Monism, Pluralism, and Instrumentalism in Logic

Following are exerts from Susan Haack's, Philosophy of Logics. A good book by all means.

Monism states that there is just one correct system of logic.
Pluralism states that there is more than one correct system in logic.
Instrumentalism states that there is no "correct" logic; the notion of correctness is inappropriate.

Below is a schematic from the book that might serve as a mental template differentiating between the three versions of the metaphysical and epistemological questions about logic:



First, some comments about the conception of correctness which both monism and pluralism require: this conception depends upon a distinction between system-relative and extra-systematic validity/logical truth; roughly, a logical system is correct if the formal arguments which are valid in that system correspond to informal arguments which are logically true in the system correspond to statements which are logically true in the extra-systematic sense. The monist holds that there is a unique logical system which is correct in this sense, the pluralist that there are several.

The point is that the difference between a pluralism which admits classical logic and its extensions (or a deviant logic and its extensions) as both correct systems of logic, and a monism which admits both classical logic and its extensions (or a deviant logic and its extensions) as both fragments of the correct system of logic, is only verbal.

The instrumentalist position results from a rejection of the idea of the 'correctness' of a logical system, an idea idea accepted by both monists and pluralists.

An instrumentalist will only allow the 'internal' question, whether a logical system is sound, whether that is all and only the theorems/syntactically valid arguments of the system are logically true/valid in the system.

An illustration is the meaning-variance thesis proposed by Feyerabend's, which states: that the meanings of theoretical terms in science depend upon the theories in which they occur, so that there is failure of rivalry between alternative, apparently competing, scientific theories.

Another version of instrumentalism seems to derive from a refusal to apply any idea of truth, even a system-relative idea, to logic. Logic, it is argued, is not to be thought of as a set of statements, as a theory to be assessed as true or false; rather, it is to be thought of as a set of rules or procedures, to which the concepts of truth and falsity simply don't apply.

The issues summarized:
Does it make sense to speak of a logical system as correct or incorrect? Are the extra systematic conceptions of validity/logical truth by means of which to characterize what it is for a logic to be correct?

Furthermore,
Must a logical system aspire to global application i.e. to represent reasoning irrespective of subject matter, or may a logic be locally correct, i.e. correct within a limited area of discourse?

So, upon becoming acquainted or re-acquainted with the following types of metaphysical statements about logic, as to whether there's just one correct logical system, or a plurality of them, or even the irrelevance of the question manifest in instrumentalism, what would you answer in the poll?