Books for David Hume
Could you please recommend some good commentary books or theme books for David Hume ?
It would be better if you own / have read the books yourself, and include how they were ...etc.
Thank you
It would be better if you own / have read the books yourself, and include how they were ...etc.
Thank you
Comments (106)
And here's a little sideshow.
That's great resource links for David Hume studies. Thank you.
Thank you for the links. But do you have any links for people who are critical of Hume? I've only started reading him and I'm unimpressed. Were people in his day truly unaware of kinetic energy and the cause and effect of one billiard ball hitting another? Look at this quote:
“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connextion; [that is] any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that attends to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."
All of science is based on cause and effect. What am I missing here?
Hume was writing at a time shortly after Newton, when Newton and his theories had the status of the Beatles and their works - so Hume and the people for whom he was writing not only knew about Newton's mechanics but they were front of mind.
Hume's point was that people were mistaking a scientific theory that at base is simply a mathematical model for predicting future observations, for a metaphysical claim about the fundamental nature of things. The metaphysical claims, such as notions of 'cause', are interpretations of the theory of mechanics, not a part of it, and no end of confusion arises from confusing the two. Hume did his best to clarify the distinction, but human nature is incorrigible and people continued then, as they do now, to confuse metaphysics with physics.
But, he would ask - if you take a copy of Hume's treatise in hand, and ask the question: 'does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number? Experimental reasoning concerning....fact and existence'? - in fact, it does not. So Hume's book typifies the fundamental problem with the positivism it was to give rise to: it falls victim to it's own critique. Comparing it to the mythical uroboros, the snake that swallows itself, 'the hardest part', Stove would say 'is always the last bite'.
Thank you for your reply. It was partially helpful. Try as I might, I cannot think of billiard balls and cause and effect without thinking of them in terms of physics and not metaphysics.
And if the answer derived from metaphysics is different from the answer derived from physics, which do you think we should accept?
Thank you for the links. I've only just glanced at the first one but it seems very interesting and worthwhile. I understand Hume to be saying that causation may exist but causation cannot be observed. That claim is exactly the kind of idiocy that I find so appalling among certain philosophers. When Mike Trout hits a home run, the ball makes a dramatic change of direction and increases in speed. That causation is highly observable.
And it’s very easy to observe cause and effect relationships when doing experiments with electricity. If you turn a light switch on and the light comes on, Hume might reply that we are simply observing an association. But if I tell him I’m going to turn the light on and off to the time of a song he knows, he might be more inclined to agree that the switch is controlling the light. But if his skepticism in the cause and effect persists, I know of one way to persuade him. I would sever the electrical wire connecting the switch to the light bulb so that the switch no longer works. If he is willing to hold the wires together, the switch works again. To explain the power of electricity, he only needs to hold one wire in one hand and the other wire in the other hand. Now the current flows through his body, completes the circuit and the light bulb lights up once again. Cause and effect is observable through experiment.
That's funny!
We don't have to choose between them. They are different because they deal with different subject matter. Physics deals with predictions of future observations. Metaphysics deals with ontological claims.
We can accept neither, both or just one without contradiction. They cannot conflict.
However I would suggest that it is sensible to accept physics, as one cannot negotiate this world effectively without it. Whether to also accept metaphysical claims, and if so which ones, is much more individual.
That's an interesting claim, but I don't think it is one Hume would agree with it. Hume was interested in making predictions. He wrote:
"But were the power of energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the effect even without experience and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it, by mere dint of thought and reasoning."
We can know that a baseball hit on a certain launch angle at a threshhold velocity will go over the fence for a homerun. Hume seems to be denying the possibility of exactly this kind of prediction.
For the life of me, I cannot see why people respect Hume and his comments on cause and effect.
Even if we sidestep the problem of induction by taking a principle of uniformity of nature as axiomatic, Hume's quote above stands because, without experience of bats and balls, we would have no reason to suppose that a bat hitting a ball would culminate in the ball travelling a long way. Newton's mechanics, which is the essential backdrop for an appreciation of Hume, was founded on empirical observation.
Hume was not denying the possibility of making predictions. Rather he highlighted that (1) predictions are based on past experience and (2) no matter how large a volume of past experience we have, the prediction cannot be made with certainty because of the problem of induction.
Yes, Hume would doubt that. And it's ridiculous. There is no insurmountable problem with induction. Induction is the basis of science. One would think that with Newton's work in view that Hume would not make such silly mistakes.
Perhaps more importantly to our conversation, Hume is clearly discussing cause and effect with respect to making predictions. He's wrong in denying the possibility of predictions. And he's demonstrably wrong as science makes these predictions consistently.
Once again, I have to say that I have no idea why Hume has the respect of some philosophers. He doesn't deserve it.
I found this article online. This is exactly the kind of thing I'm looking for, but I would love to read an article critical of Hume's ridiculous attack on cause and effect.
http://articles.thephilosophyforum.com/the-argument-for-indirect-realism
didn’t have a mystical bone in his body. Thomas Nagel put him forward as an exemplar of ‘serene indifference to the spiritual’.
How fortunate for us then, that you have at last arrived at our forum to point them out to us.
Any discussion - including the ones here - that do not take the question of modality into account when discussing Hume's challenge to induction ought to be committed to the flames.
Incidentally, Kant is where you go after Hume; if you're looking for a first step in response to Hume, Kant - and the entirety of transcendental philosophy - is the best place to go.
When I read this I think "This is exactly the kind of boil that must be lanced!" Cause and effect has a logical necessity because it has a physical necessity. At a minimum- if logic doesn't apply to the physical world, then it is worthless. When Mike Trout swings the bat and hits a pitched ball, the ball changes direction and velocity. The bat coming into contact with the ball is the cause of that effect. If Hume wants something 'wordly' then someone needs to introduce him to the idea of a transfer of kinetic energy. Hume's worthless diatribe against physics in the name of metaphysics cannot be defended.
I haven't read enough of Kant to analyze him. I know that he said Hume caused him to awake from his dogmatic slumber, but I cannot tell you if Kant ever got on the right track.
