Are some people better than others?
Humans compare in many ways. For example, some people are more talented, fit, attractive, intelligent, wealthy, motivated etc. Other people have none of these traits. The question is: Are some people better than others? The answer is simple (isn't it?): People with more good traits are better than those with more bad traits. Fully abled people are better than the severely disabled. Mentally ill people have less value than normal people. Healthy people are better than sick. Don't you agree?
There are some nasty elements throughout history in comparing humans. Eugenicists and social Darwinists thought that some people are better than others and it's the duty of society to weed out the 'junk humans' to promote a healthy human society. Though you don't have to be a eugenicist to think that some people have more worth than others, you could also be a racist or a misogynist.
On the other hand, viewing people better than other is frowned upon in our current society. Nobody wants to offend anyone. Seeing everyone as having equal worth is politically correct thing to do, but is it correct?
There are some nasty elements throughout history in comparing humans. Eugenicists and social Darwinists thought that some people are better than others and it's the duty of society to weed out the 'junk humans' to promote a healthy human society. Though you don't have to be a eugenicist to think that some people have more worth than others, you could also be a racist or a misogynist.
On the other hand, viewing people better than other is frowned upon in our current society. Nobody wants to offend anyone. Seeing everyone as having equal worth is politically correct thing to do, but is it correct?
Comments (102)
Secondly, the argument equates moral value with other kinds of worth, e.g. wealth and intelligence. A separate argument would be needed to show that these two kinds of value are actually the same. I lose to you in every comparison of intelligence etc. And I am of exactly equal worth and human value. We need to see how those statements are inconsistent, if they are.
Yes, the answer is simple. ( :gasp: )
Some people are better than others in certain respects. E.g. Usain Bolt is better than me at sprinting the 100 metres.
As I read it, your question seems to move from what is the case to what ought to be the case.
Jump up and down.
If you're thinking, "No, why should I?", then you should be able to relate.
It means greater or superior, as you and I both know.
You need to decide whether you want to distinguish "personhood" from "specific traits of a person". All persons, supposedly, are sacred beings of equal value regardless of whether they are healthy, sick, smart, stupid, sane, crazy, honest, thieving liars, and so forth. On the other hand, most of us are not going to waste too much time on the sacred worth of the person who is in the process of stealing our car after beating us up. Shoot the son of a bitch, sacred worth or not!
Parents value their children as persons of sacred worth, even if the child is affected by disabilities. People continue to love their partners who develop severe mental illness. Friends stand by the murderer.
Christians are supposed to differentiate the sin from the sinner. (Hate the sin, love the sinner.) You might not be Christian, but the distinction is still there to be accepted or rejected. Without an interpersonal connection or relationship, most of us are probably more or less inclined to reject the distinction. People who behave like shit ARE shit. Bad acts are performed repeatedly by people who are bad. You can get away with one bad act, maybe, but 5 bad acts in a row and you are scum, filth, and dirt.
So what's your decision, Purple Pond? Good people do bad shit, or only bad people do bad shit. And what if bad people do something good? Then what.
We all come into the world in basically the same way.
We all have the same basic needs to live.
We are all going to end up dead.
The day one of these changes I will say yes, some people are better than others. Human beings are all equal, no matter what they look like, what their health is, how intellectual or not they are.
But if we talk about the people as an individuals with sets of traits, as separate entities then I would have to answer that some are different from others.
But who is to say exactly what is better than something else.
Would it be better or worse for a kid to have a sick father or no father?
Would it be better for a couple who have tried for years to have children, to have a disabled son or no son at all?
Which would be the better football team, the ones that did not really have to exert themselves to win a world cup or a team of special needs children winning a match against another equal group?
Better can be a cruel word.
And in the end we all need to take a crap, and you cannot get much more equal than that.
No, we're not, and your subsequent statement contradicts this, as worded. You're just not being clear with your meaning. You mean that we are equal in some respects, and in some respects we should be treated as equals in spite of our differences.
If I can say it clearly, as I've just demonstrated, then why couldn't - or why didn't - you? Is it because it would ruin your comment? You had it set up so nicely (or so it might seem), but then I come along and pick holes in it.
There is social Darwinism, and how it was/is used. Much like there is communism, and how it was/is used. Let's not conflate the two.
I am not well-read on social Darwinism, although I'm aware of the controversy, as well as some of the ways in which it can be - and has been - used; for example, as a means of justifying discrimination in the bad sense, like racism or disability discrimination.
But can there not be a more charitable reading of social Darwinism? Or, can it be salvaged?
According to Wikipedia, in [i]The Social Organism[/I], Herbert Spencer compares society to a living organism, and argues that, just as biological organisms evolve through natural selection, society evolves and increases in complexity through analogous processes.
I don't see anything inherently against disabled people in doing that.
If you cannot read what it says there, that is your problem not mine.
Quoting Sapientia
No, I mean quite simple that we are all equal, just different.
How do you justify your use of the word better?
A dead person uses less resources and causes less pollution that a live person, a rich person uses more resources and contaminates more than a poor person. Which is the better person? Logically it would be the dead one.
Quoting Sapientia
Piss of. See I am learning from you Socrates. When I don't feel like answering someone's post I will just insult their intelligence.
Wonderful bit of research there, well done.
Oh, sorry i had not noticed that you had referenced the idiot's guide to superior wisdom.
At least find a legitimate page to use as a reference. Wiki is about the same level in truth value as the Sun.
Do genetics disease specialists add the "eu" to their field (eugenics) when they give reproduction advice to individuals who are carriers of heritable diseases, especially the really bad ones? Apparently the genetic disease doctors think that it is better that some people should not be born.
What about some future day (probably not that far off) when we can change the germ line (what we inherit through genes) to eliminate certain disadvantageous features, and enhance advantageous ones?
Would you prefer to be In the first group or the second, and why?
I would prefer to be more talented, fit, attractive, intelligent, and motivated, than less so, because higher levels of these features enable one to engage the human and physical world more successfully. Why would one not prefer that? People who have these traits are "better" than those who lack these features.
IF one would prefer to be more talented, fit, attractive, intelligent, and motivated, apparently one thinks it would be better. Can one logically prefer to be talented, fit, attractive, intelligent, and motivated, and then say "everyone is of equal worth"? If we, ourselves, would prefer to place ourselves in the "better" category, then we are not entitled to claim that everyone is equal, regardless of the undesirable traits they have.
Actually we are not a couple, why would anyone want a partner with such a bad attitude.
Only he is ever right, or you agree with him or you get dismissed as being stupid.
But thanks for the thoughts anyway. :smile:
The fact that I would prefer does not make it so, that is a dream. You might wish for it but you are what you are.
Imagine yourself on a scale from one to a thousand, taking into account your talents, fitness, emotions intelligence, ESP and all of the other things that make you you. If each part of you has a score, in some areas you might be high while in others low. Where would you be on the scale?
Now tell me, who gets to draw the line where people become better than others? Yes the ones with higher score would seem logically to be better than those with lower scores.
But for instance, a guy with a very low score might have an immune system that has prevented him from ever being sick.
Another with a very low score has a photographic memory and can play a piano concert after hearing it only once.
A guy with a very high score spends his time spending his rich wife's money in fancy restaurants, gyms and fine cloths
Quoting Bitter Crank
Some preferences are not better. Some people prefer to drink than smoke. Which is better.
Some people are quite happy that their educational level does not allow them to get a better job because they don't want responsibilities and might lose the benefits and subsidies the government gives them. They don't think it would be better.
What about the people that suffer Downs syndrome, do they not also think of themselves as talented, fit, attractive, intelligent, and motivated. Would, do they want to be better?
What's the matter with that? :naughty:
Quoting Plato'sView
Give me a pencil. :naughty:
It asked WHERE, not how. :sad:
Just that I am not so bloody lucky. :cry:
People are better at things than others (including "being a better person" morally), and some people are better at a lot of things than others. Some races and ethnic groups are also better than others at this or that, on average. However, that doesn't necessarily have any dire implications because comparative advantage is a thing. (i.e., even if you were better at everything than anyone else, it would still pay you and everyone else, to delegate the things you're less good at to others - even if they're less good at those things than you are - so you can focus time and energy on the thing you're super-best at.)
There's a higher level of abstraction at which the similarities between human beings outweigh the differences, though (i.e. everyone who is at least basically competent is equally a self-steering agent), in which case saying someone is "better" than others tout court is a bit off.
It's a question of perspective. While the difference between the capabilities and potential of a janitor and the capabilities and potential of a CEO matters a lot in the human world, in the full context of the natural world, both share a huge amount of functionality and a whole raft of amazing capabilities that we take for granted (e.g. the ability to walk, a difficult task, as robotics people like Boston Dynamics found out, though they are obviously cracking it); while the differences in genes and brain structure, etc., that make such a huge difference in the human world are in fact usually relatively small, the tip of the iceberg, in relation to that shared mass that's roughly equal. No doubt if you were Ant-Man you'd learn to recognize individual ants, but from the point of view of an ordinary human, they all look the same. Similarly, the janitor and CEO are close enough for jazz if you zoom out and treat the tiny differences as noise.
And at the highest, "spiritual" level, in most religions and systems of mysticism, all sentient creatures necessarily have a sort of equal dignity in being emissaries, or miniatures (microcosms) or "sparks" of the Absolute, God or whatever you want to call the hypothesized underlying Engine of the mystery of existence.
And just because we think some traits are better than other traits like having two legs to walk on rather than none; or having properly functioning eyes and ears; doesn't mean that the obvious next step is sending out the poison gas vans to despatch everybody who fails to be "better".
Some people fear that if we admit that some people are "better" than that means everybody who isn't better is worthless. Not so. For one thing, if you list all the traits upon which we might rate people, the list will be very long, and no one will be better at all of them.
Quoting Sir2u
Damn.
In the movie Logan's Run the people were elevated or something at 30, basically killed off, because they were considered to have used up their useful years and there was a limit to the amount of resources that could be dedicated to each person.
In the movie "Children of Men", the government offered a chance to the old, sick and invalid folks to leave to better climates and then drowned them.
Would it not be a wonderful world where they tell you at 65 that that you have chance to "move up" instead of sitting around the house all day with nothing to do. And then they kill you because society has no use for you.
Look at the situation in a lot of countries around the world where thousands of people are living non productively until they are a hundred or more. How long do you think it will be before some idiotic politician comes up with these ideas?
Suck it up and get used to it. :smirk:
Once people get on a mass murder kick, there isn't any Humanism so elevated that it will make any difference. Germany had loads of elevated Humanism on hand before Hitler came along, and he put it into deep cold storage for the duration.
I think we need to make a distinction between equality and fairness.
We're NOT equal (some are stronger, wiser, prettier and some are less of those) BUT we must be FAIR.
By FAIR I mean make access (to jobs, positions, schools, etc.) universal BUT success/failure must be determined by skill/aptitude (tests, interviews, etc.)
We can't be equal because we have different genes and environments. I think the evolution (survival itself) is premised on differences (mutations that make a species more/less adapted to the environment).
But we can be fair and give everyone a chance.
No. There is no such thing in the world as "better" except in daily communication that makes it quicker to explain one's decisions to other people who more or less share your view of better and worse.
Is this an innate quality of humans or is it something they learn.
If it is innate then in some way it must be genetic and passed on from parents, this does not happen. Many good parents have bad kids and bad parents good kids. And the physical part of it is so bad that beautiful parents in excellent health have had kids that are ugly as sin and as sickly as it is possible to be and continue living
If it is learned, then they are better because society made them better. This is also not true because two people that grow up living next door to each other, go to the same school, have the same friends, have parents that are interchangeable and can still turn out completely different.
Quoting matt
I have 2 students that suffer from mental short comings, I have never seen anyone else get so happy when they have accomplished their tasks successfully. Does that make them better than the others?
No they're not.
No. And I have a new policy now, so we'll see how that goes.
Yes. Some people just read too much into things.
Yes, the answer is simple: judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc. are subjective. Therefore, people aren't objectively "better" or "worse"--you can't be correct/incorrect with regards to whether someone or something is "better" or not.
Regardless of whether or not your conclusion is true or false, it doesn't follow from that premise alone. So, do you have any missing premises? And, if so, can you reveal them?
I wasn't trying to forward a formal argument (I shouldn't have used the word "therefore"); but if I were, it'd go something like this (btw, "subjective" = mental, and "objective" = non-mental):
(1) judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc. are mental states
(2) "better" or "worse" are judgements, assessments, evaluations, etc.
(3) therefore, people/existents/things aren't non-mentally (objectively) "better" or "worse"
I don't think it is fair to compare humans on any metric, nuanced of generalized, since value as a concept is purely subjective.
The only way to accommodate the differences inherent within the people of a society in the context of governance is to remove collectivist notions of arbitrary demographics like race or gender and adopt a more individualist approach to writing legislation. That is to say, provide equal opportunity as a right to every individual and let those individuals decide what to do with those opportunities. Although you wont see equal outcomes between typical demographics, this is as equal as society can get without descending to authoritarianism and/or fascism.
And there we have it: the false missing premise. There's nothing stopping you from strictly using those words in that way, but that's not integral to their definition, nor are they always used like that. In fact, they're often not used like that, as when someone says something akin to my example. I do not mean to suggest that it is only my opinion that Usain Bolt is better than I am at the 100 metres. He really is, whether it's my opinion or not.
The person making the judgement decides on the basis of their set of standards. This is true whether we are talking about personhood or persons with superior features. "Jack is a better man than Joe because he is strong and honest." I prefer strong, honest men over weak, lying men. I think they are better persons. "Joe is a better carpenter than Jack because his houses are straight and true while Jack's are crooked and leaky." I happen to like houses with straight walls and roofs that do not leak.
