Objection to the Ontological Argument
The ontological argument assumes the definition of God proposed by classical theism: that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
This is incompatible since if God is omnipotent, then he should be able to create a being with free will; if he is omniscient, then he should know exactly what such a being will do (thus rendering them without free will). This analysis would render the ontological argument incoherent, as the characteristics required of a maximally great being cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist.
Thus this is an objection to premise 1 since such a God doesn't exist even in my understanding.
Thus fail.
This is incompatible since if God is omnipotent, then he should be able to create a being with free will; if he is omniscient, then he should know exactly what such a being will do (thus rendering them without free will). This analysis would render the ontological argument incoherent, as the characteristics required of a maximally great being cannot coexist in one being, thus such a being could not exist.
Thus this is an objection to premise 1 since such a God doesn't exist even in my understanding.
Thus fail.
Comments (50)
I would take it a step further and suggest the traits themselves are nonsensical,
Free will is the power of acting without the constraints of necessity or fate.
If God has foreknowledge of a persons choice, then the person is constrained to that choice.
Hence rendering him without free will.
If Walt could become an atheist, can God become an atheist too?
The foreknowledge of what the person will choose doesn't effect the choice the person will make, unless the person with foreknowledge tells the person but even then not in every case.
Let me demonstrate:
You have a choice between your worst possible scenario or your best possible scenario.
I know which one you will choose, does that mean you no longer have a choice? Certainly not, you still have very good reasons for choosing your best possible scenario and very good reasons to not choose your worst possible scenario. Fate has nothing to do with it, foreknowledge of something isnt fate. It is simply an awareness of the factors that will lead to a certain decision.
aside - I think the Ontological argument is elegant logic, and not a very good proof of the existence of God.
-DingoJones
It is an interesting situation that you bring up. Is it true that having foreknowledge of what the person will choose does not affect the choice the person will make? I believe that in the case of God, His foreknowledge could certainly affect the choice that one makes. I had trouble discerning what your premises to your argument might be. However, I have produced a counter-argument that may better explain my argument:
1. If you have free will to choose, then you must have the possibility to choose each of those options
2. If an omniscient God knows what you will choose, you would not have the possibility to choose anything else.
3. Therefore, if God knows what you will choose, you would not have the free will to choose (MT 1,2)
Similar to your argument, I assumed that the omnipotent God knows what you will choose. I will expand upon premise 2 as I believe that it is the most difficult part of my argument to conceptualize. To simplify the situation, let's say that you had an option between choice A and choice B. Let us also say that an omniscient God knew that you were going to choose A. When faced with these decisions, suppose you chose A. This would be perfectly fine as it is in line with what God knew you would choose. However, let’s say that you choose B. Choosing B would mean that God did not actually “know” that you were going to choose A. This seems obvious as you did not end up choosing A, so God must have been mistaken in “knowing” that you were going to choose A. In this case, God did not truly know that you were going to choose A (because you chose B instead), meaning that He is not truly omniscient. Therefore, in the cases where God is truly omniscient, choice B is not a possible choice, as God could not possibly be omniscient while incorrectly judging that you would choose A.
This would suggest that in this situation, option B is not really a possibility and that there is only the illusion that you could choose between A and B, while in reality, A is the only “choice” that could be chosen. This means that God’s omniscience really does pose an issue for free will and the ability to choose in the face of foreknowledge.
2 simply restates the position my argument is meant to dispel. It still does not follow that gods foreknowledge effects the decision the person is making. You just sort of added another layer and then draw the same conclusion.
You go into greater detail but I think you make a mistake here:
“However, let’s say that you choose B.”
If you choose B, then that would have been the foreknowledge the omniscience granted, not that A would be chosen. You’ve made a logical loop de loop here.
Lets say you are the kind of person who, all things considered equal, seeks to preserve his life rather that end it. Lets say you are given a binary choice between being executed by a firing squad or having a nice meal. I am not omniscient but I know which one you are going to choose. Obviously, the meal. Does that mean you have no choice but to choose the meal? I dont think it does. You have good reasons not to go with the firing squad, and so you do. My foreknowledge doesnt effect your decision, the factors of the choice do.
The only way foreknowledge effects your choice is if You were to be to informed of the foreknowledge, and that would be incorporated into your choice now, though you are still very likely to make the same choice in the example above. If you became aware of what you were going to do, then you might make a different decision, which would be harder for me to predict. Omniscience would get it right though and as the factors of the choice change, so would the foreknowledge.
You cannot bait and switch an omniscient being, their knowledge/foreknowledge adjusts to any changes you make to the equation. This is because the omniscient being has perfect knowledge of the factors of the choice, not because the being has precognitive powers. An important distinction.
t0: 1AM, Jan 1 1920
t1: 1AM Jan 1, 2020
P1: Jack drinks a glass of beer at t1 (the chosen act is a product of libertarian free will)
P0: God has knowledge of P1 on at t0.
