consistent with natural selection.
You seem to be defending your metaphysical perspective. I was not challenging the (assumed) fact that it is coherent. I was challenging the notion that it's the only metaphysical framework that is coherent and presumably complete. I tried to do that by describing Armstrong's framework, and you simply rejected it based on your own ontological commitments. Believe whatever ontology you like, but if you are convinced your's is the only coherent one, or even that it's the best, then you're fooling yourself if you haven't seriously explored alternatives.
I'm not arguing for intelligent design if it amounts to any form of biblical literalism.
I am saying that the logic, mathematics, and the like, are of a different order to the physical and can't be derived from it. You can't get from knowledge of physics, to the underlying laws of logic or maths, and indeed you must already grasp logic and maths to some extent to even begin to understand physics. It is nowadays simply assumed that science provides, or will provide, an in-principle grasp of the nature of logic, reason and number, but I dispute that.
Describing rational thought in terms of survival value is the essence of 'biological reductionism'. Essentially what it says is that those very faculties which enable sapience - the distinguishing characteristic of the human - are on a continuum with claws or tentacles. But then on the other hand, whilst reducing every human trait to 'what works', it also removes any sense of there being a purpose for survival, other than propagation of the genome. It's sisyphean. So no, I'm not allied to intelligent design, but I'm equally dubious about the reigning neo-darwinian orthodoxy. Evolutionary biology is a biological theory, not a philosophy as such, but in our day it's a distinction that has been lost. (See It ain't Necessarily So, Antony Gottlieb.)
That's epistemology, and we can account for the epistemology with either ontology, and platonism entails reifying epistemological concepts.
"whilst reducing every human trait to 'what works', it also removes any sense of there being a purpose for survival, other than propagation of the genome"
It has the explanatory scope needed. Your rejection seems based on affirming the consequent. The facts are consistent with, but do not entail, a teleological goal.
But it doesn’t. That is what I’m trying (and obviously failing) to explain. The point I am trying to make is that number is real in a different way to objects of experience. But in modern philosophy, there are no ‘modes of existence’ - things are either said to exist or not. What I’m arguing - what mathematical platonism generally argues - is that number is real, but not phenomenal:
Rebecca Goldstein, Godel and the Nature of Mathematical Truth.
What I’s saying is that because our culture has become so completely oriented to the objective domain, we’ve lost the ability to understand that dimension of reality. This is something that happened over the course of history, and now the way we think is a consequence of ‘history being wiitten by the victors’.
As for evolutionary biology and philosophy, this has been debated up hill and down dale on this an many other forums. Suffice to say that I have come to doubt the explanatory efficacy of biological evolution to account for those human traits which transcend biology - which, interestingly, is just the kind of argument that Alfred Russel Wallace used in his essay, Darwinism Applied to Man, when he announced his divergences from Darwin on this very point.
Don't you remember? I rejected Armstrong's framework because it is contradictory. It allows that a single thing is also a plurality of things. That's contradictory, a thing is one and many at the same time. You may refer to this as an "ontological commitment" if you like, but don't you think that philosophers in general ought to adhere to the law of non-contradiction as an ontological commitment, if adhering to the law of non-contradiction is actually an ontological commitment? In any case, are suggesting that we ought to let the law of non-contradiction be violated?
Here's the quote again:Quoting Relativist
It is impossible that, a single thing, an entity, can be a multiplicity of things, or entities, by reason of contradiction. If we allow that the identified thing is a multiplicity of things, then the law of identity becomes useless and logic is futile. Therefore, as an ontological principle, we need to allow for an existential difference between a whole and its parts, to avoid this contradiction.