Sufficient Reason
Piggyback on an older topic about the Principle of Sufficient Reason, I wanted to start a thread about what counts as an epistemically sufficient reason?
Where does the delineation occur to conclude that a sufficient reason has occurred and can be counted as sufficient? Or what does it mean to say that a reason is sufficient at all or how it obtains its status of sufficiency?
Where does the delineation occur to conclude that a sufficient reason has occurred and can be counted as sufficient? Or what does it mean to say that a reason is sufficient at all or how it obtains its status of sufficiency?
Comments (48)
Thoughts?
How does one then avoid the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy under such a state of affairs?
So, namely if we have modalities we are concerned with, and as you stated:
Quoting StreetlightX
Then, how are we to know what causes led to what event given uncertainty about said (necessary) sufficient reasons. Thins rings of Hume's problem of induction, if that helps.
Hm, this seems to me to be a different question. Remember, the question is not over which reasons are in play, but over the status of such reasons, whatever those reasons may be. Post hoc... concerns bear upon the former line of inquiry, not the latter.
I think the difference is superficial. Surely, a reason for why an event happened the way it did is pertinent to the topic at least. Anyway, how would you answer the question about the difficulty in determining one reason from another for some event?
If you don't keep the distinction firmly in mind then, as happened in your last thread, the specificity of sufficiency is entirely lost. So -
Quoting Posty McPostface
- I still don't understand the relevance of this question.
I still don't think I understand what you're saying. If so, let's return to the OP. What do you think about the questions posed in the OP?
"The causality principle states that everything has a cause, which is very different from every thing has a reason. But the cause is a thing, and in its turn, it has a cause, etc. etc. I can do the same thing, notably that every cause has an effect and this effect is in its turn the cause of effects. This is therefore an indefinite series of causes and effects.
What difference is there between sufficient reason and cause? We understand very well. Cause is never sufficient. One must say that the causality principle poses a necessary cause, but never a sufficient one. We must distinguish between necessary cause and sufficient reason. What distinguishes them evidently is that the cause of a thing is always something else. The cause of A is B, the cause of B is C, etc..... An indefinite series of causes. Sufficient reason is not at all something other than the thing. The sufficient reason of a thing is the notion of the thing. Thus, sufficient reason expresses the relation of the thing with its own notion whereas cause expresses the relations of the thing with something else."
I noticed that in your OP you qualifiy SR with the term 'epistemically' ('epistemically sufficient reason'), and that your questions in your later posts seem to ask about questions of 'knowledge' and 'how we know'. Epistemological questions are not traditionally within the ambit of discussions of the PSR (although maybe something like: 'how can we know the PSR is the case?'). So you seem to be trying to relate the PSR with questions of knowledge, but it's unclear to me how exactly you're trying to make this relation stick. I think there's some kind of confusion over what the PSR is for you (I suspect you think it is something else than it is, and are asking the wrong kinds of questions of it), but then I can't be sure.
But it seems reasonable to believe everything has a cause. Only by considering causes to be reasons can the PSR be justified. I see no justification to believe there are necessarily non-causal reasons.
That is my sense as well, but then the second clause of Leibniz' formulation is unjustified: that a first cause has a reason (necessity of its existence).
Leibniz formulation implies brute facts can't exist, but that seems unjustified.
Not in the least. Leibniz, for instance, will cash out the PSR in logical, rather than causal terms, and there is nothing prima faice 'unjustified' about this.
Please elaborate. Why should we think there are reasons without basing the reasoning on causation?
Why expect nothingness in the absence of a reason?
Certainly, Leibniz did not think that reasons are causes, and given that he was among the principle formulators of the PSR, it seems unproductive to try to understand it on the basis of assuming, without any argument sans your incredulity, that identity.
"Why should we think reasons can only be causes? "
I didn't suggest there can't be non-causal reasons, I questioned the justification for believing there are necessarily reasons. If I'm right that the justification is based on the presence on causal reasons, then it is unjustified to claim there are necessarily reasons when there are no causes.
