Epistemic justification
I've been trying to tackle this issue for some time and have only recently started to feel a bit more confident regarding an epistemic position. However, I am still a little ambivalent, and was hoping we could discuss the topic in more detail so that I can clarify/correct any views I hold on the matter. I am very open to being challenged. It would also be interesting to learn more about others' views and how they approach epistemic justification.
I'm not sure whether I believe that holding a position re epistemic justification is a black or white issue. That is, I wonder whether one can hold multiple positions--whether the positions are compatible in some way(s). I also don't think I'm a foundherentist. My position is a combination of:
(i) Foundationalism on some beliefs, (ii) weak foundationalism on others, and (iii) coherentism on how views are related/interconnected to each other.
I'm not sure whether I believe that holding a position re epistemic justification is a black or white issue. That is, I wonder whether one can hold multiple positions--whether the positions are compatible in some way(s). I also don't think I'm a foundherentist. My position is a combination of:
(i) Foundationalism on some beliefs, (ii) weak foundationalism on others, and (iii) coherentism on how views are related/interconnected to each other.
Comments (112)
Can you give an example of how you'd analyze a typical knowledge claim? Anything about that analysis that makes you uncomfortable?
I adhere to correspondence theory re truth claims, so in this example, I am judging the truth value "true" to correspond to my experience in the present moment sitting at my PC.
I adhere to internalist theories of justification (and meaning wholesale), so in this example, my justification appeals to my believing/knowing that Realism is true and believing that direct realism is true; and that having this experience qua this experience cannot be reasonably refuted, even if what my experience is of cannot be known absolutely known (that is, even though I can be certain I am having an experience, it's possible that the content of my experience is false, e.g. I could be dreaming, hallucinating, etc. in the vein of "brain-in-a-vat" type scenarios).
That's a (strong) foundationalist position.
So far, I don't feel "uncomfortable" about that analysis.
But I become ambivalent when I consider that I have other beliefs that appeal to weak foundationalism as a "starting point"/foundational belief. For example, the (weak foundationalist) empirical claim that the sun will "rise" in the morning. And then I wonder whether it makes sense to say that strong foundationalism is compatible with weak foundationalism. Can there be different types of foundational beliefs within a system, for instance? I think so, but not totally sold yet.
On other hand, I do think it makes sense to believe that coherentism is compatible with foundationlism, since I believe that all thoughts are ultimately circular in nature like a "web/network of thoughts/beliefs." I am aware that coherentism says that there are no foundational beliefs, which I disagree with. So the way I conceive it, I have a variation of foundational beliefs that are organised in a network of other beliefs (a la coherentism).
Quoting numberjohnny5
Your experience has a quality and a content: the quality you know ("know"?) infallibly, but the content -- maybe not infallibly? Maybe not at all? Are you sure there's a foundation for knowledge here?
Are the quality of an experience and its content related?
My position is that you "don't know that you're sitting at the PC writing," i.e., that proposition is a foundational belief. What I mean by foundational is that the belief doesn't fall within any epistemological construct, i.e., it doesn't make sense that it would need justification, and it doesn't make sense that it can or could be doubted (at least generally). There are many foundational beliefs that fall into this category, for example, "This is my hand," or "I live on the Earth;" I would call these beliefs bedrock, basic, or foundational. One can identify these foundational beliefs when we consider whether or not it makes sense in particular contexts to doubt the statement/proposition, which is why it's not a matter of knowing that you're sitting at the PC. It's simply a very basic belief that falls outside any epistemic consideration, which is to say that it doesn't need to be justified. Justification comes to an end with these kinds of statements.
The reality is that there is an experience of "sitting at my pc".
Well, now that I think about it, even the content of an experience is qualitative. How can any experience not be qualitative? So to answer your question, yes, they are related in that they are identical. You cannot separate qualia from content, in other words (if you buy qualia, that is).
The quality/content may be an illusion, but even the illusion would be qualitative. The problem here is that we cannot refute solipsism or "veil of perception"-type problems, but that impossibility is not a good enough reason to reject the idea that an experience of phenomena might be illusory. It's still an experience--one can be absolutely certain about that.
I see, thanks for explaining that.
With regards to your "position", I'd rather say that "I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind." That's a foundational belief for me.
If you want your qualitative experience to be the foundation of your knowledge, then I think you need to be able to say something like this eventually:
(F) Because I have experience of A, I have knowledge of B.
The question is how to fill in A and B, and whether one determines the other, so that (F) -- is true? must be true? If is the latter, what's the nature of that necessity?
My point is that to doubt something means that one has good reasons to doubt, or has good evidence to doubt. In my epistemology one doesn't just need a justification for knowledge, but one needs a good justification for doubt, the two go hand-in-hand. So I'm not sure what it would mean to doubt that you're sitting at your pc. I'm sure that you might be able to construct a scenario in which it would make sense to doubt it, but what would it mean to doubt it in normal everyday circumstances. Do we normally doubt such things?
