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shmik June 08, 2016 at 15:53 13075 views 38 comments
As my views have become less 'main stream' forum wise, it's been harder and harder to participate in forum discussions. There are so many topics which I cannot contribute to at all. The assumed/background perspectives upon which the ideas in posts are built don't jibe with mine.

For example: Is eating meat immoral? From my perspective the question not only cannot be answered but doesn't even really make sense; I guess it doesn't for most anti-realists. The problem is that even with meta-ethics my views are not within the group of mainstream ones. It's been harder to even categorize my views into the distinct camps (even in a broad sense, anti-realism itself probably doesn't fit). So, what does one write? "From blah blah perspective, the answer is X"?

If this was just about morality, then that's all good, but it's with most of the other topics too. Reading philosophers gives them time to lay out a perspective, so you can try to see the world the same way and assess their views from within that perspective. I could imagine Heidegger coming on and trolling everyone saying they misunderstand being. But he wouldn't actually be addressing the questions or topics at hand. It's almost like to have the discussion he would need to lay out his world-view, the person that he was speaking to would need to lay out theirs, and then what?

When someone says X is immoral, I have no idea what that means to them. If they add in that they are a utilitarian, that helps somewhat; but there is still so much that is unknown about all the background stuff that made these views appealing to them. It's not as if each particular stance is logically grounded and we can't lay out a world view in a couple paragraphs.

A more recent example was a discussion about the laws of nature. Here I agree with Nietzsche, 'Let us be on our guard against saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who obeys, no one who transgresses.' What kind of conversation can one have with people that feel that there are transcendent governing forces? So many of the conversations are just people talking passed each other. There are thousands of pages on PF with disagreements about realism vs idealism: the issue isn't that no one is convinced by the arguments, but often that people don't even get each other. There are definitely posters who I don't understand at all. If they jump in with a 3 sentence input into a conversation, it cannot be helpful to me.

This is kind of rambling and suffers from the same issue that I'm trying to talk about. A few paragraphs to lay out a view on philosophical discussion on forums, which I'm sure won't make sense from some of the perspectives of others.

Comments (38)

Deleteduserrc June 08, 2016 at 16:39 #12829
Reading groups were always my favorite threads.
Moliere June 08, 2016 at 16:50 #12830
I don't disagree that there's some difficulty in being able to actually grapple with serious philosophical issues in a forum format. I think that this might also be the result of misunderstandings of ground rules between speakers, too -- not just on the philosophical issues, but even the rules which govern a productive philosophical conversation, which seems to change with the format because it falls somewhere in-between a casual conversation and a formal paper.

Perhaps there could be a better understanding if one were to be more specific about the rules of a particular thread?


I've noticed what you speak of in some of my phil readings -- like, I lacked the ability to create what seemed like a good conversation starter about something I had an interest in.

At the same time, I have got to say that forums like these have been most beneficial to me in being able to express and read thoughts and arguments. In some sense the benefit was just having an outlet and a place where I could gather suggestions for further reading. This latter point is what has always kept me around the forums -- without a formal environment, it's been the best thing for finding new philosophy sources to track down and ponder.


Another motivation for my posting, when I have the time, is when I see someone grappling with issues that I've been motivated to grapple with I want to help them to think through them -- it's hard to think in a bubble, and it helps to have a conversation partner.


(And, I agree @csalisbury -- reading groups, whether it be books or papers, have been my favorite aspect to the forums)
Hanover June 08, 2016 at 17:27 #12831
And yet I am able to tell a random person on the street who I know nothing about and who may not share my worldview that I find lying wrong, and he'll know just what I mean. Curious I can accomplish that there, but the OP can't do that here.
Jamal June 08, 2016 at 17:39 #12832
Reply to Hanover You remind me of Banno sometimes.
Hanover June 08, 2016 at 17:47 #12833
Funny you should say that because after I wrote that, I thought it sounded Bannoish.

Anyway, I'm much more entertaining than Banno.
ArguingWAristotleTiff June 08, 2016 at 18:33 #12835
Quoting Hanover
Funny you should say that because after I wrote that, I thought it sounded Bannoish.


