ShawnOctober 15, 2018 at 23:0711700 views222 comments
A seemingly simple yet deadly complex question.
How do facts obtain?
Comments (222)
Michael OssipoffOctober 15, 2018 at 23:47#2206480 likes
Logical facts about one proposition implying another obtain lexicographically and (it seems to me, and so I'll suggest it) tautologically.
An example is the fact: "There is no proposition that is both true and false."
...which means: "A proposition that's not true isn't true."
...or "If a proposition isn't true, then it isn't true."
...which is an obvious tautology.
In one earlier argument in an earlier thread, someone said that all (true) theorems* are tautologies, because they all merely show that one thing implies something else--means something else, as is the case with obvious tautological syllogisms like my Slitheytoves syllogism example.
*A true theorem is an implication whose antecedent consists, at least in part, of a set of mathematical axioms.
So the obtaining of an abstract logical implication is there, intrinsic in the implication itself, because one fact [the consequent] is there in another fact [the antecedent]
But yes, of course that's really a simplification, because often the implication of a consequent is by a chain of, or inter-related, inter-referring system of, separate implications. But that doesn't change the intrinsic truism-nature of the obtaining of an abstract fact or system of them.
So there isn't a metaphysical problem about the meaning of, or the how of, the obtaining of abstract facts.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2018 at 01:54#2206580 likes
That framework presupposes that a thing is not a fact unless and/or until it somehow gains it's status of being so(unless, and/or until it obtains).
What is the thing that has yet to have become a fact... beforehand?
creativesoulOctober 16, 2018 at 02:11#2206600 likes
I may be completely mistaken, for I do not find the notion of facts obtaining to be very helpful...
However, it seems to me that statements obtain truth(and thus become fact) if and only if they correspond to reality/events/states of affairs/the ay things are/were.
Reply to creativesoul There are contingent facts, i.e., a certain state-of-affairs that does not exist now, but may exist in the proper setting. For example, there is no mug on my coffee table at the present moment, but now there is, so the fact obtained based on me putting the mug on the table, among other things. There are a whole range of facts from physical facts, metaphysical facts, to logical facts, and how they obtain varies, some are necessary features of reality, so they do not obtain in the same way, if they obtain at all.
By the way, one of the definitions of a fact is, a state-of-affairs which obtains.
There are a whole range of facts from physical facts, metaphysical facts, to logical facts, and how they obtain varies, some are a necessary feature of reality, so they do not obtain in the same way, if they obtain at all.
What does this mean? Is the status of facthood obtained by what?
What does this mean? Is the status of facthood obtained by what?
Facts are simply states-of-affairs, and there are different kinds of states, viz., brain states, physical states, abstract states, contingent states, and necessary states, to name a few. So a fact about my apartment would have to do with the arrangement of things, at least partly, in my apartment. How many bedrooms or bathrooms is a fact about the apartment. If we talk about a fact obtaining, then partly we're talking about the existence of those states-of-affairs. If the state exists, then the fact obtains.
creativesoulOctober 16, 2018 at 02:50#2206670 likes
There are contingent facts, i.e., a certain state-of-affairs that do not exist now, but may exist in the proper setting. For example, there is no mug on my coffee table at the present moment, but now there is, so the fact obtained based on me putting the mug on the table, among other things. There are a whole range of facts from physical facts, metaphysical facts, to logical facts, and how they obtain varies, some are a necessary feature of reality, so they do not obtain in the same way, if they obtain at all.
Well, possible worlds goes beyond what I'm saying, but that too is a possible contingent fact. However, there are some contingent facts that never obtain.
Why do they have to have something in common?
— Sam26
Because you're calling them all by the same name.
Do all games have something in common?
What difference does that make?
— creativesoul
You don't see the parallel?
I wouldn't equate calling states of affairs "fact" with calling whatever we arbitrarily choose to call a "game"... a "game".
All facts are states of affairs on this view. Some are positive. Some are negative. The positive one's exist. The negative ones do not.
What sense does it make to say that there is a state of affairs that does not exist?
That seems to me to be not taking into account the existential dependency of the purported 'state of affairs'. Positive ones do not necessarily require our talking about them. Negative ones exist in only that way.
Seems deeply wrong.
Some states of affairs are not existentially dependent upon our awareness and/or conception of them. Others most certainly are.
Seems to me that the only sensible conclusion is that these so-called 'facts' obtain existence.
What are they prior to existing?
Can these facts be true? How do they do that?
creativesoulOctober 16, 2018 at 05:32#2207260 likes
A negative fact(potential;logical possibility;etc) is one that has yet to have occurred and/or taken place(actualized, instantiated). That which has yet to have taken place has not yet taken place. All states of affairs are what has already happened and/or is happening. If nothing has happened, there is no state of affairs. No negative state of affairs has yet happened. Thus, it is not yet a state of affairs...
The synonyms of the term fact include reality, certainty, actuality, etc. From these, it is clear what we try to mean by fact. Much of my knowledge about the 'first principles of things' is borrowed from metaphysics, after which, I try to align it to logic. I'm not sure whether the study of fact is within the bounds of metaphysics or epistemology, however, I have a strict definition of it:- Fact is that which is; reality; the absolute; the undeniable; the indisputable, etc, etc, you get the drift. From such a definition, it means I do not consider something like a table or a human being as a fact. That is because, there was a time when they did not exist and they can also cease to exist at a future time. For me, to suppose that there is anything beyond a fact is illogical (or blasphemy to sound a bit biblical). So, that component, quality or character of existence which is imperishable and unchangeable, I call fact. What we refer to as 'something' in relation to another 'thing' is, to me, just a configuration or expression of fact. At some point it (fact) expresses a human being, at another, a table. There also comes a time when they (tables, humans and the like) are not expressed. The why and how of it can only be understood by overcoming the relativity of perception, if such is possible.
That the fact that the cat is on the mat obtains just is that there exists the cat and there exists the mat and the cat is positioned on top of the mat.
That the fact that the cup is in the cupboard doesn’t obtain just is that the cup doesn’t exist or the cupboard doesn’t exist or the cup is not positioned within the cupboard.
So are you asking how things come to exist? Are you asking how one thing comes be positioned relative to another?
What is the thing that has yet to have become a fact... beforehand?
A proposition.
I guess there could be and are different systems of definitions about these things, but I suggest these:
1. Things are what are describable and can be referred to.
2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things.
3. A proposition is a thing that is or might be a fact.
4. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" or "False"
5. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" if and only if it is a fact.
6. A statement is an utterance of a proposition.
(But, alternatively, someone could define a proposition to be a statement alleging a fact. I try to avoid that, because it brings people (who make statements and allege) into it, but it avoids the introduction of a proposition as a thing that is or might be a fact.)
7. I suggest that an abstract fact, or consistent system of them, always amounts to a truism, two different wordings of the same state of affairs. The statements of their corresponding propositions are saying the same thing.
I give the example of this abstract fact:
"There is no true and false proposition." Someone called that an unverified axiom, but it means "If a proposition isn't true, then it isn't true." That's a truism, and, as such, doesn't need any proof or verification.
So, consistency is tautological and inevitable.
I suggest that abstract facts always come down to such a truism, without needing reference to anything outside the system of facts being spoken of. That avoids the question of an abstract fact's how or why.
Michael Ossipoff
Michael OssipoffOctober 16, 2018 at 13:42#2207620 likes
Some people speak of facts "obtaining" or being true. When someone says that, they're using "fact" to mean "proposition" or an alleged fact.. I prefer to say that a fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things. Then, there's no need to speak of a fact "obtaining", which would be redundant, because there's no such thing as a non-obtaining fact.
Maybe a proposition could be defined as "something that differs from a fact only in that it might or not be one."
By the way, one of the definitions of a fact is, a state-of-affairs which obtains.
That's redundant. A supposed "state-of-affairs" that doesn't obtain isn't a state of affairs.
My own wording used to be "An aspect of how things are." But "A state of affairs" is a good definition, as is "A relation among things."
Sometimes, to that latter definition, some people add "...or a set of properties of things". But that's redundant, because properties are things, and a thing's having of a property is a relation among those two things .
There are a whole range of facts from physical facts, metaphysical facts, to logical facts
I suggest that they all--all facts about the describable-realm and anything in it--come down to abstract logical facts, at the basis of all that's describable. That's what my Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics consists of.
Because of the tautological inevitability of abstract facts or inter-referring systems of them (...regardless of whether someone wants to say they "exist" or not), there "being" a describable realm, including physical universes like ours, is explained. The describable realm is explained within itself.
And, in case anyone thinks that sounds Atheistic, no, that isn't inconsistent with Theism. Theism doesn't require that the describable realm not be self-explanatory as a complete logical system, any more than it requires that the physical world not follow its own laws.
Michael Ossipoff
Michael OssipoffOctober 16, 2018 at 15:02#2207720 likes
"Then, there's no need to speak of a fact "obtaining", which would be redundant, because there's no such thing as a non-obtaining fact". — Michael Ossipoff
The Principle of Bipolarity would contradict this conclusion.
But it's tautologically-invevitable that if a proposition is true it's not untrue.
Consistency is tautologically-inevitable.
That consistency is the only rule governing a person's life-experience story, because it's inevitable.
That, the consistency-requirement, is why logic enters a person's experience-story, as a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
"A fact is that which is represented by a true proposition." — aletheist
What about a false proposition? Is that possible for a fact to represent a false proposition?
No. By its definition, a false proposition isn't a fact, and doesn't correspond to one.
A false proposition is still a thing that purports to be a fact. It's still a thing that differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or not be a fact. (...or whichever definition one prefers).
...but its truth-value is "False" because it isn't a fact.
What about a false proposition? Is that possible for a fact to represent a false proposition?
This is backwards; a fact does not represent anything. A true proposition represents a fact; a false proposition purports to represent a fact, but does not really do so.
So facts are mind-independent? I thought they were mind-dependent...
Facts are independent of any individual mind or finite collection of minds. This does not entail that they are independent of mind in general. If an infinite community were to carry out infinite inquiry, facts are what would be represented in all propositions constituting their consensus beliefs - i.e., the absolute truth.
The present King of France is bald, is a fact that doesn't correspond to reality. What can you say about that?
It is not a fact, it is a proposition; and it is not a true proposition, since it does not refer to a real object - there is no present King of France - so it does not even represent a fact. It merely purports to represent a fact, as all propositions do.
Michael OssipoffOctober 16, 2018 at 18:59#2208130 likes
The present King of France is bald, is a fact that doesn't correspond to reality. What can you say about that>?
If the king of France has hair, then "The king of France is bald" isn't a fact.
Here's what I could find about the Principle of Bipolarity:
As it is usually understood, the principle of bipolarity is that every proposition must be capable of being true and capable of being false, which rules out propositions that are necessarily true or necessarily false.
I don't understand that. If a proposition differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or might not be one, or if a proposition is what purports to be a fact, then there's nothing about that that says that a proposition can't be definitely true or definitely false. ...might definitely be a fact or definitely not be a fact.
Propositions are understood to have a truth-value of True or False. Maybe a proposition's truth-value could be unknown, or maybe it could be known.
For example, here's a definitely false proposition:
"There is a true and false proposition" is false proposition. It's truth-value is definitely "False".
So I don't know how it could be said that a proposition can't have a definite truth-value.
Just because some propositions' truth-values aren't known doesn't mean that no proposition can have a definite truth-value.
By the way, I've noticed that someone at an Internet discussion somewhere defines a proposition as a statement, and a fact as what makes a proposition true.
Maybe that fits too, but I like defining "proposition" in terms of "fact". ...but that might just be my bias or prejudice, due to my definition being the first one that occurred to me.
It is not a fact, it is a proposition; and it is not a true proposition, since it does not refer to a real object - there is no present King of France - so it does not even represent a fact. It merely purports to represent a fact, as all propositions do.
I don't understand that. If a proposition differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or might not be one, or if a proposition is what purports to be a fact, then there's nothing about that that says that a proposition can't be definitely true or definitely false. ...might definitely be a fact or definitely not be a fact.
So, facts are independent of the Principle of Bipolarity? I don't know.
