Philosophy is ultimately about our preferences
I haven't read a lot and, perhaps, this post shows that.
That aside I'd like to ask a specific question regarding emotions and how it relates to philosophy.
What I've observed is philosophy can be essentially divided into opposing concepts. For every thesis there's an antithesis. The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.
There's no flaw in the logic I suppose. Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them.
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.
What say you?
That aside I'd like to ask a specific question regarding emotions and how it relates to philosophy.
What I've observed is philosophy can be essentially divided into opposing concepts. For every thesis there's an antithesis. The interesting thing is that any two conflicting stances are reasoned positions.
There's no flaw in the logic I suppose. Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them.
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.
What say you?
Comments (77)
Surely you don’t mean that? The flat earther is not holding a reasoned position.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well, yes, the differences in views come from the different underlying assumptions.
Quoting TheMadFool
Well I don't know about that. The project of picking axioms is intended to be done rationally, not "I like that assumption". So theory choice models come into play.
Flat-earthers prefer to ignore the ''evidence''.
I want to clarify that it's not knowledge of the physical world I'm concerned with. What remains is what can be called the yin-yang structure of philosophy.
Quoting MindForged
Axioms, by definition, have no supporting reasons. So, can't be rational.
If you apply a model of theory choice we very well get supporting reasons. If the axioms taken on result in a theory which introduces a bunch of ad hoc elements, isn't fruitful, is too inconsistent relative to another theory with the same results but sans-those defects, the latter theory is more rational.
Axioms can be supported with reason, just check out Penelope Maddy's "Believing the Axioms".
I see it's not as simple as I thought but I see an infinite regress in the making.
Consider theories A, B, C. Each has its own axioms. You're saying that the respective axioms must cohere with each other and that counts as reasons supporting the entire collection of axioms.
However, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. There must be a mother-theory, the beginning of all theories. It, being the first, doesn't have the luxury of such a support structure because no other theories exist alongside it.
So, this mother-theory consists of axioms that are arbitrary - preference based - and has no rationale in being chosen.
One could say that there's some kind of a feedback loop. Theory A (mother-theory) spawns theory B and that leads to theory C and so on and theory C supports B and B supports A; this chain of theories forming a kind of self-supporting structure.
In a sense it means we start off with our cameras out of focus and as time passes the focus adjusts (theories modify each other) so that we get a clearer picture of reality.
As I said, the above model mirrors physical theories, science to be specific.
I'm not talking about that. I'm referring to what people calls philosophy of life - a worldview that frames our thoughts, attitudes and practice. Worldviews are shaped by metaphysics (if I'm correct) and metaphysics is a region of space which is filled with contradictory philosophies and there is no actual process by which we may verify or disconfirm theories in it. Such a place is journeyed through only per choice; no rationale.
Depending on what you mean by "cohere", no I'm not saying that. We can (and have had) theories which were contradictory (early calculus, Bohr model of the atom) but which were still the more rational theory at the time because they trumped their competition in how much they explained.
Quoting TheMadFool
I don't really understand this. The model of theory choice works for any kind of theory, including theories strictly about logic. Logicians essentially argue this way about their axioms, e.g. the intuitionist says to the classical logician, "My theory of logic is more rational because it makes less extravagant assumptions and is computationally useful."
This way of justifying theories does not depend on any particular axioms because it has basically universal support (everyone from logicians to sociologists essentially makes reference to such theories being made better or worse on these grounds), the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them.
Quoting TheMadFool
No, metaphysical theories rest on logical theories (for various reasons) and both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are.
I agree with you to the degree that axioms need to lead to systems that explain our world as best as possible. Ergo axioms not arbitrary.
Even logically, axioms shouldn't lead to contradictions.
It seems there are checks on our axioms and the systems they spawn.
But what of the yin-yang structure of reality? We all know duality is an essential feature of our world. Light-darkness, good-bad, etc. This pattern of opposites also extend into philosophy: theism-atheism, materialism-spiritualism, etc. It is in this region of philosophy where preference may play a greater role. For instance there's not much that can be said of God's existence or non-existence. God is a rational dead end. Other philosophical entities too are of such form. In such cases isn't it personal preference, not rationale, that swings our vote?
