A possible insight into epicurean philosophy
I have/had taken to trying and really digging into Epicurean philosophy some time back. It is an ongoing project.
Perhaps one of the hardest points for my understanding of Epicurean philosophy was the fourth tenet of the tetrapharmakos:
Famously Epicurus claimed that this edict applied even in extreme cases such as his own death in Diogenes Laertius' text of a letter attributed to him:
Or at DL 10.118, where Diogenes is in prose and not quoting:
So this is meant to be taken quite literally, if these sources are to be believed as accurate portrayals at least of Epicurean philosophy (which can be argued! :) ), and is not merely a practical belief to assuage anxiety in times of relative comfort. Rather, the Epicurean sage is truly happy even in the most dire of circumstances -- a slow and painful death form health or by torture.
For me it's not that there's anything logically against the remark, only that it seems quite implausible on its face. So the question is -- how does a rational and intelligent person, who I take Epicurus to be, make a statement like this without sounding easily dismissable? What makes this work as a practical tenet, especially considering that Epicureanism was always meant to be practiced?
A way of resolving this for me popped into my head the other day. One of the things about Epicurean philosophy is how it is meant for a community of practitioners. And by joining said community one is dedicated to making oneself into a better Epicurean. So really it's not that every Epicurean will be able to fully adhere to the invulnerability of the sage -- it's that, by joining said community, you slowly turn yourself into the sort of person where it really is enough to merely have good memories to endure any pain whatsoever.
And, at least in the case of Epicurus -- it does seem that he faithfully followed through on exactly that in his last days.
EDIT: The insight being -- it's not that the trick of remembering good times is especially good. It's that the practice of philosophy is so good that all you need is a simple mental trick to endure any pain.
Perhaps one of the hardest points for my understanding of Epicurean philosophy was the fourth tenet of the tetrapharmakos:
What is terrible is easy to endure
Famously Epicurus claimed that this edict applied even in extreme cases such as his own death in Diogenes Laertius' text of a letter attributed to him:
When he was already dying he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus: “Living this blessed and also final day of my life I write this to you. Sufferings from strangury and dysentery are continually with me, and there is no way in which there could be any increase in their magnitude. Yet against them all I set the joy of my soul at the remembrance of our past conversations. But as for you: as befits your support of me and of philosophy since your youth, take care of Metrodorus’ children.”
Or at DL 10.118, where Diogenes is in prose and not quoting:
Even on the rack the wise man is happy. He alone will feel gratitude towards friends, present and absent alike, and show it by word and deed. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans.
So this is meant to be taken quite literally, if these sources are to be believed as accurate portrayals at least of Epicurean philosophy (which can be argued! :) ), and is not merely a practical belief to assuage anxiety in times of relative comfort. Rather, the Epicurean sage is truly happy even in the most dire of circumstances -- a slow and painful death form health or by torture.
For me it's not that there's anything logically against the remark, only that it seems quite implausible on its face. So the question is -- how does a rational and intelligent person, who I take Epicurus to be, make a statement like this without sounding easily dismissable? What makes this work as a practical tenet, especially considering that Epicureanism was always meant to be practiced?
A way of resolving this for me popped into my head the other day. One of the things about Epicurean philosophy is how it is meant for a community of practitioners. And by joining said community one is dedicated to making oneself into a better Epicurean. So really it's not that every Epicurean will be able to fully adhere to the invulnerability of the sage -- it's that, by joining said community, you slowly turn yourself into the sort of person where it really is enough to merely have good memories to endure any pain whatsoever.
And, at least in the case of Epicurus -- it does seem that he faithfully followed through on exactly that in his last days.
EDIT: The insight being -- it's not that the trick of remembering good times is especially good. It's that the practice of philosophy is so good that all you need is a simple mental trick to endure any pain.
Comments (44)
I think the limits with applying Epicureanism (& Stoicism) by itself is that it gives very valuable advice but it doesn't really guide us how to get to that state of mind. That's because human beings are masters of self-deception and thus we often fail to become the type of people we want to through rational deliberation, we fail to notice the hidden motives that underly the emotions and rationales that inhabit our contemplation (Kierkegaard) So the roots of our anxieties aren't always quite what they appear to be.
Like take the fear of death for an example (something I've struggled through for long time). I and many others stubbornly refused the Epicurean argument while in angst. I mean we find it largely convincing in ways (in fact, we want to believe it and live by it) but somehow it doesn't appease us and we fight back fiercely why the Epicurus' reasoning doesn't work. And strangely, many of us have these strange contradictory urges towards suicidal thoughts despite our supposed fear of death.
Now that I largely escaped death anxiety, I can really understand better what was driving those anxieties. Although I'm much less anxious of death now, the Epicurean argument wasn't really more compelling than it was before. Rather that now I'm in a different state of mind, I'm free from the fetters that prevented me from experiencing life properly. It was much less that I was afraid of death itself, but rather I was too absorbed in the far future. I wasn't satisfied with the present and had extreme anxieties about future concerns & failures, so I was really looking too far ahead (to divert myself of what bothered me) and only saw death rather than long uncertain years of life to look forward to. And if death is the only thing you see, you start becoming obsessed with it. It was really the fear of life that was the root of it all, but it's difficult to perceive that when the concept of death is the immediate occupant of your thoughts.
(I can't say this for all individuals who experience death anxiety because our experiences are different case by case, but from talking to another friend who suffered the same anxieties, I suspect that the roots are similar.)
But in my anxious state of mind, I couldn't really see that and apply Epicurus' principles properly. I can come up with other parallel examples. Like say, a friend who had a skin condition that caused his face to become crimson and no amount of rational argument could convince him that he isn't the ugliest person in the world (in comparison to people who had even much more severe problems with their appearance) He got out of it by applying make up and it struck him how strange he found his rationalization back then, that his condition wasn't even such a big deal never got to him until now.
Basically, human rationalizations are complex and fucks with your mind. I take Epicureanism seriously, but for setting goals to achieve rather than advice to simply follow by somehow forcefully convincing myself of it. Just being "convinced of the arguments" doesn't get me there. I think the less emotional barriers one has, the easier it is for people to simply follow the advice directly, but I suspect most people will fail to do that for the reasons mentioned. Clearer self awareness is needed, and that's usually achieved not by rational deliberation of the moment but placing yourself in a state of mind where these barriers weaken so life in context is easier to see.
I found Wolfman's words long time ago helpful:
http://forums.philosophyforums.com/comments.php?id=65083&findpost=1172736#post1172736
Sounds like bullshit, with all due respect to Epicurus. But, some people are more disciplined in what they can endure. I'm skeptical that any kind of suffering can be endured in such a fashion.
Not sure about Epicurus' particular position or framing or Molier's interpretation, but is it possible that can be part of the mental trick Epicurus noted? People who are disciplined to endure pain experience the same type of pain as those who are undisciplined but that discipline may be due to them being able to take their moments of pain in perspective better. They have a mental trick. It's just that perhaps developing a mental trick is the "hard part" which I have noted in my response above.
So my object is more to gain an understanding of the philosophy -- while my initial impulse of this particular part of Epicurean philosophy was to be dismissive, that's far from helpful in understanding it. Epicurus was no slouch. So, presuming that there is something worthwhile to be had to the fourth part of the tetrapharmakos, that it is not merely practical advice to assuage anxiety but also seems to have a direct relation to the actual endurance of pain, in what way can we make sense of this?
that's what I'm attempting to illuminate through my answer.
Secondly, two things come to mind -- one is the role of rationality in ancient ethics, and two is the differences in rationality between antiquity and modern day.
It would seem that your finding is something of a challenge to the stoics and the more rationalist interpretations of the epicureans. While the arguments were persuasive to your reason, you claimed they were not enough to influence your character -- that this took something more than the argument. Something like an insight into yourself and why the argument was not moving you initially, based on your description. And so reason was not enough to modify character, therefore it must take more than reason to get one to a place where said beliefs become practical. The philosophers art is not enough.
But then I'm reminded that reason and emotion were not so cleanly separated in antiquity as they are often today. Might we consider the insights into your character which helped you reach a state of mind where the epicurean cure became effective as reason operating on the soul, if in fact reason is not separate from emotion? Perhaps the arguments differ from the power of reason, where the former gave you the goal (as you said), and the latter is what operated on your soul (used in the broad, non-spiritual sense) to help you realize that the cure could help you with your fear of death?
