Theories without evidence. How do we deal with them?
This topic came out of a casual interchange elsewhere, but was off-topic, so I started a new one. :up: Here is what started it:
Quoting Sapientia
Quoting Pattern-chaser
Quoting Sapientia
I used to think as @Sapentia does, then one day I wondered why I should dismiss the brain-in-a-vat theory:
Because it's ridiculous!
It is? In what way?
We'd be able to tell!
The brain-in-a-vat theory requires that the brain is fed an electro-bio-chemical 'data stream' that indistinguishably gives rise to the same impressions and sensations. Down to the finest detail.
But it's obvious we live in the real world, the one we see and hear.
Is it? Your 'real world' would look the same if you were a brain-in-a-vat! With no way to distinguish between theories, what is obvious?
But being a brain-in-a-vat is wildly unlikely!
If you think about it, there is no way you can know or calculate how unlikely it is.
Of course I can. Statistics was invented for this!
Go on then. Apply a number to the probability of you being a brain-in-a-vat, and justify that number.
An estimate, or approximation, will do, provided you can justify it.
A better statistician than me could do it.
How? However good the statistician, you still need a basis to calculate a probability. We have no knowledge or evidence that could give us that basis. Of course, the same applies to the theory that (given their limitations and shortcomings) our senses and perceptions show us a direct view of Objective Reality.
What?
Both theories lead to the same conclusion: no justified value of probability (of correctness) can be calculated in either case.
So both theories are equal, then. On a par?
No. Lacking any means for comparison, we can't correctly compare the two. The only logical conclusion we can draw about these two theories is that they can't both be true, because they contradict one another. One of them could be true, or both could be false. That's it. That is a complete statement of the logically-justified conclusions we can draw.
So the universe is a random pool of seething chaos, then?
No, but it contains uncertainties. Some of them will forever remain uncertain, to human beings. The universe does not collapse into chaos just because there's something you can never know.
...
So how can we choose a theory, when we can't even compare them?
By how useful they are to us. By the value we place on them. Having no logical argument to guide us, we shouldn't really choose at all. That's what logic tells us. But, if we must proceed, we can choose the one that is most useful to us. And that's what we do in practice, in the real world. It's why we leap to the conclusion that Objective Reality is what our senses show to us.
We need only remember that this is a guess we chose to make, against the recommendations of logic.
And we could be brains in vats or humans in an Objectively real world, or something different again. We have no way to tell.
Quoting Sapientia
I do think that [XXX] can be brushed off for being unrealistic, just as the evil demon, brain in a vat, and dreaming butterfly thought experiments can be brushed off.
Quoting Pattern-chaser
This is the main lesson that philosophy, via logic, passes to humans: that these theories can't be brushed off. No theory which accounts for all the evidence - especially when there's little evidence, or none at all - can be dismissed. We can only chose between them on the basis of utility; of how useful they are. You could be a brain in a vat. There is no way you can tell.
Quoting Sapientia
No, that's a false narrative. I'm actually doing philosophy a service by encouraging waste removal. There seems to be a common misconception, especially amongst those who are relatively new to philosophy, that the wildest imaginings to have come out of philosophy should be given more credence than they are due, and that they should be treated as being on par with views of a much stronger grounding.
I used to think as @Sapentia does, then one day I wondered why I should dismiss the brain-in-a-vat theory:
Because it's ridiculous!
It is? In what way?
We'd be able to tell!
The brain-in-a-vat theory requires that the brain is fed an electro-bio-chemical 'data stream' that indistinguishably gives rise to the same impressions and sensations. Down to the finest detail.
But it's obvious we live in the real world, the one we see and hear.
Is it? Your 'real world' would look the same if you were a brain-in-a-vat! With no way to distinguish between theories, what is obvious?
But being a brain-in-a-vat is wildly unlikely!
If you think about it, there is no way you can know or calculate how unlikely it is.
Of course I can. Statistics was invented for this!
Go on then. Apply a number to the probability of you being a brain-in-a-vat, and justify that number.
An estimate, or approximation, will do, provided you can justify it.
A better statistician than me could do it.
How? However good the statistician, you still need a basis to calculate a probability. We have no knowledge or evidence that could give us that basis. Of course, the same applies to the theory that (given their limitations and shortcomings) our senses and perceptions show us a direct view of Objective Reality.
What?
Both theories lead to the same conclusion: no justified value of probability (of correctness) can be calculated in either case.
So both theories are equal, then. On a par?
No. Lacking any means for comparison, we can't correctly compare the two. The only logical conclusion we can draw about these two theories is that they can't both be true, because they contradict one another. One of them could be true, or both could be false. That's it. That is a complete statement of the logically-justified conclusions we can draw.
So the universe is a random pool of seething chaos, then?
No, but it contains uncertainties. Some of them will forever remain uncertain, to human beings. The universe does not collapse into chaos just because there's something you can never know.
...
So how can we choose a theory, when we can't even compare them?
By how useful they are to us. By the value we place on them. Having no logical argument to guide us, we shouldn't really choose at all. That's what logic tells us. But, if we must proceed, we can choose the one that is most useful to us. And that's what we do in practice, in the real world. It's why we leap to the conclusion that Objective Reality is what our senses show to us.
We need only remember that this is a guess we chose to make, against the recommendations of logic.
And we could be brains in vats or humans in an Objectively real world, or something different again. We have no way to tell.
Richard Feynman:If we will only allow that, as we progress, we remain unsure, we will leave opportunities for alternatives. We will not become enthusiastic for the fact, the knowledge, the absolute truth of the day, but remain always uncertain … In order to make progress, one must leave the door to the unknown ajar.
Comments (146)
Surely there are sufficient reasons to brush off?
1. morality is social
2. solipsism is not
3. therefore there are morals impertinent to solipsism
4. solipsism is side-lined by anyone with moral awareness
Brushing on looks like a performative contradiction to me.
Either way, I'd find it a bit rude if you thought me a mere figment of your mind.
Brush off. (y)
(Englitch is my 2[sup]nd[/sup] language, please let me know if "impertinent" is the wrong word above.)
This topic is not about solipsism. It's about how we treat theories when there is no evidence.
There are all kinds of thought experiments and ideas, p, where all evidence is compatible with both p and ¬p, some of which were mentioned above.
What Bateson called differences that makes no difference (non-information).
I'd say other reasons can occasionally make a difference, though.
So, in the context of this discussion, how do we tell what is nonsense and what is not? That's rather the core of this discussion. How do we tell, logically and rationally, whether a topic is nonsense? :chin:
Basically "theories" without evidence are not theories. The lack of the evidence would take the speculation as a thesis at best... :)
Enjoy the day, :cool:
As Nagel remarked of Plato, in his essay Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament, that:
So out of this kind of concern, you can find some kinds of criteria that aren't really objectively or scientifically definable, but, given the appropriate sensibility, still meaningful, even deeply meaningful. And furthermore, I think you will find in many of the traditional philosophies (Greek, Semitic, Indian) the notion of the 'illusoriness of the world' is less like the sci-fi visions represented in The Matrix or Conception, and more like a sense of disenchantment with what culture and society, or 'the world', has to offer.
Whereas in purely scientific endeavours, the terms of reference are much narrower - you have a left-hand side, which is your equation or prediction, and a right-hand side, which is your outcome, experiment or observation. But the point about science generally is that it is *not* really questioning the nature of lived existence as such. Science is after all 'natural philosophy', and natural philosophy starts with certain assumptions. I think many of the puzzles and conundrums in this respect revolve around confusing the methodological naturalism which underpins the scientific attitude, with a metaphysical position, which it actually isn't. But because of the way that science has tended to move into the vacuum created by the rejection of traditional metaphysics, then we tend to look to science for the kinds of philosophical answers that it is not actually able to provide.
I would start with this. Do we need to know if a theory is nonsense? If there is no pressing need to answer the question, I'd vote for wide ranging open mindedness. Most of today's science was a crackpot theory at some point.
That would get my vote too. :up: I only used the term "nonsense" because @timwood used it first, and I repeated his term. I am questioning several posters who seem to think that an assertion (unjustified!) of 'nonsense' is sufficient reason to discard a theory which accounts for all available evidence.... :chin:
Quoting Damir Ibrisimovic
OK, theses, not theories. But you have not answered, just quibbled about terminology. :roll: Can we justify - logically - dismissing theses which account for all available evidence, just because we don't like them? :chin:
I'm sorry, but I don't see it. And your words don't seem to be helping me do so. What we do with no-evidence-theories is an element of the logical and structured thought which is the only factor (I think) common to all schools and disciplines of philosophy. The brain-in-a-vat theory is a good example because it can account for all available evidence, but our knee-jerk nonconscious-mind response is to dismiss it without further consideration. In this example, there is no logical justification for this. In the everyday world, this human ability is more useful, and more often correct, if only pragmatically so.