I do not understand this question. Facts are not signs that represent something else; as we established previously, they are real states of affairs. Propositions purport to represent facts, and true propositions really do represent facts.
A state of affairs that is not real is not a fact. If I were to have a dream in which I was flying like Superman, it would be a fact that I had the dream, but not that I was flying like Superman. Quoting Posty McPostface
Facts represent things in the world.
No, facts are real states of affairs in the world and do not represent anything else. Propositions purport to represent facts. True propositions really do represent facts. Other kinds of signs represent other aspects of the world, including qualities, things, and habits. Quoting Posty McPostface
What's this "representation" thing doing here in language?
I do not understand this question. Language itself is a system of signs, a means of representation.
Not true, In the dream, you were flying like superman...
Yes, it would be a fact that I was flying like Superman in the dream, but not that I was actually flying like Superman. Quoting Posty McPostface
True propositions really do represent the actual state of affairs? Is that more succinct?
True propositions really do represent real states of affairs. Reality is not limited to the actual; there are also possible and necessary states of affairs that are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them, even if they never actually come about. For example, this is a true proposition: If I were to drop a stone while standing on the earth, it would fall to the ground. Quoting Posty McPostface
Representation of what, then?
Whatever you like - states of affairs, qualities, things, habits, etc.
For example, this is a true proposition: If I were to drop a stone while standing on the earth, it would fall to the ground.
So, what happens to the Principle of Bipolarity? It would not be true that you were to drop a stone while standing on Earth? Therefore, the Principle of Bipolarity is nonsense?
Actuality is existence, which is the reaction of things upon one another. If I were to jump off the roof and start flying like Superman, that would be actually flying like Superman. Dreaming about flying like Superman, or imagining that I am flying like Superman, is not actually flying like Superman.
I am not familiar enough with it to say for sure. Why should we rule out propositions that are necessarily true or necessarily false? What kind of necessity is relevant? Does this alleged principle only exclude analytic propositions, such as "all bachelors are unmarried" (necessarily true) and "some bachelors are married" (necessarily false)? My example is not in that category.
Does this alleged principle only exclude analytic propositions, such as "all bachelors are unmarried" (necessarily true) and "some bachelors are married" (necessarily false)?
Yes, it excludes only analytic propositions.
So, in your example, Superman is not analytic, yet, we talk about him as a synthetic a priori sense. So, is he a synthetic a priori conception of the human mind, only? I mean, he could exist in a possible world, no? Therefore has he become analytic>?
The chocolate chip cooky is teleologically purposed or instantiated to be eaten. It's purpose as bomb material or other such things is denied and is therefore nonsense.
Reply to Posty McPostface I think you're overlooking the addition of concrete to the batter which not only increases their ballistic attributes but it makes them more likely to float!
So, in your example, Superman is not analytic, yet, we talk about him as a synthetic a priori sense. So, is he a synthetic a priori conception of the human mind, only? I mean, he could exist in a possible world, no? Therefore has he become analytic?
As above, and as in the case of Hamlet, we would have to specify the universe of discourse.
So, how is it so obvious that a proposition represents states of affairs?
It is obvious that we use language to express propositions. It may not be obvious that propositions represent states of affairs. It should be obvious that words represent all kinds of objects.
I think you're overlooking the addition of concrete to the batter which not only increases their ballistic attributes but it makes them more likely to float!
When all of your senses are screaming in agreement that a particular perceptual phenomenon exists, you're as sure as can be that the phenomenon somehow really exists. It's not mystical at all in that being hit over the head with a frying pan convinces the victim that the frying pan exists (repeated strikes enhance certitude).
The how or why of perception itself is the somewhat mystical bit. We are rapidly demystifying the physical biological structures and mechanisms which comprise our internal and mental machinations (in ways that can predict our behavior as if we're biological robots), but we still have that nagging feeling like something, we, are actually behind the wheel, and in so far as that relates to the "we" in "how do facts obtain?", we will likely not find satisfying answers.
Why do we actually feel feelings? We're wired to feel them (to take in stimulus, somehow parse it, and then learn via an output/input loop) but why do feelings feel like anything?
The mind-matter gap is now easily bridged, but the mind-feeling gap is not yet so.
Why "like" being used here? Like denotes that nothing in the real world is representative of something idealized, like Superman?
As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible.
As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible.
We can invent ways to occupy our mind with things. Suppose we created a new meta-material that can interface with our minds and fly or levitate or change in form and heighten certain features that Superman has. I mean use your imagination and think about how we could become akin to Superman or woman one day.
VagabondSpectreOctober 16, 2018 at 21:43#2208710 likes
Reply to Posty McPostface I don't know if that's effible, because anything I say can only be weighed against your own eminent subjective feelings. Anything I say would amount to they feel like feelings.
It comes out as a brute fact, that we feel, and we can either accept or reject them as valid epistemic starting points.
How many frying pan strikes does it take to get to the center of an ontological philosophy?
Yes, feelings are ineffable. They can't be spoken of. But, we're deviating from how facts obtain their status of facthood. Is it when reality hits you ob the head?
If facts are definite things, then they would have to obtain by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy. We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.
creativesoulOctober 17, 2018 at 02:08#2208910 likes
That the fact that the cat is on the mat obtains just is that there exists the cat and there exists the mat and the cat is positioned on top of the mat.
That the fact that the cup is in the cupboard doesn’t obtain just is that the cup doesn’t exist or the cupboard doesn’t exist or the cup is not positioned within the cupboard.
So are you asking how things come to exist? Are you asking how one thing comes be positioned relative to another?
No, I'd just say that the cat is on the mat and the cup isn't in the cupboard. Might stretch to say that it's a fact that the cat is on the mat and the cup in fact isn't in the cupboard.
A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 14:54#2209310 likes
"A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?" — creativesoul
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
Here is an attempt at a summary of the approaches that I know of:
1. A proposition is a statement, and a fact is what makes a proposition true.
(...but I don't know how well-worded that is--It isn't my favorite approach.)
2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things, and...
a) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true, and, if not a fact, would be one if it had a truth-value of "True"
(That last clause is so that someone can't assign a truth-value of "False" to their kitchen-table, and say that it's a false proposition.)
or
b) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and refers to what is or isn't a fact, and refers to a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True".
or
c) A proposition is something that purports to be a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true.
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I think I like 2c best, with 2a as next-best.
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I don't know of any real problem in saying that a proposition is a statement. Also, I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition (...but I can't say that I've thoroughly examined the matter). It doesn't seem to matter if the set of false propositions is allowed to be extended to things that we don't really call "propositions". But it seems neater to avoid that.
Michael Ossipoff
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 15:12#2209320 likes
They certainly fit my definition of things, because they're describable and can be referred to.
, then they would have to obtain...
But any putative "fact" that doesn't obtain isn't a fact.
by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy.
All it takes is being a state-of-affairs or a relation among things.
We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.
But a distinction between facts of this physical universe and abstract facts is a metaphysical assumption (...though of course a meaningfully-practical one) . I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
I suggest that the physical world centers on our experience, as a matter of "if..."
A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things
This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact. In other words, 2c is correct (assuming bivalence) once modified to read as follows: A proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False," and does represent a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True."
I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition
A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things. However, every proposition involves terms; for example, "some kitchen tables have four legs" is a (true) proposition.
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 15:23#2209340 likes
I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
This is what Peirce identified as the subject matter of mathematics - drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of affairs, the universe of pure possibility. The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience. Inquiry is the process by which we distinguish truth from error - retroduction generates hypotheses, deduction explicates them, and induction evaluates them.
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 15:54#2209380 likes
”A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things” — Michael Ossipoff
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This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact.
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I think there’s room for different definitions about that.
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Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
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“If the additive associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”
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That’s both a proposition and a fact. It’s a fact, and it’s a proposition with truth value of “True”.
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What’s said in that line is both a fact and a proposition.
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You can, if you want to, qualify what you say, by saying, “…but I only mean that as a proposition.” If you don’t say that, then you’re asserting it as a fact. Whether it’s really a fact is, of course, subject to proof.
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When you hear me say that alleged implication about 2 + 2, and if you don’t know if it true, then you have it only as a proposition. When it’s been proved for you, then it’s a fact for you.
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Michael Ossipoff
Reply to Michael Ossipoff
You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 16:31#2209410 likes
”I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.” — Michael Ossipoff
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The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe…
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The meaningful definition of the actual physical universe is: The physical universe in which the speaker resides.
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…is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience.
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The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.
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No physics experiment could prove, establish, suggest or imply contrary to that suggestion.
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”I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition “— Michael Ossipoff
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A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things.
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Of course it wouldn’t make any sense to have a definition of “proposition” that makes it possible to truly (by that definition) say that a kitchen-table is a false-proposition. I just meant that I don’t know if it would result in any wrong conclusions about other matters, if that obviously inappropriate naming were allowed by a definition of “proposition”. But I added a clause to that definition, to avoid the possibility of saying that a kitchen-table is a false proposition.
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I emphasize that I don’t and wouldn’t advocate that definition without that added clause.
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Michael Ossipoff
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 16:54#2209430 likes
You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
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No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.
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Yes, by the definition of “proposition” in terms of “fact”, that we’re talking about, a fact is a true proposition. …as a consequence of how I defined “proposition” in terms of “fact”. But I defined “fact” independently, and didn’t (in the “2” series of definitions) define “proposition” other than in terms of fact.
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Yes, in definition 1, I first defined “proposition” and then defined “fact” in terms of “proposition”.
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But, as I said, definition 2c is my favorite of those systems of definitions. In that system, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined in terms of fact. Though, by those definitions, a fact is a true proposition, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined only in terms of “fact”.
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There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.
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That is indeed an important distinction in your system of definitions.
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I’m not saying that your above-described system of definitions is wrong or couldn’t be used. My point was merely that the situation permits more than one valid and useful system of definitions.
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One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.
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And of course it’s undeniable that when I say:
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“Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
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“If the additive-associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”…
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…That, to you, is only a proposition, if you don’t know if it’s true. Then you see the proof, and find out that it’s true. So now it’s true. It has become a true proposition. … and a fact.
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Those are reasons why I prefer 2c as written.
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I re-emphasize that I’m not saying that your system of definitions, with the added entities of signs and interpretants, isn’t valid and can’t be used.
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I’m merely saying that there can validly be more than one system of definitions in these matters.
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Michael Ossipoff
The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.
You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.
No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.
So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).
One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.
What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake. Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context. YMMV.
Michael OssipoffOctober 17, 2018 at 20:06#2209630 likes
”The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.” — Michael Ossipoff
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You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do.
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One accepted definition that I like is: “being the antecedent of an implication.”
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That isn’t nonstandard.
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Another well-accepted definition that I like is: “suppositional”.
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Another that I like is: “not necessarily objectively real or existent.”
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…easily satisfied, because “objectively-existent” and “objectively-real” aren’t well and unanimously defined. …especially by Materialists.
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If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.
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Not by my practical operational definition of “actual”:
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“Part of or consisting of the physical world in which the speaker resides.”
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”No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.” — Michael Ossipoff
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So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
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As I said, I’m not saying that your system of definitions is wrong or not useful. I merely say that no one system of definitions is the only right one.
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A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).
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Yes, there’s no need to speak of a fact as true or false. In fact, I agree that it would be meaningless. A false putative-fact obviously isn’t a fact. There’s no such thing as a false fact. A true fact? Well, if trueness is what belongs to a proposition that is a fact, then it follows that all facts are true propositions, and that, strictly speaking, facts, being true propositions, are true…only when spoken of as propositions.
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Though truth or falsity of facts isn’t a necessary or even meaningful notion, it isn’t unreasonable to speak of a fact as a true proposition, and, in that limited sense, call it “true”…only when speaking of it as a proposition.
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”One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.” — Michael Ossipoff
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What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake.
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Your definition system isn’t wrong.
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Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context.
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Certainly, in the definitional system that you’re speaking of. I repeat that your definition-system isn’t wrong or un-useful.
Michael Ossipoff
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 02:23#2210340 likes
No, I'd just say that the cat is on the mat and the cup isn't in the cupboard. Might stretch to say that it's a fact that the cat is on the mat and the cup in fact isn't in the cupboard.