I don't know. A bit of free association going on there. I don't really have an argument against anything you've said, just a reaction.
Well, it's effective insofar as pleasure becomes present. The Epicureans are aiming to produce pleasure through the value and significance of the past. They have knowledge of the absence of pain or what it takes to "endure" painful activity, pleasure, and are trying to produce that state in ourselves by referencing our memory. Quelling present pains isn't the point. Replacing them with something else is the goal.
Epicureans' absurd call to feel pleasure in anything, even torture, is sort of an exaggeration to the imagined maximum benefit in the world. If we are stuck in this world with so much pointless and terrible pain, then the best we can do is to remove it as much as we can. If we are stuck being tortured, the only way to improve things replace the pain with pleasure, as much as it is possible. If one could enjoy torture, then their inevitable future would cease to be suffering. It's just not very effective. An idea to the benefit of the people imagining the world without suffering (not even from torture!!!) rather than to anyone being tortured.
Basically, a follower of Epicureanism or some other kind of philo-religious doctrine imagine a kind of "superhero" that would be able to deal with what they normally cannot do. For example, the evangelical Christians will say "What Would Jesus Do (WWJD?)?" and appeal to the demigod Jesus as the penultimate figure. The Buddhist sees the Buddha as the goal to attain (as well as nirvana), the ideal person. Epicureanism and Stoicism create an image of a person who is able to deal with pain and whatnot by sheer will alone - what a strong person they must be! Essentially, these kinds of beliefs revolve around a quest for the ideal hero.
I'm always a bit skeptical of philosophies or religions or self-help books that attempt to solve a problem in life without recognizing that life is problematic just because of this problem. Certain early Christian sects recognized the problem of life and essentially shunned existence, eventually going out of existence entirely since nobody had children and it was apparently too nihilistic for everyone else. Buddhists come right out in the open and say that life is suffering, and then offer ways to deal with this suffering (it wasn't until it became more of a religion that Buddhism started to see these techniques as part of some kind of cosmic law).
But you don't really see this in the Greek philosophies. Some of the techniques used can work to an extent no doubt, or at least help reassure the individual, but they still don't quite go far enough to recognize that an unproblematic life is not one that you have to use techniques to deal with.
This dilemma is unique to the Epicureans, and their rivals don't have to deal with it because they bite one of two bullets: either, like the Cynics and Stoics, they admit that man's end is more abstract than we might think, and so remove ethics from the concreteness of pleasure and pain, or like the Cyrenaics, they admit that philosophy is of very limited power, and while it can help you, there is no state of sagehood that will relieve you of all life's ills, or guarantee you won't be harmed. How is a man happy on the rack, if he feels pain, and lack of pain is the end? Does he literally remove the pain through some mental trick, as Moliere seems to suggest? But this is just fantasy -- bodily pain is inflicted by our animal nature that philosophizing has no power to stop. Is it that even in pain (as Epicurus 'screams' on the rack), we can still be happy? Then the core of Epicureanism is compromised, and it isn't really a hedonism, but some sort of virtue ethics that gives lack of pain some secondary role, certainly not the end.
I don't think they care whether or not they remove pain form their lives entirely. It's all about an idea which sometimes comforts in less immediate situations, but really does nothing (by their own admission) in situations like being tortured. Their target would seem to be more general, a question of how someone thinks about an approaches the world in daily life, more so than handing out magical torture immunity. I think the Epicureans have other more pessimistic philosophies in their eye, rather than immediate relief from any pain. I'd say it is just a fantasy and that's all the Epicureans ever wanted it to be.
A core is hard to compromise when it wasn't there in the first place. The Epicureans are certainly guilty of presenting a imagined miraculous future as if it is real, but then what does logical coherency mean in the face of life? If the Epicurean outlook makes them feel better, mainly in general terms, what use is the more accurate descriptions of human experiences like the Cyrenaics? The distance of philosophy sort of gives the Epicurean outlook a space to work.
I'd also say that though I find the extreme cases (which were relevant to the day, but I'm not so sure we care about invulnerability) hard to buy that there may still be something to the philosophy -- something reasonable and worthwhile -- when an Epicurean isn't trying to defend against counter-examples. If the Epicurean way of life could relieve pain, in the no-bullshit way of actually doing so (as opposed to having a practical benefit by simply believing that pain is easy to endure), then I'd still say that there's merit to the claim.
And it strikes me that there are people who are better at coping with pain in their life, even if they are not going to stand up to torture. I could see how a disposition would lend itself to being able to endure pain, too. So, it seems to me, there's plausible reason for accepting that there might be some way to make one better able at coping with pain (though whether Epicurean philosophy actually accomplishes this is another question -- just saying I wouldn't write it off as absurd in lesser, more common, cases)
I understand your reaction quite well because I've had similar lines of thoughts myself. I still don't really understand how the fear of death (and in general, the relation between anxiety & rationale) works.
The relation between how reason, emotion, and agency is a very tricky one to me. So my rant that I'm soon going to write below has limited perspectives and easily seen gaps. =\
Note that I actually don't think that the power of arguments is so ineffective in all cases regarding anxiety. It can prevent people from drifting into a train of irrational thoughts that can become the fuel for anxiety to take place. (I mean the reason why people are afraid of death in the first place was because they were able to reason out the fact about their mortality and what it means to them)
Also, I'm not quite sure that I was "convinced by its reason yet it didn't move my character" more like there were different sides of me that were convinced and another side that was unconvinced. It's sort of like that experience you have with Procrastination. Part of you know it's irrational and another voice in your mind becomes louder and convinces you into it.
I think that certain deep anxious states (like common anxieties about their appearance and death) tends to not just be about the object of anxiety, but something rooted elsewhere. So the Epicurean Arguments that are laid out don't really serve as a good framework to the people who are grappling with those problems. It's the self's relation to the objects of their thoughts & emotions that's often more important. I think this relation between to the self and the object tends to mean something unique to the experience for each person (a narrative) which is why I think you can often learn more insight from people who can empathize with your experiences (or can analyze them to a high degree) than from general practitioners who just happens to know a lot about how the mind works.
Kierkegaard's Psychology was pretty insightful for me in understanding the problem from this perspective (His "Subjectivity is Truth" is more about this, one's personal narrative, than a framework of metaphysics or fideism, which I find most people mistake to be the emphasis. A bit like Nietzsche's philosophy of truth.)
I doubt that Epicureanism fares much better for ordinary life -- even if it's not as bad as torture, it's questionable whether it's bearable, or whether Epicureanism has anything to say about making it bearable. What Epicurean wisdom amounts to, most generously interpreted, is a set of maxims for avoiding typical sources of pain in life.
In other words, if the 'counterexample' is all of life, it becomes hard to see your philosophy as anything other than an abstraction, aimed at a kind of intellectualistic perfection of the body.
Quoting Moliere
I don't think it makes sense to cope with pain. By the time it hits, it's already too late -- pain is pain, it doesn't get better except by being eliminated. But then that's not coping with pain, but rather avoiding or eliminating it. The Epicurean life is perhaps so simple and safe that it minimizes risks of certain pains, but even then it reifies certain things that are clearly instrumental, like eschewing luxury.
Ever yell "FUCK!" when you stubbed your toe? Made the pain a lot less sharp.
Coping involves resuming your general activities as if nothing has changed (i.e. not succumbing), and also includes directing your attention to finding an elimination of the pain.
I don't think coping means being easier to bear. To bear is synonymous to cope. Both involve not succumbing.
Lots of the religious and philosophical stuff I've grown up in has been vaguely anti-ascetic, but it's difficult for me to know whether that position is justified. It could be that a lack of exposure to asceticism makes it difficult to appreciate the extent to which suffering can be warded off. But even in those traditions, asceticism is a higher calling NOT intended for ordinary lay practice, which Epicureanism claims to be.
Yeah, I agree with all of what you said. I think the monk's remaining still is proof itself of the effectiveness of whatever he was doing, but I don't think I have a ghost of a chance of ever learning whatever that is.
I'm a bit cynical about philosophies of How to Live, not because I think that's less important that abstract theoretical stuff, I'm just skeptical that philosophy of any kind can teach you much about how to live your life.