Am I entitled to make these judgements about other people? Yes. Are you? Yes.
If you think being the best batter on the team makes you a superior person, that's your business. I don't happen to care that much. To me, being the best batter on the team is pretty much a matter of indifference. On the other hand, being the best batter on the team means he is a better ball player than the other people on the team, even if I am indifferent.
Making judgements about other people according to your opinion doesn't make you a relativist, if you are worried about that. It just makes you a person with opinions about other people, which puts you in the company if over 7 billion other people.
That's not how the title is worded. That's just one interpretation of it. I interpreted it differently. It's down to the person behind the title to clarify its meaning. If the question is whether some people are better than others, as per the title and opening post, then my answer is yes, in some respects they are. Some people are better than others at the 100 metres, for example. The question makes little-to-no sense outside of that context.
Quoting Harry Hindu
No, it depends on the criteria, which can be objective. Your way would make it necessarily subjective, but it isn't.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Depends on the criteria, and the criteria needn't consist of someone's values. If the criterion is my values, then that's what determines it. And if it's something else, then it's something else that determines it. As for the criteria: better in what respect? You make an error in assuming that it must be about values, and you make an error in assuming that it must be a "who" that "decides" rather than a "what" that "determines".
You mean with regards to the conventional definition, right? I don't know if I use the terms "better/worse" unconventionally then.
Two things you've helped me realise is that I didn't read the OP very carefully (I assumed the OP was discussing only one species of "judgment"); and also, that I wasn't very precise in what I meant by "judgments, assessments, evalutations, etc." with regards to "better" or "worse".
Moreover, my premise (2) is not false; it is true. "Better" or "worse" are judgments, which occur in minds. Judgments do not exist external to minds (where would we locate them if they did?). Which leads me onto...
There are at least two species of "judgments, assessments, evalutations, etc.":
(1) ones that attempt to match onto objective (i.e. external-to-mind) things, which might include measurements, comparisons, standards, etc.
(2) ones that do not match onto objective things, which include personal valuations or preferences/taste.
I was referring to (2) with my argument of "better" or "worse". I agree that we can, for example, judge objectively whether one person is faster at running the 100m than another; or whether an artist is more accurately able to represent a landscape than another artist. These are measurements that we can judge and compare as we can observe and measure their existence external to minds. What we can't do is apply that logic to things like personal preferences, as personal preferences do not exist external to minds. I tend to avoid using "better" or "worse" when it comes to (1) because therein confusion/lack of clarity lies.
So I would put your Usain Bolt example like this: "it is a fact that Usain Bolt is faster than I am at the 100 metres." "Better" is too vague to me for me to know in which sense you (or others) are using it (although to be fair, it would be helpful if I analysed comments better too!).
Furthermore, one could use "better" in the sense of (1) and say "Usain Bolt is faster than me when running the 100m". But "faster" does not mean "better" in the sense of (2). Someone might think slower is "better" in the sense of (2), for example.
I don't think that the meaning of my Usain Bolt example was ever really vague. The man on the street would understand.
"They" are the objects that we judge, sure. I'm saying, ontologically, judgements etc. are mental though. Without minds "comparisons" and the like don't exist. Of course without minds objects are "bigger" or "smaller" in size, for example (even though the whole idea of "bigger" or "smaller" doesn't make sense sans mental ideas of measurement). But there are no evaluations about that without minds. Measurements, standards, comparisons etc. is mental activity only. The whole concept of "bigger" or "smaller" is subjective because they refer to a mental construction for measuring/comparing objective phenomena. Criteria is subjective too.
You're saying that judgements are mental, and I agree. But when I say that Usain Bolt is better than me at running the 100 metres, the judgement aspect is not as relevant as the truth aspect. It's like you can't see the wood for the trees! The truth is what answers the question. Pointing out that judgement and subject are involved does not answer the question. It doesn't do anything.
And criteria are not subjective, even if they require a subject to set them, which they don't in at least some cases. No one really needs to set the criteria for what makes the moon bigger than my foot. The criteria are predetermined, unless you change them to something else.
Relational qualities are the topic, not comparison. Comparison relates to the topic, but it doesn't get to the crux of the matter.
I view truth as mental too. Maybe you mean "fact" by "truth"...? I use the conventional definition of "fact" as "states of affairs".
Also, when it comes to judgements etc., "relevance" is mental/subjective too.
Quoting Sapientia
I think you mean "fact" by "truth."
Quoting Sapientia
What actually are (as in, ontologically) criteria to you?
Bigger/smaller/faster/slower/etc. are comparative measurements of phenomena, right? Where in the world does the act of measuring occur?
Why? It's not. If a statement is true, then the truth is what the statement says. How is that mental? It isn't.
Quoting numberjohnny5
A fact is, or corresponds with, the truth. If it's a fact that the cat is on the mat, then the truth is that the cat is on the mat, and vice versa.
Quoting numberjohnny5
That's pointing to trees.
You: "Look! That's a tree!".
Me: "Okay, but let's talk about the woods".
Maybe "for you" the tree is relevant, but how is this one tree relevant in the context of a question about the woods?
[B]Or, better put, you're focussing on the map instead of the territory.[/b]
Quoting numberjohnny5
I've clarified what I mean, and it doesn't make that big of a difference whether we focus on truth or fact.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Determinants. They can be objective or subjective.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, they're relational qualities between one thing and another. They're separable and independent from comparison or measurement.
Measuring is a thing that subjects or apparatus do. Measurements are what they give when they're done. It can be subjective or objective.
Again, map-territory.
You are right.
Both fact and truth are subjective, they both happen in the mind. I would really like to see someone point out a truth in the street. Truth and fact are descriptive of the events and objects of the external world. And the are both relative to point of view.
If I am in the north in winter and you in the south it will be summer. The sun Is way down south is what I would say but you would say no it is on top of us. If the sun was over the equator both statements, the sun is in the north and the sun is in the south are true at the same time.
We judge, measure, compare the objects in our minds, even if we take measurements with a ruler, the results are processed in the mind.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Exactly, the fact that you can measure 1km using a measuring device make no difference to the fact that both the km and the 1 only exist in the mind. As Plato said mathematics is what we use to describe the universe.
Because "truth" is an aspect of statements in which we make a judgement about things. Judgements are mental, something you agreed with in an earlier post. We say "the cat is on the mat" as a statement we believe to be true. Statements require meaning; statements refer to things. Meaning and reference are subjective, mental occurrences. What the statement is about can be a non-mental thing/event (i.e. the cat on the mat) (but it doesn't necessarily have to be non-mental either--it could be mental, e.g. making a truth-statement about your own mental experience).
Quoting Sapientia
I wouldn't say that because the thing that is doing the corresponding (i.e. the thing that is making the reference) is the individual in question. People make statements about the facts, not the other way around.
Quoting Sapientia
I don't understand the analogy you're making re woods and trees.
But no, I'm trying to clarify and distinctify the difference between subjectivity and objectivity when it comes to judgments etc. (By the way, the way I use the terms, "subjectivity" just refers to the spatio-temporal location of minds; and "objectivity" refers to the spatio-temporal location of anything that are non-minds.)
Quoting Sapientia
Just because you believe you've clarified something doesn't mean the other person is clear on what you mean. That's the whole point of a commitment to conversing and arguing with others' perspectives/views. I get the impression that you don't care to help me understand your views better with a statement like that.
Anyway, I think it's important to acknowledge the difference between "fact" and "truth" because the meaning we have for those terms influences the conclusions we make, as well as helps us understand each other. That's what I'm interested in--I'm not interested in being right mainly because I don't think that's generally, in my experience, a good way to argue philosophically. And not many people generally tend to agree with me so I don't bother (i.e. I'm not too emotionally invested in) trying to convince them either. But I do think it's good practice and healthy to challenge my own views and others' views.
Quoting Sapientia
I'm still not clear what that entails. Looking up a dictionary definition yields this:
"a factor which decisively affects the nature or outcome of something."
Is that what you mean by "determinant"?
Also, what are your definitions for "objective" and "subjective"? We may be using them in different ways, which would add to miscommunication here.
Quoting Sapientia
I think we agree on that.
Another way of describing objects/things or facts (as events between things) is that, ontologically, there exist a variety of different stuff. What "makes" those things different are the particular properties they have relative to other things; maybe that's what you mean by "relational qualities." So while some objects are bigger than others ontologically, there is no comparison between "big" and "small" without minds. We make up a system of thought (like language, mathematics, etc.) that enables us to compare things with each other.
The act of perceiving, comparing, describing, measuring, judging etc. about that stuff is subjective (i.e. occurring in minds). When we say one object is bigger than another object and that matches/corresponds accurately to what we're referring to, that would be a true statement/judgement.
Another way of putting it is that relations exist and we make particular judgments about them. Some of those judgments can be true, and some false.
Quoting Sapientia
I agree, although again, I'm not sure how you're using "subjective or objective."
I wouldn't say all facts are subjective. Some facts don't happen in the mind. The reason I believe this is because I think facts are essentially events, and there exist events occurring inside and outside minds.
Quoting Sir2u
That's almost close to my view. I think that "truth" is an aspect/part of statements. Facts can be mental (like neurons firing), but they are not meaningful statements that refer to things, which is what truth-statements are. In other words, "facts/events" only include those things that exist that aren't meaningful (i.e. non-associative qua minds).
Quoting Sir2u
Yes, the confusion some people have about this issue, I think, is down to relative, spatiotemporal reference points. For someone in the north, they occupy a particular location relative to the sun; and for someone in the south, they occupy a particular location relative to the sun. So both people can make statements that are true relative to where they're situated in relation to the sun.
Quoting Sir2u
I agree.
Quoting Sir2u
Yes, the concept of km and the unit of 1 only make sense in reference to a system of thought like mathematics.
I don't think "collective mind" makes sense outside of thinking that it refers to multiple minds thinking in particular ways. But meaning is personal and not literally shared with/by others.
Quoting matt
I use "subjective" to refer to things existing in particular locations: minds. I use "objective" to refer to things existing in particular locations: non-minds. So I don't really see any other alternative option--"truth" exists in one of these, and in my view, it's "subjective".
Quoting Sapientia
If the OP intended the title to mean the way you interpreted it, it would say, "Are Some People Better Than Others At Certain Things?"
If that were the case, then yes, some people are better than others at certain things - but that would be a boring topic as everyone would agree that we have objective measuring sticks of who is a better runner, or ball player. But being a better runner or ball player does not make you a better person.
Quoting SapientiaExactly. That is why I said earlier, "It is nonsensical to ask a subjective question as if it had an objective answer."
The problem with your argument is that it connects truisms with one or more false premises. The less time that is spent on these distracting truisms which you - [i]and certain others who indicate a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way which indicates a certain kind of haughtiness[/I] - raise, the better.
Yes, I do agree that judgements are mental. But no, truth is not an aspect of statements in which we make a judgement about things. Truth is what a true statement says. That a truth can be, and in at least some cases is, separable from - and independent to - judgement, refutes that argument. For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us. That is true whether it is judged or not. It would be absurd to suggest that the length of time that the Earth has existed depends on our judgement. You can rightly say that our judgement of that length of time depends on our judgement, but that's trivially true and beside the point.
As for meaning and reference, there is a charitable assumption that we are both competent English speakers, and that we aren't using words in unusual ways. So, "the cat" refers to the cat, and not a fish or an idea or my experience. If I had meant to refer to a fish or an idea or my experience, then I could have used the right words. That's a starting point to a sensible conversation, and that's the only kind of conversation that I'm interested in.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, the individual is not doing the corresponding. The individual can make a statement, and it either corresponds with the truth or it doesn't. The correspondence is out of our hands. We can make statements, not correspondence.
I never suggested that people can make facts about statements. That's a misreading of what I said, as can be seen by comparing the two quotes above.
Quoting numberjohnny5
It means that you're missing the bigger picture by focussing on what's close by. What's close by are the words that I'm speaking and the judgements that I'm making and so on. By I'm trying to get you to step back and look at the bigger picture, or at that which is outside of your immediate vicinity.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Judgements don't make sense without something to judge. I'd rather we talk about that something, rather than getting bogged down by the judging and the judgement that is produced, as I think that it has a better chance of getting an answer to the question of the discussion.
Quoting numberjohnny5
So then you explain to me why my clarification has not clarified it for you, and we work from there.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, but I think that it's important to acknowledge the similarity.
And I prefer not to digress too much by, for example, talking about talking, or talking about the other person, or their motives, or talking about myself, and so on.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Sure, why not? I would turn that around and ask you why you think that that definition is inadequate, if that is what you think.
Some words are difficult to precisely define in a way which avoids problems, like "chair" or "game", yet we know roughly what they mean, are able to correctly identify them, provide examples, and communicate effectively. The words "subjective" and "objective" are like that. I don't think it necessary to attempt to precisely define them, and I'm not willing to do so unless you give me a good enough reason. I could quote you a dictionary definition or give you some examples, but is that really necessary? If your interpretation differs from the norm, then that may be where the problem lies. And if it doesn't, then I'm not sure why you think that there's a problem.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I use the terms in a not too dissimilar manner. Off the bat, and loosely, I'd say that what is subjective is what relates to, or comes from, or is about, or depends upon, or is produced by, the subject. So, thinking, judgement, opinion, evaluation, experience, and that kind of thing. And what is objective is otherwise, like facts, the truth, rocks, planets, reality, and that kind of thing.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes.