Hmmm...I cannot say that I have ever noticed a similarity between you and Banno~
Hanover June 08, 2016 at 18:39 #12836
No, we're pretty different I'd say...
The Great Whatever June 08, 2016 at 18:47 #12837
Moral anti-realism is the mainstream position in modern philosophy and Western society at large.
mcdoodle June 08, 2016 at 22:35 #12839
I like reading groups too though it's hard to keep up. Not enough people here read the by-month material seriously so it died. I'm about to fill a hole in my reading by reading Critique of Pure Reason if anyone's interested in a slow read. I never have understood this transcendent/al stuff so am giving it another go.

The forums have been very useful to me in a scattergun way. I'm back at college now at age 67, partly stimulated by the chat. But I steer clear of Ethics stuff mostly, both here and in academe , I don't relate to the debates. Ethics I try and do out in the world rather than talk about, based on my politics and a very simplified virtue system - do to others as you would be done by. But I dont eat meat schmik - I invented a veggie character in a story once and she convinced me :) (Sometimes tho bacon is decreed an honorary vegetable)
S June 08, 2016 at 23:14 #12842
Quoting shmik
As my views have become less 'main stream' forum wise, it's been harder and harder to participate in forum discussions. There are so many topics which I cannot contribute to at all. The assumed/background perspectives upon which the ideas in posts are built don't jibe with mine.

For example: Is eating meat immoral? From my perspective the question not only cannot be answered but doesn't even really make sense; I guess it doesn't for most anti-realists. The problem is that even with meta-ethics my views are not within the group of mainstream ones. It's been harder to even categorize my views into the distinct camps (even in a broad sense, anti-realism itself probably doesn't fit). So, what does one write? "From blah blah perspective, the answer is X"?


I can't relate very much with your position, but I suppose it's much like the position of an atheist with regards to many philosophy of religion discussions which make certain religious or theistic assumptions which aren't shared by the atheist.

I don't agree that the sort of ethical question in your example doesn't make sense for most anti-realists. I think that those who would claim that it doesn't make sense are a minority.

Quoting shmik
When someone says X is immoral, I have no idea what that means to them. If they add in that they are a utilitarian, that helps somewhat; but there is still so much that is unknown about all the background stuff that made these views appealing to them. It's not as if each particular stance is logically grounded and we can't lay out a world view in a couple paragraphs.


I'm with Bannover on this one.

Quoting shmik
A more recent example was a discussion about the laws of nature. Here I agree with Nietzsche, 'Let us be on our guard against saying that there are laws in nature. There are only necessities: there is no one who commands, no one who obeys, no one who transgresses.' What kind of conversation can one have with people that feel that there are transcendent governing forces? So many of the conversations are just people talking passed each other. There are thousands of pages on PF with disagreements about realism vs idealism: the issue isn't that no one is convinced by the arguments, but often that people don't even get each other. There are definitely posters who I don't understand at all. If they jump in with a 3 sentence input into a conversation, it cannot be helpful to me.


I can imagine an interesting and productive discussion for and against the proposition that there are transcendent governing forces, but of course, unfortunately it doesn't always turn out like that. That's just one of those things that you have to learn to accept and deal with, lest you be overcome by frustration and disappointment.

As for brevity, it can be either a merit or a shortcoming, but my preference is for the former - both in terms of my own writing style and in that of the posts of other forum members. I can't stand verbosity, vagueness and excessive use of jargon.

Quoting shmik
This is kind of rambling and suffers from the same issue that I'm trying to talk about. A few paragraphs to lay out a view on philosophical discussion on forums, which I'm sure won't make sense from some of the perspectives of others.


I think you got the point across. No need to publish a treatise on the subject.
shmik June 09, 2016 at 15:22 #12858
Yeh reading groups seem good. I've never really taken part.

Reply to Moliere For sure, forums have been great for me, especially as a bounce off for further reading or just hearing about areas that may interest me. I'm not sure what ground rule would help on issues, it's not as if they have bad culture.