I'd disagree with this assertion because there's more to Epicurean philosophy than maxims. That maxims are for initiates more than anything -- but for those that wished to dig deeper there were texts upon texts to do so. It just wasn't necessary to do so in order to live a happy life. (hence, the maxims for those who wanted to live as an Epicurean, but maybe did not want to be a philosopher).
The great difficulty here is just how little that's left to infer from over the ages. But there's enough evidence to indicate that there's more to the philosophy than maxims.
And the entire philosophy is not just about avoiding pain -- it's about living a happy life, and the answer to the happy life is pursuing pleasure in the correct way.
The focus on pain, here, is just because I find this to be the problematic (from my perspective) part of the philosophy, not because this is all of what Epicureanism entails. Especially since, though it is hedonic, the Epicurean does not avoid pain, but deals with it (since pain is an inevitable part of life) -- and deals with it by directing our focus to what it is we do have control over, rather than what we do not.
Quoting The Great Whatever
But what if you felt pain to a lesser degree because of your general state of mind? I think that makes a great deal of sense. I can remember what pain was to me as a child, for instance. It hurt a great deal more than it does now.
I would say this isn't quite accurate, either, or is at least ambiguous depending on what you mean by "luxury".
A particular luxury isn't a bad thing, per se -- it's just that the pursuit of luxury can seduce one into forgetting what makes human beings happy. Luxury would safely fit into the category natural but unnecessary desires, like sex, because it's a creature comfort, but it's not necessary for the fulfillment of a happy life.
Though if you mean the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle then, yes, that would seem to fit into the unnatural and unnecessary desires, and therefore would be forbidden according to the ethic. Not sure which you're saying, though.
What do you mean by reification? What idea are Epicureans treating like a thing? I would claim the opposite -- that as far as philosophy goes, Epicureanism tends towards eliminating reifications than making them. For example, the pursuit of luxury -- where men would pursue luxury as if it were something that can be held onto, Epicureans would say that an item of luxury is of course pleasurable, but that you are hurting yourself because of some idea you have about the luxurious lifestyle when you could just fulfill your desires which are natural to you and, thereby, be happy.
In the case of Epicureanism, at least, they did more than create an image -- Epicurus was the person you were meant to aspire to become like.
But it was not by sheer will alone. In accord with the philosophy it seems to me that what was meant to change one's character was the power of reason -- but in practice I think the Epicurean community plays a larger role in being able to accomplish (or progress, at least) along the Epicurean path. At least, this would go in line with my reasoning I've put forward in this thread. But it fits very well with what goods Epicurus emphasized -- self-reflection, autarky, and friendship with fellow Epicureans.
Quoting Saphsin
I agree entirely here. I think this is the function of the Epicurean community, and the maxims. In some sense one is meant to take certain tenets on faith not because there are not arguments, but because once we are already ensnared by an irrational anxiety then we require an irrational means to undo that anxiety. It's not the object -- it's that we are pursing something that is no object in the first place, yet we treat it as such (wealth and death come to mind as the obvious examples here, but anthropomorphized Gods and other superstitions fit too).
If that were so I think that this would be a blow against the Epicurean cure, too. The cure is meant to apply to all humans, I think. It's not meant to apply to people in particular circumstances with particular experiences, but something that is commonly felt by mankind.
(not saying you're wrong, by any means. Just responding more than anything)
Epicureanism's main thrust and appeal was that it was not esoteric, that anyone could practice it and reap its benefits. So aside from the weakness of claiming there were (probably?) deeper doctrines that we don't and can't know about right now, it seems that even if this is true it's not going to save the common case, which is what is so important to the Epicurean to begin with.
Quoting Moliere
That correct way being the achievement specifically of static pleasure, which is the freedom from pain. Quoting Moliere
But this is precisely what's under question. How does the Epicurean deal with pain? Clearly it can't be by impotent mental tricks, which you seem to agree. But then, we seem to have no evidence that they do, except precisely by avoiding it, which is what the Epicurean recommendations amount to.
Quoting Moliere
There is no such thing as an unnatural or unnecessary desire. Epicureans treat temporary, contingent, custom-bound properties of things (like the desire for a luxurious lifestyle) as if they were inherently bad in virtue of conflicting with a static human nature. This is reification because it takes what is situational and treats it as essential. There is nothing good or bad about wanting a luxurious lifestyle in of itself.
Quoting Moliere
But there may be circumstances in which the pursuit of a luxurious lifestyle is beneficial. Doctrines about what is natural or unnatural -- which a naturalistic eudaimonism like Epicureanism must commit itself to -- must perform these reifications, or else collapse into a different kind of hedonism (I would say a genuine hedonism) that treats pleasure as good on its own terms rather than because it checks off certain requirements having to do with final ends and human nature.
This is something appealing about Epicureanism to myself (and is probably what anyone from today would find appealing next to some of the more aristocratic sentiments expressed in the day), but I don't think it was the main thrust.
Happiness is.
As for "probably" -- if we accept Diogenes Laertius as a source when describing rather than quoting (as I do in the beginning of the post -- where the quote about being happy on the rack comes from, though it is problematic), then he describes several texts Epicurus wrote, including one called On Nature comprising of 37 books.
Insofar that by "deeper doctrines" all we mean is "more than maxims", we already have access to them too. Even letters do more than speak about maxims -- they contain arguments. But we don't have to rely upon the letters alone -- there's Diogenes Laertius' chapter on Epicurus, Cicero's De Finibus (polemical), Plutarch's Against Colotes (polemical) Lucretius' poem On the Nature of Things, and the remains of an inscription done by Diogenes of Oenoanda just as a few examples. I know there are more texts than this, too, but these I'm at least familiar with.
Again, I would say that this is only appealing to us because of the cultures we live in. But I wouldn't say that this is the focus of Epicureanism, as much as it is a result of its methods. If there be a universal cure, then it would apply across the board, not just to the sage.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Sort of. First, the division between static and dynamic pleasure is not necessarily an Epicurean one. This way of understanding Epicureanism is at least contended in the literature, and I haven't been able to find the division in the Epicurean texts. If you know where to look I'd be much obliged to you for pointing this out.
As of right now, at least, I'd say the better way to understand the proper way is to understand Epicurus' theory of pleasure. Happiness is achieved by pleasure. Pleasure is the fulfillment of natural and necessary desires, as opposed to the other two kinds of desire which are "natural and unnecessary" and "unnatural and unnecessary". (logically speaking there could be a fourth, but in terms of the philosophy there are no unnatural and necessary desires).
Under this rubric I'd categorize the avoidance of bodily pain as natural but unnecessary, if we accept the DL quote at least. And there is at least reason to believe that the philosophy applies, even in extreme cases, because Epicurus died a horrible death and, again if we accept the texts as evidence in the first place, faced said death with the appropriate Epicurean attitude (though, granted, said death was specifically not one of torture on the rack, or in the brazen bull). While it makes sense to avoid pain, what we have control over is a calm state of mind, which helps us deal with bodily pain.
But, aside from extreme cases, yes -- mental tranquility and freedom from bodily pain are very important to living an Epicurean life. But this is not the correct way -- this is the goal. The correct way is better understood, so I would claim at this point at least, through Epicurus' theory of pleasure. (which is what leads to things like the necessity of self-reflection, so that one can appropriately identify their desires and categorize them, then act on the appropriate ones).
Quoting The Great Whatever
Exactly :). That's my question. One thing that may differ in our approach here, though, is that I'm assuming from the start that there's an answer to the question -- not that Epicurus fails here, but rather, that I'm failing in understanding.
I'd note that it's more of a practical hermeneutic rule on my part rather than a belief I necessarily hold, except insofar that it is necessary to believe in order to test a belief.
It is the tricky part, I agree. If we accept the evidence of Epicurus' death, however, then we have evidence of possibility, at least, of enduring extreme pain. The popularity of the philosophy just shows that Epicurus' philosophy was not only something that applied to him, though it's possible that the philosophy applies differently in the two cases (the lay Epicurean vs. the Sage being quite different in their life patterns, at least, even if they draw from the same texts and doctrine).
The "how" is exactly what my question is.
My guess, right now, is that the Epicurean way of life transforms character to be the sort of person that is better able to deal with pain than before they were an Epicurean. Otherwise impotent mental tricks, such as remembering happy times with friends, would have no effect.
