is there a name for this type of argument?
One type of argument that I see often in the sciences is the following:
One wishes to refute a scientific theory, A.
One assumes that another theory, B, is correct.
One then shows that A and B give different results.
Since B is assumed to be correct, A must be wrong.
Typically theory A is a new and non-traditional or counterintuitive theory, while B is a well-established and traditional theory. What is unconvincing about this type of argument is the assumption that B must be correct simply because it is already established and popular.
My question is whether there is a specific name given to this type of argument. As I am not familiar with the literature on the analysis of human reasoning and argument, the nearest name I can think of is a straw-man argument, but in my experience a straw-man argument isn't quite the same thing. A straw-man argument in the above context would claim that theory A has some feature which it does not in fact possess, and then refute that feature, thus seeming to have refuted the theory. Or it would misinterpret or misrepresent theory A and then attack the misinterpretation. What I have described above isn't quite so blatant as a straw-man argument.
One wishes to refute a scientific theory, A.
One assumes that another theory, B, is correct.
One then shows that A and B give different results.
Since B is assumed to be correct, A must be wrong.
Typically theory A is a new and non-traditional or counterintuitive theory, while B is a well-established and traditional theory. What is unconvincing about this type of argument is the assumption that B must be correct simply because it is already established and popular.
My question is whether there is a specific name given to this type of argument. As I am not familiar with the literature on the analysis of human reasoning and argument, the nearest name I can think of is a straw-man argument, but in my experience a straw-man argument isn't quite the same thing. A straw-man argument in the above context would claim that theory A has some feature which it does not in fact possess, and then refute that feature, thus seeming to have refuted the theory. Or it would misinterpret or misrepresent theory A and then attack the misinterpretation. What I have described above isn't quite so blatant as a straw-man argument.
Comments (9)
Sadly, it is all too common both in society as a whole and in science in particular.
Regarding attempting to favor one element of the dichotomy over another, other fallacies (in the form of appeals to authority, popularity, tradition, etc...) can also accompany a false dichotomy.
The characteristic thing about the type of argument I have described above is the implicit, almost "sneaky", assumption that theory B is right. It's introduced completely casually, as if its validity is intuitively obvious. Yet, as a scientific theory, theory B is just as subject to doubt (in my opinion) as any other theory, and its popularity is no proof of its validity. If one happens to hold to the popular model, one should still be able to articulate the fundamental evidence for it, whether that be an ab initio proof or some experimental observations, or both. There's something knavish and underhanded about this type of argument that really gets under my skin, even when I'm not one of the disputants. I thought there might be some famous name attached to it, like a politician's name, or the name of someone in a famous novel or play, who used this type of argument to "win" his case, even though some people could see it was more of a trick than a good argument.
Classically we call such assumptions "circular reasoning" or "begging the question". When the conclusion (the truth of theory B) is assumed or taken for granted rather than made logically likely or necessary by the premises, then the argument is not strong or valid (respectively). He's starting with the premise that theory B is true and calling it a conclusion.
Circular reasoning is much easier to pull off when you combine it with other fallacious appeals (such as false dichotomies, straw-men, etc...). What bothers you so much about what you describe seems to be the fact that there is no solid argument to begin with, where premises are treated as substantiated conclusions.
Where A is the non-preferred theory, B is the preferred theory, and x is a result of A but not a result of B:
1. If A then ~x
2. If B then x
3. B
4. therefore x (2,3 modus ponens)
5. Therefore ~B (2, 4 modus tollens)
The "problem" is that B is a premise, and its truth is not established. The argument just shows that A and B are mutually exclusive.
Other issues may sway one towards either A or B (ideally, the "best" theory is identified abductively as the best explanation for the empirical evidence - i.e. it has the greatest explanatory power and scope), but the reasoning cited is not actually a problem.