I'm inclined to follow C.S. Peirce when it comes to this kind of thing. Simply put, the question whether we're brains in a vat, and similar questions or claims, are frivolous. If there's no reason to think something, it's pointless to think it. Peirce put it well, I think.
"But the mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief. There must be a real and living doubt, and without this all discussion is idle."
"Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we don't doubt in our hearts."
We deal with theories without evidence by testing them. If they can't be tested, we move on.
But how do we justify, logically, this "moving on"? Please quantify your emotional assertions with some logic. Place a numerical value - and justify it! - on the probability of (say) being a brain-in-a-vat. And if you can't, then please admit that you choose to dismiss this particular theory for emotional, and not rational/logical reasons. :smile:
It was a big shock when I admitted this to myself, some time ago, and I fought against it. But if we apply - and rely on - logic, we must follow it to its conclusion, even if we'd rather not. And logic says that a plausible theory that can't be falsified or disproven is (at least until the arrival of new evidence) acceptable for use, and may not be casually dismissed.
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
Oh, I agree. :smile: But probably not for the same reasons you do. :wink:
I'm not sure I know what you mean, here. Are you saying that if something is logically possible, there is no reasonable basis on which it may be disregarded?
Quoting Pattern-chaser
I think the significant word in this otherwise absolute statement is "plausible." A plausible theory is one that is reasonable, probable, feasible. So, it would first be necessary for the theory in question--e.g., that we're brains in a vat--to be plausible. If you maintain that we're brains in a vat, you must establish that is a plausible theory before you can say it may not be casually dismissed. You have the burden of proof--Onus probandi incumbit ei qui dicit, non ei qui negat.
I may have a greater regard for considerations of utility in making judgments than you do. But It seems to me your position is based on a logical fallacy, i.e. the argument from, or appeal to, ignorance.
There are too 'collective representations' in symbols which according to skeptics have merely been fabricated and according to believers have been divinely revealed or inspired. There are some collective representations, symbols, such as the cross, the sun, the eye, and other artistic motifs that represent things in the mind that are absolutely not logical, and grounds for many for rejection. This is the terrible result of a consciousness opposed to the unconscious, which is structured more like dreams, which do not adhere to the 'clarity' of the waking state.
Both the believer and the skeptic are wrong. The mind is not the philosophy of logic, or epistemology. The mind with its desires, purposes, fantasies, ITS EXISTENCE, is fundamentally metaphorical, artistic, and ambiguous in its expression.
A theory that does not have evidence in the formal sense of a philosophical dialectic or debate may not be, in its solidity, subject to the same classification as would another theory, say, of gravity. A theory of reincarnation is comprised of archetypal ideas and unconscious symbols which absolutely transcend the logical discourse on such a subject, and encompass the inner workings of the mind, which absolutely can never be recreated, but felt and perhaps expressed... Only in art, poetry, perhaps theology.
Philosophical and scientific debate about truth seems to be so out of touch with the reality of oneself. It seems more like Hegel's master/slave dialectic.
A further thought - do you think there’s a resemblance between what you’re saying here, and the celebrated anecdote about Samuel Johnson? This is that, after attending one of Bishop Berkeley’s lectures on the non-reality of matter, Johnson was said to have kicked against a large boulder outside the premisses, saying to those he was with ‘I refute it [i.e. Berkeley’s philosophy] thus’.
I have seen many discussions of that exclamation over the years. My view is that Johnson’s action does not actually refute Berkeley’s principle of esse est percipe [‘to be, is to be perceived’]. But it seems very similar to the kind of reaction you have in mind.
You know it's okay to quote the participants of this thread verbatim. I don't see anyone here saying he is dismissing the theory cause he dislikes it.
I like the brain-in-a-vat theory, but I don't defend it.
Maybe I should ask you. What what would be the proper treatment of such theories after they'd been argued a thousand times and no one had managed to escape the vat universe to show its reward?
Besides dismissing them, or calling them frivolous, how should such theories guide us? -- that we shouldn't be choosing at all? I am inclined to believe that such a theory's adherent could also be returning the favor by calling our claims of real trees, roads, and water ridiculous and frivolous because such claims lack proof besides the mere existence of trees, roads, and water -- which, by the way, are perceptible by our senses. What would that sound like to you? -- foolishness, because our senses are playing tricks on us!
Let us also conveniently deny that we could actually see the vat, brain, and tubes.
The brain-in-a-vat scenario is not a theory, it is a thought experiment. And it doesnt concern itself with weither or not we can tell or if it is happening to us, but rather about the epistemological implications of such a scenario. Is the brain right or wrong in believing what he believes to be true, considering he truly is receiving the impulses leading to those beliefs, although in the end it's just an elaborate mascarade?
It has none of the components of a theory. It doesnt pretend to be one. It is not about ontology, but epistemology.
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
I mean: how will you justify this "moving on"? I'm asking for a formal, logically constructed and argued, justification.
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
Yes, absolutely. But I'm not saying that any/all such theories must be investigated, or even considered. Only that they may not justifiably be disregarded or discarded, according to simple logic.
OK, I chose the word unwisely. Instead of "plausible" I should've said "possible".
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
Don't start me off! I acknowledge no such burden. Like everyone else here, I submit my opinions for the consideration of others. But I am not required to prove anything. Just as you are not required to consider posts that you consider inadequately proven. "Burden of proof" disputes belong in the playground, where they should stay.
Quoting Ciceronianus the White
Perhaps; perhaps not. My purpose in exploring this avenue of absolute and unbending logic is to justify my own pragmatism. The world is uncertain, so we need to find alternatives to relying on certainty. Hence my recommendation (elsewhere) that we choose theories (the ones that come without evidence) according to their utility or value (to us).
Quoting Ciceronianus the White Really? I can't see it. Perhaps I'm just being daft. It happens from time to time. :wink:
I venture to make a suggestion. If you make an assertion, here or elsewhere, that you're unwilling or unable to support, you should make that clear when you do so. Then, those foolish enough to question your claim (which you invited people to respond to) rather than ignore it would at least have been given warning that you don't think you need to support it.
You're not required to accept this suggestion, of course, but as it would save others time and trouble, it would be a kindness. Vale.
The brain in a vat scenario doesn't describe a theory
There are a world of difference between a thought experiment and a theory. If you ever wanted to answer "but that's dumb, that won't ever happen" to a thought experiment, then you missed its point. If you did the same to a theory, you would raise valid concern about the reach of said research.
Not even, although it is kinda closer, on the metacognitive level. Still, Putnam's argument was about putting to light certain things about our epistemology in relations to our views on how directly connected our beliefs are to the world. That is all that a thought experiment does, it sets a scenario in a way to bring our attention to certain things we normally dont notice. Dennett calls them intuition-pumps, and I think the term fits well. But you need to be careful about how much pumping you do. Just like a thought experiment can bring to light certain aspects of a philosophical problem we didnt notice before (like in the trolley dilemma), it can also obscure the more relevant aspects of the problem, or simply throw you down an infinite discursive loop, which is why in the end Putnam himself said the brain in a vat argument didnt work.
Its not a theory. Its more like a linguistic or cognitive puzzle box. It doesnt posit new knoewledge, it wraps and unwraps previously held beliefs on themselves to view them in a new light.
Ah, it seems I have mis-spoken. Again. Oh well, let's try to put things right. :wink: You could be responding to one of two things, and I'm not sure which, so I'll reply to both, if I may?
The burden of proof thing has always annoyed me. It smacks to me of point-scoring, and 'winning' arguments even when my argument is wrong (and maybe even when I know it's wrong!). I consider our discussions here to be co-operative investigations, not fights. If there is any 'burden', it lies with all of us. But this doesn't mean that I cannot or will not respond to things I have said (or mis-said!), only that I don't acknowledge any 'burden'.
Alternatively, you might be referring to my pushing you to offer a logical justification for your preferred strategy of "moving on". In doing so, I am trying to get you to do one of two things. Either to admit that there is no logical justification, nor can there be, or (better! :smile:) to tell me where I've misunderstood, and explain how there is a logical justification that I have missed....
:smile: :up:
There are often different ways the logic calculation can be run.
On the one hand, I personally agree with your quote above. I think I do so because the possibility that incredible theories can turn out to be true is interesting, exciting.