I'll remention here because I'd like to see what you think of the argument: Children feel pain to a greater degree than adults do from the same sources of pain. You burn your hand on a stove you don't go crying about it. You may not be a happy Epicurean, but there's a difference in the feeling of pain between these two events. I'd say that this is due to development in dealing with pain. If that were the case, then it seems plausible, at least, that we could further develop ourselves so that pain is less of a nuisance (easy to endure), no?
Quoting The Great Whatever
I'd half-way agree with you, here. Epicureans believe in a static human nature. I'm with you on that. But the Epicurean doesn't treat a desire as intrinsically bad. There are no intrinsic bads -- there are only things bad insofar that they violate what is good, i.e., what leads to a happy life -- pleasure.
If you can have a luxurious lifestyle without anxiety then there's nothing wrong with it. The error is in thinking that a luxurious lifestyle will relieve you from pain, when it won't -- especially when people who are rich often worry about maintaining their riches, and thereby make themselves unhappy. But if you were an Epicurean who happened to inherit a trust-fund, for whatever reason, and it was just added to your life through no struggle of your own, then there'd be nothing wrong in keeping it if it didn't lead you to become anxious in trying to maintain it.
I don't necessarily agree with the Epicurean categories, but I find them more useful than the usual division of pleasure today -- which is largely subjective, empirical (in the sense that one must try it themselves) and phenomenological. While even human nature, so I would agree (just to switch to my beliefs, vs. Epicurean beliefs), is not static, I think there are too many commonalities between humans to treat the notion as fallacious.
So I suppose that while I agree with you that "human nature" is a reification, I'd just note that it's a practical one which yields practical knowledge (which is contingent, as you note), if not universal knowledge. (which would be a strike against the Epicurean claim to a universal cure -- but the notion of a universal cure is not what I would defend. I fully confess that I doubt this. My aim is to understand what is valuable, though, rather than discount Epicureanism on some of its more exaggerated claims which were more a product of the state of ethics at the time, so I would argue).
Quoting The Great Whatever
I would note here that it seems to me your notion of genuine hedonism here seems to be committed to a theory of pleasure which states that pleasure is subjective, empirical (as in, one has to try things out, not in any scientific sense), and phenomenological as I mentioned earlier.
Would you say that's true or false? I'm just guessing because that strikes me as a good approximation of how people talk about pleasure.
Which would highlight where you differ from the Epicureans. But if that be the case then I would at least float the idea (to see how you would respond) that your disagreement is not with how Epicureans deal with pain (as a related aside, though not necessarily direct to Epicureanism: is pain not inevitable, after all? Won't every life feel pain?), but with their treatment of pleasure.
And if that is the case, wouldn't the charge of reification just depend upon which theory of pleasure we think is true? (not rhetorical -- I want to hear what you have to say to the question)
But why would a work on nature be relevant?
Quoting Moliere
Yeah, a pretty clear statement of the division is in Lives & Opinions 10.136:
Quoting Moliere
From the Letter to Menoeceus:
My emphasis. I don't see any way to read this other than being free of bodily pain as being necessary for happiness.
Quoting Moliere
What I'm saying is, I don't see how this differs from simply conditioning oneself to feel less pain. Both emotionally and physically, some repeated exposure can actually subdue the pain itself. Short of that, I don't understand what better coping with the pain amounts to, unless you're talking about something extrinsic, like making better life decisions in the face of pain.
Quoting Moliere
If humans differ significantly enough as to what they find pleasant, then the use of a static human nature is going to be detrimental to your ethics. It seems to me they do.
Quoting Moliere
If you are asking whether pleasure is a feeling, then yes -- and I'd say also that I don't know of any way to understand pleasure except as feeling, to the extent that this seems not to be a theoretical commitment but rather a facet of competence with the lay concept. Epicurus at least seems to agree -- again from the letter:
If your point is that pleasure needs to be seen as something other than a feeling, then I can't understand that claim except to treat it as the countersensical suggestion that pleasure ought to be treated as something other than pleasure. Or perhaps that you have some reason for being a hedonist nominally but at root are actually not interested in pleasure, but something else (some other human fulfillment) and so your ethics are not hedonistic (meaning they aren't Epicurean).
Quoting Moliere
I basically have a Cyrenaic sort of hedonism, which differs from Epicureans on several points regarding pleasure:
-All pleasure is kinetic. There is no static pleasure, the latter just being indifference or the absence of pleasure and pain. Indifferent states in a sense do not exist, because they are lack of motion, rather than a kind of motion, and the achievement of a truly static sate is thus simply death.
-There are no categories of natural, unnatural, necessary, or unnecessary, goods, desires, pursuits, etc. Things are good and bad not by nature but by contingent bodily makeup and convention. Nothing is inherently good or bad, except for pleasure and pain, which are not really 'things' in the sense that anything can be either pleasant or painful potentially. Furthermore, we do not have enough knowledge about human commonality to make universal recommendations.
-Pleasure is good insofar as it is pleasant, not insofar as it services a notion of happiness or eudaimonia. Happiness, if there is such a thing, is worthwhile for pleasure's sake, not vice-versa.
-There is no inherent tie between virtue and pleasure.
The rest I still must think about, but I wanted to respond to this -- here I am attempting to stay away from what I believe is ethical, but am rather attempting to make sense of Epicurean philosophy. While, granted, I have sympathies to epicurean ethics, I don't think (or, perhaps, no longer think?) it even possible to be an Epicurean today. At least minimally speaking I don't think it possible to be an Epicurean in the same vein as Epicurus and the communities that sprang forth from there were. It would have to be called Neo-Epicureanism or something to distinguish it, since there is no continuity between the communities of the past and people today who claim to be Epicurean.
Just to lay that out there. The beliefs I'm espousing are not so much about the topic of ethics as much as they are about how Epicureanism works (even though I am not and, according to what I believe, cannot be an Epicurean).
Because it's nature which gives sense to the ethic -- in the world, as portrayed by Epicurus, the Epicurean doctrine is what makes sense. Further, it is human nature, in particular the nature of our soul, which gives the ethic its force.
Lastly, it seems to go against the claim that epicurean philosophy is just a collection of maxims. Without having the actual texts it's not clear-cut -- but since Epicurus uses arguments in all of his letters, including the letters on nature, it would seem to me that we can't call Epicurean philosophy a collection of maxims only.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Thanks! I don't pretend to know and have read everything, even of what I'm familiar with. I've tended to jump back and forth between the primary texts and secondary texts to help me understand them. As I noted, my quest to understand Epicureanism is an ongoing project.
However, I don't think that this division here goes against what I'm saying about Epicurus' theory of pleasure being central to the philosophy. I'd rather say that this is one way of summing up the philosophy, but that the majority of the philosophical work is being done by the theory of pleasure -- that this is the "main thrust", so to speak -- where the division between natural and necessary, natural but unnecessary, and unnatural and unnecessary desires is how a proper Epicurean is meant to sort their desires and then act to fulfill the first category in order to obtain the goal of peace of mind and freedom of bodily pain (which you may say I'm contradicting myself here -- I admit there's a tension, but I'm trying to figure out how to resolve that tension more than anything -- but perhaps freedom of bodily pain does not mean we do not feel bodily pain, but rather, a lesser degree of pain? At the least this would make sense if pain is inevitable, which would at least cohere well
Quoting The Great Whatever
So I tracked down my copy of the letter. I think it a lesson on the importance of interpretation. I'll type out what my copy states:
I honestly couldn't argue which is the better interpretation. I don't have that kind of basis. I imagine that it would rely upon which way we're trying to make the philosophy cohere together based on several texts, to be honest. It wouldn't surprise me if you could kind of go one way or the other, at least without some pretty deep study. But this should highlight where some of our difference in opinion comes from on this particular point.
The other solution that comes to mind, for me, is to strike out the example that Diogenes Laertius uses of on the rack, since it is not in quotes, and simply give up the ground on invulnerability in all circumstances. But that wouldn't work to make sense of pain in the context of the ethics of the day, at least as I've come to understand them through the secondary literature.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Does it have to differ? What if "conditioning oneself to feel less pain" is, more or less, what makes pain easy to endure?