I don't want to make it too simple -- the limbic system is shaped by experiences too, and prior thought, just as the cognitive systems are.
I think of the mind as a network and information flows in all directions. So, while the limbic system is the origin of our impulses, I believe reason also informs our emotions. If this were not so, morality would not exist. Morality, religion are about controlling our basic instincts and while how much of this has been achieved is debatable the fact remains that we're trying to rein them in.
That is simple relativism. The problem that presents itself in today's culture, is that the only arbiter of reality is science - but science doesn't deal with questions of value. I suppose the conservative view is that there really are moral standards, and that humans can either observe them, or not, and then face the consequences. But the libertarian view is that every individual is the sole arbiter of what is correct for him/her. So I think that in effect questions about value are indeed regarded as private or subjective or a matter of individual choice, as the alternative seems to be some form of coercive ethics.
This is the 'is-ought' problem in a nutshell that was identified by Hume, and which is still an outstanding problem in ethical philosophy. So - one form of that view is called the 'boo-hurrah theory'. It basically says, as you are more or less saying, that our choices are driven by what we don't (boo!) or do (hurrah!) like. And it's a very influential undercurrent.
I suppose, having written that, I've mostly addressed it in terms of ethical theory, but I think it also illustrates the general point.
Consistency is a theoretical virtue, but it's one we do not always get the pleasure of attaining. What's interesting is that even if a contradiction pops up, one can work around it. People have inconsistent beliefs all the time, and want to get rid of that if made aware of it. But oftentimes they cannot, and so have to tolerate the inconsistency for a time.
Quoting TheMadFool
I wouldn't deny that *in general* preferences guide what we believe.I was just saying axioms in particular are not, necessarily, simply picked arbitrarily on grounds of preference.
I don't know what model of theory choice you might be referring to, but I can't think of a single exposition to which "everyone" refers. There are perfectly well respected critics of pretty much every version from Popper to Becker. Its just wishful thinking to suggest we have some universally approved means of judging the value of theories (prior to formal proofs).
Quoting MindForged
And even if the above were the case (which I'm certain it isn't) then the weight to give to each factor would itself be axiomatic and so subject to rational choice theory, and so on.
Quoting MindForged
Really? So the popularity of theological-based metaphysics just about the time when most people were religious, and it's subsequent waning as atheism grows is just a coincidence? The popularity of laissez-faire existentialism, round about the time of anti-consertative cultural change, again just coincidence? The rejection of the predominantly Jewish logical positivists round about the time of rising anti-semitism in Europe, Heidegger's conclusion that German is a 'special' language just as nationalism is growing in Germany, the odd prevalence of Naturalism in Australia, even the glaringly obvious fact that continental philosophy is called continental, and you're still trying to claim that philosophical theories are largely accepted or rejected on their virtues?
It's a reciprocal relationship... feeling thinking feeling thinking experience feeling memory thinking perception thinking feeling... Then "a network and information flows in all directions". It gets complicated fast. And "we" are in that reciprocating engine, trying to make sense of it. We externalize ourselves, observe others, theorize.
So, whence come our preferences?
You misunderstand, my point was that arguing based on theory choice is used in all fields, not that there is a single model of theory choice everyone subscribes to. In fact, the bit right after what you quoted references this:
[quote='Me']the only difference being how highly respective parties rate particular theoretical virtues and how they conceive of them.
[/quote]
The specific value given to each weight probably doesn't matter, all you need is to be able to give them different weights (of we have to get deep down, primitive recursive arithmetic is more or less never doubted). I already said people disagree on the particulars of this.
Really? Because....
Quoting MindForged
It's a very convoluted interpretation that has this exchange saying what you claim. Not only do you specifically make the claim that "both metaphysical theories and logical theories have the worth assessed via how virtuous their theories are.", which is almost word for word what I argued against, but you answer MF's suggestion that they are chosen [from personal preference], rather than rationally selected, with the word "No". Now you're saying that what you really meant was "Yes, that is generally how they're chosen" and that I'm simply being uncharitable by reading 'no' to mean 'no'.