Quoting Hanover
And yet I am able to tell a random person on the street who I know nothing about and who may not share my worldview that I find lying wrong, and he'll know just what I mean. Curious I can accomplish that there, but the OP can't do that here.


Yes I (The OP) have some troubles with that. Of course they will know how to deal with you, I'm not making an argument that communication is impossible. Someone who wanted to engage with a philosophical discussion would have different issues. When you say 'lying is wrong' are you asserting that lying is wrong or stating your attitude? Do you intend it to have a truth value? Perhaps you mean that we have duty not to lie, or that you have been commanded not to lie by an authority. It could be that you hold by Sartrean ethics which I know nothing about. Are you asserting a rule not to lie, or roughly generalizing what you consider to be the best course of action. If it is a rule, does it subsist like matter? Discovered or created? Maybe you perceive it like people perceive secondary qualities, real but not subsisting in matter. If it's an attitude, is it an attitude that you project onto the world so that you actually experience it, or more like a taste? Is the best place to start our analysis to look at the language you use to express morality, or the phenomenology of moral experience? Has @Michael grilled you about the definition of ought yet?

Next thing someone tells you that there are no moral rules because nothing can get through the is-ought divide. But maybe to you there is no problem at all because we don't start off as subjects disconnected from the world; rather the world is always already imbued with value.

More likely someone tells you that lying doesn't always end up with the best consequences and discussion continues on indefinitely.
shmik June 09, 2016 at 15:40 #12859
Quoting mcdoodle
I like reading groups too though it's hard to keep up. Not enough people here read the by-month material seriously so it died. I'm about to fill a hole in my reading by reading Critique of Pure Reason if anyone's interested in a slow read. I never have understood this transcendent/al stuff so am giving it another go.


I've been meaning to have a look at it again, got through about 1/3rd five years ago but my attitude was wrong, too critical. I'd be interested in CPR but I've always been bad with consistent reading/posting.

Quoting mcdoodle
The forums have been very useful to me in a scattergun way. I'm back at college now at age 67, partly stimulated by the chat. But I steer clear of Ethics stuff mostly, both here and in academe , I don't relate to the debates. Ethics I try and do out in the world rather than talk about, based on my politics and a very simplified virtue system - do to others as you would be done by. But I dont eat meat schmik - I invented a veggie character in a story once and she convinced me :) (Sometimes tho bacon is decreed an honorary vegetable)


For ethical reasons, I've been on and off vegan, vegetarian, kangatarian and various other diets which don't have names. I find it interesting that after a while the whole relationship with meat can change. At one point its just food and at another its a moral issue to deal with.

How did your your own character convince you of something?
shmik June 09, 2016 at 15:51 #12860
Quoting Sapientia
I can't relate very much with your position, but I suppose it's much like the position of an atheist with regards to many philosophy of religion discussions which make certain religious or theistic assumptions which aren't shared by the atheist.

I don't agree that the sort of ethical question in your example doesn't make sense for most anti-realists. I think that those who would claim that it doesn't make sense are a minority.


Yeh that's a good example. There are many forms of anti-realism which have similar foundations to realist views, going along with them most of the way but having differences. It was much easier when I held by error theory. Now I don't think that morality should be thought of as principles at all, so when someone makes a statement about a moral rule it's hard to understand. What's their relationship to it, do they actually have this abstract rule which legislates their actions etc. There's something very bizarre about rationally deriving a rule and then having it control you. I've yet to hear someone say "I don't care at all about animals but it was proved to me that eating them is immoral, so I'm a vego". Yet people can debate the morality of eating meat without considering whether the other person cares about animals as relevant.

Quoting Sapientia
I think you got the point across. No need to publish a treatise on the subject.


Part of what I'm saying comes from Deleuze and Guatarri's "What Is Philosophy", so the treatise is already out there though the book is much more interesting than my post.
Deleteduserrc June 09, 2016 at 18:02 #12865
Reply to shmik
Part of what I'm saying comes from Deleuze and Guatarri's "What Is Philosophy", so the treatise is already out there though there book is much more interesting than my post.


