ShawnOctober 11, 2018 at 00:0312600 views34 comments
Taking the trolly case as an example, can a utilitarian calculus be ever devised? How does one mitigate the problem of time-respective utility maximization?
Comments (34)
unenlightenedOctober 12, 2018 at 12:06#2198940 likes
Well the fat man was just about to produce such a calculus, the benefit of which would have been incalculable, but some short-sighted consequentialist pushed him in front of a trolley.
LD SaundersOctober 12, 2018 at 15:14#2199130 likes
Who cares about the alleged "utility-maximization"? What's a util and how can one objectively measure it? And even if one could objectively measure it, how would that be meaningful from an ethical standpoint?
Utilitarianism has a lot of problems, and has been exposed as an inadequate moral theory, despite attempts from people like Singer to make it the be-all and end-all of morality, and one of its failures is the very straightforward notion that it is impossible to compute it. So, even if hypothetically it was the entire basis of morality, we would still not be able to rely on it to answer moral issues.
Andrew4HandelOctober 12, 2018 at 16:12#2199210 likes
Utilitarianism has a lot of problems, and has been exposed as an inadequate moral theory
I agree with this.
I think the idea of a utilitarian calculation is problematic for various reasons. I don't think pleasure and pain are similar things to reach an equality with.
Pain is almost indisputably bad even just by basic definition (outside of sadomasochism) which makes Negative Utilitarianism and pain minimisation most realistic. This is a negative morality.
On the other hand pleasure can be attached to dubious things like overeating and causing obesity and heart disease and even Nazis and slave owners experienced pleasure. So I don't think pleasure can outweigh pain in a meaningful ethical way or that pleasure equals the good.
Another issue is how you make the measurements and what boundaries you set and what things you include and all these things appear arbitrary. For example we can consider the welfare of unborn children,we could include more and more animals and even plants and environments or planets in a calculation. Adding and subtracting things arbitrarily skews the equation.
We might conclude what is good for us now is not good for people in the future. (climate change etc) The future itself is unknown so how can we know what the impact of an action will be long term?
I think minimising pain and increasing pleasure are fine but not really moral issues. There is meta-ethical issues to go through first (Why is pain bad & pleasure good? etc)
Reply to Posty McPostface Biologically, happiness and pain are chemical reactions. They're complex and yet to be understood but if they are just chemical reactions they can be quantified. Right?
If happiness and pain can be quantified they can be accurately compared and this would allow us to develop a utilitarian calculus right?
What do you think?
unenlightenedOctober 12, 2018 at 18:58#2199550 likes
Just to elaborate on what I mean by "time-respective utility maximization". I mean to say that the assessment of utility is time-bound; but, we can't peer into the future and say what will happen. Therefore, we are constrained to the present moment in making decisions.
Well the fat man was just about to produce such a calculus, the benefit of which would have been incalculable, but some short-sighted consequentialist pushed him in front of a trolley.
Well, yes. This is the heart of the issue. Where one cannot deal with the calculus time-bound. It must be a calculus that encompasses the entirety of time in the future. Therefore it's impossible to calculate what is of maximal utility, at least when presented with future events.
"Can a utilitarian calculus ever be devised"? Yeah easy. You just need a formula that simplifies to a function of one variable.
"Will that formula reflect my emotional view of a situation?".
Firstly, it is unlikely that my emotional view is very clear. Hell! At least a formula can make a decision!
But if I do have a clear emotional view, then that could be factored in to the formula to make it more "accurate". If the formula is allowed to be a computer program with lots of ifs and buts, then such factors can be accomodated provided they are consistent.
I agree with most if not everything you have said about utilitarianism. But, the net-utility is still of value to analyze. As to how to define utility, could be a question worth exploring.
The calculus must fail, and one ought to walk away from Omelas.
Interesting book. What's it 'bout?
unenlightenedOctober 12, 2018 at 20:58#2199690 likes
Reply to Posty McPostface It's a short story thought experiment. Wiki has the essence of it. Imagine a great society, according to whatever utility you want to use, everyone is healthy wealthy and wise, or whatever, everyone cooperates and cares for each other... paint the nearest thing to perfection you can realistically imagine, and then add a small price, that one person will be deprived of all this and live in misery and squalor, and this miserable life is the essential learning tool through which everyone else's wonderful life is sustained. That is, maximum utility depends on a radical unfairness and cruelty to one. Is it a price worth paying?
one person will be deprived of all this and live in misery and squalor, and this miserable life is the essential learning tool through which everyone else's wonderful life is sustained.