The arguments people use to justify their theories and the reason they chose them are not the same thing.
If you're claiming that arguing based on theory choice means that theories are selected by such rational means then you'd have to explain the trends in philosophical thought, rationality does not have a Zeitgeist.
If, however, you're claiming that regardless of how theories are actually chosen, they are defended using rational theory choice models, then your argument is a non sequitur, the OP is about how theories are chosen, not how they're defended. I very much doubt the OP was confused into thinking that philosophers actually admitted to his claim.
Quoting MindForged
Yet your claim is that it is responsible for selecting one set of axioms over another. I can't think of very much that matters more in explaining the differences in fundamental philosophical lines of thought, which is what the thread is about.
How is that convoluted??? People argue about their theories in this way, but that does not entail that the acceptance and historical proliferation of theories is guided in this way. As I also said, but which you seem incapable of reading, is:
Quoting MindForged
This conversation has a fairly narrow topic matter (the justification of axioms). Please actually read what was said instead of trying to overgeneralize. My point is that using a model of theory choice allows you to give justification to the axioms you choose (the example I gave being how intuitionists argue for their logic).
Quoting Pseudonym
Which I quite clearly said above. Again,.you simply do not read
Quoting Pseudonym
Hmm, let's try reading the OP:
Quoting TheMadFool
OP is talking about whether the axioms we pick can be given rational justification, concluding that they essentially "must originate with our preferences". I articulated how they can be chosen rationally and argued that the manner used to pick theories is rather general, and can and has been used to support even fundamental positions rationally. This does not entail me claiming something about how positions gain traction/adherents in philosophy.
Quoting Pseudonym
No, what is responsible is simply the differences in the weights you give, not their specific value. People nearly always place a higher importance on consistency than on existence of ad hoc elements, adequacy to the data is taken to be most important, etc. The values can be arbitrary so long as these relationships are established (especially since the values can be reduced anyway).
So I repeat, please actually read my posts, and actually read the OP. Tends to make one cranky to have to get this all in order when you could have just read...
Quoting MindForged
You actually said "No" in answer to the proposition that metaphysics is journeyed through by personal choice (as opposed to rational necessity). You then said directly that metaphysical theories have their worth assessed by how virtuous they are. Not, that they could be assessed this way (but actually aren't), not that people pretend to assess them this way but actually just follow the zeitgeist. It is convoluted to derive some interpretation of those propositions whereby "No, that is not how metaphysics is navigated" means "Yes, that's exactly how metaphysics is navigated (but there is another way". It is convoluted to derive an interpretation of "Metaphysical theories are assessed by their virtue" that means "Metaphysical theories are not assessed by their virtue but by their alliegence to the current culture".
Communication is generally a two way effort, has it even crossed your mind that rather than my not reading properly it might be you not writing clearly?
I stopped reading the moment you said this, because no matter how much you insist that, I can go up and quote what I said:
Quoting MindForged
This is a waste. You cannot seem to read, it seems trivial to show how you are misrepresenting what was said. That's very directly opposed to what you claimed I said.
A good philosophy will take into account both the thesis and antithesis, and resolve the paradox by finding a synthesis, that is, a principle that contains both thesis and antithesis, and can explain when the thesis is correct vs when the antithesis is correct.
Example:
Each age might well be defined more by its mass delusions than by its comprehension of truth. The future will laugh at the delusions we hold to be the truths of today. It is not a difficult thing to do, to close ones eyes and move into the mind of the future and laugh or cry at the delusions of today. To do so one need only posses a modicum of intelligence an that rarity that is the capacity for an independence of thought and an independence of preference.
So producing responses without reading through the whole post is an entitlement unique to you? Or is it your uniquely accurate judgement of the quality of the post which allows you to construct erudite responses based on isolated expressions where others doing so are are aggressive and uncivilised?
Quoting MindForged
Nowhere have I made the claim that you did not say additional, perhaps even contradictory thing at some later point. I'm quoting you directly on something you actually did say. It either directly contradicts what you later said (in which case you have simply made an error somewhere), or you are making the case that theories needn't be selected by preference alone, but generally they are, which, as I said, is a non sequitur in respect of the point made on the OP.
