Why do you believe morality is subjective?
For the sake of simplicity, the discussion will be limited to moral actions of man towards man, not man towards other beings such as God, angels, animals, plants, or objects.
(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice. I.e., if the act is just, then it is morally good, and if unjust, then morally bad. It is nonsense to speak of an act which is morally good yet unjust, or morally bad yet just.
(2) Justice is defined as: equality in treatment among all men.
(3) Under such a definition, justice is objectively evaluated.
Equality is a mathematical concept that is objective. Equality in treatment is observable, qualifiable, and even quantifiable when measurable goods are involved.
Example 1: Six persons share a cake. All else being equal, it is just to divide the cake into six equal pieces. Anything else would be unjust.
Example 2: An employer distributes the year-end profit to the two employees. Employee 1 was twice as productive as employee 2, and all else is equal. It is therefore just to give employee 1 a share worth twice as much as the share given to employee 2. The shares are not equal, but the treatment is equal relative to the productivity of the employees. Thus the just act may be relative, but still objective. To speak in general terms, justice is relative to the factors that determine the just act, but if these factors were the same, then the act would be the same for all men; and sameness is objective. Of course, the factors that serve to influence the decision must be rational, that is, backed up by objective reasons.
It is acknowledged that other real life examples may be more complex; but the complexity speaks only of the challenge in finding the just act; it does not entail subjectivity, inasmuch as a math problem may be challenging, but its solution remains objective.
(4) If the criteria to evaluate the moral value of an act is justice, and justice is objective, then morality is objective.
(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice. I.e., if the act is just, then it is morally good, and if unjust, then morally bad. It is nonsense to speak of an act which is morally good yet unjust, or morally bad yet just.
(2) Justice is defined as: equality in treatment among all men.
(3) Under such a definition, justice is objectively evaluated.
Equality is a mathematical concept that is objective. Equality in treatment is observable, qualifiable, and even quantifiable when measurable goods are involved.
Example 1: Six persons share a cake. All else being equal, it is just to divide the cake into six equal pieces. Anything else would be unjust.
Example 2: An employer distributes the year-end profit to the two employees. Employee 1 was twice as productive as employee 2, and all else is equal. It is therefore just to give employee 1 a share worth twice as much as the share given to employee 2. The shares are not equal, but the treatment is equal relative to the productivity of the employees. Thus the just act may be relative, but still objective. To speak in general terms, justice is relative to the factors that determine the just act, but if these factors were the same, then the act would be the same for all men; and sameness is objective. Of course, the factors that serve to influence the decision must be rational, that is, backed up by objective reasons.
It is acknowledged that other real life examples may be more complex; but the complexity speaks only of the challenge in finding the just act; it does not entail subjectivity, inasmuch as a math problem may be challenging, but its solution remains objective.
(4) If the criteria to evaluate the moral value of an act is justice, and justice is objective, then morality is objective.
Comments (245)
That's your opinion.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, that's just equality. Is killing everyone for no reason just? Justice is defined through morality, not the other way around.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Yes, if justice is objective.
Example: mercy isn't always just, but it could be argued to be morally right.
I like the way you've laid this out and your argument is persuasive. Rather than "justice," I think "fairness" is the right word, but that doesn't change the overall point. I do think that fairness in creation and application is the most important requirement for any set of laws or rules. If everyone gets treated the same, people are unlikely to do things that are too terrible. But that's governance, not morality.
So, let's see. Is it true that
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't think I buy this. I'll think about it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
As I said, I would say "fairness" but I agree with the definition.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Definitely don't agree with this, but I'll think more about it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't agree, but I like your formulation.
Subjective.
Quoting BlueBanana
Can you give a concrete example of merciful act? I cannot think of one where the morality is contrary to justice.
Quoting BlueBanana
I think you agree with me that killing everyone for no reason is unjust. And it is unjust precisely because there is an unequal treatment. In this case, because you treat the victims as what pleases you; not them.
Are you saying the definition of justice is subjective? Definitions of concepts are always objective. If not the case, then the Socratic Method of finding correct definitions would be in vain. At worst, you could say that my definition is wrong and then proceed to explain why.