Quoting numberjohnny5
And yes.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, well I [I]think[/I] that I [I]might[/I] have just gone [i]some ways[/I] to clarifying that. This time, I'll let [i]you[/I] tell [i]me[/I] whether I have or haven't. :wink:
Or in certain respects. That's the only way that it would make sense, so it's a charitable interpretation. I could have just replied that it makes no sense.
Quoting Harry Hindu
For the love of God, a better person [i]in what respect[/I]? The question can't be sensibly answered unless that is specified, except by saying that it makes no sense.
Quoting Harry Hindu
And that's why I assumed that he was doing something less baffling. But maybe you're right that he was just being nonsensical.
He hasn't bothered to reply, thus far.
Well, thanks for your honesty. I don't know what you mean by "a preference to be referred to in a certain outdated way", but re "haughtiness", I definitely don't think I'm superior to anyone. I do think some of my views are more reasonable than others'; and I also think that some of my views might be incoherent or not very well-fleshed out. That's one reason why I'm participating in this forum.
The "problem" could be that you don't understand what I'm saying re "truth" and "fact", I don't understand what you're saying re "truth" and "fact", or that you're wrong (I obviously believe my views are true).
Quoting Sapientia
I'd say that "that the Earth preexisted us" is an empirical claim, and I think you're saying that that empirical claim is "true". So you're judging a (meaningful) statement (that refers to the empirical domain) to be true. That's what truth is for me: a judgment about facts/events or claims (which are mental facts/events).
I'm also not saying or implying that facts/events depend upon our judgements about them; in other words, to use your example, I don't believe that the Earth's preexistence hinges upon our judgments.
Quoting Sapientia
Even though we may want to enter into conversations with that "charitable assumption" in mind (and I often do), to do so without some scepticism would be foolish, in my view. I've taken part in many discussions in my life-time (which is nearing 40 years), and it's often the case that terms or words are being used conventionally and unconventionally among conversing participants.
I did take your "the cat" as referring to an actual cat, btw. And I don't think words can be "right" or "wrong", only conventional or unconventional. We may use the word "cat" to hold meaning unconventionally for an actual hat, for example. There's nothing "right/wrong" about that particular decision though.
Quoting Sapientia
Ok, what is "the truth", ontologically? Does it have location? Does it have properties? What kind of thing is "truth" for you?
Quoting Sapientia
You said "A fact is, or corresponds with, the truth." I understand "correspond" as something minds do--we make truth-statements in order to match/correspond with facts; this is because my ontology says that "truth" is a property of statements that are used to make judgements that correspond with the facts. So that's why I said "I wouldn't say that" because under my ontology it doesn't make sense to say "facts correspond with truth." Correspondence requires minds, in that sense. I think you're using "correspond" differently, almost interchangeably with "truth". I don't know.
Quoting Sapientia
If we can't sort out the details (i.e. the trees) then the bigger picture is not worthwhile for me. The bigger picture (the wood) hinges on and is identical to the (all the trees).
Quoting Sapientia
I already have an answer for the OP. I'm not sure what question you're hoping to find an answer to.
Quoting Sapientia
Ok, re "fact" and "truth", I'm not clear because I don't understand how you're using those terms. So you can help me understand the difference (if there is a difference?) between "fact" and "truth". What is "fact" ontologically; and the same question goes for "truth" (which I already asked you above).
Quoting Sapientia
Me neither, but if the issue that is causing an impasse is being caused by how we're conversing, our intentions, etc., then that needs to be addressed. Ignoring that would only make a conversation more impenetrable, don't you think?
Quoting Sapientia
It's not that I think your definition for "criteria" is inadequate, it's rather that it's not conventional, which means it's difficult to be on the same page as you about what we're talking about. Here are some conventional definitions of "criteria/criterion":
- a principle or standard by which something may be judged or decided.
- A standard or test by which individual things or people may be compared and judged.
- a standard by which you judge, decide about, or deal with something
That's how I use the term: "criteria" are subjective/mental constructs i.e. standards/principles that we apply to or impose upon things. That seems to be different from how you're using "criteria".
Do you see why it's sometimes important to focus on the "trees" before we jump to the "woods"?
Furthermore, you said that "criteria" weren't subjective, which was what I was arguing against.
Quoting Sapientia
The way to try and limit that is to know the conventional or standard definitions being used in a particular intellectual milieu.
Quoting Sapientia
I disagree, and I have a precise definition of subjective/objective; a major upshot of that precision is that it helps make things easier to organise in my thinking/beliefs; and it also helps other people realise the difference between their and my definitions. From that starting point, some progress can be made. Whereas, the less precise definitions are, the much more difficult it can be to make progress.
Quoting Sapientia
It's only necessary insofar as it's helpful for a conversation to progress effectively. That's something I care about, so I deem it necessary. You may not care so much, and that's fine, but that's important to know for me because it can help make a decision re whether to continue conversing with you and to manage my expectations, for example. Not that I'm saying I'm not interested in conversing with you at the moment, I'm getting some value out of it, for one thing.
Quoting Sapientia
Ok, thanks for clarifying that. I agree, except that I also use "fact" to refer to (non-associative) mental events (i.e. as distinct from mental events as statements about mental events); as well as non-mental events.
I don't know what I meant either. Do you have any idea, @Sir2u? :snicker:
Do they count for something? What part do you think they play?
Quoting matt
Could it be both at the same time? Could it be both at different times? Why do you think it might be objective.
Name one please.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Is a tree in the middle of the forest an event? When does it become a fact?
Oh happy day, I am not on Sappy's list of Dingbats.
As to you question, I think that you are full of shit. Not that you are not telling the truth though, because you probably have no freakin idea what you meant. Not many others do either I think because it makes no sense at all in the context of any sane discussion.
Is it not strange that when I claimed that you should have explained better your OP in that obnoxious self pitying thread about whether philosophy makes people pretentiousness, you said that even a half witted person should be able to figure it out because it was so OBVIOUS and that there is no room for misinterpretation. But then you have the balls to post this.
[quote="Sapientia]That's not how the title is worded. That's just one interpretation of it. I interpreted it differently. It's down to the person behind the title to clarify its meaning. If the question is whether some people are better than others, as per the title and opening post, then my answer is yes, in some respects they are. Some people are better than others at the 100 metres, for example.[/quote]
One more time.
Learn to be civil, learn to try and see other peoples point of view.
And try to understand that we are not in a battle to be right all the time. You do not have to be telling people "either prove it or admit you are wrong", because you are definitely not prepared to prove anything except with bullying.
Grow up.
Have a nice day too.
Sure. A person driving a car in another country.
Quoting Sir2u
Yes. A tree in the middle of the forest is an event. I'd say events in this sense are "situational", that is, they involve objects "interacting" (which could simply involve "being" a tree in relation to other objects/trees/animals/etc.) in some way within a situation/context/environment.
Facts are observer-independent. Things don't graduate to become facts. Facts exist; observers can happen to experience/perceive facts; and they can make judgements about facts if or when they experience them.
The "fact" of someone driving in another country is information, is the information not in your head?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Information might be observer independent, but a fact is something that has been proven/judged/evaluated to be true. That can only happen in someone's mind which means that a fact is not independent of the observer. Many things might be true even if we have no knowledge of their existence, but a fact is a human construct used to define the level of reliability of information.
Let's substitute the word "event" for "fact" here. And let's assume there's the event occurring of someone driving in another country. Before I introduced that claim, that event was occurring. After I focused on other things since I introduced that claim, that event was also occurring. The event is occurring as I type. None of what I have been doing has effected the event of someone driving in another country. My role has to just introduce the claim about that event. Introducing and making claims are (ontologically) mental events. So mental events are required to "discuss" non-mental events (someone driving in another country) in this example. But in this example, mental events do not cause non-mental events to occur. In other words, the statement/claim about someone driving in another country has no direct effect on the event of someone driving in another country.
Quoting Sir2u
It depends on what you mean by "information". I've just been having a conversation with someone in another threat about it, and it seems to me that "information" (in that thread) refers to meaningful statements/claims about phenomena that can be relayed via various means of communication to other individuals, and so on.
I don't define "fact" the way you do, and I don't think that's the conventional way in philosophy of talking about "fact" (not that things being unconventional/conventional are "wrong/right"). It seems that you think that facts are only facts if they are tied to truth-statements. I don't think that's a necessary condition for "fact" though. That's tied to what I think "truth" is too: an aspect/part/property of judgments/claims/propositions that relate to events/facts. "Truth" is a mental event about other mental events or non-mental events. "Facts" (i.e. events) do not need truth-statements to validate them as "facts". "Facts" are facts regardless of what any mind thinks about them.
event:
Something that happens at a given place and time
fact:
Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction
A collection of facts from which conclusions may be drawn
I really do find that difficult to agree with. Information about the event, yes, that would be fact but the event itself no.
Quoting numberjohnny5
But the event causes the information, on that we agree. This sort of brings us back to the falling tree. [s]Millions[/s] Zillions of events are happening in the universe as we discuss this, which are facts? I think that we can only call facts the ones that we know about.
Did you read about the supernova in the Orion Belt? No,me neither. Probably because no one saw it. It might have happened or it might not. So can the supernova be a fact? Only when the information is available.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I use the definition I gave above.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, facts are only facts if they describe correctly reality. Facts are statements of truth because they describe reality.
So much in so little!
First of all, it doesn't have to be a claim of any type, which is important, because you begin by taking what you've put in quotes as a type of claim (which is a statement). In addition to statements (which need to have been stated, and stated by someone) and judgements (which result from the act of judging, which requires someone to perform the act of judging) there are facts (which don't need to be stated or judged by anyone, and do not need anyone to be around at all).
Now, despite the fact that I am using a statement to express to you a fact, that statement is not itself the fact. That would be an error similar to - if not an example of - those errors which arise as a result of a failure to properly distinguish between use and mention. It is a fact that the earth preexisted us. And it is a fact that the earth preexisted us whether I make that claim or not.
You interpret me to be saying that "that the Earth preexisted us" is true, which is understandable, but not quite right. I would say that, "The Earth preexisted us", is true - which is a subtle but important difference. I would not begin the sentence with, "That", because that's how facts are denoted, which would suggest that I'm saying that a fact is true, but that's not what I'm saying. I think that it would be a category error to claim that a fact is true, but correspondence with truth avoids that problem.
Despite the fact that I have judged that Earth has preexisted us, and despite the fact that I have judged the statement, "Earth has preexisted us", to be true, that doesn't really matter here. That is the tree, so to speak. What matters is the woods, which is the fact, which is what I was expressing to you through the use of language.
With regards to your last sentence in the quote above, I think that it's productive to think about this in terms other than - or at least in addition to - claims; so, in that sense, when you bring up facts and events in addition to claims, that's a start. But I don't agree that claims are mental in nature, unless you only mean that they require a claimant for their production. Claims are just a kind of statement or assertion, and are therefore independent of any mind, except for their production. And they're dependent on that which is external and physical, be that my mouth, sound waves, a pen, or my mobile phone which I'm using to type this very statement. One type of statement is a recorded statement, and recorded statements necessarily have physical properties.
Instead of facts, events, or claims, it makes sense to think about the judgement as being about a possibility. It is possible that Earth preexisted us, and I judge that it has. But again, this is not about my judgement, nor, primarily, is it about the possibility. It's about the fact. This is, again, where another tree-wood or map-territory sort of analogy would be appropriate.
Quoting numberjohnny5
That's good. Just take care not to suggest otherwise.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, well, I'm glad that you caught my drift that I'm using words conventionally (as with "the cat" and the cat, as opposed to the hat, which, funnily enough, I call "the hat"), despite any lingering doubts that you might've had. I am hereby confirming to you that that is indeed the case, so that we may move on.
Quoting numberjohnny5
It's just a term which refers to what a true statement says. (That's the kind of thing it is). So, if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth. Why should I care whether or not it has a location? I'm not sure whether it even makes sense to ask that question of it. As for properties, I've told you a bit about the truth already, like what I've reiterated above, and like what I've said about correspondence with fact.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Then you misunderstand it, in my assessment. That's the act of association, which is distinct from the correspondence of which I'm talking. Not only is it distinct, the correspondence of which I'm talking does not depend on the act of association.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I don't think that that's worded correctly. The "in order" suggests intention. The intention varies and is not relevant. Rather, we make truth-statements [i]which[/I] correspond with facts. I know that correspondence between truth-statements and facts do not necessarily require minds doing anything at the time, because, for one thing, if all minds suddenly ceased to exist, then, all else being equal, recorded truth-statements would remain, and at least some of them would correspond with fact. For example, "Earth exists".
Quoting numberjohnny5
So, you think that truth is a property of statements which correspond with facts. But you also seem to think that how statements are used, and judgement, is also somehow relevant. It's the latter that I have a problem with. In what sense are they presumably of relevance? They aren't necessary for correspondence, properly understood, to take place. You could define it as a mental correspondence, but I don't know why you would do so. That's not the correspondence that I'm talking about, which is the correspondence between true statements and facts. Whenever there's a true statement, like "Earth exists", there's a corresponding fact. That's it. No judgement required. No one is required at all. No one needs to be doing anything. What could possibly make you think otherwise? Are you some sort of idealist or aren't you? Because you sound like one in some respects.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Then the problem must be with your ontology.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Either correspondence does not require minds or you're talking about correspondence in a different sense for some reason. But if it's the latter, why are doing so?
Quoting numberjohnny5
I'm using it differently, yes. But not interchangeably with "truth". Correspondence is about the relationship between true statements and fact, which is a conditional relationship in the logical sense.
