What is uncertainty?
So much focus in philosophy is about certainty. Many philosophers spend their time analyzing what we can be certain about. Asking questions like: how can we be certain of anything? Is a priori knowledge certain? Can we be certain that the sun will rise tomorrow? How can we be certain that your not a brain in a vat? These questions about certainty are interesting, however, I find questions of uncertainty equally fascinating.
What is the meaning of uncertainty? Is it merely a feeling or is it quantifiable? If is something that quantifiable are there objective ways of determining how uncertain something is? You might mention stuff like Bayesian theory which begs the question: how does uncertainty relate to probability? Does probability totally engulf our notions of uncertainty? are there aspects of uncertainty that can't be explained in terms of math?
So many questions, so much uncertainty.
What is the meaning of uncertainty? Is it merely a feeling or is it quantifiable? If is something that quantifiable are there objective ways of determining how uncertain something is? You might mention stuff like Bayesian theory which begs the question: how does uncertainty relate to probability? Does probability totally engulf our notions of uncertainty? are there aspects of uncertainty that can't be explained in terms of math?
So many questions, so much uncertainty.
Comments (64)
In a colloquial sense, it's just probability. You claim it begs the question, but it really doesn't. The average Joe (myself included), in every day speech, is liable to say that when he's "certain" or "uncertain", he's simply communicating the rough likelihood of something he believes or knows to be the case. It's just a substitution of terms in that case, so I don't see where the question begging enters.
The first thing to note is that certainty is an attitude.
So it's not "Can we be certain that the sun will rise tomorrow?" but "Ought we be certain that the sun will rise tomorrow?"
Not sure about that, but I would say that it is a state of being.
Certainty being a real, true state and uncertainty an unknown or unproven state.
What is a state of being?
I can make sense of a propositional attitude, but a state of being - sounds suspicious.
Quoting Sir2u
Folk are certain of unproven things all the time. So that's not right.
I think there is a distinction to be made between certitude, which is an attitude, and certainty, which is an undoubted fact.
In a sense, you're right. But if an astronomer were trying to asses the probability of the sun shining tomorrow, they would take into account the possibility of a black hole wondering into it's path, or whatever might result in it not shining 24 hours from now.
A physicists might say there's a non-zero chance all the atoms of the sun don't fuse tomorrow, or release their radiation until 48 hours, or pass through one another, missing the nucleus or what have you.
I agree that
Quoting Banno
because a calculation that demonstrates that something is very likely or unlikely to happen provides little comfort in itself. Let's say that a stadium holding 60,000 fans will be hosting the last game of a tied World Series. You have a ticket, and you definitely plan on being there. The morning of the game a terrorist organization announces that 1 (one) person will be selected randomly and will be killed during the game--shot; instant death. No suffering.
Will you still attend?
1 out of 60,000.
Your decision to attend or not attend is a question of emotion and attitude, more than probability, because the probability of you being killed at the game is low. If you go, it will be because you FEEL confident that you won't be the one. The probability of dying at the game, you tell your self, is really, really low. If you don't go, it will be because you FEEL there is too much risk of you BEING THE ONE. One in 60,000 is just to close for comfort. (You face higher odds of dying from other things that you continue doing, because your attitude allows you to.)
Sure, but this isn't the same thing as philosophical certainty. When we want to know if we're certain the sun rises tomorrow, we're not concerned about our feelings on the matter. Rather, we're concerned about knowledge claims. Can anything outside of logic or math be certain?
Example: I don't think I live inside a simulation of some sort, and it doesn't effect me in everyday life, but can I know that for sure? Is there a defeater for the simulation argument?
The problem is that we use the word "certainty" to refer to things which are known as definite fact, while we use certitude to refer to the attitude of an individual being certain. I can say that It is a certainty that Donald Trump is president of the United States, and I can express the same thing as a certitude, by saying that I am certain that Donald Trump is president of the United States. The two propositions "it is certain that...", and "I am certain that..." have distinct meanings.