I would say that normally we do know that it's not an illusion. However, I maybe using the word know differently from you. What I mean, is that we are reasonably sure that such-and-such is the case. I don't have to know with absolute certainty to make the claim that "I know..." Furthermore, if you don't know that you're sitting at your computer doing X, viz., having that experience, then how would you know that you're having any experience? We can be reasonably sure that our sensory experiences generally don't mislead us, if this wasn't the case, then we couldn't be sure of much.
I have good evidence that during the experience conveniently described as “I am sitting at my pc” this is not in fact what is occurring.
What is occurring is the experience of sitting at “my” pc.
I (me) can only logically and fundamentally be the entire experience (the room, the chair, sounds, sensations of all kinds). “I am sitting at my pc” is merely a description for sake of convenient transmission during an experience of a conversation about the previous “pc” event.
"I don't know that my experience of sitting at my PC writing is not an illusion, but I know that I am currently having an experience of some kind."
I question that you're really being honest with yourself here. I bet you really do believe that you are actually sitting at your PC writing, and that is not an illusion. Your issue is that you can't prove it, so you feel as if you ought to be skeptical of that. Please consider this.
It is not at all irrational to believe that the world of experience is actually a reflection of the actual world. I suggest that this is actually a properly basic belief because it is innate (no one had to convince you of this through argumentation), self-evident, consistent with a rational world view, and the presence of such beliefs is consistent with everything else we believe about the world (e.g. it's consistent with natural selection). It would be irrational to abandon this belief solely because of of the conceptual possibility that it is false. You should not abandon a belief just because there is an epistemic possibility of it being false; rather - a belief should only be abandoned if it is rationally defeated - i.e. you acquire a new belief that contradicts this innate belief, and you have more reasons to believe the new belief true.
I would submit that your just playing word games. "I am sitting at my pc," is the experience of sitting at my pc, what else could it mean? What else would we be talking about when we say, "I am sitting at my pc," besides the experience itself? When you talk about it, you're merely describing the event, or describing the experience. We use the words to convey the experience to others.
In the most shorthand form we find. The issue is we tend to think our shorthand, our therefore merely convenient form of description, is itself what reality is.
I am not doing word games but words are all we have in order to do the conversation on these matters.
"I am sitting at my pc" is not what is occurring. It describes a picture that even we ourselves do not see in the moment of that particular experience.
So what is it, then, that is ACTUALLY occurring in that moment?
You do not see a you at the pc, correct?
A "you at your pc" is imagined. Then there is the conversation with another about that experience.
That conversation, then, merely describes to this other what you had imagined (and not what was actually occurring).
So back to what was actually occurring: In the experience described (imaginatively), "I am at my pc", was the entire experience of a room, a chair, perhaps breathing, perhaps a watery mouth, perhaps pain from some injury in an elbow, the temperature of the room, the sensation of touching the keypad, etc, etc, etc.
All those sensations above, the entire space within which all sensations arose, have to, by necessity, been "you".
There was never a "you" in a room, at a pc.
There was only ONE thing occurring, not a whole lot of separate things (with apparently merely one of those things being "you").
This ONE thing occurring is the entire experience. The entire experience IS "you".
"You" cannot, and does not, exist outside of or inside of any experience that is arising. "You" are never separate from experience. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE! (if we are to talk of reality and not illusion).
The only phenomena which gives rise to the idea that "I am sitting at my pc" is merely THE IDEA itself.
THE IDEA (of "I am sitting at my pc") is the picture imagined. The picture is imagined for use merely as a description.
Let's face it. We do not even have to resort to imagine such a picture in order for the actual experience to occur.
The picture is just for data storage purposes, and therefore data for conversation beyond the actual experience.
So it is not word games, BUT, to define more accurately what is actually occurring requires a far greater amount of words (if asked to define, essentially).
So therefore we shorthand the experience into a convenient description.
The issue is JUST BECAUSE we use shorthand DOES NOT MAKE the shorthand what it actually was.
It is not reality, it is a version or shorthand conveniently imagined version of reality.
Where should be the fundamental difference between pain as the content of consciousness and your pc?
I understand that our language is just a description of reality, and thus how we talk about reality. It doesn't follow from that that our description is reality.
Quoting raza
You seem to want to talk about simple everyday explanations in a metaphysical way. If we spoke to each other in the way you seem to want too, we would never get anywhere with our talk. Obviously we can analyze our experiences in ways that we don't normally do in our everyday speech. If what you're saying is the case, then we wouldn't know what we were talking about when we told each other, "I am presently sitting at my computer typing." The fact is that we do understand. If you talked with people in your everyday life like you're talking right now, they would think you were crazy. Unless of course there was a specific context that dictated a more accurate picture (however, I don't think the way your talking is more accurate) of what it means to experience these kinds of experiences. In my case I'm talking about everyday speech acts.
Raza, I can't make any sense out of your contention. It might make for interesting philosophical discussions, and that's a stretch, but other than that, I don't find some of it plausible.