Quoting numberjohnny5
It's important to recognise which details are essential and which are not. I think that you've been focussing on aspects which are not essential to the bigger picture.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I know that you already have an answer. I think that it's the wrong answer. That's how we ended up here. The original question was whether some people are better than others. You gave an answer, which I then questioned, which lead to you providing further details, which I have been criticising, and you've been responding to my criticism, and so on, and so forth, and this is where we're at. My concern is the right answer.
Quoting numberjohnny5
One difference is that truth requires language whereas facts do not. To use your terminology, one could think of truth as a property of statements and facts as a property of reality.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, I was using the conventional definition. What I'm saying, with regards to what we're talking about, and with regards to the example - which, if I recall correctly, was something like whether or not the moon is bigger than my foot - is that the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective, in that it's defining feature is that it reflects reality, rather than my judgement, which might clash with reality.
Also, once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement". So, what I was saying was not far off from the wording and gist of those definitions. I think that you're just over-anyalysing. We can call it something else if need be.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, and another way to avoid that is not to seek an unnecessary degree of exactness, not to over-analyse, not to rigidly adhere to the wording of definitions, and to instead adapt to a way of thinking in line with the spirit of what's being said and in line with the Wittgensteinian concept of family resemblance.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, so we agree on that, except that I haven't quite wrapped my head around your possible exception. I might have some idea about what you're getting at, but don't worry about explaining it in detail unless it's pertinent to our main topic of discussion.
Thanks, but to which post/claim(s) are you referring?
(Btw, I'm currently in the middle of responding to your last (big) post to me, but I won't be able to finish it until the weekend as I'm really busy.)
I was referring to his overall argument or stance, which would include posts like the one you were replying to - this one - as well as this one, which I also briefly commented on.
Quoting numberjohnny5
That's fine, I can wait. And besides, it took me a couple of days to reply. (And yes, that was a [I]big[/I] post for me. It took me a long time to come up with. I lost track of time because I was concentrating and "in the zone").
Thank you,have a nice day.
Well, at least it shows you're trying to agree! :P
Quoting Sir2u
I've never comes across this definition of "fact".
Anyway, a reason why "fact" is the same as "event" is because in my ontology all things are events. In other words, all things/objects are comprised of properties in relations interacting in particular ways with other things. There's a dynamic fluidity to all that exists, and all that exists is physical, in my view. So in that sense, events are properties undergoing change. Information, as phenomena that we perceive and organise mentally, is included in this ontology.
Quoting Sir2u
I think information is a mixture of the event and our experience and processing of the event into an organised, coherent and meaningful set of statements/judgements.
Quoting Sir2u
You're conflating knowledge about events with events. They are not the same. It seems like you're defining "fact" as "knowledge-by-acquaintance" (or acquaintance knowledge). Conventionally, knowledge is justified, true belief in analytic philosophy, right? That's mental phenomena. You're saying mental phenomena about phenomena we have no mental phenomena about is not phenomena.
Do you have a term for phenomena we do not experience and have knowledge of then, if it's not the term "fact" for you?
Let's return to my vignette about someone driving in another country being a fact/event. Would you agree that just because you or I do not know about someone driving in another country at this present moment, that it is therefore not an event that is actually taking place? That because we aren't aware of, having an experience of, or have no knowledge that someone in another country is driving right now, it is not an event? Is that your position?
I presume you'd agree that someone knows that someone is driving in another country even if we do not, right? If you agree, then that means that there are generally people who do know that events are taking place and generally people who do not know that events are taking place in a given moment. What relationship, then, does an event have with mental phenomena in the form of knowledge? How are they connected so that events only qualify as events if they are known?
Quoting Sir2u
If a supernova occurred it would be a fact despite our lack of knowledge about it. Again, knowledge-by-acquaintance is not identical to what--the thing/event in question--we're acquainting ourselves with. Things happen, whether we are aware of them or not.
Quoting Sir2u
So facts are mental phenomena, for you? What's the difference between "reality" and "fact"? What are events that aren't known?
Because if events/facts only occur when minds know about them occurring, that's a causal argument. That is, you'd be positing that minds and only minds cause events to occur.
Quoting Sapientia
The reason I think it's important to care about where things are located for ontological matters is because I think it's nonsense to believe that things/events that exist have no location. "Truth" as "a term", in your words, is located somewhere, otherwise it doesn't exist. Further, the original focus of my inquiry is related to whether "truth" is subjective (occuring in minds) or "objective" (occurring external to minds). So for me, ontologically, thinking/conceptualising "a term" is a mental event, and hence located in minds. The properties of said mental event (on one relative scale of analysis) are comprised of neurons, synapses, chemical reactions, etc.
The problem I have with your explanation for "truth" is that it's unclear and muddled. You write, "...if the statement says that the cat is on the mat, and the statement is true, then that's the truth." Let's break this down.
{The first part of this conditional is:}
(i) "if the statement says that the cat is on the mat,"
(ii) "and the statement is true,"
In other words, if the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true,...
{The second part of this conditional is:}
(iii) "then that's the truth."
...then the statement "the cat is on the mat" is true.
That's a tautology. In other words, your conditional is stating that if the statement about a fact (the cat on the mat) is true, then the statement is true. (I assume by "that's the truth" you're claiming that the statement about the cat is true. But it's redundant and unnecessary to use "true" and "truth" in that way. It muddies the waters.) So all you need to say is "if I judge my statement to correspond with a fact (in this case, the cat being on the mat), then I judge my statement to be true."
Otherwise, what's the difference between "true" and "truth"? I wonder whether you're conflating "truth" with "fact" there, as in, "it's a fact that the statement about the cat on the mat is true."
Ok, so using your definition/explanation of "true/truth"...you write,
"For example, it is a truth that Earth preexisted us."
In other words, I read that sentence as claiming: "it is true that Earth preexisted us." I don't know what else is could be saying. Maybe it's saying "it is a fact that Earth preexisted us"? But if so, that sentence is still a statement. Referring to facts necessarily involves statements about facts. There's no escaping that fact. Furthermore, you're judging that statement about facts to be true.
"First of all, it doesn't have to be a claim of any type..."
"a type of claim (which is a statement)"
Any statement is a statement about stuff. Statements refer, that's what they do. So any mention or reference about facts is necessarily a statement or claim of some type. So it does have to be a claim...
"despite the fact that I am using a statement to express to you a fact, that statement is not itself the fact."
In other words, although I am using a statement to refer to a fact in a particular way, that statement is not actually the fact I'm referring to. Yeh, I agree.
Quoting Sapientia
Judging something to be the case is identical to judging something to be true. That's the only way we can refer to facts, by referring to them in different ways.
Quoting Sapientia
Both statements are claims about past facts (i.e. that the Earth preexited us). (And statements about facts as ontological statements about ontological facts are empirical statements/claims.) The first statement is a claim about a past fact that you judge to be true, do you not? You're not saying "it is false that the earth preexisted us", are you? And you're not saying "I'm not making any ontological commitment as to whether the earth preexisted us", are you? If your answer to two those questions is "true", then logically, "It is a fact that the earth preexisted us" is a claim that you believe to be true. What else can it be?
The second statement is also one that believes it is true (again, what else can it be?).
Quoting Sapientia
I wasn't using the word "that" in any special way, or in the way you're describing; that is, '"that the Earth preexisted us" is true' and '"The Earth preexisted us", is true' are identical statements to me.
In any case, you're then acknowledging that facts cannot be true. Does that mean that judgments about statements that correspond to facts are the things that can be true?
Quoting Sapientia
It's more that "truth" is a property of statements that judges how statements refer/relate to facts. That is, "truth" is the aspect of statements that we use to judge whether statements relate to the facts "accurately" or not. Having a statement without a judgment about that statement excludes it from being a statement. Statements judge. Statements are a type of sentence. A sentence that doesn't judge is rather a non-propositional sentence, like a question or phrase. So it's the property of "truth" in a sentence that makes it a statement/proposition.
But you also seem to think that how statements are used, and judgement, is also somehow relevant. It's the latter that I have a problem with. In what sense are they presumably of relevance? They aren't necessary for correspondence, properly understood, to take place. You could define it as a mental correspondence, but I don't know why you would. That's not the correspondence that I'm talking about, which is the correspondence between truth statements and fact.
Quoting Sapientia
The judgement is required, otherwise what do you think truth-values are? They are judgements about stuff: either true or false (depending on the species of logic you use). "Earth exists" is a statement that is judged to correspond with a fact.
Quoting Sapientia
I'm saying correspondence requires minds because that's what's involved when corresponding statements to events/facts.
Quoting Sapientia
Ok, thanks. So "truth" is a property of minds, then, correct? I would say that "facts [are] a property of reality", but because I think that minds are also part of reality, that means there are also mental facts/events. So "truth" is a type of fact - a mental fact i.e. an event that occurs in minds as opposed to a fact/event that does not occur in minds.
Quoting Sapientia
The conventional definition of criteria refers to standards/principles that we judge. In an earlier post you said "criteria are not subjective". Then you said that criteria are determinants. I don't believe standards are non-mental. So an "objective standard" (i.e. your " the appropriate standard to use would be one that is objective") in my ontology would refer to a real external-to-mind standard, akin to what a Platonic realist might believe about Forms being real. I'm an anti-realist on abstract objects like that (insofar as those objects exist external to minds).
You also say "once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement"." Are you saying that minds set or decide upon criteria? If so, it then seems you believe that subjective criteria then "graduate" or change to become objective criteria as "determinants" that relate to (subjective) judgments. Criteria are mental abstract objects, and "judgements" are abstract objects. (I don't know what would be included in "outcome" there.) Which means that subjective standards (as mental abstract objects) "determine" other mental abstract objects like judgements. There is no objective criteria involved.
In an earlier post you wrote, "And criteria are not subjective, even if they require a subject to set them, which they don't in at least some cases. No one really needs to set the criteria for what makes the moon bigger than my foot. The criteria are predetermined, unless you change them to something else."
I don't think you're using the conventional definition of "criteria" here. "What makes the moon bigger than my foot" are the ontological properties of those two objects. An assessment of their relative sizes might involve criteria, which would be subjective, obviously (since assessments occur in minds).
Quoting Sapientia
You say, "Also, once criteria are set or "decided", they determine the outcome or "judgement". So, what I was saying was not far off from the wording and gist of those definitions. I think that you're just over-anyalysing. We can call it something else if need be."
You could say I'm over-analysing, but I think I have good reason to do so since I don't think you're being clear or coherent, in my view. I think what you're saying is "far off from the gist of those definitions". I also don't understand how criteria that is set or decided by minds can 'determine the outcome or "judgment".'
I always try to understand what others are saying, it is up to them to convince me to agree with them and for me to do the same.
Quoting numberjohnny5
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/fact
There are sometimes many definitions of a word. When this happens it is necessary to provide the definition one is using to avoid problems. People tend to presume that the meaning of what they write is obvious.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I suppose that if this is your way of seeing things then it is acceptable, but I am still not sure whether or not I could agree with it.
Quoting numberjohnny5
This is were I disagree most. I do not see the event itself as the information. From my point of view the information is the product of the event, even if the event is just a tree sitting in the middle of a forest. The information is the description of the event.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, you are doing that. See above. Fact and knowledge are not the same. We can have facts as knowledge but we cannot have all of the facts. My question was, if information about some obscure event in the universe is not available to us is it still a fact? Using common acceptable definitions of fact, I don't see how that is possible.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, I am saying that if something is unknown then we cannot have mental phenomena about it. It is, if it is actually happening phenomena. But How does anyone know about it?
Quoting numberjohnny5
The Unknown.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Ok, I think that here is were the problem of our misunderstanding lies. If those people are driving around some place, then they are witnesses to their own events. Others would see them as well. This would be a fact.
But how can something be a fact if absolutely no one knows about it?Quoting numberjohnny5
This, again, is where we diverge in agreement. Events and information cannot be the same thing. Information is the result of events, events cause information. What information is available if no event occurs? None right.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Look at any of the definitions of fact, what do they all imply? Reality is everything that is in existence, of which we know very little. Fact is what we do know about reality. Event about which we have no knowledge (unknown) are usually called unknown events because we have no facts about them. There might have been events that generated information, but we do not have the facts.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, events occur all the time. I am positing that events can happen, do happen but we are often ignorant of their passing because we have no facts about them. No one said anything about our minds causing events to happen even though that sometimes is the case, as in the event of me replying to you.
I think that you should stop calling events facts unless you can properly explain how that is possible and where you got the definition of fact that you use.
I think that it might be nonsense to assume that everything that exists [i]must[/I] have a location. A thing that exists might well have some sort of [i]relation[/I] to something that has a location, but there are some things with which it does not seem to make sense to even ask, due to it seeming to be a category error. Where is perpendicular located? Where is justification located? Where is mathematics located? Where is the biological kingdom [i]Animalia[/I] located? Where is the number twenty located?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, in a sense, it's located somewhere. But we'd have to break down what's meant. The term, [i]as a word on a screen[/I], does indeed have a location. But is that necessarily, or always, what is meant?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Thinking and conceptualising are indeed mental events, and they do indeed occur in minds. But what about concepts? The continued existence of concepts does not seem to depend on anyone being around performing any kind of cognitive act relating to them, nor on any kind of mental event taking place. So, where are concepts located?
Quoting numberjohnny5
It's your analysis that's muddled, not my explanation, although my explanation might have been unclear [i]to you[/I], so I will attempt to clarify.