Western philosophy is steeped in a theistic world view, so the mere fact of a rich literature carries no weight. That's not to suggest there might not be good justifications imbedded therein, but what are they?
(BTW, your link didn't work)
I was alluding to Leibniz's cosmological argument.
If. But there is no argument against an if.
I know, and I was relating an objection: it depends on the assumption that nothingness should somehow be expected in the absence of a reason. A state of affairs of "nonexistence" is incoherent.
I used "if" to avoid asserting a negative ( "there is no justification..."). I acknowledge there may be justification of which I am unaware.
A belief in X is rational only if it is justified. What is the justification for believing there are necessarily reasons for everything? The only justification I'm aware of is causation, and that is not sufficient because that only establishes the necessity of causal reasons.
Why incoherent?
A state of affairs is something that exists, so it entails the "existence of non-existence." This is (broadly) logically impossible.
Alternatively, to suggest there could have been nothingness implies the proposition "there is nothing" is true in some metaphysically possible world. "Is" is a statement of being (existence), so this again reduces to the self-contradictory term, "non-existence exists".
" To those who don't regard causation as such though, to those who think causation itself must be explained, something other must be doing that work. "
That's circular reasoning: why assume causation must be explained, unless one first believes everything has an explanation?
By contrast, we have an empirical basis for believing causation. It may not be ontologically primitive, but it seems an epistemologically justifiable belief that is not circular.
So, thank you for taking the time to address this issue of causes. I seem to be interested in what that 'something else' is. What do you take it to mean?
What is a sufficient reason?
It's an assumption that entails a causally efficacious necessary being, which is unique (all other necessary "beings" are abstractions, which are not causally efficacious). The alternative is an assumption of an uncaused brute fact - one whose nature entails the potential for change (and thus does tell us what causality is), and is also unique.
As an example of the latter, consider a quantum system in an initial state that deterministically evolves per a Schroedinger equation. That it will evolve is instrinsic to what it is.
Theists are drawn to the assumption of a causally efficacious necessary being, while atheists would propose the brute fact. Consequently there's no persuasive power in this line of enquiry - contrary to devotees of Leibniz' argument.
"No idea what you're talking about. "
Same here. But let me know if you have any specific questions.
Where is the delineation for sufficient reason.
The sufficiency or insufficiency of the reason is determined by the individual or individuals whom are in receipt of the particular reasoning.
One can apply all the reason one likes towards a particular conclusion or deduction and it will still be rejected upon the arbitrary, feelings or beliefs of the recipient.
In the short term, within the context of debate or discussion reason is subservient to feelings or emotions.
The PSR, really only has relevance, in the context of academic discussion, or published data, here the rules of the game generally exclude the interference of the "I feel" "I think" "I believe" etc.
Feelings and opinions remain the arbiter of reason within the context of daily life, however the sufficiency of reason is in proportion to the temporal persistence of the reason itself. The longer the idea persists in time the greater or more sufficient is its reasoning.
M
While it's true that the PSR has traditionally been pressed into the service of theistic arguments, that it necessarily entails a 'causally efficacious necessary being' is just another unargued-for assertion. In any case, 'brute fact' plays right into the hands of fideism anyway, so the alignment of the one with theism and the other with atheism is largely a forced and unconvincing one.
Yes, I made an assertion, and I didn't present an argument. My assertion is based on prior discussions I've had on the topic. If you'd like to discuss whether or not the Leibniz' Cosmological Argument makes a good case for God's existence, I'm happy to do that, but this would mean you'd have to show why belief in the PSR is justified (which you previously said you weren't interested in doing) and compelling (because if the argument isn't compelling, it's pointless).
Regarding your comment about playing into the hands of fideism, I really don't understand your point. Are you suggesting an atheist is having faith in atheism, or that this sends theists into expressions of faith?