(de re semantics stipulated throughout)
There is no truthmaker of P1 at t0, so how can this constitute knowledge at t0?
(where truthmaker: = an elements of reality to which the proposition corresponds)
(note the difference between a freely willed act and one that is the product of determination)
1.) Iff God made Jack choose to drink the beer at t1, then choice of action action would be a product of determination.
2.) God’s omnipotence gives Him power to look at the future.
3.) Jack chooses to drink the beer at t1.
4.) God has knowledge that Jack chose to drink the beer at t1, at t0.
5.) Jack acted upon his free will at t1 and God has knowledge of what his choice will be at t0 without intervening in any way.
6.) Jack’s beer drinking at t1 is not a product of determinism.
In this situation we are not tied to saying that God forced Jack to drink the beer, showing that a future, freely willed act is possible. Jack can choose to drink the beer at t1 and God can have knowledge of this act at t0.
Your assertion, "2.) God’s omnipotence gives Him power to look at the future."
Is defeated by my argument. God can't do the logically impossible.
I am treating A-theory of time (presentism) as true.
Relativist, while God and time may belong on a different forum, I think an understanding of how God can understand the future in A-theory of time pertains to the debate about the Ontological argument by defending @princessofdarkness situation in which God knows the future, but does not determine it. It seems that your objection goes something like this:
1. At a time (t0), a future time (t1) only exists as a series of potentialities
2. A series of potentialities has no truth making capabilities, therefore nothing can be known with epistemological certainty
3. God cannot know what happens at t1 at time t0
4. God cannot be all-knowing (1,3 MP)
Even in an A-theory of time, certainly some propositions exist at that present moment, and God knows the truth of all those propositions at that current moment. So if someone were to say, "Jack is going to drink a beer at t1" God knows the truth of that proposition, and so knows what will happen at t1. It does not seem that A-theory directly eliminates the possibility of God's foreknowledge.
To connect this with the ontological argument, it seems that princessofdarkness's case holds up, and the God can be both omnipotent and omniscient, even in A-theory of time.
Or you could be a B-theorist :)
You are asserting God knows, not showing how it can be possible. It is impossible because libertarian free will implies Jack's actions aren't determined. Drinking a beer is only a possibility at t0.
My apologies, I assumed God's omniscience was true definitionally true based on the ontological argument, and that you were merely questioning how can omniscience and free will can go together. I fail to see how you have challenged the ontological arguments premises besides rejecting its conclusion? If the ontological argument is to be taken as true, it seems that the conclusion of an omniscient God is true, and so we can then assume based on the reasoning above that there is not a problem with omniscience and foreknowledge, which I believe was at the heart of your post:
Quoting Relativist
God is omniscient (where omniscient entails knowledge of the future)
Libertarian free will exists
A-theory of time is true
Brute facts don't exist
Omniscience could be revised to mean only that God knows everything that is knowable. This would imply he can only know elements of the future that are the product of strict determinism.
Perhaps brute facts exist (God knows the future by brute fact) but this undermines some important reasons to believe a God exists (i.e. the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument).
Perhaps compatibilism is true, and therefore determinism is true, although this undermines a common theist response to the problem of evil.
Perhaps B-theory is true.
I guess, in this case, omniscience is not so much about causation as it's about truth.
1. suppose, for the sake of argument, that here in 2018 I know exactly how 2020 will unfold
2. knowledge implies truth, cannot be false, non-negotiable
3. come 2020, my foreknowledge can then not fail to occur, regardless of whatever else, everything must then occur as foreknown
4. everyone's goings and doings, my own included, are not free to diverge in any way, even if I had told everyone what would occur, since then my foreknowledge would be false
5. absence of freedom is seemingly contrary to free choice, including my own, throughout 2020
No particular dependence on causation, only on truth, as per the foreknowledge.
Theists don't normally - or classically use the 3 O's in their proofs of God. These are beliefs theists hold by faith, and are outside reason. For example - the CA 's only conclusion is there was, at least at one time, an un-created creator, that is all. The entire basis of the OA is that God is outside our ability to imagine, and in the arguments from design, only one of the O's is implicit.
It is way more common for atheists to describe this theist belief that is held by faith, as a basis of an argument and then defeat one of the O's with reason. They establish a proposition that has never been offered as derived by reason - then say it is not reasonable. This is the basis of the the argument from evil and all the O paradoxes. And the theist response to both at the end of the day is the same - we have no idea at all with the limited tools we posses, any true definition of what God is.
Necessarily, a being has maximal excellence in every world only if it has omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection in every world
1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and
2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.
It is possible that there is a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise)
Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being exists
.
Therefore, (by modal logic axiom S5) it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being exists.