What I am saying is not like saying that a triangle is a triangle. What I am saying is like saying that a triangle is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles. In saying that the truth is what a true statement says, rather than that the truth is the truth, or that a true statement is a true statement, I'm explaining that if the true statement were, "the cat is on the mat", then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat. Your confusion seems to be a result of confusing a statement with what it says, which relates back to my earlier mention of the use-mention distinction. The distinction here might be seen as subtle and at risk of being overlooked or dismissed as trivial and uninformative, but it's not trivial, because it plays an important role, and it's not uninformative, because it tells us what truth is.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Wrong. The conditional does not state that if the statement is true, then the statement is true, which is like stating that if the shape is a triangle, then the shape is a triangle. The conditional states that if the statement is true, then the truth is what it says, which is like stating that if the shape is a triangle, then the shape is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, that would be saying something else, which would be making a different point to the one that I'm making. That's a point which is beside the point.
Quoting numberjohnny5
We've been over this already to some extent. I thought we had it covered. :meh:
A statement can be true, but a statement can't be truth, as that doesn't make sense. We use "true" to say what a statement of that kind [i]is[/I], and we use "truth" to say what a statement of that kind [i]speaks[/I].
I'm not conflating "truth" with "fact", despite the striking resemblance in the way in which they can be used, which I have acknowledged, because, like I said, the truth is defined by its relation to statements, whereas facts are not.
I think that the problem is that you have to pay very close attention to what I'm saying and the distinctions that I'm making, otherwise it's easy to get lost.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Of course I'm judging it to be true. That's an implication of my stating it, but that is of no significance here. Another implication is, as you say, that it's a fact that Earth preexisted us, but that's not what it says, as what it says is about a truth. It says what it does, and what it says is close enough to saying that it's true that Earth preexisted us. So I see little point in digging any deeper.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Use-mention! Please bear it in mind when I'm trying to point out stuff like this:
[I]That the earth preexisted us[/I] is a fact, not a statement. The statement would be, "That the Earth preexisted us". I'm [i]using[/I] a statement to express a fact, not [i]mentioning[/I] a statement relating to fact. It's the fact that I mean to talk about, not the statement.
That's what I was getting it. Do you follow me now?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Oh good, so you do understand. It was just a breakdown in communication to some extent, given what we've just gone through.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, they're not identical, because we judge a statement to be true, whereas we judge a possible state of affairs to obtain or be the case. Resemblance is not equivalence.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes.
Quoting numberjohnny5
It's about a past fact. It's not about my judgement, although my judgement is implied when I make the statement. And I don't judge any fact to be true, because I don't consider facts to be the kind of thing that can be true. Statements, on the other hand, can be true. And I do judge, "Earth preexisted us", to be true.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, I'm not saying either of those.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Well, yes, it is. That shouldn't have been in any doubt. You are drifting away from why I made the comment that you're replying to in the first place, which had to do with the distinction between facts and statements. I wasn't suggesting that statements aren't statements, or anything of the sort.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Correction: that "I" believe to be true, not that "it" believes to be true. And I wasn't talking about statements, I was talking about facts!
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, but I am, and they're not to me, so I would suggest that you abide by this distinction, otherwise I might end up misinterpreting you.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Statements can be true. Judgements can be right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate, etc.
Quoting numberjohnny5
First of all, [i]truth[/I] doesn't judge. (I take it that you were not being literal when you said that, but I don't think that that way of talking will help clear this up).
[I]We[/I] judge what is the truth, but we don't need to do so for there [i]to be[/I] truths. That is, truths do not depend on our judgement.
It's wrong to say that having a statement without a judgement about that statement excludes it from being a statement. Rather, for anyone to make sense of a statement in relation to an agent, it must be assumed that there is an underlying judgement from the agent about the statement, such that the statement is true.
What you're doing here is confusing metaphysics and human psychology. Statements, in the form of recorded statements, would exist without any judgement about them or interpretation of them. They would exist without any humans whatsoever.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, no, no. Truth-values are [i]properties[/I], not judgements! The judgement would be what [i]we[/I] make [i]about[/I] the truth-value of a statement. Again, judgement is dispensable here in terms of [i]necessity[/I], given that we're talking about metaphysics, and not human psychology.
Correspondence between true statement and fact [i]does not[/I] require judgement. Logically, the conditional does not need to include judgement, and it should not include judgement if we're aiming to give an accurate account. If the statement is true, then there's a corresponding fact. That's it! You can't rightly add something to that formulation that has no place being there. Otherwise it's anything goes: if the statement is true, [i]and I feel like a ninja[/I], then there's a corresponding fact!
That a statement [i]is[/I] judged in terms of truth-value, is not that it [i]must be[/I].
Quoting numberjohnny5
That reply isn't very helpful, because it doesn't explicitly answer my question, leaving it down to me to figure out what the answer is. I'm going to go with: you're talking about correspondence in a different sense to me, for some reason that isn't clear to me, and you don't want to explain why you're doing this. Well, you'll just be talking past me, and that isn't something that I want to get too involved with, except in order to redirect you back to the sense of correspondence that I'm talking about.
If you want to talk about the mental act of association or comparison, then you should at least be clear about it. The term "correspondence" already has a technical use within philosophy, and, more specifically, in relation to theories of truth. Please use another term if this sense of correspondence is not what you mean.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, not correct. That's a logical leap you'll have to explain.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Truth isn't a type of fact - at least not in my book. And also, in my book (which, by the way, is the bestest book ever) there's no such thing as a mental fact, [i]unless[/I] by that what is meant is just a fact about something mental. Also, facts and events are different things, and should not be conflated. Facts can be about events, and events that have occurred or are occurring are factual. It isn't correct to say that facts occur and events are the case - it's the other way around.
So, I don't think that you've got your terms straight. But I'm guessing that you might have rejigged your terms to suit your metaphysical commitments, which, for you, take priority.
Quoting numberjohnny5
What I had in mind there was more Lockean than Platonic, as in primary qualities. The moon is bigger than my foot, not because I perceive it to be so, but because of the primary qualities of the moon and of my foot. That's the objective standard to which I was referring.
Quoting numberjohnny5
It's something that can be either predetermined or set. I could set the criteria for whether the moon is bigger than my foot to be whatever I like, but I can't alter reality by the setting of a standard. That would be a shallow, deceptive, and very egocentric position.
In reality, the moon is bigger than my foot, regardless of the philosophical games that we play.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, so maybe I diverged from convention somewhat. So shoot me. Does it really matter?
With regards to your last sentence, I've noticed that there are two different senses of "subjective" and "objective" at play here. I agree that assessments are subjective in the sense that they are mental and require a subject, but they can also be objective, in a sense, if they are based upon and reflect reality.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Well, you'll need to explain why you think that. What's not to understand? That makes me think that maybe you don't understand what criteria are and how they function. Criteria are like rules. If I set as my criteria for what day it is, whatever date on the calendar I judge to be the most appealing, and the date that I judge to be the most appealing happens to be February 25th, then that's what determines what day it is in accordance with the aforementioned criteria. That's the outcome. If someone were to ask me how I was judging what day it is, or how I am determining what day it is, then that would be the answer. That's my criteria.
Similarly, there are facts about the world which, like criteria, determine the outcome to predicted events, and determine the answer to certain questions. The difference is that we don't set these "criteria" - they're predetermined. But we can set our standards accordingly, and that way move closer towards objectivity.
Yeh, that's good. I was being facetious, btw. :)
Quoting Sir2u
Ah, I think I can see how you're defining fact a bit better. My criteria for "facts" include unknowable/unperceived events/things, and yours is tied only to mental events. I'm saying that all things that exist--all events/happening/things--are facts, whether we know about them or not. So it's not tied exclusively to mental phenomena.
Quoting Sir2u
I explained my ontological basis for facts as events already. The definition of fact I use (but which I've elaborated on myself personally) is here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_affairs_(philosophy). And here's an excerpt from The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich):
[i]"A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs
whose obtaining makes that proposition true. Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs. Facts
possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations. Thus the fact that Brutus stabbed Caesar contains the objects Brutus and Caesar standing to one another (in
that order) in the relation of stabbing. It is the actual obtaining of this state of affairs that
makes it true that Brutus stabbed Caesar."[/i]
Quoting Sir2u
Saying something like "we have no facts about them" is confusing. It's not that we literally "have facts" about stuff; it's that we have information or experience about/of stuff--and that "stuff" we call "facts". The facts you're referring to are not internal, but external, so we don't literally "have" the external stuff internally.
Quoting Sir2u
"Description" as in a linguistic description?
And I didn't say "the event itself" was the information; I said it's a mixture between the event and our perception and thinking about the event. Think of it in terms of direct realism: phenomena cause us to perceive them (via the particles from their properties that reach our sensorial apparatus). As we experience them, we can think about what we're perceiving/experiencing, and decide to selectively organise some of that experience as sufficient for a "piece of information" that we may want to communicate. So it's a blend of phenomena interacting with us--that's what I think "information" is. It's not either one or the other.
It's not clear to me what you take "information" to be based on your descriptions there. It seems like you've given two definitions of information: "the product of the event" and "the description of the event". Can you clarify what you mean? In what sense "product," and in what sense "description"?
Quoting Sir2u
Just to clarify, ontologically, all events/things are facts. That includes mental events. Anything that's actually happening is an event of some sort. So ontologically, "knowledge" of some X is a mental event. The X is also an event/fact, and the X could be another mental event or a non-mental event. For example, I am having the mental event right now of thinking that I know I am having a mental event right now. I can look across the room at a plant and notice I am having a mental event of looking across the room at a plant. The events are facts. The plant across the room (from my perspective) is a fact/event. Every existent is a fact/event.
So "fact" and "knowledge" are ontologically identical in terms of them both being actual events occurring. But epistemologically, (i) "knowledge about some fact" is different than (ii) the actual fact that the knowledge is about.
And I don't think it's possible to have "all of the facts."
Quoting Sir2u
In my view, if we have no good reason to believe a particular event/fact is occurring whatsoever (so that we're only speculating without any evidence or good reasoning), then we don't know whether it is occurring either way. It could be occurring; it might not. Whether we have that "information" about the event or not doesn't affect whether the event is actually occurring though.
Quoting Sir2u
I agree with that. But not having mental phenomena about some X doesn't mean that X isn't real. Things we don't know have no bearing on whether those things exist.
Quoting Sir2u
If no one knows about some phenomena it doesn't mean that phenomena isn't happening (unless you're some kind of idealist). Facts include knowable and unknowable phenomena. That's because mental phenomena has no bearing on facts obtaining for me (unless the only facts existing were mental facts/events).
:up:
"Thus a fact is an actual state of affairs."
The key word here is Actual.
Presently existing in fact and not merely potential or possible
Taking place in reality; not pretended or imitated
Being or reflecting the essential or genuine character of something
Existing in act or fact
Not one of those definitions allows one to suppose that something is happening. They would all need confirmation that an event is happening.
Quoting numberjohnny5
So how does one obtain the state without the information necessary.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I use the standard definition of information
Knowledge acquired through study, experience or instruction
A collection of facts from which conclusions may be drawn
So both of the ways I use it seem to be perfectly in order.
Joe lifts his hand and slaps Fred, a series of events that I have experienced. The event itself was created by the people involved and and I watching received the information.
Because I witnessed the event I have the information about it and a good description(the facts) of it for anyone that wants to hear the details. I can also concluded from seeing Joe's actions that it must have hurt Fred.
Quoting numberjohnny5
But not having mental phenomena about something simply means that we do not know anything about them therefore it cannot be claimed that facts exist about them.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Where would you get the true proposition about anything that is unknown?
Where would you obtain a state of affairs that would make the proposition true?
Quoting numberjohnny5
I have already stated that there are many unknown things happening in the universe.
Quoting numberjohnny5
You are very confused. Facts are information therefore they are subjective according to your own words. In your head, mental.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_of_affairs_(philosophy). Nice one son. :up:
This will take us into new territory, which can only make me think these posts will grow even larger. :S
Perpendicular: if we're only talking about mental abstracts, then perpendicular is a mental event (so located in minds). If we're talking about a state of affairs/fact in which two things are actually at 90 degree angles to each other, then that is located in that state of affairs. If we're talking about a mind assigning a state of affairs/fact as being perpendicular, it's a mixture of both mental and non-mental facts, in which both have location.
Justification: this is a mental event (so located in minds).
Mathematics: a language system that allows us to make sense of relations and has instrumental utility. This is mental, since languages are meaningful, and meaning is mental.
Animalia: according to our criteria/definitions of this kingdom, the "kingdom" is any place the animals in this kingdom are located.
The number twenty: located in our minds, since numbers are mental constructs/events.
Quoting Sapientia
I meant "truth/true" as in what it is ontologically. In my view, anything related to "truth/truth-values/claims, etc." is a mental event. (I'm an internalist on meaning.) The term "true" as a word on a screen is ontologically pixels on a screen. But the meaning of "truth/true" is a property of the mental.
Quoting Sapientia
I disagree. For example, if only one person existed and at time T1 they had a concept x, and then at time T2 they didn't have a concept x, then concept x would not obtain/exist at time T2. Concepts as mental events are not numerically identical with other people's concepts (even if their concepts share a very high degree of similarity). Concepts also aren't static things; in my ontology: everything that exists is also changing. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense.
Quoting Sapientia
No, I'm not confused with the difference between what a statement is ontologically, and what a statement refers to or does. Saying that "if the true statement were, 'the cat is on the mat', then the truth would be that the cat is on the mat" is confusing to me; so you're right about me not finding your explanation coherent. Obviously, if I find something incoherent it doesn't mean others do. I think we may agree in general though that a statement about a fact is not the fact itself, right?
Quoting Sapientia
I don't use "truth" in the way you use it. So "truth" is what the truth-statement is stating with regards to facts?