Why do you ask?
That sounds fine by me. I asked because it would affect/effect how the conversation goes if I knew that much.
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 02:24#2210350 likes
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
Again?
Have we discussed this already?
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 02:27#2210370 likes
You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.
Nothing here jumps out to me as being wrong.
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 02:31#2210390 likes
...a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
Propositions are existentially dependent upon language on my view...
Reply to creativesoul
What exactly do you mean by "existentially dependent"? Following Peirce (again), I would say that propositions - and all signs, for that matter - exist only when embodied in what he called "replicas," which include but are not limited to their expressions in various languages. The same proposition (or other sign) can (and usually does) exist in multiple replicas, which can be in different languages and even other kinds of sign systems. For example, a properly functioning weathervane is a replica of the proposition, "The wind is blowing from that direction."
Reply to Posty McPostface
A replica is an actual embodiment of a sign, such that it can be interpreted as such within a particular system of signs. The same word can appear many times on a page or screen, and each of these is a replica of that word. The version of this post that I typed and submitted on my computer is one replica of it; what you are reading now is another.
A replica is an actual embodiment of a sign, such that it can be interpreted as such within a particular system of signs. The same word can appear many times on a page or screen, and each of these is a replica of that word. The version of this post that I typed and submitted on my computer is one replica of it; what you are reading now is another.
You lost me. And how does this affect the obtaining of facts?
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 03:42#2210740 likes
...a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
How do "facts" come into the picture here? Are facts states of affairs on your view?
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 03:48#2210760 likes
A proposition represents a purported fact or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real fact or a real relation among things.
So...
Propositions represent one of two things. Facts and/or relations. True propositions represent real facts and/or real relations. What do false propositions represent?
Propositions represent one of two things. Facts and/or relations. True propositions represent real facts and real relations. What do false propositions represent?
Indeed. The question on my end is how do facts obtain their status of facthood.
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 03:50#2210780 likes
That's one that I've found imperative to understanding this framework as well.
So, can we say that facts are representations of states of affairs, and then delve more deeply and state that facts are logical relations between objects in logical space?
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 03:55#2210800 likes
So, can we say that facts are representations of states of affairs, and then delve more deeply and state that facts are logical relations between objects in logical space?
We could if we abandon the meaning of "fact" as states of affairs.
This discussion is about one particular framework, or so I thought it was...
You can try and do that; but, Wittgenstein already did most of the work for you. Just sayin.
creativesoulOctober 18, 2018 at 04:05#2210870 likes
So, "logical space" refers to all logical possibility(that which has yet to have happened, and/or may never happen but could if the world were different than it is).
I'm a fan of Witt, and I'm a vehement opponent as well.
Like what? His Tractatus is partially right; but wrong on some parts like the picture theory of meaning. If you lived in a two-dimensional world, then everything would be right with the Tractatus.
You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
Can’t it be both? Words can have more than one meaning. “It is true that” and “it is a fact that” seem to be saying the same thing, so the thing which is true in the first case (a proposition?) is the thing which is a fact in the second case.
Propositions can be (and often are) expressed in language, but are not themselves language, whatever that would mean. The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction."
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. I tend to avoid the use of "obtain" in this context, because in ordinary usage it carries the idea of getting something not previously possessed.
“It is true that” and “it is a fact that” seem to be saying the same thing, so the thing which is true in the first case (a proposition?) is the thing which is a fact in the second case.
A proposition is true iff it represents a fact, but a fact is not something that can be true or false at all, so a proposition and a fact are not the same thing. When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact.
When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact.
When I say "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals" I am saying that the proposition "all dogs are mammals" is a fact.
Indeed, but in philosophy we often try to narrow down their definitions for the sake of greater conceptual clarity. That is my approach here.
Why does it provide more clarity to use the term "fact" to refer to the thing which a true proposition represents? Is it better somehow to treat "a state of affairs" and "a fact" as synonyms rather than to treat "true" and "a fact" as synonyms?
Why does it provide more clarity to use the term "fact" to refer to the thing which a true proposition represents? Is it better somehow to treat "a state of affairs" and "a fact" as synonyms rather than to treat "true" and "a fact" as synonyms?
Personally, I find it clearer, perhaps because I consider it important to emphasize the representational nature of a proposition. "Fact" is then a concise term for its object, if it is true.
Michael OssipoffOctober 18, 2018 at 17:04#2212040 likes
You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.
As I mentioned in my previous reply to that passage, I don't think we mean different things by "hypothetical".
But yes, the meaning of "actual" is what is in doubt. I don't know what you mean by "actual". I suggest that there's no reason to believe that anything describable is objectively-existent--but I readily admit that I don't know what "objectively-existent" would mean.
This physical world is, of course, fully real and existent in the context of your life
What more existence or reality would anyone want or claim for it? In what other context would anyone want or believe it to be existent and real?
And, if this physical universe is only real and existent in the context of your life, then its reality and existence are a bit more tenuous than a Materialist would have us believe.
If your experience is the basis, in the describable world, for what describably is, then that implies a tenuousness for the existence the describable world and its things.
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Elsewhere in these forums, I've posted a more complete discussion of my suggestion that the basis of the describable realm is your life-experience story, with complementarity between you the protagonist and your physical surroundings of your experience. ...a hypothetical experience story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications s about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
...with logic entering that experience-story simply because of the requirement for consistency--because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.
Michael Ossipoff
Michael OssipoffOctober 18, 2018 at 17:13#2212050 likes
A proposition is true iff it represents a fact, but a fact is not something that can be true or false at all, so a proposition and a fact are not the same thing. When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact.
A raisin is a grape that has been dried. It would be redundant to speak of a raisin that has been dried, because all raisins have been dried. But it's not incorrect to call a raisin a dried grape.
A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition. It would be redundant to speak of a true fact, because every fact is a true proposition. But it's not incorrect to call a fact a true proposition.
These intermediaries of sign, representation, etc aren't incorrect, but they're unnecessary to this topic.
Why not, if everything is hypothetical? Mere possibilities that are mutually inconsistent are not problematic at all; that is just what contingency means. What constrains facts to be consistent with each other, if nothing is real (as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it) and nothing is actual (reacting with other things)?
A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition.
So you define a true proposition as a state of affairs or relation among things? Why not just stick with calling the latter a fact? What advantage do you gain by treating "true proposition" and "fact" as synonyms?
These intermediaries of sign, representation, etc aren't incorrect, but they're unnecessary to this topic.
Perhaps unnecessary, but (in my view) helpful. The benefit of defining a fact as the object of a true proposition is highlighting the representational nature of all propositions.
creativesoulOctober 19, 2018 at 00:54#2213010 likes
False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.
Facts obtain if they're real?
— creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact.
Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
Unreal states of affairs are not facts. All facts are real states of affairs. Again, no contradiction.
And by the way, "aletheist" comes from the Greek word "aletheia," which means truth; I am someone who believes in truth.
creativesoulOctober 19, 2018 at 02:55#2213230 likes
Reply to creativesoul
Apology accepted, although I am still curious - what did you think it meant, such that you suspected me of being comfortable with incoherence/self-contradiction?
creativesoulOctober 19, 2018 at 03:12#2213250 likes
Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.
— creativesoul
These two statements are not contradictory. Not all mammals are dogs. All dogs are mammals. In any case, here is what I actually said about facts.
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
— aletheist
Unreal states of affairs are not facts. All facts are real states of affairs. Again, no contradiction.
Agreed. Right now, I'm considering what you're arguing...
Not all states of affairs are facts. All facts are states of affairs. There are two kinds of states of affairs then:Real states of affairs and unreal states of affairs. Real states of affairs are fact. Unreal states of affairs are not.
Propositions represent both real and unreal states of affairs.
Are facts states of affairs on your view?
— creativesoul
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
What do false propositions represent?
— creativesoul
False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.
So some propositions represent nonexistent(unreal) states of affairs, while others represent states of affairs.
How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
Facts obtain if they're real?
— creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. I tend to avoid the use of "obtain" in this context, because in ordinary usage it carries the idea of getting something not previously possessed.
Exactly. So you do not use this notion of 'facts obtaining'?
All propositions are language.
— creativesoul
Propositions can be (and often are) expressed in language, but are not themselves language, whatever that would mean. The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction."
So, this admits - good or bad - that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language?
I have significant trouble accepting that.
It does not follow from the fact that the same proposition can be expressed in different languages that propositions exist independently of language.
Multiple languages can talk about the same thing. If we are going to claim that whatever they are talking about exists independently of language, then we ought at least get what they're talking about right. They're not talking about the proposition. They're talking about the states of affairs. Some states of affairs can exist independently of language. Others cannot. Relationships as well...
creativesoulOctober 19, 2018 at 04:04#2213310 likes
I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction."
Without language there is no propositional meaning, on my view. Translation presupposes pre existing meaning, a plurality of languages, and someone who can translate what the one says into the other.
creativesoulOctober 19, 2018 at 04:13#2213340 likes
The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas.
How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
This happens all the time. Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. No such person ever actually existed. Signs can represent possibilities and necessities, not just actualities. Reality is not coextensive with existence (more below).
It does not follow from the fact that the same proposition can be expressed in different languages that propositions exist independently of language.
True, but I have not claimed otherwise. Much hinges on what we mean by "exist" in this context. Following Peirce, I define it as reacting with other things. Propositions and other signs do not exist in this sense apart from their embodiment in languages or other sign systems. However, the reality of a proposition does not depend on any (or all) of its actual embodiments - the proposition itself, as a general type rather than an individual token, is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.
Some states of affairs can exist independently of language. Others cannot. Relationships as well...
Agreed. That is basically what I mean by real states of affairs and real relations among things - they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks (or says, or writes) about them (in a language or other sign system). Some real states/relations also exist - if they are involved in, correspond to, or govern reactions between things.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 03:51#2214750 likes
”there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.” — Michael Ossipoff
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Why not, if everything is hypothetical?
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I said that the propositions, and the things that they’re about are hypothetical. In that sense, the story itself is hypothetical. I didn’t say that everything is hypothetical.
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There’s no such thing as a fact that’s hypothetical. …unless you mean “proposition” instead of “fact”.
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If you want to say that propositions are hypothetical facts, that would wrongly imply that all propositions are facts. Better to say that a proposition is a thing that has a truth-value of True or False, and has a truth-value of True if and only if it’s a fact, and, if not a fact, would be one if its truth-value were True.
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…or some such wording.
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Maybe just say that a proposition is something that purports to be a fact.
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Abstract implications are facts, and, as such, they’re true propositions. They aren’t hypothetical. The propositions that they’re about are hypothetical.
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Mere possibilities that are mutually inconsistent are not problematic at all; that is just what contingency means.
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Yes, there are mutually-inconsistent propositions:
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“There’s a watermelon on that [some particular] table.” “There isn’t a watermelon on that table.”
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What constrains facts to be consistent with each other
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For two alleged facts (propositions) to be mutually-inconsistent means that one of them implies the falsity of the other.
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So, saying that there aren’t mutually-inconsistent facts is the same as saying that there aren’t true and false propositions.
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Saying that there isn’t a true and false proposition is the same as saying (for one thing):
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“If a proposition isn’t true then it isn’t true.”
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That’s an obvious truism, a tautology, and, as such, doesn’t need any proof.
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Saying that two facts are contradictory, or that there’s a true and false proposition, would contradict that tautology.
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, if nothing is real (as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it)
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…as what is? Your meaning there isn’t obvious.
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and nothing is actual (reacting with other things)?
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If “actual” means “reacting with other things”, then all the things in the logical system that I speak of are actual, because they interact.
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A good definition of “actual” is:
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“Physical; and part of, in, or consisting of, the physical universe in which the speaker resides.”
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But yes, I agree that defining “actual”, “real”, “existent”, “substantial” and “substantive” is a big problem for objectors to my metaphysical proposal.
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I ask people, if they think that this physical world is somehow more than just the hypothetical setting for a life-experience-story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things—then in what way is it more than that?
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“Actual”, “real”, “existent”, “substantial”, or “substantive”? Then what do you mean by that?
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And, in what context, other than its own, do you think that this physical world exists and is real, so as to distinguish it from what I propose?
