An argument defeating the "Free Will defense" of the problem of evil.
The argument from evil is an inference that a 3- omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world. Theists reject this with the "free-will" defense, which suggests that God "had" to allow evil because it is a necessary consequence of free will. My argument defeats this defense based in Christian doctrine:
1. Logical contradictions do not exist.
2. If x exists then x is not a logical contradiction (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is logically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.
1. Logical contradictions do not exist.
2. If x exists then x is not a logical contradiction (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is logically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.
Comments (132)
Theologically, you are missing the concept of forgiveness. Imperfect beings are forgiven their imperfect acts of free will.
Please address the actual argument and tell me what premise(s) you disagree with.
They are addressing your argument. If you provide no epistemological justification in favor of adopting your form of argument -- in this case, you jump straight into an attempt to prove a variety of truths about the nature of evil, free will, God, suffering and the world in under ten propositions -- then your interlocutors are under no obligation to adopt your preferred form of argument in order to dispute your reasoning and conclusions.
I think what you've written here is a decent try at rebutting one particular form of one particular argument that some theologians have made historically. But you seem to think that this would extend to (a) defeating all possible theological arguments on the point (rather than attempting to show that one particular theological argument is self-defeating on its own terms); (b) your argument having actually made definitive statements on its own merits (about God, free will, etc.), rather than merely showing some possible contradictions in a felonious theological argument.
Premise 4 is based on Romans 6:7:
" anyone who has died has been set free from sin"
1John3 also supports this. It also shows that we will be like Christ, glorified and pure - i.e. improved and therefore not diminished in any way, while a lack of free will would be a diminishment.
Epistemological justification for adopting this form of argument:
it is a valid deductive proof (as far as I can tell, although I admittedly skipped a couple steps - such as from 4 to 5, because they seemed trivial), so the conclusion is necessarily true if the premises are true. Further, the truth of the premises is more plausible than the converse - so it's reasonable to believe them (again, as far as I can tell).
I'm not claiming the argument has dialectical efficacy - i.e. that it can persuade a Christian. Rather, it is reasoning that a person should consider who is having doubts about God as a result of considering the problem of evil. The free-will defense is often presented as a defeater of the argument from evil, and I'm presenting this as a defeater of THAT defeater.
I agree it doesn't defeat all possible theological arguments, just the one I alluded to. I'll add that the "free will defense" only addresses the evil performed by free-willed individuals; there are other evils in the world - but that's beyond the scope of this discussion.
There is a tension between God's omnipotence and his inability to create free-willed beings that do not sin. It's the crux of my argument, and it also has bearing on the atonement. This also is beyond the scope of the present discussion.
This does not seem to be logically airtight-
[i]4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin[/i]
4. they freely chose not to sin but could have chosen otherwise. Their choice was not determined by God, it was a free choice.
5. Omnipotence allows them to be free, it does not force them to desist from sin. The lack of sin is by their own choice, not God's omnipotence
6. He did create a world of free-willed beings who do not sin and do sin
Your argument is that God can make us free but determine the outcome of that freedom. Your argument is mostly logical except for this point. The choices must be made by created beings themselves and not determined by God. But, ultimately, God's omnipotence may create a world of free beings who do not sin, if all fallen spirits return to heaven. In other words, God may be in the process of doing just what you are saying, but that process requires a temporal fall from grace. 'All will be well, and all manner of things will be well' Julian of Norwich.
Freedom is a necessary part of goodness.
I believe this is the heart of the matter. Who is to say that the pain and suffering is 'needless'? Suppose it serves a greater good? Suppose when we all get to heaven we agree that a little suffering helped us to grow closer to God? Isn't God and only He, the ultimate judge on what is needless or not?
Ahh the quote I was looking for:
"God judged it better to bring good out of evil than to suffer no evil to exist."
Read more at: https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/saint_augustine_158175?src=t_suffer
I do not take suffering lightly, indeed I hate it, however the possibility of the above still exists.
"Your argument is that God can make us free but determine the outcome of that freedom. "
That is not my argument. If God's knowledge of the outcome entails being determined, then the non-sinning souls in heaven do not have free will. But if there are non-sinning free-willed souls in heaven, then such beings can exist without contradiction. Omnipotence implies God can create any contingent thing that does not entail a contradiction.
"Who is to say that the pain and suffering is 'needless'? Suppose it serves a greater good? Suppose when we all get to heaven we agree that a little suffering helped us to grow closer to God? Isn't God and only He, the ultimate judge on what is needless or not?"
This is the heart of the problem of evil. We see evil all around us, with no apparent good coming out of it. A committed Christian can always rationalize it in terms of God "having a plan" beyond our understanding, but that is a non-answer to the question of "why?" The simplest answer to the " why? " is: the Creator is indifferent or he lacks the ability to prevent it. So while I acknowledge that strong faith can provide a reason to reject the argument from evil, it doesnt satisfy those who develop doubt and seriously entertain the possibility there is no God.
They are in heaven because they freely chose not to fall with the rest of creation, not because God made it impossible for them to fall.
"They are in heaven because they freely chose not to fall with the rest of creation, not because God made it impossible for them to fall."
Is it impossible to fail in heaven, or are the souls in heaven changed in some way?
I don't know. But maybe they choose to surrender the freedom to fall. Origen of Alexandria says that they remained loyal to God by free choice.
If all are eventually saved then maybe, at the end of time, 6. in your post above, will be finally realised.
btw, there are two 6s in your post. I'm talking about the first one.
Are you really choosing to give up free will, or is that an unexpected consequence? Is it a good thing to lack free will? Why bother with suffering on earth (a consequence of free will) for our brief stay here, while spending eternity as robots? If it's good to lack free will, why ever give people that chance to fail?
Thanks for spotting the numbering error. I corrected it.
No, I don't think so. They would give up the freedom to sin but would still be free in infinite possibilities of goodness. Like an alcoholic coming to the realization that everything good can (if with difficulty) be found in sanity and sobriety.
"They would give up the freedom to sin but would still be free in infinite possibilities of goodness. "
Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just create beings like THAT - without a freedom to sin, but free in infinite possibilities of goodness?
Because freedom is necessary if goodness is to be freely chosen. Created beings must choose for themselves, God cannot make the choice for them. In time and space all creation is involved with this choice.
I believe this premise is flawed. How can you have contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin. Heaven would not allow sinners or sins in it at all, if it is this magical haven of goodness that religion portrays it to be. If this is true then those who are in heaven do not have any free will because they do not sin rather than they do not sin because God created them. You can't have a free-willed soul in heaven it is just illogical. Free will entails making decisions between possibilities, therefore, these possibilities could be anything between ultimate good and ultimate sin. But how can you ultimate sin in heaven? Disagreeing with this would then make Heaven illogical which is somewhat a foundation of your argument.
Quoting Relativist
God couldn't both create beings that do not sin and give them free will at the same time because not every decision in the world is going to be between options that are not sins.
"freedom is necessary if goodness is to be freely chosen. "
Sure, but that's a tautology. We make choices every day, sometimes choosing good and sometimes bad. At death, we stop having these choices (according to your theory). What good comes from this brief period of moral freedom? Is it good because some will fail and suffer damnation? That makes no sense.
i do not see how, Quoting EnPassant
is a tautology, it is saying something quite different - It is not real goodness if it is not freely chosen.
If I put a gun to your head and tell you to give the beggar a dollar, did you do anything good? Or if I promise you $1,000 if you give the beggar a dollar, and you chose to believe me, did you do anything good ?
Do you agree with the both of the following:
1. If there are free-willed souls in heaven, then:
at least some of them will sin & Romans 6:7:
(" anyone who has died has been set free from sin") is false
2. If the souls in heaven do not sin then they lack free will.
I think you will agree, but I'd like you to verify.
Not necessarily.
Quoting Relativist
Great good. If we become good we will be closer to God in the next life.
"i do not see how, "Because freedom is necessary if goodness is to be freely chosen"
is a tautology"
It just defines what it means to be a free choice. A free choice is only free if there is freedom.
" It is not real goodness if it is not freely chosen."
This seems a different statement, but I disagree with this one. I don't see a good thing must be freely chosen to be considered good. Hypothetically, a robot that follows Asimov's 3 laws of robotics can still do good, even though it cannot choose to do harm.
then the person who programmed it, in one way shape or the other chose to do good, not the robot.
[quote=EnPassant]Not necessarily.[/quote]
You previously said, "They would give up the freedom to sin but would still be free in infinite possibilities of goodness" This seems to imply we stop having these choices to sin or not.
[quote=Relativist]What good comes from this brief period of moral freedom? [/quote]
[quote=EnPassant]Great good. If we become good we will be closer to God in the next life.[/quote]
You seem to be suggesting it is a good thing to be close to God in spite of a loss of moral freedom. Well and good, but then why not create beings with that absence of moral freedom to begin with? Then everybody wins: this results in more good than the merit system God devised - a merit system that results in good people suffering. How is God's merit system better than what I proposed?
Are you suggesting Christianity is incoherent (since Romans 6:7 is generally accepted), or are you suggesting the souls in heaven lack free will? I can't tell what you're disagreeing with.
OK, Thanks. I agree that my argument is tied to that premise, but if the premise is false this just changes the problem.
Assuming the souls in heaven lack free will: If the ultimate fate of good people is to live eternally without free will, then why would God ever put us in a state of free will? Less good comes of it because it results in some good souls unnecessarily experiencing evil done to them on earth, and it results in some souls choosing evil and not receiving a good, eternal life with God. It's a contingent fact that God put this system in place, and it does not exhibit maximal goodness. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.
Assuming the souls in heaven HAVE free will, then Christianity is false.
Asimov's robots have positronic brains which give them full consciousness (self-awareness, intentionality, etc). They think as we do, except for being unable to violate the 3 laws.
My main point is that, IMO, goodness is not dependent on truly free will. In a sense, God lacks free will: he can't do evil because that is against his nature. And yet, he is considered the personification of goodness.
I agree with you personally in saying that Christianity is false. I just think that your argument could be a tad stronger. For example, it is stated in religion that God has put these evils on earth as a sign and our free will is used to determine whether we get to live a life of good will in heaven or eternal evil in hell. But, Free will can't be stripped away after earth life because then God will be taking away his gift to us which is not omnibenevolent. So, this leads on to the fact that, again, we have the potential to do bad in heaven and good in hell BECAUSE we still would have free will, therefore making the Two illogical and God doesn't do anything that is illogical.
Furthermore, this contradicts the premise that there are free willed souls in heaven that do not sin because it is clear that this is impossible. Because if you have free will you have to sin. They come hand in hand. This is what makes heaven and hell illogical because eternal greatness and eternal evil does not exist alone. They come hand in hand. Either together or not at all. Just because they are departed souls of Christians does not mean they are far from sin, is my point.
Thanks for your comments - I agree with everything you said. If I decide to put this into an essay, I'll try to be more comprehensive. For now, I'm working through bits of it at at time.
Incidentally, I previously raised this question on a Christian forum, and almost everyone who replied actually agreed with the premise that the souls in heaven have free-will and do not sin. They could not explain why God could not just create such beings directly - they just asserted he can't. The reasoning appeared to be: he would've if he could've, but he didn't so he couldn't.
I think what the argument might be is that what matters to God is that every being has had the opportunity to make free decisions. So the beings in heaven have had that ability and, by the decisions they chose to make, have qualified for entry to heaven. The arguments that are used to say that, for instance, a being that is shielded from temptation, or created immaculate like Mary, would not have free will, can be equally applied to say that, once in heaven, a being no longer has free will (they are now shielded from temptation, or rendered immaculate). But perhaps it is enough for an apologist that the qualified being once had free will.
Why would you say this? Clearly it's a false premise. Logical contradictions do exist, I encounter them quite often. Here's an example: the circle is square. In order to justify this premise of yours, you'd need to either show how these things which appear to exist as logical contradictions are either not contradictions, or exist as something other than contradictions.
"the beings in heaven have had that ability and, by the decisions they chose to make, have qualified for entry to heaven"
Yes, but God set up this process - he defined the qualifications, and they are contingent - God had a choice (i.e. the qualifications do not appear to be metaphysically necessary). It is basically a game that God created that will inevitably lead to harm coming to good people while on earth, and eternal harm coming to those who don't pass the test. Both sets of harm seem inconsistent with omnibenevolence. Further, it doesn't even appear that the test is administered fairly - obviously some have a harder time of it than others.
That is certainly a distinction, and any distinction can provide an escape hatch. That's why I don't suggest my arguments could convince a committed Christian - they can always resort to "God moves in mysterious ways." Arguments such as mine are only relevant to someone who is actually willing to entertain the possibility that a 3-omni God does not exist. The real lesson is that such a God's non-existence seems more likely than his existence.
BTW, Mary being "immaculate" just means she was born without original sin (see this)
OK, contradictory semantic constructions exist - but they have no referent in the actual world. How's this?:
1. An object that is describable as a logical contradiction is metaphysically impossible. (e.g. square circles are metaphysically impossible)
2. If x exists then x is metaphysically possible (converse of 1)
3. Omnipotence entails the ability to directly create any contingent entity whose existence is metaphysically possible.
4. There exist contingent free-willed souls in heaven who do not sin (e.g. the departed souls of faithful Christians). (Christian doctrine).
5. Therefore God's omnipotence entails the ability to directly create free-willed beings that do not sin.
6. Therefore God could have created a world of free-willed beings who do not sin
7. In this world, evil befalls the innocent due to the sinful acts of free-willed individuals
8. God created this world instead of a world of free willed beings that do not sin.
9. Therefore God chose a world with needless pain and suffering.
10. Therefore God is not omnibenevolent.
Yes I know. As a former RC I find myself constantly being tempted to correct people that say or imply that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception says that Mary conceived Jesus without having sexual intercourse - a temptation I often fail to resist :snicker:. The question I'm raising there is whether proponents of the free will theodicy defence are cornering themselves into saying Mary had no free will, since removing a tendency to commit 'sins' (shielding her conception from the taint of original sin) sounds to me like depriving them of free will. After all, if God could do that for Mary, why didn't She just do it for everybody, and that way make sure that everybody goes to heaven?
I don't think you've avoided the problem I brought up. How do you account for the existence of impossibility? You've limited "exists" such that it can only refer to possibilities. Why privilege possibilities over impossibilities? If you allow that possibilities exist, why not also allow that impossibilities exist?
" How do you account for the existence of impossibility?"
Impossibility is a property of propositions, not of the elements of reality that may be described by the propositions. True propositions correspond to elements of reality, but propositions are false because they do not correspond to elements of reality (i.e. I subscribe to correspondence theory of truth). An impossibility = a proposition that is false out of logical necessity, so it cannot correspond to an element of reality.
Not at all. Free will means you have a choice between sin and virtue. If you 'have' to sin you would not have the choice not to.
What corresponds, or does not correspond, with reality is the meaning of the proposition, what it means. But isn't the meaning of the proposition part of reality as well? So the meaning, what the proposition means, is real, and existent, whether it is possible or impossible.
Quoting Relativist
How would you describe meaning as an object?
" isn't the meaning of the proposition part of reality as well"
Meaning is something that exists only in the mind. It constitutes relations among other elements of the mind, so meaning is still just another abstraction. Abstractions are a special kind of existent, and one can argue that they do not actually exist. e.g. circles do not actually exist; rather, circular objects exist from which we abstract out the concept of circular via the way of abstraction.
This seems a digression. At issue is: what non-mental objects exist? Contradictions exist only as mental objects.
Why would one try to argue that mental objects do not exist? What would be the point of this argument, and how would it be supported.
Quoting Relativist
As far as I'm concerned what is at issue is that you are limiting your definition of "exist" so that only non-mental things can be said to exist, in order to make your argument. If your argument against God is based in the assumption that immaterial things, such as mental things, do not exist, then why don't you just take the easy route? 1) Immaterial things do not exist. 2) God is described as an immaterial thing. Therefore God does not exist. See how easy it is?
Good and Evil is a human subjective concept connected to law. For example, marijuana laws are changing in many places. What was once called evil, by the law, is no longer evil, where the law is revoked. The same behavior can be evil in one place but not in another place. It is all based on how human define it. Marijuana laws have nothing to do with God. However, depending on the political and legal environment, this can be called evil or not. Then some will blame God for the latest new evil that was created by man.
In natural instinct, all actions are morally neutral. The Lion can kill to eat, or the hyena can steal to survive. It is all part of the ways of nature, that allows nature to integrate in 3-D. It is humans who define good and evil and then blame God for the evil.
Bible symbolism shows Adam and Eve being told not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, which law. Once you do that, humans will rig the system with subjective laws to benefit themselves and their cronies.
There was also the tree of life, where good and evil do not exist. It is based on natural instinct. But you can't have it both ways, so natural human instinct disappears.
Consider President Trump revoking a wide range of rules and regulations put in place by the previous administration. Trump got rid of a bunch of subjective evil, that the previous administration can blame on God, who was not even in the meetings, when the laws were made. Minimizing law heads humans in the direction of natural instinct, where good and evil disappear.