Quoting Sapientia
I agree that this is partly what is happening, and I'm sometimes still "lost" when you attempt to explain things further. I have hope though! :)
Quoting Sapientia
No. It impossible to refer to facts without referring to facts. That doesn't mean I'm saying facts only exist if we refer to them though. So saying "That the earth preexisted us is a fact" is a statement about some state of affairs/a fact. It's an ontological/empirical statement you're making. Please can you tell me how that's not a statement about a past fact? I know that when you're using a statement to "express" a fact you're not referring to that statement as a statement; rather, you're using a statement to make an ontological claim about some state of affairs in the past. I'm saying that statements refer to things, and there's no escaping that fact. You can't make an ontological claim--express a fact--without making a statement about a fact. That's all I'm saying and trying to clarify.
Quoting Sapientia
I hope so :P
Quoting Sapientia
Sure, I know that's how you use it. Just for clarification, the way I use "judgement" in a statement is that a "judgement" affirms whether a statement is true or false in relation to or when referring to facts.
Quoting Sapientia
Yeh, I've got a feeling that your use of "fact" and "truth" are similar, if not identical. As if you're saying "it's a fact that this true-statement truthfully corresponds to a fact."
Quoting Sapientia
Yes, that's what I mean...what makes a statement true or false is that someone is judging that statement to be true or false. Without that judgement about the statement being true or false means the statement is not a statement--it is a different kind of sentence, like a question or phrase.
Quoting Sapientia
I'm not. I have so far been referring to statements as being made in the present (as in, statements being actually thought or expressed in the present moment by minds), not statements as recorded on some document or by pixels on a screen. The latter type of statements are ontologically just that, non-mental, organised (symbolic) patterns that we use to assign meaning onto.
Quoting Sapientia
Yes, there are mental facts: that mentality occurs in brains is a fact. I explain more about this below re "subjective" and "objective"...so stay tuned!
Quoting Sapientia
Yeh, I was incorrect that judgements are identical to truth-values; rather, it's that judgements assign truth-values to a statement. So we judge a statement to be true or false (i.e. assigning a truth-value to that statement), in relation to a fact. It wouldn't make sense to judge a statement without a truth-value.
(Aside from that, it doesn't make sense to me to say "Truth-values are properties" because all existents are just bundles of properties, in my ontology. But we don't need to go there...yet.)
Quoting Sapientia
That a statement is judged in terms of truth-value, is not that it must be."
Bear in mind my view of "truth" is not conventional. When you say "true statement", I parse that as a person judging that statement to be true (about something). For example, I parse the statement, "the Earth preexisted us" as "the statement 'the Earth preexisted us' is true". I am making a judgement about that statement by assigning a truth-value to it--the value "true". Without my judgement about that statement, it wouldn't function as a statement in the conventional sense. A statement that isn't judged to be true or false (i.e. without a truth-value) is not conventionally "expressing" anything, unless it's functioning as a question or a phrase. I hope that makes things clearer, even if you don't agree.
Quoting Sapientia
Ok. Correspondence does require minds. This is because the correspondence theory of truth is about statements corresponding to facts; and in my view, "statements" as statements occuring in the present in the form of thoughts expressed verbally, are mental events.
Quoting Sapientia
In my view, "truth" is a property of statements/claims/propositions that we judge in relation to what the statements are corresponding to. Since statements as thoughts are mental events, and since "truth" is a property of statements as mental events, then "truth" is a property of minds.
Quoting Sapientia
Where can I get one?
Quoting Sapientia
Let me try to clear this up. In my ontology, all existents/events are facts--they're actual/real. There are non-mental facts, like trees, rocks, stars, and so on. There are mental facts, like thoughts and perceptual experiences. "Truth" is a type of mental fact.
Quoting Sapientia
They're not different in my view. In my ontology, since all existents are consistently, dynamically changing in relation to other existents, all events consist of a collection of existents interacting or in relation to each other. This applies to the micro and macro levels of scale. States of affairs as facts are the way things are happening. Things/existents are constantly happening. Things that are happening are events, in my view.
Quoting Sapientia
I see. I define "standards" as norms people create, and so they're not objective (as in, external-to-minds). So "objective standard" doesn't make sense to me.
Quoting Sapientia
Haha. I diverge from convention all the time. I don't think that's a problem in itself. Why it matters to me in this case, is to just clarify your views in lieu of mine.
Quoting Sapientia
I only use "subjective" and "objective" one way: they are both terms re location, i.e. where some x occurs. "Subjective" refers only to locations occurring in minds. "Objective" refers only to locations occuring external-to-minds. That's it. So "assessments" are things that occur in minds, and hence "subjective". Assessments can refer to/or are about "objective" things, but are not themselves "objective" (unless by "objective assessments" you're referring to a piece of writing or pixels on a screen, in which case, those things don't have meaning "in" them).
Quoting Sapientia
Ah, that sounds different in the way you're explaining "criteria" from the other times. I agree that minds set rules/criteria/standards, and then according to those criteria, minds determine whether facts match them, for whatever reason.
Quoting Sapientia
I don't use "criteria" for objective, mind-independent facts. I keep those two things separate. I'd just say that we can construct criteria about some facts in order to predict or discover how those facts develop or change.
Well, that's one way of explaining it, but I'm not convinced. It seems as though you're putting the cart before the horse, in that it seems as though you're setting out to reduce whatever I bring up to something that has a mental or a physical location, rather than starting from a position of impartiality whereby you keep your options open.
To focus on just one of my examples: classifications, once made, do not depend on us in any way. They don't depend on our having some kind of mental event which involves them. If a cat has been classified as feline, then, accordingly, a cat is feline, and that's that. That would be the case if there were no cats, no people, or no cats or people. It's not like an electronic device which needs a source of electricity to keep it powered up. It's more like a lever which, once pulled, remains as such until someone comes along and resets it, if they ever do (which they needn't).
Quoting numberjohnny5
I know that you meant to talk about what it is ontologically. It was already predetermined that we were talking about a word, because you asked me about the term "truth", which is a single word term. I then gave you a particular example of what that could be referring to, and the example I gave you makes some sense as a reference, has a physical location, and is not mental. But I emphasise that that is only one take on it, and one particular example. It doesn't put the matter to rest. There are a number of ways of interpreting what a word is ontologically, not a single way, and the answers depend on how this is framed.
Quoting numberjohnny5
We fundamentally disagree then. It just isn't plausible that the existence of concepts depends on us actively thinking of them; nor, consequently, that they pop in and out of existence, all of a sudden, in accordance with our active thoughts. They're just not like that. Concepts are separable from - and independent of - the act of conceiving. But you're trying to blur the lines.
It doesn't even [i]make sense[/I] to take a concept as a mental event. It's [i]conceiving[/I] which is the mental event. You're confusing a noun with a verb, and a thing with an act.
Concepts are fixed. Subsequent to conception, they remain static and uniform. They depend on beings such as us for their conception only, and from that point onwards, they're independent. We can alter them, if we're around to do so, but even if we do, those alterations will then remain in place unless tinkered with.
And everything that [i]physically[/I] exists is changing.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, we agree about that. But I don't understand your confusion, nor why you don't find my explanation coherent.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, so long as you mean what I mean by that. My meaning is consistent with what I've said previously.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, but that's disconnected to what I said, and connected to a possible misinterpretation of what I said.
Let me try again:
It is a fact that Earth preexisted us. That Earth preexisted us is a fact. A fact is not a statement. Therefore, that Earth preexisted us is not a statement.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I didn't think that you were saying that.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, and my favourite colour is blue, but these points are beside the point. You are focussing on the saying, instead of what's being said, which is always frustrating when it's the latter which matters.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Oh god, what a pickle. There's an incongruity between what we're referring to. I'm not disputing the above, so your question contains an erroneous suggestion.
You're referring to a statement about a past fact, and then you're asking me how this statement about a past fact is not a statement about a past fact. :brow:
The problem is with the first part. The point I made was never about a statement, it was about a fact. But you're making this about my statement. I'm talking about stuff, and you're talking about my talk, rather than the stuff. The result is a disconnect.
This is an example of the kind of thing that I think is happening here, where it's easier to spot the problem:
[I]Person A: "That cup is an object".
Person B: "But 'cup' is a word!".[/I]
And this is what's happening here:
[I]Me: "That Earth preexisted us is a fact".
You: "But 'That Earth preexisted us' is a statement!".[/I]
It's the same problem. :meh:
Quoting numberjohnny5
Then what's with the poorly composed question and the points which miss the point?
Quoting numberjohnny5
But I'm not trying to escape it!
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, but there was no need for that.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Oh dear. No, that is not the case at all. That's a kind of idealism which I strongly reject. It's odd, because some of the things you've said make me think that you're a realist like me, but then you come out with a bombshell like that.
What makes a statement like, "Earth preexisted us", true or false, is whether or not Earth preexisted us - which has nothing whatsoever to do with anyone judging any statement to be true or false.
[B]"Earth preexisted us" is true if, and only if, Earth preexisted us.[/b]
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, that's not right. There doesn't have to be (present tense) any judgement for the statement to be a statement. It just has to have the right sentence structure; or, at best, you could argue that there must have been (past tense) a judgement (from which it doesn't follow that there must be one).
Quoting numberjohnny5
Then that's the problem. My understanding was that we're talking about statements in general, not restricting the conversation in that manner, which conveniently suits your argument. Why would you do that?
Quoting numberjohnny5
That's not inconsistent with what I said. I'm fine with that sort of fact, namely facts about mental stuff.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Why would you do that? :angry:
The convention makes sense. You shouldn't diverge from it. That's going to cause more problems than it solves.
Quoting numberjohnny5
But why? Don't.
Do you parse cats as dogs and up as down?
Quoting numberjohnny5
I think what you really mean is "assertion" or "claim". Statements are broader and more ambiguous. But again, judgement is only necessary in past tense, not present tense i.e. there must [i]have been[/I] a judgement, but there doesn't have [i]to be[/I] one.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I can't be bothered to verify whether or not that wording is conventional. The gist of it is understandable, but, given the wording of it, I disagree with it. It makes your earlier mistake of confusing judgement and property. A statement that isn't judged to be true or false is not what makes a statement lack truth-value. Truth-value doesn't hinge on judgement of truth-value. For a statement to have truth-value, it need only be meaningful. And, for the kind of statements that we've been talking about to be true, they'd need to correspond with facts which reflect them.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Your conclusion doesn't follow, because statements aren't limited to being those which "occur" in the present, in the form of thoughts expressed verbally (which are arguably "mental events").
Your view is unreasonably narrow, and it seems as though you've purposefully made it that way, because making it that way will give you your desired conclusion.
What you're doing seems to be fallacious along the lines of begging the question or moving the goalposts.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, truth-values are properties of statements. The truth is not a property of a statements. We do judge the truth, and we do judge the truth-value of statements, and we do judge whether statements correspond with fact.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Again, your conclusion doesn't follow, since statements would have to [i]be[/I] thoughts. Talk of statements "as" thoughts doesn't work. And your second premise is false: truth is not a property of statements.
Quoting numberjohnny5
But that's just wrong. Why would you do that?
How about, in my ontology, cats are a type of dog?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Okay, but then your view is wrong.
Quoting numberjohnny5
There's a relationship between facts and events, but they're not indistinct, so they can't be identical. And the way that we conventionally talk about them reflects this distinction which you're attempting to set aside.
(N.B. There are parts of your reply that I have not addressed, because I felt, in relation to these parts, that there wasn't much more to be said).
Sorry to butt in here, but yes it is easy to see why there is confusion.
In the first sentence "that" is used as a pronoun.
In the second it is used as a conjunction.
Maybe that is why you are confused.
I don't mind you butting in, but I do mind you butting in with only a trivial point about grammar which misses the point and an ironic accusation of confusion.
By the way, using the that-clause like this is not really anything special. It's a common way of expressing or referring to facts, and is recognised in the context of philosophy:
[quote=Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy]The word is also used in locutions such as:
It is a fact that Sam is sad
That Sam is sad is a fact
That 2+2=4 is a fact.
[/quote]
Ok, thanks, I'll go with that definition.
Quoting Sir2u
Let me try to rephrase what you're saying there in an attempt to make progress.
If we are not perceiving/experiencing some X, then we cannot make claims about some X. In other words, we have to have some experience of some X to be able to claim some X exists or to make particular claims about aspects of some X. Is that right?
Information about some X is knowledge obtained from some X. That seems to be saying that making claims about some X is impossible without experiencing some X. Is that right?
If so, the issue I'm trying to resolve is not about making claims about some X. The issue for me is whether experiencing some X and making claims about some X is necessary for some X to obtain/exist.
Quoting Sir2u
The "obtaining" of a state of affairs just means the actual happening/occurring/existence of a fact/event. But you don't seem to think that facts happen unless they're known about.
Quoting Sir2u
Wait--I just want to make sure I know what you mean by "good description (the facts) of it". Do you mean after having witnessed the event you had knowledge about the event and could therefore describe your knowledge about the event to others? If so, then in other words, you're saying that because I have observed/experienced some X, I have obtained knowledge about some X, and therefore I can make a claim about what I know about some X.
That's not something I disagree with. That you couldn't make a particular knowledge-statement about it prior to experiencing it makes logical sense. I'm saying that some X/that particular X you experienced didn't actually/ontologically just appear/begin-to-exist just when you or because you observed/experienced it. When I talk about "facts" I'm making existence claims. Facts obtain/occur/happen/are/etc. So I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. That objective facts are mind-independent. (Subjective facts are mental facts.)