So this article you have linked is less helpful. It simply accepts Hume's statements as if he were making sense. Here's a quote from your article:
This is, of course, nonsense. We know much more than just "the two always occur together." Taking the baseball example I've been using for the transfer of kinetic energy, we can experience this transfer in different ways. We can observe Mike Trout hit the baseball over the fence. We could also put our hand in the path of the bat as it is swinging. Of course, we suffer some broken bones but we will not have any misunderstanding of what caused the bones to break. It was obviously the transfer of kinetic energy from the bat to the hand. We are not limited to this "constant conjunction" Hume mentions. Philosophers are allowed to use more than one of our senses. We are allowed to think for ourselves. And I think David Hume is nothing but an anal fissure.
At best this is a confused statement, at worst a meaningless one. It is clear what logical necessity is. It is supremely unclear what 'physical necessity' is, or how it relates to either logic or cause and effect.
"Logical necessity" can have several meanings. It could mean that a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Or, it could relate to modal logic as "a transfer of kinetic energy will cause something" in every possible world. I do not use it in this second sense. Rather, a transfer of kinetic energy will always have an effect in our world as surely as the fact a valid conclusion follows from the premises.
And presumably you can present an argument for this assertion?
I don't need an argument. I use induction to make a valid inference. Induction can only be overturned by induction. You are welcome to attempt to prove me wrong. If you don't wish to take the assignment, I don't blame you. To attempt to do so would be a fool's errand and would overturn all of science and we should have to go back to living in caves.
It's also worth mentioning that causality in nature is supremely differential: one can modulate the effects of causes by all sorts of means - score one for empiricism. Were cause and effect to have the force of logical necessity, both science and nature would be much poorer for it. Those who think Hume stands against science know neither much of science nor Hume.
I'm tempted to give you two different answers here. The first goes like this:
I'm not willing to debate the validity of induction. Induction works. If it didn't, we would still be living in caves. If you think a particular induction is wrong. that's certainly understandable. All you must do is show by induction that a particular induction is wrong.
But since we are discussing philosophy, perhaps I should go with my second response:
I'm working to develop a livable epistemology. Virtue epistemology attempts to answer the Gettier problem but it isn't apt (meaning it's unwleldy and difficult to use on a daily basis). I'm sensitive to the charge that all human thinking should not be based on presuppositions because that makes all human thinking circular. My new epistemology is built on the concept of the testable hypothesis. The proposition "My senses are basically reliable" is a testable hypothesis and a good starting point for a livable epistemology. My sense of vision can be tested by my sense of touch, etc. The answer is yes, my senses are basically reliable. The idea that induction is basically reliable is also a testable hypothesis. Are all inductions going to be correct? No. But inductions can be used to test other inductions until we come to a satisfactory level of certainty or probability about truth. If one wishes to challenge a particular induction, they must do so using induction. Trying to use deduction to challenge induction is a category error.
Then you're not willing to debate Hume. Which is fine, so long as this is acknowledged.
Quoting Ron Cram
You have more in common with Hume than you might think, then. Like him, you seem to want to hew to a more anti-foundationalist way of thinking about the world. Hume often invokes incredulity (and a bizarre kind of anger) on account of his seeming radicality; which is unfortunate because Hume is a far more pragmatic, cautious philosopher than people give him credit for.
I'm guessing here, but using the baseball example I'm guessing you are talking about things like how wind might impact the ball hit by Mike Trout. Yes, that's true. The wind can make the ball go a longer or shorter distance and this is measurable. But it doesn't change the fact that the cause of the effect of the ball's change of direction and velocity is observable and well understood.
Hume disagreed with Newton on many things. But Newton was correct, not Hume. Let me give you a short quote from the paper "Hume's Attack on Newton's Philosophy":
"Thus, my claim is not that Newton did not figure importantly in Hume’s philosophy, but, instead, that Hume’s project is in many respects more hostile to Newton’s achievements – as available to well-informed eighteenth-century readers – than many recent interpreters have realized." http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5382/
Again, Newton was right. Hume was philosophically motivated and wrong.
Saying that Hume and I have the same attitude doesn't add much to the conversation. Our attitudes aren't important, correctness is. I do want to debate Hume's mistreatment of induction and his attack on Newton. Make no mistake, Newton stands for science.
But I'm also eager to learn why people still hold Hume in high regard when he is so obviously wrong and so obviously anti-science.
But Hume was not wrong. You've all but admitted that short of begging the question, you can't even address Hume's problem. And Newton's picture of the world is anything but 'right' in any nuanced sense of the term. His linear conception of cause and effect is incredibly artificial, and is scientifically useful within only very narrow parameters. Like I said, it takes a poor grasp of both science and Hume to make the conclusions you do.
I mean, we can try and hash together his argument for you, but in the end if that is what you really want then you'll have to read him yourself. He does a far better job of making his argument than any of us could. You'll find it in Book 1 of A Treatise of Human Nautre
Wow, that's neat.
I have read Hume, not everything he's written but enough for me to quote him in context and explain why Hume is wrong. If you think I've misunderstood Hume, you are welcome to try to set me straight.
I've also provided above a link to a paper - that I only recently found - that agrees that Hume is attacking Newton. If you don't understand my point, you might want to read the paper and see if his explanation of Hume's attack on Newton makes more sense to you.
I have no problem with an attack on conceptual idealism. I'm not a big fan of Plato. Again, let me provide you with one of the quotes from Hume that I find ridiculous:
"“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connextion; [that is] any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that attends to the outward senses."
Notice that Hume is not talking about a purely mental exercise. He is relying on his sense of vision. Further, he is denying the possibility to understand cause and effect such as is easily seen in one billiard ball striking another. This is clearly observed by anyone, even a child can understand that this is a transfer of kinetic energy. Even a child understands that the second ball moves because it was struck by the first ball. All of science is built on discovering causes and effects. Philosophers who accept Hume's thought here are still in the dark ages of philosophy and can never be philosophers of science.