Oooh, you should start a thread around some select quotes from WIP. I think that could be fun. I'd do it myself, but I'm currently using my copy to prop up my dresser, which is missing a piece, and it'd be a hassle to find another fix.
The Great Whatever June 09, 2016 at 19:50 #12868
Reply to csalisbury Reply to mcdoodle If you guys want to do a reading group, I am up for it. I just finished some things and have some extra reading time. And I haven't read any philosophy for quite a while now.
Deleteduserrc June 10, 2016 at 02:34 #12889
I'd be down for a reading group, just don't think I could do Kant this summer (Moliere and I and some others did the 3 critiques a couple years back on old PF, and I've still got a few years yet before I want to refresh.)
shmik June 10, 2016 at 02:48 #12898
Reply to csalisbury I'm only part way though, I've had to put it on hold for the last couple of months. I've got some time off in a couple of weeks and will hopefully finish it then. Would be great to discuss afterward.
Deleteduserrc June 10, 2016 at 02:51 #12899
Reply to shmik It's such a fun book, imo. I hope you do start a thread!
shmik June 10, 2016 at 04:19 #12917
Yeh its great. If you want to relive it a little, Daniel Coffeen has a half hour talk about it on his podcast. He's ridiculously into it so it makes for good listening.
https://itunes.apple.com/au/podcast/danielcoffeens-podcast/id305353009?mt=2
Jamal June 10, 2016 at 04:30 #12920
I'd be up for a reading group too, but like csalisbury I'm not so sure about going back to Kant, just yet. But if you started one I could probably be persuaded.
Moliere June 10, 2016 at 05:02 #12921
Quoting shmik
I'm not sure what ground rule would help on issues, it's not as if they have bad culture.


I guess my thinking here is that, though we set out our arguments in the form of persuasion, it might be helpful for people to understand that, in philosophy, few are persuaded. So, at least insofar that we believe philosophy is actually worthwhile, we must be doing something else aside from persuading (though, on the rare chance, we are sometimes persuaded too -- it's just not the norm, at least not within a particular conversation).
Moliere June 10, 2016 at 05:09 #12922
Reading groups are the shit! :D I think I could actually swing one now, too. Not sure I could lead it, but I could participate. My most recent phil reading has been the small stuff on my shelf that I haven't read yet -- nothing with any kind of coherent project or anything, but more of a mixed hodgepodge.

If Deleuze tickles your fancy I'd be more than happy to dig into Deleuze with people. I read Anti-Oedipus about 2 years ago, now, but I came away from the reading with impressions and a feeling of its whole rather than a real understanding of the text in spite of my efforts to do otherwise. Perhaps the level of understanding I sought isn't there to be had, but I enjoyed the effort a great deal. And his summary of Kant's critical philosophy is superb (his history writing is a beacon of clarity). So I know I'd enjoy reading any of his works.

Or anything, really. As I said, I don't exactly have a direction with my philosophy reading atm.
Deleteduserrc June 10, 2016 at 05:52 #12923
Reply to Moliere
And his summary of Kant's critical philosophy is superb (his history writing is a beacon of clarity). So I know I'd enjoy reading any of his works.

It's amazing how insightful-in-digestible-prose he can be, when he wants. The clarity of works like Kant and Critical Philosophy is exactly what makes me willing to engage him when he goes obscure.
S June 10, 2016 at 10:37 #12927
Quoting shmik
It was much easier when I held by error theory. Now I don't think that morality should be thought of as principles at all, so when someone makes a statement about a moral rule it's hard to understand. What's their relationship to it, do they actually have this abstract rule which legislates their actions etc. There's something very bizarre about rationally deriving a rule and then having it control you. I've yet to hear someone say "I don't care at all about animals but it was proved to me that eating them is immoral, so I'm a vego". Yet people can debate the morality of eating meat without considering whether the other person cares about animals as relevant.