Quoting Wayfarer
So I'm arguing that objectivity as a criterion tends to imply a quantitative, rather than qualitative, judgement. Your example of the division of a cake is clearly quantitative.
But how to arrive at such criteria for many ethical questions is a much more difficult matter.
Say you're adjudicating a dispute between claimants to native title of some lands against an industrial interest that wants to develop them for commercial reasons. The latter claimant might argue convincingly that there are economic grounds for development - that many people will benefit through economic development and its associated activity. Whereas the native title claimant may assert that they have a moral right to the land on the basis of their continued occupation of it, even if they readily acknowledge that they have no intention of developing it.
Then a judgement has to be made as to the relative worth of traditional occupancy vs economic development.
And I don't see how such a judgement could be described as 'objective'. I think you might be able to arrive at a disinterested or impartial judgement by a party that has no vested interest in the outcome. But it still wouldn't necessarily be described in objective terms, as such.
It's not that I think moral judgements are 'subjective', but that I think the whole paradigm of 'subjective vs objective' needs to be critiqued.
One human problem is 'What will I do?' Does your conclusion provide a practical solution?
Killing someone as a revenge might be just, but not moral.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't see how that is unequal just because there's someone deciding about the nature of that equal treatment.
Another example, what if you can choose to help one person or multiple people, but if you only help the one person, their gain from the help is greater than the combined gain of the multiple people?
Doesn't our notion of justice involve more than equality of treatment? Equality of treatment implies that 'all men' are equal, yet we know that is not the case. If we only act fairly, meaning give each person an equal slice of cake, then what about the starving person who comes to the table? To treat everyone equally would then be to preserve inequality.
Let us suppose that the other people at the table give the starving person some extra cake. Must, in the cause of justice/equality they all give the same amount? And if only one person donated their share of cake, do all the remaining shares now become 'unjust'?
I think that to solve such problems we have to bring in more rules. But once you have more than one rule in play then you can no longer reduce it to a mathematical type calculation and we are back to morality as usual, where people don't agree and can't find way to resolve their disagreements.
Culturally defined. Let's look at what you think defines justice.
"(2) Justice is defined as: equality in treatment among all men."
The first thing that strikes is the word "men". These days in most civilised societies justice is also offered to women. Odd that you you should hold such an outdated notion.
Secondly, you strangely use the word "all". I suggest that there is not a single society that has offered justice to all men and women, let alone 'all men'.
Third, I think you have a big task ahead if you think that people who the society deeds as worthy of justice, shall receive that justice equally.
Your definition is so bad it's not even wrong. It's nowhere near.
Saying your definition was subjective , I was being kind.
I agree that what is quantitative is objective, but a thing does not need to be quantitative to be objective. The proposition "what is not quantitative is not objective" is itself not quantitative, which would make it not objectively true; thus making it a self-contradiction.
Quoting Wayfarer
Your example points to a moral problem that is challenging, but not subjective. Any judgement which has an objective criterion implies a 'better' or 'worse', depending on how close it gets to meet that criterion. Judgements with subjective criteria don't enter the realm of 'better' or 'worse'. In your example, while the ideal solution may be challenging to attain, there are nevertheless solutions which are clearly better or worse. E.g., siding with one of the two parties is clearly better than kicking both parties off to build your own private mansion. Therefore the problem remains objective.
Regarding 'impartiality': I agree that it has a place in the topic, but it is not incompatible with 'objectivity'. I argue that a judge must remain impartial precisely because the criterion of judgement is objective.
The practical solution is found through the Golden Rule: "How can I act in a way that I would want others to act towards me?". The golden rule is directly derived from justice, because it demonstrates an equal treatment between yourself and others.
If by 'revenge' you mean "a desire for justice (and nothing beyond it)", then it is not immoral. But if you mean "a desire that goes beyond justice (i.e. swinging the pendulum the other way)", then it is immoral, but also unjust because you are now treating the victim differently than how you would want to be treated.