Good and evil do not 'disappear' in the direction of natural instinct. Instinct ultimately compels us toward happiness. It is not the instinct that is 'wrong' it is our inability to understand and thence control instinct that causes the manifestation of human evil, and the subsequent dilution or disappearance of 'good'.
Instinct is the word of 'God', as it manifests directly out of Nature and there are few who suggest that 'God' or 'Nature' is a source of evil. Humans are the only source of evil.
Evil has only one source and that is human stupidity. Stupidity has only one source and that is a misunderstanding of God/Nature/Instinct.. these are effectively and functionally synonymous.
If God is beautiful then so is instinct.
Instinct, unlike God, has the advantage of existing, and is therefore, perhaps more deserving of reverence and respect. :)
M
There are 2 classes of evil that the Argument from evil uses, and the core of the counter argument is the same for both. Compensating goods. There are 3 tests needed to meet this criteria. The first one is - the compensating good needs to be significantly better than evil, the second one is you can not have the good without the evil, and the third is there is no other way to get the good. In the first class of evil, that caused by man, the compensating good is free will. The proposition is, that it is significantly better to be a being with free will, than to be a being without free will. However this allows for choices that are evil, and you can not have this good without this evil.
The second type of evil is that not caused directly by man, such as illness or natural disasters. Finding the compensating goods in this class of evil is much more difficult. In general these discussions spin down to cognitive distance. That if there was a compensating good, we would have the ability to see it, and recognize it as such. There is no overwhelming argument that I know off that says we would. So it becomes a no-seeum defense. And your view on the validity of the proposition, that there are some states of affairs, that exist, or can exist that we are un aware off.
My argument does not depend on the non-existence of mental entities qua mental entities. I resolved your original issue when I replaced "logically impossible" with "metaphysically impossible." A state of affairs is metaphysically impossible if its existence is broadly logically impossible. A square circle is strictly logically possible (logic alone does not entail a contradiction), but it is broadly logically impossible because the meanings of "square" and "circle" entail a contradiction; i.e. its actualization would violate the law of non-contradiction.
OK, tell me if I understand you properly then. "Metaphysically impossible" depends on "broadly logically impossible", which depends on how the terms are defined. So "metaphysically impossible" is dependent on the definitions of the terms. "Square circle" could be metaphysically possible if the terms were defined such that this would not be contradictory.
Since we can define the terms however we please, how is this relevant to whether something exists or not?
The notion of "Creation" is anthropomorphic.
An error that many make is, saying or theorizing too much about matters unknowable and indescribable.
I suggest (as an impression and a feeling, but not an assertion) that what-is, is good, and that there's good intent behind what is.
It's my feeling that little, if anything, can be said, beyond that, about such matters.
My suggestion in the paragraph before last doesn't imply that there is a physical world (or an ensemble of them) because of God's will. I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just "are".
So, don't blame this physical world on God.
In fact I claim that you're in a life--this one in particular--because, as the hypothetical protagonist of a hypothetical experience-story (consisting of a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications, with a mutually-consistent configuration of proposition truth-values), you're someone pre-disposed to life, with "will to life" (as someone quoted Schopenhauer). You're metaphysically prior to, and the reason for this life that you're in.
So, blame yourself, not God, for the fact that you're in a life, and the fact that you're in a life like the one that you're in..
Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.
But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness.
Was it not such a good idea for you to start this sequence of lives? That's moot now.
So, don't evaluate or judge all of what is, all of Reality, by this life, or this sequence of lives.
As I said above, I suggest that what-is, is good. That's outside the describable, assertable, arguable, provable realm, and it's just an impression, feeling, and unprovable opinion.
Michael Ossipoff
"Metaphysically impossible" depends on "broadly logically impossible", which depends on how the terms are defined. So "metaphysically impossible" is dependent on the definitions of the terms. "Square circle" could be metaphysically possible if the terms were defined such that this would not be contradictory."
That's right.
"Since we can define the terms however we please, how is this relevant to whether something exists or not? "
If you define “circle” and “square” differently from me, then you and I won’t be able to have a meaningful discussion about circles and squares. We need to agree on semantics to discuss the logic.
Consider this proposition:
Prop A: X is a circle & X is not a circle
Is it possible for X to exist? No, because it violates the law of non-contradition. Now consider this statement:
Prop B: X is a circle & X is a square.
“Square” is generally defined in such a way that it is not a circle. So with this definition in mind, Prop B entails Prop A. Therefore the X of Prop B can’t exist because it violates the law of non-contradition.
" I suggest that a physical world is a logical-system, consisting of abstract logical implications that just 'are'."
That doesn't make any sense. Logic is an epistemological tool; it applies to propositions (descriptions of some aspects of reality) not to the ontic objects of reality. If there are no intelligent minds articulating descriptions of reality, then there are no propositions (except in some abstract sense that every aspect of the world is describable, in principle).
[i]"Anyway, when the "problem of evil" is stated, there's over-emphasis on this physical world and its importance. Sure, this life matters, in the sense that how we conduct ourselves in it matters.
But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness."[/i]
That seems a self-defeating position. Why bother continuing to live, and to improve your life and that of your loved ones?
More importantly, why did God bother to put us into this hellhole (as it is for some, at least)? Did he want some maleficent amusement?
I’d said:
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Relativist replied:
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No, it doesn’t make any sense in terms of Materialism.
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Use it as you wish.
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From what you say, it evidently doesn’t “apply to” the ontic objects of reality that you believe in.
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“Materialism must be right, because anything else would be inconsistent with Materialism.” :D
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Uncontroversially, there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can state them or speak of them.
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Uncontroversially, there are complex inter-referring systems of abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and various mutually-consistent configurations of the truth values of their propositions.
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I don’t claim that the antecedents of any of those implications are true.
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Among the infinity of such systems, there inevitably is one that models the events and relations of your experience.
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There’s no reason to believe that your experience is other than that, or that this physical world is other than the setting in the “experience-story” consisting of that logical system.
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There’s no physics experiment that can establish or suggest that this physical world is other than that. As Michael Faraday pointed out in 1844, physics experiments detect and measure logical/mathematical relational structure, but don’t establish some sort of objective reality for “stuff “.
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What’s that you say? “It wouldn’t be real.”? Who said it was? I make no claim about anything in describable “reality” being real.
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,,,no propositions being spoken of anyway.
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But that isn’t an objection to my metaphysics, because my metaphysics is subjective idealism.
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Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist of the experience-story, is complementary with his/her surroundings in the story, the setting of the story. Obviously, without an experiencer, it wouldn’t be an experience-story. …so the experiencer is essential, central, fundamental and primary to the experience-story.
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But yes, there’s no justification for claiming that all of the true abstract facts would suddenly become false if all conscious beings were to somehow vanish. But, more relevantly, it’s meaningless to speak of all conscious beings vanishing, or not being, in the first place. That’s because it’s uncontroversially inevitable that there are all those experience-stories.
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That depends on what you mean by “the world”. Of course it’s tautologically true if you’re referring to the describable world. I don’t claim that all of Reality is describable, or that words are universally applicable and meaningful.
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I’d said:
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What it means is that you needn’t worry about it, complain about it, or agonize about it.
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But as I said, this life is real enough in its own context. Why bother to live and improve your life and those of your loved-ones? Because what else are you in this life for? You’re in a life because, as that hypothetical protagonist of that hypothetical story, you were someone who wanted, needed, or was otherwise predisposed to a life. You possessed (or were and are)what Schopenhauer called “the will to life”. So, what else is there for you to do, but to follow through with what you wanted and what you’re here for?
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If you question the advisability of starting in a life, or a sequence of lives, then I say, “Good point! But you wanted that, and so here you are.”
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I take it that you’re referring to the God that you believe in. Good question! Maybe it should make you doubt your belief in Fundamentalism and Biblical Literalism.
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Though I don’t debate Theism vs Atheism, I do sometimes answer questions and objections, like “the problem of evil”.
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Your objection, quoted above, is one that I answered in the post to which you were replying.
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As I said, your life-experience story consists of a complex system of uncontroversially-inevitable abstract implications, about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. Central, primary, and fundamental to that story is you, its protagonist and experiencer.
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Don’t glibly make statements about the indescribable, as by attributing those inevitable abstract implications to God’s will or making. Don’t be so quick to blame God for your being in this life that you wanted or needed.
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Initially, you had (were) the will-to-life. Then, in the course of some of those lives, you got yourself into a snarl of want, addiction, excess and guilt, leading eventually to birth in a Land-Of-The-Lost societal world such as this one. …because it’s what you were now consistent with.
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Own up to it as your own doing.
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You wanted it, but, regardless of what this physical/societal world is like, the overall whole of what-is can’t validly be characterized, judged or evaluated by this brief life in this world (or even by this long but finite sequence of lives).
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Anyway, as I was saying, however bad this planet’s societal situation is (and it is bad), worldly incarnated-life is just a blip in timelessness. …so you’re making too much of it.
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If worldly-life is just a blip in timelessness, then what purpose is there in it? Ultimately just play, of course. But try to play fair and nice.
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You’re characterizing and evaluating the whole of what-is, based on this brief life in this particular physical world and societal world. You’re overgeneralizing.
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Michael Ossipoff
Relativist: “That doesn't make any sense. Logic is an epistemological tool; it applies to propositions”
Michael Ossipoff: “No, it doesn’t make any sense in terms of Materialism.”[/i]
My statement doesn’t depend on materialism being true – e.g. minds can exist as immaterial entities without entailing logic having an ontic status. It’s undeniable that logic is an epistemological tool since it provides a means to infer propositional truths from prior truths. That fact doesn’t preclude it being something more than that, but you need to make a case for it.
Michael Ossipoff: “Uncontroversially, there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can state them or speak of them.”
100 years after the big bang, no one was around to state, speak, or contemplate any such abstract facts. Did abstract facts exist at that time? My point is that these “facts” of which you speak are merely descriptive, and reality exists with or without it actually being described. If you have a different view, then make a case for it.
Michael Ossipoff: “There’s no physics experiment that can establish or suggest that this physical world is other than that. As Michael Faraday pointed out in 1844, physics experiments detect and measure logical/mathematical relational structure, but don’t establish some sort of objective reality for “stuff “.
Physics pertains to physical relations among ontic objects, relations that are describable in mathematical terms. These physical relations do not exist independently of the objects that have them.
Michael Ossipoff:” there’s no justification for claiming that all of the true abstract facts would suddenly become false if all conscious beings were to somehow vanish.”
Relations exist as constituents of states of affairs, and we can think abstractly about these relations but that doesn’t imply the relations actually exist independent of the states of affairs in which they are actualized.
Michael Ossipoff: “What it means is that you needn’t worry about it, complain about it, or agonize about it.”
Your assertion isn’t the least persuasive, and in fact it merely seems dismissive – since you aren’t actually confronting the issues.
Michael Ossipoff: “I take it that you’re referring to the God that you believe in”
No, I’m referring to a God that is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. It seems unlikely that such a God could exist given the gratuitous suffering that exists in the world.
Michael Ossipoff: “Don’t glibly make statements about the indescribable, as by attributing those inevitable abstract implications to God’s will or making. Don’t be so quick to blame God for your being in this life that you wanted or needed.”
I don’t blame a God for anything. What I do is to draw inferences about what sort of God makes sense. Given the nature of the world: a 3-omni God doesn’t make much sense.
Michael Ossipoff: “… however bad this planet’s societal situation is (and it is bad), worldly incarnated-life is just a blip in timelessness. …so you’re making too much of it.”
It seems to me that you make too little of it. You haven’t really addressed the issue of the problem of evil, you just assert it’s not a big deal.
"We see evil all around us, with no apparent good coming out of it."
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"A committed Christian can always rationalize it in terms of God "having a plan" beyond our understanding,"
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"but that is a non-answer to the question of "why?""
Why is that a non- answer? it satisfied the saints of old. It satisfies many Christians. Do you mean the answer does not satisfy you, or the majority? What does that have to do with anything?
"The simplest answer to the " why? " is: the Creator is indifferent or he lacks the ability to prevent it."
There is another answer: He is neither indifferent not lacks the ability to prevent it, but does it for the greater good, which no human is in a position to judge or to know all the facts to judge. This is another possibility so your list of possibilities is false.
"So while I acknowledge that strong faith can provide a reason to reject the argument from evil,"
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"it doesnt satisfy those who develop doubt and seriously entertain the possibility there is no God"
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But remember this, in a world without suffering, a single pin-prick will be sufficient reason to doubt the existence of God, I am sure.
as my post above, for the evil done by man, the compensating good is free will.
For natural evil ( illness, natural disaster, etc) that is harder to identify the good, and the discussion does lead to cognitive distance. if there was a good, would we know it and recognize it as such. There is much good in the world, do we know the cause of all of it ?
Given the existence of God, evil is not a problem to me since God's existence and creation must contain an answer to the problem that is compatible with who God is. An assumption no less, but one that is allowable.
I think this article will cover the topic. Need to read it.
I simply do not understand the validity of the argument. Given the omnipotence of God, He could create a world in which evil exists and there is a greater good created by the evil that exists. Let's just say that if He did create such a world, then the argument, the 'problem of evil' will not apply.
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But you believe that there’s some (undisclosed by you) “ontic-reality” that can’t be explained by my explanation. Alright, what ontic-reality would that be? Can you verify that there is that ontic-reality?
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Whatever it is that you mean by “ontic status”, there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them. Other than that, I don’t claim any “ontic status” for them.
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How could something with so little “ontic status” be the basis of a physical world that (you believe) has more “ontic status” than that? But can you prove that the physical world has more ontic-status than that?
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I’ve repeatedly clarified that I make no claim about the “ontic status” or “reality” of abstract facts, or of the physical world. What I’m saying doesn’t require any of those things to be “objectively real”, whatever that would mean.
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And that’s the problem, isn’t it. You’d have to be specific about what kind of “reality” or ontic status the physical world has, and which isn’t had by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of truth-values for those propositions.
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You’re the one advocating some undisclosed special ontic-reality or ontic-status for something (this physical world). I make no such claim about anything that can be described.
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It isn’t clear what you think I’m claiming that logic is. As I said, there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them. I don’t claim that they’re “more than [something]”. I don’t claim any “reality” or “ontic-status” for them. I’ve already clarified that.
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I don’t know what “ontic reality” you believe in, but I refer you to what I said above in this post.
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1. Presumably you’d say that physics existed at that time. Do you think that physics doesn’t comply with logic’s abstract facts (…or with mathematics, which, itself, complies with logic). Since you’re talking about a matter of physics, it would be meaningless to say that there wasn’t physics then, in some sense. …and therefore mathematics and logic, in the same sense.
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2. All that’s irrelevant, because I make no claim about the “existence” (…whatever that would mean) of the abstract facts that there timelessly are, in the sense that we can speak of them.
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3. Don’t give me Subjectivism as an objection. I don’t claim the objective existence of our surroundings independent of us, the experiencer, the protagonist of our life-experience story. I’ve already clarified that. You’re repeating an already-answered objection. I’ve been saying that Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist, is primary, fundamental, and central to the logical system that I call your “life-experience possibility-story”.
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4. The big-bang, and some things about physics soon after, can be inferred from current experience, such as modern physics observations and experiments, and articles you’ve read about those observations and physicists’ conclusions from the observations. So it’s unclear what your objection is.
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Abstract facts can be described, and can be used in descriptions, if that’s what you mean. I’ve said only that there are those facts, at least in the sense that we can speak of them. That’s all I claim for them. Other than that, I make no claim about their “ontic status”.
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Your objection about what they merely are, seems to be a way of saying that you believe that abstract facts would need to be something more ontologically powerful, in order to produce the objectively-existent “ontic reality” that you think that this physical world is. Is that your objection?
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If so, then my answer is that you’re the one who believes that this world possesses whatever unspecified “ontic reality” or “ontic status” you’re speaking of. I’ve made no such claim.
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Your objection is similar to what Janus said. He said that I was missing the all-important distinction between logical truth and substantive truth. I asked him what he meant by “substantive”, and he said that it means (something like) “of, about or referring to our experiences”. Well of course that’s what the hypothetical experience-story, to which I refer, is all about.
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I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial—That’s another wording of my claim that there’s no reason to believe that they’re other than a hypothetical logical system.
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And yes, I’ve been saying that from the beginning of this discussion as well.
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Of course. And that’s even true of physical reality. Even if no one said anything about it, our physical surroundings would remain.
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Verbal activity isn’t necessary to the physical world around us.
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Anyway, I don’t claim that Reality is describable, other than a [it]subset[/i] of it that we talk about.
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But what you mean is that you believe in an “ontic reality” or “ontic status” for the physical world, such that it has some sort of “objective existence” that’s more than the logical system that I’ve described. Again, I mention that you’d need to be more specific about that.
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I’ve admitted that I can’t prove that this physical world doesn’t consists of some other “ontic reality” that you believe in, existing superfluously, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the uncontroversially-inevitable logical system that I’ve described.
