Problem of the Criterion
In the field of epistemology, the problem of the criterion is an issue regarding the starting point of knowledge. This is a separate and more fundamental issue than the regress argument found in discussions on justification of knowledge.
(A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
(B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?
Below is a short video illustrating the case:
Here is the original paper proposed by Roderick Chisholm.
And finally, here is a rundown on the whole idea presented.
(A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
(B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?
Below is a short video illustrating the case:
Here is the original paper proposed by Roderick Chisholm.
And finally, here is a rundown on the whole idea presented.
Comments (31)
I like the following version. Allegedly it is the most general formulation of the problem:
(1) Which propositions are true?
(2) How can we tell which propositions are true?
Both 1 and 2 can be answered with "LOGIC" - the ultimate and only truth determiner in our world.
Of course, the problem loops back and asks how one determines the truth of LOGIC itself? The answer is LOGIC is self-proving mechanism.
SELF-PROVING MECHANISM:
1. If MOST/ALL predictions of LOGIC come true then LOGIC is true
2. MOST/ALL predictions of LOGIC come true
Therefore,
3. LOGIC is true
We move from a vicious circularity to a benign one.
Not sure about that last part, but I like where you're taking this. :smile:
We know a proposition to be true because we have the method of logic.
The criterion problem spills over into logic as logic itself is in a similar circularity. We can't prove logic is true because we would be assuming it's true if we do that.
But...
We can employ a strong argument in favor of logic which depends on its predictions coming true in every field of knowledge we know of since we even began thinking.
Oh, well that's a monumental task at which Russell and the positivists have tried approaching. The positivists tried to tackle the problem through devising a method without addressing the particular, I think. You have to address both at the same time to not fail. Not sure. If you address the issue with logic alone you fail to address how we can pick out particulars, I think.
Wondering what others think about this...
Edit: You can see the culmination of the failure the positivists had, in the verification principle, in my opinion.
Anyone think science is a particularistic or methodist approach to the problem of the criterion?
I guess the key ingredient in my argument is mathematical probability.
How so?
Quoting TheMadFool
Yes, but knowledge and truth aren't the same. So no cigar, yet...
There are truths and falsehoods. In the beginning we have a method or a few particulars, it doesn't matter.
Say we start with particulars and we develop a method. As we accumulate more particulars the method gets automatically verified. The more particulars, the more stronger our method.
Now, imagine we had a method. We accumulate particulars. As we accumulate more particulars the method, again, gets automatically bolstered.
I guess I'm saying the required distinction for the Criterion problem to be a problem, viz. Particular vs method, isn't that clear enough. They seem to be in some kind positive loop instead of a negative one.
Hmmm... So, to win you have to have each complementing the other?
One could say that many of the problems in the world stem from the Criterion problem. Not enough particulars to go on to devise a suitable method or not good enough a method to cover all particulars.
So, science is a method, hence; the scientific method...
Can you name any particular stances?
And, is the method approach winning against the particularistic one?
Both are two sides of the same coin and only together can we make a purchase.
Hmm, unsure about that. I think both cannot be spoken without the other. Kind of like dialectics?
I don't know. I can see them both come together like yin and yang; the parts may be confusing but the whole makes sense. I wonder what others have to say about this.
But perhaps Roderickite is less like gold, and more like salt. In that case, the method would be to try and dissolve the sand in water and then filter and evaporate. If I have no idea what Roderickite is, then not only do I not have a method of separation, but I have no way of knowing whether any separation I might make has separated out Roderickite, or Unenlightendite, something completely different.
I think I am a dissolutionist about this problem. To pose the problem is already to have distinguished properties of knowledge that make it different, and thus to already have both a sample and some criteria and a method. To deny it is to deny knowing what the problem is that one is posing. It is to talk of 'knowledge' whilst denying that there is knowledge. That's nonsense.
I think I know where you're going with this. You mean to highlight how do names attain/obtain their meaning? Kripke might have the answer to this question, if anyone here is knowledgeable enough on Kripke... I ain't unfortunately.
Then, taking a step back, what does 'properties of knowledge' entail or mean to you? I feel as though we're setting the horse behind the cart here.
Quoting unenlightened
Again, we don't first arrive at knowledge without having some method or criteria for considering first as knowledge. So, maybe those have to be addressed first before we can talk about particulars instead of method. But, again, we're stuck in a loop again.
Oh, well I have nothing to go about on here. It's just nonsense all the way down from this starting point.
Quoting unenlightened
Can we lay off the F-bombs? Seriously @unenlightened...
The method of F-ing about is how it actually works.
Hu? Hows does that work out?
If I put it politely for you, it is play that is the beginning of knowledge. Play is imitation, recitation, messing about. This is not nonsense at all, it is the creativity of experimentation and exploration that starts without goal as purpose and becomes purposeful. The joy of smearing mud on a rock becomes the joy of art; playing dollies tea party with mud and water becomes panning for gold, or running a restaurant. Babble becomes philosophy.
One does not go looking for Roderickite that one has no idea what it is, one plays in the sand and something different comes out of that, and one calls it Roderickite.
Yes, but we do have to know the rules of the game first, if we want to play...
Quoting unenlightened
I feel as though we're getting lost here. Here is the gist of the criteria for determining knowledge:
Quoting Cardinal D. J. Mercier
Found in the paper referenced in the OP.
It seems clear, elegant, and simple enough, yes?
Well, yes, We do use knowledge about assessing the true and falsity of determinating knowledge. I was wondering about what criteria we use in determining knowledge.
But in both cases the knowledge we obtain isn't exactly commensurate, though we call both knowledge -- one is artistic and one is scientific; just to create another division of sorts.
It seems to me that the criteria of knowledge are highly specific to not just area of study but even time and place. Acting in a Shakespearean play when Shakespeare was alive would be different from acting in a Shakespearean play today. Doing chemistry in the time of Lavoisier differs from doing chemistry now. It all depends on our social arrangements, in a way, which are highly specific. Lavoisier could prove atoms existed through a fairly basic electrochemical reaction, and that mattered to the time because of the conflict between materialism and religion. Nowadays? You are kind of appealing to different groups. We are divided due to our experiences.
As to which starts first -- I don't know. I start with knowledge, but even starting with knowledge presupposes some element of what it is we know. Just as starting with a method presupposes some element of how we know.
How could you sort such a conundrum?
Experiential knowledge is prone to such analysis. It' more about how to do deal with ethical sentiments.
Quoting Moliere
The gist of the sentiments is ethical ones.