The op raises questions about "certainty", and if there is such a thing a certainty. If you argue to reduce all certainty to the attitude of certitude, then you argue that "certainty" as we commonly use it doesn't refer to anything real. But then the op goes on to question "uncertainty". And "uncertainty" is generally used to refer to an attitude like certitude, so it would be a mistake to represent "uncertainty" as the opposite of "certainty".
There are, as a great philosopher said, "known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns."
We can sort things into those three categories.
known knowns:
sun rises
ice melts at >0ºC
bolts of lightning cause thunder
known unknowns:
One of 20 horses will win the Kentucky Derby (which one?)
One fine day I will drop dead (which day?)
Frost may ruin the apple crop (where?)
Unknown unknowns:
All the things that might happen about which we have nary a clue even existing. Even though unknown unknowns make themselves altogether too well known all too often, we can't guess what future unknown unknowns will be.
We can have certainty about known knowns; there can be some doubt about known unknowns, but considerable certainty as well. We can also be fairly certain that unknown unknowns will make themselves known in the future.
Claiming that we can't be certain about the sun rising is posturing. Is anyone really uncertain that ice will melt a temperature greater than 0ºC? Does anyone actually think that all of the horses in the KY Derby will either break their legs before they reach the finish line, or that 3 to 20 will arrive at exactly the same moment? Does anybody believe that nothing totally unexpected will happen in the future? No, they don't.
Nobody thinks they are a brain in a vat. Nobody things they are actually a character in a simulation. These are interesting mind games, but games none the less.
Quoting Marchesk
Practically, yes. We can't be certain about everything, but there are many things that we are certain of--like the sun rising and that we are not brains in a barrel.
I would take the question about rising suns or barrels of brains seriously if I thought you did. Your only concern about the sun rising is coming up with a proof. The sun will rise whether you come up with a proof or not, because your proof is irrelevant. So would mine, so would everybody else.
If it makes no difference in our lives, it isn't fit material for philosophy. It's like "Can angels dance on the head of a pin, and how many?" It's utterly irrelevant.
It was fit for Hume, Kant and many other philosophers, starting with the ancient skeptics. I don't delve into philosophy because it's practical, I delve into it because it's about the big questions we all wonder about.
I don't take the simulation or BIV argument seriously in everyday life, because they're made up scenarios based on our current level of limited technology, but I do sometimes wonder about appearances versus reality, which is more generally the Kantian concern, and is backed to some extent by the findings in science the past several centuries, particularly physics.
However, if we ever do get to an advanced enough technological level, then some of Bostrom's arguments take on more weight. One Star Trek Next Generation episode involving the infamous Holodeck malfunction ended with the crew pondering whether they were inside a simulation of someone else's construction. And if you have that level of technology, then it does become a real concern.
It matters for the whole idealism/realism/skepticism argument. The skeptic would say that if the perfect BIV scenario is possible, then our claims to knowledge are wrong, since we can't be certain we're not perfectly envatted. The idealist would respond by saying we know what appears to us, and the BIV scenario could only exist for the mad scientist. And the realist would be left with the difficult task of bridging the epistemological gap.
We can certainly say who cares, it doesn't matter, nobody really acts like solipsism is true, etc. But it doesn't change the fact that these are well established philosophical problems. And that was enough to plague Witty throughout his life, or so I've read.
Actually, the category of unknown unknowns is quite difficult, and somewhat paradoxical. You can't name any unknown unknowns because that would say that they are known as unknown. Even to say that there is such a thing as unknown unknowns is to say that it is known that there are unknown unknowns and that's paradoxical.
Quoting Bitter Crank
I think the issue is whether the fact that ice will melt at temperatures above 0 degrees is really anything more than just the attitude of individuals who believe this. If this fact is reducible to just a whole bunch of people believing this, the certitude of all these individuals, then there is no such thing as "it is certain that ice will melt above 0 degrees". But if there is something independent from the individuals who believe this, which constitutes the fact that ice will melt at temperatures above 0 degrees, then we have an objective certainty. It is certain that ice will melt at temperatures above 0 zero degrees, regardless of the beliefs or certitude of any individual human beings. We use "certainty" as if it is an independent, objective thing, but maybe it's just an attitude and there is no such thing.