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Your claim is a stronger one, that the physical world has to be more than what I’ve described. That’s a strong statement, requiring strong evidence. …starting with a better specification of what you think it is.
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You don’t seem to be able to be more specific about what that other supposed “ontic reality” is, or why it’s necessary to explain the physical world.
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All I’ve been saying is that there’s no reason to believe that the physical world is more than what I’ve said it is.
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The burden (to give that reason) is on someone who claims that there is such a reason.
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Physics is about logical and mathematical relational-structure. I get that you believe in some “ontic objects” that you aren’t being very specific about the nature of. You’re wanting to attribute some objective, fundamental, primary reality to the hypothetical things that that logical and mathematical relational structure is about.
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But, as I said in the passage that you quoted, Faraday pointed out that there’s no reason to believe in your objectively-existent (whatever that would mean) “stuff”.
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As I said, I get that that’s your belief. Stating it isn’t the same as supporting it.
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Faraday’s point was that there’s no physical experiment that can establish or suggest that there’s objectively-existent “stuff” (the ontic objects that you believe in), in addition to the mathematical/logical relational-structure observed by physical experiments and observation.
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Logical and mathematical relational abstract facts can refer to hypothetical things. The burden of proof is on someone who wants to claim that this physical world is other than that. …when no physics experiment can establish or suggest that it is.
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I get that that’s your belief.
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That’s an expression of your unsupported belief in the objective existence (whatever that would mean) of the objects that you believe in.
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What you’re claiming has nothing to do with verifiability or observation. It has everything to do with unsupported assertion of doctrinaire, dogmatic principle.
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And, by the way, I make no claim for the “existence” or “reality” of the abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. I’ve already said that more than once (lots more than once).
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You could ask: How could an existent physical world result from abstract facts whose existence I don’t claim?
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Answer: I haven’t claimed “existence” for anything in the describable, assertable, arguable world.
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I’ve many times clarified that too.
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And, when you claim “objective existence” for something, the burden is on you to say exactly what you mean by “objective existence”.
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You know, that’s really crucial: You’ve got to define your terms, and you’ve got to clarify exactly what it is that you’re claiming.
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So far, so good, That’s consistent with a definition of “fact”.
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Of course. Facts are often defined as relations between things. …as well as states-of-affairs, or aspects of how things are.
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You said that we can speak abstractly about relations (…and, I’d add, about abstract facts too). That’s the only sense in which I say that there are abstract facts.
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But it’s meaningless to speak of all the conscious beings vanishing (or not being there in the first place), because every life-experience story is inevitably there. The conscious beings and their surroundings (and the abstract facts that are apparent to humans) are mutually complementary in that hypothetical logical system.
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So it would be meaningless to speculate about whether there’d be those abstract facts if there were no beings to whom for them to be apparent. The beings, their surroundings, and the abstract facts (apparent to such beings as humans), are mutually complementary—in a completely hypothetical inevitable system of logical relation.
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In a meaningful sense, from your point of view (…and what other point of view do you have?) it’s all there for and because of you.
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You ask why did you bother dreaming up all this..why are you living this hypothetical story? Because it was inevitable that there’s someone like you, in that inevitable infinity of hypothetical experience-stories with their complementary protagonists.
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How could it be otherwise?
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I confronted the “problem of evil” by pointing out that the evil societal world to which you refer is only one of infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-worlds, which are settings for infinitely-many life-experience-stories.
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This world is the setting for a temporary life. And, if there are, additionally, a long but finite sequence of lives, then even that, too, is temporary.
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As I said, all that is a blip in timelessness.
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I also emphasized your own role in your birth in this world. I agree that your notion doesn’t make sense—your notion of a God who is responsible for this world or your birth in it.
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By speaking of this life and this physical world as all that there is, you’re greatly exaggerating it. ….unnecessarily fabricating something big and bad.
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I’ve been talking about the complete insubstantiality of what describably is.
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Nisargadatta had a good point when he said that, from the point of view of the sages, nothing has ever happened.
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So don’t worry so much about it.
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Yes, this societal world is bad. No, there’s nothing that we can do about that. And no, it isn’t everything.
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That isn’t un-supported dismissiveness.
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Right..the one that is your one-true-God to disbelieve-in.
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Alright, I take back my statement that you believe in that God
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You’re right to doubt that your notion of God corresponds to a God that there is.
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(A definitional quibble: Some people (and I agree with them) reserve “exist” for the things of the describable realm.)
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I don’t claim that your notion of God makes sense.
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Your notion of “omnipotence” includes a notion that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it. That’s the objectionable part of your notion of a 3-omni God.
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“…the nature of the world”? I presume that you’re referring to this societal world. It’s at least as bad as you think it is.
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But, when Western philosophers refer to “The World”, they’re referring to Reality. They’re referring to all that is. I suggest that the whole of what is, is good. I don’t assert that or argue it, or claim to be able to prove it to you. It isn’t that kind of a topic.
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But, here’s a bit of evidence (There can be evidence even on unprovable matters):
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I’ve been saying that there’s no reason to believe that what describably is, isn’t completely insubstantial. That implies an open-ness, a lightness, of the describable realm, and of life in it.
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I’ve spoken about the arguable and supportable temporariness of this life (or finite sequence of lives). …as a temporary blip on timelessness.
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I agree that it’s real in its own context, and that, obviously, while we’re here, it matters what we do. We can make things worse for ourselves, in this life, and in this sequence of lives, if we want to.
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Obviously there’s no need to make it bad for ourselves. And, while in it, we might as well be easy on ourselves enough to like it. I make that much of it.
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I claim that I have.
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1. This life (or finite sequence of them) is a temporary blip in timelessness.
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2. I’ve suggested (but not proved, because there’s no such thing as proof in these matters) an open-ness and lightness implied by the insubstantiality of the describable world, which includes our lives.
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3. As implied or suggested by the above points (but if you don’t think so, I can’t prove you’re wrong), I suggest that the whole of what is looks good instead of bad. …which I emphasize is a subjective matter of opinion, an impression, and not a matter for assertion, argument or proof. …because assertion, argument and proof have nothing to do with such matters.
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4. I’ve suggested that words can’t describe Reality. That includes pessimistic words. That undermines any pessimistic words purported to describe the whole of what-is.
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5. You seem to want to imply that God must be the omniponent God that you speak of, who is responsible for this world and your birth in it. but that’s an unsupported claim, and a fallacy that the “problem of evil” argument depends on.
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I don’t participate in the arguments about Theism vs Atheism, but the “problem of evil” argument made by Atheists doesn’t hold up.
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I’ve told why it isn’t as big a deal as you think it is.
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Michael Ossipoff
You seem to be saying that it is possible that all this evil exists for the greater good. I'm not disputing that. What I'm saying is that the "best explanation" (i.e. applying abduction) for the evil in the world is that there is no 3-omni God. i.e. based on what we can know and perceive about the world, it appears unlikely that such a God exists. As I've said several times, I don't suggest this will change the mind of a committed believer - and that's because of the possibility you bring up. However, if someone is willing to entertain the possibility of God's non-existence, then this constitutes a reason to think God might actually not exist.
But this life and this world are a blip in timelessness. In fact, the long but finite sequence of lives that you're in is likewise only a blip in timelessness.”[/i]
The physical world’s existence is a universally held belief. The same cannot be said for the immaterial. Your claim that “this life and this world are a blip in timelessness” is an assertion that needs support – why do you believe this? Why should I believe it?
[i]“That’s an expression of your unsupported belief in the objective existence (whatever that would mean) of the objects that you believe in.
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What you’re claiming has nothing to do with verifiability or observation. It has everything to do with unsupported assertion of doctrinaire, dogmatic principle.”[/i]
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that deals with what exists. “Objective existence” just means it actually exists, rather than merely hypothetically existing. Unicorns can have a hypothetical existence. The cat sitting on my lap has objective existence.
That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else. We are not taught that there is an external world, we naturally recognize a distinction between our self and the external world of our perceptions. In other words, it is innate – practically everyone believes it. It is irrational to abandon a belief arbitrarily, or just because it is possibly false. Do you have an undercutting defeater for this belief of mine? Were you born with the belief that the external world is an illusion, or was your prior belief in an external world defeated by some fact you encountered?
“you believe that there’s some (undisclosed by you) “ontic-reality” that can’t be explained by my explanation.”
I can’t judge that, since I haven’t assessed the ontology that you have hinted at. However, I question why you should believe your ontology is true. For example, you asserted “this life and this world are a blip in timelessness” – why think that?
“Alright, what ontic-reality that be? Can you verify that there is that ontic-reality?”
I apply the principle of parsimony. The evidence for the existence of a physical world is extremely strong, so that is a strong starting point for an ontology. I can’t rule out non-physical things existing, but there’s no reason to believe it unless a good case can be made for it. Regarding “verification” – I rely on my sensory input, and the instinctual way my brain processes this input such that I can sufficient sense of it that I (and my ancestors) have managed to survive to procreate. That’s enough verification for me.
[i]“there are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can speak of them”
Sure, we can speak of them, but that doesn’t imply they have some sort of existence independent of the states of affairs in which they are instantiated. I know circular objects actually exist in the world. I do not know that “circles” exist independently of 1) circular objects 2) minds to contemplate states of affairs with the property “circular”.
““objectively real”, whatever that would mean.”[/i]
It means that it actually exists as an entity. Ontology deals with what exists.
[i]“You’d have to be specific about what kind of “reality” or ontic status the physical world has”
Specifically: the physical world exists (the is probably the least controversial ontological claim anyone can make).
“and which isn’t had by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of truth-values for those propositions.”[/i]
Are you asking me to prove your ontology false? No can do. For the sake of argument (since I don’t know much about your ontology), I’ll assume your ontology is as coherent. That doesn’t make it true. I’ve examined D.M. Armstrong’s “States of Affairs” physicalist ontology and it also seems coherent. His seems much simpler, and more consistent with intuition than yours. Why should I accept yours?
“You’re the one advocating some undisclosed special ontic-reality or ontic-status for something (this physical world). I make no such claim about anything that can be described.”
Do you deny the existence of the physical world? The physical world is the only think I’m certain of. I don’t rule out the possibility that non-physical things exist, but it seems irrational to believe something just because it is POSSIBLY true. A case must be made for it, not merely a set of assertions.
“It isn’t clear what you think I’m claiming that logic is.”
I’ll refrain from guessing. Why don’t you tell me if you agree with the statement I made (“logic is an epistemological tool”) and tell me if you think there is anything more to it than that.
“Do you think that physics doesn’t comply with logic’s abstract facts”
Known physics is actually incoherent, so I’ll assume you’re discussing an idealized physics – the actual “natural law” of the universe. I expect that this idealized physics is coherent – it entails no contradictions. What other abstract facts of logic do you have in mind? But yes, of course, I believe that the operation of the universe throughout its history have been consistent with this idealized physics. But I think you’re overlooking the key point: physics (as generally discussed) is descriptive. The fact that 2 electrons repel each other is not dependent on an abstract law that makes it so; rather, it is due to the intrinsic properties of the electrons.
“I don’t claim the objective existence of our surroundings independent of us, the experiencer, the protagonist of our life-experience story. I’ve already clarified that. You’re repeating an already-answered objection. I’ve been saying that Consciousness, the experiencer, the protagonist, is primary, fundamental, and central to the logical system that I call your “life-experience possibility-story”.
Good for you. I disagree. Shall we agree to disagree, or do you think you can show that your view is more worthy of belief than mine?
“Your objection about what they merely are, seems to be a way of saying that you believe that abstract facts would need to be something more ontologically powerful, in order to produce the objectively-existent “ontic reality” that you think that this physical world is. Is that your objection?”
I’m saying that I believe abstractions are causally inert and they actually exist only in their instantiations and in the minds of intelligent beings as a product of a mental exercise.
“I suggest that this life and the physical world in which it is set, are completely insubstantial”
Why do you believe such a thing? This seems similar to someone claiming to be solipsist – one can’t prove them wrong, but there’s not really a good reason to abandon the basic world view that we have innately.
“it would be meaningless to speculate about whether there’d be those abstract facts if there were no beings to whom for them to be apparent.”
It is relevant when discussion the nature of abstractions. Some people think triangles exist as platonic objects in a “third realm” or in the mind of God; others believe they exist only in their instantiations. These controversies may, or may not, be relevant to you – but they are not inherently “meaningless".
[i]Relativist:
“Your assertion isn’t the least persuasive, and in fact it merely seems dismissive – since you aren’t actually confronting the issues. “
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Michael: ” I confronted the “problem of evil” by pointing out that the evil societal world to which you refer is only one of infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-worlds, which are settings for infinitely-many life-experience-stories.”[/i]
At best, you are giving me a reason why you reject the argument from evil. You have given me zero reason to reject it, and I doubt you could persuade anyone because your position depends on accepting some rather unconventional beliefs. ,
“As I said, all that is a blip in timelessness.”
From my point of view, that is an incoherent statement. Timelessness is a term that I’ve seen applied to God and to abstract objects. Even if we assume those things exist, that doesn’t make the physical world a “blip in timelessness.” I accept that it probably makes sense in your world-view, but TBA – I don’t see anything of interest in it, since it seems pretty far fetched.
OK, Agreed.
Quoting Relativist
I will address this below:
Quoting Relativist
Agreed.
Quoting Relativist
Agreed.
Right, now to the part I have difficulty with.
Quoting Relativist
How do we know it is the best explanation? If God actually exists, we could put this question to him: Does it appear unlikely that You exist, based on what we can know and perceive about the world?
If the answer is yes, that it appears unlikely to us, that still does not mean that God does not exist, since we have asked Him the question and he has answered yes. If the answer is no, then we have to make a judgement as to whether or not God is telling the truth or aware of the truth, both seem to be highly probable.
My question is this: what is the basis on which we can make the judgement that God's goodness is incompatible with reality? Do we have the knowledge (or omniscience) and the authority to judge God?
"My question is this: what is the basis on which we can make the judgement that God's goodness is incompatible with reality? Do we have the knowledge (or omniscience) and the authority to judge God?"
The basis is our intuitive understanding of right and wrong and conceivibility: there are many bad things that occur for which there is no conceivable offsetting good. How does one make sense of the 14th century "black death" plague, in which 30-60% of Europe's population died?If we can't conceive of an offsetting good, why should we believe there is one? Abduction entails finding the best answer, and a non-answer can't be considered better than an actual answer.
The classic argument to this point is cognitive distance. If there was a compensating good, would/could we see it, and recognize it as such. We human beings have a very long history on not believing a whole bunch of things exist, that is, until we close the cognitive distance that actually allows us to see them. Because we can not perceive something with the tools we have, is not a very good reason to deny it's existence.
The usual example given is:
A chess novice is watching 2 chess masters playing - She see one of the players lose his bishop early in the game and the novice see this a a bad thing. However the master knows that the loss was part of a strategy and was actually a very good thing.
If you have the time Dr. Hud Hudson does a very good job of on this issue in this lecture.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mJbgnyFlW5M
"Because we can not perceive something with the tools we have, is not a very good reason to deny it's existence."
We shouldn't deny the possibility of existence unless proven impossible, but mere possibility is insufficient grounds for rational belief in something.
Both God's existence and his nonexistence are epistemically possible, so clearly we need more than mere possibility to justify belief.
I always think the better question than "does God exist" is , is it reasonable to believe that God exists. The first question seems to require a level of evidence required of a fact. The second does not.
Quoting Relativist
i disagree with this, depending on the level of evidence, or the basis of belief.
but mere possibility is insufficient grounds for rational belief in something.
— Relativist
i disagree with this, depending on the level of evidence, or the basis of belief.
My statement refers to believing something solely on the basis that it is possible and without considering evidence. Do you really disagree with that?
Not sure it is actually possible to belief something is possible without evidence. How would concept of something's possibility enter ones mind in the absence of something that would pass as evidence.
There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death, so why believe there is an offsetting good?
That is not a statement of fact. As above, the traditional argument is cognitive distance. Are you sure, that if there was a compensating good, you would see it and recognize it as such?
Relativist:There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death, so why believe there is an offsetting good?
That is not a statement of fact.
On the contrary, "There is no evidence of an offsetting good to the evil of the black death"
is a statement of fact, if true. Why think it false?
the factual statement would be, that we are not aware of any offsetting goods. That there are none is not a matter of fact. Your point assumes, that if there were compensating goods, we would see them and recognize them as such. I have challenged that point a few times now, without you addressing it.
The belief "there is no evidence" is justified by the fact that I am aware of no evidence. Similarly, take any ad hoc possibility X: I am aware of no evidence for X, and that is sufficient to believe there is no X.
You are more than free to believe by reason that there is no compensating good from the black death, because you do not see any compelling evidence that there is one,
That is a very different statement than you made earlier.
Quoting Relativist
This statement proposes as a matter of fact that there is NO evidence. Again just because you do not see any evidence, does not make it a fact that there is no evidence.