On the other hand, some people will disagree with the quote. They may do so because, for them, it's more comfortable to live in a world where things are largely nailed down. For them, even if we don't have a particular answer it's necessary to feel there is some reliable method of finding answers.
In the absence of any hard answer it can be logical to put the focus on managing our emotional experience.
Quoting Jake
:up: Yes. :smile:
Quoting Jake
Well yes, I agree, and sympathise. But I'm not looking to spare feelings, my own as well as anyone else's. :wink: I'm trying to get around what we want to believe, and see whether we're kidding ourselves, unknowingly. And I think we could be, hence this topic.
Yes, it does matter. It is the topic. There are some moves which are permissible against a theory and which have no purchase whatsoever on a thought experiment. For example, questioning the likelihood.
If you spend your adult years researching the chances of survival of a 3-d human being thrown in a 1-d universe, and someone tells you "but that's dumb, that's not going to happen", that person has a point. You have spent an inordinate amount of energy and time researching something that is absolutely unlikely to happen in the history of existence.
If someone offers you a moral dilemma, say, "you are stuck in a burning building with a young child and the person you consider to be the most culturally important in the social domain you respect the most, they are both passed out, and you may only save one, what do you do", and your reflex is to say, "yeah, but I won't ever be stuck in a burning fire with John Dickerson and a kid", you failed utterly at grasping the terms of the linguistic exercise you were committing to.
Questioning the likelihood of a thought experiment is a sure-fire way of signaling how far you are from the proper philosophical attitude.
You miss my central point, with your quibbling over terms and philosophical orthodoxy. :roll: Whatever this "something" is, can you quantify how "unlikely" it is? If not, how do you know it's "unlikely"?
:sweat: "The proper philosophical attitude"? Please. :snicker: :roll:
We consider them logically especially in the way we all experience or perceive their applications. For example, we may not have evidence of consciousness, thought or emotion but we do agree on the activities which describe those identities. So, perhaps we start there, with the definition of that activity and then we include other activities related to it. Also, we should consider the objective applications when it comes to excluding other activities in the same way we considered them to include them instead of shifting to a subjective perspective. This means that if we all agree as to what consciousness, thought and emotions are, then we should also all agree as to what they are not. We should not attempt to exclude based on personal perspective something born of objective agreement. Maybe that could work for a while before actual objective proof is found.
Most of the time objective agreement is not filtered through logic and therefore perhaps a personal take on issues is the best remedy even against objective agreement especially when it rests on 'popular belief' minus the common sense.
So can you apply your recommended strategy to the brain-in-a-vat example? It's a good example because we must deal with it as it is. There is no more evidence to be found, nor will there ever be. It's possible, but we can't be more precise than that. So how do we apply your thinking to this example? :chin:
Hitchens was asserting, without credible evidence, that something as small as the rules of human reason would be binding upon something the infinite scale of gods. To be more precise, he wasn't asserting that so much as just assuming it to be an obvious given, as a matter of faith.
Given that everything Hitchens had to say on the subject of gods was built upon a lack of evidence, what he was saying can be dismissed without evidence too. Hitchens was hard selling a theory without evidence, and it seems relevant to observe how so many ardent reasonists fully embraced what he was selling with enthusiasm.
What this suggests is that many or most of us aren't actually interested in the validity of various theories at all, but rather in striking some kind of emotion generated pose.
I think the brain-in-a-vat example is a very intelligent thought experiment. However, it ignores the reality of our perception. While most of our perception relates to our senses directly, there is a level of perception which seems to be beyond them. I mean instances where we meet a person and we perceive them as compatible/incompatible or as having some kind of good/ill intentions, etc. Intuition and gut-feeling may not be right all the time or exactly scientific but the accuracy and the degree of dependability by the instinctive mechanism is quite telling. I would say it's akin to how sometimes we know we're dreaming during the dreaming process itself. I think our perception of reality questions itself as much as it asserts itself. A computer based on '2-D logic' could not surpass it indefinitely. By '2-D logic' I mean the computer will generate reality based on the queries you posit to it. But, how will it respond to 'mindless wondering'? This is because, if it does, then it may raise questions. And if it doesn't, then it will at some point seem suspect.
And, how will the computer deal with our capacity to will? This is because it is also our capacity to override our reality.
There's an informality about life which no computer or any one person can seem to replicate. I think it's because we don't just perceive direct responses, we also look into the meanings behind the meanings and at the same time we can ignore meaning and indulge in some illogical or fantastical prose which to any program would be 'chaos' - something no computer however super can relate to due to its '2-D logic'.
I think it's what 'The Matrix' tried to explain.
I believe the limit to the brain-in-the-vat theory is our relative perspective or perception. At some point someone will notice that the computer's responses are not their own.
I think the brain-in-a-vat theory is a good analogy for the relationship between our perception and reality. However, it cannot be limited to either.
The fact of relative perspective makes it difficult to use terms like 'objective'. It's why Einstein had a problem with Newton's theory of gravity. To him gravity existed beyond our planet while Newton's theory was limited to events within the planet. It wasn't that either was wrong, only that they observed the same mechanism from different perspectives and scales.
If perspective and scales of consideration were always equalized then there would be fewer disagreements.
Yes, I've seen this before, but it's just like Occam's Razor: a rule of thumb which has proved useful in the past, which we can choose to apply if there's no better way of proceeding. Neither of these razors has authority; they're just ways of guessing.
If we are choosing to turn a spotlight on such decisions, as we are here, the use of rules of thumb (guesses) doesn't seem appropriate or useful. They just help to mask our lack of justification for the decisions we make about these things. It is my intention here either to convince you that we make these decisions without justification, or to learn from you that there's something I've missed. Can you help? :chin: :up:
I mean does the brain-in-a-vat explanation [and others like it] really serve as a theory? It doesn't provide much of any explanation, the world just jumps up a level to the vat-brain world which is left unexplained. It also doesn't say anything new about the vat-world.. if it has brains then it is constrained to operate under the same laws that allow for brains and electrode, stimulators to exist.. it's not anything new.. it's literally the same world, just with an extra manufactured world in it.
That's the problem I think which is that speculative theories add unnecessary claims that do not serve the purpose of a theory. Sure it's true they could be true.. but by normalizing the belief of untestable claims you're effectively normalizing the belief in anything imaginatively possible that doesn't contradict what's already known about how the world works. You'd be normalizing belief in invisible, imperceivable unicorns made of undiscovered particles, in parallel imperceivable realities. There's no need to do that and, secondly, I don't think those sorts of claims, which are unverifiable, should have the same level of credence as testable theories. It's better to keep it in the same realm as other imaginative claims, why elevate it more than what's possible since, because of epistemic restrictions, they could never actually be a justified true belief.
Quoting Pattern-chaser
I didn't miss it, I meant what I said when I said that evaluations of likelihood are useless against a thought experiment.
Quoting Pattern-chaser
Fuzzily, yes. More likely than say, Platonic Idealism being the case, but less likely than humanity turning out to be the only currently alive form of sentient and sapient beings. It's a large ballpark, so much that the corners escapes into the horizon, but its still a ballpark. But it doesn't change anything to the fact certain linguistic methods restrict the range of responses which can be applied successfully to them.
A thought experiment is closer to a game of Dungeon & Dragons then it is to a scientific theory.
Quoting Pattern-chaser
I'm not kidding. Some people, some of my friend included, are incapable of adopting a philosophical attitude. They cannot entertain hypotheticals if these do not seem to apply directly to immediate cases. Moral dilemmas are annoying to them. Even intellectuals came be this way.
It matters. Metaphysical theories are often, if not always, indifferent to facts or actual events. That they are indifferent is an issue of contention, but not of confusion. Let us make this one thing clear.
What metaphysical theories try to achieve is coherence.
The problem is, the world it proposes approaches infinitely more complexity above a world which is not really a brain in a vat. And as the additional complexity approaches infinity, the likelihood approaches zero.
I’ve intentionally avoided this thread because it addresses a darn good, and very complex, question. Compliments to the chef.
Theories without evidence … This to me seems to make the issue revolve around empirical data. But, then, this would oust all metaphysical theories, including that of materialism among many others. In how we make sense of the empirical data is then embedded our reasoning concerning what is or, at least, what might be, given the empirical data we have. To some such as myself, non-empirical experiential data also gets tacked on; e.g. the presence of awareness, of emotions, and other aspects of mind is then intra-subjective data we all hold and can readily agree on intersubjectively … making their presence objective in the “impartial” sense of the word (it’s not an obsolete definition of objectivity by any means), or so I maintain.