Quoting Sir2u
It wouldn't be a true proposition about a particular, actual unknown or un-experienced fact/event. It would be a claim that there exist some unknown or un-experienced facts. It's just an existential claim. It's based on reasoning and other available evidence accumulated by experience. For example, I realise that after having experienced many things in my life, there are some things I haven't experienced that I know exist. I have experienced the sturdiness of a wall in my backyard, and I infer, from experiencing many walls at different locations as sturdy, that other walls exist that are sturdy that I haven't experienced as sturdy. You can apply that logic to other things I haven't experienced but are actual/happening. Essentially, it's an ontological claim based on actuals, i.e. actuals exist in places we have yet to observe. We may not know specifically what those actuals are or what they're like (apart from knowing that they must be physical, in my view), but that's different than knowing that unknown actuals exist in some form.
Again, I'm saying some facts exist that we don't know about to support my claim that objective facts don't rely on minds to exist. I think you're arguing that objective facts rely on minds to exist. Correct me if I'm wrong (I know you will ;)).
Quoting Sir2u
How could you claim that if you have no information/experience/knowledge about those unknown things? That's the argument you're using against me! You're contradicting yourself. On the one hand, you say one can't make claims about facts unless facts are known about, and also that facts are present actuals that aren't happening. And on the other hand, you're saying that some unknown things are happening. But you say that what determines whether a fact is happening is confirmation of it happening. But how can one confirm something they don't know about? That seems confused to me.
Quoting Sir2u Quoting Sir2u
One doesn't literally "obtain a state of affairs". "Obtain" means exist/happen. And I think it's a mis-reading to assume that states of affairs literally "make" (as in, they intentionally/actively make) propositions true. That's just a manner of defining facts. What actually happens is that states of affairs exist, we experience them and judge our statements about them to be true or false. Another way of stating "a state of affairs is a way the actual world must be in order to make some given proposition about the actual world true" is, "a proposition is true if it accurately relates to some state of affairs obtaining".
Quoting Sir2u
Do you believe in past facts?
Quoting Sir2u
How can something actual not be happening? It doesn't make sense to me to suppose any existent isn't happening since all existents are changing. I don't believe in anything being literally static. I'm a Heraclitean, in that sense.
Quoting Sir2u
Or you're using "facts" in a different way to me; or you're misunderstanding me (which I think is true). I've stated multiple times that there are subjective facts (facts about mental events happening like thoughts etc.), and objective facts (non-mental facts). I wouldn't say "facts are information" because that's a category error. Rather, I'd say information as knowledge is factually a mental event, since knowledge occurs in minds.
Yes, it is not possible to make claims about anything that no information exists for.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Not exactly. while it is true that information about anything has to come from the source, the object itself provides us with the information, if no one has any information about something then no one can make any claims about it.
Quoting numberjohnny5
If absolutely no information about X exists no one can make claims about whether it exists or not, it might or it might not exist. Could you give me an example of something that exists but that we have no information at all about? Our knowledge or lack of it has nothing at all to do with somethings exists, there are zillions of things out there in the universe that no one knows about but nobody can claim that they exist.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I think you should get a dictionary.
So where does the "obtaining" part fit in, is it not the gathering, collecting, acquisition of knowledge? Is there a definition of obtaining that I do not know? What is the definition you use?
Events might happen, as I have already said, but an event is not the same as a fact. And unless you can find some way to prove that they are the same then there is no way to continue. I cannot agree to them meaning the same thing.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I have never said it did. That is why one says that one observed an event, because one is watching it happening. They happen simultaneously, it would be impossible for the "looking at it" to make it happening.
Quoting numberjohnny5
I cannot accept your use of the word fact to include the unknown. Something that is unknown cannot be a fact. Please mention just one unknown fact and I will agree with you that it is possible. The tell me an objective fact.
Quoting numberjohnny5
If it is not a true proposition about a particular object, event then it cannot be a fact.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Simple deduction my friend, if there was nothing unknown in the universe then nothing new would be discovered, but as we see every day new things are being discovered thus there are still unknown things in the universe. But that might change tomorrow if they fail to find anything new.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Anything, even things in the past that have been certified as a fact remain a fact while the circumstances about the fact remain the same. When they were declared facts they were actual states of affair, or evidence of them still exists to prove that they were facts. Archeologists dig up past facts all the time, even if they don't know what they are.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Who said it could not?
Quoting numberjohnny5
That sounds interesting.
Quoting numberjohnny5
No, you are using it incorrectly.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Not in my dictionary.
Fact; A piece of information about circumstances that exist or events that have occurred
Quoting numberjohnny5
And you would, and do have it wrong. The only part that you have right is that it occurs in the mind.
Knowledge; The psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning.
Many people claim to have knowledge of god, can anyone prove it to be a fact.
Lots have people have been walking around with the erroneous knowledge that screwing standing up stops a woman from getting pregnant. That was the result of perception, learning and reasoning. But a lot of them still get pregnant because it is not a fact.
Click on the bottom of the post and some dots should appear, click on the dots and a pencil will appear.
Well, that's because I'm a physicalist, and it doesn't make sense to me how a non-physical thing can exist. It's not as though I haven't thought about and argued this stuff before, btw.
It's not that I'm "setting out to reduce whatever" you bring up as if I had some kind of agenda. I don't tend to use the terms "reduce/reductionism" because there's often a lot of stigma surrounding those terms in places I've argued philosophy, especially from those who tend to be dualists, universalists, and realists on abstract objects. Furthermore, what makes you think you're being more impartial?
Also, "mental" is physical.
Quoting Sapientia
No wonder you believe that there exist "objective standards" of some kind. It seems that you're an externalist. A cat is thought of as feline always to someone. There is no view-from-nowhere. A cat's classification is reinforced by others thinking about a cat as feline. Classifications don't make sense outside of mental events. We assign/impose concepts upon things. Those things aren't real, objective things though. As an internalist, that's my view, anyway.
Quoting Sapientia
That's just weird to me.
Quoting Sapientia
Again, that's just a bizarre thing to me. Interesting to know though. I'm curious what "concepts" are ontologically for you?
Also, hypothetically, or for the sake of argument, if concepts are thoughts, do you think that thoughts "pop in and out of existence"?
Quoting Sapientia
Well, as we all have different ontologies, I'm sure it doesn't make sense to you. In my view, things are happening/being in some way, some more dynamic than others. Nouns and verbs can be useful, but are just ways of parsing and organising experience. Remember that old thing you said? The map ain't the territory.
Quoting Sapientia
Your definition of "criteria" makes a bit more sense to me now...I think.
Quoting Sapientia
So that's everything then. :)
Quoting Sapientia
It's confusing because as I said there's a more straightforward way of making that claim, rather than saying something like "it's the truth that this statement about this fact is true". Using "truth" and "true" in that statement just seems redundant to me. Otherwise, it seems like "truth" is being used like a fact, as in, "it's a fact that this statement about this fact is true".
Quoting Sapientia
I don't know why what I said there makes you think I'm an idealist. I am a realist on some things, but I'm an anti-realist on some things, like abstract objects. Also, I've checked and it seems that, standardly in analytic philosophy, (propositional) statements involve an individual judging statements to be true or false. But then, if you're an externalist and you believe things like concepts are mind-independent once they've been conceived, you would disagree. I'd guess you're a realist about abstract objects too.
Quoting Sapientia
There is a relationship between statements and facts. What makes that relationship is individuals/minds using statements to refer to facts. Objective facts don't literally make that relationship, because they aren't individuals/minds--they don't have things like intentions or will. That's the purpose of propositional statements: they refer to things; and minds judge whether those statements accurately refer to facts or not. What else is going to judge whether a statement is true or not? The non-mental objects/events/facts can't, can they? If there was no one around to observe facts and to make judgements about them in the form of statements, the facts would still obtain, but there would be no true or false because truth is a property of propositions only. No minds, no truth.
Furthermore, I think we have to be careful about how we use/interpret language because it can mislead us into mistaken views. Facts don't actually "make" statements true or false. That's just a manner of speaking. Facts are observed and judged to be facts (via statements/propositions) by individuals/minds.
Quoting Sapientia
I think that's because statements don't inherently contain meaning, so it would only be relevant to discuss statements that we think and utter ourselves, or when we assign meaning onto written statements of some medium. Apart from that, it could be an assumption I made that I wasn't aware of.
Quoting Sapientia
Yeh, I checked and it seems I'm not using an unconventional definition of "truth" re propositions afterall. Oops. Still learning.
Btw, some conventions make sense, some don't, right? So I wouldn't stick to a convention unless I agreed with it. I think it's useful to be aware of conventions in general though so as to have a reference frame from which to discuss this stuff.
Quoting Sapientia
Those examples aren't equivalent to my statement. Is your statement, "The Earth preexisted us" a true statement because it refers to past facts?
Quoting Sapientia
What I mean by "judgement" is an evaluation and psychological commitment towards the relationship between a statement and how it refers to the facts. E.g. I evaluate whether a statement refers to the facts accurately (via acquaintance knowledge), and if I believe the correspondence is accurate, then I commit myself to a truth-value, namely, "true" or "false".
Also, I make a distinction between "statement" and "sentence". I take "sentence" to be a broader class in which things like statements, questions, instructions, and exclamations exist.
Here's some references I use (The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, by Honderich):
[i]"Most modern logicians maintain that statements are distinct
from sentences, citing the fact that not all sentences are used to make statements or arguing
that the same statement may be expressed by different sentences. Some use 'statement' and
'proposition' interchangeably, regarding them as alternative names for what is 'expressed'
by an indicative sentence or 'asserted' when such a sentence is used. Others distinguish
between the two, so that a proposition is what is asserted when such a sentence is used to
make a statement."
"The term 'truth' seems to denote a property, one which is also expressed by the truth-predicate 'is true'. But if so, of what is truth a property? What are the primary 'bearers' of
truth, and of its counterpart, falsity? At least three candidates can be put forward:
sentences, statements, and propositions. Loosely, a sentence is a linguistic token or type,
such as the string of written words 'This is red'. A statement is the assertoric use of a
sentence by a speaker on a particular occasion. A proposition is what is asserted when a
statement is made—its 'content'. Thus two different speakers, or the same speaker on two
different occasions, may assert the same proposition by making two different statements,
perhaps using sentences of two different languages."[/i]
Quoting Sapientia
I don't think that's sufficient. Any statement can be interpreted meaningfully in numerous ways, since meaning is subjective.
Quoting Sapientia
Yes, and individuals/minds are the ones that refer or do the corresponding. The facts don't do anything but "sit" there.
Quoting Sapientia
It would also apply to individuals presently assigning meaning onto statements inscribed on some medium in the past.
Quoting Sapientia
Maybe. Do you think you could be wrong about that, or that there might be other explanations?
Quoting Sapientia
I think a lot of what's going on is that we obviously don't share similar views about how to use terms conventionally. But more than that, a lot of these views are based on implicit ontological beliefs that influence our explicit views and understandings. It's not necessarily a fallacious issue.
Quoting Sapientia
Err...because I think I'm right?
Quoting Sapientia
Or not.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Yes, but that's changing the topic from when a cat [i]is[/I] feline to when a cat is [i]thought of as[/I] feline. And, obviously, if you change the premise by inserting some kind of subjective activity, like being thought of, then that's going to necessitate a subject. You won't get any disagreement from me there. I'll just note that that doesn't address the topic. To make it on topic, you'd have to bring out a hidden premise to connect what I've said with what you've said, and that's where I suspect your form of idealism would come in. It's a variation of the old chestnut, "to be is to be perceived". But the perception part is an unnecessary addition which Occam's razor can cut out. A cat is a feline because it has been classified as such, and that's a sufficient explanation.
Quoting numberjohnny5
That's a kind of nonsense phrase that idealists tend to bring up. I don't recall ever seeing a realist actually posit a so-called view-from-nowhere. I certainly have not done so. There doesn't need to be a view at all. It's the idealist who thinks in those terms. I'm just telling you what's the case, or what it would be.
Quoting numberjohnny5
This so-called reinforcement is not necessary. It suggests some sort of post hoc confirmation. But, of course, if a cat is feline, then a cat is feline. That's logical and indisputable. And what determines whether or not a cat feline? Why, whether or not it has been classified as such, of course. There's no additional step required for a cat to be feline. There's no timer, no expiration date, and no need for confirmation. That's entirely in your imagination, and it's illogical. It's a result of misapplying psychology to matters of logic. This isn't an enquiry into human understanding. It's about an objective logical relationship.
Quoting numberjohnny5
Oh yes they do. On the contrary, they wouldn't make sense without the "outside of". It's your idealist reductionism which turns it into something which clashes with good sense. Whatever appeal there is to this view is deceptive. Just as things like rocks and trees don't depend on mental events, and just as facts of the kind under discussion - such as that Earth preexisted us - don't depend on mental events, nor do logical relationships like those implied by classification.
Quoting numberjohnny5
What does that mean? We come up with concepts. They're conceived by us. An act of conception. But they're no more attached to us than you or I are attached to our respective mothers by umbilical cord. We are independent, as are they.
And it's a similar thing with classifications. Things don't classify themselves. We classify things. But once a classification has been made, we're no longer necessary. We can step back. Job done. You'd need a cause for the situation to change.
Quoting numberjohnny5
But it's just logic. It's weird to me that it's weird to you. The classification was, remains to be, and - all else being equal - will be going forward, that cats are feline. In light of that classification, if there's a cat, then it's feline. Now, why would that require actual cats or people, bearing in mind that the classification has already been made? The answer is that it wouldn't. That's not how logic works. But you need it to be otherwise for your argument to work, so you posit a fake requirement, and hey presto!
Quoting numberjohnny5
Again, I don't like that question, because I'm not quite sure what it is you're asking. It's vague and unspecific. If, on the other hand, you were to ask me whether they're [i]this[/I] or [i]that[/I]...?