Old school. We can't know any empirical claim with 100% certainty, isn't that what Kant showed, that the Noumea is not something we can know.
What is the difference between the phenomenal that we sense, and what the BIV senses...? I don't see what's different so then what is the use of a distinction where there is no distinction.
p.s. take the blue pill.
For the idealist, none. Not everyone is an idealist, so ...
Idealists die don't they?
I think so. Berkeley's not still among us. Maybe God grew tired of perceiving him?
It could be that our mind's aren't capable of processing the amount of information required to achieve certainty. An extreme case would be the impossibility of omniscience for finite beings like us. There's just too much stuff to know.
May be the uncertainty is imposed from the outside in contrast to what I said above. We may not have the instruments or they may be inaccurate leading to errors in our predictions.
Also what if certainty is simply impossible to achieve. This seems to be the case with me. How can one ever be sure that what we know is the truth. There's time to consider. What if what we know is only a temporary state of the world? There's space to consider. What if what we know is confined to our Earth, our Solar system and that the rules/laws are totally different in other parts of the universe? The bigger question is how do we know if all this is not an illusion? These are unanswerable questions which leads to the fact that uncertainty is what we have to live with.
Given this is the case we stratify our world. One obvious classification would be to physical and mental. We can increase the certainty in our knowledge of the physical world with greater ease than in the mental world. We can have better instruments and unbiased data, etc. We can play around with the level of certainty we want in knowledge - 70%, 80%. 90%. 99%.
Uncertainty is inescapable but levels of certainty can be achieved.
Well if so then thought must be contingent since the good Bishop is not still here, and there must be a here, where they are no longer at and therefore a reality that is independent of their dreams.
So then the only certainty is contingency whose only limit is possibility.
How would you be certain that the level of 70%, 80%, or 90% had been achieved? Or would you be 90% certain that 70% certainty had been achieved, etc.?
Quoting Marchesk
The universe will chug along? What does that mean?
I guess we'd have to look at our instruments. A measuring scale with an error margin of +/-1% would mean we're 99% sure. Right?
No, because the margin of error is an average, so it doesn't mean that each time is 99% sure.. And there could be other factors involved which are not being measured.
If we're dealing with statistics and have a confidence interval of 95% and a margin of error of +/-3% with a projected figure of 50% then we are 95% sure that the actual figure will be between 47% and 53%.
But to not doubt some given fact is to adopt a specific attitude towards it - that is, to be certain of it.
I can't see your distinction.
So the distinction I refer to is the difference between something which I, you, someone else, or even a group of people, have an attitude of certitude toward, and something which everyone has an attitude of certitude toward.
SO we can be certain of things other than facts.
No, one is an attitude while the other is a generalization concerning many attitudes, stating that everyone has the same attitude. Do you not recognize the difference between an attitude and a statement saying that two people have the same attitude?
I have an attitude, and you have an attitude. The statement that we both have the same attitude is not itself an expression of an attitude.
Only (2) is an expression of an attitude, yes? Unless you want to argue that (1) is (2) in disguise...
(1) is a statement about the Earth; (2) - (5) are statements about people, attributing attitudes to them. (2) might be a special case - if candid it counts as a report.
Now what's the point you're making?
"I am certain" is a statement of an attitude; but "We are certain" isn't. Nor is "He is certain".
Banno said:
Quoting Banno
I said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As you pointed out, only 2), "I am certain the earth is flat", is an expression of an attitude. Therefore "everyone is certain the earth is flat" is not an expression of an attitude. And it follows that "it is an undoubted fact the earth is flat" is not an expression of an attitude because "undoubted fact" means doubted by no one. Furthermore, it follows that "certainty", which means "an undoubted fact", is not an expression of an attitude either.