The BIV scenario, as far as I can comprehend, is one asking how we can justify that we are not BIVs. Maybe this can be justified. My best go at it in a nutshell: The very idea of being a BIV is dependent on there being such a thing as real brains, wirings, and computers. Yet if we were BIVs, then all our empirical data would be bogus by entailment of so being BIVs. Thereby making our beliefs of real brains, wires, and computers bogus. Thus making the possible reality of being a BIV bogus. So the idea could maybe be argued to be self-annulling, if not necessarily self-refuting. Not claiming that in its current form this argument is failsafe, but with some tweaking, who knows …
At any rate, it’s an epistemological problem; one that, to me, addresses justification for the explanations of evidence we do have.
In thinking about the thread’s intended point, though, Zeno’s paradoxes of change/motion came to mind. How to justify that Zeno’s paradoxes are rationally flawed and that change/motion is real? Here again, the validity of what experience informs us and of what a certain set of reasonings conclude directly contradict, so the two conclusions can’t both be correct. Here, I trust the validity of awareness—which is ever-changing—far more than that of the reasoning specified, so I’m certain that the reasoning is flawed though, so far, I haven’t figured out how.
But again, to me the thread’s theme is complex. Me, I’d venture on teleological causation as it applies to choices made between mutually exclusive possibilities. We are driven toward an aim that is found in the not yet materialized future—one that is often enough itself chosen, and often enough changes via our choices—that then determines/causes us in the present to favor investigating some givens and to move on when it comes to others. Were the aims to change, the choices we make would follow suit. To me this is an intrinsic part of the logic—or, the justification—to why and when we move on from contemplating such things as BIVs or Zeno’s paradoxes.
Still, this in itself is a metaphysical position that, like others, attempts to make best sense of the evidence at hand.
All the same, I’d like to read of other logical reasons for dismissing some philosophical conundrums but not others.
Yes, this is how I understand it. When we dismiss a notion as unrealistic, we're using our nonconscious minds in the same way that we make up our minds about new people we meet within seconds. As you say, it's an instinctive reaction, and it works very well in situations that are ill-defined, maybe with many disparate variables involved. But it isn't always right.
In this circumstance, I'm trying to set aside this non-conscious response, and look at what lies behind it. Is there any logically-justifiable justification for, in this case, dismissing the brain-in-a-vat notion? I don't think there is. I can't find one, which is why I started this topic: to see if I'm missing something that someone here knows about. Am I missing something, or is it the case that our dismissal of brain-in-a-vat is arbitrary, unjustified and unjustifiable? :chin:
Indeed. But this topic offers the brain-in-a-vat scenario as an example of a speculation that is possible, but comes without any evidence. And it asks: how should we deal with such speculations, logically? :chin: :chin: :chin:
Quoting javra
I think that, because the source of our 'data' from 'the world' is Objectively (hard definition :smile:) unknown and unknowable, I don't think you can oppose any speculation of this type by focussing on the source of the data. :chin:
But BIV is only an example, and the main issue here applies to all such speculations that are possible, but that come without evidence. How should we deal with such speculations, logically? :chin: :chin: :chin:
Quoting javraMe too! :up:
And also:
Quoting Akanthinos
OK, then I apologise to all for my imprecise use of words, and re-present the topic as: how should we deal, logically, with speculations that are possible, but that come without evidence?
N.B. Brain-in-a-vat is a good example, but it is only an example, and not the topic itself. We are entirely unconcerned here with whether the brain-in-a-vat speculation is true or not.
I found your OP admirably frank. Many people, when asked what logical reason they can give for dismissing the BIV hypothesis, will almost never just say "I don't have any such reason. I just dismiss it". Instead they will engage in all manner of evasions, some of which you pointed out in the dialogue of the OP and some of which other posters have themselves attempted.
I think your question is worth answering directly. As a preliminary venture. Consider:
BIV Hypothesis (BIV): I have lived a normal life on earth for many years. Last week I was, without realizing it, removed from my body. My brain was placed in a vat of chemicals and hooked up to various electrodes which produce in me sensory experiences just like those I would have if I were still in the ordinary world. For example, I have sensory experiences as if I am in my apartment; as if I am in my office; as if I am eating by the lake. But really, I am never in any of the places my sensory experiences show me to be in. I am a brain-in-a-vat, and I have been for a week, but I never noticed it.
Real Life Hypothesis (RL): I am now in my apartment having sensory experiences of my apartment. In general, my sensory experiences as a fairly accurate guide to my present surroundings. I have never been en-vatted.
Consider a single object: a table. I am now looking at the table at an angle from my chair - at least this is what I normally would suppose I am doing. I have certain sensory experiences of the face of the table stretching away from me and of the front edges of two of the legs. As I get up and move around the table the sensory experiences change. The face of the table appears a different shape as I move around it. I have sensory experiences as of the underside of the table, the other sides of the legs, and finally the other two legs that I couldn't see from my chair. According to RL all of these sensory experiences are caused by a single thing. The table. According to BIV what I see is caused by a series of different electrical stimulations which produce a series of hallucinatory images related in just the way that the parts of a table are related. On two counts RL is simpler than BIV here. First, RL posits one cause - the table, and says that the different sensory experiences I have are just what the table looks like from different angles. BIV posits many different things - independent electrical stimulations which lead to a series of hallucinatory images. Second, that all of the hallucinatory images are related perfectly so as to mimic RL is a sheer unexplained coincidence on BIV. The images could have been related any other way, but they are related exactly table-wise and no explanation of this is ever given. On RL, there is no coincidence. The table looks like a table because it is one. RL therefore is a superior explanation.
Of course, this is only to consider a small part of my total sensory experience - my visual experience of a table as I move around it, and to make a few comments about it. More could be said both about that aspect and about other parts of my sensory experience, but perhaps this is enough for now.
To the more general theme of the thread. When two theories are consistent with all of the evidence, choose the best explanation.
PA
Outside of metaphysics the brain-in-a-vat theory is not as striking. It may be seen as an 'atheists' version of 'God and his creation'. The brain is omni-present/scient/potent in its influence on the illusion it creates. However, this theory also suffers the same flaws that religious theories do. In a literal sense, we get to ask what the origin of God/brain is; and to what capacity does creation/illusion exist or interact with the reality of their creators; or what does free-will and choice mean, etc.
I believe the brain-in-a-vat theory only addresses the idea of our perception of reality and cannot, due to its many deficiencies, form any lasting imprint on reality. Every consideration about reality infers that it is a composite of innumerable factors which cannot be simply represented by a singular configuration, whether it be God, brain-in-a-vat, or otherwise. It is why those theories keep getting a face-lift over time, in order to adjust certain inconsistencies, perhaps in our understanding or their telling.
However, fundamentally, something absolute will never be explained satisfactorily using relativity. And because all we have are our perspectives, only our perception of reality can be explained by any theory but, as to reality itself, we must be resigned to a blanket acceptance of its undeniable presence. Also, the fact that we learn means that we know that our perception of reality is continuously short of actual reality and, therefore, we make constant efforts to catch up to it as much as we can.
The idea that the illusions of the brain define our reality, means that it must be one brain in one vat generating a single illusion representing the whole of existence, reality and everything. If every one of us is/has a separate brain-in-a-vat, then the relativity of perception and perspective and the consequent interactions fail to solve the problem of perception vs reality which it attempts to do.
For the brain-in-a-vat to create any illusion, it must have perception for its raw materials. Therefore, what part of its reality is it perceiving? That connection between illusion and reality calls for a mechanism which governs their interrelation. This brings logic into play. Consistency and connection are always implied in the identity of what logic is. The laws which determine reality, akin to logic, are rigid and do not alter. Therefore, logic has to surpass the limits of illusion and must as well relate to the reality of the brain-in-a-vat. This logic dictates that everything in the illusion is born of and bears a connection to the objects in the brain-in-a-vat's reality. In this way consistency is maintained throughout and the overall intelligence avoids conflict with individual circumstances. Also, because all the elements of illusion are based on perception, there is no significant line of demarcation between the illusion and reality when they are thus interrelated. Thus, reality is manifest in the illusion even when disguised. So, in the same way our reality (or perception of it) fades into illusion, it just as well fades back into our reality.
Personally, I choose to accept a theory which states that illusion is a part of reality, in that, it is a representation of it, though with certain modifications which may distort or disguise the relation. Nonetheless, they are always related.
So, for me, if the illusion corresponds to our common-world reality then the reality where the brain-in-a-vat exists has been misrepresented.