In terms of what or who you are during the experience within which the pc is a part, there is not a difference.
Any difference noticed is gradated accordingly based on attention. Attention shifts about. One's fundamental identity is all that which arises in any moment. All that which arises in consciousness, therefore, is "you".
The commonly and habitually presumed identity, one's apparent body, say, within a room, is merely an aspect of "you". The body commonly and habitually presumed to be "you" is one of many aspects within consciousness.
Consciousness, seen in this light, is essentially the entire space within which everything arises.
I agree it doesn't necessarily follow and nor do I recommend it does or shouldQuoting Sam26
I don't recommend at all we talk in this "metaphysical" way. This is a particular subject, however, we are talking about here.
This way of talking is merely for understanding sake. It is to, more or less, realize as, say, fundamental, and then forget. Once it is understood fundamentally it becomes like something running in the background.
In particular moments it can be brought back to attention as a form of realignment. It can be a way to address the ego-sensation - put the ego-sensation in it's proper subservient place (as not one's essential identity).
Quoting Sam26
What I find implausible is the commonly presumed separate body-ego as one's essential identity.
The main reason, meaning perhaps the easiest reason to define, is that one's skin encapsulated body (the merely presumed "you") CANNOT exist separate from any experience that is said to be occurring OUTSIDE of this form (or inside this body-form, if it is an ache or a heartbeat, for example). .
The body is what I am. This being involves consciousness but the relation between me an my being is not that the being could be substracted and then one would be left with the real me.
I think therefor I am.
It is rational rather than philosophical.
Disputing it is like imagining one exists separate from the world or universe.
Just as it is irrational the concept which says, of these bodies, "we came into this world". Compared to a far more rational concept which says, of these bodies, "we came out of this world (as a leaf comes out from it's branch)".
So how we talk matters because it informs (the mind). Though it is not important to talk this way all the time but I think is important to understand.
Are you presuming the existence of two things AS you?
If so, why complicate it so?
Assumed by you OF you? Or are you assuming others assumptions of you?
I can't grasp a concept of "transcendental ego". I see "ego" as a circular thought experience which also generates sensations which essentially causes contraction.
It's therefore a type of tension. "Ego" is a tension (or IS tension). This is why I refer to it as "ego-sensation". It is effectively a "sensation" we create ("we", meaning, our pattern of thinking).
This "ego-sensation" that is created by a habitual "pattern of thinking" creates contraction.
"Contraction" is like anti-relationship, in essence. It is a retreat from relationship. A form of defense or cowering, or a form of attack (as a consequence of feelings of defensiveness).
But overall is a contraction, as opposed to expansiveness (openness, perhaps).
By the way, I think that is part of the comparison game. Ultimately futile, in my opinion.
Certainly not necessary in the human relationship sense. The “comparison game” would be a cause of contraction rather than expansiveness.
1. I reject the correspondence view of truth.
a. While it works in many cases, it is flawed. Nothing corresponds to universal ideas or negations. There is no one-to-one mapping between what we think and reality. Reality is much more coomplex than our limited experience and abstractions reveal.
b. The definition of Isaac ben Israel, adopted by Aquinas is much better: Truth is the adequacy of intellect and reality. Adequacy is a relative concept. What is adequate to one requirement need not be adequate to another. It is not lying to teach Newtonian physics to civil engineers, even though it is woefully inadequate in quantum and relativistic contexts. This means that truth is an analogous concept -- partly the same and partly different depending on context. What is adequate for physics may be inadequate for metaphysics.
2. I think knowledge is not a species of belief.
a. I define knowledge as awareness of present reality. Reality is present by acting on us, My knowledge of my keyboard is due to it acting on my sensory system, and my awareness of some of the effects it has wrought. Things can be cognitively present directly (by acting on me) or indirectly (by having acted on others, who act on me).
b. A belief is completely different. It does not require awareness of the presence of the object of belief. Instead it is a commitment to the truth of a proposition which is the object of belief. So, while knowing is an act of intellect (our capacity to be aware), believing, as a commitment, is an act of will. So, while Descartes knew he was in his chamber (because it acted on him via his senses), he chose (for methodological reasons) not to believe he was in his chamber. This act of will (Cartesian doubt) was completely orthogonal to his knowledge, and so, no reason to question what he knew.
3. As Aristotle pointed out, not all propositions can be proven. Some must be accepted without proof, i.e., as fundamental.
a. Fundamental propositions are knowable. Although we cannot prove them, we can know them experientially. For example "This apple is red." We know from experience that the phantasm (bound contents) that evokes the concept
b. Once we have a population of fundamental, experiential propositions, we begin a constructive movement we can call "modeling." It adds to our experienced content new notes of intelligibility to "fill in the gaps." These constructive elements or gap fillers, are not known, but are believed. That does not make them unimportant, or even unreliable, as we test them in daily living. E.g., we expect objects to persist, even when we don't experience them. Many of these gap-filling beliefs are so reliable, that we are willing to say we "know" them -- even though we can't derive them from experience.
c. Considering Eddington's two tables, for example, we think of the table of everyday experience as continuous and not atomic because the construct of continuity is adequate to our everyday needs. Our dishes, knives and forks do not fall through it, onto the floor. We don't think it's continuous as a result of direct experience of its microstructure. So, while the notion of macroscopic continuity is experiential, adequate to our usual needs, and so true; that of microscopic continuity is a gap filler, and unreliable when consider the table's microstructure.