The problem with answering this question in any straightforward way is that what kind of thing counts as a sufficient reason can be cashed out in a few different ways. To take Leibniz again as an exemplar, for him, the sufficient reason for any one thing was, in a certain sense, the entire universe. For Leibniz, one cannot think the sufficient reason for anyone one thing without including the entirity of the universe within its ambit. In fact, not just one universe, but multiple worlds, along with certian logical relations between them, were necessary to properly cash out the PSR. The thing is, this is quite clearly not the only way to do so (and it is often said that Leibniz ultimately fudged the whole enterprise right at the end with the God stuff, and didn't quite fulfill even his own strictures on the PSR).
Deleuze, for instance, has a reworked understanding of the PSR that dispenses with the many worlds, along with the God, while at the same time insisting on its non-causal, transcendental operation (and there's lots of gaps to fill here with respect to just what that means). So, long story short, what counts as 'a' sufficient reason depends on who you ask, and it won't be some simple answer like 'because x'. As Deleuze said of Leibniz, his pursuit of the PSR required a 'crazy invention of concepts', each interlocking in various ways in order to really do the work of the PSR. The PSR on its own simply says: there are reasons for why things are as they are and not otherwise. Exactly how this is put to work, is the work of philosophy.
Not sure what made you think I'd want to discuss this since I didn't so much as mention it.
Quoting Relativist
The latter.
"Not sure what made you think I'd want to discuss this since I didn't so much as mention it."
Well, I had the impression you were criticizing me for making an "unargued-for assertion", so I was offering to support that assertion. Perhaps I misunderstood
I believe the consensus was that the PSR is or was an epistemological principle first and foremost in the piggybacked thread mentioned in the OP.
I'm rereading it and will do so due to the thoughtful posts there.
The reasoning itself arises out of the preceding feeling or beliefs. We do not reason ourselves into beliefs upon the basis of a sufficiency of reason. Rather we apply reasons to apriori beliefs with the intention of imposing a sufficiency upon the reasoning of others. (That is what we all do here)
The sufficiency is determined, whilst the reasoning is merely the puppet of the subconscious and the voice of apriori belief.
There is no such thing as reason, there are only feelings. The course of human history should be proof enough of that.
Apriori belief or feeling is therefore the 'sufficiency' and reason is just the straw, the filler that gives the apriori-'sufficiency', its logical substance. . The logic or reason can be straw stones rice or crumpled paper it merely fills a space 'sufficiently'.
Reason is not consistent (because it is determined by emotion), and for it to satisfy a 'sufficiency principle' it must be consistent.
One cannot say there is sufficient straw in the bag, without being certain that there is purely straw in the bag.
Some will find the foregoing reasonable and others will not. This fact/belief is already determined and needs no proof.
M
Your account is plausible, except for your comment "there is no such thing as reason" - that's overly strong. We do have foundational beliefs that are not the product of reason, but we still apply reason to derive additional beliefs, albeit that they are contingent on those foundations.
Thank you for that Relativist. Point taken in respect of reason. Perhaps it would have been more reasonable to assert that 'there is no such thing as reason ALONE'.
I am not certain if I can agree that we have foundational beliefs that are not the product of reason. Please expand upon same? Are you referring to the noumenal, or to the will?
M
Foundational beliefs are those non-verbal beliefs that are innate, and form the basis for the way we perceive the world. For example, we see before us a red ball and a ripe strawberry. We recognize a commonality: redness. Recognizing this quality is not a product of deduction, nor of semantic analysis. Rather it is hardwired in our brains. Similarly, we naturally perceive a distinction between ourselves and the external world (as well as the existence of distinct objects in that external world). This explains why there are no solipsists.