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But yes, largely because “existent” and “real” don’t have a consensus definition in metaphysics, I make no claim that anything in the describable realm (including abstract implications and physical universes) is real or existent (other than in its own context or the context of someone’s life).
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A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition.” — Michael Ossipoff
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So you define a true proposition as a state of affairs or relation among things? Why not just stick with calling the latter a fact? What advantage do you gain by treating "true proposition" and "fact" as synonyms?
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Well, there needs to be a word for something that purports to be a fact. Some such things are facts and some aren’t.
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But yes, that makes for some awkward wording for the definition of “proposition”. I don’t object to first defining a proposition as a statement, and then defining a fact as what a statement asserts. Either is alright.
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But isn’t there something redundant about the statement and what it asserts? What it asserts is a state-of-affairs or relation among things. A statement or proposition could be “There’s a watermelon on the table”. What does it assert? This: There’s a watermelon on the table. Then what’s the difference between that proposition and the fact that it asserts? (other that some propositions aren’t facts) That’s a good reason to say that a true proposition is a fact. Propositions and the facts that they assert are certainly indistinguishable when written. Their only difference is that some propositions aren't facts.
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So, that’s why I like the definition-system that I’ve suggested, in spite of the awkwardness in wording a definition for “proposition”. That awkwardness seems inevitable.
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In the definition-system that I’ve been speaking of, I define a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, but I don’t deny that alternative definition-systems can be helpful. I don’t even claim that an alternative one isn’t better, in important ways, than the kind that I’ve been suggesting.
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Michael Ossipoff
Then what’s the difference between that proposition and the fact that it asserts?
You answered your own question in how you asked it - the proposition asserts a (purported) fact, rather than being a (purported) fact. The difference is between that which represents (proposition) and that which is represented (state of affairs or relation among things) - i.e., between a sign and its object.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 19:49#2215530 likes
How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul
This happens all the time. Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. No such person ever actually existed. Signs can represent possibilities and necessities, not just actualities. Reality is not coextensive with existence (more below).
In order for A to represent B, A must stand in place for B.
Let Hamlet(the play) be A and a man named Hamlet who was the prince of Denmark be B...
Hamlet(the play) doesn't represent(stand in place for) a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark. Rather it creates him. B is existentially dependent upon A. That cannot be the case when A represents B. There must first be something to represent before it can be represented. The sign "Hamlet" represents both, the play and the main character. These things are existentially dependent upon one another. Without the sign "Hamlet" there could be no play or character.
Calling that a case of A representing B neglects/ignores the existential dependency.
Let A be "Shakespeare" and B be the person we call such. "Shakespeare" represents a particular person. Remove the name and the person remains...
Hamlet (the play) doesn't represent a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark. Rather it creates him.
The play itself cannot and does not create anything. Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. That is why Hamlet (the man) is not real - he is as he is entirely because of what Shakespeare thought (and wrote) about him, rather than being as he is regardless of what anyone thinks about him.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 20:26#2215560 likes
Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea.
If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent. It only follows that A is existentially dependent upon B. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else.
Let the play Hamlet be A. Let B be Shakespeare's idea.
There is no way possible that the entire play Hamlet was complete in Shakespeare's thought prior to pen. Seems to me that the play and the idea are pretty much one in the same.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 20:36#2215580 likes
How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul
This happens all the time.
Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea.
:yikes:
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 20:42#2215610 likes
So facts are mind-independent? I thought they were mind-dependent...
The present Kind of France is bald, is a fact that doesn't correspond to reality. What can you say about that>?
There seem to be two senses of 'fact'. Statements are referred to as 'facts'; this is the sense in which the encyclopedia is understood to be a compendium of facts. States of affairs are also understood to be facts; so-called ostensive facts. However, states of affairs cannot be exactly the same things as facts, since we can have imaginary or possible states of affairs, but it seems wrong to speak of "imaginary facts".
So "the present king of France is bald" presents an imagined or possible state of affairs; but it seems wrong to say that it is a fact. It would be a fact if the state of affairs it represents were actual.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 21:09#2215660 likes
However, states of affairs cannot be exactly the same things as facts, since we can have imaginary or possible states of affairs, but it seems wrong to speak of "imaginary facts".
What reason is there to posit imaginary states of affairs or possible ones?
What do they have in common with actual states of affairs that make them count as states of affairs?
Imaginary or possible states of affairs are counterfactual. Hillary Clinton could have been the president, for example.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 21:24#2215710 likes
To be clear, I'm not at all arguing or objecting to the use of hypotheticals. I'm asking what good reason there is to call them "states of affairs" when they are clearly not?
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 21:25#2215720 likes
I've always been interested in this notion of states of affairs and how they obtain. Thus, I'm piddling around here...
I'm asking what good reason there is to call them "states of affairs" when they are clearly not?
Hypotheticals are clearly not, or at least may be not, actual states of affairs; they are imagined states of affairs. You do seem to be piddling...in the puddle...stirring up what has already been settled...and muddying the waters...as usual...
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 21:48#2215790 likes
What good reason is there to call hypotheticals imagined states of affairs?
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 21:50#2215800 likes
What do all states of affairs have in common that make them what they are?
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 21:51#2215820 likes
What good reason is there to call hypotheticals imagined states of affairs?
Hypotheticals are not necessarily imaginary states of affairs; they may turn out to be actual. The utility of the distinction between actual and imaginary states of affairs seems obvious.
To make distinctions, provided there are real differences between the things being distinguished, leads to clarity and nuanced thinking.
Hypotheticals are not necessarily imaginary states of affairs; they may turn out to be actual. The utility of the distinction between actual and imaginary states of affairs seems obvious.
To make distinctions, provided there are real differences between the things being distinguished, leads to clarity and nuanced thinking.
Reply to creativesoul So, the imaginary events described in a work of fiction are not events in your view? What would you rather call them; and what would be the advantage to your alternative terminology (if you have one)? If you think there is an unclarity lurking in the distinction between imaginary and real events, then tell us what it is.
If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent.
What do words like "unicorn" and "phoenix" represent? If your statement is correct, how are we able to talk about things and events that are in the future - i.e., that do not (yet) exist, and may never actually exist?
Hamlet sets out a plethora of unreal states of affairs. There are true propositions about Hamlet.
There are true propositions about Hamlet (the play) because Hamlet (the play) exists. There are propositions about Hamlet (the character) - such as "Hamlet was the prince of Denmark" - that are true only within the universe of discourse established by the play. Shakespeare really imagined and wrote about Hamlet as the prince of Denmark; but Hamlet was not really the prince of Denmark.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 23:05#2216030 likes
Why must something happen in order to count as an event? If events rely on happening in order to qualify as events, then are past events no longer events since they are no longer happening? Your proposed elimination of usages of the term 'event' to refer to imaginary or possible happenings seems pointless, since the distinction between actual and potential, possible or imaginary events is perfectly well understood by most everyone (apart from you apparently).
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 23:26#2216070 likes
If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent.
— creativesoul
What do words like "unicorn" and "phoenix" represent?
If your statement is correct, how are we able to talk about things and events that are in the future - i.e., that do not (yet) exist, and may never actually exist?
Talk about the future represents our thought and belief about what has not happened.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 23:37#2216100 likes
Your proposed elimination of usages of the term 'event' to refer to imaginary or possible happenings seems pointless, since the distinction between actual and potential, possible or imaginary events is perfectly well understood by most everyone (apart from you apparently).
Disagreement is not misunderstanding.
There is a difference between things that have happened and things that have not.
There is a difference between things that have happened and things that have not.
You don't appear to be understanding the distinctions between events which happen, are happening, will happen or might happen and events which are merely imagined to happen, to be happening, to be going to happen or to be likely to happen.
You say that there is a difference between things that have happened and things which have not; and you seem to be implying (or more than merely implying; asserting although you have given no argument) that the former qualify as events and the latter do not; rather than employing the much more sensible distinction (as is almost universally done) between events (rather than calling them "things") that happen and those that do not. All you are really arguing about is the definition of a word; and your definition is contrary to common usage without any cogent reason for being so.
creativesoulOctober 20, 2018 at 23:52#2216160 likes
You don't appear to be understanding the distinctions between events which happen, are happening, will happen or might happen and events which are merely imagined to happen, to be happening, to be going to happen or to be likely to happen.
I understand just fine. You're calling things that have not happened "events". I'm not. You're calling imaginings "events". That is to conflate that which has happened with that which has not, to put it mildly... There are all sorts of other issues that haven't been mentioned yet. I'm being nice.
So what? The purpose of the conditional "actual" is to make that distinction. There are imagined events and there are actual events; they both involve concatenations of things, people, processes and/ or relations. If you want to coin a different term to designate imagined events; what term are you proposing; and what would be the advantage of doing away with the actual vs imaginary/possible/ potential distinction?
Yes, as you said you are "piddling"...piddling is indeed the word, and I will waste no further time with your sophistical pedantry and self-aggrandizement. You wonder why I don't take you seriously sometimes! It's not to do with me disliking your style as you previously suggested, it's to do with a lack of cogent content.
Michael OssipoffOctober 21, 2018 at 17:23#2216940 likes
Whenever anyone predicts anything about what the future is going to be like they are imagining states of affairs which may or may not come to be. When you wonder what really happened in the past and hypothesize that certain events occurred, you are imagining states of affairs which may or may not have happened. If you think you have discovered that an event you thought happened in the past did not in fact happen, then you don't usually conclude that what you thought was an event that you believed had happened now no longer qualifies as an event, but rather that it turned out to be an imagined, as opposed to a real, event.
That is the common way to think about what states of affairs or events are, and I can't see any good reason to reject that way of thinking. Certainly no one here has come up with a good reason for saying that people cannot actually imagine past or future events unless the events had happened, or will happen, respectively.
creativesoulOctober 21, 2018 at 20:51#2217160 likes
There are imagined events and there are actual events; they both involve concatenations of things, people, processes and/ or relations.
All imagined 'events' are linked together by thought and belief. All imagined events consist entirely of thought and belief. They are no where else to be found. There are three kinds of imagined 'events'. They include 1.thought and belief about what has already happened, 2.thought and belief about what is currently happening, and 3.thought and belief about what has not yet happened.
Imagined 'events' about what has already happened and/or is happening can be true/false. 'Actual' events cannot. Rather it is precisely the 'actual' events that render imagined 'events' true/false.
Imagined 'events' about what has not happened include all of the false imagined 'events' about what has happened(they are false because they did not happen), all of the false imagined 'events' about what is happening(they are false because they are not happening), and all thought and belief about what has not yet happened - all imagined future 'events' - regardless of whether or not they become true/false by virtue of happening or not.
So, here we have arrived at a group of imagined 'events' that have not happened. This group includes all false imagined events and all imagined future events which have yet to have been determined as either.
If all facts are states of affairs, and all states of affairs are results of actual events, and only the actual is real, then it only follows that there are no such thing as real or actual future states of affairs.
So, perhaps it is here, in this context, that a proposition about future states of affairs(imagined 'states of affairs' and/or 'events') can obtain the status of actual events/states of affairs(fact)?
This notion of facts 'obtaining' could be a means of distinguishing between imagined states of affairs that are false as a result of not happening and imagined states of affairs that aren't able to be true or false as a result of not happening.
Piddling.
creativesoulOctober 21, 2018 at 22:54#2217290 likes
So, here we have arrived at a group of imagined 'events' that have not happened. This group includes all false imagined events and all imagined future events which have yet to have been determined as either.
Utterances of hought and belief about what has not happened cannot be true at the time of utterance.
creativesoulOctober 21, 2018 at 23:13#2217350 likes
Events that never took place are described by false propositions.
Events that have yet to have taken place are described by prediction.
Both consist entirely of thought and belief. Both are about what has not happened. There is no other kind of belief about what has not happened.
creativesoulOctober 21, 2018 at 23:52#2217400 likes
Hamlet is an account of events that never took place and of people that never existed. Hamlet exists only in the form of meaningful language. Statements about Hamlet are statements about imaginary events and people. Imaginary events and people are existentially dependent upon the imagination and language use. Statements about Hamlet are true if and only if they correspond to the story of Hamlet(the imaginary account).