4. If our knowledge were merely a self-consistent set of beliefs, we would have no reason to think they would be applicable to reality. Why?
a. In order to apply our knowledge to reality, we need to recognize that we're dealing with an instance of something we know. For example, to apply "Coral snakes are dangerous," we must recognize that we are facing a coral snake. If the animal before us could not evoke the concept
b. Again, if our knowledge were merely a self-consistent web, experimental data could never change our knowledge. First, we would not know the results, because that requires experiential input, and second, what was self-consistent before would not become inconsistent. The only inconsistency is between what we used to think and the new, experiential data.
I'm not quite sure why I wouldn't - without restriction - call a discussion on an internet-forum a human relationship. Look at this post - I'm not responding to you but to a statement.
You say that it is Chrystal clear and then attempt to qualify that with the rain analogy.
So, therefore, what is it that rains?
Another way to put it: What is the “it” in the sentence “it is raining”?
I don’t know what this reply is responding to. The last response I made to you where I used the term “relationship” was in regard to yourself comparing yourself with another with mere assumptions about what an other could be assuming about you. I then called that out as playing a comparison game which I referred to as a futile game.
It is futile because it is circular, it creates unnecessary tension in your own mind, at it is a fabrication (assumptions) rather than actual, which all lends itself to a you which suffers contraction.
Whatever - I guess I understand pretty well if somebody tries to tell me something. It is not that I'd have to speculate much to understand it that way.
Quoting raza
I think you will tell me. As far as I understand, at least.
So, are you able to therefore clearly crystalize for me what it is that rains?
I don’t know the answer. I don’t claim to know the answer. You, however, appear to know the answer and that it is Chrystal clear.
I can only know what isn’t with regard to this subject.
Indeed, I don't see how non-qualitative experience (whatever that is?--seems incoherent to me) can be the foundation of knowledge, since experience is necessarily qualitative, and knowledge is (ontologically) mental phenomena based upon experience.
Experience is the only starting point/foundation of knowledge whatsoever. No experience, no knowledge.
I use the conventional definition of "knowledge" per analytic philosophy (justified true belief).
In my view, some knowledge claims can be absolutely certain and some can't. The latter feature in the class of empirical claims, which cannot be proved (i.e. cannot be certain) and only provisionally verified. Since we cannot absolutely know some things ("brain-in-a-vat" type arguments and solipsism, etc.), all we can do is provide good reasons to believe one possibility over others. Since I can't absolutely know that my experience at my pc is an illusion or not, the best I can do is have good enough reasons to support my belief that I am sitting at my pc, and that that experience is not illusory. That's good enough to me, and I'm generally someone who has a commonsensical view on stuff like this, but I'm also aware of the logical and empirical impossibilities/barriers to making claims on absolute certainy.
Quoting Sam26
Because experiencing an illusion is still an experience. I don't think it is an illusion at all, but I can't be absolutely certain. But I also don't need to be absolutely certain to claim that I know that I am sitting at my pc. As you say, I can be reasonably sure about the general veracity of my sensorial experiences.
I am being honest. As I mentioned to another poster, I don't believe that my experience of sitting at my pc is an illusion, even if I can't know that with absolute certainty. But I don't need to know that with absolute certainty. I think it's reasonable to believe the experience is accurate. Hence why I think my present phenomenal experiences are foundational (classical/strong foundationalism), but whether those experiences are illusory or not (e.g whether I am actually a brain in a vat seemingly experiencing sitting at my pc) are foundational in a weak sense (modern/weak foundationalism).
Quoting Relativist
I generally agree with that.
I will throw this out there, however.
The way I see what is "it" that rains.
Rain is part of the living process of this planet's life of which we, of course, experience. Thought is also part of this living process.
Both thought and rain arise in consciousness (consciousness being space within which all experience arises).
Rain is a result of cause and effect so nothing rains (or no thing rains).
All we can say is rain rains. It makes little sense to say water rains. Rain is rain. Water is water.
Does water river when we try to describe a river?
Why, when we see a river, do we not say a river is rivering?
Thoughts also arise within consciousness as a result, it would appear, of cause and effect.
I don't think. I experience thoughts which arise.
So I am not the thinker of thought. Thought just does it's thing just as rain just does it's thing.
When there is rain I experience it........but I didn't do anything to make it occur.
Same with a thought. A thought arises. Cause and effect means that the thought that arose will generate another thought.
A thought will sometimes also generate an act. And then an act will often generate a thought.