I share your views about thinking of morality and moral behaviour and psychology in abstract and rational terms. We typically and primarily relate to morality emotionally. I think that most people mean the same, or at least similar things, when that say that such-and-such is wrong, but then philosophers come along and overcomplicate things. What most people [i]express[/I] is disapproval. This is the case whether they mean to state an objective truth or just their subjective judgement. I believe that fundamental underlying meaningful elements behind the use of common moral language can be known if one takes a reductionist approach, and I further believe that the most useful and meaningful results can be found if one examines subjectivity rather than depart on a wild goose chase by seeking moral objectivity - which, if it does exist, is basically redundant - even if it could be proven.

The rule-based approach and other such approaches (some forms of utilitarianism come to mind), when isolated from our emotional feelings regarding an ethical issue, seems to move away from what makes ethics meaningful, and move towards something else, such as duty - which can be blind. Much like how some - many even - religious people are blinded by devotion, and become insensitive, misguided, unreasonable, cold, and so on, as a result. Likewise if morality is thought to be akin to mathematics, in which one can find moral guidance by performing an indifferent calculation.
Hanover June 10, 2016 at 14:56 #12929
Quoting Sapientia
I think that most people mean the same, or at least similar things, when that say that such-and-such is wrong, but then philosophers come along and overcomplicate things.


This assumes near universal agreement on moral issues. The problem is that moral norms vary depending upon time and place, with what is right in the US being different from what is right in Saudi Arabia, and what is right in the US in 2016 is different than what was right in the US in 1776.

In order to deny the relativity of morality (as in it's not dependent upon such things as time and place), some standard has to be asserted that describes the absolutist basis for it. It's not that philosophers are overcomplicating what we already know to be right and wrong, it's that they wish to explain how it is that slavery (for example) was just as immoral in 1600 as it would be in 2016 and why the oppression of women is just as bad in Saudi Arabia as it is in the Ireland (where Baden has a harem of women).

Quoting Sapientia
The rule-based approach and other such approaches (some forms of utilitarianism come to mind), when isolated from our emotional feelings regarding an ethical issue, seems to move away from what makes ethics meaningful, and move towards something else, such as duty - which can be blind.


Perhaps it does eliminate some of the feeling from the enterprise, but there is a valid reason for doing that, and it's to remove the subjectivity from the analysis. If my sole reason for not murdering is that it makes me feel hella bad, then it'll be difficult to convince you not to murder if you don't have that same negative feeling. If, though, I have a reason that transcends you and me (like God told us not murder), then that's at least provides an objective basis.

I think your position only works if we're all good people with the same views of right and wrong. Sort of like we all see blue the same way, so we don't need some philosopher offering a complicated view of what blue is. We know blue when we see it. I just don't think the same holds true for morality. Those who share similar norms typically are those in the same community, but the question is whose norms are truly good.

mcdoodle June 10, 2016 at 17:25 #12931
Quoting shmik
How did your your own character convince you of something?


Well, fiction is an odd business, to invent it you have to enter in some way into the imagination of the character you're writing about. I had set up the daughter of the (woman) protagonist to be an annoyingly-right child, so I got her (at age nine) to disrupt the household by suddenly asserting the rights of animals - throwing out clothes, refusing food, insisting on separate eating utensils from her disgusting carnivorous brother. And I just emerged from writing the situation, thinking, beyond fiction - this girl is right!
S June 14, 2016 at 15:15 #13002
Quoting Hanover
This assumes near universal agreement on moral issues.


No, actually it doesn't. I think that you've misunderstood the point that you addressed. I wasn't talking about any particular moral issues, or indicating that I believe that morality is in some respect universal; I was talking abstractly about what it means to state that X is wrong. When I stated that philosophers overcomplicate things, I was referring to the difference between the sort of way in which, for example, shmik questions the meaning of basic moral statements, and the way in which, as you pertinently pointed out, a random person on the street can readily grasp the meaning.

Quoting Hanover
Perhaps it does eliminate some of the feeling from the enterprise, but there is a valid reason for doing that, and it's to remove the subjectivity from the analysis. If my sole reason for not murdering is that it makes me feel hella bad, then it'll be difficult to convince you not to murder if you don't have that same negative feeling.