Good question.
First off, metaphysical theories, as always, either illuminate, strengthen, or cast doubt on our established beliefs. We take them seriously, regardless of their disconnect with physical realities. You could build your own metaphysical speculation -- with one requirement, it must be coherent. ( I'm not going to define here what coherence means, you could look it up yourself).
So, how should we treat these speculations? As a critique of our own belief. You do not need to provide evidence to build a critique -- use the other person's evidence if you'd like. (Critique of pure reason, as they say). Here's an example in action. @BrianW is actually critiquing here:
This Quoting BrianW
this, Quoting BrianW
and this, Quoting BrianW
Finally, let me name drop some astrophysicist by the name of Arthur Eddington who wrote Science and the Unseen World. Apparently, he is known for his "other ways of knowing." And again, don't ask me to quote from his book, I have not read it substantially, but feel free to browse it yourself.
Harman's Brain in a Vat scenario may well have been a thought experiment, but he doesn't own the concept, neither does Putnam. The idea that we might actually be brains in vats is a theory. It may not have been what Harman or Putnam were talking about, but it clearly is what @Pattern-chaser is talking about, so I think it might be reasonable to dial down the indignation a bit.
But, as I have now too-often repeated in this thread, it doesn't make sense to question the likelihood of a thought-experiment. And presenting it as a theory doesn't magically turn it a theory. If Pattern-chaser can say with any semblance of rectitude that Putnam's brain-in-a-vat "theory" does not provide us any evidence to support either its conclusion or its contradiction, it is exactly because it did not even attempt at becoming an hypothesis. Putnam may often be very confused, but he isn't anywhere confused enough to do such a beginner's mistake.
And acting as if Pattern-chaser's interpretation is just as valid is simply wrong. Putnam's BIV was never about what Pattern-chaser's want it to be. Not even close. It's not an earlier version of the Simulation "theory", never was anywhere close to it, and you are doing a serious disservice to philosophy by spreading this misrepresentation.
I told you how. If BIV was a simplifying explanation of the way things are, it would be compelling. In fact, it is radically complexifying. The world it proposes is inconceivably more complex than the non BIV world. It necessitates beings of godlike sophistication and power, technology hundreds of orders of magnitude more advanced than ours. All of the complexity of the seeming-world is merely a microcosm manipulated by entities whose information processing capabilities are on par with our entire (observable) universe's.
In short, It falls to Occam's razor.
The OP wants to discuss this question: is there any reason to think that we are not brains in vats, and if not, on what ground can we dismiss that idea? It does not matter to this issue whether you call it a theory, a hypothesis, a thought experiment or whatever. The question still remains whether there is any reason to think that the world is like that.
The fact that Putnam uses the idea as a thought experiment does not matter. We can use the idea for a different purpose. It isn't as though Putnam's use of an idea is God's law, and any other way of using the idea is apostacy. In any case, Putnam too wanted reasons to believe we aren't BIVs. He gives arguments against that idea.
Jesus bloody Christ (to borrow a turn of phrase)
Any mention of the words 'brain in a vat' does not automatically and irrecoverably refer to to Putnam's Brain In A Vat Thought Experiment™.
Quoting Akanthinos
No, but it does turn it into a theory in a completely normal way, according to a perfectly understandable common usage of the term.
Quoting Akanthinos
Pattern-chaser (to the best of my reading, apologies in advance if I've missed it) did not mention the name Putnam in his entire post. The only mention of the name I can find is actually your first post, so why would you think he's talking about Putnam's thought experiment? Why not Harman's original concept, or one of the many science fiction references before that? As I said, Putnam does not own the concept, not every reference to it is a reference to that which he had to say about it.
Quoting Akanthinos
Why are we still going on about Putnam's version when (as far as I can tell) no-one but you has even mentioned it?
Quoting Akanthinos
This is the most interesting bit of your whole post. What service do you think I owe 'Philosophy' exactly? Let's, for that sake of this far more interesting point, presume Pattern-chaser had directly referenced Putnam's Brain in a Vat Thought Experiment by name, and called it a theory (in the scientific sense you're imagining), treated it as something designed to explain some phenomenon in a manner which could be falsified. In other words, let's presume he got it completely wrong, then I (or anyone else) come along and say "Yeah, he's right you know, it is a theory". What is it you imagine Philosophy is such that it would be harmed by that? Even if I managed to spread this 'misinformation' far and wide such that half the world believed it, I'm baffled as to what consequence you think that would actually have such that this level of indignation is required to stamp it out early lest it do...what exactly?
As a general rule any unmotivated question of the form 'is there any reason to think that such-and-such is not the case' can be readily dismissed out of hand. It is the conspiracy theorist's question: "is there any reason to think the Queen is not a lizard?; "is there any reason to think we are not ruled by aliens?"; these are not questions to be taken seriously. They are questions to be laughed at and ridiculed.
Quoting hypericin
:up:
As if the BIV thesis itself did not demand a radical profusion of things to be explained. Anyone who thinks it might function in an explanatory capacity in any sense fails to understand the English use of the term 'to explain'.
In a broad logical sense of "can", any question "can" be dismissed, but it doesn't follow that they should be. I take it you didn't mean to make that claim. You compare the question about BIVs to the question[I] "what reason is there to believe that the queen is not a lizard?"[/I], and the suggestion is that both questions are ridiculous. Because they are ridiculous, they should not be asked. Is that right?
If so, pursue the issue just slightly below the surface. Why is the question about the queen ridiculous? I am tempted to say that the question about the queen is ridiculous precisely because there is a very obvious and decisive reason for thinking that she is not a lizard. Namely, the queen does not look anything like a lizard normally looks, nor does she walk around on all fours (or slither!) sticking out a forked tongue laying eggs. That is the reason for thinking the queen is not a lizard, and if we did not have this reason, the question about what reason there is to think she is not a lizard would not be ridiculous. If you had absolutely zero information about the queen or about human social institutions, you might well wonder whether this random entity "the queen" is a human being or something different. So if the BIV question is analogous to the queen question, it can only be ridiculous if there are obvious and decisive reasons for thinking that we are not BIVs. In which case, I don't see the point of insisting that the BIV question should not be asked, when you could instead simply provide the answer.
PA
Yeah how do we know they don't do this?! What reason do we have to think the lizard people don't do that??
What reason is there to believe that I am in my apartment?
Obviously, being in my apartment entails that I am not a BIV, so having a reason for the former also gives me a reason for thinking I am not a BIV.. This question doesn't ask why something isn't the case, so is this question acceptable to you?
If so, does this question not raise all of the same issues as the original BIV question which you tried to dismiss?
I note in passing that I didn't say anything about being an impartial rational inquirer, but I do not see why the mere fact that a thesis is, in your opinion "bullshit" means that it should not be taken seriously, although I'm not entirely sure what you mean by "take seriously".
PA
Oh silly me! That could be so, but the simpler explanation is that the queen is what she looks like she is. A human.
PA
Well this can be answered quite straightforwardly: none. Maybe you're in your apartment, maybe you're in a library, maybe you don't even live in an apartment, maybe a million other things, but, from your posts so far in this thread at least, there is literally no reason - apart from you now intimating that you do - to believe that you are in your apartment. Speculation here is contained by available and public evidence, and does not begin out of thin air, without grounds. That's the difference.
--
Alternatively, if you're asking the question of yourself (while being in your apartment), then, pace Wittgenstein, you don't understand how the English language works.
I don't know what reason you have to believe that I am in my apartment. Perhaps only the fact that I say that I am.
PA
I'm sure you do. Of course, this has nothing to do with being or not being a BIV and everything to do with having a proper grasp of the English language.
I am not sure I follow. If I am in my apartment then I am not a BIV. So if I have good reason to believe I am in my apartment I can simply deduce that I am not a BIV. Thus, I am not a BIV. The discussion has everything to do with BIVs after all!
PA
What kind of disjunction is this? What motivates it? Nothing. It might as well read: "if I am in my apartment than I am not a cloud; so this has everything to do with clouds". It's child's talk.
PA
PA
It is as necessary as the the very idea of BIVs: arbitrary and irrelevant. It's a response equal to the status of the question. I'm not saying don't discuss it; just to be aware that whatever will be discussed about it will be a bunch of crap, because the question itself is a bunch of crap.