Also, I'm confused by your comment that one cannot wring existence from logic. You may have heard about Descartes doing exactly that... cogito ergo sum. Augustine of Hippo said basically the same thing a thousand years before Descartes.
No, I have addressed Hume's problem repeatedly. Hume says that cause and effect cannot be observed or ascertained by any method. Hume writes that if we think we see cause and effect, we are mistaken - that what we see is really only two things that are associated in spatial and temporal conditions. Hume believes real cause and effect may exist but cannot be known.
I've been told that Hume was discussing the issue of cause and effect from the perspective of metaphysics and not physics. I've shown that claim to be false. I've been told Hume is only making the limited claim that the cause and effect cannot be learned by conceptual idealism (as if anyone claimed it could be determined by conceptual idealism). I've shown that claim to be false because Hume spoke of "looking" at billiard balls and saying that cause and effect cannot be determined by means used by scientists.
This entire conversation is almost surreal. It's like people cannot read Hume for what he is saying because they were previously told what he said and they can't get passed these previous ideas.
No one here has even attempted to show that Hume and Newton agree. Yet, it seems that everyone holds that belief and wants to pretend that Hume is an empiricist in the same way that Newton is. It isn't true and I cannot find any reason why so many people would hold such a clearly erroneous view.
As I said previously, if you are unable to address the question of modality, then you are unable to address Hume. That is just the case with your reading. To the flames it goes.
Quoting Ron Cram
I have heard about Descartes' famously fallacious argument, yes.
Please explain because it seems to me that Hume is talking of straight physics with no appeal to modal logic at all. Hume is saying that we cannot observe causation. I'm saying that's ridiculous. Of course, we can see it and we can point to it in many cases. Hume's view is contrary to Newton's law of cause and effect. If you think you can prove me wrong, then do so.
Here's what you wrote in your initial post.
You discuss modality, necessity, contingency and logic. It certainly looks to me like you are discussing modal logic. Since you are not discussing modal logic. Please elaborate. Please provide a quote from Hume where mentions modality or describes what you are referring to because I don't see any of that in the passage I quoted. I see a simple denial of being able to observe or ascertain the cause of any effect, a claim which is contrary to Newton and demonstrably false.
But please quote Hume discussing modality and causality and explain how you understand the passage.
"In contrast to Hume, Whitehead claims that we have many daily experiences in which we are directly aware of caused connection. He uses the famous example of the reflex action in which an electric light is suddenly turned on and a person's eyes blink. The person is directly aware that the flash caused the blink; a necessary relationship exists between the light and the blink. With this doctrine, Whitehead directly attacks Hume's influential theory of causation." - James Gould
I think you are reading into the text that which is not there. Notice the words "power or necessary connexion." Hume is describing straight physics. The power that Hume is denying in the billiard example is the transfer of kinetic force. The movement of the second ball is the infallible consequence of being struck by the first ball.
Are you also claiming that Alfred Lord Whitehead was too dense to understand Hume correctly?
" He believes that Hume has failed to distinguish adequately talents and virtues (148ff, 174ff), is mistaken in contending that only judgments or beliefs can properly be deemed unreasonable (150), and argues against libertarianism by somewhat dogmatically holding that every event has a cause (165ff)." http://humesociety.org/hs/issues/v27n2/steinberg/steinberg-v27n2.pdf
Here again is another philosopher who agrees that Hume is crazy to argue that cause and effect are unknowable.
I literally quoted Hume's exact words with some bolding. Like, the opposite of reading things into the text which are not there. On the other hand, Hume nowhere speaks of 'kinetic force', which is something that you've quite literally conjured out of thin air to put into Hume's mouth.
And yes, there are plenty of people who disagree with Hume, but appeals to authority are meaningless and about as straightforward a case of fallacious reasoning as can be.
I'm saying that you are adding meaning to the bolded words that Hume himself never intended. You are literally reading into the text that which is not there. Not only that, but you completely ignored the word 'power' which was not modified by 'necessary.' This destroys the meaning you want to impose on Hume's text.
My mention of 'kinetic energy' was never intended to be in Hume's mouth. Rather, i commented because I was shocked that he did not use or understand that term. Hume says we cannot see cause and effect in the billiard balls. I'm agreeing with Newton that we can see a transfer of kinetic energy from one billiard ball to the other. This is plainly observable. So, I am not reading into Hume as you complain. Rather, I'm shocked that he is so ignorant and that other philosophers have not pointed this out.
And the point isn't just that some people disagree with Hume. The point is that other people disagree with Hume in exactly the same way I do. You had accused me of not understanding Hume or science. Since Whitehead and these other philosophers agree with me, then you are accusing them of being philosophical and scientific dunces as well. It should be plain to you that is not true.
I had two purposes in starting this discussion. One was to learn of other philosophers who had criticized Hume regarding his attack on Newton's Law of Cause and Effect. This discussion has not helped me at all in that regard. It seems no one here has realized and tried to resolve this obvious conflict.
My other purpose was to learn why some people think Hume and and Newton agree on cause and effect when they so obviously do not. So far, I've gotten two different attempts to explain these variant views can be resolved. One is that Hume is writing in terms of metaphysics and not physics. That simply isn't true as I've shown. The second is your attempt to show that I don't understand Hume correctly because I don't see the modality in his argument. Even with the quoted text with the bolded words, I still can't read into the text what you see there. I think it is clear that you ignored the phrase 'power or' which shows that the term 'necessary connexion' is not really 'necessary' in the sense you are trying to impose on the text. If it was, then Hume would have said 'necessary power'. I can't help but think that smart people must have some other way of misunderstanding Hume so they can reasonably think he agrees with Newton. So, my second purpose also seems rather unfulfilled.
Hume's text stands on its own. That your two stated purposes are (1) affirming and pandering to your own preconceived view of Hume ('he was wrong'), along with (2) adressing an issue he barely raised - his relationship with Newton - speaks more to your own projections than it does to Hume's project. When your argument hinges upon the lunatic sophistry of 'necessary is not really necessary', then I can only leave you to your own devices. I wish you luck.