Quoting BlueBanana
To impose your desires on others against their will results in unequal treatment.
Quoting BlueBanana
This case is similar to example 2 in the OP. The justice is relative to the predicted net gain, and this does not entail unequal treatment, because if the predicted gain was equal in both options, then I would help everyone equally.
Yeah thanks. I think you are correct that I could have used the term 'fairness' in this case too. I think 'justice' is the more general term to account for the treatment of all beings, and 'fairness' is the more narrow term to account for the treatment of beings of the same species only. E.g. It is fair to treat all men as equal, and it is just to treat man as man and animals as animals.
As per example 2 in the OP, justice can be relative to some rational factors. In this case, it is relative to how starving some people are. Giving unequal pieces of cake relative to how starving people are can still result in equality in treatment, because anyone would get a larger piece if that person was starving too.
To generalize, we can always rely on the golden rule: "I should treat others in a way I would like to be treated if I were in their situation". This is always just, because you treat others as equal to you.
If I treat everyone as some sort of means to whatever happens to please me, then everyone is treated by the same rule, and would at least count as equal treatment.
If I expected everyone else to follow that same rule, then it would even be a kind of rule which applied to me.
Methinks you need a more robust theory of justice.
Justice should also be offered to children you know; why are you omitting children? :joke:
By 'men', I mean mankind. A minor misunderstanding.
Quoting charleton
You may be right, but that would merely suggest that no society is completely just; not that justice is subjective.
Quoting charleton
Are you saying that just people are not necessarily treated justly? Once again, you may be right, but that only speaks of the injustice in the world; it does not entail that justice is subjective. Since morality is about 'what-ought-to-be' and not about 'what-is', you cannot defend or attack a morality based on historical facts.
To preserve equality in treatment, if you treat others and yourself as you please only, then you would be forced to accept others to treat you, others, and themselves as they please only. But the two behaviours cannot co-exist mutually because what pleases you does not necessarily coincide with what pleases others. Therefore this behaviour is incompatible with justice.
Yup. I agree that the notion of equality posited here would lead to something along those lines.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
The principle of the matter can co-exist, though. If I and everyone treated everyone and themselves exactly as they pleased there is nothing contradictory in that. It's completely equitable in that everyone is treating people in the same manner. Whether we succeed is another matter altogether.
But I do not think that the principle is exactly a just one. Which is why I was thinking there would need to be more to justice than mere equality.
I don't say morality is subjective. I say that moral feelings, impulses, attitudes, judgments, values, ends.... vary from one person and from one cultural context to another, though it seems there are common biological bases to all that variety, rooted in our nature as human animals.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'm inclined to suspect this is an oversimplification, but let's see where it leads.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
This oversimplification I can't accept. I might allow that equality or proportionateness in treatment is required of any conception of justice, but it seems to me this is only one condition of a conception of justice, not by itself an adequate conception of justice.
For instance, if a man assaults anyone who looks at him crooked, I don't call his action "just" and "good" in light of the fact that he treats all his victims the same.
Something in addition to such proprtionality is required before an act counts as "just".
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
According to my above argument, the definition has yet to be specified. All we know is, a concept of equality or proportionality must factor into the characterization somehow. But how? And what else can or must factor into our characterization of justice?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Not so.
One of us says the pieces should be the same size.
Another says the size of the cake should be proportionate to the weight of the consumers.
Another says it's the weight of the cake, not its volume, that should be measured. Another says either weight or volume will suffice, but we should make a distinction between the fit and the unfit among the consumers: We should give a piece proportionate to the weight of each fit person, and then skew the proportion so that those consumers who are too light get a bigger piece than the piece given to those who are fit, and those who are too heavy get a piece smaller than the piece given to those who are fit....
It's not clear that any one of these suggestions is "more just" than the others.
This illustrates the way in which the concept of equality or proportionality is insufficient to determine an adequate conception of justice.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
As I've argued above: Even if we grant that the morality or "goodness" of an act can be evaluated purely in terms of a conception of justice, and even if we grant that equality or proportionality is essential to any conception of justice, it has not been shown that there is an objective standard by which to arrive at a single noncontroversial definition of justice adequate to this purpose.