You agree that I am justified in believing there is no evidence. Therefore I am justified in making the assertion "there is no evidence."
"There is no evidence" is a proposition; it is either true or false. If true, it is a statement of fact. As fallible creatures, we don't generally have access to objective truth (exception: analytic truths), so any assertions we make are representations of belief. It's reasonable to ask me to justify the belief, and I did so. Therefore you ought to accept that my reasoning is valid.
maybe it would help if I format your point as I see it.
Set up:
(the traditional argument of evil) - Evil exists, If God was all good, all seeing, and all powerful He would see the evil, be motivated to stop it, and have the power to do so. However - evil exist therefor God does not.
( the traditional theist response) - For evil and an all good, all powerful, all seeing God to co-exist there must be compensating goods, or morally justifiable reasons why God allows the evils to exist.
Your argument:
P1. We are not aware of any compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons for the Black Death.
P2. If there were compensating goods for the Black Death we would be aware of them, and recognize them as such.
Conclusion - there are no compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons for the Black death.
My challenge is to your implied P2. and therefor your conclusion. I am not arguing P1
I'm going to say a few things to add to the argument.
I believe the argument has merit. First, it does seem that God (as most Christians define God), does have the ability to create beings with a free will, and who never sin. For example, supposedly God created the Angels in heaven with free will and yet some rebelled and some didn't. Given that, it would seem that an omnipotent being could have only created beings that have a free will, and only use that free will in benevolent ways. So God could have only created the Angels that he knew wouldn't choose to use their free will in evil ways. Presumably this is true of all persons.
Second, if we have free will here on Earth, and we then go to heaven where we no longer have free will, would it still be the same person? Also taking away freedom of will would seem to go against God's desire to have beings that freely love him. Does God want robots, what kind of love can someone give who doesn't have the ability to choose otherwise?
Christians seem to think (many Christians) that having a free will solves the problem of evil, but I think it adds to the problem. For example, God being omniscient would have to know who would choose him and who would reject him. Why even create beings that you know will choose to reject you? If you choose to create beings that you know will end up in eternal damnation what does that say about you? If I create a robot with a free will, knowing that robot would murder 1000 people, that makes me responsible. The free will argument that many Christians propose makes God responsible for evil.
No, creating a strawman does not help. Respond to what I said in my immediately prior post. In particular, this comment:
You agree that I am justified in believing there is no evidence. Therefore I am justified in making the assertion "there is no evidence."
Do you see anything wrong with this?
(My argument differs from your strawman because I'm applying abduction (inference to the best explanation) and it is to the world at large, inclusive of all the evils we perceive in it.)
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“Existence” is metaphysically-undefined. In any case, no one denies that this physical world is real in its own context, and that your life, and this physical world which is its setting, are real in the context of your life.
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I haven’t claimed existence or reality for anything describable, including the abstract facts that I’ve referred.
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(Actually, I’ve said that many times.)
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There’s no such thing as oblivion. At the end of lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation), you’ll never experience a time when there’s no experience. Only your survivors will experience a time when you aren’t.
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At the end of lives (or the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation), obviously there’s sleep, but there’s no such thing as oblivion.
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Eventually, during that sleep, there will be no knowledge, memory or perception that there ever was, or could be, such things as identity, time, or events.
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The finality of that sleep at the end of lives, and the absence of any knowledge, memory or perception that there is, was, or could be, such things as identity, time or events, suggests the use of the word “timelessness”. And, because of that timelessness’s finality, compared to the temporariness of life, suggests that we can call timelessness the natural, usual state-of-affairs.
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…a closer and closer approach to, but never quite a reaching of, the Nothing that is the backdrop to everything.
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Comparing something of temporary finite duration to timelessness suggests the use of the word “blip”.
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That’s a bit circular.
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So all you’re doing is defining your “objective existence” as more than hypothetical existence.
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I agree that that’s the best you can do toward specifying what you mean by “objective-existence”.
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I asked you in what way you think the physical world is more than hypothetical, and your answer is that it’s more than hypothetical by being more than hypothetical.
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The cat sitting on my lap has objective existence.
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…by which you mean that it’s part of this physical world. The things of this physical world are “objectively-existent” by being part of this physical world. And this physical world is “objectively existent” by being this physical world. And yes, that’s the best that you can do, to answer my question.
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As I said, no one denies that this physical world is real and existent in its own context. You haven’t answered noncircularly my question about what you mean by “objective existence”, but that’s alright, because it isn’t metaphysically defined.
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But thank you for clarifying and establishing that you don’t have an answer to my question about in what way you think that this physical world is more than what I said it is.
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I asked you in what way this physical world is more than what I said it is, and your answer amounts to saying that you don’t have an answer. I acknowledge and accept your that answer.
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It resolves and completes this discussion.
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...for Materialists, of course.
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(But no one denies that the physical world is real and existent in its own context.)
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Your experience is the epistemic foundation for all else. Your experience-story is uncontroversially modeled by a complex system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things…with a mutually consistent configuration of hypothetical truth-values for those propositions.
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(..though there’s no reason to believe that any of those hypothetical propositions are true.)
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…with you as the protagonist/experiencer who is complementary to your surroundings in that experience-story, and thereby is central to that story, which is for you and about your experience.
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And there’s no reason to believe that your experience of this physical world is other than that, or that this physical world is other than the setting in that hypothetical experience-story.
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You’ve admitted that you don’t have an answer regarding in what noncircular way you think that this physical world is more than that. ”This world is more than just hypothetical by being more than just hypothetical.”
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There’s undeniably an external world in our experience. That’s what our experience story is about.
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We’re taught that this physical world is fundamentally, primarily, and objectively existent (without a definition of what “objectively-existent” means). …and that there’s an philosophically-meaningful distinction between physically-actual vs hypothetical but not actual. “Actual” legitimately means “Of, consisting of, part of, or referring to, this physical world.” …for the purpose of saying what’s merely hypothetical vs what’s actual. But that definition doesn’t address the matter of in what way this physical world is supposedly more than hypothetical.
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We’re taught, from an early age, to be little Materialists and Science-Worshippers. Some of us never question that.
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I was raised Atheist. When I was in elementary-school, I was a Materialist, and I used to argue Atheism to my Sunday-school teachers.
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Of course. We’re the protagonist and it is our surroundings. Of course we perceive the world from the point of view of the animal that we are, in our experience-story.
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Of course, your surroundings are complementary to you, in your experience-story.
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Certainly not.
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I’ve many, many times said:
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I can’t prove that this physical world doesn’t have whatever (unspecified) ontic-status that you think it has, superfluously, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute fact, alongside of, and duplicating the events and relations of, the uncontroversially inevitable logical system that I’ve described.
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When saying that there’s no reason to believe that your experience and this physical world are other than what I’ve described them as, I’ve asked you for such a reason, and you haven’t given one.
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As animals, we instinctively deal with our surrounding physical world as best we can. Kids, and most people, and (for all we know) all other animals leave it at that, and don’t ask what there really is, or why they’re in a life, or why there’s something instead of nothing.
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…but that doesn’t support Materialism.
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If you want to discuss philosophy, and the matter of what is, then you need to be willing to question your prior beliefs and assumptions.
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I’ve clarified, many, many times, that I don’t claim any reality or existence for anything describable. …including the abstract facts that I refer to, or the physical world. (…though obviously the physical world is real in its own context, and in the context or our lives.)
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If there’s some ontological position that I left out, then feel free to specify it.
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What ontology do you think that I believe is true? You mean when I say that I don’t claim any reality or existence for anything describable, including the abstract facts that I refer to, or the complex inter-referring systems of them that I refer to, or this physical world?
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On the other hand, neither do I claim that your unspecified, unparsimonious, unverifiable and unfalsifiable ontology isn’t true.
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Saying that I don’t make ontological claims isn’t the same as saying that I believe in an ontology.
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And, if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one.
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I answered that above, where you first asked it, above in your post.
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But it isn’t about an ontology. It was just a fairly uncontroversial comment about experience in life, and in the sleep at the end-of-lives.
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(Though I haven’t experience the end of lives, there are nevertheless uncontroversial things that can be said about experience.)
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It doesn’t support you. Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony.
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*It’s like not noticing a big dog-dropping in the middle of your well-vacuumed carpet.
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In contradistinction, what I’ve been saying is about things (abstract facts) that are uncontroversially-inevitable, for what they are, at least as discussion-topics (…even if not claimed to be existent and real).
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As I’ve said, many, many times, no one denies that this physical world is real and existent in its own context and in the context of our lives.
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In what other context or manner do you want or claim for it to be real and existent? What would that even mean?
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You never answered regarding what you claim this physical world is, or gave any reason to say that it’s more than the hypothetical system that I described.
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But no, there’s absolutely no evidence, no physics-experiment, to support a claim that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in your hypothetical experience-story, a complex abstract logical system.
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…no evidence or physics-experiment to support a claim that the physical world consists of other than abstract logical and mathematical relational facts.
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What ontology would that be? That was the question that you haven’t answered. All you said was that the physical world is more than hypothetical, in the sense of being more than hypothetical…because it’s more than hypothetical.
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I made no claim of anything describable existing, including the abstract facts that I spoke of.
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That’s okay, because I don’t claim it. …as I’ve said many, many, many times.
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Verification of what? That your life and this physical world are real in the context of your life? No one denies that (…as I’ve said many, many times.)
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Of course you experience from the point of view of the animal whose experience is your life-experience-story.
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None of that supports a claim that this physical world is other than what I said it is.
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I don’t claim any existence for them. …as I’ve said many, many, many times.
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See above.
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I addressed your Subjectivism argument in my previous post. There’d be no point in repeating it all here. I’ll just repeat that I have no disagreement with Subjectivism. I refer you to my answer to that, in my previous post.
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“Actual” is often defined as “of, pertaining to, consisting of, or part of this physical world. No one would deny that this physical world is “actual” in that sense.
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No one denies that this physical world actually exists and is real in its own context.
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As I asked above:
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In what other context do you want or claim for it to be real and existent? …and what would that even mean?
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When I asked, “What would it mean for this physical world to be “objectively real”, your answer was:
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“It means that it actually exists as an entity.” That doesn’t answer anything. It just substitutes another word or phrase that you haven’t defined.
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You’re not saying what you think this physical world is, other than what I said it is.
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…but it doesn’t give license for unspecified claims using undefined words.
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Of course it exists in its own context. If you want to say that it exists in a context or way other than that, then specify that context or way.
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If you want to say that it exists as something other than what I said it is, then specify what else it is.
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Is that what I said? No, I was merely asking you what ontological status you believe that this physical world has, that isn’t possessed by the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story built of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a mutually-consistent configuration of hypothetical truth-values for those propositions.
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I’m not proposing an ontology in this discussion. I’m merely pointing out that there’s no reason to believe that the physical world is more than the setting in the experience-story logical system that I’ve described.
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To propose an ontology, I’d propose that the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facgs, and that the describable world consists of nothing other than that.
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Maybe I should call that ontology/metaphysics “Ontic Structural Subjective Idealism” (OSSI).
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But, in this discussion I’m not saying that. I’m only saying that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world and your experience of it are other than what I’ve said they are.
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When emphasizing that I don’t claim that anything describable exists (including the abstract facts that I refer to), I’m not making ontological claims. It can’t be called an “ontology”. You’re the one with an ontology that you aren’t specifying or being clear with us about.
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I don’t know what ontology you’re talking about. You yourself said that you don’t either.
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At least as discussion-topics, there uncontroversially are abstract facts. That would be a difficult thing to argue against (…but it wouldn’t surprise me if you tried.)
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But, since I’m not claiming their existence or reality, or that of anything describable, then I’m not quite sure what “ontology” of mine you’re referring to.
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(This post was too long to post and so I'm posting it in two installments. This is part 1.
Part 2, the last of 2 parts, will be along next.)
MIchael Ossipoff
Part 2 of 2:
“Physicalism” (a regrettable two-meaning word for Materialism (or for a philosophy-of-mind position)) is blatantly unparismonious, with its big, blatant brute fact. (…the alleged fact of this physical world being the ground of all being, the fundamental and primary reality, and constituting all of reality).
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Do you deny the existence of the physical world?
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Of course not. It’s real and existent in its own context, and in the context of our lives. It’s just that I don’t claim any other existence or reality for it. Denying and not claiming aren’t the same thing.
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And what did I say about:
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“I don’t deny that this physical world has whatever ontological status you believe in, superfluously, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, alongside of and duplicating the uncontroversially-inevitable logical system that I’ve described.”
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No one denies its existence and reality in its own context. But we can discuss is nature and origin.
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I’ve repeatedly emphasized that I make no claim regarding the existence or reality of the abstract facts that I refer to.
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But uncontroversially there are those facts in the sense that we can mention or speak of them.
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And what do you think that I believe in. I’ve repeatedly emphasized that I make no claim regarding the existence or reality of the abstract facts that I refer to.
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…a case for what in particular?
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What assertions have I not supported? I merely invited you to give a reason why this physical world must have whatever unspecified special ontic-status you’re saying it has.
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You’re the one who believes in a ontology that is not only unsupported, but isn’t even specified. Yes, you say you believe in a special ontic status for the physical world, but you aren’t being clear about what it is.
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I emphasize that, in this discussion, I’m not advocating an ontology or metaphysics. I’m merely pointing out that there’s no reason to believe in an ontology that says that this physical world is other than what I’ve said.
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No, don’t guess. Just look at the postings that you’re replying to, and ask yourself what claims I’ve made, there, about logic.
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Logic can be a useful tool for relating the truths of propositions, if that’s what you mean. It’s also useful in digital electronics, for studying and relating the 2- valued settings of circuit-components.
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It’s also a subject of discussion.
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I haven’t claimed more for logic.
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As I’ve said, many, many, many times, I don’t claim any existence or reality for the abstract facts to which I refer, other than that we can refer to them, mention them, speak of them.
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See directly above.
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“Do you think that physics doesn’t comply with logic’s abstract facts”
Known physics is actually incoherent, so I’ll assume you’re discussing an idealized physics – the actual “natural law” of the universe. I expect that this idealized physics is coherent
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Many expect that physics’ explanations will consist of an open-ended infinite-regression.
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Yes, because there are no such things as mutually-contradictory facts. The consistency of our physical world is .something that stands out about it, an empirical observation that agrees with and is explained by the fact that
there’s no such thing as mutually-inconsistent facts. …including among the abstract facts that are the basis of an explanation for your experience of this physical world.
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Yes, there have been seeming contradictions or anomalies in physics, like the black-body radiation’s predicted and observed energy-wavelength curve, the Michaelson-Morely experiment result, and the planet Mercury’s orbit’s seemingly anomalous rotation of apsides. These things have all been found consistent with new physics.
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And now, currently, there are seeming anomalies too, such as the apparent acceleration of the recession of the more distant galaxies. I don’t suppose that anyone doubts that there’s physics that will explain that too, and which might be eventually discoverable by our physicists.
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In fact, it maybe could be argued that no physical world can be proved inconsistent, because any seeming inconsistencies, anomalies or contradictions could be explained by as-yet undiscovered physics, or hallucination, delirium or dream, or mistaken memory of what happened (consider how much eyewitnesses can disagree).
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A set of hypothetical physical-quantity-values, and a hypothetical relation among them (a physical law or theory), together comprise the antecedent of an abstract implication.
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…except that one of those hypothetical physical-quantity-values can be taken as the consequent of that implication.
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A mathematical theorem is an implication whose antecedent consists (at least partly) of a set of mathematical axioms.
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See directly above.
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What you describe regarding those electrons needn’t consist of other than hypothetical things, hypothetical propositions about them and their relations, and abstract implications about those hypothetical propositions, for which there are various mutually-consistent configurations of hypothetical truth-values.
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(…though there’s no reason to believe that any of those propositions are true.)
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That would be an improvement over the way these discussions usually end.
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What belief of mine are you referring to? If I made a controversial claim, what was it?
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It’s just a matter of clarifying and listening to exactly what we’re claiming. When you said that you disagree, exactly which part do you disagree with? …my statement that the experiencer/protagonist is primary, fundamental and central to the logical system that I call your life-experience story?
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So you aren’t central to your experience? Or you claim that there isn’t a complex hypothetical abstract logical system of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, that are the events and relations of your experience (…even if this physical world of your experience is superfluously something else too)?
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Sure, we can agree to disagree, but it’s good to clarify what we mean too,
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…and what exactly is it that you think they’d need to cause? I mean, your above-quoted statement of belief implies that this physical world possesses some unspecified special strong ontic-status that abstract facts can’t “cause” or be the basis of.
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I’ve been saying that, upon metaphysical examination, there’s no reason to believe that this physical world isn’t insubstantial, in the sense of not having ontic status that can’t be explained by a basis of abstract facts about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things.
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As I’ve been saying (quite a few times), I claim no existence or reality for the abstract facts to which I refer, other than that we can refer to, discuss, and speak of them.
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But you believe in a physical world that’s more than that. A physical world that has some uspecified brute-fact ontic status different from that.