I don't get Ron Cram's concerns. Hume is simply stating that certainty can never be gained from matters of fact. Cause and effect, is just a habit we have to get by in the world. We see something in constant conjunction and tend to use this to conclude that they will always be conjoined. However, we are using past experiences to justify this connection, something we cannot justify without using past experience itself (i.e. circular reasoning). You are using the very method of induction to prove induction. Thus cause and effect (and all synthetic reasoning) can never be truly justified with any certainty. Make all the laws of physics you want, it can never be 100% certain. This, however, is built into the model of science. Scientific "facts" may seem eternal, but new evidence at a future point can change these "facts". Thus, why science is based on strong theories that support the current evidence.
It seems to me that you understand Hume's point of view correctly, but don't see that he is demonstrably wrong. Hume's POV is contrary to Newton's Law of Cause and Effect. Cause and effect can be known. It can be observed and it can experienced through other senses as well. I don't know if you have read the entire discussion here or not. One of the examples I gave was that the flow of electricity and interrupting that flow by turning the switch on and off is a cause for the light bulb going on and off. One way to know this is to cut and expose the wire, hold both exposed wires and then feel the flow of electricity go through your body as the light bulb lights up.
Alternatively, you can also observe the transfer of kinetic energy when one billiard ball strikes another billiard ball and causes it to move. Hume seems to be completely ignorant of the existence of kinetic energy. But this is an observation any child can make once the existence of kinetic energy is understood.
There is no circular reasoning involved.
I changed the wording in my comment for clarification, but my point stands.
I think you are fighting imagined arguments. Hume is not saying that observation itself is suspect, but rather that the ground for which cause-and-effect takes place- that is to say induction, has no certainty to it because induction is using its own logic to justify itself. Thus, he is not doubting that you have senses and impressions and ideas and can extrapolate from experience using these cognitive tools some sort of understanding of how the world works, but rather, is doubting that the basis for this understanding has any justification outside human habit. In other words, he is looking for a justification of certainty between cause and effect, and he sees that it is lacking DESPITE the fact that indeed every time we observe certain "constant conjunctions" it does appear to us to be some sort of immutable law of cause-and-effect going on.
I meant to include @StreetlightX too.
I understand what Hume is saying. I understand that he is not denying the existence of causes and effects. Hume is denying that they are observable or ascertainable in any way. I'm just pointing out that he's wrong. Kinetic energy is well understood and the transfer of kinetic energy can be observed. Hume's billiard ball example is a perfect example of observing cause and effect even though Hume claims he cannot see it. I also gave you the example of electricity flowing through your body as a way to determine cause and effect. Did you read that? Care to respond?
Hume's argument is a frontal attack on Newton's Law of Cause and Effect which states that causes and effects are observable and knowable. Indeed, if they were not observable and knowable, science would have no foundation.
Quoting Ron Cram
:rofl:
Perhaps you would like to quote some passage of Hume where he writes that it is possible to observe or know causes and effects? If you cannot do that, I will continue to hold my opinion which comes from the plain reading of Hume.
You do realize, I hope, that if Hume was correct then Newton's Laws of Motion would be completely unwarranted. His Laws of Motion describe forces, causes and effects which Hume denies is possible to know.
By this time in history, philosophers should have rejected Hume. I believe the fact Hume is held in high esteem by philosophers to be the biggest cause of scientists' dislike of philosophers.
This is the opposite of what he said. He WAS denying whether the ground for cause-and-effect was certain, due to the inability of induction to prove itself outside of circular reasoning.
Quoting Ron Cram
No, that is not what he is saying. As I said earlier, "Thus, he is not doubting that you have senses and impressions and ideas and can extrapolate from experience using these cognitive tools some sort of understanding of how the world works, but rather, is doubting that the basis for this understanding has any justification outside human habit. In other words, he is looking for a justification of certainty between cause and effect, and he sees that it is lacking DESPITE the fact that indeed every time we observe certain "constant conjunctions" it does appear to us to be some sort of immutable law of cause-and-effect going on"
Quoting Ron Cram
Yes, I did, and you are completely missing Hume's point. See my responses above.
Quoting Ron Cram
Newton was doing science as it was practiced in his time. Hume is doing philosophy. Newton is simply describing the "habits of thoughts" of what appears to be cause and effect relationship. Hume is trying to explain the ground for cause and effect. These are two different investigations.
I will include @StreetlightX again.
And each thinks Hume has a killer point against their opponent, and a ridiculous folly against themselves.
I don't see how this really diminishes the point I was making between Newton and Hume. Newton was answering questions about mathematical concepts as applied to observations. Hume was discussing the foundation of principles like cause-and-effect and the problem of induction. If anything Hume was mainly critical of some of the more superstitious part of his writings (related to religion mostly). It also seems to me that Hume's skepticism lead him to be an anti-realist when it came to things like "forces", "energy" and the like. He believed strongly that there were habits of thought that humans viewed the world with, and this seemed to be the source of regularities. At least in this interpretation, we see a proto-Kantianism (transcendental philosophy) coming through.
Sure, and I just explicated that in my last post. However, I did not really see Ron Cram making any of these points. Rather, I just saw mixed up notions with regard to Hume's analysis of the foundation of cause-and-effect.
Quoting ?????????????
I don't know what you mean here by "internalise the necessity" but doesn't make "transcendental"? He does seem to indicate that cause and effect are indeed "custom" and "in us" rather than "out there" which opens the door for transcendental idealism. As far as having a full-blown Kantian version of this, he does not seem to provide that detailed an explanation. In other words, time/space/causality and categories of cognitively structured world are not present in his philosophy. He is more concerned, it seems, with establishing a skepticism of whether these laws are somehow "out there".
I appreciate that you are making an attempt to explain your thinking. It would improve your responses greatly if you could actually quote from Hume to support your point of view, as I have done.
I'm not here criticizing Hume's attack on induction, which has more merit than his attack on cause and effect and deserves a more detailed and nuanced response. I'm just criticizing Hume's attack on Newton's Law of Cause and Effect and his Laws of Motion.