Let's use an example. Person A wants to live. Person B wants person A to die. How do either person A or B can act so that the equality in treatment is preserved at all times?
This is question begging nonsense.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
A MASSIVE error. You omitted children and women. Did you realise that it was international women's day this week?
I doubt you have anything worthy to say. So I'll not hold my breath waiting.
Person A treats B exactly as person A wants to do -- since A wants to live, A will defend themselves. Person B treats A exactly as person B wants to do -- since B wants A to die, B will try to kill A.
But they'll both be treating one another exactly as their desires dictate.
I agree. Inasmuch as if the human eye sees an object, it is likely that the object seen is real, so it can be that if humans have a moral feeling, it is likely that it points to a real morality. That said, I do not use this argument in the OP.
Quoting Cabbage Farmer
You omit that equality in treatment in all men includes the very man treating others too. If the man wouldn't want others to treat him the way he treats others, then he is not just, because he treats himself differently than he treats others.
Quoting Cabbage Farmer
See example 2 in the OP. Justice can be relative to the factors that determine the act. Those factors are found rationally. As long as for a given rational factor, everyone is treated equally, then justice is done.
Quoting Cabbage Farmer
In example 1, you omitted the phrase "all else being equal". This example was intentionally over-simplified to introduce the concept. Example 2 gets more complex and introduces the factors you mention. If you have a valid argument to introduce a factor that makes justice relative to it, then the acts remain just as long as everyone involved is treated equally relative to those factors.
Quoting Cabbage Farmer
Justice: equality in treatment in all men, even when it is relative to some factors which were arrived at rationally. The factors are determined through objective reasoning; the persons are compared against those factors objectively; therefore justice is determined objectively.
Haters gonna hate, but not philosophize. :groan:
As I said earlier, "To preserve equality in treatment, if you treat others and yourself as you please only, then you would be forced to accept others to treat you, others, and themselves as they please only." In your response, neither A nor B are accepting the same treatment from the other. Thus equality in treatment is not preserved.
To generalize: "Equality in treatment in all men" means that for a given situation, a just treatment is determined such that all men must follow it for others and themselves, as well as from others. This is really nothing more than the golden rule.
Please refer to the post I made above.
This is merely an opinion or position. An argument is a position backed up by reason.
Quoting charleton
I was aware. As previously stated, by 'men', I mean mankind. This is a conventional term in traditional philosophy. Thus I am not omitting children or women. But what is the point to linger on this? Do you want me to apologize? I can if you want. My intent was not to offend anyone.
I think you are begging the question here. There might be disagreement about what constitutes 'an objective judgement' for many kinds of reasons. But here you're more or less insisting that objectivity is self-evident or that there are some objective criteria which just naturally everyone will agree on. And I don't think you've established that.
I think what you're actually wanting to argue for is more along the lines of 'natural law ethics' - a subject that I'm not that familiar with, but I feel it provides the kind of non-subjective grounding that you're wanting to advocate.
No I do not want you to apologise. But this is a clear indication that morality is neither absolute or objective. You can't even agree with the moral position to had a few days ago.
Even if my position were to have changed, it does not entail that morality is neither absolute nor objective. But regardless, my position has not changed. Can you describe how you think it has changed?
Day One: All men are equal
Day Two: Oops I mean women and children too.
So what are the objective rules to morality then?
What ever shit comes into your head?
Good that which contributes to the survival and reproduction of the species
Bad that which detracts from the survival and reproduction of the species
Some examples that this wider definition supports
If your choices are biologically determined, then they’re not really choices.
Richard Polt Anything but Human
I may have misunderstood your point, but are you saying that the right factors that influence the act are not obtained objectively? Maybe an example might help.
A policeman arrests a black man that was present at a crime scene, and does not arrest a white man that was not at the crime scene. If the reason the policeman arrested the black man and not the white man was because of race, then the act was not just, because race is not a valid reason to arrest someone. If on the other hand the reason was because one was at the crime scene and the other was not, then the act was just, because this is a valid reason to arrest someone.