We can say true things about Hamlet, even though Hamlet consists of imaginary events and people. That is solely as a result of the fact that we're offering an account of Hamlet and in doing so the only standard for truth is correspondence with/to the story itself. The story itself is the result of actual events. In saying true things about Hamlet, we're not saying true things about what has not happened. We're saying true things about what has. The writing of Hamlet has happened.
Again, yes what you have said is piddling (strange your habit of commenting on your own work), and nothing to do with your claim that imagined events that do not obtain do not qualify as events. You even use the term " imagined event" which shows your self-contradiction.
creativesoulOctober 22, 2018 at 00:19#2217500 likes
In what way does referring to events that are either fictional and therefore don't happen, or hypothetical and therefore may or may not happen, or have happened, as 'events' lack utility?
Straight answer for once instead of the endless evasion and irrelevant bullshit assertions.
creativesoulOctober 22, 2018 at 01:29#2217580 likes
n what way does referring to events that are either fictional and therefore don't happen, or hypothetical and therefore may or may not happen, or have happened, as 'events' lack utility?
Fiction, falsehood, and prediction all consist entirely of thought and belief about what has not happened.
Comments (222)
An example is the fact: "There is no proposition that is both true and false."
...which means: "A proposition that's not true isn't true."
...or "If a proposition isn't true, then it isn't true."
...which is an obvious tautology.
In one earlier argument in an earlier thread, someone said that all (true) theorems* are tautologies, because they all merely show that one thing implies something else--means something else, as is the case with obvious tautological syllogisms like my Slitheytoves syllogism example.
*A true theorem is an implication whose antecedent consists, at least in part, of a set of mathematical axioms.
So the obtaining of an abstract logical implication is there, intrinsic in the implication itself, because one fact [the consequent] is there in another fact [the antecedent]
But yes, of course that's really a simplification, because often the implication of a consequent is by a chain of, or inter-related, inter-referring system of, separate implications. But that doesn't change the intrinsic truism-nature of the obtaining of an abstract fact or system of them.
So there isn't a metaphysical problem about the meaning of, or the how of, the obtaining of abstract facts.
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, that's true. I wonder how can it be addressed?
Any thoughts?
They're status of facthood.
What is the thing that has yet to have become a fact... beforehand?
However, it seems to me that statements obtain truth(and thus become fact) if and only if they correspond to reality/events/states of affairs/the ay things are/were.
Yes, what is it?
By the way, one of the definitions of a fact is, a state-of-affairs which obtains.
What does this mean? Is the status of facthood obtained by what?
Obtains by what?
Quoting Posty McPostface
I'm just trying to make sure that we are on the same page, so to speak...
Are you asking me to answer the question I posed to you?
Facts are simply states-of-affairs, and there are different kinds of states, viz., brain states, physical states, abstract states, contingent states, and necessary states, to name a few. So a fact about my apartment would have to do with the arrangement of things, at least partly, in my apartment. How many bedrooms or bathrooms is a fact about the apartment. If we talk about a fact obtaining, then partly we're talking about the existence of those states-of-affairs. If the state exists, then the fact obtains.
Same question to you Sam...
What do facts obtain?
If that's how you see things, then go for it.
So what is it before it obtains?
I do not normally employ such a framework. So, I'm here to consider it...
It's a paradox, no?
Simply its possibility, i.e., if it's contingent.
Perhaps. Show me what you mean...
Modality then? Possible worlds semantics?
That we obtain facts from things it presupposes that there is something more to the world we see.
I don't think so. I mean the discussion has been about "facts obtaining" and what that means. How do you get from there to us obtaining facts?
Well, possible worlds goes beyond what I'm saying, but that too is a possible contingent fact. However, there are some contingent facts that never obtain.
Remember that just because something is possible that doesn't mean that it is so.
So they're facts(considered states of affairs) regardless of whether or not they exist?
Well, it seems inherently inadequate and/or otherwise mistaken to me intuitively... We'll see.
So, a negative fact is a state of affairs that never actually exists, and a positive fact is one that actually exists(obtains)?
That all depends upon what it's built upon...
Well not quite. Sam is arguing that they obtain by virtue of actually existing.
Sam what do all facts have in common that make them what they are, aside from us just calling them all by the same name?
Seemingly yes. Yet, the parable exists insofar as to experienced of not, and individual particular fact can obtain or not in the world.
Why do they have to have something in common? Do all games have something in common?
Takes some careful consideration, and an adequate framework...
Because you're calling them all by the same name.
What difference does that make?
Sorry, I don't understand your point.
You don't see the parallel?
And we're at ground zero.
It's a little early, so might have to wait until I can rest.
It's 8:17 here in Cali.
How did you obtain this post?
That's the mystical part! No?
Night Sam...
Same, just not time yet.
So, where did we leave off?
I wouldn't equate calling states of affairs "fact" with calling whatever we arbitrarily choose to call a "game"... a "game".
All facts are states of affairs on this view. Some are positive. Some are negative. The positive one's exist. The negative ones do not.
What sense does it make to say that there is a state of affairs that does not exist?
That seems to me to be not taking into account the existential dependency of the purported 'state of affairs'. Positive ones do not necessarily require our talking about them. Negative ones exist in only that way.
Seems deeply wrong.
Some states of affairs are not existentially dependent upon our awareness and/or conception of them. Others most certainly are.
Seems to me that the only sensible conclusion is that these so-called 'facts' obtain existence.
What are they prior to existing?
Can these facts be true? How do they do that?
Why call it one?
That the fact that the cup is in the cupboard doesn’t obtain just is that the cup doesn’t exist or the cupboard doesn’t exist or the cup is not positioned within the cupboard.
So are you asking how things come to exist? Are you asking how one thing comes be positioned relative to another?
You've misunderstood my point.
Quoting creativesoul
A proposition.
I guess there could be and are different systems of definitions about these things, but I suggest these:
1. Things are what are describable and can be referred to.
2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things.
3. A proposition is a thing that is or might be a fact.
4. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" or "False"
5. A proposition has a truth-value of "True" if and only if it is a fact.
6. A statement is an utterance of a proposition.
(But, alternatively, someone could define a proposition to be a statement alleging a fact. I try to avoid that, because it brings people (who make statements and allege) into it, but it avoids the introduction of a proposition as a thing that is or might be a fact.)
7. I suggest that an abstract fact, or consistent system of them, always amounts to a truism, two different wordings of the same state of affairs. The statements of their corresponding propositions are saying the same thing.
I give the example of this abstract fact:
"There is no true and false proposition." Someone called that an unverified axiom, but it means "If a proposition isn't true, then it isn't true." That's a truism, and, as such, doesn't need any proof or verification.
So, consistency is tautological and inevitable.
I suggest that abstract facts always come down to such a truism, without needing reference to anything outside the system of facts being spoken of. That avoids the question of an abstract fact's how or why.
Michael Ossipoff
Some people speak of facts "obtaining" or being true. When someone says that, they're using "fact" to mean "proposition" or an alleged fact.. I prefer to say that a fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things. Then, there's no need to speak of a fact "obtaining", which would be redundant, because there's no such thing as a non-obtaining fact.
Maybe a proposition could be defined as "something that differs from a fact only in that it might or not be one."
...or as "an alleged fact."
Michael Ossipoff
I agree. A proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact. A fact is that which is represented by a true proposition.
That's redundant. A supposed "state-of-affairs" that doesn't obtain isn't a state of affairs.
My own wording used to be "An aspect of how things are." But "A state of affairs" is a good definition, as is "A relation among things."
Sometimes, to that latter definition, some people add "...or a set of properties of things". But that's redundant, because properties are things, and a thing's having of a property is a relation among those two things .
I suggest that they all--all facts about the describable-realm and anything in it--come down to abstract logical facts, at the basis of all that's describable. That's what my Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism metaphysics consists of.
Because of the tautological inevitability of abstract facts or inter-referring systems of them (...regardless of whether someone wants to say they "exist" or not), there "being" a describable realm, including physical universes like ours, is explained. The describable realm is explained within itself.
And, in case anyone thinks that sounds Atheistic, no, that isn't inconsistent with Theism. Theism doesn't require that the describable realm not be self-explanatory as a complete logical system, any more than it requires that the physical world not follow its own laws.
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, "purports" (in a definition of "proposition) is a better word than "alleged", because it doen't require talking about an action of a speaker.
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, I suppose you can phrase it so.
The Principle of Bipolarity would contradict this conclusion.
What about a false proposition? Is that possible for a fact to represent a false proposition?
But it's tautologically-invevitable that if a proposition is true it's not untrue.
Consistency is tautologically-inevitable.
That consistency is the only rule governing a person's life-experience story, because it's inevitable.
That, the consistency-requirement, is why logic enters a person's experience-story, as a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
Quoting Posty McPostface
No. By its definition, a false proposition isn't a fact, and doesn't correspond to one.
A false proposition is still a thing that purports to be a fact. It's still a thing that differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or not be a fact. (...or whichever definition one prefers).
...but its truth-value is "False" because it isn't a fact.
Michael Ossipoff
So, facts are immune to the Principle of Bipolarity?
This is backwards; a fact does not represent anything. A true proposition represents a fact; a false proposition purports to represent a fact, but does not really do so.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
No, a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact.
A fact represents a state of affairs, no?
I'd say yes, but I'd better look up the Principle of Bipolarity.
Michael Ossipoff
Alright, but isn't a sign a thing?
I define things as what are describable and can be referred to.
Michael Ossipoff
Look no further than here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4290/principle-of-bipolarity
No, a fact is a real state of affairs, which a true proposition represents.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
By that definition, I suppose so. I was mostly emphasizing that a proposition purports to represent a fact, rather than to be a fact.
What's a "real state of affairs'?
The real is that which is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it. Consider these three propositions.
The first two are true, and thus represent facts. The third one is false, and thus does not represent a fact, even though it purports to do so.
So facts are mind-independent? I thought they were mind-dependent...
The present Kind of France is bald, is a fact that doesn't correspond to reality. What can you say about that>?
Facts are independent of any individual mind or finite collection of minds. This does not entail that they are independent of mind in general. If an infinite community were to carry out infinite inquiry, facts are what would be represented in all propositions constituting their consensus beliefs - i.e., the absolute truth.
Quoting Posty McPostface
It is not a fact, it is a proposition; and it is not a true proposition, since it does not refer to a real object - there is no present King of France - so it does not even represent a fact. It merely purports to represent a fact, as all propositions do.
If the king of France has hair, then "The king of France is bald" isn't a fact.
Here's what I could find about the Principle of Bipolarity:
I don't understand that. If a proposition differs from a fact only by the fact that it might or might not be one, or if a proposition is what purports to be a fact, then there's nothing about that that says that a proposition can't be definitely true or definitely false. ...might definitely be a fact or definitely not be a fact.
Propositions are understood to have a truth-value of True or False. Maybe a proposition's truth-value could be unknown, or maybe it could be known.
For example, here's a definitely false proposition:
"There is a true and false proposition" is false proposition. It's truth-value is definitely "False".
So I don't know how it could be said that a proposition can't have a definite truth-value.
Just because some propositions' truth-values aren't known doesn't mean that no proposition can have a definite truth-value.
By the way, I've noticed that someone at an Internet discussion somewhere defines a proposition as a statement, and a fact as what makes a proposition true.
Maybe that fits too, but I like defining "proposition" in terms of "fact". ...but that might just be my bias or prejudice, due to my definition being the first one that occurred to me.
Sure, I guess it would make sense, too, to say that a proposition is a what tells of a purported fact.
That just wasn't the first definition that occurred to me.
Michael Ossipoff
Hence, what do facts represent?
So, facts are independent of the Principle of Bipolarity? I don't know.
I do not understand this question. Facts are not signs that represent something else; as we established previously, they are real states of affairs. Propositions purport to represent facts, and true propositions really do represent facts.
Quoting Posty McPostface
The Principle of Bipolarity has to do with propositions, not facts.
Again, you use 'real' here again. Why is that?
Facts represent things in the world. What's this "representation" thing doing here in language?