If, in fact, what you meant to propose is some third option, I'd be interested to understand what that is, but if all you're going to do is re-quote what you wrote beforehand and claim that if I've misinterpreted it it must be my fault for not reading it properly, then you've clearly somehow missed the last 2000 years of philosophy, which has, by some understanding, just been one concerted effort to re-write Plato more clearly.
Generally, with argument, the disputants try to establish a basis of agreed axioms and facts and then the game is to discover whether one side or the other has made a logical slip on the way to their conclusions.
But sometimes the argument will reveal a deeper disagreement at the axiomatic level - at that point, people usually just agree to disagree, though sometimes arguments about axioms can result in insights and changes of mind too.
Although sometimes both can be right or wrong, often (with informed debates) one person is wrong and the other person right - but it's not always easy to figure out how and in what way, and with the really deep questions it might take decades or even centuries to figure out what's what.
And though I get what you are driving at, I am not sure "prefer" is the right word. For example, most of the people I know who doggedly adhere to one or the other view of what they consider to be a binary option (such as realism or idealism) behave as if their view is more likely than not to be correct.
And for the most part, when one theory does supplant another, it is because the new theory either resolves or dissolves significant issues that the supplanted theory was unable to resolve or dissolve.
Seriously?
In QP you get answers like "maybe" if you ask if a particle is exactly at a given spot.
On the other hand the subject here is philosophy and hence the human condition. I'm not yet sure how that sentence contradicts human freedom but I am sure it does...
We may not know exactly where the particle is, but we are certain that the particle is somewhere just because we don't know where it is doesn't mean it doesn't exist and isn't somewhere, that was my argument.
This is a difficult question. When I listen to physicians I get the impression that the uncertainty is really attributed to nature itself like: the particle there is really some "potential" to manifest as a particle there.
Is fallacy your word of the day? False and fallacy are not synonymous. In philosophical argument, a fallacy is generally considered a failure in reasoning that renders an argument unsound. On the other hand, false is an attribute of a philosophical premise and/or conclusion. I strongly recommend investment in a dictionary. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy is one of the best. A bit pricey. But it should last a life time.
And broaden your mind a bit. "Disagreeing with TogetherTurtle" is not on any list of fallacies I have seen. In it is philosophical courtesy to be able to identify an alleged fallacy in someone else's argument. And if can't identify it, then it is likely you do not know what you are talking about.
Statements having a binary truth/false value are "apophantic" and generally considered to have minimal meaningful content.
And if you think there is any philosophical consensus regarding your theory of truth, you would be wrong. Your "state" theory of truth is a new one. And what good is it? And what is the status of the claim the all unicorns have purple tails? Well according to you, we know it must be true or false, we just do not know which. What help is that? If you are going to have a theory of truth, it ought to useful.
When I am wrong, I will admit it and improve. I now know that I was using the word incorrectly and change from now on. Thank you for that.
Quoting Arne
Why? Isn't that what all of computing is based on? Switches turning on and off to get to some sort of end. Isn't that math in its entirety? All math has a solution, even if no man has found the answer. Even if there is more than one answer, we know yes to those, and no to the rest. I don't think I have to tell you that we wouldn't be communicating right now if yes or no answers were useless.
Quoting Arne
Why would consensus indicate accuracy in any way? The consensus has been wrong about very many things in the past, and it changes when proven wrong, because that is logical. Also, why would I think there was a philosophical consensus regarding anything? Isn't the whole idea of philosophy that there is no consensus until there is a correct answer?
This "State" theory as you put it isn't really new. As I mentioned before math, and science are pretty much entirely the studies of how things are, and proving that they can't be something else.