I think you are right and I heartily like the term 'foundational beliefs'. The idea is in harmony with Schopenhauer's 'will' as representation Nietzsche's will to power, and Freud's instinctual basis of functional behavior. However if indeed conscious belief's are merely reasonings arising out of subconscious innate beliefs, we must then ask what is the purpose and origin of these innate beliefs?
Given that they are beliefs that are independent of reason, we must ask are they independent of the reasoner and the self ie do they originate from Nature.
These beliefs are consistent with a natural origin. All living beings have to interact with the world to survive and reproduce. I don't even think there's anything special about our intrinsic beliefs vs that of other animals.
Here's a related perspective. Christian Philosopher (and epistemologist) Alvin Plantinga has defined "properly basic" as follows:
where "p" is a belief and "S" is a subject holding belief p, and "warrant" = the conditions a belief must satisfy to constitute knowledge if p is true:
[i]1. p is properly basic for S in with respect to warrant if and only if S accepts p in the basic way, and p has warrant for S.
2. A belief has warrant only if the cognitive process that produces it is successfully aimed at truth - that is, only if there is a high objective probability that a belief produced by this process is true (given that the process is functioning properly in the sort of epistemic environment for which it is designed).[/i]
Plantinga's purpose is to argue that belief in God constitutes knowledge, but his analysis makes as much (or more) sense in terms of innate beliefs about the world. Our perceptions about the world have been shaped through evolutionary history in a way that is (in a real sense) aimed at truth - where truth is a correspondence between our image of the world and the actual world. Consequently, they satisfy his definition of "properly basic" and arguably, are sufficient for some knowledge of the world.
Christian Philosophy can indeed at times be relied upon to produce fine human beings and fine specimens of logical thought/philosophy.
It (good Christian Phiosophy) reminds one of the old adage that 'Christianity would be a great thing if anyone ever tried it'.
Fundamentalism aside there is much that is humbling, admirable, practical and Universal in Christian thought.
The difficulty I have with Religious thought in General is that it gennerally offers the same variant of Cartesian Dualism in respect of its view of consciousness and the human 'individual'. The notion is the cradle for the assumption that there is a 'God' and then there is a 'me' that is derived from and importantly DISTINCT from this 'God'. Essential to this line of reason is the notion of the endogenous generation of thought that constitutes this 'me'. Spinoza did not venture down this road, paved as it is with all of these presumptions upon assumptions.
Ultimately the existence or non existence of this 'me' is perhaps the fundamental philosophical question. When the 'me' is assumed a point or place in the Unverse is then fixed out of nothingness. A locus and mechanical generation of endogenous thought (AND a material Universe) is also assumed, and a distinction is then made between this concept of a 'me' and the 'remainder' of the Universe.... all of this assumption is predicated upon the initial assumption of an in-dependent material 'me'. The Cartesian cogito was perhaps the biggest blunder of Modern Western Philosophy, and it has yet to be corrected becuase it fits so perfectly with capitalism and democracy vis the 'worship of me' and the 'I think' and the century of the self.
I do not like this assumption , firstly because it is ilogical and secondly becuase of the complex and dangerous sequale it entails, and the fixed nature of belief in the sequelae, as though the premise of the 'me' had been established in any sound manner. A veritable empire of pure conjecture is constructed upon the assumed 'me' and is passed off as philosophy when it is nothing but poetry.
Plantinga assumes the 'me' and also falls prey to the subsequent assumptions of an endogenous generation of thought.. the 'me-thinking'.
"2. A belief has warrant only if the cognitive process that produces it is successfully aimed at truth -"
Here we encounter the assumption that beliefs are produced by cognetive processes. This is the fundamental assumption behind the 'me-paradigm'. However we are also considering supposedly innate beliefs that are the basis of these cognitive beliefs and are themselves independent of, or apriori to the cognitive process.
The assumption of self generation of thought, and the assumption of a distinct and independent 'me', are dangerous in that they are assumptions that establish a tension between that which is innate (purely factual) and that which is 'real' (purely hypothetical).
M