A state of affairs that is not real is not a fact. If I were to have a dream in which I was flying like Superman, it would be a fact that I had the dream, but not that I was flying like Superman.
Quoting Posty McPostface
No, facts are real states of affairs in the world and do not represent anything else. Propositions purport to represent facts. True propositions really do represent facts. Other kinds of signs represent other aspects of the world, including qualities, things, and habits.
Quoting Posty McPostface
I do not understand this question. Language itself is a system of signs, a means of representation.
Not true, In the dream, you were flying like superman...
Quoting aletheist
Really do? True propositions really do represent the actual state of affairs? Is that more succinct?
Quoting aletheist
Representation of what, then?
Yes, it would be a fact that I was flying like Superman in the dream, but not that I was actually flying like Superman.
Quoting Posty McPostface
True propositions really do represent real states of affairs. Reality is not limited to the actual; there are also possible and necessary states of affairs that are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them, even if they never actually come about. For example, this is a true proposition: If I were to drop a stone while standing on the earth, it would fall to the ground.
Quoting Posty McPostface
Whatever you like - states of affairs, qualities, things, habits, etc.
What do you mean by "actually" here?
Quoting aletheist
So, what happens to the Principle of Bipolarity? It would not be true that you were to drop a stone while standing on Earth? Therefore, the Principle of Bipolarity is nonsense?
Quoting aletheist
States of affairs sounds right. So, what I said was true?
Actuality is existence, which is the reaction of things upon one another. If I were to jump off the roof and start flying like Superman, that would be actually flying like Superman. Dreaming about flying like Superman, or imagining that I am flying like Superman, is not actually flying like Superman.
Quoting Posty McPostface
I am not familiar enough with it to say for sure. Why should we rule out propositions that are necessarily true or necessarily false? What kind of necessity is relevant? Does this alleged principle only exclude analytic propositions, such as "all bachelors are unmarried" (necessarily true) and "some bachelors are married" (necessarily false)? My example is not in that category.
Quoting Posty McPostface
To which specific statement are you referring? Obviously we use language to express propositions, which represent states of affairs.
However, Superman is an actuality here.
Quoting aletheist
Yes, it excludes only analytic propositions.
So, in your example, Superman is not analytic, yet, we talk about him as a synthetic a priori sense. So, is he a synthetic a priori conception of the human mind, only? I mean, he could exist in a possible world, no? Therefore has he become analytic>?
Thoughts?
Quoting aletheist
So, how is it so obvious that a proposition represents states of affairs?
It's done very much the same way they make chocolate chip cookies last forever with baked on enamel and high explosives. There's a secret ingredient.
The chocolate chip cooky is teleologically purposed or instantiated to be eaten. It's purpose as bomb material or other such things is denied and is therefore nonsense.
Sorry chocolate cookie!
Where? "Flying like Superman" is shorthand for "flying like Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc."
Quoting Posty McPostface
As above, and as in the case of Hamlet, we would have to specify the universe of discourse.
Quoting Posty McPostface
It is obvious that we use language to express propositions. It may not be obvious that propositions represent states of affairs. It should be obvious that words represent all kinds of objects.
:chin:
Yes, I neglected to mention that facts themselves cannot be subjected to the Principle of Bivalence.
Why "like" being used here? Like denotes that nothing in the real world is representative of something idealized, like Superman?
Yes and no.
When all of your senses are screaming in agreement that a particular perceptual phenomenon exists, you're as sure as can be that the phenomenon somehow really exists. It's not mystical at all in that being hit over the head with a frying pan convinces the victim that the frying pan exists (repeated strikes enhance certitude).
The how or why of perception itself is the somewhat mystical bit. We are rapidly demystifying the physical biological structures and mechanisms which comprise our internal and mental machinations (in ways that can predict our behavior as if we're biological robots), but we still have that nagging feeling like something, we, are actually behind the wheel, and in so far as that relates to the "we" in "how do facts obtain?", we will likely not find satisfying answers.
Why do we actually feel feelings? We're wired to feel them (to take in stimulus, somehow parse it, and then learn via an output/input loop) but why do feelings feel like anything?
The mind-matter gap is now easily bridged, but the mind-feeling gap is not yet so.
As far as we know, nothing really flies the way that Superman is imagined to do in comic books, television shows, movies, etc. By all appearances, he simply wills himself to fly without activating any particular mechanism for physically doing so. I seem to recall that in the earliest comic books, he was portrayed more as jumping than flying - "leaping over tall buildings in a single bound" - which is perhaps more plausible.
What do they feel like?
We can invent ways to occupy our mind with things. Suppose we created a new meta-material that can interface with our minds and fly or levitate or change in form and heighten certain features that Superman has. I mean use your imagination and think about how we could become akin to Superman or woman one day.
It comes out as a brute fact, that we feel, and we can either accept or reject them as valid epistemic starting points.
How many frying pan strikes does it take to get to the center of an ontological philosophy?
Yes, feelings are ineffable. They can't be spoken of. But, we're deviating from how facts obtain their status of facthood. Is it when reality hits you ob the head?
If facts are definite things, then they would have to obtain by being judged in terms of some metaphysical strength dichotomy. We would need an essential distinction - along the lines of claiming some hard and sure contrast between facts of the mind and facts of the world.
Ok. Something to play around with...
A proposition is or might be a state of affairs or a relation among things?
That can't be right.
Do you use this notion of "facts obtaining"?
No, I'd just say that the cat is on the mat and the cup isn't in the cupboard. Might stretch to say that it's a fact that the cat is on the mat and the cup in fact isn't in the cupboard.
Why do you ask?
No, again, a proposition represents a purported state of affairs or a purported relation among things. A true proposition represents a real state of affairs or a real relation among things.
Here is an attempt at a summary of the approaches that I know of:
1. A proposition is a statement, and a fact is what makes a proposition true.
(...but I don't know how well-worded that is--It isn't my favorite approach.)
2. A fact is a state of affairs or a relation among things, and...
a) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true, and, if not a fact, would be one if it had a truth-value of "True"
(That last clause is so that someone can't assign a truth-value of "False" to their kitchen-table, and say that it's a false proposition.)
or
b) A proposition is something that has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and refers to what is or isn't a fact, and refers to a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True".
or
c) A proposition is something that purports to be a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False", and is a fact if and only if its truth-value is true.
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I think I like 2c best, with 2a as next-best.
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I don't know of any real problem in saying that a proposition is a statement. Also, I don't know of any problem that results by letting a kitchen-table be called a false proposition (...but I can't say that I've thoroughly examined the matter). It doesn't seem to matter if the set of false propositions is allowed to be extended to things that we don't really call "propositions". But it seems neater to avoid that.
Michael Ossipoff
They certainly fit my definition of things, because they're describable and can be referred to.
But any putative "fact" that doesn't obtain isn't a fact.
All it takes is being a state-of-affairs or a relation among things.
But a distinction between facts of this physical universe and abstract facts is a metaphysical assumption (...though of course a meaningfully-practical one) . I propose that the facts of the physical world are, ultimately, just abstract facts, like the other abstract facts. ...and that the describable realm (including the physical universes) consists of nothing other than abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
I suggest that the physical world centers on our experience, as a matter of "if..."
Michael Ossipoff
This definition is fine, but a proposition is not itself a state of affairs or a relation among things, so a proposition cannot be a fact. Instead, a proposition represents a state of affairs or a relation among things; i.e., a true proposition represents a fact. In other words, 2c is correct (assuming bivalence) once modified to read as follows: A proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, and has a truth-value of "True" or "False," and does represent a fact if and only if its truth-value is "True."
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
A kitchen table is not a proposition at all, because it does not purport to represent a state of affairs or a relation among things, and does not have a truth-value. Even the English expression, "kitchen table," is not a proposition, but a term; it represents a certain general class of things, rather than a state of affairs or a relation among things. However, every proposition involves terms; for example, "some kitchen tables have four legs" is a (true) proposition.
I hope I've since improved the wording.
Michael Ossipoff
This is what Peirce identified as the subject matter of mathematics - drawing necessary conclusions about hypothetical states of affairs, the universe of pure possibility. The problem with trying to extend it to the actual universe is what he called "the outward clash" - we constantly encounter resistance as we interact with other things; only some of our hypotheses turn out to be consistent with our experience. Inquiry is the process by which we distinguish truth from error - retroduction generates hypotheses, deduction explicates them, and induction evaluates them.
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I think there’s room for different definitions about that.
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Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
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“If the additive associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”
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That’s both a proposition and a fact. It’s a fact, and it’s a proposition with truth value of “True”.
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What’s said in that line is both a fact and a proposition.
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You can, if you want to, qualify what you say, by saying, “…but I only mean that as a proposition.” If you don’t say that, then you’re asserting it as a fact. Whether it’s really a fact is, of course, subject to proof.
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When you hear me say that alleged implication about 2 + 2, and if you don’t know if it true, then you have it only as a proposition. When it’s been proved for you, then it’s a fact for you.
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Michael Ossipoff
You are basically defining a fact as a true proposition, rather than as the object of a true proposition. This is inconsistent with defining a fact as a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. There is an important distinction between a sign (such as a proposition) and its object (such as a state of affairs); i.e., that which represents vs. that which is represented. There is also a third aspect, the sign's interpretant, which is the effect that it has on an interpreter.
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The meaningful definition of the actual physical universe is: The physical universe in which the speaker resides.
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The suggestion that the physical world consists of the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things is entirely consistent with our experience of the things and events of our physical surroundings.
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No physics experiment could prove, establish, suggest or imply contrary to that suggestion.
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Of course it wouldn’t make any sense to have a definition of “proposition” that makes it possible to truly (by that definition) say that a kitchen-table is a false-proposition. I just meant that I don’t know if it would result in any wrong conclusions about other matters, if that obviously inappropriate naming were allowed by a definition of “proposition”. But I added a clause to that definition, to avoid the possibility of saying that a kitchen-table is a false proposition.
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I emphasize that I don’t and wouldn’t advocate that definition without that added clause.
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Michael Ossipoff
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No, I defined a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, and I defined “proposition” in terms of fact.
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Yes, by the definition of “proposition” in terms of “fact”, that we’re talking about, a fact is a true proposition. …as a consequence of how I defined “proposition” in terms of “fact”. But I defined “fact” independently, and didn’t (in the “2” series of definitions) define “proposition” other than in terms of fact.
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Yes, in definition 1, I first defined “proposition” and then defined “fact” in terms of “proposition”.
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But, as I said, definition 2c is my favorite of those systems of definitions. In that system, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined in terms of fact. Though, by those definitions, a fact is a true proposition, “fact” is defined independently, and “proposition” is defined only in terms of “fact”.
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That is indeed an important distinction in your system of definitions.
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I’m not saying that your above-described system of definitions is wrong or couldn’t be used. My point was merely that the situation permits more than one valid and useful system of definitions.
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One thing I like about 2c is that it doesn’t need to bring in additional entities such as signs and interpretants.
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And of course it’s undeniable that when I say:
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“Given the definition of the positive integers by repeated addition of the multiplicative identity:
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“If the additive-associative axiom and the multiplicative identity axiom are true, then 2 + 2 = 4.”…
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…That, to you, is only a proposition, if you don’t know if it’s true. Then you see the proof, and find out that it’s true. So now it’s true. It has become a true proposition. … and a fact.
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Those are reasons why I prefer 2c as written.
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I re-emphasize that I’m not saying that your system of definitions, with the added entities of signs and interpretants, isn’t valid and can’t be used.
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I’m merely saying that there can validly be more than one system of definitions in these matters.
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Michael Ossipoff
You evidently have a very different definition of "hypothetical" than I and most others do. If everything is hypothetical, then nothing is actual.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
So did I - a proposition is a sign that purports to represent a fact, which is a real state of affairs or a real relation among things. A state of affairs or a relation among things cannot be true or false, only a sign can - specifically, a proposition. There are no "true facts" or "false facts," only true propositions (representing facts) and false propositions (not representing facts).
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
What you see as a benefit, I see as a mistake. Again, I think that distinguishing signs from their objects (and their interpretants) is very important in this context. YMMV.
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One accepted definition that I like is: “being the antecedent of an implication.”
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That isn’t nonstandard.