Hume writes:
“There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy or necessary connexion, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall, therefore, endeavor in this section to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.”
First of all, I disagree with Hume calling this 'metaphysics.' Even during the days of Aristotle, concepts of power, force and energy relate to physics and not metaphysics. Hume refers to 'necessary connexion' because it is impossible to establish cause and effect without a connexion between the two actions or events. This is what makes it necessary.
Hume again writes:
“When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operations of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; [that is] any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that attends to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion."
Let me state it again. Hume is wrong here. We are able "in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion... that binds the effect to the cause." Hume's statement is demonstrably false. Once a person has learned the nature and properties of kinetic energy and how the transfer of kinetic energy works, then one can recognize a new instance of that power at work even though they have never seen it in that setting before. A child can learn about the transfer of kinetic energy in school and will immediately recognize that cause and effect on the billiard table. Similarly, if someone has never seen electricity before, with a proper experiment he can immediately grasp that electricity is the cause of the light bulb coming on.
Our understanding of kinetic energy and electricity has nothing to do with human habit. It has to do with understanding how these forces work, the results they cause and the ability to observe this connection.
Hume does not argue that our powers of observation are so poor and untrustworthy that we cannot make observations that are true and reliable. When Hume argues against induction, he is arguing against our ability to infallibly infer the future or past based on what we observe. Hume's attack on cause and effect does not depend on his attack on induction. Rather, Hume's attack on induction depends on his attack on cause and effect.
Hume writes:
“All reasonings on matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses." Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section iv point 22.
By 'reasonings' Hume includes inferences or inductions. So, clearly, his attack on induction depends on his attack on cause and effect, not the other way around as you suppose.
Hume's point in the 'billiard ball' example is that the cause (kinetic energy) is not actually observed, and he concludes that causation cannot be directly experienced at all. Unfortunately he focusses too much on the visual mode of perception, which is a common failing among philosophers.. 'Kinetic energy', on Hume's view, thus cannot be anything more than a merely inferential hypothesis.
The argument against this claim is that we can directly feel the force of our own bodies acting on objects and the force of objects acting on us. It is on the basis of our own experience as causal agents that we are able to conceive of the very idea of force or energy in the first place. Whitehead makes this very point in his distinction between the modes of experience: 'presentational immediacy' and 'causal efficacy'; if I remember correctly. I read somewhere Searle also making this point against Hume; but I can't remember where I read it.
When billiard ball A strikes billiard ball B, must (some of) A's kinetic energy be transferred to B?
Yes. We can see the stationary ball move and we can hear the energy transfer. Also, if you observe a baseball bat striking a softball in a slow motion video, you can observe that transfer of energy also. The observation of transfer of kinetic energy is well established. And it must happen.
If the ball is moving, then you are observing its kinetic energy. Evidently, this is the point Hume doesn't understand. I agree with your second paragraph.
When did you observe this? How did you observe this?
The usual argument here is that we presume nature to be uniform, but we cannot possibly prove that. Thus laws such as those you refer to have everything to do with human habit and custom, just as Hume claims.
This is metaphysics because we are discussing the nature of forces- what it "is". It is not simply predictions, experimentation, observation, modelling phenomena, and data collection of the physical universe (things that science does).
Quoting Ron Cram
Again here, Hume is not doubting the science of kinetic energy that we observe. He is doubting that we have any basis for how observation comes about in the first place, as you can only use past observations to justify the future which is using inductive reasoning itself to justify itself. There is no basis for why our observations should hold consistently true each new instance except by custom. Now, you may disagree with his radical empiricism, but what you must understand is Hume is discussing the epistemology of inductive reasoning (which leads to the custom of cause-and-effect), not the findings that one may have from the reasoning (that one thing is caused by another).
Your debate about causation is unwittingly just a debate about realism (laws of nature real and "out there") vs. idealism (laws of nature are in our heads).
I think if Hume was wrong in the way that Ron Cram is claiming, then nobody would remember his books. What he's casting doubt on is based on his radical empiricism i.e. we can observe that an effect is preceded by a cause, but we never actually perceive something called 'a cause'. What we perceive are invariant conjunctions of events, things that always happen in a certain sequence. But they're not bound by force of logical necessity, being of the same nature as inductive observation; there's no reason why the ball A might not simply stay still when struck by ball B instead of careening away on some occasion. It's just that we never observe that happening, so we presume it won't ever happen; but again there's no logical reason why it can't happen.
That is why Russell remarked in his chapter on Hume that Hume's scepticism seems to challenge the very grounds of scientific prediction. But it's the also true that Kant more than adequately dealt with Hume's scepticism, in fact it was Hume's treatment of causality that famously 'awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers'.
Excellent restatement of the point I was trying to make :). Indeed, great point about not perceiving something called "a cause".
Quoting Wayfarer
I think there is more nascent Kant than people think in Hume. At certain points Hume even refers to customs and habits as instinctual, which very much points to an innate synthetic a priori categorization. I don't know why that connection isn't made much as if they are opposed to each other.
Do you have any specific quotes on Hume's view of time and space? I think the point is more subtle than you suggest. Impressions are from sense data in Hume's view and these seem to come together into habits and customs.. shorthand for internal categories, in my opinion. I don't know how empirical Hume was when he constantly reiterates that it is simply custom and not an actual reasoning "out there".
Also, Kant views time and space as a priori synthetic which was his own spin on it. Hume did not use that vocabulary, but again, I can see the nascent idea there in the idea of customs and habits.
Hume is considered empiricist basically because of his notion of impressions being from sense data. He seems to build our understanding up through these impressions into some synthetic learning process that leads to more abstract ideas. However, I think there is other times when he does seem to invoke an idea that habits are instinctual and it is not derived purely from synthetic knowledge. Or at least, there is something beyond just experience going on in the mind.
IN actual fact in that article, Kant also considers the early critics of Hume, some of whom echo exactly Ron Cram's argument. It's very similar to Johnson's argument against Berkeley, kicking a stone and saying 'I refute him thus'. The common-sense criticism of Hume simply says, 'common sense tells us that A causes B, and that's all there is to it.' Whereas, Kant really does understand what Hume has spotted, and then actually answers that. I won't try and abstract or summarise it, as it's virtually a semester's work to even read it.