But a super special kind of mental phenomena. If you want to pick out some of your beliefs and call them "knowledge", you do that by saying something about the connection between those beliefs, the mental phenomena, and the content of those beliefs, what the beliefs are about, and what the beliefs are about is not (necessarily) mental.
I say the language is accurate “I am sitting at my pc” because it is accepted as the appropriate form of sentence structure for disseminating that information.
Just because it is accurate in that way does not mean that is what actually occurred.
It leaves behind the question as to who “I” is or “you” are during the “at the pc” experience.
I therefore state that what “you” are during the “at the pc” experience is the entire experience thus it’s content.
You cannot be a content separate from every other content within the experience.
The “brain” engaged with the pc is, in effect, being also the pc. The pc is, during that experience, imbedded in the “brain” (for context, “brain” as awareness).
It is not particularly different to the sentence structure “the rising sun” while no actual event such as that is occurring.
I'm not sure I'd put it like that. We can value "knowledge" as "super" or "special" qua mental phenomena, but that's only a subjective assessment. There's no objective value to that assessment. Although I'm not sure whether you meant it like that.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I'm not sure what you're getting at there.
You mean the "map-is-not-the-territory"-type thing? I agree: descriptions or propositions about stuff are not identical to the stuff that those descriptions/propositions are about.
Quoting raza
Firstly, I don't know what you mean by "content". Secondly, in my view, "experience" is mental only. The boundaries of experiences are within the brain (in connection with the body). We experience stuff internally and externally though.
Quoting raza
I disagree, and I think thinking about things like that leads to confusion and incoherency. Being aware of the pc is not being the pc, but maybe you're being poetic or something.
Content = objects identified within an experience, usually named.
“Experience” is mental only? What is therefore beyond the “mental”?
“Experience”, in my view, is electrical. Some call it “chemical”.
But I do not see where a boundary lies where “mental” is on one side and something else on the other.
So what is the “something else” which apparently isn’t “mental”?
I’m not suffering confusion from the understanding I have put forth.
“Being aware of the pc is not being the pc“
What is it that is being aware of the pc? A “mental” something?
Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental."
Quoting raza
Yes, mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena.
Quoting raza
The boundary is the boundary of the brain.
Quoting raza
The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences.
Quoting raza
Yes, a mind.
They cannot be distinct from each other in any scientific way.
> “Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental.”<
>“mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena”<
Hence the contradiction above.
The term “mental” is utilised to define every phenomena along with the observer. As you put it: The “mental” that “experiences”.
As in your statement below.
>The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences<
You're conflating the idea of "mind and brain" with a real/actual mind and brain. There are actual organs that we call "minds/brains"--they're not just ideas, unless you're an idealist.
Quoting raza
Wrong. They are distinct in that minds are a type of brain state, i.e. minds are conscious states (as opposed to non-conscious brain states). There is a ton of evidence to demonstrate this.
Quoting raza
Can you point out the contradiction?
A non conscious brain state? You mean a dead mind or brain?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes. One phenomena. Brain and mind, not brain and then, over there, a mind.
Just as a living body is essentially a body-mind.
> “Every thing (or all things) that is not mental is "beyond the mental.”<
>“mental phenomena is electro-chemical, and experience is mental phenomena<Quoting numberjohnny5
A thing (as in “every thing”) does not exist unless it arises within the mental.
This point is also made with your statement, >The "something else" is the stuff that the mental experiences<
The “something else” (or the “every thing”) does not exist unless it arises in the mental.
What is clear is the form of the conclusion. It rains, so there is rain and rain is defined by raining. The most to-the-spot explanation of metaphysics is: Do not explain something, that exists, by something else, that exists.
Or in more Heideggerian terms: The problem is not to explain beings by other beings but to say what the being is as being. "To be" can not be substituted with "being experienced" - I tried to point at the falseness of the whole metaphysical apparatus built on the dichotomy of subject and object.
You understand that reality is more or less defined by not being dependent on particular beings. That is how you tried to point out that sitting at your computer was not sitting at your computer - which is self-contradictory. If you weren't, you weren't. The possibility of the statement not being true affirms that the fact is a fact: one can only understand falsity by a reference to what things actually are. Again this is not to be understood as a reference to some eternal truth, which would be just as fictional. More modern approaches to the problem leave that notion behind.
We are beings in a world. I can see myself typing sentences. Why couldn't I be something else? Because I am myself. Psychologism is ridiculous.
Is this “I” or “you” that is sitting at the pc one object of the three listed in this sentence: “I” am sitting on a “chair” at my “pc”?
Dunno - are you?
No, it is impossible.
Consider what "chair" really stands for. It is a word used, essentially, to describe a sensation (in a particular way when coupled with the word "sit").
The sensation of sitting on a flat raised surface will feel much the same as that on a "chair".
The arse on a chair, or other surface, contributes equally the sensation value of the "sitting on chair" experience.
No arse on chair means no chair in that experience. The "chair" sensation is not existing unless arse is equally involved.