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I merely claim that there’s no reason to believe otherwise. I’ve been inviting you to give such a reason. The burden of verification is on the person who claims something about the “existence” of something, the person who claims special ontic status for something.
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Whose telling you to abandon it? It’s genuine, real and existent in its own context, and in the context of your life. What more do you want or expect of it?? That makes it real enough for all practical purposes.
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What other reality do you want or believe for it to have?
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Exactly. But let’s be clear which of us is advocating an unverifiable, unfalsifiable proposition.
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All I’m proposing for the describable world is uncontroversially-inevitable abstract implications.
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You’re advocating, for this physical world, some unspecified special ontic-status additional to, over and above the uncontroversially-inevitable facts that I’ve referred to. …something that superfluously, unparsimoniously, unverifiavbly, and unfalsifiably duplicates the relations of that logical system.
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So let’s get that straight.
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No need to quibble about how or if the abstract facts exist. I haven’t claimed that they exist other than as subjects of discussion or mention.
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I was referring to your Subjectivism objection. I too suggest that the subjective point of view is the relevant one.
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In a previous post, I spoke at length about the complementarity between the experiencer and his/her experience story and the physical world that is its setting.
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Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts.
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Does that sound bootstrap-circular? Fine, that’s ok. It’s a self-contained complete logical system.
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Inevitably among the infinity of complex logical systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, with all the configurations of mutually-consistent truth-values for those propositions, there’s an experience-story about you. That’s what this is.
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…or at least there’s no reason to believe otherwise.
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By “unconventional beliefs”, I assume that you’re referring to what we were discussing above. I’ve been emphasizing that what I’ve been saying doesn’t include any assumptions, brute-facts, beliefs or controversial statements. It’s, rather, a questioning of unsupported (and even unspecified) ontic beliefs.
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But an unnecessary adherence to what you perceive as the “conventional” isn’t helpful in philosophy.
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But I like this part of your post better, because it gets away from the unnecessary disagreement about obvious and uncontroversial matters, and gets into the more difficult, but still discussable, subject of the problem of evil.
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…a subject that deserves more space than would reasonably fit into this already-long post.
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…and presumably you’re going to justify that claim by what you say below?...
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Fair enough. No disagreement there.
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What makes this life (or finite sequence of lives) a blip in timelessness is the temporariness of this life or finite sequence of lives.
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“But doesn’t there have be timelessness for us in order for you to validly say that?”
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Sure, and I’ve mentioned the timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs.
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I’ve supported those statements by the uncontroversial statement that there’s no such thing as oblivion.
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What does “TBA” mean?
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…not a very specific objection.
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Suit yourself. As Schopenhauer1 pointed out, no one is ever convinced here by anything that someone else says, because everyone evidently is only trying to support their already-chosen beliefs and positions. …as opposed to honest, open, interested discussion with willingness to question our assumptions.
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Michael Ossipoff
If you started with a black background and wrote on that background with a light gray color, the light gray color will appear white due to the contrast with black. When thing are very evil, like in war, even intermediate evil starts to become good. If everyone was shooting each other to kill and you shoot only to wound, instead of kill, this is light gray or doing good under those black circumstances. In peacetime, shooting to wound is gray against white, which now makes the same action look evil.
If you consider how laws are made, someone does an evil act first, then a law is created to help people know how to avoid the evil and do good. Good comes from evil, due to the contrast that is created. There is no need to avoid anything, until we decide it was evil. Then the contrast for good appears.
In practical reality, it is easier to make mistakes than to be perfect. It is easier to act on compulsions than via deliberate choice. Making mistakes or acting hastily gives one the opportunity to set a dark contrast in memory, so one can learn to move closer to perfection; good.
This is a fallacious. It assumes that God could know, independently of actually creating, what free-will creatures would choose. This requires that free will choices can be known independently of the existence of the agents making them. That is contrary to the nature of free-will agency.
The existence of free-will is convertible with the existence of creatures who are responsible for at least some of their own acts. But, no one is responsible for acts that must occur independently of their actual existence. So, in order to know what a free-will agent chooses, the agent must actually choose it. If this were not so, the agent would be pre-determined to the choice, and so not free -- at least not in the sense that would underwrite responsibility.
Thus, while God can create a creature who does not choose to sin, God cannot know that the creature does not choose to sin in the absence of creating that creature. This does not contradict divine omniscience as God still knows all that actually is, and all that it is in His power to do. Note that God does not know creation by prediction, but by His self-awareness in holding creation in being throughout the space-time manifold.
But yes, it seems to be time to agree to disagree.
The topics of the ontological part of this discussion have all been well-covered, again and again.
Michael Ossipoff
" an unnecessary adherence to what you perceive as the “conventional” isn’t helpful in philosophy"
Sure, but unconventional positions must be explained and supported, whereas conventional positions are generally understood. You are presumably criticizing my position, which is perfectly fine, but if your counter depends on some unconventional views, you have the burden of explaining and supporting them - and you haven't really done this. It has seemed more of a guessing game where you make some assertion and then I have to guess at what you mean, then you reply that I got it wrong and hint at some more things for me to guess at. I havent even discerned whether or not you are a theist.
"no one is ever convinced here by anything that someone else says, because everyone evidently is only trying to support their already-chosen beliefs and positions. …as opposed to honest, open, interested discussion with willingness to question our assumptions."
Seems like a false dichotomy. My views have absolutely altered as a product of discussions like these, and I think that is common. One learns by striving to understand alternative points of view. I am finding it a bit tedious to understand yours. Perhaps you feel the same, since you have questioned some of my terms. In particular, you have questioned my term "ontological status, so I'll clarify: the ontological status of X entails: does X actually exist? Does it exist hypothetically? What properties does X have, and what relations does it have to other things that exist? Does it exist necessaily or contingently?
"I was referring to your Subjectivism objection."
What subjectivist objection? I didn't know I made one, so this might be a misunderstanding on your part.
"Saying that the abstract facts depend on there being someone to discuss them is meaningless, because there are inevitably infinitely-many experience-stories with their complementary protagonists, some of whom discuss abstract facts."
It is relevant if someone claims the actual world is a consequence of abstractions, which I thought you had implied. Did I misunderstand?
"if you say that you don’t know what ontology I believe in, that might be because I emphasize that I don’t claim or assert one."
I gather that you don't claim or assert a complete ontological system (you and I have that in common), but you DID makethe ontological claim (or claims with ontological implications):
"this life and this world are a blip in timelessness”
This implies that timelessness exists, that this world exists, and that the latter's existence is within the broader context of tbe former. You added:
"What makes this life (or finite sequence of lives) a blip in timelessness is the temporariness of this life or finite sequence of lives."
This does not establish the existence of timelessness as a state of affairs, as something that actually exists as a context for the temporal world.
"“But doesn’t there have be timelessness for us in order for you to validly say that?”
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Sure, and I’ve mentioned the timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."
Our short temporal lives exist within the context if the temoral existence of the universe. This therefore does not establish the existence of timelessness
"timeless sleep at the end-of-lives (or at the end of this life if there’s no reincarnation). …which, by its finality in our experience, and its timeless nature, is the natural, normal, usual state-of-affairs."
Please explain what you mean by your claim that our experience has a " timeless nature". It appears to me that our experiences are entirely temporal. Death seems to me the temporal endpoint of our consciousness, so I see no reason to think this entails "timelessness."
"I’ve supported those statements by the uncontroversial statement that there’s no such thing as oblivion."
What is "oblivion"?
"Materialism, with its big brute-fact*, fails the Principle of Parsimony."
You are confusing my position with materialism. I simply have the uncontroversial belief thst the physical world exists. I am agnostic regarding the existence of anything immaterial. That, of course, makes your assertion relevant to me: show that materialism fails the principle of parsimony - this could shift my view.
"TBA" = is my autocorrect's translation of "TBH" = "To Be Honest". I apologize for my tablet.
Your assertion that because you are not aware of any compensating goods, therefore there are none. Is not a fact, it is something you believe to be true, by reason. Which, I acknowledge is ok, and reasonable. However, so is my position that, there may well be compensating goods even if you are unaware of them.
It not the simple inference you state, it's an inference to the best explanation.
If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist and we have the capacity to discern right and wrong - not infallibly, but our moral judgments should be expected to be generally trustworthy. This provides grounds to judge God's actions and inactions against the objective moral values we are confident are correct. For example, we know that it is wrong to allow a person to die when we could have prevented the death - particularly if the act of prevention does not place ourselves, or anyone else, at risk. We might judge this erroneously on occasion, when there are extenuating circumstances of which we're unaware, but we can be expected to get it right most of the time. Out of the 100,000,000 who died in the black death, it does seems unlikely that we're judging it wrong each of those times. This is just one natural calamity, which I brought up because it was such a big one - but there's uncountably many of these throughout history. Children are born blind, or without limbs. Some are born with degenerative diseases, like Muscular Dystrophy, who grow more feeble each day of their short lives. Throughout history, countless people have suffered needlessly because modern analgesics and antibiotics didn't exist at the time. I could go on.
There's no reason to think that an omnipotent God couldn't have created a world without these afflictions and without the various natural disasters that have occurred. If we assume God performs miracles on a few, why doesn't he perform miracles on everyone and eliminate the afflictions entirely?
What is the best explanation for all the evil the world has seen and has continues to see? Is the best explanation an omnibenevolent God who chose to create a world with the many evils this one has, despite there being no apparent reason why he couldn't have create a world without these problems?
Or is the better explanation that there is no such God - and nature simply takes its course?
The latter answers all questions about the evil in the world. The former answers none of them. Sure, it's possible there are answers that we are simply not capable of seeing, but why believe this to be the case?
My argument to the best explanation considers both God's existence and his non-existence, and concludes that his non-existence is more likely given the evidence. Your position seems to assume God exists, and rationalizes the evil he allows based on the mere possibility that there's a billion billion good reasons that we are simply incapable of discerning. If God exists, then that surely must be so. But start with a balanced view, as I did, and that rationalization doesn't make for a good explanation.
According to Romans 6:7: " anyone who has died has been set free from sin"
Do you agree this means that the souls in heaven do not sin? Don't they have free will, or does God remove our free will when we die?
My point is that this suggests there can exist free willed beings who do not sin, despite your claims to the contrary.
This is a good question -- one that has been resolved by Aquinas in his Summa Theologiae. When we choose, we always choose some good -- something that will satisfy a natural desire. Motivational psychology agrees on this, differing, perhaps, on the number and kinds of motivating factors. So, a sinner does not choose evil per se, but a defective good. (E.g. I want money or a dopamine rush, so I kill someone to get it.) In life, each option before us satisfies some of our desires while leaving others unsatisfied. So, we are free to select one set of partial satisfactions over another -- leaving us open to choosing evil (under the guise of good).
Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us.
"Once we are in the presence of God, we are in the presence of the highest good, fulfilling all our desires. So, there is no reason to choose a partial and incomplete good, and so sin. That need not mean that we have no choices. We could still have many different completely good lines of action open to us."
Then you have to agree there is a possible state of affairs in which there exist free-willed creatures who do not sin. Why wouldn't an omnibenevolent God just place us in that environment to begin with?
Not sure I have ever seen an argument that depends on a state of affairs in heaven, as a defense for the argument from evil, Seems like a proposition in conflict with the conclusion to me.
To the point I would make the following argument.
There are two states of affairs we can identify as good and evil. In order for free will to exist in beings like us, both states must be an available choice. If beings like us were created with an inability to chose evil, there would be no option and no choice, and no free will.
Then the major question left, is free will, as opposed to no free will, a compensating good for the free choices of evil it allows?
That is a very good question. I can only point to reality, and say that is not how God chose to create.
As I also know, with metaphysical certitude, that God exists, I'll just have to accept that I do not have all the answers.
"Not sure I have ever seen an argument that depends on a state of affairs in heaven, as a defense for the argument from evil, Seems like a proposition in conflict with the conclusion to me."
It shows that Christianity is incoherent.
"There are two states of affairs we can identify as good and evil. In order for free will to exist in beings like us, both states must be an available choice. If beings like us were created with an inability to chose evil, there would be no option and no choice, and no free will."
Are you saying the souls in heaven (i.e. the souls of dead, faithful Christians) are not "like us?"
I realize my argument would not convince a committed theist, but it should sway someone who's tries to objectively weigh God's existence and non-existence without presupposition.
I do not see how any anti theistic argument can be depended on a particular state of affairs in heaven
Look back at the argument. It basically shows that if Christianity is true (premise 4) then God is not omninenevolent (the conclusion). You could reject premise 4, but this is Christian doctrine. That's why I said an omnibenevolent God is not consistent with Christianity.
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Of course. Evidently I should better clarify what I’ve meant.
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You say that abstract facts aren’t real or existent, and I say that I don’t claim that they’re real or existent. You say that abstract facts aren’t causative, and I say “causative of what?? I say that I don’t claim that they’ve caused anything substantial, or that this physical world is substantial, real or existent. ..other than in its own context (…but what in what other context do you believe or want for it to be real and existent?).
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But I’m not asserting that this physical world doesn’t have whatever reality, existence or special ontological status you believe it does. But I merely ask you to specify what you mean when you claim that it does. …and to tell why you think it must.
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I assert only that there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can speak of them. Other than that, I don’t assert the existence or reality of anything describable, including the abstract facts that I refer to.
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Of course nor do I assert about indescribable matters. So really I’m not asserting anything at all (…other than the very modest assertion in the paragraph above).
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To ensure that that’s so, then, instead of asserting that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting of a hypothetical experience-story, I’ll instead just ask for a reason why it must be.
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You say that I don’t support my assertions, My one and only assertion (as of now, at least) in this discussion is that there are abstract facts, in the sense that we can speak of them. Do you really doubt or deny that?
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As you said, the burden of proof is on the person who is making an ontological claim or assertion. In this discussion, that’s you.
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…and too readily uncritically-believed.
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I’m merely inviting you to tell what you mean when you say that this physical world is real and existent. …what special ontic-status you claim that this physical world has. …what you think that this physical world is, other than the hypothetical setting for the hypothetical life-experience-story that I’ve described.
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In what context or manner, other than its own, do you believe that this physical world is real and existent?
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That isn’t a criticism; it’s just a question.
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As explained above, I’m not making any assertions. I’m merely asking questions. As I said, the burden of verification or justification is on the person making an assertion, and that’s you.
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As for explanation, I’ve genuinely been doing my best. If there remains anything unclear, I’ll answer any specific question.
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Then I hope that I’ve now better clarified what I assert, what I don’t assert, and what I’m asking.
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I don’t recommend or encourage playing guessing-games.
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I’ve now clarified that there’s only one modest assertion that I’m making in this discussion. …and I hope that I’ve sufficiently clarified what it is. I’ll repeat it here:
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**There are abstract facts, including abstract implications, in the sense that we can speak of them.**
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That’s what I mean. That’s all that I assert here.
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Then I refer to complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things—and, for each such system, many configurations of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those propositions.
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…without any claim that any of those propositions are true.
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(I modestly suggest that there’s no reason to believe that any of them are true, but that isn’t an assertion.)
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Then I refer to, among the infinity of such complex hypothetical logical systems, one that models your experience in this physical world.
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And I ask what, specifically, you think this physical world is, other than the hypothetical setting in that hypothetical logical system, which I call your “experience-story”.
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If you claim that this physical world has reality, existence or ontic-status other than that, then I ask you, specifically, what you mean by that.
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If you claim that this physical world is real and existent in a context other than its own context and the context of your life-experience, then I ask you, specifically, what context that would be.
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And I ask what your justification is for any ontological assertion(s) that you make in answer to one or both of the questions asked in the two paragraphs before this one.
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The paragraphs immediately above this one list the questions that I ask.
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The above is an effort to better clarify what I assert, what I don’t assert or claim, and what I ask.
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I don’t suggest, recommend or encourage guessing about what someone means. If there’s something I said that you don’t know the meaning of, then ask what I meant. ….and specify the particular passage, and what is unclear about its meaning.
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I’m a Theist.
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I emphasize that (I suggest that) the discussion of Theism is outside the area of discussion that is describable, explainable, assertable, arguable, or provable.
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I rarely use the word “God”, other than when answering someone who has done so. It seems anthropomorphic, simplistic, and presumptuous about the applicable range or our descriptions, to imply that we’re discussing a being with a name.
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It’s my (not assertable, arguable or provable) impression and feeling that what-is, is good, and, in fact, that there’s good intent behind what-is.
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I suggest (but don’t claim to prove) that metaphysics implies or suggests that, or gives that impression.
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I suggest that philosophy of mind does too. …and would even for Materialists.
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But I make no claim to list all that could suggest or imply that.
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And I emphasize that I don’t claim that I’m anything I’m saying in this matter is assertable, arguable or provable.
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Alright, and, as I clarified above, I’m asking what it means to say that this physical world “actually exists”.
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One accepted meaning for “actual” is: “Of, in, part of, consisting of, or referring to, this physical world”.