Good points.
Hume stated: "At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind; that there is a certain step taken; a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect, and I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other: I know, in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension; and it is incumbent on those to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact."
To me that is the question (in a nutshell, maybe not literally) to which Kant replied, but also leaving Hume open to the possibilities that Kant conceives.
It makes no sense to me to think that we see the kinetic energy; we see the ball moving is all.
It is a presumption if one has limited evidence. Most people understand that proof is not absolute. Even in capital criminal cases, the prosecutor doesn't have to prove absolutely that the defendant is guilty. All that is required is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have that level of proof in this case. When a solid object is moving and hits another solid object, kinetic energy will be transferred. There is no reasonable basis from which to doubt that proposition.
This is not a purely mental exercise nor is it limited to our vision. We can feel the transfer of kinetic energy when our bodies are hit or when we hit a solid object. In another example I've used here, one can feel electricity move through his body and light the light bulb. The question of knowing cause and effect is not in doubt. And knowing that it will always happen that way is also not in doubt.
Hume's statement that our opinion here is based on habit and custom is simply false. We are talking about a situation in which we know the nature and properties of solid objects. If you want to know the nature of solid objects, you talk to a condensed matter physicist. It is not possible for a solid object of classical size to pass through a solid object of classical size. The kinetic energy of the first object MUST BE transferred to the second. There is no reasonable doubt.
This is an interesting thought. Clearly, I am a realist. I've never considered Hume's position on this point. Is he considered an idealist?
Doubting "how our observations come about" is "doubting the science of kinetic energy." We are not talking about past observations or future observations. Those topics have to do with induction. As I have already demonstrated, Hume's attack on induction depends upon his attack on the law of cause and effect, not the reverse. The law of cause and effect can be shown in one demonstration.
If you want to know the nature and properties of solid objects, you don't ask a speculative metaphysician - which is exactly what Hume is in this argument. It is ironic to me that Hume has become exactly what he despises.
If you want to know the nature and properties of solid objects, you ask a condensed matter physicist. They can explain to you why classically sized solid objects cannot pass through classically sized solid objects and why kinetic energy from the first billiard ball will always be transferred to the second billiard ball.
Why would anyone believe Hume over Newton on this topic? Why would someone believe Hume over a modern condensed matter physicist?
"This essay consists of five sections in addition to this introduction. First, I discuss Hume’s attitude toward Newton. Newton claims that natural philosophy should be the foundation for other sciences, while in the ‘Introduction’ to the Treatise Hume asserts the supremacy of the ‘science of man’. For Hume the human sciences can attain the high epistemic status of ‘proof’, while much of the physical sciences must do with lower forms of ‘probability’. Furthermore, Hume’s ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ do not replicate Newton’s fourth Rule; this opens a gap between the ontologies and methodologies of Newton and Hume. Moreover, Hume’s account of causation is designed to undercut the reductionist bias of natural philosophy. According to Hume the parts of natural sciences that go beyond common life can be evaluated from the point of view of the science of man. I end with remarks on the philosophic origins and significance of Hume’s attack on Newton’s natural philosophy."
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/5382/
I may word things a little differently than Schliesser, but I'm not the first to notice Hume's attack on Newton.
When you see a moving billiard ball, you are looking at its kinetic energy. When you see a stationary billiard ball, you are looking at its inertial energy.
"The full extent of Hume’s indebtedness to pre-Newtonian mechanical philosophy becomes evident once we realize that he accepts the mechanists’ view of what counts as a proper explanation. Hume writes about the nature of Newton’s achievements: ‘While Newton seemed to draw off the veil from some of the mysteries of nature, he shewed at the same time the imperfections of the mechanical philosophy; and thereby restored her ultimate secrets to that obscurity, in which they ever did and ever will remain’ (emphasis added). Hume treats Newton’s refutation of the mechanical philosophy not as a decisive advance in knowledge but, instead, as decisive evidence for the claim that nature will remain unknowable in principle. The way to make sense of Hume’s remark is to see that it reveals that he implicitly accepts the mechanists’ insistence that theirs was the only program that offered the possibility of intelligible explanation, even if it only offered hope of post-facto rational reconstruction."
"Hume’s anti-reductionism is made evident by the important assumption in his account of causation that all matters of fact are, in an important sense, alike. In the Treatise, he writes, ‘there is but one kind of necessity, as there is but one kind of cause, and that the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature.’ Moreover, ‘Passions are connected with their objects and with one another; no less than external bodies are connected together. The same relation, then, of cause and effect, which belongs to one, must be common to all of them.’ Hume thinks that we apply the same type of inference about matters of fact, and that all facts have the same causal structure. In causal explanations there is, thus, no reason to privilege the motion of small bodies or any ‘lower level’ causes. Further evidence for his anti-reductionism comes from Hume’s eight ‘rules by which to judge of causes and effects’ because it is ‘possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other.’ Thus, the relative neglect by scholars of Hume’s historical, economic, and political works is odd because these should reveal as much about his views on causation as do those on more ‘philosophic’ topics."
As you read Schliesser quoting Hume, are you not struck with the absurdity of Hume's comments?
He is saying there is only one kind of cause, so if you are looking at a cause of a moral necessity it is exactly the same as a cause of a physical necessity. Really?