PA
Consider the Realist hypothesis that I am in a physical and mind-independent world. Trees, rocks, rivers and such are all physical and exist independently of my thoughts and perceptions. Many philosophers - and non-philosophers too - have wanted to affirm Realism. So they have looked for a reason to believe it and usually always appealed to sense perception. The role of the BIV hypothesis is that, because it is compatible with all possible sense perception, it is supposed to illustrate that the information given in sense perception cannot be straightforwardly taken to support Realism (note the qualification 'supposed to').
Again, the significance of this isn't meant to be "uh oh, maybe we are BIVs after all". It is meant to be that there is no reason to believe Realism and so, if you want a worldview that is based only on good reasons, Realism cannot be a part of it, even though many of us are initially attracted to it.
Maybe you don't care about building a worldview that sticks to such standards, but I think you miss the point if you think its just for 'over-imaginative children'.
PA
It was never my intention to promote a discussion of whether the brain-in-a-vat speculation is true or not. It's only here as a good example of speculation which are possible, but that come without evidence. And let's be clear: I am not proposing BIV as being true (or false). Please can we leave the correctness of BIV alone? :wink:
Quoting BrianW
Yes, of course. A real illusion is, of course, real. :up: :wink:
What evidence? The point of this discussion is to ask how we deal with speculations for which there is no evidence. It seems that logic takes us so far, but no farther. And when we reach that point, we must stop. The temptation is to draw conclusions anyway, instead of having the courage to admit that we don't know, and that the only logically-justified conclusion we can draw is ... that we don't know. :chin:
With all due respect to Mr Putnam, I just picked up ('stole', if you like) a speculation that I used for illustrative purposes only. I make no attempt to show that BIV is true or false. In fact, I believe that it cannot be demonstrated to be true or false. That's the issue that I'm trying to focus on.
Philosophy is about thinking, and thinking about thinking. Almost any subject can be considered philosophically - that is to say, using careful consideration and structured thought - and I see no reason why this particular topic should be different. A "serious disservice to philosophy"? No. A simple application of philosophy, to discuss something that is usually ignored. :chin:
You seem to have mistaken Occam's Razor for something authoritative. :chin: It's just a rule of thumb, a way of guessing when we can think of no better way to proceed with our reasoning.
Well that's great news! :up: Now, if you could just offer a logical justification for dismissing such things...? Seriously, some of these things just look ridiculous, and we dismiss them without a second thought. But are we justified in doing so, or are we just hiding from the uncomfortable truth, that we have no logical justification at all for dismissing such things? Is it all just to avoid admitting to ourselves that there are things - many things - that we just don't know, and that we can never know? :chin: :razz:
Why? What grounds do you offer that could be rationally engaged with? [I]Ex nihilo nihil fit[/i]. Rationality is not your - or anyone's - play-thing.
Thank you for this, @PossibleAaran! :smile: With two examples, we can make the whole thing a little more interesting. I start from the position that both BIV and RL are possible, and that they both come with the same amount of evidence: none at all. Here's an interesting question:
Can we compare the two?
Odd as it seems, no. :chin: Having no means to assign probabilities of correctness to either speculation, we have no means to compare them. We can say that they are not both correct, as they contradict one another. We can say that one or both of them could be incorrect. Logic allows no further justified conclusions, isn't that so? :chin:
Also, a treat for those concerned that unlikely speculations are given equal weight with more likely scenarios: we cannot logically justify saying that BIV and RL are equally likely. This is because we can't establish a numerical probability for either one. :up:
My (unjustified!) conclusion is that we should never dismiss these things, but instead we should use them as it suits our convenience. RL offers me utility, so I use it. BIV is a teaching-story that I find otherwise useless, so I don't use it. But it remains a possibility, and I continue to remember this as my reasoning progresses. I'm not leaving lies behind me, to confuse me later. Isn't this the only practical and honest way of proceeding?
You offered several speculations. I have taken them in the way you intended, and not given them serious consideration. I'm sure you haven't either. But let's consider them logically.
If any speculation can be disproven, logic seems to recommend dismissal. Fair enough. But what if you come across a speculation that is possible, but can't be disproven? What then? There does not seem to be a logically-justifiable reason to dismiss it. :chin: Do you know of one?
Quoting StreetlightXI beg to differ. Isn't this exactly why we're here, in this forum? :wink:
Speculations do not need to be disproven and logic recommends nothing of speculation because the latter offers nothing to it. This entire line of questioning is just charlatanism; and of course, some are indeed here just for that.
Another unjustified assertion. Why do speculations not need to be disproven? What is the logical justification? You keep insisting that there is no question to answer, but all you offer to support your case is unjustified assertions. You seem to be presenting a position that you believe to be logical, and I'm asking you for the logical justification for your position. What is it?
Because rationality deals with arguments on the basis of the inferences that are soundly and validly developed in the course of those arguments. Speculations of the BIV kind offer nothing of the sort - just stories for children playing at philosophy.
A lovely image. :up: Stories are how humans learn and remember best. You can deal with reality as you see fit. I will continue to think about things I consider interesting, and the stories presented here are interesting, to me at least. It seems one or two other people also agree. Perhaps you should just leave us kids to play here, in the philosophy playground? :razz:
I'm not saying illusions are real. Only that the components of illusion are borrowed from our perception of reality.
Quoting Pattern-chaser
I agree that beyond logic no argument is appropriate or necessary, and should proceed no further.
As to BIV and RL, I would ask that you formulate a personal test for which to recognize the difference between reality and illusion. A kind of litmus test for the difference between the 'texture' of illusion vs that of reality. I believe you will find it impossible to mistake one for the other.
I am (saying illusions are real). They aren't what they pretend to be, of course, that's what illusions are all about. :wink: But an illusion has existence as such, so it's real. :up:
Quoting BrianW
Issues such as we are discussing here wouldn't even exist if we (humans) knew of a test by "which to recognize the difference between reality and illusion". It's the nub of the problem. In many circumstances, we can't distinguish reality and illusion (or even hallucination).
I would love to create a test such as you describe, but I'm afraid I can't. :meh: I have no clue as to how to go about it. :fear: I actually believe it to be impossible, but I'm very much open to persuasion. So please, go ahead and explain how, for example, we can detect the "texture" of an illusion. It would be really useful. So can you help? Go on, try it. "I believe you will find it impossible to" distinguish one from "the other." Prove me wrong. Please. It would be enormously helpful and useful.
[Some illusions are poor illusions, and seeing through them is easy for anyone. Can we please assume the illusions we're considering are convincing illusions, OK? It simplifies the discussion. Great. Thanks. :wink: ]
But when there is no evidence, there can be no inferences. This topic asks what we do in such circumstances, not what we (should) do in other situations. And besides, inference is unreliable. I prefer deductions, or a simple admission that 'I don't know'.
A deduction follows directly and unavoidably from its source material. Inference generalises from the specific, and is unreliable for that reason. Deduction is not inference; it is as reliable as the source on which it is based.
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/inference?s=t
Primitive.
The issue is basically no situations qualify for the "no evidence" context.
If we are having "theories" some sort of context of evidence is proposed. We are posing some sort of event or phenomena and then developing description which reflects it. These cannot be outside evidence because they are evidential claims. Each poses something happens and the which events would occur of an account to be accurate.
"I don't know" is an ever present feature... but it has nothing to do with theorising. Properly stated, "I don't know" applies to every theory we might involve, since future events are yet to come and we might be mistaken. The only time "I don't know" doesn't rate a mention as a potential is in the very limited context of describing meanings of events that have already appeared.
Theories work in spite of this spectre. The threat of "I don't know" doesn't ever suppose lack knowledge, it's just a reference to a possibility. When we deal with theories, we are taking the step of accepting we see how things work/they repeat, such that we can draw inferences of how things work and what's going to happen. They do nothing to eliminate the possibility of "I don't know." Theories don't need to though, for they are just meant to be an account the world we do know. Eliminating a possibility of being wrong is not required.
If you know how to deal logically with speculations that come without evidence, please say so.
We already know by our experiential lives we are not BIV. The events of my life, my experiences, my body, the interactions I have with other and everything around me, etc., these are not a Brain in a Vat-- I mean, my brain is in my skull.
In this context, the "illusion" or "simulation" argument doesn't help because you are the content of the illusion or simulation. Our experiential lives might be caused by a BIV, but that doesn't make our lives any less ours. We are not BIV. The BIV is just some distance cause which is not us at all.
Nor, might I add, is the BIV any sort of "theory" in regards to who we are, what we do or what will happen to us. At best, it could be a proposed account of a prior cause of our experiential lives and world, but even this wouldn't account for us as the illusion claim tries to. It would just be talk of some event which happened prior to our experiential world, a sort of Big Bang for the Big Bang. It no more accounts for us than saying the Big Bang happened, Earth formed, life evolved or you were conceived by your parents.