Regarding the in character sarcastic comment about unicorns, we know they don't have purple tails because we know unicorns do not exist, and if they do exist and do have purple tails, then that is true. And lastly, knowing that unicorns don't have purple tails and don't exist is useful because we now know that we don't have a missing piece of the ecosystem. If they did exist, and we just have not seen them because they are hiding, we would notice a lot of fields being consumed over night. Conservation efforts would be that more inaccurate because we failed to factor in an entire species, and that could have disastrous consequences on the Earth. If they existed and didn't have purple tails, we now know that we shouldn't identify them that way.
Essentially, you have challenged the idea that knowing whether something is true or false is useful, and you can't really argue that you'd want to know that it is true there is a spoon in your garbage disposal before you turn it on.
That is a fair enough question. But I did not say they were useless. I said to the effect they were considered to have less meaningful content. I did not say they had no content at all. A real life example is (and I am going on memory here), there was a time when a little more than half of Americans surveyed said they were unhappy with Obamacare. But further digging into the issue found that about 30 percent of those who were unhappy with it were unhappy because they would have preferred a single payer option.
And for the most part, those questions that can honestly be answered yes/no or true/false are not questions philosophy deals with. For example, it may be technically correct to say freewill is true/false but we just do not know which. At true as that may be, we already know that. And telling people interested in the issue what they already know is generally not a significant contribution to the discussion. Just saying.
"Reasoning is but reckoning." -Thomas Hobbes
You may find this hard to believe, but not all philosophers agree with Mr. Hobbes.
Are you suggesting that all problems are mathematical in nature and therefore have a mathematical solution?
Are you suggesting that people truly interested in the nature of being are going to satisfied with know that there is an answer but that we just do not know what it is? Either god does/does not exist. We just do not know which. But it's all cool. Few people have ever asked whether there was an answer. Instead, the ask what the answer is. Surely you must have notice that?
And if your answer is yes, are you going to be rude to all who disagree with you? (there will be many of them).
Are you familiar with Professor Hubert Dreyfus?
I strongly recommend his book What computers cannot do. It is a bit outdated. But his primary premise is that the "world" (which I am confident in this case does not mean what you think it means) probably does not mean what you think it means) cannot be represented with a Cartesian subject/object approach.
Seriously, a reading group for Heidegger's Being and Time will get off the ground in the next few days. If you think a computational approach to being is the answer, you need to get in on this reading group. It is extremely hard stuff, but you will never again look at the world in the same way.
No, you have the chicken before the egg. T/F answers are what the world is made up of and math is a reflection of that.
Quoting Arne
No, I am not saying people should not be satisfied with knowing just that there is an answer, in fact, that dissatisfaction is the major driving force for scientists and the rest. I feel as if you only understand what you wish to.
Quoting Arne
The reading group does intrigue me however. If I am wrong, I would like to know. My view is either true or false after all. I just got my paycheck so if I have to buy the book I could I suppose
Interesting. If your argument is that questions with yes/no answers are of little philosophical meaning and are rarely perused by philosophers (a position I'm inclined to agree with), I wonder how you justify your assertion quoted above. Surely it is just as possible that he will be entirely unmoved by an in depth analysis of Heidegger.
Philosophy seems ever caught up in this contradiction. Even such seemingly obvious ideas such as that I have a hand simply because I see one in front of me (per Moore) is considered up for debate and open to question, yet the idea that Heidegger (or similar) is saying something meaningful goes virtually unquestioned,by the same group of people.
Edit - "Either his ontology is correct or it is not." - Arne
I am more of a cart before the horse guy.
Quoting TogetherTurtle
There are two widely accepted translations. I presume one of them will be used. Both are available for download free of charge.
Will you be wrong? Yes and no and I am sincere in saying that. Nothing you have said is incompatible with Heidegger. But if you are serious, you will walk away with a much deeper and broader understanding of "world", though not inconsistent with the one you expressed. But once you grasp his understanding of "world" you will laugh to yourself every time you hear the term used in a colloquial manner. And the same with T/F. Heidegger would not quibble with your understanding. But he will sure as hell deepen it.
Heidegger was educated as a mathematician and a physicist.
You're right in that the primary motivation seems to be truth rather than motivation. However, the fact is so many philosophical issues haven't been resolved as such i.e. truth-value of propositions are unknown. In such cases belief is a matter of preference is it not?