Quoting numberjohnny5
I think that "thoughts" is ambiguous. So, it depends. In a sense, yes. In another sense, no. My thoughts on the ethics of the death penalty haven't changed for quite some time. I'm still against it, and I remain against it, even when I'm not thinking about it. There's a sustainability there, and a kind of transcendence. Yet, nevertheless, it seems as though there's another side to thought, whereby thoughts just pop in and out of my head, like what shift I'm working tomorrow, or what to have for dinner. There's more of an instantaneity there, and a proximity to thinking.
Quoting numberjohnny5
But the act of conceiving is distinct from the concept conceived, yes? Like the act of production is distinct from the product produced. I presume that you'd agree that a product, once produced, no longer depends for it's existence as a product on the process in which it was produced, yes?
Quoting numberjohnny5
Sigh... I feel like this is going around in circles to some degree. It might be time to just agree to disagree and move on.
To be clear, I don't agree that there would be no truth-values, because truth-values are properties of meaningful statements, and there would be meaningful statements, which is to say that there would be statements, at least some of which would have a meaning, even if no one were there to understand it; and that, if there were someone there, then they could, with a sufficient understanding of the language, understand it. Just because someone is required for the creation of a meaningful statement, and to understand it, and to judge its truth-value, it doesn't follow that someone is required for it to exist and to exist as a meaningful statement. That's the sort of fallacy that crops up in idealist thinking.
Note that I reject any interpretation of "statement" that would necessitate someone being there at the time making any kind of judgement about it. That would be to confuse what's required for understanding with what's required for existence, which is in essence the fallacy that idealists make. And that would also be begging the question, as the conclusion would be inherent within the premise. Your argument would be trivially true and unpersuasive to anyone who doesn't already share your view.
This is a statement: "Earth preexisted humanity". It is displayed on a website. If we all suddenly ceased to exist, then, all else being equal, the statement would still be there, and it would of course still be true, because it would of course still be the case that Earth preexisted humanity.
Q.E.D.
And I don't agree that there would be no truth or falsity either, as truth and falsity would correspond accordingly with what is or is not the case, which, as I've demonstrated, does not depend on us or our judgement
If no minds, then no minds to judge, comprehend, ascertain, perceive, conceive, understand, think about, know, etc., etc., the truth. But, nevertheless, the truth would be there, with or without us, and with or without our minds, or those of anyone else for that matter, and with or without our judging, comprehending, ascertaining, perceiving, conceiving, understanding, thinking, knowing, etc., etc., anything at all, because the correspondence between truth and fact does not require us, or our minds, or those of anyone else, or any judging, comprehending, ascertaining, perceiving, conceiving, understanding, thinking, knowing, etc., etc., to take place - again, as I've demonstrated. The show would simply go on without us.
These minds of ours are seemingly capable of deceiving us into thinking that their place in the world is more important than it actually is. Fortunately for me, I'm a wise old owl who can see things as they are. You jelly?
Question: Are some people better than others?
Answer: Yes, I'm better than all of you.
I've been pondering about our debate to try and understand it more clearly. I think we're talking about different things.
I think you're basically saying that we can't make verifiable claims about events/circumstances if we haven't experienced those events/circumstances.
I'm saying that the kinds of things that objective events are ontologically doesn't hinge on subjective mental states (like experiencing those events, making claims about them, etc.) for them to be the kinds of things that they are. They are the kinds of things that they are whether we experience them or not. So I'm saying that "facts" as objective events are mind-independent. That's a different claim than the one you're putting forward, which is based on a different definition of "fact" I think you're using.
I'm using the standard philosophical definition of "fact". I think you're using a general or non-philosophical definition of "fact", like this one: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/fact
I would agree that we can't make (provisionally) verifiable (or falsifiable) claims about events/circumstances if we (a) haven't experienced those events directly, or (b) haven't experienced/learnt about those events indirectly. But that's not a claim against what I'm saying about objective facts being mind-independent.
Where did you get this definition? Please give me the link to it, unless it is Wikipedia.
It's not changing the topic. In my view, a cat is never objectively feline because "feline" is a meaningful term that is assigned to animals like cats/that have the properties that cats have relative to other animals. This is just a fundamental disagreement about what meaning is, and whether abstract objects are real or not, I think, and so we'll just be going around in circles unless those issues are addressed.
Quoting Sapientia
You're misunderstanding me. I'm not saying anything like "my perception of something makes it have the properties that it does", like Berkeley. I'm saying, rather, that anything meaningful I assign to objects/properties is not the same as the objects/properties I'm assigning meaning onto. That my classifications of stuff are not the same kinds of stuff as the stuff I'm classifying. It would be a category error to assume the opposite were true.
Quoting Sapientia
A cat is an animal that we label "feline" based on our taxonomy of animal classification. "Feline" is obviously a label that individuals construct. The term "feline" is not inherent within the animal itself, otherwise what kind of thing, ontologically, is "feline"? What and where is the property "feline"?
Quoting Sapientia
The "view-from-nowhere" phrase was brought up because it seems you believe concepts (once conceived) are things that objectively exist sans minds. So it's like you're saying that when concepts are initially conceived, they are from an individual perspective; but then after that, they are objectively real from no perspective. They exist in the thing they are about, somehow.
Quoting Sapientia
Logic is mental. Concepts are mental. If there were no individuals, there would exist no logic. Are you equating logic with objective phenomena like rocks and trees?
Quoting Sapientia
Yes, they are. The kinds of things that concepts are are brain states, particularly, mental states.
Quoting Sapientia
Classifications are made by individuals, right? So they are made from a perspective. They can be written down as objective ink on paper, but they need individuals to assign meaning onto them, otherwise they are just ink on paper.
What is your take on meaning--where is it? What is it? I think this will get to the heart of the matter in terms of our disagreements.
Quoting Sapientia
No, it depends on what kinds of things we're referring to. Conceiving something and "holding/maintaining" the concept conceived are mental events i.e. thoughts. They are subjective phenomena. They aren't objective (external-to-mind) phenomena. I think what you're talking about is conceiving something as mental phenomena, and then expressing that conception in various material forms, maybe? Like expressing the concept "blue moon" as a drawing on a piece of paper, or via speech-sounds. If that's what you're getting at, that drawing and those speech-sounds wouldn't actually have any inherent meaning. They are objectively a drawing and speech-sounds in that they exist external-to-minds, but meaning is assigned to objective (external-to-mind) phenomena. That's because objective phenomena is not the same kind of thing--doesn't consist of the same kinds of properties/materials--as subjective phenomena. The first-person experience of conceiving and making statements, etc. cannot be observed from third-person perspectives. We can only observe the things that constitute the expression of concepts from third-person perspectives. So for example, the conception of some criteria cannot be literally first-person observed/experienced from another person's first-person experience. That criteria can be expressed via language though. So the "act of producing" some criteria in your mind is not the same kind of thing, ontologically, as the way that criteria is produced/translated/expressed in the form of objective materials, like speech-sounds, pixels on a screen, a diagram/list on paper, etc.
Quoting Sapientia
The statement would still be there as pixels on a screen, but there would be no meaning inherent in those pixels. Meaning occurs in minds--we assign meaning onto things like pixels on a screen.
Quoting Sapientia
"Truth" is always true to someone because truth is a property of propositions, and propositions are mental events. (Objective) facts/states of affairs are not dependent on someone's perspective, as we agreed.
Quoting Sapientia
I think "the truth" is something you're thinking is a real abstract. You spoke of Lockean primary qualities as opposed to Platonic Forms, but you do realise that primary qualities are inherent qualities within things, right? How does something mental, like "criteria", or a concept, though originally conceived within a mind, then become inherent within the object/thing the criteria/concept refer to?
I think by "the truth" you mean "the cat is feline is an objective fact". But in my view, when we say "the cat is feline," we mean, "it's a fact that we assign meaning to those animals we label as "cats" in the form of a classification system in which cats are labelled 'feline'."
It's like you're saying we conceive of things and make truth-claims about things, and once we have made truth-claims, they persist with or without us. So they go from being mental to non-mental. Well, what exactly is existing/persisting that once was mental and now isn't? What kind of thing is an objective truth-claim? Do you believe 2+2=4 is an objective fact? Where and what kind of thing is the concept "2" in reality if not in minds?
Also, I still want to know what evidence you have to support your claim that I'm some kind of idealist.
I must admit, after having looked into it, I didn't realise there were a few popular philosophical and non-philosophical definitions of fact/states of affairs that are not the same. I assumed there was only one--the one that I thought was the standard definition. So that's another thing that I've found useful to learn through this debate/discussion.
I use the Russellian definition, which is one among other popular/standard philosophical definitions. Here's a link: https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2009/entries/states-of-affairs/
The Wikipedia (and Honderich) definitions are also standard definitions, I think, although they don't clearly make reference to objective facts/states of affairs as ontologically different in "kind" in relation to things like truth-claims or propositions, which are mental.
Another discussion about this is in this link: https://philosophynow.org/issues/115/Facts_and_Opinions
The conclusion details the ontological difference between facts and beliefs/claims.
So, in light of these definitions, my view is that as facts/states of affairs aren't the same kind of thing as mental states (which experience and produce things like truth-claims), I then infer that facts/states of affairs don't hinge on things like truth-claims to be the kind of thing that they are i.e. to have the properties that they do. Objective things that mental states refer to aren't the same kinds of things as mental states that do the referring. And that's what leads me to conclude that "facts/events/states of affairs" aren't mind-dependent (but mind-independent), since they don't possess the same properties of minds, and are in different locations to minds (i.e. external to minds).
Interesting article.
"Like properties and particulars, states of affairs make up an ontological category — a fundamental kind of entity. At least, they seem to be so regarded by those philosophers who deploy this concept in philosophical explanations. Explicit recognition of states of affairs is relatively recent in philosophy. In the guise of facts, states of affairs entered center stage at the beginning of the 20th century in efforts of Bertrand Russell (Russell 1985) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1961) to account for truth as a property of beliefs or sentences."
Quoting numberjohnny5
The article you referenced says,
"The justification for thinking there are states of affairs could thus be regarded as abductive, that is, as a kind of inference to the best explanation. This kind of inference can be evaluated along a number of dimensions — Is the data real or bogus?"
How can any form of inference or evaluation not be mental.
"The Combination Argument
Both Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore came to hold that the only states of affairs that there are are facts -- states of affairs that obtain. Various passages in their writings suggest an argument for this conclusion, based on the compositionalist conception of states of affairs. For example:
We are not now hearing the noise of a brass-band; and we all, I think, can understand the nature of the fact which I express by saying we are not. What these words imply is that there simply is no such thing in the Universe as our being now hearing that particular kind of noise. The combination of us at this moment with hearing of that particular kind of noise is a combination which simply has no being. There is no such combination. (Moore 1966, pp. 277-278)
We can call this the "combination argument" (Wetzel 1998). If we consider (1)
(1) this wall's being dark green
this state of affairs would simply consist of this wall exhibiting the color dark green, on the compositionalist view. For there to be such an entity, this connection must hold between the wall the color since the state of affairs simply is the connecting of the wall to the color dark green.
In arguing for states of affairs, Gustav Bergmann (Bergmann 1964) and D. M. Armstrong (Armstrong 1997) appeal to an argument of the following sort:
The constituents of (1) are, let us say, the wall surface and the color dark green. How is (1) differentiated from the mere collection of these constituents {this wall, being dark green}, or the mereological sum of those constituents, this wall+being dark green? Presumably the constituents might exist even if they were not so connected. But if the constituents of (1) could exist even if (1) did not, then (1) cannot be reduced to simply the collection or mereological sum of its constituents.
The combination argument shows that this conclusion is inconsistent with the existence of possible but non-obtaining states of affairs, as follows:
(B1) For a basic state of affairs of the form a's-having-F, a's-having-F exists when and only when exemplification connects a to F.
(B2) If a is connected by exemplification to F, then a's-having-F obtains.
(B3) Hence, a's-having-F exists only if it obtains.
(B4) Since this could be generalized to other ties connecting constituents to form states of affairs, there are no non-obtaining states of affairs.
The combination argument assumes that exemplification is the connection that accounts for the unity (and thus existence) of a basic state of affairs of the form a's-having-F. The argument also assumes that exemplification is the connection that accounts for the obtaining of a basic state of affairs of the form a's-having-F. Clearly, the soft actualist cannot agree with both assumptions.
At this point a soft actualist compositionalist might appeal to the following distinction. Let us say that the connection among the constituents of a state of affairs that accounts for the existence of that state of affairs is the constitutive connection for that state of affairs. And let us say that the connection among the constituents of a state of affairs that accounts for the obtaining of a state of affairs is the actualization connection for that state of affairs. In the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus Wittgenstein says: "Form is the possibility of structure." (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 13) Wittgenstein appears to be differentiating the constitutive and actualization connections of states of affairs. The "structure" (such as exemplification) is the actualization connection. The possibility of such structure being realized is the constitutive connection. The possibility of this wall surface being dark green is the constitutive connection that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of (1), on this view. Thus, a soft actualist who views states of affairs as compositional can use this distinction to escape the conclusion that there are no non-obtaining states of affairs. Exemplification must hold between the constituents of a's-having-F for this state of affairs to obtain, but a different tie accounts for the existence of that state of affairs. Soft actualism thus requires two primitives where hard actualism can get by with one."
This is the continuation of some of Russell' ideas. It seems to imply that there must be some sort of perception for there to be a state of affairs. He also pointed out that states of affairs are facts, not that facts are states of affairs.