Again, his "custom or habit" belies a sort of a priori (cognitive feat) going on here:
[hide] From: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/
Section 4, part 1 of the Enquiry distinguishes (as we have seen) between reasoning concerning relations of ideas and reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence. Demonstrative reasoning (concerning relations of ideas) cannot establish the supposition in question, “since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change, and that an object, seemingly like those which we have experienced, may be attended with different or contrary effects” (EHU 4.18; SBN 35). Moreover, reasoning concerning matters of fact and existence cannot establish it either, since such reasoning is always founded on the relation of cause and effect, the very relation we are now attempting to found in reasoning (EHU 4.19; SBN 35–36): “We have said, that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition, that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the proof of this last proposition by probable arguments, or arguments regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question.”[6]
Although Hume has now shown that there is no foundation for the supposition that nature is sufficiently uniform in reasoning or the understanding, he goes on, in the following section 5 of the Enquiry (“Skeptical Solution of these Doubts”), to insist that we are nonetheless always determined to proceed in accordance with this supposition. There is a natural basis or “principle” for all our arguments from experience, even if there is no ultimate foundation in reasoning (EHU 5.4–5; SBN 42–43):
And though [one] should be convinced, that his understanding has no part in the operation, he would nonetheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle, which determines him to form such a conclusion. This principle is CUSTOM or HABIT. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word, we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature, which is universally acknowledged, and which is well known by its effects.[7][/hide]
However, as we both agree Kant and Hume are "internal" about causation as seen here:
[hide]https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/:
Kant agrees with Hume that neither the relation of cause and effect nor the idea of necessary connection is given in our sensory perceptions; both, in an important sense, are contributed by our mind. For Kant, however, the concepts of both causality and necessity arise from precisely the operations of our understanding—and, indeed, they arise entirely a priori as pure concepts or categories of the understanding. It is in precisely this way that Kant thinks that he has an answer to Hume's skeptical problem of induction: the problem, in Kant's terms, of grounding the transition from merely “comparative” to “strict universality” (A91–92/B123–124). Thus in § 29 of the Prolegomena, as we have seen, Kant begins from a merely subjective “empirical rule” of constant conjunction or association among our perceptions (of heat following illumination by the sun), which is then transformed into a “necessary and universally valid law” by adding the a priori concept of cause.[/hide]
However, Kant goes on to build a comprehensive cognitive-based metaphysics (Transcendental Idealism) that proves necessity that is derived from forms of intuition/categories of understanding combining with sense experience:
[quote=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-hume-causality/]The “formal [or “general”] conditions of experience” include the forms of intuition (space and time), together with all the categories and principles of the understanding. The material conditions of experience include that which is given to us, through sensation, in perception. Kant is thus describing a three-stage procedure, in which we begin with the formal a priori conditions of the possibility of experience in general, perceive various actual events and processes by means of sensation, and then assemble these events and processes together—via necessary connections—by means of the general conditions of the possibility of experience with which we began.[/quote]
Indeed, Hume would never seem to idealize time/space/causality as a priori, but my point was that he is opening the door by pointing out our internal/psychological tendency for habit and custom. There is a hint of a priori truth, but he would never take it that far. He only went as far as skepticism and not an acknowledgement of synthetic a priori truths or conditions.
It's tied together- the point being that there is no principle behind cause-and-effect. Yes, we will probably always think in terms of cause-and-effect, but the principle cannot explain itself (though Kant's answer was synthetic a priori truths).
Quoting Ron Cram
Ugh, you are showing a lot of ignorance here on what metaphysics and epistemology are trying to investigate. It is the BASIS for which we know things, not the actual empirical observations themselves. You must go a step BEYOND the mere observations for what they are discussing. Here look up anything about metaphysics and epistemology: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaphysics/, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/, https://www.iep.utm.edu/epistemo/. By not questioning the basis for our own reasoning, you are simply relying on scientism. Science itself has its foundations, even if scientists don't know that they are participating in this. Usually, scientists that deal in more abstract matters do in fact know a bit of philosophy of science and epistemology (though probably some better than others).
Quoting Ron Cram
Hume didn't presume to be a physicist. He was investigating the nature of human understanding.
I admire your tenacity, but there's still an apples-and-oranges problem here.
There's a well-known video of Feynman trying to explain how magnets work:
What's notable here is the idea that explanations only make sense within a given framework. What's more, explanations you give within a framework don't justify that framework. You can point to them as contributing to the coherence of the framework, but how far that gets you is debatable...
You can also point to them as instances of the framework's not yet having been disconfirmed (or "falsified"). And what you make of that -- further non-disconfirmation -- comes down to what Hume is talking about, the framework all frameworks slot into, expectations that nature is uniform and that induction will work. Even if you did want to argue that the success of some bit of mechanics as an explanation contributes to confirming this overarching framework, you'd immediately be engaged in circular reasoning. Unless, Hume allows, there's an alternative deductive justification for accepting induction.
That's nonsense to me I'm afraid. I understand the idea of kinetic energy and yet I don't see it when I look at a moving object. Do you think someone prior to understanding the notion of kinetic energy would see kinetic energy when they looked at moving objects? Of course you can say something like what they are really seeing is kinetic energy, but that would be an inferential claim about, not a phenomenological description of, what they are seeing.
I read someone in the previous posts said that Hume opposed to Newtonian Science? Is that justified comment? Because I also read from a book that Hume's whole purpose of writing the Treatise was studying and finding about human nature using Newtonian Scientific methods.
No. It's just people trying to put words in Hume's mouth that he never spoke or wrote.
If Hume had been arguing against Newton, he would have been written off as a loony, rather than being as respected as he was in his time. Newton had godlike status in 18th century Britain and nobody could have publicly said anything against his physical theories without being ridiculed.
Hmmm. That argument has a funny ring to it in talking about Hume, since many people feel there's another god Hume was interested in arguing against, only he was pretty careful what he said about it while he lived.
No, I don't. But once someone understands kinetic energy, they must see it when they see a moving billiard ball. If they don't see it, they don't understand kinetic energy. It's that simple.
Yes, it's justified. Hume wrote some complimentary things about Newton, but he didn't really understand Newton's science and so he wrote things that were previously refuted by Newton but Hume didn't know it. Read the philosophy paper by Schliesser here. I've quoted several paragraphs from the paper that discuss Hume's philosophical opposition to Newton.
Also, this article on Hume and Newton. This article mentions that Hume's writings show evidence he had read Berkeley's criticism of Newton, but there's little evidence Hume really understood Principia:
"Barfoot is correct to suggest that Hume's treatment of mathematics shows debts to Berkeley's criticism of Newton. There is less evidence for Barfoot's claim that Hume would have had working knowledge of the most technical parts of the Principia."