Then what is the BIV speculation? Because it concerns our relationship with Objective Reality, something to which we have no direct (Objective) access, we don't and can't know if it's correct (or incorrect). And there is no evidence. There are other such issues; BIV is only an example. The RL speculation posted earlier is another one. There is no evidence for its correctness either. So what do we do with such speculations? I cannot accept that we should dismiss them because they're difficult to deal with. If there are good reasons to dismiss these things, I would like to know what they are. One thing I think we can all agree is that our reasoning would be simpler and clearer if we had such reasons.
Reality is (for us humans) filled with uncertainty. Everywhere we look, there are things we don't know, and some of them we can't know. At least knowing that we don't know is a step in the right direction, n'est ce pas? :smile:
BIV claims direct access to objective reality: our experiential world is caused by a brain in a vat and we can know about it. If it were true, there would be BIVs people could observe, including us, had we observation of the room. It's works the same way any other claim about empirical reality does-- if you want to confirm it, you observe. You might know it without observation (e.g. forming a correct theory before its tested).
You can't know that, which is rather the point. The BIV speculation is defined to be indistinguishable from the RL speculation, and from every other possible speculation concerning our relationship with Objective Reality. BIV and RL are indistinguishable to us. Either could be correct, or both could be wrong. But we do not and cannot know that we are, or are not, BIV.
One example is that: All illusions, whether dreams, day-dreams, fantasies, hallucinations, delusions, etc., are narratives. Mental narratives. They are stories we tell ourselves. If you stop/pause the narrative, then the illusion stops. However, it is not possible for everyone, all the time, to consciously/deliberately halt the narrative. One sure method which interrupts the narrative is the insertion of choice or deliberateness. You will find that in dreams, the succeeding sequence of events seems to be governed by a pre-determined and undisputed necessity. Therefore, if you can, try challenging that necessity or choose not to adhere to it. By training your attention/focus, it is possible to shift from the un/sub-conscious to the conscious just like in meditation or trance the reverse can be achieved.
Another difference between reality and illusion is the multifaceted/versatile nature of reality in contrast to the one-sided nature of illusions. To put it in layman's terms, illusions do not have a series of whys, whens, hows, etc., unlike reality where multiple sequences of causes and effects are open for consideration. This means that in an illusion the one event in focus is the only event in existence while in reality attention can be shifted between multiple concurrent events. An attempt to shift focus in an illusion will most likely disentangle it to some degree. I would express it thus: to the mind, illusion is all-consuming while reality is always open-ended and accepting of a variety of choices.
Illusions seem to bypass the reflective and intellectual mechanism, or use them to establish a pre-set state of affairs before acting directly on the instinctive and emotional part. Therefore, a good deal of emotional control can help one in identifying between illusion and reality. Most illusions keep by their grip on our emotional reins. Thus, to be able to take a breath while in distress can, hypothetically, instantly dissipate an illusion. I dare even say that to mock an illusion is to overcome it.
There are many other ways and factors in the distinction between illusions and reality. For most people the mechanism is un/sub-conscious even when trained. For example, a person may wake up at a particular time every morning, sometimes having to exit a dream sequence part way through, without realizing the significance of the choice/deliberateness applied.
If what I say is not agreeable at face value, try any of the exercises and see if in time you do not develop some degree of ability to rouse yourself mid dreaming or at least develop the capacity to realize you're dreaming as it unfolds.
If it's indistinguishable, then it is the same: the experiential world is present, the brain of my body is still there. Someone in my experience could take it right out of my head. In this respect, it doesn't matter whether my brain in my skull is present by a BIV or not. Either way, there is a brain in my skull.
Not really. It offers a possible speculation, nothing more. RL is another such speculation. If we were concerned here with their correctness, we would truly be wasting our time, for such speculations cannot be verified or falsified. But we are, instead, wondering how these speculations, and others like them, should be dealt with logically. Thankfully, this does not require access to OR. :wink: :up:
So, if you were colour-blind, red and green would become 'the same', because you can't distinguish between them? The two speculations are indistinguishable to us humans.
You consider only illusions that are detectable because they feature imperfections? Of course such illusions can be detected, with application and practice. But can you not conceive of a convincing illusion? One good enough to convince you (and me), at least? That is what we are discussing here, surely?
Yes, really. BIV is a truth known by direct access to objective reality, like anything else.
Of course, we could avoid having any concern for correctness, but if we do so, we render our statements meaningless. There is no point to a position which leaves us without nay sort of knowledge. It's just a waste of our time. Nothing is what it offers. We cannot even trust it as a path to avoid error, for the right answer doesn't disappear just because we haven't been told its true by something else.
Such thought is neither reason nor philosophy because it offers exactly no insight. We don't learn anything from it. It doesn't clarify our reasoning. All it does is trick us into thinking "mystery" is profound and get us to ignore what we do know.
How about the knowledge that we have no knowledge pertinent to the matter in hand? To move something from 'don't know we don't know' to 'know that we don't know' is worthwhile, isn't it? :chin:
I would just see one colour. Red and green remained distinguished to the world, others and even, in various conceptual senses, to me. They are distinguished all they way up and down. That's why I'm colourblind-- there is a distinction, a colour, which I do not see.
There is no illusion indistinguishable from reality. To succumb completely to an illusion implies a deficiency (disease or deliberately applied constraint e.g., influence of drugs) which impairs the cognitive apparatus.
No, it's not. It's a speculation. How could we recognise it as 'a truth', when there is no evidence concerning its correctness?
Then I defer to your omniscience. For myself, I cannot scale such heights. I seek logic that works for me, with all my faults and deficiencies.
Entirely poisonous. It precludes such awareness by denying us knowledge.
For us to lack knowledge, that supposes there is something we don't know, some sort of distinction we are unaware of in the present, something that we could (and should,since we are worried about the negative effects of not knowing and want to prevent that) learn. If we are going about proclaiming "We don't know anything. We cannot know anything.", we are rejecting such learning.
Being aware of how you might be wrong, in the context of knowledge, is only as useful as you can learn what missing and avoid the problem.
...because recognising truth is a question of understanding what is so rather than giving arguments form evidence. Evidence is used for making specific justifications. You don't need it to know something per se. Even for empirical contexts, someone can just have an idea (e.g. yesterday X,Y,Z happened) without observing what's occurred.
My conclusion is the result of application of logic. To suppose an illusion indistinguishable from reality is like claiming an ocean submerged within another ocean. Where's the logic in that?
By definition, either we have an illusion or reality. Having both as one implies illusion is just a synonym for reality.
Real Life Hypothesis (RL): I am now in my apartment having sensory experiences of my apartment. In general, my sensory experiences as a fairly accurate guide to my present surroundings. I have never been en-vatted.[/quote]
To contextualise what I was saying earlier, everything stated to happen in RL here also happens in BIV account. The measure of "I am in my apartment, etc." is given by the BIV world too (that is, my body in the experiential world in my apartment of the experiential world). In this BIV, the person is still in the ordinary world. They have been all those places (there body, as experienced was there). Being BIV would just be an extra fact they might not know about.
Yes, exactly. Although an omniscient creature could tell RL from BIV, we cannot. :up:
Consider an illusion that an omniscient creature could see through, but that is completely convincing to you.... :chin:
You're missing the point. We could also tell; we just need the right concept of whether the BIV was there or not.
My point is RL is still present in the BIV context. There is no "illusion" or "simulation." The person really does still exist in their experiential world. So it's not a case of "not being able to tell" but rather that we are [i]the same person we know[i] whether there is a BIV or not.
Ahhh, I see. Namaste. :pray:
However, pure, empty speculation does not engage us to anything more than an interpretation of the language used. You can immediatly dismiss it because you can always immediatly dismiss anything, but in this case it doesnt make for bad praxis to do so.
Sheesh! I just said, you do not need evidence to build a critique. But you'd be welcome to take advantage of the other person's arsenal, if you'd like.
And my point is that BIV and RL are both examples of speculations that don't come with evidence. Their truth or falsehood is not the subject of this topic. To sort out our relationship with Objective Reality is much, much, more than I am attempting here. :wink:
If we are to dismiss something, I think we should know WHY we are doing so, not just rely on knee-jerk assertions. Either that or admit clearly that we are acting illogically, without a basis in reason or rationality. At least that is honest. :wink:
I'm unsure of the continuing purpose of the thread honestly.
If someone proposes spending a million dollars to study the brain-in-vat possibility and they have no evidence, their proposal is dismissed promptly.