Quoting The Great Whatever
I am not asking whether pleasure is a feeling or not. I grant that pleasure is a feeling.
I'm asking whether the theory of pleasure I put forward captures that feeling, for you.
As I understand it, when people talk of pleasure they mean that it is. . .
Subjective -- The person who feels pleasure is the one who can say whether or not this or that is pleasurable. The speaker has priority over anyone else on whether or not such-and-such is pleasurable.
Empirical -- One cannot know what is pleasurable without having tried this, that, or the other thing/activity/state/etc. You must try it out to know if something is or is not pleasurable.\
Phenomenological -- related to the first, but I like to state this explicity; pleasure is had only from a first-person perspective. I differentiate this from the first category only by saying that the first governs the rules by which we may speak of pleasure, while this latter point gives the ontological foundation for said rules.
If this is the case then it would be a reason why you wouldn't agree with Epicurus, who maintains that not only that pleasure is the rule, but that pleasure works in a particular way. He claims to know what is pleasurable for you, for me, and for every human.
Now, having said this, there's something else that should be noted -- Epicurus' philosophy does not really focus much on particular actions or things. It's not that this, that, and the other are forbidden. And I don't think that a proper Epicurean would be against this, that, or the other on the basis that everyone will react to it in the same manner. So I don't think a charge of hubris would apply so easily, at least, as the strong statement above seems to indicate. There's plenty of leeway for "trying things out" and seeing what works for you in a particular circumstance. What is "fixed", so to speak, is fixed by human nature, and that leads to how we can free ourselves from anxiety, and thereby live a joyous life.
So perhaps you would also differ with respect to human nature being so fixed -- or, even, it seems to me, you claim that it is in a state of flux. I wouldn't agree with the latter, even if I also don't agree with the former notion that human nature is immutable (though never explicitly stated, it would seem to me that this is a reasonable inference from the basis that the Epicurean philosophy is meant to be a universal cure).
Quoting The Great Whatever
On the rest of what you say I'll grant, though your fourth statement strikes me as odd. Here, however, I would note that you are in agreement with Epicurean philosophy. It's perhaps one of the strongest reasons I disagree with Epicureanism, in the end. But the Epicurean puts forth pleasure as the goal.
I have doubts both that physics is foundationally relevant to ethics (perhaps it is instrumentally) and that the Epicureans did any useful physics. What we know of their theories makes them seem speculative and unhelpful.
Quoting Moliere
But is there any real sense in which Epicurean views on nature tie organically to their ethical project? It seems in the modern imagination the latter has retained some interest while the former hasn't in the slightest. Is everyone involved in modern Epicureanism just deluding themselves? And if not, doesn't that show the physical project to be of little importance?
Quoting Moliere
I never said his theory of pleasure wasn't essential to the project, only that the Epicureans understand pleasure in a certain way, creating divisions between the static and the kinetic, and valuing the latter only insofar as it is on road to the former. Epicurean pleasure is negative and still, a pleasure of freedom from ill. The question as the letter points out is 'necessary for what?' If it's necessary for eudaimonia, the final end, and freedom from bodily pain is among what's necessary for this, there's just no getting around that you need to be free from bodily pain to be happy. And I think this is pretty obviously right. The problem is that once you admit this plausible principle, you're stuck as an Epicurean, because you have to say that the sage somehow must be able to avoid bodily pain with impunity, which he can't. The Epicurean wants, on the one hand, to have complete control and freedom over his life, and on the other, to base his ethics around what by its nature can't be controlled. I don't think there's a way of resolving this dilemma.
Quoting Moliere
It's more than that -- it makes one tenet of the tetrapharmikos obviously false, which is what we started out with. I think an Epicurean philosophy that abandoned the abstract ideal of an invincible sage is perfectly coherent, but it goes against the spirit of the philosophy, and eudaimonistic philosophy generally.
Quoting Moliere
There's a difference in what usually when we say we can cope with X, or get better at dealing with X, we don't mean we remove it, but make its presence more tolerable. If we could remove it, we exactly wouldn't have to cope with, or get better at dealing with, it. With pain this distinction seems not to hold. I can't make sense of undergoing pain and easing it -- to ease pain is simply for pain to go away.
Quoting Moliere
Some of this would have to be tempered -- it seems unreasonable to say that you can never 'say' that someone else is in pain, or that you 'can't know' if something will be painful without undergoing it. We often can make educated estimations that people are in pain (but this is sometimes very hard to do), and educated guesses about what will be painful, although this is also hard. I have never hit my dick with a hammer, but I can say with confidence it would be painful and so won't do it.
But yes, pleasure is always from a first-person perspective, and nothing is essentially guaranteed to be pleasant or painful, and there is no ultimate measure of what is or is not either of these other than the feeling itself.
Quoting Moliere
Epicurus seems to speak explicitly against luxury and sensuous gratification, in a sort of moralizing tone, and defensively as if he knows, claiming to be a hedonist, that people will accuse him of approving of or recommending these things. Certainly Epicureanism makes explicit universal recommendations for how one ought to live.
Quoting Moliere
There's a subtle difference here, though, in that Epicureans take themselves to be doing ethics in the sense of finding the final natural end of a thing -- it just happens to be for humans, and that end for humans just happens to be a certain kind of pleasure. Thus the point of Epicurean philosophy is to begin by asking 'what is eudaimonia?' and to give an answer to this question: 'static pleasure.' But the Cyrenaic hedonists don't ask this quesiton, because they deny that the end is eudaimonia. And so an Epicurean can sensibly ask, 'why is pleasure good?' and respond, 'because it is a human's natural end,' and so an Epicurean chooses particular pleasures for the sake of a state not reducible to any of these, for the sake of happiness. The Cyrenaic, by contrast, will choose happiness for the sake of the particular pleasures, which need no justification outside of themselves, including not in human nature.
I don't think it makes sense to look at ancient theories in light of foundationalism. The search for foundations, I don't believe, is what drives very much ancient philosophy but modern philosophy.
As for whether they did or did not do useful physics -- I mean, I wouldn't know whether or not that's the case. I do know that their atomic theories cohere well with modern atomic theories, though. But this was not by the same methods as modern atomic theories.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Definitely! Lucretius' poem does a superb job of demonstrating this.
I don't think I can say much about people involved in modern Epicureanism because I'm not involved in any sort of organized effort. But I can say that the physics ties into the ethics because it gives a pseudo-justification to the ethics. I say "pseudo-" because I think the ethical project takes prominence, though there are those who disagree with that.
Regardless of what we might give priority to in our reading, though, the physics and the ethics both support one another quite well. The ethics makes sense in a world where we have very little control over said world (it is a random collection of atoms extending infinitely upward and downward), where there is no afterlife (because the soul is a collection of very fine atoms), and where the Gods do not interfere with our lives (various superstitious explanations about nature are false). The physics makes sense in a world where we live as another one of the world's creatures with its own particular habits and needs.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Just as a note I can go with your states all the way up to "a pleasure of freedom from ill". Sounds good to me.
I suppose, for me, I just see it as a tension in the philosophy -- I don't see it as sinking the project. It could be a strike against its internal consistency. But if there is a way for people to deal with pain, and Epicureanism helps one deal with pain, then I'd say that the Epicurean philosophy is still accomplishing what it set out to do within the bounds of human nature (i.e., it is internally consistent), even if there are cases where the notion of a sage simply will not apply (i.e. it does not accomplish what was set as a standard or interesting thought experiment by the interests of ethical conversation in his time and place).
Because it's the case that Epicureanism sets out to cure what ails people due to and through human nature. Autarky comes later as a result of being free of anxiety. Having a tranquil mind is the primary goal.
Quoting The Great Whatever
I think you're overstating the case here. If a philosophy helps people within those human limits -- including the sage (which, in this case, is not just abstract, because there's Epicurus) -- then it accomplishes all that a philosophy can do. If torture is beyond that limit then what does that matter? Pain, more or less, is still easy to endure.
I mean, if you wanted, we could draw a convenient distinction just to make it true in all relevant circumstances :D. But that would be silly. And perhaps the project for invulnerability really is just silly, when the results that came from that question could still have worthwhile thoughts?
I would say "yes".