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By that definition, it’s trivially, tautologically, true that this physical universe “actually” exists.
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Can you support a claim that this physical world, and the experience-story that is your life, are other than hypothetical?
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I was referring to your comment that there are abstract facts only because there are humans to discuss them.
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Yes.
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1. My assertion and questions are only as I stated them earlier in this post.
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2. The concern about the need for beings to discuss the abstract facts is unnecessary, because, there are humans who discuss abstract facts, even in this particular physical world.
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3. In fact, additionally, because the infinity of systems of abstract facts includes infinitely-many experience-stories that imply experiencers who discuss abstract facts, there’s no shortage of discussers of abstract facts.
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Nisargdaatta, Tippler and Tegmark have said or implied similarly, regarding experiencers or observers.
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As I said before, if that sounds bootstrap-circular, that’s okay, because it’s a complete self-contained logical system. It’s a complementarity rather than a fallacious circularity. It isn’t as if I claim that discussers and facts circularly bring each other into existence, because don’t claim existence for either.
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Agreed.
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…but you DID makethe ontological claim (or claims with ontological implications)
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Yes, I claimed that there’s no reason to believe that this physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in your experience-story which is a complex hypothetical logical system. …but then, in this reply, I replaced that assertion/claim with a question. So I no longer assert it.
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That statement that you quoted there isn’t part of my ontological questions, and isn’t assertion related to them.
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In the passage that you quoted below, I told why I made the statement that you quoted above.
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As I mentioned above, you obviously never reach that “temporal endpoint” of your consciousness. You never experience a time when you aren’t there. What happens is that you gradually sink deeper and deeper into unconsciousness, and you never experience complete unconsciousnesss.
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Deeper and deeper sleep.
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Only your survivors experience a time when you’re gone.
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I answered that question directly above, because that seemed like the time to say it, in reply to that part of your post.
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Anyway, my more complete answer is directly above, in my most recent inline comment-reply-section before this one.
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Oblivion is the state of not being-there. Some people think that they’ll reach oblivion at death. Above, in this post, and the previous one, I’ve explained that you’ll never reach a time when you aren’t there.
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You are confusing my position with materialism. I simply have the uncontroversial belief that the physical world exists.
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Of course the physical world exists in its own context. As I asked above, in what other context or manner would you like or do you believe that it exists?
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So we don’t disagree about that.
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…but I ask what you mean when you say that it has some kind of existence or ontic-status that can’t be explained as I described. That’s one of the questions that I asked above, when I listed my questions.
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Let me just briefly interrupt here, and say that the matter of whether something immaterial exists depends entirely on how you define existence. Well, that’s true of material things too, where you’re saying that this physical world exists in a stronger way that’s more than as I describe.
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It all depends on what is meant by “exist”.
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Materialism says that this physical universe (including any physically inter-related multiverse that our Big-Bang Universe might be part of) is all of reality, is the ground of all being, is the fundamental, primary, ultimate-reality.
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The problem with that is: Why is there this physical universe (including any physically-inter-related multiverse that our Big-Bang Universe might be part of)?
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The Materialist answers, “Because there just is. It’s the one thing that we can be sure of.”
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Of course we can be sure that this physical world exists in its own context and the context of our lives. But the Materialist can’t tell you why this universe exists, as he believes, in the manner described in the Materialism definition stated above. He says, “It just does.” In other words, he’s giving you a brute-fact.
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When a metaphysics/ontology depends on a big unexplained fact or assumption, that’s a brute-fact.
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The physical world nature and origin that I described involves no brute-facts or assumptions.
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Yes, someone could say, “But why are there abstract-facts?” But I don’t claim any particular existence or reality for them. In particular, if desired, the system of inter-referring abstract implications that I spoke of could be regarded as unreal and nonexistent with respect to every context other than their own inter-referring context.
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If there were no abstract fact, then it would be a fact that there are no facts.
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But couldn’t there be a fact that there are no other facts other than that one fact that there are no other facts?
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Well, for one thing, that would be a distinctly unexplainable brute-fact, calling for, but not having, an explanation.
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For another thing, it implies some sort of continuum relating all facts. … in order for a fact that there are no other facts to have jurisdiction and authority over all other would-be facts. But the systems of inter-referring abstract implications that I speak of are quite completely isolated from and independent of anything outside their own inter-referring context. …and don’t need any medium, outside permission or context, in which to be.
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…like some kind of potting-soil.
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And the argued need for abstract facts to have someone who can discuss them is answered by the complementary nature of the protagonist of an experience-story, with his/her experience story.
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As I said, that doesn’t involve the facts and their discussers circularly bringing eachother into existence, because I don’t claim existence for either.
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Yes, what I’m suggesting is radically, drastically, different from what people are used to.
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But, in philosophy, you’ve got to fairly, objectively consider even the most radically, drastically different explanation, in complete disregard for how radically, drastically different it is!
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Advantage of the ontology that I’d be asserting if I were asserting something: No assumptions, no brute-fact. It passes William of Ockham’s parsimony test.
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No question about “(in the describable realm) why is there something instead of nothing?”
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The describable world that I described, composed on abstract implications, might seem extraordinarily remarkable if that’s how it is. But I point out that what Materialism claim is just as remarkable. Much more so, because of its brute-fact.
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It’s astonishingly remarkable and surprising that you’re in a life. No, I mean really.
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Compared to that, how remarkable or unbelievable is a describable-ontology based on uncontroversially-inevitable abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, and a configuration of mutually-consistent hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions?
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Its ethereality and insubstantiality, and its parsimony, makes it more believable, not less.
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And what difference would it make for your life or your experiences? How could you tell which way it is (as I’ve described vs what Materialism describes)?
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Michael Ossipoff
My reply to your other post will be along tomorrow morning (July 23rd).
Michael Ossipoff
On P4. Your proposition is assuming there is evil in heaven that the free willed beings in heaven would be free to chose if they desired, but don't because of their nature created by God. I do not think it is a valid assumption that there is evil in heaven. Or at least a case need to be made for it.
Without that, the logic of your conclusion (10) fails. It is not contradictory that God could have created 2 separate states of affairs, one we are aware of, and one we are not aware of in heaven. With beings of free will in both. One with an absence of evil. One with evil. And God's benevolence would once again be depended on if there are compensating goods, or morally acceptable reason for the evil that exists in the state of affairs we know.
Quoting Relativist
The Black Death wasn't a natural calamity.
The superstitious medieval population killed-off all or nearly-all of the cats, fearing that they were evil.
No cats, resulted in lots and lots of rats.
As you know, rats carried the fleas that propagated the Bubonic Plague.
Thereby, the medieval people largely wiped themselves out.
Michael Ossipoff
What is unnatural about killing cats?
I don't think cat killers were the only victims of the black death. My issue is that an omnipotent God could have seen to it that all humans had a natural immunity to it, or miraculously cured those who contracted it. God doesn't seem to intervene in such ways, which suggests indifference or worse.
My premise makes no assumption like this, but you can suggest this as the environmental condition that results in the absence of sin. But the question becomes: Why would an omnibenevolent God place the creatures that he loves in any OTHER environment? Why did he choose to make us suffer?
and as above - the theist answer remains, compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons. Which is why this issue always inevitably spirals to this point and has for many many years. And in all likelihood will remain as such for many more - but it is an interesting take on the argument from evil - to allow for God to exist, just not be benevolent.
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and as above - the theist answer remains, compensating goods or morally justifiable reasons. Which is why this issue always inevitably spirals to this point and has for many many years[/quote]
Sure, ...and that's also why some people conclude a 3-omni God doesn't exist. If there is such a God then there are compensating gods, but IF there are no compensating goods, then such a God cannot exist. Contemplate the evil in the world without presumption of God's existence, and seeing no compensating goods, then the conclusion is obvious. (That's not to suggest this need be the end of the epistemic quest)
agree and agree there are reasonable cases for both. I find the theist arguments more compelling, others find the atheistic arguments more compelling - both are reasonable positions.
In the end we will know - it either ends with God or big black hole, all things in the fullness of time.
Thanks for the honest and polite conversation!
You're the one insisting that God must be omnipotent.
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Anyway, moral values are another issue, and I’d just say that most people care what happens to other living beings.
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And, as I said in my previous message, it’s my unprovable impression that there’s good intent behind what-is.
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With notable exceptions that we needn’t discuss here, there seems to be some tendency for people to naturally echo, mirror or humanly manifest some of that good intent for other living things.
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You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
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In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
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This world and your birth in it can be explained within describable metaphysics.
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In the unknowable, un-assertable realm, it just isn’t possible to apply logic. It isn’t a topic of logic. And it isn’t possible to reliably say what God can influence, or what He is responsible for.
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So one weak-point in your argument is your assumption about omnipotence.
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…including the power to dictate what the infinity of possibility-worlds and life-experience-stories will consist of? …and to contravene this universe’s physical laws and the implications of logic?
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So you can’t reliably say that this world and your birth in it were intentional on God’s part.
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And how bad is it really? For some in this world, it’s a lot worse than any of us here can imagine, and I don’t deny that.
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But for one thing, as I’ve said, each life is temporary (as is a finite sequence of lives). After it, what follows? Final sleep. Sleep forever. (…for as long as you’re there at all.) …which even a Materialist would agree with.
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As I said, and no one would disagree, everyone is eventually delivered from the brief and temporary life or lives that you’re objecting to, and that deliverance is complete and final.
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When it’s over, how real will it seem, even relatively less far into unconsciousness? Maybe it will seem as Nisargadatta said it, when he said that, from the point of view of the sages, nothing has ever happened.
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Sufficiently far into the sleep at the end-of-lives, you won’t know that any of this happened, or that there ever was or could be worldly life, identity, time or events. …or menace, loss, lack, incompletion…etc.
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Where’s the badness of one’s life then?
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Of course not. You can’t be so sure of your assumption and notion of omnipotence.
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You assume that God has full power to contravene logic and physical-law.
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I suggest that The World (as Western philosophers mean that term, as the whole of what is) is overall good, in spite of the unpreventable brief, temporary badnesses that are inevitable due to logical possibility and the workings of physical-law…
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…and individual choices, wants, needs, predisposition and history, if you accepted my ontology of the describable, or the positions of Vedanta or Buddhism.
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As for the issue of Theism vs Atheism, I don’t regard that as a topic for assertion, argument or debate.
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But I’m just trying, here, to answer your problem-of-evil objection. …to explain why the argument using the problem-of-evil isn’t compelling.
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And, before you call me “uncaring”, I’m not saying that I don’t care about what happens to people. But it’s hardly up to me, is it.
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In fact, Theist matters aren’t knowable, or subject to debate, enough to reliably say that God is responsible for our physical world and our birth in it.
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…but I haven’t heard anyone invoke God to explain why there’s evil in this societal world, or, in general, why there can be misfortune in physical worlds.
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But you’re making a strong opposite claim when you want to use a fact about our temporary lives, to make an assertion about a non-logical, non-assertable and unprovable matter, based on an assumption about omnipotence, and your own assessment of “balance” between good and bad experience.
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As with my replies to the pessimism of Schopenhaur1, I have to admit that the sentiment that you express has been sometimes felt by me, and probably by all Theists, and that’s why I say that it’s a difficult problem.
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Then the question is, why would anyone believe that Reality is good or even benevolent in spite of an indication otherwise (this societal world’s badness, &/or the general sometime occurrence of misfortune) No one’s claiming that it’s logical. But I’ve told why the problem-of-evil argument doesn’t have the compellingness that you claim for it.
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There are reasons that suggest and support that impression that Reality is good. For example, there are some in philosophy (as in metaphysics and philosophy-of-mind). There’s the eventual merciful deliverance from this bad societal world, and there’s the temporariness and brevity of this life or finite sequence of lives. …the life whose sometime misfortune (especially in our bad societal-world) is the whole basis for your contention.
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Whether the badness of this societal world, with our brief temporary life in it, is enough to prove that what-is isn’t good overall, or that Reality isn’t good or benevolent is a matter of individual judgment based on feeling (not logic, because this isn’t that kind of a topic), and I don’t claim to have authority over what your judgment or feeling about that should be.
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But Atheists sometimes want to presume to assume the authority to decree how things are, and that other should perceive things as they (Atheists) do.
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Why is it necessary, important or desirable to do that?
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And you don’t know for sure that there aren’t other lives, or whether their world-settings are as bad as this societal world. But I emphasize that the matter of whether or not there’s reincarnation doesn’t affect the validity of the other things that I’ve been saying about the problem-of-evil.
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No one can tell you what your interpretation should be.
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…your interpretation based on your assessment of the amount of badness, and your belief about omnipotence. I’ve told you why that assessment and that belief aren’t warranted.
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I wouldn’t say that there’s the God that you believe in as the omnipotent one-true-God to disbelieve in, by which to evaluate Theism.
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(We can disregard whether “exist” is a good word for other than the things of the describable world.)
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As for the “rationalization”, you’re jumping to conclusions. It’s always questionable when we make assumptions about others’ motivations.
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There are all sorts of different people who are Theists. I certainly don’t claim to speak for all Theists, and so I can’t deny that there could be some who start with a chosen doctrine, and then rationalize to support it.
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But you’re blithely blanket-applying that characterization and motivation to all Theists.
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For some Theists, as for Aristotle, there’s reason for the impression of Reality being benevolent.
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And there are reasons, which I’ve mentioned, why your arguments about blame and omnipotence aren’t so convincing or compelling.
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I’m just answering the question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
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Certainly not. Only if your God exists. As an Atheist, you’re telling us what God must be like, and concluding that your God doesn’t make sense. No argument there.
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It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
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You’re insisting that God must conform to your definition and belief about how God must be, and then concluding that your God doesn’t make sense.
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You’re assigning all-important weight to a part of a life-experience that is temporary and brief.
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Importance-ratings are subjective, but you’re assuming that your own subjective assessment is valid, and that any other must not be.
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You’re assuming that a perception, impression or feeling that you don’t perceive or feel must not be valid. You want to decisively rule on a matter that isn’t even an issue for assertion or argument….and certainly not for authoritative decree.
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That isn’t “relativist”.
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In these matters, it really is necessary to be willing to question one’s assumptions—including assumptions about others’ motivations.
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As I said, you’re setting yourself up to have the authority to declare what other peoples’ motivation is.
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I re-emphasize that I’m not trying to convince you in the Theism vs Atheism argument. I don’t regard it as a matter for assertion, argument, logic or proof. I’m merely answering a question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
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Michael Ossipoff
Relativist: If a 3-omni God exists, then objective moral values exist
Michael: You're the one insisting that God must be omnipotent.
Nope. I never suggested such a thing.
You’re assuming that God is responsible for this world and your birth in it.
Hardly.
In general, just as it’s best to explain by physical-science what can be explained by physical-science, before invoking higher for an explanation—likewise it’s best to explain within describable metaphysics what can be explained within describable metaphysics before invoking higher.
How does one invoke a metaphysics "higher" than that which is describable, which evidently implies that an indescribable metahphysics? This doesn't seem to make any sense.
You can’t be so sure of your assumption and notion of omnipotence.
I'm not sure of anything. What I have argued is that a 3-omni God seems incoherent, given the world we live in. This could mean there is a God who 2-omni.
As an Atheist, you’re telling us what God must be like, and concluding that your God doesn’t make sense. No argument there.
No, I'm telling you what God cannot be like.
But you’re blithely blanket-applying that characterization and motivation to all Theists.
Nope. Consider the argument I stated in my Op: one premise depends on the Christian assumption that the souls in heaven have free will and do not sin. Not all theists are Christian, and even a Christian could simply deny the premise (e.g. maybe the souls in heaven CAN sin). A non-Christian theist could simply deny there's an afterlife. Take the argument for what it is and what it shows, and devise your own logic to get around it - such as, as you alluded above, perhaps God isn't really omnipotent. Lot's of ways around the argument, and I never claimed there wasn't. I address only a very specific set of beliefs, and that's why I tried to structure my argument pretty precisely.
I’m just answering the question about how anyone could not be convinced by the problem-of-evil argument.
Who asked that question? I've said multiple times that I knew this would not convince a committed theist. My purpose in engaging Christians on this topic was to show them how one might reasonably decide God (as usually defined) does not exist. Some Christians already realize this, and for them there's nothing notable here. But others that I've encountered seem unable or unwilling to believe that a belief in God's non-existence can be perfectly rational - and my mission is to help them be a bit more understanding.
It’s popular to start with the premise that one’s view is balanced, while those of others aren’t.
Consider these potential starting points: 1) The premise: God Exists; 2) the premise:God does not exist;
Neither of these seem "balanced," in that they both entail a presumption.
Tomorrow I'll respond to your earlier post (the one that has nothing to do with the purpose of this thread).
On reflection, I decided that my earlier response missed an important point.
The answer is that the only reason that those in heaven do not sin is because they have chosen to love God. To know we must choose to attend to the known object. To attend to God in such a way as to preclude sin we must love God. But, love, to be real must be freely given -- in other words, we can't compel someone to love us. If love can be freely given, it can be freely withheld -- and choosing not to love God (Who is Goodness and Truth) is to sin. So, the final condition we are discussing entails a logically prior condition open to sin. Thus, it is not the counter-example you seek.