If someone just wishes to explore such a theory out of intellectual interest we should do so in as open minded a manner as possible, keeping in mind that much of today's scientific consensus was at one time within the realm of crackpot theory.
Not sure why it needs to be more complicated than that.
There is nothing more authoritative available. As this theory is consistent with any given set of evidence, evidence cannot disprove it. With sufficient imagination an unlimited number of "theories" can be generated to explain any phenomenon. What if gravity was ultimately caused by invisible demons shoving things? And what if every cell in these demons bodies is in fact another universe? And what if in one of those universes reside the beings who have your brain in a vat?
But these theories have no explanatory value, they merely add vast amounts of unwarranted complexity to our model of the universe. And so they can be ignored, whether or not you deem the authority to do so sufficient.
I agree. There has been some examination and discussion of the matter, which is better than I'd hoped, if I'm honest. :smile: So let's end it here, and thanks to everyone who has contributed. :up:
We know we are rejecting the "illusion" claim of BIV logically. Our world and its interactions present to us. Whether we are caused by a brain in a vat or not, these events, RL, obtain. We are not living an unreality in experiencing RL when a BIV is involved in causality.
It's wrong to call it a speculation. We know what's going on with respect to RL whether it is caused by a BIV or not.
The curious thing about your reply Pattern-chaser, is that you assert that we cannot make a justified conclusion about whether BIV or RL is true, but you ignore my argument in which I tried to do exactly that. I argued that RL is more likely to be true than BIV because RL provides a simpler explanation of sensory experience than BIV. I detailed one specific respect in which this is so, but you didn't discuss that argument at all. You then conclude:
Quoting Pattern-chaser
To which I say: No, that is not so. RL is more probable than BIV, because of the argument I gave earlier in this thread about the superiority of RL as an explanation of sensory experience.
Having read some of your other posts here, I know what you will say here. You will point out that my argument is an explanatory inference, not a deductive one. In this connection you make two points:
Quoting Pattern-chaser
And again:
Quoting Pattern-chaser
I deny that all - in your terms - inference is unreliable. Explanatory inference is reliable and is not deduction. It involves considering competing explanations of a phenomenon and evaluating them in terms of how much of the data they explain; how many further problems are raised and, crucially, how simplistic the explanation is insofar as it involves unevidenced entities, unexplained coincidences and the like. It is not just an arbitrary "way of guessing". Do you think that this mode of inference is unreliable?
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Thanks for your thoughts Willow. I think some formulations of the BIV and RL hypotheses that are standardly discussed are weak to the criticisms you have made, but I have tried specifically to avoid that Putnam-Chalmers style criticism in my own formulations. In BIV, as I formulated it, I begin in the real world and I live there for the majority of my life. That world is filled with tables, chairs, rivers and such. It is filled with humans who I care about deeply and things which have a great value for me. It is also a world in which I dream - I see things which are entirely creations of my mind, and which do not exist without my mind. Then, after some time, I am kidnapped without realizing it and my brain is put into a jar of fluids. What the kidnappers, in effect, do to my brain is put it in a permanent state of dreaming. Everything which I see from the moment I am envatted is a creation of my brain - they are mere images created by my brain being stimulated electrically. It is not just that I live in the ordinary world of trees and rivers and then it is a deeper fact about that world that it is a product of my mind. No. If "the ordinary world" is the one I was in before I was envatted - the world with those people that I really care about and those things that I really like - then how things are if BIV is true is radically different to how things are if RL is true. In BIV, I no longer have any contact with any of those people I care about or things I value. All I have are mere images of them produced by my mind.
PA
I'm sorry if you think I have been negligent. I have tried to limit my responses to posts like this because they are so far off-topic, and also because their truth or falsehood is impossible to confirm.
But to answer you directly: RL and BIV are identical in their explanatory power. Both account completely, and without contradiction, for the human experience that results from either one of them being true.
RL and BIV are not what this topic was about. They are examples of a particular type of speculation that I wanted to consider more closely. Neither BIV or RL had anything at all to do with this topic, except that they were good examples.
Quoting PossibleAaran
Yes. :blush: I mistook inference for induction. My mistake, for which I have already apologised. Think of it as a senior moment on my part, if you're feeling kind. :wink:
Quoting Pattern-chaser
That is right, but power is not the only criterion of explanation. Simplicity is another and I argued that RL is simpler than BIV. But I understand now that these were examples used to illustrate your main point - that there are some hypotheses which cannot be decided between on the basis of the evidence alone. Philosophers often call this 'underdetermination of theory by data'. BIV and RL may or may not be instances of that. Your question is what do we do when we meet a case of underdetermination?
There are two kinds of underdetermination. One sort is underdetermination by current evidence. Given our currently available evidence alone we might be unable to decide between two theories, but if we had better technology, or more resources we could get evidence which would decide the issue. The other sort is underdetermination by all possible evidence. In such a case, no matter how much effort we expended, we could never get any evidence that would settle which theory is true. If BIV and RL were cases of underdetermination - and I say they aren't - they would likely be cases of underdetermination by all possible evidence. How do we handle the two sorts of underdetermination?
My own preference is quite old fashioned. If there is no reason to prefer one hypothesis over another, do not choose either. Suspend judgement. I see that your own suggestion is to admit that we have no reason and yet still prefer one hypothesis if it is more useful to us for some purpose. I have no in principle objection to that, but I hold that there simply are no real life cases in which both (a) the choice between two theories is underdetermined by either current or all possible evidence and (b) believing one theory would be more useful than believing another. In every case I can think of, you could make use of the useful elements of a theory without accepting the elements of it which could not be evidenced. BIV and RL might be exceptions, since it might be thought that I couldn't really live a normal healthy life if I suspended judgement on whether or not the whole thing is a fiction produced by my delusional mind. Perhaps so, but I deny that BIV and RL are cases of underdetermination.
PA
Very wise. :up: And logical. :smile:
Quoting PossibleAaran
Yes, but I suggest my own course (as above) because there is no more justified one. To me, it is more important to admit I don't know, rather than to pretend that I do. That way, I am less likely to start reasoning on the basis of my unfounded assumptions because I've forgotten that they're just guesses, and no more than that. Painful honesty is something we autists often exhibit; perhaps I'm doing that here and now...? :chin: :smile: :wink:
Quoting PossibleAaran
...and, by applying Occam's Razor (a rule of thumb; a guessing-aid), you chose RL. Fair enough. But this is little different from my choosing the one that we find to be most useful. Simplicity versus utility.... :wink:
I think maybe they are ("cases of underdetermination"), but addressing this point requires us to dive deeply into the eternal subjectivity/objectivity debate. This can often be fun, but it's also hard work trying to get Objectivists to admit that they have no direct (Objective) access to Objective Reality. By the time any kind of agreement is reached, the original point of discussion is long forgotten. So let's not, eh? :wink:
[I don't mean to brand you an Objectivist; you seem quite rational to me. :smile: But Objectivists are drawn to heresy (in their eyes) like moths to a flame. :smile: Just look at what happened in this thread, which barely touched on the matter. :wink: ]
And it is from this realization alone, that one is profoundly ignorant of the nature of the reality that surrounds him, that any substantial thought can spring.
I agree that the issue gets muddy very quickly. I think your statement of it is already difficult. What exactly is meant by "direct access" to "objective reality"? In one plain sense, obviously I do have such access. When I open my eyes, I see the physical world. I see trees and tables and roads and such. But what relevance does that have on the question about underdetermination between BIV and RL? I know well that there are answers to these questions somewhere, but it is crucial to be clear what they are before debating this issue.
PA
However, if we're plugged into the matrix then what's the difference between fact and fiction?
And we know we can never disprove the brain in a vat.
We fall at the first step.
I guess there are different levels of thinking here.
We may assume that this world is real and what we get out of the sciences and philosophy are truths. These are truths in the virtual reality we live in.
We do get scared when we have nightmares.
Wet dreams?
If there is no evidence, the most you can do is treat it as "Unsure, need more evidence." And go about your day. All truth is tentative. The Earth is a spheroid is true until a huge asteroid takes a chunk out of it. Nothing is set in stone hence the scientific method and constant evaluation of our theories.
This is why I think anything but Agnostic to be either overconfidence or under confidence because we simply don't know. Our definition of God may very well change in the future. I'd like to be optimistic and have hope but it doesn't make it so.
I pretty much agree with everything in your above post except that I see anything other than being an atheist as being way too generous to ridiculous, incoherent nonsense that people have made up.