Also I would note here that we're sort of dealing with an empirical question. It could be elucidated if not resolved through experiment. Since that's the case we're also just dealing with "sounds plausible" -- it may sound implausible in certain circumstances, but that doesn't mean that it's false, only that it sounds implausible. I note this because, in interpretation, I don't think that it makes much sense to follow what sounds plausible to us. The whole point of understanding a work is to find what made sense to the person writing it, to the extent that this is possible. So while it may sound implausible, our goal as interpreters (so I would say) is to figure out how to make it plausible.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Not sure how to make it clearer to you than the example of a child burning themself vs. an adult burning themself. We could also look at physical sports and activity -- where someone who is new is not used to physical pain as much, but as you have to deal with it you learn how to cope better with physical pain.
Heck, emotional pain is similar, insofar that we deal with emotional pain in the correct way.
If we learn how to cope, then the pain is reduced. If not, then the next time we are hurt it hurts just as much as the first time. This seems to me to be a fairly common experience. (And I would note I don't think the mechanism is exposure -- mere exposure is not enough. There's more to it than that).
Quoting The Great Whatever
Then I'd float the idea again -- it's your notion of pleasure which you differ with Epicurus on. And depending on which notion of pleasure we believe to be true then that is what would implicate who is reifying what, no?
Quoting The Great Whatever
I don't deny any of this.
What Epicurus says about sex and money is based on how these things affect people. But, again, there's nothing wrong with satisfying natural and unneccessary desires insofar that we retain ataraxia. That's the entire point of the tripartite categorization of pleasure -- to differentiate between what must be satisfied to be happy from the desires which do not need to be fulfilled, and to further differentiate between those what can cause anxiety from what will cause anxiety.
It seems to me that anyone who claims hedonism, at least in the philosophical sense (we can be practical hedonists without this, of course), owes their readers a theory of pleasure.
There are two objections I have to this. First, it's an odd thing to say, and I don't know if it has any truth to it. Second, I'm not sure how it ties into this:
Quoting Moliere
Clearly the Epicureans think that physics founds ethics in some way -- they, like the Stoics, were after what is the natural end of human beings, which requires knowledge of the natural world. However you want to put this, as providing a 'justification,' or 'foundation' or whatever, it doesn't matter. The point is that they see physics as somehow integral to ethics, which I'm skeptical of. As to the reference to Lucretius, the question is not whether the Ecpicureans think there is some such tie or attempt to provide one, but whether there is one, to be found in their theory or anywhere else. I'm inclined to say no, which means the Epicurean ethical theory has to make sense on its own terms, and it's going to make nonsense on its own terms if it founders, no matter what their physics might say. Just as an illustration:
Quoting Moliere
None of this seems to impact on the debates we're currently engaging in regarding pleasure. That there are no gods or no afterlife might be practically important: but these are facts that an Epicurean or a Cyrenaic would equally have to react to, and would do nothing to decide between their differing views on pleasure, and does nothing to make the tetrapharmikos, or the question with which this thread started, more intelligible. On these issues the existence of the gods, what our physical makeup is, whether there is an afterlife, are all just irrelevant. The same points would hold even if there were gods and an afterlife, and we were made of eternal spirit-stuff.
Quoting Moliere
My point is, first, that this is precisely not what Epicurean philosophy claims to do, and far from placing limits on itself, has a Hellenistic machismo that promises, with careful application, to bring about the invincible sage, that is undisturbed by torture. These are not human limits; they are fantasies (barring perhaps, extraordinary feats of asceticism, which are not recommended by Epicurus).
My second point is that you cannot just bite the bullet on this and then just go on affirming that pain is easy to endure. As if the contentless modifier 'more or less' helps? Clearly, pain is not easy to endure, and Epicurean philosophy does not help make it easier to endure, and the sage has no way to free himself from bodily pain by studying the philosophy.
I also doubt very much that Epicurus was anything more than a man. The sage is an ideal of the doxography; we don't expect to actually see sages walking around. Maybe people thought Epicurus was actually such a sage, which again is in keeping with the 'invincibility philosophy' of the Hellenistic schools.
Quoting Moliere
And our goal is also to acknowledge that when the best of our most generous interpretive efforts still make the philosophy founder, we have to admit the inconsistency rather than continue to deny it. Otherwise, there is no point to inquiry, we can just make up whatever we want. As interpreters and philosophers we are not just neutral historians out to give every side its best shake. Yes we do that, but only to make the arguments as strong as possible to see whether they stand up, and after that we have to leave what falls. These philosophies aren't just intellectual toys to defend and reinterpret, but are supposed to have meaningful impact on people's lives.
Quoting Moliere
First of all, the claim that an adult burning themselves feels less pain than a child doing the same is very odd, and I'm not sure what supports it. Second, I think I've already said all I needed to say in the quoted paragraph, and I don't know how your response advances the conversation.
Quoting Moliere
There is no 'correct way' to deal with emotional pain, in spite of the didactic suggestions we get from the Stoics and yes the Epicureans. To claim that there is robs it, in my opinion, of its status as actual pain (and maybe as actual emotion). Yes, pain is bad. But what follows from that?
Quoting Moliere
Okay, but this seems opposed to what I was responding to, so I don't know what you mean.
Quoting Moliere
I disagree in the sense that pleasure is not a technical concept but a folk concept, and insofar as hedonists make claims about it, they do so in reference to the folk concept (indeed I doubt hedonism has any use at all if it tries to invoke a technical concept of pleasure, which is why utilitarianism in my opinion is a dead end). So no 'theory of pleasure' is going to give you a better grasp of that folk concept, but there can be true or false claims made about that very concept. The assertion that a lack of pain is itself a pleasure, or that there is a static form of pleasure, is such a false claim made by the Epicureans, in my view. Perhaps this comes about as the result of a desire to turn pleasure, a fleeting, temporary, contingent thing, into something immortal, which is always going to be the Epicureans' absurdity. To correct these mistakes, we should not invoke a theory of pleasure, but return to the phenomenon and point out in what way the Epicureans mischaracterize it, and why their philosophy has led them to do so.
Then I must say we are talking past one another. In order to do as you say here:
Quoting The Great Whatever
We must first be able to state the inconsistency. And if there is some way to make a philosophy work then even if there's a tension (of which any philosphy has) that is not the same as the philosophy simply being inconsistent with itself.
Before being able to judge something true or false, I think you have to understand what is being said first. And in order to understand what is said, we must be charitable. I would say that I am still at the stage of understanding -- where there are some things which are clearly in contradiction to what I believe, and so I am settled (at present, at least), this is not one of them.
So I am asking -- how does the 4th precept fit into the philosophy of epicureanism? How is it possible for it to make sense? Your answer here is simply that it doesn't, because it is false. I find that unsatisfactory because it leaves much to be explained, and because it is uncharitable.
Quoting The Great Whatever
I must disagree. The thing is, the torture claim isn't a quote from any Epicurean text. It comes from Diogenes Laertius' description of Epicureanism, and could just as easily have come from the polemical works I referenced as much as Epicurus (in fact, the reference to the brazen bull is in the polemical works). So as interpreters we have to figure out what to do with it -- do we accept it as cannon, or not? If we do, then how does that fit with the claim that pain is easy to endure, and that the sage is one who is happy regardless of the circumstances? If not, then what is being claimed about pain and how do we deal with the problem of pain within Epicurean philosophy?
What is asserted by the quotes, however, is the ability to face death with happiness, even a painful drawn out death -- as Epicurus did. While not a super-human feat, it is also something that must be learned (because not everyone faces death like this) and is actually what philosophy has laid claim to outside of Epicurean texts: learning how to face death.
What your describing is one possible interpretation by the texts, I grant. But it is not the only one. And if there are different interpretations which don't have the philosophy collapsing, then the principle of charity would dictate that we go with them. Especially when dealing with ancient texts where ambiguity and a multiplicity of interpretations are easily on hand given the state of the evidence.
Why not?
Here I believe you are simply asserting that the Epicurean claims are false. These assertions are not so clear to me.
Does your doubt matter, when the sage isn't anything more than a man who has perfected a way of life? Of course he was just a man. His flaws are evident in his writing. Being a sage doesn't exempt one from being a human.