An Omni-benevolent God as judged with our limited knowledge? Yes or no?
If Yes, I accept your argument.
If no, are we saying we have unlimited knowledge?
As for me, and many others, when we are deep within the bliss of the Heavenly afterlife, we will agree to anything.
The suffering? All those disasters etc? They would seem like a bad dream, I would not be interested in discussing God's benevolence etc there. It all will seem good to me.
Christians choose to love God while their on earth, and yet they continue to sin.
Our knowledge about everything is limited, and yet we end up believing things anyway. We typically come to a belief based on the information at hand, and that's why the mere possibility of inscrutable reasons doesn't defeat a belief in God's non-existence that is formed based on the information we actually have.
Yes. The difference is that few on earth achieve and maintain union with God. It is only in such a union that conflicting desires are resolved.
Existence is a concept referring to the quality of "existing." To exist is to be in the world (world in the generic sense, not necessarily limited the physical world). The world contains beings (=existents, the things that exist). The set of all beings = the totality of reality.
We understand the concept in terms of our innate belief in ourselves and in the external world. We (all animals with any semblance of a mind) intuitively know that we exist (no one has to be convinced of the reality of their being), and we also intuitively know there are things beyond ourselves - we see them and we interact with them. So this non-verbal intuitive foundation entails a world consisting of the self and that which we perceive. From this foundation we conceive (verbally and non-verbally) of additional elements of the world beyond our perceptions.
You refer to being " real in its own context". That seems an attempt at a meta-analysis. It is in our nature to believe the world actually exists independent of ourselves; no one is truly a solipsist. So we naturally believe the world is actually real, without the qualification you suggest. One would need to come up with reasons to think our intuitive beliefs are false or misguided, which you haven't done.
"Sleep" seems a poor characterization. Death is the cessation of being, if there is no "afterlife." If there is an afterlife, there is no "sleep" - there's just a transition of states of being. In neither case does the term "timelessness" seem applicable. "Timelessness" suggests to me something that does not experience time. "Sleep suggests subtle change in state of living consciousness, not a cessation of consciousness nor a transition of states of being.
I'll clarify. Math and logic use the symbol, "?" , which is read, "there exists". This is not an ontological claim, it is used to analyze mathematical and logical relations. I label this a "hypothetical existence." It may, or may not, refer to something that is in the world. But (hypothetically) if it exists, we can deduce various things about it.
Regarding "objective existence." This refers to that which exists (not just hypothetically), with the properties it actually has, as opposed to merely what we perceive. I perceive a red ball, you perceive a red balloon. The actual object is a white balloon that we both view through a red filter. The white balloon has objective existence. I suggest that our perceptions provide us a reflection of objective reality, not necessarily identical with objective reality. However, further analysis can lead us in the direction of knowledge about the true nature of reality (a direction to a destination that we may not reach, but it is at least an ideal to work toward).
[quote=Michael]Relativist:" That there exists an external, physical world is a properly basic belief, an epistemological foundation for all else."[/quote]
...for Materialists, of course.[/quote]
Nothing I said is contingent upon materialism being true, and my statement makes no claims about the existence of anything immaterial.
I strongly disagree. Our innate, nonverbal view of the world is our epistemic foundation.
You are imaging things. I did no such thing.
No experience required. All us animals that come into the world know intuitively that there is an external world, irrespective of whether this fact is formulated with words.
Not me. I was raised Catholic. I eventually came to question what I was taught, just as you did.
Who said it did?
We have that in common.
You've made two errors: 1) you assume I'm a materialist; 2) you don't understand the principle of parsimony.
I agree that we can't confirm our properly basic beliefs. That does not preclude having rationally justified beliefs. My theory is that we have these properly basic beliefs because we are a product, and component, of this world (and this is true irrespective of whether there is a supernatural creator). This could be wrong, of course, but neither you nor anyone else has given me a reason to doubt it.
You repeated this multiple times. You seem to be saying, "nothing you've said has convinced me that my assessment is false." That's great, but I wasn't trying to convince you of anything, I was just sharing what I believe. I hope you realize that such statements don't give me any reason to think I have it wrong either.
You are casting my assertions in terms of subjectivism, that is certainly not my claim. Of course, you can believe whatever you like. I hope you aren't trying to convince me of anything, because if you are- you're failing miserably.
That is not "an ontology" it is an ontological claim. OK, I hear you and I disagree with you.
As I said above, I don't believe in an ontology. I do believe certain things exist (e.g. the physical world), and other things possibly exist (such as gods), and I'm just not sure about the nature of the mind (is it really something immaterial?)
I prefer to use the term "fact" to refer to an element of reality as distinct from propositional descriptions of a elements of reality. Abstractions can be the subject of propositions and discussed as such - if this is what you mean, I completely agree.
I think you may misunderstand the principle of parsimony. It seems to me that whatever is the foundation of reality, it entails a very complex brute fact. An omniscient, immutable God who created material reality is an extremely complex brute fact. But the principle of parsimony is actually an epistemological principle that we should refrain from making any more assumptions than necessary to explain the facts at hand. It does NOT mean that reality is simple.
You had several similar reactions wherein I tell you something I believe, and then you react in this way (what, inferring that I think you DON'T believe this?). I'm not suggesting what you do, or don't believe, I'm just telling you what I believe.
That's an interesting and bizarre perspective, since you've given no reason to believe "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts." And of course, I disagree - there are very good reasons to believe the physical world is something other than this. I expect we'll just have to agree to disagree on this.
This one: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts"
Of course I am, but I believe we are also able to contemplate objective reality, that we actually can escape subjectivism. I believe you have things backwards when you claim the physical world is a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts - these abstract "facts" (actually: propositions) are descriptive of what actually IS. Logic is not an existent, it is a rational process, so to claim the physical world is a "logical system" is a category error. Again, we needn't agree - and I doubt we ever will.
I've given you one: we believe it innately, and it is reasonable to think that this is because we are a product of that substantial world. Now you can't make that claim; you have to find a reason to reject what I've said.
We both are. But at least mine is grounded in our innate view of the world. I don't have any idea how you came up with your bizarre view.
If the physical world exists, and it is nothing more than "part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts," then you must believe abstract facts exist. If abstract facts do not exist, then the physical world doesn't exist.
100 years after the big bang, there was no one around to have an "experience story". At that point in time, did abstract facts exist?
This is an assumption: "the physical world is nothing other than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts."
I don’t participate in the Theism vs Atheism debates, because I don’t regard as a topic for assertion, argument, proof or debate.
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Besides, I doubt that anyone here would say that someone should believe something that he isn’t aware of a reason to believe.
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…or that philosophical discussion should consist of defending, or uncritically promoting or adhering to, a pre-chosen presumption.
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All I really meant to say in reply to your OP was that, in all of the many repetitions of your argument, that argument is about your “3-omni” God, who, in particular, is omnipotent.
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Without the assumption that God must necessarily have all 3 of the characteristics that you list, you don’t have an argument that would be a helpful argument for Atheists arguing for Atheism. Just saying.
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Your omnipotence assumption is an example of simplistic and anthropomorphic notions and verbalizations about matters that don’t lend themselves to description.
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No one is suggesting that you should believe what you aren’t aware of a reason to believe.
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There’s really nothing more that you can usefully or informedly say on the matter.
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You’ve been saying that, if there’s a God, then you attribute to Him responsibility for this world and your birth in it. That’s a necessary assumption in the argument from the problem-of-evil.
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When I spoke of “invoking higher”, I didn’t say “a higher metaphysics”. When I say “metaphysics”, I’m referring to describable matters of what-is.
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No. See above.
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True, but I didn’t say it.
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You seem to be implying that, if there’s God, then God created or caused this physical world and your birth in it. I suggest that that doesn’t necessarily follow. Just as physics explains things in and with respect to physics’ domain, likewise so does describable metaphysics explain things in and with respect to its domain. I suggest that we should explain as much as possible within the describable realm before invoking outside it. That isn’t irreligious.
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Atheists always talk simplistically and anthromorphically about the Literalists’ God that they so devotedly and loudly believe in disbelieving in.
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It sounds like you’re still re-living and regurgitating your upbringing. Why? (rhetorical question)
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Sure, and you genuinely believe that your view is balanced and free of presumptions.
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Well, I’ve here clarified what I meant to say in reply to your thread and your argument. That concludes what I have to say about the topic of the post that I’m now replying to.
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You get the last word on the matters discussed in this post.
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Maybe tomorrow, but anyway not much later than tomorrow, I’ll reply to your other post, the one about ontological issues.
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Michael Ossipoff
There is no "free will" so your argument is wrong in premises 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Maybe 6 is technically true but since it would be detrimental to reality, as I understand it, if God created beings with free will, I don't think that God even weighs the option of creating free will beings.
Under "free will", for the sake of this discussion, I am primarily referring to a capability to choose to do either good or evil depending on personal freedom and desire/want.
Bible doesn't say that beings in Heaven have free will. Satan is rebelling against God but Bible doesn't directly say that he rebelled as his free will choice. In general, we have very limited information about beings in Heaven.
As for humans, apostle Paul writes in Romans, "You have been set free from sin and have become slaves of God."
On Earth, a human is a slave to sin, without possibility to choose whether he will do good or evil, while in Heaven, resurrected humans will be fully established slaves to God, and will only be able to do good. A human who believes that Jesus Christ paid for his sins on the cross and resurrected on the third day still sins in flesh. Apostle Paul says: "I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out. For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I keep on doing."
There are serious logical problems and practically blasphemous implications of free will allowed by God, as I see it, but we don't even have to get into that. It is enough that the Bible is not a witness for human free will. Many Christians will object to that, but Bible is also a complex book - "It is the glory of God to conceal a matter, to search out a matter is the glory of kings," Proverbs 25:2 - so human's say on the issue, even if it's from majority of Christians, is not what decides what's true and what's not. (Proverbs are written for believers, not unbelievers, by the way, so God is saying to believers that He hides things and leaves them to be searched out, which means that believers will find some truth of the Bible while here. This sheds some light on why there are many denominations and views on various Biblical issues among Christians.)
Anyway, "free will" is not true explanation for existence of evil.
Evil exists, by the way, for a certain period of time within a certain part of whole reality. Evil is a problem in a sense that it's a sin, but it's not a problem in a sense that God created a problem.
Your claim that "the argument from evil is an inference that a 3-omni God cannot exist, because this is inconsistent with the presence of so much evil in the world" is arbitrary.
Bible gives a lot to answer why evil exists in a reality with God who is love, much more than one would see at a glance, but that's hidden.
"There is no "free will" so your argument is wrong in premises 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Maybe 6 is technically true but since it would be detrimental to reality, as I understand it, if God created beings with free will, I don't think that God even weighs the option of creating free will beings."
That is a reasonable objection to my argument, but it has another problematic implication: why would God bother to create people on earth who have a capacity to sin? Why not just create "slaves" in heaven, and avoid the pains he causes in this life - a life that is extremely brief, compared to spending eternity as a slave.
"Without the assumption that God must necessarily have all 3 of the characteristics that you list, you don’t have an argument that would be a helpful argument for Atheists arguing for Atheism."
Then you don't understand atheism. Atheism entails the belief that X doesn't exist, and for this to be meaningful - "X" must be well defined. X = an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being.
As I said, this doesn't preclude something else existing. But it is relevant what that is. Suppose there's an indifferent "God" who is omnipotent and omniscient. This doesn't imply there is an afterlife, or a "reward" for having faith in this being, nor does it means we ought to "worship" this thing. It becomes irrelevant.
I haven't previously mentioned what my position is, so I'll tell you. I am an "agnostic deist." By this, I mean that I think there's a possibilty that there is some sort of "deity" that is responsible for the physical world and the existence of consciousness. It's only a possibliity: I can't prove it true, and I can't prove it false. But I see no good reasons to think there is an afterlife (other than wishful thinking), so the hypothetical existence of this being isn't really very important - except for explaining certain aspects of the world (e.g. why there is consciousness; the nature of a metaphysically necessary first cause).
It's a good question. I have an understanding that I think is true and explains a lot. And is based on the Bible. But I don't want to give it here, really. Not that I want to tease something. I am just personally convinced not to eagerly share what I believe to be good part of the answer.
That said, if God wants you to have an understanding to that question, you will have that understanding.
At the same time, even without having clean understanding now, you could accept that God has a just plan and that His plan makes sense, but that God has timing when we will get full understanding of it, for which there is also a reason.
By the way, when you say that God causes pains for people in this life, that's not a true picture. It's a judgement against God based on incomplete information. Since we are sinners, we are quick to judge God, but we only understand part of reality. So any judgement a human makes against God is deficient. Not to mention that it's an evil act, defeating the purpose of judgement in the first place. You might argue that something is self-evident, but until rather recent period of human existence, it was not self-evident that a moving picture can be transmitted over thousands of miles of oceans and lands, through air, in a split second, from one hand-held device to the other.
Evil exists, but how and why it exists is not self-evident, in my understanding.
I tend to agree. This question is not something that can be settled by popular vote. That’s my point.
I didn't read the whole thread. Now I see your response from previous page which is in the same line of reasoning as mine.
Part 1 of 2:
Sorry about the delay in replying. Not only do I not have time to reply promptly, but I don’t really have time for these replies, to your repetition of already-answered objections, at all. But I’m going to write this one last reply. A complete inline reply. …but for the last time.
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As I said, I don’t have time to keep replying to posts that fail to answer questions about justification of claims, or even about what you mean, but which instead keep repeating the statements for which you don’t know what you mean.
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No one is paying me to be your counselor, and so this will be my last post in this discussion.
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You think?
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If your meaning for “exist” is that broad, then the physical world “exists” even if it’s nothing more than the hypothetical logical system that I discuss. Is that, then, really all that you mean when you say that the physical world “exists”?
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Saying that the physical world “exists”, as you defined “exist” above doesn’t mean that it’s anything more than the hypothetical logical system that I’ve discussed.
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This is an example of your self-contradictoriness. When asked what you mean, you give ridiculously circular answers “existence is a concept referring to the quality of existing”, or mutually-contradictory meanings.
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But regrettably, Relativist has failed to give us a consistent definition for “exist” or “real”. By his only clear and relatively-definite definition of “exist”, the physical world exists even if it’s nothing other than the hypothetical logical system that I describe.
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Or course there are “things beyond ourselves” (in the context of our lives), and of course we interact with them (Our surroundings are part of the experience-story that I’ve described, co-existent with our own bodies, and complementary to us in our experience and our experience-story).
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Those things are inevitably true of the uncontroversially-inevitable hypothetical abstract experience-story that I’ve spoken of. My question to Relativist was, in what particular way does he think the physical world is different from, more than, what I’ve described? We haven’t heard an answer from Relativist, regarding what he means, other than vague, undefined, circular, or mutally-contradictory sputterings about “exist” and “real”.
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By consistently and resolutely failing to share with us what he means, Relativist has admitted, and continues to admit, that he doesn’t know what he means.
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…completely consistent with the hypothetical abstract experience-story that I’ve described. (See above.)
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Yes, because there are no mutually-contradictory facts, then our experience-story doesn’t contain inconsistencies.
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Therefore yes, what we experience implies that our later (“beyond our [current] perceptions”) experiences will be consistent with it.
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(I’ve previously discussed how seeming inconsistencies have proved, by new physics, to be consistent with previous observations. …and how, arguably, it would be impossible to prove that a physical world is inconsistent, when the possibility of hallucination, dream, mistaken memory, etc., are considered.)
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Call it what you want, but it’s obviously true. Even you won’t try to deny that your life and our physical world are real in their own contexts, or in the contexts of your life.
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I’ve repeatedly asked you in what other context or manner you want or believe this physical world to be real or existent.
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You haven’t answered regarding what you mean, because you don’t know what you mean.
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See above. Our surroundings that we experience are consistent with an experience-story in which our bodies and our surroundings are co-existent, and in which we and our surroundings are mutually-complementary.
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Maybe it is in your nature to believe that the physical world “exists” (in some unspecified way) independent of you. But you need to understand that (aside from your not knowing what you mean by that), that belief is just that—an unsupported belief. …and unsupported, unverifiable, unfalifiable belief in a brute-fact.
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The ontology that I’d propose if I proposed an ontology is a “Solipsism” by some definitions, but not by other definitions. No, I’m not going to look up those definitions again, but you can.
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I’ve asked you what you mean by “real” and “actual”.
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I supplied an accepted definition of “actual”:
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“Of, pertaining to, part of, consisting to, or referring to this physical universe.”
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By that definition, this physical world is indeed “actual”.
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No, not really …because you haven’t even been able to share with us what you mean by “real”, “existent” and ‘actual” in your vague description of your beliefs.