So is that sensation you, while sitting on the chair, or just the sensation of "sitting on a chair" given that the chair has to exist equally in that moment when your arse is on it?
So I argue that in that "sitting" moment or experience your arse is as much "you" as the chair is "you".
No. Nonconscious brain states are involuntary brain processes that involve regulating breathing, hear rate, balance, sensory and motor functions, etc.
Quoting raza
I'm not sure whether we're on the same page, but I'll just say that brain and mind are identical. They share the same location.
Quoting raza
You're conflating epistemology with ontology there, unless you're an idealist. Are you an idealist?
A human arm can be attached or detached from the rest of the human body. The arm itself hasn't changed.
A "chair" is a product of human work, manufactured for optimal comfort and/or low price in sweatshops for fat a**e* to be placed on.
Quoting raza
No... my fat ass is my own work.
Are you therefore saying "mind" refers to will?
The entire body is in the same "location" to exist. Remove the head the body also dies and vice versa.
An actualist. An observer of what is obvious. No physical thing exists if it is not perceived.
Only either immediately or if it has been kept on ice.
Is a detached ear still an ear if it is re-attached surgically onto a leg (just to maintain blood supply to it)?
My point is about the use terms used to represent what is actually occurring rather than merely symbolic language.
An ear attached to a leg is no longer an ear. It has lost it's "ear" function.
I bet it's creation takes up most of your time.
Yes, but not limited to will. We sometimes have automatic thoughts that we can just be aware of; or sense/perceive things without necessarily acting upon those experiences.
I wasn't saying anything about death. My comment was to do with identity, i.e. a mind being identical to brain.
That's conflating epistemology with ontology. Do you understand? Knowledge of X does not determine or equate with actuality of X. By the way, you say "actualist", but that rather sounds like an idealist position: https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_idealism.html
"Idealism is the metaphysical and epistemological doctrine that ideas or thoughts make up fundamental reality. Essentially, it is any philosophy which argues that the only thing actually knowable is consciousness (or the contents of consciousness), whereas we never can be sure that matter or anything in the outside world really exists. Thus, the only real things are mental entities, not physical things (which exist only in the sense that they are perceived)."
Sure, that's to do with the function of an ear. But functionality is just one criteria that people connote to different things. An arm can still be an arm even if its past functioning has stopped, because the criteria for being an arm to one might not involve or include arm functionality.
Quoting numberjohnny5
What do you mean "act upon"? Surely a thought perceived is always "acted upon". The act could be a dismissive action.
. "nonconscious brain states are involuntary brain processes that involve regulating breathing, hear rate, balance, sensory and motor functions, etc"
Are arising thoughts therefore "nonconscious brain states" due to the fact they arise involuntarily?
Thoughts arise involuntarily, do they not?
My point is mind/brain identical with body thereby one identifiable entity being "body-mind".
For example, I am aware of the wind blowing on my face. I did not choose to notice that. I became aware of it in a passive sense. I can choose to act upon that sensation consequently, but that's not what I'm referring to here.
Quoting raza
No, thoughts are mental/conscious only. Thoughts being involuntary is not identical to nonconscious activity/states.
Quoting raza
Some do, yes. Some thoughts are voluntarily "produced".
I wonder if you over-estimate your own importance in this? A thing exists only if you perceive it? [Yes, I know you meant any/all of us, not just you. :wink:] Are there no things that have human-independent existence, then? Or maybe I should ask if there are things that have perception-independent existence? :chin: Are you offering a QM perspective here, or something different? :chin:
[I'm not offering my view here, just inquiring about yours. :up:]
That appears to be a question, so no.
I'll have to get back to you on your other inquiries. Inundated currently which I may not get through today.
Trying to find a label or box for myself is not something which interests me.
My words are my words.
Which refers to my point about what is actually occurring. Labels for parts is not a good reference for what is actually occurring.
"I am sitting at my pc" refers to a whole lot of parts which therefore implies a specific identity.
My point is that that identity, this "I, is not what it is in actuality.
One cannot be a thing other than what is occurring.
Well, in order to communicate it's important to find some common ground. Communication can be tricky in the first place. Otherwise, you may as well just argue with yourself. Anyway, you describing yourself as an "actualist" is labelling yourself. It's actually unavoidable to not label or organise experience. We need to do it to survive. But we can be aware that we're doing it, and realise that labels aren't the thing that they're labelling.
I certainly don't agree with that.
Quoting raza
One cannot not be a thing occurring as a thing occurring.
I look forward to it. :smile:
Quoting raza
This looks interesting, but I can't quite see what you're getting at. Care to expand?
All you have done here is used a category as a point on a spectrum. "Passive" is merely a point on a spectrum, the entire spectrum being "action".
"I did not choose to notice that. I became aware of it in a passive sense"
That's right. No choosing or no doing. Just as you do not beat your heart or breathing your lungs.
"Nonconscious brain states are involuntary brain processes that involve regulating breathing, hear rate, balance, sensory and motor functions, etc"
What is interesting is that people, maybe you included, identify themselves as a thinker of thoughts.