Plantinga argued that, although the first premise is not rationally established, it is not contrary to reason.
finally as an aside - while i enjoy the logic in both, i think neither is a very effective proof of God -
The argument is the inverse of Anselm's from the point of view of what is possible to imagine. Anselm presents the idea of God as being so hard to conceive that only his existence makes it possible for us to do it. Spinoza presents God as being the easiest thing to imagine but that quality tells us little about either his nature or that of his creation.
1. If God has 100% knowledge of our choice, he calculated it from the factors affecting it.
2. Our choice can be pre-calculated in every situation, by the set of factors.
3. You only have one “choice” in every situation (from 2).
This infers that our decisions are direct results of all the factors affecting them. Further, these factors are going to be consequences of other factors that affected them and so on. Resulting in Infinite regress.
Unless we take the Universe to be finite, in which case all actions are just a domino effect set off Big Bang or the day of creation. So accordingly, we would have to say all actions were predetermined and every being as just a cog in a machine.
I am fine with this belief of humans as just biochemical robots, but if you add theism to the picture it adds further contradictions. How would the concept of souls align with this? How do we think about Heaven and Hell congruent with this ideology?
That seems like a dubious claim. Can I not have good reasoning but arrive at a conclusion that doesnt coincide with facts? For example, if someone did a really good job framing someone for a crime? The evidence and reasoning would not coincide with the fact.
If I believe on faith that someone can heal with thier touch, this will not coincide with the facts. I mean, there could be no god, and my faith in god wouodnt line up with the fact. Couldnt I believe in god because god revealed himself to me, granted me powers and declare me his emissary in earth? Couldnt I believe that with no faith at all in that case ?
It seems to me the 3 things do indeed conflict at times.
As an example of knowledge versus freedom (albeit somewhat distasteful according to some), consider:
1. if Trump knows that he'll run for president again, then Trump will run for president again (traditional definition of knowledge, knowledge implies truth)
2. Trump knows that he'll run for president again ((omni)science assumption)
3. therefore Trump will run for president again (1 and 2)
[sup](yes yes, I know, Trump is not all-knowing, and distasteful was mentioned, but you get the gist) :)[/sup]
Trivial syllogism, no modal reasoning involved here for example.
We can make it more specific by year, or next election, or whatever, doesn't matter in this context.
We can also replace "run for president" with "not run for president", and the resulting syllogism holds.
Surely he will either run for president again or not (and not both).
Now we may ask: what does that entail in terms of Trump's freedom? [sup]1, 2, 3, 4, 5[/sup]
4. does that then mean that Trump has lost the freedom to postpone a decision, the freedom to make up his mind later?
[quote=someone]they say that one should never do today what may be put off till tomorrow[/quote]
As an aside, Trump may harbor justified belief, which may be true or false. For true it's knowledge. That's the ontological condition, truth.
Also, "free will" is a can of worms all by itself, so I'm trying to avoid that and just go by "freedom" in some sense.
[sup](no no, I'm not trolling by mentioning Trump) :)[/sup]
Think you are missing my point.
so lets say, i say I believe by faith the world is flat. That just makes me a fool, it does not make faith itself foolish, and it is not the faith making me foolish - it is my ignoring facts that makes me a fool.
Let's next say - by faith alone I won't get a vaccination for something. There is very very reasonable evidence that this vaccination is 99% effective in preventing this illness. That just makes me a fool, it is not faith itself that is foolish, and it is not faith that is making me unreasonable. It is my ignoring reason that makes me a fool.
So my definition of faith is a basis to believe something is true and can not be in conflict with fact or reason.
If you believe something that is conflict with fact or reason - the problem is you - not faith.
I dont see how 100% knowledge over any other percentage matters, thats a question of accuracy rather than of the principal of what I said. Foreknowledge does not affect the choice being made excepting when the foreknowledge is one of the factors in the choice. (Like if you were to change your choice between two doors after learning the door you were going to choose was the wrong one).
2...well I think my point still stands. The set of factors are what the decision is based on, and people only make decisions they think are good (even if they admit its not a good decision, they will be thinking of some other good that will come of it ie i will chop off my arm (bad decision) to escape this death trap (good decision). Again, the predictability of the decision doesnt mean a choice isnt being made. It still is, based on the set of factors as you said.
For 3, I think its better phrased as “you only MAKE one decision in every situation” rather than “have”.
I think by stating it the way you did you are treating free will as something that happens in a vacuum, a sort of magical event absent of the set of factors. I think this is an obviously fallacious way of defining free will, a throughback to when religion dictated the terms so to speak.
I feel like I have a good grasp in your point, I just disagree.
Also, I didnt say faith was foolish, you are putting words in my mouth there. All I intend to say is that things believed on faith can conflict with fact or reason.
This is just a different example, illustrating a different point. I understand that not every example will show a conflict, but some do, and that is enough for your claim to be in error.