I have decided to stop taking your comments seriously. With that, thanks for increasing the Replies count on this discussion. I suspect this attracts more readers. :blush:
"Equality in treatment" is the criteria of moral value (goodness/badness) specifically, not value in general. There are other types of values, and you are close to the mark when it comes to physical values. I would say the criteria for that one is more accurately health and safety of the individual, but you can indeed extend it to the species.
We know that moral value is different than physical value because the nazis, which are (almost) universally labelled as morally bad, would still be labelled as morally bad, even if they had successfully preserved and expanded their reign.
We don’t usually talk about torture of rocks or abuse of snow. Moral matters are (existentially) mind-dependent, i.e. subjective, and are generally social matters. Four simple basics of morals:
These have been codified in various important historical documents, such as:
[quote=Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, Article IV]Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the fruition of these same rights. These borders can be determined only by the law.[/quote]
[quote=The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, Article 19]Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.[/quote]
Liking freedom and disliking harm are typically involuntary, not a matter of opinion, not discretionary or invented, regardless of liking and disliking being mind-dependent (subjective).
The complexities of life entails significantly more complex regulations and injunctions; these, and their applicability, may be informed by the basics above.
Moral action includes acting in the interest of others.
There's none so blind that cannot see.
I suggest you continue to stick your fingers in your ears and bury your head in the sand. Alternatively could could actually start to think about what you believe on these issues - but i doubt you have it in you.
Says who?
This is good. It is another way to interpret the golden rule.
So your morality consists in total freedom of the individual, with the exception of harm. I have a couple of questions on your no-harm morality.
(1) Is it morally wrong to eat animals and plants? (2) Is it morally acceptable to lie to others if they never find out? (2) Is it wrong to give an employee a raise, and another no raise, due to favoritism?
Is it wrong to do harm to the nazis to prevent them from killing more jews?
The criteria for moral value is justice; and justice is equality in treatment among all men; thus equality in treatment is the criteria for moral value.
Circular, question begging rubbish.
The reason that this had to be declared was that morality does not definitively entail it.
If morality had included this, the declaration would not be necessary.
The problem with the golden rule is that it doesn't tell you much -- it's a guide for people who are already predisposed to be decent people to follow. But it doesn't help in harder cases.
How does the golden rule deal with injustice? I think that's where it fails the most. If we are all already predisposed to be generally decent people and we follow the golden rule then a just state of affairs may come about (though it may not too -- since predisposition plus principle isn't enough to warrant action)
But we live in a world where that is not the case.
Further, we live in a world where there are multiple goods which various people follow and which conflict with one another. So the other failing of the golden rule is it does not adjudicate between actually lived conflicting principles. It doesn't tell us how to deal with enemies.
This only proves the words describing the idea have changed, not the meaning or the idea behind them.
Circular reasoning.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How? How is imposing everyone's desires on everyone against their will not equal?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Quoting BlueBanana
So equal misery is better than unequal happiness?
Sure, but why would I follow such a rule? I would only follow it if I valued it. I will only act justly if I value justice. The value of justice must come from a subject mustn't it? If the value of justice is objective, how can it connect to what I do? Why would such objective values matter to me, or indeed to any subject?
Quite the opposite. Unless you believe the content was purely arbitrary, then it is reasonable to suggest it was inspired by real morality.
Quoting charleton
Incorrect. You believe the mathematical laws to be objective, don't you? And yet, math is taught at school. We can all rediscover mathematical laws on our own, but it is better to teach it in order to speed up the learning process and avoid errors along the way. The same goes for the laws of morality.
Actually it does. See for example the Just War Theory: how to conduct war in accordance with justice (and by extension, the golden rule). To name a few criteria, a war is just if:
The practice of the golden rule does not lead to extreme pacifism. Self-Defence and enforcement of laws are actions that are compatible with it.
That there is a text book non sequiter inference, as it stands. "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" does not just automatically lead one to just war theory. I didn't say it leads to extreme pacifism, either. What I said was it is silent on such matters.