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Another well-accepted definition that I like is: “suppositional”.
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Another that I like is: “not necessarily objectively real or existent.”
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…easily satisfied, because “objectively-existent” and “objectively-real” aren’t well and unanimously defined. …especially by Materialists.
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Not by my practical operational definition of “actual”:
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“Part of or consisting of the physical world in which the speaker resides.”
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As I said, I’m not saying that your system of definitions is wrong or not useful. I merely say that no one system of definitions is the only right one.
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Yes, there’s no need to speak of a fact as true or false. In fact, I agree that it would be meaningless. A false putative-fact obviously isn’t a fact. There’s no such thing as a false fact. A true fact? Well, if trueness is what belongs to a proposition that is a fact, then it follows that all facts are true propositions, and that, strictly speaking, facts, being true propositions, are true…only when spoken of as propositions.
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Though truth or falsity of facts isn’t a necessary or even meaningful notion, it isn’t unreasonable to speak of a fact as a true proposition, and, in that limited sense, call it “true”…only when speaking of it as a proposition.
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Your definition system isn’t wrong.
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Certainly, in the definitional system that you’re speaking of. I repeat that your definition-system isn’t wrong or un-useful.
Michael Ossipoff
That sounds fine by me. I asked because it would affect/effect how the conversation goes if I knew that much.
Again?
Have we discussed this already?
Nothing here jumps out to me as being wrong.
Propositions are existentially dependent upon language on my view...
What's yours on this?
What exactly do you mean by "existentially dependent"? Following Peirce (again), I would say that propositions - and all signs, for that matter - exist only when embodied in what he called "replicas," which include but are not limited to their expressions in various languages. The same proposition (or other sign) can (and usually does) exist in multiple replicas, which can be in different languages and even other kinds of sign systems. For example, a properly functioning weathervane is a replica of the proposition, "The wind is blowing from that direction."
What's that?
A replica is an actual embodiment of a sign, such that it can be interpreted as such within a particular system of signs. The same word can appear many times on a page or screen, and each of these is a replica of that word. The version of this post that I typed and submitted on my computer is one replica of it; what you are reading now is another.
You lost me. And how does this affect the obtaining of facts?
All propositions are language.
How do "facts" come into the picture here? Are facts states of affairs on your view?
So...
Propositions represent one of two things. Facts and/or relations. True propositions represent real facts and/or real relations. What do false propositions represent?
Facts obtain if they're real?
Indeed. The question on my end is how do facts obtain their status of facthood.
That's one that I've found imperative to understanding this framework as well.
So, can we say that facts are representations of states of affairs, and then delve more deeply and state that facts are logical relations between objects in logical space?
We could if we abandon the meaning of "fact" as states of affairs.
I think that is pertinent to advancing this discussion about what facts are. Facts are states of affairs in logical space.
What's that?
See:
https://www.quora.com/What-is-Wittgenstein-s-Logical-Space#
Logical space has lost its meaning nowadays, so it has inherited a new meaning called "state space".
This discussion is about one particular framework, or so I thought it was...
You can try and do that; but, Wittgenstein already did most of the work for you. Just sayin.
I'm a fan of Witt, and I'm a vehement opponent as well.
Yes.
Quoting creativesoul
What do you mean by that?
That can't be right.
Like what? His Tractatus is partially right; but wrong on some parts like the picture theory of meaning. If you lived in a two-dimensional world, then everything would be right with the Tractatus.
How so?
His conception of belief. It's an aside. Not relevant to this fact talk.
Oh, OK. Start another thread then. I'd been keenly interested in it.
True. I agree that facts cannot be false. But, in logical space with possible worlds, they can be wrong in another possible world.
It gets frustrating to introduce possible worlds, but they are true also.
There's the Ongoing Tractatus thread I created. Let me know if you want to post in it.
The actual was once the possible.
Would you concur or object?
Yes.
Quoting creativesoul
I would agree with that sentiment.
Can’t it be both? Words can have more than one meaning. “It is true that” and “it is a fact that” seem to be saying the same thing, so the thing which is true in the first case (a proposition?) is the thing which is a fact in the second case.
Propositions can be (and often are) expressed in language, but are not themselves language, whatever that would mean. The same proposition can be (and often is) expressed in different languages, so the proposition itself does not depend on those languages for its reality as a general sign, only for its existence in particular replicas. I already gave the example of a weathervane as the expression of a proposition without language, although it can be translated into one, such as "the wind is blowing from that direction."
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, we established earlier in the thread that facts are real states of affairs or real relations among things; i.e., they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks about them.
Quoting creativesoul
False propositions purport to represent facts, but do not really do so; i.e., they represent unreal states of affairs or unreal relations among things.
Quoting creativesoul
All facts are real, so all facts "obtain." A state of affairs or relation among things that does not "obtain" is not a fact. I tend to avoid the use of "obtain" in this context, because in ordinary usage it carries the idea of getting something not previously possessed.
Indeed, but in philosophy we often try to narrow down their definitions for the sake of greater conceptual clarity. That is my approach here.
Quoting Michael
A proposition is true iff it represents a fact, but a fact is not something that can be true or false at all, so a proposition and a fact are not the same thing. When I say, "it is true that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," is true. When I say, "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals," I am saying that the proposition, "all dogs are mammals," represents a fact.
When I say "it is a fact that all dogs are mammals" I am saying that the proposition "all dogs are mammals" is a fact.
Why does it provide more clarity to use the term "fact" to refer to the thing which a true proposition represents? Is it better somehow to treat "a state of affairs" and "a fact" as synonyms rather than to treat "true" and "a fact" as synonyms?
Personally, I find it clearer, perhaps because I consider it important to emphasize the representational nature of a proposition. "Fact" is then a concise term for its object, if it is true.
As I mentioned in my previous reply to that passage, I don't think we mean different things by "hypothetical".
But yes, the meaning of "actual" is what is in doubt. I don't know what you mean by "actual". I suggest that there's no reason to believe that anything describable is objectively-existent--but I readily admit that I don't know what "objectively-existent" would mean.
This physical world is, of course, fully real and existent in the context of your life
What more existence or reality would anyone want or claim for it? In what other context would anyone want or believe it to be existent and real?
And, if this physical universe is only real and existent in the context of your life, then its reality and existence are a bit more tenuous than a Materialist would have us believe.
If your experience is the basis, in the describable world, for what describably is, then that implies a tenuousness for the existence the describable world and its things.
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Elsewhere in these forums, I've posted a more complete discussion of my suggestion that the basis of the describable realm is your life-experience story, with complementarity between you the protagonist and your physical surroundings of your experience. ...a hypothetical experience story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications s about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
...with logic entering that experience-story simply because of the requirement for consistency--because there are no mutually-inconsistent facts.
Michael Ossipoff
A raisin is a grape that has been dried. It would be redundant to speak of a raisin that has been dried, because all raisins have been dried. But it's not incorrect to call a raisin a dried grape.
A fact--a state of affairs or relation among things--is (by the definition of "proposition") a true proposition. It would be redundant to speak of a true fact, because every fact is a true proposition. But it's not incorrect to call a fact a true proposition.
These intermediaries of sign, representation, etc aren't incorrect, but they're unnecessary to this topic.
Michael Ossipoff
Why not, if everything is hypothetical? Mere possibilities that are mutually inconsistent are not problematic at all; that is just what contingency means. What constrains facts to be consistent with each other, if nothing is real (as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it) and nothing is actual (reacting with other things)?
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
So you define a true proposition as a state of affairs or relation among things? Why not just stick with calling the latter a fact? What advantage do you gain by treating "true proposition" and "fact" as synonyms?
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Perhaps unnecessary, but (in my view) helpful. The benefit of defining a fact as the object of a true proposition is highlighting the representational nature of all propositions.
You've arrived at incoherence(self-contradiction)
Judging by your avatar name, I suspect you do not mind.
Please point out my self-contradiction, so that I may correct it.
Quoting creativesoul
What do you think it means?
Not all states of affairs are fact. All facts are states of affairs.
These two statements are not contradictory. Not all mammals are dogs. All dogs are mammals. In any case, here is what I actually said about facts.
Quoting aletheist
Unreal states of affairs are not facts. All facts are real states of affairs. Again, no contradiction.
And by the way, "aletheist" comes from the Greek word "aletheia," which means truth; I am someone who believes in truth.
My mistake. Apologies.
Apology accepted, although I am still curious - what did you think it meant, such that you suspected me of being comfortable with incoherence/self-contradiction?
Agreed. Right now, I'm considering what you're arguing...
Not all states of affairs are facts. All facts are states of affairs. There are two kinds of states of affairs then:Real states of affairs and unreal states of affairs. Real states of affairs are fact. Unreal states of affairs are not.
Propositions represent both real and unreal states of affairs.
Quoting aletheist
Quoting aletheist
So some propositions represent nonexistent(unreal) states of affairs, while others represent states of affairs.
How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
Quoting aletheist
Exactly. So you do not use this notion of 'facts obtaining'?
Quoting aletheist
I was confused... dialetheism... para-consistent logic... true contradictions...
I'm tempering my judgment... a little late, but the above very well may be wrong.
So, this admits - good or bad - that propositions are not existentially dependent upon language?
I have significant trouble accepting that.
It does not follow from the fact that the same proposition can be expressed in different languages that propositions exist independently of language.
Multiple languages can talk about the same thing. If we are going to claim that whatever they are talking about exists independently of language, then we ought at least get what they're talking about right. They're not talking about the proposition. They're talking about the states of affairs. Some states of affairs can exist independently of language. Others cannot. Relationships as well...
Without language there is no propositional meaning, on my view. Translation presupposes pre existing meaning, a plurality of languages, and someone who can translate what the one says into the other.
Propositions exist in more than one way?
This happens all the time. Shakespeare wrote a play that represents a man named Hamlet who was prince of Denmark. No such person ever actually existed. Signs can represent possibilities and necessities, not just actualities. Reality is not coextensive with existence (more below).
Quoting creativesoul
Like I said, I tend to avoid it as potentially fostering confusion.
Quoting creativesoul
Ah, I see. That would have made sense if I had called myself "dialetheist." :grin:
Quoting creativesoul
True, but I have not claimed otherwise. Much hinges on what we mean by "exist" in this context. Following Peirce, I define it as reacting with other things. Propositions and other signs do not exist in this sense apart from their embodiment in languages or other sign systems. However, the reality of a proposition does not depend on any (or all) of its actual embodiments - the proposition itself, as a general type rather than an individual token, is as it is regardless of what anyone thinks about it.
Quoting creativesoul
Agreed. That is basically what I mean by real states of affairs and real relations among things - they are as they are regardless of what anyone thinks (or says, or writes) about them (in a language or other sign system). Some real states/relations also exist - if they are involved in, correspond to, or govern reactions between things.
I find myself in agreement with much of what you have proposed. Not all.
I'll outline our agreements first, if you'd care to elaborate with me.
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I said that the propositions, and the things that they’re about are hypothetical. In that sense, the story itself is hypothetical. I didn’t say that everything is hypothetical.
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There’s no such thing as a fact that’s hypothetical. …unless you mean “proposition” instead of “fact”.
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If you want to say that propositions are hypothetical facts, that would wrongly imply that all propositions are facts. Better to say that a proposition is a thing that has a truth-value of True or False, and has a truth-value of True if and only if it’s a fact, and, if not a fact, would be one if its truth-value were True.
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…or some such wording.
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Maybe just say that a proposition is something that purports to be a fact.
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Abstract implications are facts, and, as such, they’re true propositions. They aren’t hypothetical. The propositions that they’re about are hypothetical.
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Yes, there are mutually-inconsistent propositions:
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“There’s a watermelon on that [some particular] table.” “There isn’t a watermelon on that table.”
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For two alleged facts (propositions) to be mutually-inconsistent means that one of them implies the falsity of the other.
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So, saying that there aren’t mutually-inconsistent facts is the same as saying that there aren’t true and false propositions.
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Saying that there isn’t a true and false proposition is the same as saying (for one thing):
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“If a proposition isn’t true then it isn’t true.”
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That’s an obvious truism, a tautology, and, as such, doesn’t need any proof.