That is the argument I use to support my claim that there is a distinction between certitude (an attitude) and certainty (an undoubted fact).
You suggest that certainty is an undoubted fact, but what does that entail, what is an example of undoubted fact. I doubt any undoubted facts, I think all facts are contingent, that all facts could have been otherwise. If so, does this reduce all certainty to certitude and does this mean that un-certitude is also an attitude.
Suppose that the absolute contingency of everything is the only certainty possible, then what could be meant by saying that this is a fact except that absolute certainty can't be known.
I agree with you that if certainty means "undoubted fact", and "undoubted" means doubted by no one, then there may very well be no such thing as a certainty. The point I was making to Banno is that we most commonly use "certainty" in this way, so it is incorrect to say that certainty is an attitude because we often use "certainty" in this way, which refers to something other than an attitude.
If one desires to argue that there is no such thing as certainty, in the sense of an undoubted fact, and so we ought to use "certainty" to refer only to an attitude, then that argument needs to be made. Until then, and probably even if that argument is produced, I think people will continue to use "certainty" to refer to an undoubted fact, and Banno's claim that certainty is an attitude is just a ruse.
Quoting Cavacava
Perhaps I am not interpreting correctly what you mean by "contingent", but if a contingent thing is something which could have been otherwise, this does not mean that it is not as it is. So if a contingent fact comes into being, through some human choice, or the necessary efficient cause required to bring it into being, this fact still cannot be otherwise, despite the fact that things could have been otherwise.
In any case, I don't see how this is relevant to the distinction between the attitude of certitude about how things are, and certainty, as the undoubted fact of how things are.
By "contingent" are you trying to say that there is no such things as how things are? I don't think that word serves this purpose.
That the universe is a choo choo train. Thought everyone was undoubtedly certain of this?
As a matter of English usage, you might be right, but even if you are, it's only for the nouns: the adjective that goes with both "certainty" and "certitude" is "certain".
I still don't see a philosophical point.
No, but then again I don't think "how things are" can be known, only how things are for us can be known, which is where propositional attitude comes into play. What can or can't be subsumed as attitudinal in a proposition.
So then:
a) is that (the referenced) which can't be doubted attitudinal or
b) is that which can't be doubted outside of anyone's attitude towards it?
I tend to think it is b) and, if the only thing that can't be doubted is that every thing is absolutely contingent, then contingency itself is non-attitudinal...I guess my thought is that if anything is absolute, it is absolute de re.
Sure the adjective "certain" is the same. But it means a completely different thing to say "it is certain" than to say "I am certain". Call it "objective" and "subjective" if you want, it's just the reality of the usage, these phrases mean completely different things. So it is a mistake to reduce "it is certain" to a variation of "I am certain", because when someone says "it is certain", they clearly mean something completely distinct from "I am certain".
Quoting Cavacava
I don't see what you mean by "propositional attitude". An attitude is the property of an individual. My attitude is different from your attitude. On this premise, I assume that my attitude toward any given proposition is different from your attitude toward that proposition. If "how things are" is a matter of propositional attitude, how do you jump to the conclusion that there is such a thing as "how things are for us"?
Quoting Cavacava
I agree with you here, because this is the point I am arguing. What we refer to as a certainty, something which cannot be doubted, is something non-attitudinal. Whether there is anything which fulfills this condition is another question. However, if there is nothing, then what justifies the attitude of certitude? And if this attitude cannot be justified, then the attitude of uncertainty is the justified attitude.
You've shown there's a grammatical difference, in the same way there's a grammatical difference between
Nowhere did you show there's a difference in meaning.
Certainties are not undoubted facts.
First off, Not all certainties are facts. One can be certain of things that are not true.
But what is involved in doubting some proposition, if not for adopting a specific attitude towards it?
What? You think that when I say "I", there is no difference in meaning from when I say "it"? These two indicate the same subject to you, such that there is no difference of meaning between "I am certain" and "it is certain"?
