Euthyphro and moral agency
In brief, where G means some deity of relevance (like Aditi, Dike, Yama, Yahweh, Varuna, Allah, etc), we might express the Euthyphro like so:
† is a partial definition of G (not morality)
‡ is a definition of morality that depends on G (cf theological moral voluntarism)
(Note, the above is not necessarily a strict dilemma as such, since G could be all of moral immoral amoral alike, or some may simply define G = morality; definitions seems free for all.)
Anyway, I wanted to explore any relations between the Euthyphro and the Torquemada problem (a parallel thread).
The Torquemada problem seems inconsistent with ‡ (and consistent with †). Moral agencies aren't items you purchase at your local synagogue crafted by YHWH.
Then again, Gs are typically said to be moral agents, perhaps "superior moral agents" in some sense.
What to make of it all...?
- G acts according to morality (independence)† or
- morality is acting according to G (dependence)‡
† is a partial definition of G (not morality)
‡ is a definition of morality that depends on G (cf theological moral voluntarism)
(Note, the above is not necessarily a strict dilemma as such, since G could be all of moral immoral amoral alike, or some may simply define G = morality; definitions seems free for all.)
Anyway, I wanted to explore any relations between the Euthyphro and the Torquemada problem (a parallel thread).
The Torquemada problem seems inconsistent with ‡ (and consistent with †). Moral agencies aren't items you purchase at your local synagogue crafted by YHWH.
Then again, Gs are typically said to be moral agents, perhaps "superior moral agents" in some sense.
What to make of it all...?
Comments (4)
And while G here is some God, since i'm an atheist I believe this is just a stand-in for the more general notion of convention. Morality is the mores or customs of a people, be it theistically based or not.
Regarding the torquemada problem, I don't really believe in metaphysical free will, and so agency will be limited. It's limited by our biology, and more importantly here, also limited by our upbringing.
So I think 'moral intuïtions' arent' really so free as would have to be supposed by the first senario (G acts according to morality, where morality is something independant) or the torquemada problem. 'Moral intuïtions' are also shaped by our upbringing and the culture we live in. There's no standing outside of this... unless maybe in the case of the philospher (achetype Socrates) who examines his (moral) assumptions over the course of his live by a proces of dialectics.
Going by definitions only is already suspect in itself, and the Euthyphro is applicable to some such definitions.
If a definition along with the Euthyphro leads to something incoherent, then G does not exist as defined.
No problem if G isn't real. Hm maybe there should have been an explicit voting option for that, no matter, just use the 3[sup]rd[/sup].