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Saying that two facts are contradictory, or that there’s a true and false proposition, would contradict that tautology.
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…as what is? Your meaning there isn’t obvious.
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If “actual” means “reacting with other things”, then all the things in the logical system that I speak of are actual, because they interact.
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A good definition of “actual” is:
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“Physical; and part of, in, or consisting of, the physical universe in which the speaker resides.”
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But yes, I agree that defining “actual”, “real”, “existent”, “substantial” and “substantive” is a big problem for objectors to my metaphysical proposal.
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I ask people, if they think that this physical world is somehow more than just the hypothetical setting for a life-experience-story consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things—then in what way is it more than that?
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“Actual”, “real”, “existent”, “substantial”, or “substantive”? Then what do you mean by that?
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And, in what context, other than its own, do you think that this physical world exists and is real, so as to distinguish it from what I propose?
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But yes, largely because “existent” and “real” don’t have a consensus definition in metaphysics, I make no claim that anything in the describable realm (including abstract implications and physical universes) is real or existent (other than in its own context or the context of someone’s life).
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Well, there needs to be a word for something that purports to be a fact. Some such things are facts and some aren’t.
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But yes, that makes for some awkward wording for the definition of “proposition”. I don’t object to first defining a proposition as a statement, and then defining a fact as what a statement asserts. Either is alright.
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But isn’t there something redundant about the statement and what it asserts? What it asserts is a state-of-affairs or relation among things. A statement or proposition could be “There’s a watermelon on the table”. What does it assert? This: There’s a watermelon on the table. Then what’s the difference between that proposition and the fact that it asserts? (other that some propositions aren’t facts) That’s a good reason to say that a true proposition is a fact. Propositions and the facts that they assert are certainly indistinguishable when written. Their only difference is that some propositions aren't facts.
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So, that’s why I like the definition-system that I’ve suggested, in spite of the awkwardness in wording a definition for “proposition”. That awkwardness seems inevitable.
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In the definition-system that I’ve been speaking of, I define a fact as a state-of-affairs or a relation among things, but I don’t deny that alternative definition-systems can be helpful. I don’t even claim that an alternative one isn’t better, in important ways, than the kind that I’ve been suggesting.
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Michael Ossipoff
You answered your own question in how you asked it - the proposition asserts a (purported) fact, rather than being a (purported) fact. The difference is between that which represents (proposition) and that which is represented (state of affairs or relation among things) - i.e., between a sign and its object.
In order for A to represent B, A must stand in place for B.
Let Hamlet(the play) be A and a man named Hamlet who was the prince of Denmark be B...
Hamlet(the play) doesn't represent(stand in place for) a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark. Rather it creates him. B is existentially dependent upon A. That cannot be the case when A represents B. There must first be something to represent before it can be represented. The sign "Hamlet" represents both, the play and the main character. These things are existentially dependent upon one another. Without the sign "Hamlet" there could be no play or character.
Calling that a case of A representing B neglects/ignores the existential dependency.
Let A be "Shakespeare" and B be the person we call such. "Shakespeare" represents a particular person. Remove the name and the person remains...
That is a case of A representing B.
The thing we call a "tree" and a tree. Etc...
The play itself cannot and does not create anything. Shakespeare created the idea of a man named Hamlet who was once the prince of Denmark, and then wrote about it in the play, which represents that idea. That is why Hamlet (the man) is not real - he is as he is entirely because of what Shakespeare thought (and wrote) about him, rather than being as he is regardless of what anyone thinks about him.
If A represents B, then B must exist prior to A otherwise there's nothing to represent. It only follows that A is existentially dependent upon B. That which is existentially dependent upon something else cannot exist prior to that something else.
Let the play Hamlet be A. Let B be Shakespeare's idea.
There is no way possible that the entire play Hamlet was complete in Shakespeare's thought prior to pen. Seems to me that the play and the idea are pretty much one in the same.
Quoting aletheist
Quoting aletheist
:yikes:
How can one thing represent something else if that something else does not exist to begin with? There's nothing to represent.
Hamlet didn't suffice...
Nonsense; people often refer to imagined scenarios (states of affairs).
There seem to be two senses of 'fact'. Statements are referred to as 'facts'; this is the sense in which the encyclopedia is understood to be a compendium of facts. States of affairs are also understood to be facts; so-called ostensive facts. However, states of affairs cannot be exactly the same things as facts, since we can have imaginary or possible states of affairs, but it seems wrong to speak of "imaginary facts".
So "the present king of France is bald" presents an imagined or possible state of affairs; but it seems wrong to say that it is a fact. It would be a fact if the state of affairs it represents were actual.
Since unreal states of affair and relations do not exist, there is nothing to represent.
Hamlet sets out a plethora of unreal states of affairs. There are true propositions about Hamlet.
Something is definitely wrong with this account...
What reason is there to posit imaginary states of affairs or possible ones?
What do they have in common with actual states of affairs that make them count as states of affairs?
Imaginary or possible states of affairs are counterfactual. Hillary Clinton could have been the president, for example.
Hypotheticals are clearly not, or at least may be not, actual states of affairs; they are imagined states of affairs. You do seem to be piddling...in the puddle...stirring up what has already been settled...and muddying the waters...as usual...
That's all I ever do aside from systems analysis and creation...
Hypotheticals are not necessarily imaginary states of affairs; they may turn out to be actual. The utility of the distinction between actual and imaginary states of affairs seems obvious.
To make distinctions, provided there are real differences between the things being distinguished, leads to clarity and nuanced thinking.
Quoting creativesoul
So, what's you point?
That they are concatenations of real or imaginary events, processes, things or relations.
Quoting Janus
Muddle.
There's a useful distinction in this context.
So what? This neither contradicts nor even relates to anything I have said, as usual... :roll:
What do words like "unicorn" and "phoenix" represent? If your statement is correct, how are we able to talk about things and events that are in the future - i.e., that do not (yet) exist, and may never actually exist?
Quoting creativesoul
There are true propositions about Hamlet (the play) because Hamlet (the play) exists. There are propositions about Hamlet (the character) - such as "Hamlet was the prince of Denmark" - that are true only within the universe of discourse established by the play. Shakespeare really imagined and wrote about Hamlet as the prince of Denmark; but Hamlet was not really the prince of Denmark.
What you are calling "imaginary events" have not happened. Events happen.
Why must something happen in order to count as an event? If events rely on happening in order to qualify as events, then are past events no longer events since they are no longer happening? Your proposed elimination of usages of the term 'event' to refer to imaginary or possible happenings seems pointless, since the distinction between actual and potential, possible or imaginary events is perfectly well understood by most everyone (apart from you apparently).
Complex thought and belief.
Quoting aletheist
Talk about the future represents our thought and belief about what has not happened.
There is a distinction between actual and possible. That which is actual has happened. That which is possible has not.
Quoting Janus
Past events happened.
Quoting Janus
Disagreement is not misunderstanding.
There is a difference between things that have happened and things that have not.
Yes, and future events will happen, possible events might happen and imagined events are imagined as happening. So what?
Quoting creativesoul
You don't appear to be understanding the distinctions between events which happen, are happening, will happen or might happen and events which are merely imagined to happen, to be happening, to be going to happen or to be likely to happen.
You say that there is a difference between things that have happened and things which have not; and you seem to be implying (or more than merely implying; asserting although you have given no argument) that the former qualify as events and the latter do not; rather than employing the much more sensible distinction (as is almost universally done) between events (rather than calling them "things") that happen and those that do not. All you are really arguing about is the definition of a word; and your definition is contrary to common usage without any cogent reason for being so.
They have not happened. They are not events. They are imaginings.
I understand just fine. You're calling things that have not happened "events". I'm not. You're calling imaginings "events". That is to conflate that which has happened with that which has not, to put it mildly... There are all sorts of other issues that haven't been mentioned yet. I'm being nice.
Piddling.
So what? The purpose of the conditional "actual" is to make that distinction. There are imagined events and there are actual events; they both involve concatenations of things, people, processes and/ or relations. If you want to coin a different term to designate imagined events; what term are you proposing; and what would be the advantage of doing away with the actual vs imaginary/possible/ potential distinction?
The one consists of what has happened. The other consists of thought and belief.
Remove our language. What's left of the possible? Nothing.
The two are not the same. Why call them both by the same name?
Quoting Janus
All meaningful language use satisfies this criterion.
Yes, as you said you are "piddling"...piddling is indeed the word, and I will waste no further time with your sophistical pedantry and self-aggrandizement. You wonder why I don't take you seriously sometimes! It's not to do with me disliking your style as you previously suggested, it's to do with a lack of cogent content.
...if you think that an imagined "state of affairs" is a state of affairs.
Your fallacy results from your calling it a "state of affairs" when it's only something imagined, and not necessarily a state-of-affairs.
An "imagined 'state-of-affairs' " is a proposition, but it isn't necessarily a state of affairs.
Michael Ossipoff
Whenever anyone predicts anything about what the future is going to be like they are imagining states of affairs which may or may not come to be. When you wonder what really happened in the past and hypothesize that certain events occurred, you are imagining states of affairs which may or may not have happened. If you think you have discovered that an event you thought happened in the past did not in fact happen, then you don't usually conclude that what you thought was an event that you believed had happened now no longer qualifies as an event, but rather that it turned out to be an imagined, as opposed to a real, event.
That is the common way to think about what states of affairs or events are, and I can't see any good reason to reject that way of thinking. Certainly no one here has come up with a good reason for saying that people cannot actually imagine past or future events unless the events had happened, or will happen, respectively.
All imagined 'events' are linked together by thought and belief. All imagined events consist entirely of thought and belief. They are no where else to be found. There are three kinds of imagined 'events'. They include 1.thought and belief about what has already happened, 2.thought and belief about what is currently happening, and 3.thought and belief about what has not yet happened.
Imagined 'events' about what has already happened and/or is happening can be true/false. 'Actual' events cannot. Rather it is precisely the 'actual' events that render imagined 'events' true/false.
Imagined 'events' about what has not happened include all of the false imagined 'events' about what has happened(they are false because they did not happen), all of the false imagined 'events' about what is happening(they are false because they are not happening), and all thought and belief about what has not yet happened - all imagined future 'events' - regardless of whether or not they become true/false by virtue of happening or not.
So, here we have arrived at a group of imagined 'events' that have not happened. This group includes all false imagined events and all imagined future events which have yet to have been determined as either.
If all facts are states of affairs, and all states of affairs are results of actual events, and only the actual is real, then it only follows that there are no such thing as real or actual future states of affairs.
So, perhaps it is here, in this context, that a proposition about future states of affairs(imagined 'states of affairs' and/or 'events') can obtain the status of actual events/states of affairs(fact)?
This notion of facts 'obtaining' could be a means of distinguishing between imagined states of affairs that are false as a result of not happening and imagined states of affairs that aren't able to be true or false as a result of not happening.
Piddling.
Utterances of hought and belief about what has not happened cannot be true at the time of utterance.
Events that have yet to have taken place are described by prediction.
Both consist entirely of thought and belief. Both are about what has not happened. There is no other kind of belief about what has not happened.
We can say true things about Hamlet, even though Hamlet consists of imaginary events and people. That is solely as a result of the fact that we're offering an account of Hamlet and in doing so the only standard for truth is correspondence with/to the story itself. The story itself is the result of actual events. In saying true things about Hamlet, we're not saying true things about what has not happened. We're saying true things about what has. The writing of Hamlet has happened.
Again, yes what you have said is piddling (strange your habit of commenting on your own work), and nothing to do with your claim that imagined events that do not obtain do not qualify as events. You even use the term " imagined event" which shows your self-contradiction.
Adopting a framework as a means for contemplating it's utility is not self-contradiction.
Piddling includes adopting foolish frameworks, and dealing with foolish people.
In what way does referring to events that are either fictional and therefore don't happen, or hypothetical and therefore may or may not happen, or have happened, as 'events' lack utility?
Straight answer for once instead of the endless evasion and irrelevant bullshit assertions.
You're making this all a bit too fun for me. Take as much rope as you need.
Fiction, falsehood, and prediction all consist entirely of thought and belief about what has not happened.
Events do not.