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In any case, of course I haven’t claimed that your beliefs are false. Perhaps you haven’t noticed, but I’ve many, many, many times repeated this:
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I re-emphasize that the system that I’ve described in uncontroversially-inevitable. It doesn’t need an explanation or a justification, or assumptions or a brute-fact.
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…whereas your superfluous, unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact addition to it does call for (and doesn’t get) an explanation. In fact you evidently don’t know what you mean when you speak of it.
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See immediately above.
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No. You’ll never experience a time when you aren’t.
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Only your survivors will experience that time. I explained that in the post that you’re “replying” to.
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It would be better if you don’t “reply” to posts that you haven’t read.
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Again, wrong. You proposed “afterlife” could start during sleep.
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“To sleep, perchance to dream.”
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…by which maybe you mean that timelessness is the absence of experience of time.
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What a coincidence! That’s how I’ve been using that word.
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The sleep at the end of lives will consist of deeper and deeper unconsciousness, but without you ever experiencing a time when you aren’t.
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Yes eventually there will be no perception, sense or knowledge of identity, individuality, time, or events, or any knowledge or sense that there ever were or could be such things.
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But you’ll still never experience not being. For you there won’t ever be such a thing as not being.
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These aren’t controversial statements.
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See above.
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I make no ontological claim (of “existence” or “reality”) for the abstract facts that I refer to, or to the hypothetical experience-stories consisting of systems of inter-referring abstract implications.
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What a coincidence. That’s how I label what I describe.
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Yes, abstract logical facts are discussable, and, other than that, I make no claim regarding their existence or reality, or the “objective existence” or “objective reality” (…whatever you mean by that) of that of the physical world
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…whatever you vaguely mean by that.
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Okay, in answer to my question about you mean by the “objective existence” had by this physical world, but not by the hypothetical system that I’ve described,…
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…your answer is that you’re saying that your existent universe differs from the hypothetical system that I describe, by existing :D …and by not being just hypothetical.
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Do you realize that that isn’t an answer, but is only a circular re-statement of the question?
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Do you realize that you’re admitting to us that you don’t know what you mean?
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Everything has the properties that it has.
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As I said above in this reply, there are no mutually-inconsistent facts, and therefore your experience-story doesn’t contain inconsistencies. Whatever you observe, your future observations will (at least eventually) be consistent with it. For more detail and completeness, I refer you to the part of my previous reply in which I answered about why and how your experience is consistent.
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You see a red ball. Later you could find out that it’s a red ball. But you could instead find out that it’s a white balloon viewed through a red filter (or viewed through mist, colloidal solution, or smoke that scatters blue light, or illuminated with red light).
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By the way, I acknowledge that Idealism, or even Eliminative Ontic Structural Idealism, needn’t be Subjectivist. For example, Max Tegmark’s MUH (Mathematical Universe Hypothesis) has been called Ontic Structural Realism. He once stated, as his first principle, an “External Reality Hypothesis).
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No doubt, his objective physical worlds, too, are there as logical possibility-stories. It’s just that they aren’t about your experience.
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That doesn’t prove or even imply that your surroundings don’t have existence independent of you (…or that they don’t—I describe an story from the subjective, experiential point-of-view simply because that’s obviously (tautologically) our point of view and our experience.)
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If you believe that, then that’s another matter on which for us to agree to disagree.
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Yes, I retract the accusations of your being a Materialist. You merely believe that some unspecified, undefined “objective existence” or “objective reality” for the physical world isn’t an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact assumption (and wouldn’t be, even if you knew what you meant by it).
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(…but it is, of course.)
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Do you realize that you’re just substituting “view” for “experience”?
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Not only have you admitted it, but, by your continued repetition of the same statements, without answering questions about what you mean, you continue to admit that you don’t know what you mean.
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That Objectivism or Realism is your unsupported belief.
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And all I’m saying is that there’s an experience-story, consisting of a hypothetical logical system, that models our experience.
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…and that you haven’t given a reason to believe that our physical world is other than the hypothetical setting in that hypothetical story.
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In fact, you haven’t even been able to say how our physical world is different from that, because you don’t know what you mean by what you’re vaguely saying.
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Of course there are our surroundings, as sure as there’s us as animals. Those surroundings, the world we live in, is the necessary setting for our experience-story, a world of which our bodies are part, a world that is complementary with us, in our experience-story
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You’re saying it’s more than that. I ask in what way, and how do you know it. You didn’t answer because you don’t know what you mean.
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I’d said:
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I’ll add that the difference between you and them is that you want to make an (vague and unspecified) ontological or metaphysical theory out of the intuition that you refer to.
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The other animals couldn’t care less about your ontological or metaphysical theories.
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Retracted.
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Don’t worry about its definition, or look it up if you want to. You don’t seem to realize that your theory that you (vaguely and un-definedly) express consists of unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact assumptions.
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…while the abstract hypothetical system that I described, and which you want to superimpose your unbverifiable brute-fact theory on, is uncontroversially-inevitable.
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But this is all secondary to the fact that you’ve shown that you don’t know what you mean.
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….and you don’t know what you think this physical world is, other than or different from the setting in the hypothetical experience-story that I described. ...whatever sort of an unverifiable brute-fact assumption you’re talking about.
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…other than its nature as an unnecessary, superfluous, unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact assumption?
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…(quite aside from the fact that you haven’t even specified, and evidently don’t even know, what you mean by your theory.)
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No, that isn’t what I’ve been saying. I’ve been saying that your theory is an unnecessary, unverifiable superfluous brute-fact assumption theory of a physical world which, by its “objective existence” or “objective reality” is different from the hypothetical logical system that I’ve described.
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…In fact you haven’t even answered regarding what you mean by “objectively existent” or “objectively real”, because you don’t know what you mean.
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Yes, because now you’re saying that we’re the product of a larger physical world whose “existence” is quite independent of us.
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It’s a proposal (or would be, if I proposed or asserted it) regarding what describably is.
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Look up “ontology”.
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[quote]
You’re the one with an ontology that you aren’t specifying or being clear with us about.
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To be continued.
Michael Ossipoff
Part 2 of 2:
As I said above, I don't believe in an ontology. I do believe certain things exist (e.g. the physical world)…
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If, as you said, you believe that we’re the product (via evolution, chemistry and physics) of a physical world that exists quite independently of us, then, in your scenario, Consciousness is the property of being a purposefully-responsive device. ..period.
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So no, in the scenario or theory that you believe in there’s nothing immaterial about us at all.
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…whatever it is that you mean by that. (You won’t say because you don’t know).
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At the beginning of the long post that I’m now replying to, you defined Reality as the whole of all that is. Then that would include abstract facts too, because there uncontroversially are abstract facts, in the sense that we can discuss them.
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So, by what you yourself said, abstract facts are indeed elements of Reality.
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Or you could , for the ad-hoc occasion, change your meaning for reality. …probably to some unspecified meaning.
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Facts and propositions are distinctly different. I’ve been referring to abstract facts, but I’ve also mentioned the hypothetical propositions that abstract implications are about.
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Of course that’s part of what I’ve said and meant. There are hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things. And there are abstract implications about those hypothetical propositions.
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Those abstract implications are abstract facts.
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An implication is an implying of one proposition by another. That’s a state of affairs, and that’s also a relation between things (because propositions are things*)
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*Things are what can be referred to. By that definition, propositions and facts, too, are things.
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Of course, there’s necessarily something unexplainable.
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There, now that’s your best argument yet!
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But, if you know or say that it’s “complex”, then you’re saying more about Reality than I would.
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So that’s another thing on which we must agree to disagree.
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There you go again with “complex”.
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Again I wouldn’t presume to say that much about an unknowable, non-describable matter.
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“Complexity” is an attribute of concepts or conceptual matters. It seems more than a little presumptuous to apply it as you are.
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..or that Reality can be meaningfully, un-presumptuously and confidently spoken of as having a conceptual attribute like complexity (or its opposite).
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But yes, as you said:
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…and that’s why you want to make unnecessary assumptions about “objective existence” and “objective reality” for this physical world?
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…even if you don’t know what you mean by “objective existence” and “objective reality”.
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Well, no, not exactly, because you evidently don’t know what you mean by terms that you’ve been using.
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But of course I don’t claim that you know what you believe.
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No, I haven’t said that. I didn’t say that the physical world is nothing other than a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts.
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I said that there’s no reason to believe that it’s other than that. That isn’t the same statement, is it.
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I many, many, many, many times said that I can’t prove that this physical world isn’t, in whatever (unspecified) way you believe, superfluously, unverifiably, unfalsifiably, and as a brute-fact, more than the uncontroversially-inevitable hypothetical system that I’ve described.
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In my previous reply to you, I quite explicitly specified what I assert, and what I don’t assert. …and what questions I ask.
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But you’re continuing to quote me as saying what I’ve specifically clarified that I’m not saying.
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That’s one reason why I give up on replying to you, except if you (unexpectedly) ask a genuinely new question or state a genuinely new argument.
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…nor have I asserted it.
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When I ask in what way you think this physical world is other than the hypothetical system that I’ve described (and why you believe that), I emphasize that that hypothetical system that I’ve described is uncontroversially-inevitable.
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…and that’s the difference, and that’s what you’re missing. I describe something uncontroversially-inevitable, and ask you how you think the physical world is more than that. Then you say that I haven’t given reason to believe the physical world isn’t more than that.
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I haven’t claimed that it is. But, the difference is that what I’ve described is uncontroversially-inevitable, and your theory, about what the physical world additionally is, is a superfluous, unverifiable brute-fact assumption.
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(…about which you can’t even tell us what you mean)
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That’s all I’m saying. I’m not asserting more than that.
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Indeed we will, if you think that you’ve given any good reasons. (…let alone any very good reasons.)
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I’ve made it abundantly clear, many, many, many times that I’m not claiming that,
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I’ve said that I can’t prove that this physical world isn’t superfluously, as an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact, something different from the uncontroversially-inevitable hypothetical system that I’ve described.
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In my post just before this one, I explicitly specified what I assert and what I don’t assert.
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But you’re still quoting me with a claim that I’ve specifically, many times, disclaimed.
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As I said, that’s a good reason for giving up on replying to you.
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…whatever that’s supposed to mean. (No, don’t explain it.)
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No, actually facts.
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I spoke of facts, and meant facts.
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Maybe you need to do some reading about the difference between a fact and a proposition. In general, it’s good to read a little about a topic before expounding about it in a posting.
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A fact is sometimes defined as a state of affairs, or as a relation among things.
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An implication is an implying of one proposition by another proposition.
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That’s a state of affairs, and it’s a relation among things (propositions).
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As I mentioned elsewhere here, “things” are what we can refer to.
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I’ve amply, many times, repeated to you regarding what I assert/claim, and what I don’t assert. …even to the point of an explicit list. What I assert is entirely uncontroversial. No, I’m not going to repeat all of it for you again, but here’s a short-version (for more detail, I refer you to previous posts that you’ve “replied” to.
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But here’s what I assert “is”:
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Uncontroversially, there are abstract facts, including abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can discuss them.
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That implies that there are also infinitely-many complex systems of inter-referring abstract implications about hypothetical propositions about hypothetical things, each of which system has many mutually-consistent configurations of hypothetical truth-values for those hypothetical propositions.
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Inevitably, among that infinity of hypothetical logical systems, there’s such system that models the events and relations of your experience.
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I call it your “experience-story.”
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Without asserting anything more, I asked you in what sense you think that this physical world is other than or more than that system? If you say that this physical world is “real” or “existent” in some sense that that hypothetical system isn’t, then I ask what you mean by “real” and “existent”.
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But yes, you did give a definition of “exist”. …a definition sufficiently broad that, by your definition, this physical world would “exist” even if it’s nothing more than the hypothetical system that I describe.
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…something that you seemingly forget all about, when contradicting yourself in other things that you say.
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But no, I’ve many times clarified that I don’t assert that this physical world is nothing more than the hypothetical system that I describe.
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I merely ask in what way you think it’s different from or more than that.
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It’s a simple question that you haven’t answered, because you don’t know what you mean by “real” or “existent”.
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As I said, there are uncontroversially are abstract facts, including abstract implications, in the sense that we can discuss them.
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Other than that, I’ve many, many, many times repeated that I don’t make any claim for their existence or reality.
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…maybe to you, because you believe in a “category” that you can’t specify, because you don’t know what you mean.
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I suggested it because you (and whoever else says what you say) can’t specify what you think this physical world is, other than the hypothetical system that I’ve discussed.
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…because you don’t know what you mean.
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Oh, ok, the reason to believe it is that Relativist believes it. :D
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Let me guess: You likewise can’t non-circularly say what you mean by “substantial”.
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You like to quote a “claim” that I haven’t made.
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See immediately below:
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I’m merely asking you what you think this physical-world is that’s more than part of the uncontroversiallyi-inevitable hypothetical system that I’ve described.
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In case you missed it, I do claim that the infinity of complex hypothetical logical systems that I describe are uncontroversially-inevitable. (…because there uncontroversially are abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can discuss them.
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So I’m asking what you think that this physical world is that’s more than a part of a hypothetical system that is uncontroversially-inevitable.
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Do you get it yet? The system that I describe is uncontroversially-inevitable.
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…and what you propose (or would if you knew what you meant) is an unverifiable, unfalsifiable brute-fact something that you claim “exists” in some unspecified stronger way than the hypothetical system that I described.
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You see the difference? What you’re proposing is a (not even specified) unverifiable, unfalsifiable assumption of a brute-fact.
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But whether or not you understand that, I’m not going to keep explaining it to you every time you repeat the same objections.
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If the physical world exists, and it is nothing more than "part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract facts," then you must believe abstract facts exist.
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…but you’re the one who claims that this physical world exists in some way that’s different from and more than the hypothetical system that I’ve described.
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I merely ask what you mean by “exist”, when you say that.
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You haven’t specified a meaning for “exist” by which this physical world “exists” but a hypothetical logical system doesn’t “exist”.
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…because you don’t know what you mean.
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Okay, suit yourself. I’ve made no claims about the “existence” of anything, other than my assertion that there are abstract facts, including abstract implications, at least in the sense that we can discuss them.
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Again you’re repeating, word-for-word, something that you already said, and which I already answered, in previous posts. No, I’m not going to repeat the answer. I refer you to the post in which I answered it when you said it before.
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I don’t assert that assumption. I’ve been thoroughly explicitly specific about what I assert, what I don’t assert, and what I ask.
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I merely asked (notice the past-tense):
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“If you think this physical world is more than part of a logical system of inter-referring abstract implications, then, specifically, what else do you think it is?”
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You didn’t give an answer, or when you thought you were giving an answer, you were unable to define your terms, because you don’t know what you mean.
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Alright, I don’t have time to reply to any more of your repetition of already-answered objections.
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This discussion is concluded.
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When I don’t reply again to Relativist, that doesn’t mean that he’s said something irrefutable. It just means that I don’t have time to keep replying to his repetition of already-answered objections.
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Michael Ossipoff
Omitted word:
I meant to say that "things" are what are in the describable, explainable world, and can be referred to.
Maybe there's a better wording.
Michael Ossipoff
I left out a reply to this statement:
Let's ignore the "very complex", because I already answered that.
But yes, as I said, other than that, that's your best objection.
Yes, there must be the unexplainable.
Reality isn't explainable.
But no, that doesn't change the fact that your theory involves a brute fact (even if you don't know what it is or you mean), while the hypothetical system that I describe doesn't need any assumption or brute-fact (...as an explanation in the describable realm).
So your theory consists on adding some brute-fact to a system that doesn't have or need any assumption or brute-fact.
The fact that Reality is unexplainable, and that there must be the unexplainable, doesn't mean that there must be unexplainability at the verbal, describable level (...where we call it a brute-fact).
In fact, I've presented an explanation and description of and within the describable world that doesn't need any assumption or brute-fact.
Though Reality is unexplainable and indescribable, and probably unknowable (certainly to anyone at this forum), that doesn't mean that brute-facts are necessary within physics or metaphysics,
In the physical world, things are explained by physics
...even though physics doesn't explain the whole of Reallity, or even why there's a physical world..
So, physics explains in the physical world, but only there, because that's all that physics is about.
Likewise, in verbal, describable metaphysics or ontology, everything describable can be explained within metaphysics/ontology.
....even though describable metaphysics doesn't explain the whole of Reality.
So describable metaphysics explains in the describable world, but only there, because that's what describable metaphysics is about.
And you haven't shown that your (unspecified) brute-fact for the describable world is necessary.
Michael Ossipoff
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Michael - I seem to recall your saying you would give me the last word. Maybe I dreamed it. Seriously, I don't have time to respond to everything you wrote, but if you will identify the most important thing you'd like me to respond to, I'll be happy to do so.
You must have dreamed it..
I said that I'd give you the last word in the other topic, distinct from the ontology-topic...when you posted 2 replies, one about your ontology issue, and one that wasn't about that.
At the end of my Part-2 post, I said:
"This discussion is concluded."
Michael Ossipoff
Apparently it means it's time for monologues. Here's mine: I admire your passion.