However, As we have established, thoughts are involuntary (they merely arise, and then "actively" heard if in a "passive" way - passively noticed, or they generate a more grossly physical act, or are dismissed, or generate another thought).
What is it, though, that is surviving?
All these survival applications will still be involuntary because it will involve acts that were generated by thoughts which involuntarily arose.
There is the experience that could be labelled "survival".
My argument is that one is what is occurring.
It is impossible to be one without what is occurring and it is impossible for there to be any occurrence without one.
You cannot be a thing separate from your experience. You can only be whatever the experience is.
You identity is whatever is occurring. Whatever arises in consciousness is you.
Now the discussion is reaching an appropriate level. Not being able to distinguish yourself from the rest of the world is classified as a serious mental disease. Maybe you should see a doctor.
If you can do so and it is just your theory that says you couldn't, there must be something wrong with your theory.
Furthermore if it seems all in all that the mind could not exist without body (Mind=>Body) and the body could not exist without mind (Body=>Mind), then on can conclude that mind and body are the same (Mind<=>Body). Again there is me and there is my chair.
Yes. Your level. I replied in kind once you revealed your attitude.
Quoting Heiko
That is the end of our conversation.
A subjective idealist (and solipsist), then. :meh:
Presumably you regularly experience other folks' bodies and gesturing and such?
Not their self-awarenesses, though.
Red marks conundrum:
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yep (y)
You don’t have my permission so I’m not in that box. Feel free to delude yourself with your array of various boxes to play with.
Doing so, as you have, is merely a reaction from a sense of insecurity. A condition which manifests as wanting to produce order and control.
Know what is yours.
My point was that being aware of something is not necessarily a voluntary act.
Quoting raza
Just to clarify, I said some thoughts are involuntary, not all.
Quoting raza
A biological organism/entity, to put it broadly.
Quoting raza
Some "applications" are involuntary, and some are voluntary.
Quoting raza
I'm not sure I understand. I'd put it like this: to be or to exist is to "occur" or be to undergoing processes.
1. So do "you", as the thinker, voluntarily generate a thought?
2. If so, how and why do you do this?
Do "you", as the thinker, generate an involuntary thought?
3. If so, how and why?
4. If not, what DOES generate an involuntary thought within "you", the thinker?
If "you" the thinker does NOT generate an involuntary thought, does it still not remain that an involuntary thought is still being regarded as a "thought"?
If an "involuntary thought" is thereby a result of thinking then what or who is the thinker of it?
Is the thinker of an "involuntary thought" you (the "thinker" of thoughts)?
5. If "you" the thinker does NOT generate an involuntary thought, does it still not remain that an involuntary thought is still being regarded as a "thought"?
6. If an "involuntary thought" is thereby a result of thinking then what or who is the thinker of it?
7. Is the thinker of an "involuntary thought" you (the "thinker" of thoughts)?
I think the idea of involuntary vs voluntary arises because some thoughts seem to be far more spontaneous - as if from nowhere, and not, therefore, necessarily following a remembered thread.
(Missed numbering it)
2a. Do "you", as the thinker, generate an involuntary thought?
I can voluntarily generate (some) thoughts, yes.
Quoting raza
To reflect, plan, make decisions, etc. I do it mainly by concentrating or focusing on specific aims or goals, e.g. I want to modify my CV, so I will have to think about what aspects of my current CV need updating.
Quoting raza
The "you" there can be misleading. I am not voluntarily generating an involuntary thought; that's a contradiction. Involuntary thoughts arise and I become aware of them, and I can subsequently voluntarily act upon them, e.g. pay them attention, dismiss them, etc.
Quoting raza
Nonconscious processes that are triggered by internal and/or external stimuli. Voluntarily thoughts can also trigger involuntary thoughts.
Quoting raza
Yes. Any phenomena that one is aware of that constitutes thinking is a thought. Thoughts cannot be nonconscious though.
Quoting raza
The person it is happening for/to.
Quoting raza
Yes.
Quoting raza
So you don't believe in free will then?
Correct.
This still suggests cause and effect. A thought generates the next.
Cause and effect.
It will always SEEM like a choice. That is the trick.
Do you have any good reason(s) for why that is the case? Another question would be, do you have any good reason(s) for why free will is not the case and (strict) determinism is true?
Is it not so?
No, I agree, I am not separate from my experience(s); they become part of me as they happen. But I don't think I am only those experiences. My identity is not limited to "whatever is occurring", I don't think. I have memory and a remembered history. Sure enough, this history stems from past experiences, but it persists, and helps to form the being that I refer to as "me".
Again, whatever arises in consciousness is me, but I am not limited to that. Your view here would seem to reflect that odd understanding that some people have, they 'they' are just their consciousness, and that their nonconscious minds, and their doings, are something foreign, something distinct from themselves. Maybe even their bodies are included too. :chin: Not so. You are all of you, not just some of the parts. Even your gut bacteria, which has its own DNA, not yours, contributes to 'you' and 'your' identity. You are a community. Some parts of that community are 'you' (in the sense that they carry your DNA) and some are not. And some parts of your mind are conscious, and some are not. All of them, in combination, are 'you'.