I also recommend this paper. The abstract begins: "In this paper, I analyze Hume's missing shade of blue example from a Newtonian point of view. I argue that an analysis of the missing shade of blue example reveals considerable ignorance of Newton's achievements in optics."
Schliesser also wrote his dissertation on Hume and his "lack of knowledge" about Newton's accomplishments.
Hume was not respected in his time. His books didn't sell well and the people who understood Hume well, such as Thomas Reid, criticized him sharply. Kant also wrote against Hume. Kant's biggest problem is that he also was not a good student of Newton and he gave Hume too much credit. Hume's fame didn't really show up until after he died.
Well, all I can say is that your hypothesis is falsified: I understand kinetic energy and yet I certainly don't see it when I watch moving billiard balls (and I've played plenty of snooker and eight ball in pubs and even won a competition, so I know what I'm talking about).
I would say instead that the idea of the energy of the balls is conveyed in the speed of their movement and the sound of their striking one another, and is not directly seen at all but felt in the body. In other words it is misleading to speak of it as a visual phenomenon when it is equally an auditory phenomenon and it consists mostly in an associative somatic response.
Do you see kinetic energy when you watch a film of moving billiard balls? Of course we can have just the same response as we do in 'real' situations, which shows that 'seeing kinetic energy' is not really seeing kinetic energy at all, but consists in an associative somatic response coupled with a conceptually based inference. If you think you do see kinetic energy when watching a film you are obviously mistaken because there is no really no kinetic energy (of the kind and intensity that you think you are perceiving, at least) present in the phenomenon you are perceiving.
So what is the actual Newtonian Method that Hume have adopted to study human nature?
How could principles of natural science be applied for study of mental workings of human nature?
Are there some examples of the actual methods being applied in the discourse of the Treatise and Enquiries?
Sorry but the link wouldn't let me download the document because my ipad had no MS Word.
They cannot. Natural science is possible only because nature always repeats itself. If the same conditions apply, nature will do exactly the same thing. The mental workings of humans are not so. In the exact situation different humans will respond differently. In fact, in the same situation even the same human will react different if he is in a different mood.
The only way to conclude that humans would all react in the same way would be if you believed in determinism and that humans do not have, at the very least, a limited free will. But this is an idea that is testable with a simple thought experiment. If you are convicted of a crime and locked in prison, would you feel like your will has been limited? Of course, the answer is yes. You recognize that you have lost something important to you - your freedom.
Hume and Adam Smith should probably be credited as the founder of psychology, but it is wrong to think of this discipline as a natural science. Many fields, political science, psychology, sociology, are given a status as a "science" but this is only through a misunderstanding of what science actually is or an honorary title bestowed because the field attempts a systematic and thorough examination of the data. Only the hard sciences are science. The soft sciences are just studies of human behavior.
Can you read PDFs? This link is to Schliesser's dissertation.
I said "if" someone understands kinetic energy, they will see it when they see billiard balls moving.
This is proof you do not understand kinetic energy.
Explain your understanding of kinetic energy so that I can see how it differs from mine.
The kinetic energy of an object is the energy that it possesses due to its motion. This is rather standard definition. If you see an object in motion, you can see that it has kinetic energy. When you see that object strike another object, it slows down or stops and the other object (if its inertial energy is small enough to be overcome by the transfer of kinetic energy) will begin to move.
Yes, I was able to download and view the PDF link. It seems a wonderful book. Thank you.
I can see your point, and fully agree with you about the Newtonian methods and Humean approach.
It woke me up from a slumber in that regard in Hume studies. Thanks.
What does the energy look like?
Your welcome.
It looks like a body in motion. If you see a body in motion, then you are looking at a body that has kinetic energy. it really is that simple.
To quote Newton: "... it is plain that the absolute forces of those bodies are as the bodies themselves." Page 153 of the Principia
Well That is exactly my understanding of kinetic energy; which means that according to you I do understand it. And yet I do not experience "seeing kinetic energy". How do you explain that? Perhaps all humans are not the same; in which case, even if you do experience seeing kinetic energy, it would not necessarily that I would experience the same.
Quoting Ron Cram
You're are equivocating; 'looking at a body that has kinetic energy' is not the same as 'looking at kinetic energy'; whatever that could even mean.
No, I'm not equivocating. Movement of a body is kinetic energy. When you look at a body that is moving, then you are seeing a body with kinetic energy. Can you see movement? If so, then you can see kinetic energy. See the Newton quote I provided.
Let's look at it a couple of different ways. Is the speed of the moving body accelerating? Then its kinetic energy is increasing. You can literally observe the kinetic energy increasing. Is the speed of the moving body slowing? Then the kinetic energy is dissipating. You can literally watch the kinetic energy increase, decrease, start, stop and transfer to another body. This is all perfectly well understood by anyone who understands kinetic energy.
Why is this hard for you? Perhaps you are confusing observing kinetic energy with measuring kinetic energy. Measuring kinetic energy is a different task. But observing the presence of kinetic energy or change in the kinetic energy or the transfer of kinetic energy is very easy with the unaided eye.
I'm trying to determine exactly what portion of my explanation you are having trouble with. What claim are you denying?
Let's take the Mike Trout home run example I used early on. When a pitcher throws the ball, do you agree that the ball has kinetic energy? Do you agree that you can observe the fact the ball has kinetic energy without the need of special instruments? When Mike Trout hits the ball, the ball changes directions and increases in velocity. We may not be able to see the increase in velocity with the naked eye, but we can certainly see the change in direction, correct? And we have radar guns that will confirm the increase in velocity. Do you doubt that the contact of Mike's bat with the ball is the cause of the change of direction and velocity? And do you agree that our observation of the bat hitting the ball is confirmed by the sound of the bat hitting the ball? Where exactly are you having trouble?
Perhaps this science paper explaining how momentum from the bat transfers kinetic energy to the ball would be helpful to you.