Also, there are so many points of view given any situation, each pulling us in different directions which usually have competing emotional effects (some are sad, others pleasant and still others neutral). Given so isn't it preference then that ultimately has the upper hand in our decisions on whether to believe a particular philosophy or not?
On the other Hand mental products are the kind of things we can assign a definite truth value on. Like mathematics: We just define something to be true or false and conclude from there. And - of course - your initial statement that we can do this for all statements is the natural stance we take towards matters to organize them. But there is a degree of freedom which point of view to take towards things. This is reflected in phrases like the application of mental models.
There is do discordance over the measurement having shown a certain value but how to interpret it.
If we are at the point where "preference" is the right criterion there must be many equally appropriate models to chose from.
It is an interesting issue. But does the history of philosophy and its issues unfold before people in the manner you describe? Are people not more likely to be "drawn" to issues from a particular area of philosophy or "drawn" to the approach of a particular school or "drawn" to the writings of a particular philosopher long before they acquire any deep and broad across the board understanding of philosophy and its issues?
And if that is the case, do we choose what we are "drawn" to? How would preference play any significant role except in the rare cases where people are strongly drawn in more than one direction? But even then, the draws from different directions would have to be relatively equal or people would simply go the direction they are more strongly drawn.
Perhaps we overestimate the role that choice, preference and free will play in our lives. In our average everydayness, we spend very little (if any) time contemplating directions of our movement? We simply move forward in the direction we are drawn and only contemplate (briefly) when we feel the pull from a different direction.
Of course, some would likely attempt to confuse the issue by trying to make some sort of cause and effect connection between our preferences and the directions we are drawn and thereby render trivial all decisions. I suspect there must be a meaningful difference between:
1. Philosophy is ultimately about our preference; and
2. Philosophy is ultimately about that to which we are drawn.
There's no flaw in the logic I suppose. Therefore the difference between thesis and antithesis must lie with the axioms of the arguments offered in support of them.
Differences in choice of axioms must originate with our preferences (likes and dislikes).
Therefore, philosophy is not so much about rationality as it is about our personal preferences.”
For the sake of argument, let's say that I prefer a worldview that everything is comprised of 3 types of Monads as Leibniz put forth in his philosophy. Lest also say I put forth a thesis repeating Leibniz. A philanthropist, preferring the rigor of modern day science commissions an antithesis that will pass the scrutiny of the the peer review process at Journal Nature. Which thesis do we have most reason to believe?
Moving to moral theory. For the sake of argument, let's say I prefer to believe that germs and viruses do not exist, and this is the axiom behind my reasoning in my thesis entitled “Public health, sumglic health, why we should regularly poop on the street.”
At some point, facts matter.
But there is no one fact that we can all hang our philosophical coats on. Different points of view exist and are encouraged by philosophers. The problem is, depending on the angle of view, different conclusions arise.
As a simple example take the fallacy of appeal to misery. If we stick to facts then a young boy did steal the bread. However, the other fact that's relevant to the matter is the boy was dying of hunger.
You're right in a way but apply this idea to the very beginnings of every branch of philosophy and we realize that logic or reason (claimed bedrock of philosophy) has a small role to play if any.
I have never claimed logic or reason to be the bedrock of philosophy. And if it is not, are you suggesting that preference would necessarily be the only other option? I still maintain that we are drawn in particular directions and absent some sort of competing draw, we go toward that which we are drawn. And that we do so with minimal, if any, deliberation.
I thought it was and is. It isn't?
Quoting Arne
How do you differentiated ''draw'' and ''preference''?
By contrasting reason with preference I meant to expose the truth about certain aspects of philosophy; specifically some areas where reason has failed to make progress and that leaves us with what's left - ''preference'' or your ''draw''.
Why are you asking me the questions I asked you?
Please see my comment from three days ago.
I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting positions, both logically adequate.