If that's your argument then I see no point in discussing this with you.
I just took the definition from the OED. You can take that up with them, if you don't think they're making an adequate representation of usage. In my part of the world, that's exactly how "certainty" is most commonly used. Perhaps the usage is different over in your neck of the woods?
The difference in meaning between "I" and "it" was not at issue; the question was whether "certain" means something different in "I am certain" than it does in "We're every last one of us certain".
I noted the pragmatics issue, that "I am certain" might count as a report. I don't think we'd want to say that by being used in such a report "certain" gets a different meaning. What should we say about the difference between a report and, I guess, "an observation"?
An appeal to authority. Hm.
I have only a Shorter OED, but it lists five definitions. The one you appear to leap to is the third: "Not to be doubted; established as a truth or fact".
To others your re-wording might appear self-serving. Of course, I would never suggest such a thing.
We're not talking about the meaning of "certain". We are talking about the meaning of "certainty". "Certainty" means "it is certain" rather than "I am certain". The distinction between these two is a distinction of meaning, as "I" means something other than "it".
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I don't see how that's relevant. The issue is whether certainty is an attitude. The meaning of "certain" in "I am certain" is irrelevant, if the meaning of "certainty" is other than some form of "I am certain". Which it is.
As I said, it's the most common use around here. My OED has it as 1 a) "an undoubted fact", where b) is "a certain prospect (his return is a certainty)".
"Certain", on the other hand is defined as 1 a) "confident, convinced (certain that I put it here)", and b) "undisputable, known for sure (it is certain that he is guilty).
Why do you insist on denying this difference in usage, the split in usage expressed by the difference between 1 a) and 1 b) of "certain". Surely you are familiar with this distinction between "I am certain that..." and "it is certain that ...". Why not just go with where the evidence naturally leads us, rather than trying to pigeonhole things to fit some preconceived idea, which appears to be incorrect?
What's the point in doing philosophy in that way; where instead of changing your theory to fit the evidence, you deny the evidence which is inconsistent with your theory? It is only yourself that you are deceiving.
Propositional attitudes are reports using attitudinal verbs like believe, hope, is certain, in 'that' sentences. I tell you that I am certain or uncertain can you deny my report? Sure you can deny the "that" part of it but not the attitudinal part, no? How things are as they are, can't be known, Kant showed this, so then reports of this type have to be how they are for the reporter.
Yes, that's my point, the only certainty we can have is that we cannot be absolutely certain.
Suppose I am, as always on this forum, looking for my keys. You tell me they're in the kitchen. I look around a little and, not seeing them, ask you if you're sure. You might say, "I'm absolutely certain I saw them in the kitchen." By saying that, you express your certainty, as we've put it, but you also encourage me to have the same attitude toward the proposition that you saw my keys in the kitchen.
There may be some subtle differences here. It's most natural to answer "Are you sure?" with a report of your own degree of confidence (or certainty or certitude). If the question is "They're in the kitchen?" maybe you answer "They certainly are." (I'm having trouble coming up with natural occasions where I'd reach for "It is certain that ..." or "It is a certainty that ...") It's not clear yet that the intended force of such statements is different rather than just grammatically more natural or convenient.
But I can think of one difference, and I'm not sure how much of a difference it is. There are at least two different sorts of claims of confidence available: (1) the simple and exclusive report of your own level of confidence, in some cases explicitly recognizing that others do not share it, even if they have the same access to evidence that you do; (2) a claim that anyone (by which is meant any member of your epistemic community) who had the same access to evidence that you do would have the same degree of confidence.
It's my suspicion that (2) is actually the standard case, and that even when people say things that sound like (1), there's an implication that they have special knowledge, access to evidence others don't. If we're arguing about whether someone will be on time, I might express, somehow, confidence that he will, with the implication that I know him, I know his habits, his record of punctuality, that I know him better than you do, and, again by implication, if you knew everything I know, you'd be similarly confident he'll be on time.