Quoting The Great Whatever
I mean that it doesn't really go against anything I said. What is universal to Epicurean philosophy, such as his theory of pleasure, does not forbid sexual activity, or eating cheese, or having money. There are not particular rules or laws which an Epicurean must follow in the sense that you shouldn't have bacon mixed with cheese, that luxury is forbidden, etc. etc. What is universal is a set of categories which holds for people. But within those categories variation can play a part. You mentioned luxury and sex. But neither of these are forbidden, according to Epicurean principles -- not intrinsically. It doesn't work like that. Rather, if your desire for sex is an unnatural and unnecessary one, then you should not act on said desire. But if your desire for sex is a natural and unnecessary one, you can act on that desire.
It's not the particular action which is forbidden.
When Epicurus recommends against luxury and sexual desire it is because people are made anxious by the pursuit of such things. It is the disturbance of tranquility that he is combating, not the particular actions.
Quoting The Great Whatever
What does that matter?
Let's go with it being a folk concept. So, you are a hedonist. Meaning, pleasure is what we should pursue -- it is the only good.
OK. So, how do I do that? What is pleasurable, or what is pleasure? These are natural questions to ask of any hedonist.
Even if it is a folk concept, that doesn't mean the philosopher is unburdened to defend their hedonism.
Again, this only follows if you have a concept of pleasure -- or "the things themselves" -- to contrast against the Epicurean concept of pleasure, or "The phenomena itself" as described by the Epicurean.
First of all, if you a priori don't accept any conclusion to the effect that a tenet of Epicureanism is false, on the grounds that this is uncharitable, then Epicureanism is literally unfalsifiable. I hope that rereading this you see that it's an absurd position. So being charitable I'll assume you can't have meant it, I guess.
I have not simply stated that the tenet is false; I have shown how the Epicurean is led to being forced to make a false claim by a desire on the one hand to maintain a philosophy of invincibility and on the other to tie the end to something naturally occurring and intuitively plausible to hold that position. This requires them to face at some point the intertwined questions of whether 1) bodily pain 'counts' in the freedom from pain that the Epicurean maintains is the end; 2) whether if it does not, the philosophy can genuinely be called a hedonism in any interesting sense, and whether it loses its intuitive plausibility in abstractions as a result, and loses its grip on the notion of pleasure; 3) if it does count, whether bodily pain is entirely avoidable or not; and 4) if it isn't, how then the Epicurean can maintain that the successful application of its philosophy can result in the sort of invincibility from harm that it promises as an ideal. All of these issues are intertwined and I have argued that there is no way to keep all these balls in the air at once. Epicureanism has contradictory impulses and something must give. But it does take criticism to see this, and to realize the ways in which Epicureanism is not workable. So yes, I've said the tenet is false, but of course I've said that! It wouldn't be a criticism otherwise. But it's not that it's 'simply' false, I've explained at length how and why it is, and why the Epicurean is drawn to making the false statement due to contradictory impulses. To throw up your hands after all that and claim that we can't just declare the principle to be false due to charity is absurd. I really don't see how proper criticism is possible by these lights.
Quoting Moliere
Because, if you accept that pain is in some cases not easy to endure, then you cannot also accept that pain, as a general principle is easy to endure. I'm not sure how you're squaring this contradiction for yourself, other than by saying 'yeah well that rule of the tetrapharmikos only applies sometimes,' which renders it totally impotent, since then Epicureanism is not only not a universal cure, but only a cure for those seasons in which you're not in serious pain that's hard ot endure -- in which case, who gives a shit, we don't need philosophy for times when everything is easy to endure! The insight of the Epicurean position is presumably that all suffering, even the difficult, can be made easy to endure, or else it has no bite. But this is precisely what you've denied, and then acted as if it isn't a problem! Is Epicureanism really so weak that it amounts to 'life is easy when life is easy?' Is a philosophy even needed for that?
Quoting Moliere
As I said, there's no such thing as necessary v. unnecessary desires. What this amounts to is still an imposition on behavior and a set of moral do's and don'ts. The fact that you've said, no, it's not 'thou shalt not have sex,' but rather 'thou shalt not have unnecessary sex' doesn't change that, it only qualifies the nature of those prohibitions.
Quoting Moliere
Sometimes they are, sometimes they aren't. Again, reification.
Quoting Moliere
There is no 'Epicurean concept of pleasure.' There is only one concept of pleasure, which both the Epicurean and other hedonists make claims about. The Epicurean then makes, in my estimation, a false claim -- namely, that freedom from pain is itself pleasant.
To see why this isn't so, we can note that corpses are free from all pain and struggle, yet they feel no pleasure. So it must be that living free from all pains and struggles, and experiencing this freedom is what is good, not simply being free from it. But what is it to experience this? In eating we experience pleasure as a relief from hunger, as well as from the stimulation of our taste buds. But these are both kinetic pleasures by the Epicurean's account. So the taste itself cannot be the pleasure that matters, nor can it be relief from pain. Rather, the Epicurean has to say that the state itself of not being in that pain must be pleasant. But pleasure is a feeling, and so must have some phenomenological quality (which is why corpses don't undergo it, because they feel nothing). So what does not being in any pain feel like? Well, precisely nothing -- there is a feeling to relieving one's bladder, or the taste of a delicious food, but there is no feeling at all of 'not being hungry,' except insofar as it is kinetic satisfaction of, and so removal of, hunger. If you abstract away from all kinetic aspects of pleasure, there results no feeling at all, and so no pleasure. So Epicurus is wrong: it is not pleasant to be free of pain, but rather indifferent.
That's not what I said?
As for criticism being rendered inoperable -- Yes, exactly. Until you understand something you can't criticize something. In order to understand something one must interpret charitably. This is especially the case when dealing with ancient texts being translated from cultures we have no tangible familiarity with and who we cannot even so much as ask a question of.
Now, perhaps you already understand Epicureanism. I would say in only some parts I do, but others I do not. Especially how Epicureanism treats pain -- I would say there's a tension in the philosophy here. But I don't think that the entire project collapses in on itself due to the tension, at least not yet, and it seems to me there there is a workable solution to the tension.
At the very least, if it be so central -- and given the philosophy, it seems to me pain is quite important -- then it makes sense to figure out how this concept works within the philosophy assuming that it does, in fact, work as a practical rule of interpretation.
These are things I said earlier, but it is worth saying them again because, while it may sound absurd to you that I'm still reading with this sort of thought in mind. If that renders my thoughts a waste of time then I apologise for wasting yours. But, all the same, it has been worthwhile to me thus far because your points have motivated me back to the texts.
Quoting The Great Whatever
First off, this was just one possible solution to the problem. I'm not necessarily committed to saying that it only works sometimes. Mostly it's a problem I'm trying to work out. Of course if there is no workable solution then, hey, strike against the philosophy. But I'm not yet convinced that this is the case -- especially considering there are workable solutions.
Second, if it works sometimes, most of the time, and even helps to ease pain in times of duress, I would say that "renders it totally impotent" is an exaggeration on your part. Especially considering the frequency of torture. Supposing 100 things happen to you in your life, and 1 percent of those things is torture, and such-and-such a way of life helps you with the other 99 percent of things -- then, clearly, even if you are in error one time, you have a net benefit.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Eh, I think this is kind of a strawman account. The distinction between kinetic and static pleasure isn't some kind of central distinction to the philosophy, one (though we have already talked about that, so I feel like we might just repeat ourselves here), and the pleasures you're talking about are clearly necessary and natural pleasures. So they are the one's one is meant to fulfill in order to be happy. Even if "there is no such thing as necessary and natural pleasures", then even by the reifiecation these things are clearly what is meant. This doesn't really speak against anything Epicurus states.
Sure it is, and in fact you just said it again:
Quoting Moliere
I disagree that we ought to go into interpretation assuming that what we're interpreting works or is correct; I hold that such a view amounts to making a position unfalsifiable and has allowed you to disregard my criticisms on the simple grounds that they declare Epicureanism false in some way, which is an absurd maxim to abide by. You seem to think charity requires of us that we assume as a working rule that our interlocutor is right, which is obviously ridiculous. That's not what charity is, and it makes decent criticism impossible. Yes this conversation is a waste of time if you continue, as you have, to disregard what I say just on the grounds that it disagrees with Epicureanism. Read what you've written and tell me that's not exactly what you've done -- not dismissed it because it's wrong, but because it results in Epicureanism being in some way incoherent as a whole. Well then, why am I wasting my breath, since all roads lead to the Garden for you, and this is an a priori constraint on your interpretation of the philosophy?