This language is rather confusing, because we cite reasons within arguments, not axioms. Axioms are the foundation of certain mathematical or logical universes. They don't show up in premises when we argue. It is possible you are using "axiom" more casually to mean, a starting point in an argument, e.g. the first premise of an argument. If that's what you mean, then axioms could act as reasons because we cite reasons in argumentation. Axioms would just be those starting reasons we cite. But this way of interpreting things would render your question moot, as our choice of positions would be determined by reasons/axioms.
Do we choose axioms? We certainly choose arguments. Perhaps that is what you were trying to say.
Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.
Also, is something irrational if it is chosen by our preferences?
I’m not sure how this is the case. Two conflicting stances can both be reasoned positions, but the mere fact they are conflicting does not mean they are reasoned. Perhaps I have misunderstood you, and you are describing a hypothetical scenario in which there are two reasoned conflicting position, both logically adequate.
This language is rather confusing, because reasons are those things we cite when we try supporting a position. If axioms support arguments, then axioms could act as reasons. From here, your overall concern is rendered moot, because we could maintain a position by citing said axiomatic reasons. When you say:
If axioms are reasons, then citing them can be “rational.”
Are you saying if it is rational for me to do X, then there must necessarily be a reason for me to X? Or are you saying if there is no reason for me to X, then doing X cannot be rational? I’d be very careful about employing a reason-loaded conception of rationality.
It seems you think reasons are required for rationality when you say:
But I'd examine this claim if I were you. If I smell smoke upon waking, and believe, genuinely, my house is on fire, and I desire to live, is it not rational of me to save myself? Now suppose there is no fire. There is no reason for me to flee. Am I rendered irrational because I have no reason to flee? You could say my own beliefs and desires give me reason to act, but then you'd be admitting our preferences/ mental states can act as reasons, which is contrary to your point.
Also, why is something irrational if it is chosen by our preferences?
We start off with some agreed upon initial assumptions. ''Assumptions'' because we can't defend each and every premise (infinite regress).
These initial assumptions are the murky waters, don't you agree?
Take the abortion debate. Pro-lifers begin with the assumption that fetuses are persons and therefore abortion is murder. Pro-choicers begin with fetuses are NOT persons and advocate abortion as women's right.
They don't agree with the initial assumptions and that's why have contradictory beliefs. The logic isn't faulty but the initial assumptions are different.
The main problem is to determine whether a fetus is a person or not. That, it seems, isn't possible within the current scientific and religious systems.
So, it then becomes a matter of preference which argument to buy into.
That's what I mean.
Have you considered the life and the paths we take do not unfold as your examples suggest? I suspect most radical pro lifers grew up into their beliefs long before they even entertained, if ever they did, the notion that they could believe what they preferred.
I'm of the opinion that people reason their positions on all matters. It simply can't be a matter of blind belief. Naive? Wrong?
In my last post to you I gave you two examples (Monads and shitting in the street) of how an absurd preference could lead to an absurd thesis. In a philosophical debate, it is generally incumbent on you to either point out a flaw in my examples, or explain how the outcomes are equally good as your thesis argues.
You instead countered:
"But there is no one fact that we can all hang our philosophical coats on".
So what? Does you theory that every thesis is equal since it is based on preferences hang its hat on one fact? How does that counter my examples?
this is actually quite beautiful. Is this from somewhere or did you make this up? Either way, I like it.[hide][/hide]
I don't understand the distinction you're trying to make here.
Say I have a preference for vanilla ice-cream. I don't choose this preference (at least not in the moment), it is simply there as a brute fact. So when I'm faced with two choices of ice-cream, I will either choose the one I prefer, because I prefer it. Or deliberately choose one I do not prefer (maybe to expand my tastes, or simply out of self-flagellation). But if I'm given two meals, one of which is prepared with vanilla, and one of which is not. I may be 'drawn' to the one that has vanilla in it, even if I can't determine why. It's still because I prefer vanilla, it hasn't become some mystic force compelling me toward one particular meal. All that's happened is, absent of any other reason, I choose the one which reflects my preferences. I might be well aware I'm doing that, or I might be doing it subconsciously. I'm not sure what significance the distinction between those two routes has to the OP. Perhaps you could lay it out a bit?
And you never will so long as you continue to equate trivial decisions such as flavors of ice cream with decisions regarding one's philosophical journey.