If you don't have that feeling, then you're seriously lacking in something which is vital to being a moral agent: empathy. You can't really remove the emotional foundation and retain morality; you'd be left with an empty structure which in some way resembles morality, but is not in fact morality - such as a set of rules. So, you could convince such a person not to murder, but I'd question whether such a person has actually understood that murder is immoral in the way that a moral agent must.

Quoting Hanover
If, though, I have a reason that transcends you and me (like God told us not murder), then that's at least provides an objective basis.


No, that is no basis at all. That's just following a command.

Quoting Hanover
I think your position only works if we're all good people with the same views of right and wrong. Sort of like we all see blue the same way, so we don't need some philosopher offering a complicated view of what blue is. We know blue when we see it. I just don't think the same holds true for morality. Those who share similar norms typically are those in the same community, but the question is whose norms are truly good.


All I'm basically saying is that moral agency requires a moral sensibility. That doesn't require that everyone react in the same way, or that we must all be good people with the same views of right and wrong. Rather, my position requires that a person be capable of emotionally grasping what it means to judge something as either moral or immoral, and to be susceptible to reacting in the manner that you'd expect of a moral agent.
Thorongil June 18, 2016 at 12:41 #13067
Reply to The Great Whatever I seem to recall seeing surveys done of professional philosophers that showed that most of them are moral realists, or at least a majority of them are. Although, it was likely representative of only Anglo-American analytic philosophers.
shmik June 22, 2016 at 06:14 #13256
Quoting Moliere
I guess my thinking here is that, though we set out our arguments in the form of persuasion, it might be helpful for people to understand that, in philosophy, few are persuaded. So, at least insofar that we believe philosophy is actually worthwhile, we must be doing something else aside from persuading (though, on the rare chance, we are sometimes persuaded too -- it's just not the norm, at least not within a particular conversation).


Been sitting exams and I don't go on forums when in study mode so this is a little late.

I agree, it would be nice if more conversations were seen as working together on an issue rather than against each other.
shmik June 22, 2016 at 06:19 #13257
Quoting mcdoodle
Well, fiction is an odd business, to invent it you have to enter in some way into the imagination of the character you're writing about. I had set up the daughter of the (woman) protagonist to be an annoyingly-right child, so I got her (at age nine) to disrupt the household by suddenly asserting the rights of animals - throwing out clothes, refusing food, insisting on separate eating utensils from her disgusting carnivorous brother. And I just emerged from writing the situation, thinking, beyond fiction - this girl is right!

I really love this. Its seems so much more human to me then if you went to a philosophy class and got convinced of utilitarianism.
shmik June 22, 2016 at 06:45 #13258
Quoting Sapientia
I share your views about thinking of morality and moral behaviour and psychology in abstract and rational terms. We typically and primarily relate to morality emotionally. I think that most people mean the same, or at least similar things, when that say that such-and-such is wrong, but then philosophers come along and overcomplicate things. What most people express is disapproval. This is the case whether they mean to state an objective truth or just their subjective judgement. I believe that fundamental underlying meaningful elements behind the use of common moral language can be known if one takes a reductionist approach, and I further believe that the most useful and meaningful results can be found if one examines subjectivity rather than depart on a wild goose chase by seeking moral objectivity - which, if it does exist, is basically redundant - even if it could be proven.


Yeh I'm with the view about starting from subjectivity, I don't even really get the idea of taking moral language as the starting point. To me it's almost two different things, what morality is and how we talk about it. It would be like taking language as the starting point to proving that process philosophy is false as we talk about objects. Language already includes a way of conceptualizing morality and I think the general way of talking about it is already mistaken. Otherwise you run into issues like the Frege - Geach problem.

But from this my issue arises, what is this persons relationship to the rule. Because people do think to themselves 'I want to do X but its against the moral rule Y'. So the relationship must be more complex than 'I disapprove of X'.
S June 23, 2016 at 13:14 #13334
Quoting shmik
But from this my issue arises: what is this persons relationship to the rule? Because people do think to themselves 'I want to do X but its against the moral rule Y'. So the relationship must be more complex than 'I disapprove of X'.