That certainly sounds emotionally unappealing. I can't imagine it is difficult to translate into a very large negative amount in the calculus.
Yes, though, this leads to the crude understanding that utilitarianism is a hedonic philosophy, which isn't necessarily true.
Isn't Utilitarianism maximizing happiness?
As for the the time-perspective you mention I agree. Consequences are very hard to predict given that the causal chain extends into infinity. Hitler was, in the short term, very bad, killing 6 million people but, if it wasn't for him, many third world countries would still be under colonial rule. Bad example?
I don't think there is a principled difference between the consequences over time and any other consequences - for example the consequences over all people/the environment and so forth. Any formula has to be as accurately predictive as possible over all consequences.
Reply to unenlightened in that case, the suffering of the child will cause the suffering of everyone else in society as it is emotionally and ethically unappealing and this will be reflected in the calculus making that system unviable. However, if no one (or very few people) knew about his suffering then absolutely yes it will be worth it. We already have people who suffer as described in every moral system except in this case it will be only be one person.
unenlightenedOctober 13, 2018 at 09:02#2200480 likes
in that case, the suffering of the child will cause the suffering of everyone else in society as it is emotionally and ethically unappealing and this will be reflected in the calculus making that system unviable.
I don't agree. Perhaps it is worth going into a little. Unfortunately, it is simply not the case that another's suffering makes me suffer that much. If it was generally the case there would be no need for morals in the first place. If hurting you hurt me as much, no one would hurt another. I would prefer not to see homeless people on the street, but not so strongly as to make myself poorer, or give up my own comfort to change their situation. We do have many people who suffer, and in this example, that is reduced to one, and by hypothesis, this is the minimum of suffering. Theemotional suffering of all is the necessary minimum to sustain a kindly peaceful beneficial society.
In other words, most people will regretfully accept the suffering of one, for the benefit of many, and their regret will console them that they are suffering too. But it is immoral to do so, and utilitarianism that counts justice the supreme value in its calculus is no longer utilitarianism, but deontology.
Reply to unenlightened I didn't mean it like that. I meant that if the entire population knew that their happiness is sustained by the suffering of an innocent child, that eventually some are going to form a resistance to the system due to the suffering it causes them to know that they are sustaining an unfair system and that resistance will cause massive suffering in the long run. Basically, there will be people like you who will be strictly opposed to the system and will cause suffering to everyone else by being opposed (I don't mean this in a negative way at all).
most people will regretfully accept the suffering of one, for the benefit of many
Keyword: Most
Some will be staunchly against the idea and those some will be the main cause of suffering in the calculus. So in the end, the unjust suffering of one person, if known to everyone, will be reflected in the calculus as an unviable system due to the staunch disagreement of a few.
unenlightenedOctober 13, 2018 at 12:40#2200680 likes
So in the end, the unjust suffering of one person, if known to everyone, will be reflected in the calculus as an unviable system due to the staunch disagreement of a few.
Keyword: in the end
If you adjust the calculus to reflect the morality of each individual, you no longer have a calculus that can decide morality, rather morality decides the calculus.
Reply to unenlightened yes, but the morality these people have is not necessarily shared. If the entire world is made of masochists, the calculus will calculate the most optimal way to maximize pain, etc. It's hardly a morality if not everyone shares it. The calculus will decide the most pleaurable option depending on each individual's own view of morality. It will maximize pleasure depending on the individuals' view of pleasure. It does not decide a morality because a common value (other than the avoidance of pain and seeking of pleasure, in whichever form that may take) is not necessary for the calculus to find a perfect system. In fact if the world was split in half between masochists and sadists then the calculus would not have a problem with that but it would even try to actively make that the case if it could.
Reply to LD Saunders There is no end all morality. Constantly it is a game of ethics to contain what could be accepted as morality. There will always be the inability of ethics to be morality. Ethics is a reference for morality.
On the other hand pleasure can be attached to dubious things like overeating and causing obesity and heart disease and even Nazis and slave owners experienced pleasure.