In addition and consistent with my previous comments, we do not make the number of decision during the course of a day as we think we do, let alone significant decisions. We spend most of our day on "auto pilot" when it comes to executing the decisions we have already made.
It is mine. It is rooted in my interpretation of Heidegger's Being and Time.
How does this work? What is it about my equating trivial decisions with decisions about a philosophical journey which prevents me from understanding your distinction?
Quoting Arne
I don't understand the relevance of this. How does the number of decisions we make impact on the definition on the distinction you're trying to make?
I thought I'd asked rather a simple question, I just want to know what distinguishes being drawn to something from having a preference for something. All I'm getting so far is possibly either that you're defining one as being subconscious and the other conscious, or else you're defining one as being more powerful (or less trivial) than the other. The trouble is, it's not clear which, and in either case, I'm not sure how it would be demonstrably the case in philosophy.
What is it about my distinction that you are having difficulty understanding?
Preferences would be irrational as they aren't reasoned positions.
you seem to be expressing a preference for the reasoned position?
and why would preferences not be a reasoned position?
don't most people have reasons for their preference?
in fact, couldn't one consider a preference to be the result of a previous reasoned decision rendered default?
if you are going to suggest that a preference is not a reasoned position, then what type of position is it?
is it just built in?
and if you want to suggest philosophy is ultimately about preference, then why would that be limited to just philosophy?
philosophically oriented people strike me as more contemplative than the average bear?
if they are going to make their decisions based upon preference, why are they spending all of that time thinking, reading, and writing?
and couldn't one argue that a reasoned position is simply a preference supported by argument?
in fact, if we push your premise, your preference for preference as the ground of philosophy that all reasoned positions are the product of preferences and there is, therefore, no room for reason as an alternative primordial ground. As a result, even your distinction between preference and a reasoned position is a distinction without a difference.
I fail to see how arguing for or against the notion that we prefer what we are driven to or drawn towards contributes any substance.
One guy touches the trunk and says the elephant is rough and the other guy touches the tusks and says its smooth. Note smooth and rough are contraries. The whole picture is missing but there's proof on both sides (the rough trunk and the smooth tusk) leading to contradictory conclusions.
I think philosophical issues can be described as blind men feeling different parts of the problem and coming to irreconcilable conclusions.
So, until we see the issue in its entirity we don't really have any choice to persuade us to take side on the basis of logical arguments. We, therefore, adopt or believe in what we like. Preference!
I don't see how that follows. I'm asking why you think preferences are irrational if they aren't "reasoned." Are all non-reasoned things irrational? Is my tv set irrational? My taste for Indian food? These are non-rational...not irrational. Also, rationality and reasons can split apart, as my examples illustrated. Furthermore, rationality is a complex; it is an achievement of sorts. There are no default rational items. In order to arrive at "rational" beliefs, we will need justifiers. Justifiers themselves need not be justified. Insofar as our preferences can act as justifiers (I can think of several accessibility internalists who think this) they would be part of the process of rational belief formation. Because they themselves are non-rational elements of one's justifying base does not make them irrational.
I don't know about that. Aren't there premises that we all agree on? ...that we're each in a life in a "physical" world...and that there are abstract facts (at least in the sense that we can mention them)?
No, I suggest that our metaphysical differences originate in our ability to use terms that we conveniently forget to define, and then determinedly refuse to define. ...and our willingness to repeat assertions without answering arguments against them.
Of course it usually can't be proved that one metaphysics is true and that others are false, because pretty much all metaphysicses predict the same physical world that we observe...and usually do so by unparsimonious, unfalsifiable unverifiable contrivance.
But it can be shown that a metaphysics is unmparismonious, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, dependent on assumptions or a brute-fact.
....or that one isn't.
Much of the argument and difference here consists of repetition of claims that aren't supported when questioned.
As someone asked in an OP earlier, of what value is metaphysics without consistent, well-specified and consistent definitions? Some people here get angry when asked to define a term by which they feel they support their position.
...a term like "substantial", "real", "existent", "actual", etc.
Michael Ossipoff