So one the one hand, an expression of confidence might mean, you can take it from me, I'm in a position to know so trust me, you can rely on my being right about this. But it might also mean that if you were in my position, you'd feel the same. But there's one other complication: I ask that you recognize my process as reliable, and suggest that what I'm confident about, I should be confident about. The suggestion regarding you is similarly that, if you were in my position, if anyone were, the right attitude to hold would be the one I hold.
My point is that in the phrase "it is certain", "is certain" is not attitudinal. Is this not obvious to you?
You appear to have proceeded with faulty logic. You say, Kant has convinced me that how things are cannot be known. Therefore when people talk in a way in which they claim that how things are is known, they cannot actually mean that how things are is known. So, you conclude that what they really mean when they sat that how things are is known, is that how things are to them is known. In reality though, they really mean that how things are is known.
Do you see the problem? People are claiming that how things are is known. You say that it is impossible that how things are is known. So you conclude that they are not really claiming that how things are is known. But just because it is impossible that how things are can be known, this does not mean that it is impossible for people to claim that how things are is known. And despite your false conclusion, people go on claiming that how things are is known, though this itself might be a falsity.
No.
In the expression "It is certain", what does 'certain' add to the statement if not some attitudinal report, otherwise what's the utility of word 'certain', you could just say 'It is'.
I think your position is untenable. We are talking about certainty and uncertainty. How things are in themself can't be known, no objective viewpoint is possible. People generally talk about reality as they experience it, how it is for them, " sunrise is at 7 am tomorrow', they may be aware that the earth rotates so really the sun does not rise, but they typically don't talk that way because it is not the way they experience it. All experience is reported from someones point of view, we do not experience of anything as it is in itself, because such a view point does not exist.
You might say that "certain" is redundant here. But redundancy is useful to emphasize something to add strength to the statement. The utility of the word "certain" here is to emphasize that this is not an attitudinal report. In no way can it be interpreted as adding attitudinal report, as the intent in the usage is to emphasize that this is not an attitudinal report. Therefore the utility of the word is to emphasize that this report not be interpreted as an attitudinal report.
Quoting Cavacava
I agree that it is very possible that how things are cannot be known. However, some people don't agree with this, and it is those people who use "it is certain..." to express how things are. I think my position on this is very tenable, the OED bears me out. It is those people who are using "it is certain" in this way, whose position you think is untenable. You might try to convince them of this, and make them stop using "certain" in that way, but I think that would be a futile effort. It's like an atheist who sees people using the word "God", and thinks the theist position is untenable, and therefore they ought not use "God". I am just describing what is going on, people use "certain" in this way, like people use "God" in that way. If you think that the things referred to by these words is non-existent, then that's a different argument. It doesn't make my position, my argument that people use these words in that way, untenable.
Are you familiar with the method of Platonic dialectics?
Sometimes we have an idea of what a word ought to mean, how it ought to be used, and this preconceived notion clouds our apprehension of how the word is really used, what it really refers to. The Platonic method is to determine the nature of what the thing is which is referred to by the word, by examining usage, rather than accepting some preconceived notion of what the word ought to mean. So for example, in Plato's Theaetetus, they approach "knowledge" with the preconceived idea that knowledge must exclude falsity. However, in all the various ways that knowledge is described, none of them can exclude the possibility of falsity. Therefore it is demonstrated that the word "knowledge", in how it is commonly used, does not refer to something which excludes falsity. Knowledge, which is the thing referred to by the word "knowledge" does not really exclude falsity.
Now, we could argue that everyone misuses the word "knowledge" and they ought only use it when the possibility of falsity has been excluded, or we could allow that the preconceived idea that knowledge must exclude falsity is wrong, and start a new inquiry into what sort of thing knowledge really is, without that preconceived notion.
With respect to the topic of the op, uncertainty, if knowledge cannot exclude the possibility of falsity, then uncertainty rather than certainty is the essential, or integral part of knowledge.