It can indeed be more complex, but it need not exclusively be about personal subjectivity, as indicated by the statement 'I disapprove of X'; it can also be about how the subject relates to other subjects, i.e. intersubjectivity. The anticipated dissaproval of breaking a "moral rule" might be attributable to society or state. But it could also be solely a personal conflict between desire and guilt, between temptation and personal disapproval. If it really is a moral rule, as acknowledged by the subject, then I would expect there to be psychological conflict of this sort. On the other hand, it could just be a "moral rule" in that it is what the society in which the subject resides deems to be so, but is not truly acknowledged as such by the subject. In which case, the absence of such a personal moral dilemma would be understandable.
Michael August 21, 2016 at 08:41 #16955
Quoting Sapientia
If you don't have that feeling, then you're seriously lacking in something which is vital to being a moral agent: empathy. You can't really remove the emotional foundation and retain morality; you'd be left with an empty structure which in some way resembles morality, but is not in fact morality - such as a set of rules. So, you could convince such a person not to murder, but I'd question whether such a person has actually understood that murder is immoral in the way that a moral agent must.


I wonder if perhaps this means that murder being immoral isn't something you understand but something you feel.
andrewk August 22, 2016 at 01:26 #17043
[quote=Hanover]And yet I am able to tell a random person on the street who I know nothing about and who may not share my worldview that I find lying wrong, and he'll know just what I mean.

Curious I can accomplish that there, but the OP can't do that here. [/quote]
The OP can easily accomplish what you are talking about here. What he can't do is what he was talking about in the OP. There's a critical difference between the two, that involves a first-person pronoun.
The Great Whatever August 22, 2016 at 04:27 #17069
Reply to Thorongil That would be interesting if true. A lot of papers I've read both in philosophy and out seem to throw out moral anti-realism by the way and very casually, as if it were a commonsense truth. I'm reading a lot in linguistics too now about evaluative adjectives, deontic modals, predicates of personal taste, and so on, and it's usually assumed without argument that these things can't have objective extensions or participate in objective truth values.
shmik August 22, 2016 at 05:47 #17076
Reply to The Great Whatever Funny that this exact conversation occurred in 2 threads. Pretty sure the paper Throngil is talking about is this one:
http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP

shmik August 22, 2016 at 06:00 #17079
Quoting Michael
I wonder if perhaps this means that murder being immoral isn't something you understand but something you feel.


Recently I've been liking the idea of morality being something you Judge. Understanding and feeling are both too passive.
The Great Whatever August 22, 2016 at 07:17 #17093
Reply to shmik My predictions for the majority on the questions, before looking at this:

a priori knowledge: yes [RIGHT]
abstract objects: platonism [RIGHT]
aesthetic value: subjective [WRONG]
analytic-synthetic distinction: yes [RIGHT]
epistemic justification: externalism [RIGHT]
external world: non-skeptical realism [RIGHT]
free will: compatibilism [RIGHT]
god: atheism [RIGHT]
knowledge: empiricism [RIGHT]
knowledge claims: contextualism [RIGHT]
laws of nature: non-humean [RIGHT]
logic: classical? [this question doesn't make any sense] [STILL RIGHT]
mental content: externalism [RIGHT]
meta-ethics: anti-realism [WRONG]
metaphilosophy: naturalism [RIGHT]
mind: physicalism [RIGHT]
moral judgment: non-cognitivism [WRONG]
moral motivation: externalism [WRONG]
newcomb's problem: meh [X]
normative ethics: consequentialism [WRONG]
perceptual experience: disjunctivism [WRONG]
personal identity: psychological [RIGHT]
politics: egalitarianism [RIGHT]
proper names: millian [RIGHT]
science: realism [RIGHT]
teleporter: survival [RIGHT]
time: meh [X]
trolley: switch [RIGHT]
truth: deflationary [WRONG]
zombies: inconceivable [WRONG]

That's 20/28 attempted right, but it looks like I was misinformed about the prevailing metaethical opinions. Interesting also that a lot of these views don't make sense in conjunction, and it seems statistically some of the philosophers must hold these fashionable views simultaneously in conjunction.