From nowhere, or from a part of your mind that operates outside your consciousness, and therefore outside your conscious awareness? Thoughts that originate in your nonconscious mind cannot be labelled voluntary or involuntary, unless you insist on doing it randomly. You have no basis to recognise a thought as one or the other when you had no knowledge or awareness of it until it was presented to your conscious mind. It's just a thought that appeared to you - conscious 'you' - to emerge spontaneously. And even this appearance only seems so because things happen outside of your consciousness, and you seem, perhaps, to be forgetting that this is so? :chin:
Everything you have identified can be classified under “Experience”.
One would not be aware of “DNA” if it as a subject did not arise within the experience which is you.
I don’t see ourselves as “their or my consciousness”. I see consciousness as what we arise within.
On memory and history, memories arise within consciousness. Memorise, therefore history, are thoughts - which is experience - which is you.
“You”, therefore, is far more fluid that we tend to think (unless our thinking is somewhat stagnant).
You are fluid in that as an experience changes and shifts, so you also do because you are that.
Yes indeed. As I already said: Quoting Pattern-chaser
Quoting raza
They arise within nonconsciousness too. I.e. memory takes part in nonconscious thinking. Memory is not exclusive to consciousness.
Quoting raza
Yes...
Quoting raza
No. I am changed by my experiences. But I am not wholly defined by them, just as I am not wholly defined by consciousness. I have many parts. Memory and consciousness are two of them. My body is another vital part, as our minds are embodied, not independently existent. My nonconscious mind is another part. It does most of the work. It does much of what we like to think of as conscious processes, but are not. I think reducing us to mere experience is something of an insult. We have many failings and shortcomings, but we are more than just accumulated and remembered events.
I am not separate from my experience, but I am not only my experience. I am not passive, like a rock, or something. I respond to the things I experience, so (at the least) I am the sum of my experiences and my response(s) to them.
Nothing happens, that you remember/experiences, outside of consciousness.
Consciousness and brain needs to be defined. “Brain”, which is process, is the room “you” are in. The universe perceived is essentially “the brain”.
This “room” or “universe” can be referred to, therefore, as “consciousness” within which things arise.
Experience arises within consciousness.
The “human brain” processes life, whatever that electrical form is, into particular imagery and sensations as though an aperture.
The “aperture” generated imagery/sensation processor of a slug will not be the same universe as perceived by the “human-brain aperture”.
LIFE is a perception on a possibly infinite spectrum upon which human consciousness occupies a sliver.
That “sliver” is “the room” or the “universe” of our perception. The universe we perceive is Consciousness.
“Consciousness” is not the visible skull area.
The physical skull and body is merely an animated object which arises as an experience within Consciousness which we generally habitually and falsely regard as ourselves.
However, our selves are actually the whole entire experience that arises within “the room/universe of our perception”. Or rather, Consciousness.
I wonder if, when you write "brain", you mean "mind"? It looks that way.... :chin:
As for the rest, I'm not quite clear what you're getting at. I think you are attempting to define consciousness, but your words are only confusing me. Sorry for being dim. :confused:
The reason for confusion is that I am interpreting used words in a different way, but there is no real choice other than to do this because it is more problematic to invent a new language.
The human brain perceives something we call “life” in a particular way.
Life, as we perceive it, is not life as other creatures or plants “see” it. Even individual human brains are having different perceptions of what is supposed to be the same thing (synesthesia or even as subtle as a different mental focus).
It’s perception is everything being experienced in any moment, whether it be pain in a foot, a heartbeat, the warmth of the sun, a voice, the space defined as a room, thoughts, etc, etc.
Also, therefore, the entire body which we assume to be me or you is as much a merely perceived thing as a voice heard or the warmth of the sun felt.
So what I interpret “Consciousness” to be the invisible void within which everything arises.
So even what we see to be the universe, such as stars, planets and whatever the space is in between, is merely a perception unique to the human brain and which also merely ARISES within Consciousness.
You or I as the merely perceived thing - the merely PERCEIVED identity, just one of countless things that are experienced as arising in Consciousness, is only a product of thinking itself.
As such, the thought “me” is just a habit of mind.
(I’m not alluding to any distinction of 2 things, brain and mind. I’ve used “habit of mind” as a figure of speech. Habitual thinking or persistent and consistent thought, perhaps).
This “me” also incorporates within it “others” when they enter into any particular experience.
This maybe why certain age old philosophy has regarded one’s enemy as merely a reflection of an aspect of oneself.
Therefore this also maybe why particular wisdoms speak of understanding, and that there really is no “other” and that there is only “one”, or something like that.
But, regardless of old wisdom culture rhetoric, too me it is plain and obvious based on direct experience of what is arising and with the confronting knowledge “I” can never be a separate thing to what is perceived generally in any moment.