John Mill has arguments against this, namely that the pleasure of mozart is a higher pleasure for someone who can appreciate music thoroughly than for someone who does not know anything about music, mozart, music theory or art at all. There are thus 'higher' pleasures; that is, rolling around in the mud for a pig is a lower pleasure than, say, listening to mozart, bach or beethoven. Obviously there are problems often with utilitarianism, but John Mill makes countless points and, if I remember correctly, addressed everything you just said.
Reply to Andrew4Handel the question of why pleasure or pain is good or bad is irrelevant. People prefer pleasure to pain. Pleasure is, in a sense, the escape from pain, the stopping of pain. Sadomasochism... That is not pain but pleasure. The idea of utilitarianism is to say that, given a set of circumstances, what is the sumum bonum, the greatest good, is happiness and therefore the solution to any dilemma in which the question of morality is in play (the question of what is right or wrong) will involve the realization of what solution will include the greatest amount of happiness either for the individual himself regarding his or her own acts, or for the system itself, which includes all thinking, judging people. The most moral solution to an ethical dilemma is what involves the most amount of happiness.
This is the utilitarian rule of thumb, and though this rule of thumb is not a categorical imperative, it often works.
My own personal problem with utilitarianism involves the use of drugs. A morphine high is by no means a low pleasure. Firstly, it involves complex chemistry and pharmacological knowledge in order to exist. Secondly, the feeling of morphine is probably one of the best feelings a person can have. So, the question of morality for a heroin addict involves, "Is it moral for me to rob this person to get money to experience the best feeling of pleasure?"
But, the experienced utilitarian can break this down. A morphine high does not include true happiness. Pleasure is not the utilitarian calculus, happiness is. Happiness and pleasure are often used interchangeably in utilitarianism. Perhaps this is the root of some problems; the snares of language. In any case though, the immediate consequence of a heroin addict making the decision to rob someone does not in any way relate to his eventual feeling of heroin, even though he is robbing for the money for the heroin, and so his judgment would not even constitute a utilitarian calculus.
Act utilitarianism does not work for the species, only a rule utilitarianism does...
In the case of rule utilitarianism, there is a fundamental calculus involved, even if the calculus does not necessarily exist to do what we wish it could do in the strict sense of utilitarianism, that is, for utilitarianism itself to be the sumum bonum, the source of the path to the greatest amount of happiness for society. The calculus already in play is the conception of right being what involves the greatest amount of happiness. That is the calculus of what is right, and the opposite would be what is wrong.
Rule utilitarianism supposes that there is a rule system that could exist that could raise the bar, the average amount of happiness, for every individual within that jurisdiction.
People simply are not smart enough nor willing enough for this to ever happen.
This is why it is an ethical theory... it works sometimes, just as any other ethical idea... But breaks down specifically when the problem is more complex than the complexity of the thesis.
Andrew4HandelOctober 14, 2018 at 14:40#2202300 likes
There are thus 'higher' pleasures; that is, rolling around in the mud for a pig is a lower pleasure than, say, listening to Mozart, Bach or Beethoven
I don't think Mill justified the concept of a higher pleasure.
But that is not what I was referring two. Higher and Lower pleasures were invented to prevent the criticism that people could reach a state of pleasure doing trivial things so that you couldn't differentiate between high and low culture.
What I am referring to is pleasure attached to destructive things.
I think there still is the problem of justifying why Mozart is Better than the worst pop music however.
If pleasure is your metric and foundation of an ethics then that ethics cannot rely on other metrics like differentiating between sources of pleasure and quality of pleasure and still be the same utilitarian ethics.
Andrew4HandelOctober 14, 2018 at 14:50#2202320 likes
I think it is hard to justify the claim that any pleasure or happiness is good. one the reasons is the dubious exploitative circumstances these things arise from. It is hard to imagine a circumstance where pleasure was being derived in an ethical way in a fair society and where pleasure was not overwhelmed by the presence of suffering including just suffering present in nature like predation and disease.
Reply to Andrew4Handel There are shortcomings in every philosophy, including utilitarianism. People prefer pleasure to pain. People prefer happiness than pleasure. I guess we will just have to take that as our premise. Obviously there are contradictions, and that is why it is a rule of thumb.