I'll get to the rest later.
If all roads lead to the Garden for me then I couldn't even disagree with the philosophy. I certainly do. My disagreement has been with your interpretation on the basis that it is uncharitable, not because I think Epicureanism must be correct. Correctness is a different sort of judgment from interpretation. Further, I wouldn't criticise your interpretation on the basis of whether your are correct or not because there are multiple interpretations -- I'll emphasize again that we're dealing with an ancient text written in a culture we have no tangible contact with, and merely translations of said text, and on top of that we aren't even dealing with an entire text, but fragments. Clearly there are going to be multiple interpretations, even of the fair variety. However, I think there are certainly more charitable interpretations at hand than what you present thus far.
If you've read Bertrand Russell's A History of Western Philosophy you'd get similar treatments in his chapters on Nietzsche and Hegel. If, in fact, Russell's interpretation of Nietzsche or Hegel were correct then his criticisms would have a lot more weight. As they are, however, it reads better as a joke book of sorts and a good example of why interpretation is so important prior to criticism.
Quoting The Great Whatever
And perhaps this is where we are crossing paths, too -- as I emphasized above, I am not dealing in correctness here as much as I am dealing in interpretation of belief. "Working", in this sense is just "coheres together".
How does the Epicurean deal with the problem of pain? How does the Epicurean philosophy make pain easy to endure?
Not "Does the Epicurean philosophy make pain easy to endure" -- but "How does it. . ."
See the difference? The first is after a fact. The latter is after a meaning.
I have found that a simple attitude adjustment takes care of all my great physical pains (which are short and few): I look at it from the point of view of an adventuring ascetic. My pain is both holy and exciting. Now, it might take a little more than a simple act of will to don this attitude, but if you can manage it, it works. It totally takes the sting out of it, and renders it almost fun!
The only thing I have left to conquer is emotional or psychological pain. Last time I checked there were no ascetics purposefully inducing panic attacks or heartbreak. I believe this is the only reason I am not also insulated from this type of disturbance as well.
I have, however, learned how to beat fear: I study it. I categorize and describe it, and it takes the sting out.
But could you do it consistently, or while still adhering to the epicurean philosophy as presented in the ancient texts? I don't know. The stoics and the epicureans seemed to have disagreed with one another enough to criticize one another and form different schools and compete over disciples/students.
It's certainly possible to be inspired by both or many other lines of philosophical thinking. I wouldn't deny that. I just don't know if I'd call it Epicureanism, in that case. The philosophy is supposed to stand on its own, at least -- not grab from other schools. Otherwise why would they form different schools? It seems to me that since the practioners at the time believed there were differences divergent enough to argue over them that it is better to try to look for what it was those differences were and keep the schools conceptually separate. But I'm looking at it from the point of view of someone who likes to reconstruct arguments in order to understand how said thinker was thinking.
On emotional pain -- I'd think it depends on what you'd count as "conquering". Just to never feel emotional pain, when it comes to panic and heartbreak, the Epicurean philosophy is meant to deal with the former, and Epicurus' stance on erotic love is meant to avoid the latter. There's a hillarious passage in Lucretius which gives advice for those who find themselves infatuated with someone by way of erotic love (at least, hillarious to me) such as reciting the flaws of the one you are infatuated with anytime you want to draw close to them or sleeping with random people until your infatuation subsides.
I'm afraid this thread passed me by a couple of months ago, but my old gits' philosophy group has just been talking first about the Stoics and then about Epicurus. Perhaps because we're all older people we focused for a while on Epicurus' apparent belief that dying itself is not to be feared because, in the ordinary course of death, our soul-atoms begin to lose their potency (I'm probably putting this wrongly but this is how we put it). A woman-member gave a remarkable and moving account of her 4-year-old child dying in just such a way - refusing medication even when her mother tried to smuggle it into her, and dying in some sort of peace and accommodation with what was happening to her.
I find the debate about pain earlier in the thread a bit strange. I've had a lifetime of cluster headaches, 40 years of them now, and talked to other people about the experience of pain. I think in an odd way one can enter into the experience of pain. You don't thereby mitigate it but you do develop an attitude towards it, a non-contentious mode which makes a difference. I see that to my mind I'm anti-Stoic and pro-Epicurean, as it were, in feeling this.
I do think 'pleasure' for Epicurus is a descendant of Aristotle's, who's only a generation away, and Aristotle is clear that there is intellectual pleasure, and (if they are different) there is pleasure as a state which is different from appetitive pleasure.
Lastly, I'm interested in 'mental pain' as part of the Epicurean model, again, in contrast to the Stoic-inspired cognitive behavioural model that's all the rage. For the Stoics it seems a question of technique. For Epicureans it's reflection and an accommodation with nature, as Dryden's version of Lucretius (which is great fun in itself, a late revelation to me!) puts it:
[quote=Dryden/Lucretius"]For life is all in wandring errours led;
And just as Children are surpriz’d with dread,
And tremble in the dark, so riper years
Ev’n in broad daylight are possest with fears;
And shake at shadows fanciful and vain,
As those which in the breasts of Children reign.
These bugbears of the mind, this inward Hell,
No rayes of outward sunshine can dispel;
But nature and right reason must display
Their beames abroad, and bring the darksome soul to day.[/quote]
I think it's easier for me, too, to accept that death is nothing to us, but I think that's probably because I was an atheist first for a long long time (having been raised to believe in an afterlife, first) -- so perhaps it's also just a matter of having dealt with different aspects of life which cause people anxiety.
If you are interested in Epicurean psychological pain you may want to try and find:
Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology., David Konstan, in Philosophia antiqua (a series of monographs of ancient phgilosophy), isbn 90 04 03653 9
Which I think confirms your statement, but fleshes it out :).
It really helped clear some things up for me on the differences between Epicureanism and Stoicism and Buddhism; something which, at the time, was not so clear. (Actually, @apatheticynic -- you may also be interested in reading https://www.amazon.com/Stoics-Epicureans-Sceptics-Introduction-Hellenistic/dp/0415110351 for more on those differences. Just remembered that book when I wrote the above reference)
Thanks. Konstan is the author of the current Stanford entry on Epicurus but doesn't touch on pain much there. I'll look out the book next time I'm back on the trek to the uni library.
My discussion group didn't dwell so much on the attitude to death but the attitude to dying.
The other aspect of Epicurus where he seems to follow Aristotle is in the pro-attitude to philia, usually translated as 'friendship'. That interests me in a socio-political way. As against 'liberalism' in the European sense, the liberalism of Rawls and Mill, I've always believed in 'socialism' broadly constructed. We are mutual animals, there is no individualised 'state of nature' for Rousseau or Rawls to go to, even as an ideal type, for humans always band together in social groups. The strand of non-marxist socialism that runs from the early 19th century, often involving experiments in living together like New Lanark, strongly appeals to me (I remember Barbara Taylor's 'Eve and the New Jerusalem' as a seminal book that made me see history in a different pro-feminist way). Greek philia seems to me to relate to this sense of mutuality, comradeship, which analytic and liberal commentators don't quite know what to do with, so they gloss over it, whereas for Aristotle and Epicurus, I'm interested to find, it was central.
As regards emotional pain: I myself have somehow already acquired the ability to live completely free of every emotional disturbance, be it sadness, anger, regret, envy, resentment, bitterness, hatred, insecurity, invalidation, non-self-acceptance, self-loathing, restlessness, impatience, or what have you. I belief I acquired this ability from studying every form of philosophy, most noteably Plato, and by concerning myself most with studies in general and with my favorite artform. I live in a state of tranquility. The only two disturbances that ever cross my path are fear (very infrequently) and boredom (less infrequently). My discovery of how to overcome fear (by studying it) gave me the idea of overcoming all disturbances, rather than merely living without them. I would like to be able to endure each of the disturbances mentioned above in a cheery mannor. Currently, I am capable of undergoing frustration while being amused by my situtation (kind of like watching Meet The Fockers and living Meet The Fockers simultaneously). I acquired that talent from a friend of mine who was clever enough to figure out a way to laugh at his own misfortune. The most practical starting place would be boredom. Someday I hope to be able to be bored and also to enjoy myself and my boredom at the same time.