I do not think you have made headway in your point, except to attempt to define away my objections. You define faith as not in conflict with fact or reason, then declare faith cannot be in conflict with fact or reason. Again, im not saying there is anything wrong with faith, that's another discussion in itself, but only that its pretty clear to me that faith and fact (i didnt really address reason) can indeed conflict.
You should rethink this. People have faith in all sorts of irrational things. Suggestion: accept what you know by faith AS LONG AS it does not conflict with reason. God's non-existence cannot be proven, so you're position is safe. Philosophers of religion puzzle through various aspects of God, and sometimes change their opinions after rational analysis. If they simply had faith in their view of God, there would be no role for rational analysis.
First, to clarify. I believe that in your arguments, foreknowledge means: “having true knowledge of a future action, event, outcome. God’s omniscient foreknowledge would be having knowledge of all future events, actions, or outcomes” If this is incorrect, please let me know.
I believe that you are mistaking predictions with knowledge of future actions. In your example of the firing squads, you state that you have knowledge that the man will choose the meal and that it is obvious that he would do so. However, this is not representative of knowledge of his choice. You simply would have some knowledge of the person’s possible results and the desires and characteristics of that person. You then are making a prediction about what they will choose. However, no matter how likely your prediction is and regardless if your prediction comes true, it does not constitute of actual knowledge of someone’s choice. Predicting someone’s action, no matter how likely, is not foreknowledge and would not constitute the omniscience that is being referred to.
-DingoJones
I also believe that you make a good point that foreknowledge does not have an effect in changing your decision. However, that is not what I am arguing. I am arguing that God’s knowledge of a future event excludes all other future events from occurring besides the one He knows is going to happen. There is no changing the factors of the “choice” because God already knows every possible factor and knows what will occur from it. This foreknowledge or knowledge of future events would be precognitive and part of God’s omniscience.
It's not a lack of free will because it changes your present decision or affects your present decision in any way. It is a lack of free will because there is no choice in the action that you make. The omniscience of God excludes other actions other than the one that He knows you are going to take.
I think I see where we diverge. I dont think of omniscience as granting foreknowledge directly, I think of omniscience as granting foreknowledge based on infallible knowledge of the present. God would perfectly track the causality, not peek into the future. I think this is clear unless you think omniscience transcends time and space, which I take it you do?
Ya see I think god is just a perfect predictor, because he knows all that is, he can infallibly predict someones choice.
I dont think it does, I think that the omniscience only informs. It is knowledge, it can only effect something by being known if it is known by the actor/agent that is making the decisions. Knowledge, regardless of accuracy of the knowledge, possessed by someone other than the agent/actor has no ability to effect the outcome or decision. It is just data, data which indicates certain things, but does not control the outcome as you attest.
That is exactly what I am saying, just add fact as well to complete.
-Dingo Jones
I am not necessarily sure what may be entailed with omniscience transcending time and space.
However, I certainly believe that God transcends time and space. I would also believe that God’s characteristic of omniscience is not lost due to the fact that He “moves” through time and space. In this way, omniscience itself may not be able to transcend time and space, but God’s omnipotence and omnipresence (which allows God to transcend time and space) allows His omniscience to transcend time and space as well.
I think omniscience is redundant to omnipotence. Everything is. I’ve never really understood why any other attributes would be included in gods description.
1. What argument -- do exist-- does not fail?
2. What criterion -- to might exist-- did a failure-success distinction have?
3. What definition -- to only exist-- for contradiction to formulate, in principle, never has incoherence?
4. If and only If Questions [1.], [2.], [3.], have correct answer, then and only then has existence proof -- (thereby not refuting argument from incompatibility to incoherency)?
5. To whose iteration --does exist somewhere in text-- of 'The Ontological Argument' has referral, here?
6. If --indeed-- someone's understanding matters for others to not exist, does 'Yajur' refer nothing not existing to whom has not any understanding of anything (--.Or is an objection not claimed, understood by Yajur)?
Attention about Critique for Incoherency.
Were there an older version of theism, more classical -- there is a most!-- than that which is claimed,
was gender to really make a difference, for purpose of reference, had some one language not one pronoun ? Thusly: What should -- morality or ethic?-- be argued just to never conflict with what would --will or power?-- be argued, means for example that and only that, that morality does co-derive will-to-power, mirrors a thesis so gave earlier, so then subjugation is correct, because an argument might fail? While the Nietzsche is in the background sentiment is appreciated --by the way: this is a judgement & analysis & comment-- what whips about freely is a characteristic belief, for coherency to not have been morally bankrupt, neither to have need to understand when so -- i.e. being morally nil-- why. Rather. Understanding to not exist, thereby "thus fail", could be actually an unpalatable taste, even to follow the remit to dare think for oneself (Dares can always be not followed.) A reply awaits, a whip.