Say, in the deciding of whether or not a person should steal, if a person considers the happiness they will receive or not receive, and the unhappiness of the person who will be stole from, one can calculate what would be the right thing to do. Chances are, stealing something won't make you happy. It might please you or give a sense of sateity but nothing more. Realizing the unhappiness which would be the result of such an act renders the act immoral.
What will amount to the greatest amount of happiness?
This is not vague. It works sometimes.
Andrew4HandelOctober 14, 2018 at 22:51#2203390 likes
What will amount to the greatest amount of happiness?
I don't think you can measure happiness and add it together. What exactly is being measured and how is it being added together?
Another issue non utilitarian values. If you stole from a huge multinational you could argue no one was being harmed. But people would like to say theft is wrong in principle even if no one appears to be harmed.
A general principle as opposed to a calculation seems more realistic. For example the principle never to hit a child. This means don't hit a child even if somehow in the long run it might be of benefit.
Comments (34)
Utilitarianism has a lot of problems, and has been exposed as an inadequate moral theory, despite attempts from people like Singer to make it the be-all and end-all of morality, and one of its failures is the very straightforward notion that it is impossible to compute it. So, even if hypothetically it was the entire basis of morality, we would still not be able to rely on it to answer moral issues.
I agree with this.
I think the idea of a utilitarian calculation is problematic for various reasons. I don't think pleasure and pain are similar things to reach an equality with.
Pain is almost indisputably bad even just by basic definition (outside of sadomasochism) which makes Negative Utilitarianism and pain minimisation most realistic. This is a negative morality.
On the other hand pleasure can be attached to dubious things like overeating and causing obesity and heart disease and even Nazis and slave owners experienced pleasure. So I don't think pleasure can outweigh pain in a meaningful ethical way or that pleasure equals the good.
Another issue is how you make the measurements and what boundaries you set and what things you include and all these things appear arbitrary. For example we can consider the welfare of unborn children,we could include more and more animals and even plants and environments or planets in a calculation. Adding and subtracting things arbitrarily skews the equation.
We might conclude what is good for us now is not good for people in the future. (climate change etc) The future itself is unknown so how can we know what the impact of an action will be long term?
I think minimising pain and increasing pleasure are fine but not really moral issues. There is meta-ethical issues to go through first (Why is pain bad & pleasure good? etc)
If happiness and pain can be quantified they can be accurately compared and this would allow us to develop a utilitarian calculus right?
What do you think?
Well, yes. This is the heart of the issue. Where one cannot deal with the calculus time-bound. It must be a calculus that encompasses the entirety of time in the future. Therefore it's impossible to calculate what is of maximal utility, at least when presented with future events.
"Will that formula reflect my emotional view of a situation?".
Firstly, it is unlikely that my emotional view is very clear. Hell! At least a formula can make a decision!
But if I do have a clear emotional view, then that could be factored in to the formula to make it more "accurate". If the formula is allowed to be a computer program with lots of ifs and buts, then such factors can be accomodated provided they are consistent.
I agree with most if not everything you have said about utilitarianism. But, the net-utility is still of value to analyze. As to how to define utility, could be a question worth exploring.
Yes, though, this leads to the crude understanding that utilitarianism is a hedonic philosophy, which isn't necessarily true.
Interesting book. What's it 'bout?
Depends on your calculus of utility of happiness. Nothing ever gets done with happy and content and satisfied individuals.
That certainly sounds emotionally unappealing. I can't imagine it is difficult to translate into a very large negative amount in the calculus.
Isn't Utilitarianism maximizing happiness?
As for the the time-perspective you mention I agree. Consequences are very hard to predict given that the causal chain extends into infinity. Hitler was, in the short term, very bad, killing 6 million people but, if it wasn't for him, many third world countries would still be under colonial rule. Bad example?
Good example. Just wondering about the time-perspective part.
Yes,
I don't agree. Perhaps it is worth going into a little. Unfortunately, it is simply not the case that another's suffering makes me suffer that much. If it was generally the case there would be no need for morals in the first place. If hurting you hurt me as much, no one would hurt another. I would prefer not to see homeless people on the street, but not so strongly as to make myself poorer, or give up my own comfort to change their situation. We do have many people who suffer, and in this example, that is reduced to one, and by hypothesis, this is the minimum of suffering. Theemotional suffering of all is the necessary minimum to sustain a kindly peaceful beneficial society.
In other words, most people will regretfully accept the suffering of one, for the benefit of many, and their regret will console them that they are suffering too. But it is immoral to do so, and utilitarianism that counts justice the supreme value in its calculus is no longer utilitarianism, but deontology.
Quoting unenlightened
Keyword: Most
Some will be staunchly against the idea and those some will be the main cause of suffering in the calculus. So in the end, the unjust suffering of one person, if known to everyone, will be reflected in the calculus as an unviable system due to the staunch disagreement of a few.
Keyword: in the end
If you adjust the calculus to reflect the morality of each individual, you no longer have a calculus that can decide morality, rather morality decides the calculus.
Rule-utiliarian calculus.
John Mill has arguments against this, namely that the pleasure of mozart is a higher pleasure for someone who can appreciate music thoroughly than for someone who does not know anything about music, mozart, music theory or art at all. There are thus 'higher' pleasures; that is, rolling around in the mud for a pig is a lower pleasure than, say, listening to mozart, bach or beethoven. Obviously there are problems often with utilitarianism, but John Mill makes countless points and, if I remember correctly, addressed everything you just said.
This is the utilitarian rule of thumb, and though this rule of thumb is not a categorical imperative, it often works.
My own personal problem with utilitarianism involves the use of drugs. A morphine high is by no means a low pleasure. Firstly, it involves complex chemistry and pharmacological knowledge in order to exist. Secondly, the feeling of morphine is probably one of the best feelings a person can have. So, the question of morality for a heroin addict involves, "Is it moral for me to rob this person to get money to experience the best feeling of pleasure?"
But, the experienced utilitarian can break this down. A morphine high does not include true happiness. Pleasure is not the utilitarian calculus, happiness is. Happiness and pleasure are often used interchangeably in utilitarianism. Perhaps this is the root of some problems; the snares of language. In any case though, the immediate consequence of a heroin addict making the decision to rob someone does not in any way relate to his eventual feeling of heroin, even though he is robbing for the money for the heroin, and so his judgment would not even constitute a utilitarian calculus.
Act utilitarianism does not work for the species, only a rule utilitarianism does...
Rule utilitarianism supposes that there is a rule system that could exist that could raise the bar, the average amount of happiness, for every individual within that jurisdiction.
People simply are not smart enough nor willing enough for this to ever happen.
This is why it is an ethical theory... it works sometimes, just as any other ethical idea... But breaks down specifically when the problem is more complex than the complexity of the thesis.
I don't think Mill justified the concept of a higher pleasure.
But that is not what I was referring two. Higher and Lower pleasures were invented to prevent the criticism that people could reach a state of pleasure doing trivial things so that you couldn't differentiate between high and low culture.
What I am referring to is pleasure attached to destructive things.
I think there still is the problem of justifying why Mozart is Better than the worst pop music however.
If pleasure is your metric and foundation of an ethics then that ethics cannot rely on other metrics like differentiating between sources of pleasure and quality of pleasure and still be the same utilitarian ethics.
I don't see how it can be irrelevant. If you claim pleasure is good then fail to give a reason for this claim then it is foundationless
My example is how pleasure can be bad for you because the things you are doing are destructive.
For example these Auschwitz personnel seem happy
https://rarehistoricalphotos.com/laughing-at-auschwitz-1942/
I think it is hard to justify the claim that any pleasure or happiness is good. one the reasons is the dubious exploitative circumstances these things arise from. It is hard to imagine a circumstance where pleasure was being derived in an ethical way in a fair society and where pleasure was not overwhelmed by the presence of suffering including just suffering present in nature like predation and disease.
Say, in the deciding of whether or not a person should steal, if a person considers the happiness they will receive or not receive, and the unhappiness of the person who will be stole from, one can calculate what would be the right thing to do. Chances are, stealing something won't make you happy. It might please you or give a sense of sateity but nothing more. Realizing the unhappiness which would be the result of such an act renders the act immoral.
What will amount to the greatest amount of happiness?
This is not vague. It works sometimes.
I don't think you can measure happiness and add it together. What exactly is being measured and how is it being added together?
Another issue non utilitarian values. If you stole from a huge multinational you could argue no one was being harmed. But people would like to say theft is wrong in principle even if no one appears to be harmed.
A general principle as opposed to a calculation seems more realistic. For example the principle never to hit a child. This means don't hit a child even if somehow in the long run it might be of benefit.