I mean you may prefer just war theory... but if you can accept those terms, then I don't see how you would be able to dissent from the example I used earlier. It was a similarly loosy-goosey principle that can be interpreted in any number of ways, without it sounding quite so nice. And even then I don't see how, of all doctrines, just war theory somehow naturally flows from the golden rule. You'd have to, at the very least, argue the case.
The listed items are not exhaustive (which may not be feasible in the first place). More like a few simple basics extracted from experiences through life this far.
Say, 1500 years ago slavery, misogyny, stoning, mistreating animals, etc might just have been common everyday stuff of no particular consequence/interest, whereas today they're considered immoral or criminal. I guess the contemporary political correctness movement exemplifies emerging morals or moral awareness.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I couldn't say in general, though favoritism comes through as wrong to me; I'd certainly raise my eyebrows if I noticed, but maybe the company established a kind of "discrimination" that new employees are informed of? For that matter, is it morally wrong to mow the poor lawn...? What did the nice green grass ever do to anyone, to deserve such barbaric treatment...? :)
Either way, not all situations are (readily/necessarily) morally decidable, as shown by the Trolley problem. I'd say both decidability and undecidability have to be taken into consideration in an analysis.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Nah, the nazis forfeit their rights.
Suppose we wanted to reduce morals to something. What might this something then be? What would acceptable "moral atoms" look like? Self-interest alone doesn't do it for me (like some rules seem to suggest), but maybe that's just me.
Quoting bert1
Well, maybe you don't follow any such rules. Or any morals at all perhaps. The universe at large sure don't. :) It would mean someone else might deem you not moral based on your actions or inactions.
Only if you believe in the god delusion.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, why?
utter nonsense.
My point was that 'revenge', once clearly defined, cannot be just, while at the same time immoral. But we can work on a concrete example if desired.
Quoting BlueBanana
"Equality in treatment" means that for a given situation, whatever act you choose, you must also accept it from others under a similar situation. Now, the act of "imposing others' desires against my will" cannot be accepted, by definition. As such, it is an unjust act.
Quoting BlueBanana
This depends once again on the net result, but for the most part, yes. What if you were on the bad end of that unequal happiness situation? Would you not wish for that slightly better equal happiness?
I must say, you touch on what I believe is the one weak point of my argument. But I will try my best to answer it.
As per point (1) in the OP, if the act is just, then it is morally good, and if unjust, then morally bad. It is nonsense to speak of an act which is morally good yet unjust, or morally bad yet just.
Now you ask "why be morally good"? For no other reason that it is morally good. Morality is not a means to another end, but an end in and of itself. "Why should I do x if I don't want to?" Because it is morally good. "Why should I not do y even if I want to?" Because it is morally bad.
Yes, starting with your claim as a premise. Having mercy is never immoral, while any punishment can be just as long as the same law is applied equally to all criminals.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Accepting something based on rational reasoning dodsn't make it your will.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'd think about the situation objectively and try to not be selfish, and accept my situation as a just sacrifice for a greater good.
They are connected, because both are derived from justice. Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" is the only way to preserve equality in treatment when interacting with others. Just War Theory: how to conduct a war while preserving justice. If you are in conflict with a neighbouring country, how would you want to them to behave towards you in order to resolve the conflict? E.g., you would likely want them to first use peaceful acts before resorting to force. As such, to preserve justice, you ought to behave the same way towards them. Thus the Just War Theory is related to the Golden Rule.
Quoting Moliere
I forget what example you are referring to.
You here speak of changes in the legal system, not changes in the moral point of view. Nobody wants to be a slave; not the masters, not the slaves. And nobody wants to be the victim of misogyny or stoning; not now, not then. Similarly to today, those victims surely would have wanted to revolt on the grounds of injustice. In general, we cannot discover a morality from historical facts, because morality is about "what-ought-to-be", not about "what-is".
Quoting jorndoe
The trolley problem is not a moral issue but merely a rational one. I did not mention this in the OP, but one necessary component of a moral/immoral (as opposed to amoral) act is intentions. If you never intended to kill anyone, as is the case in the trolley problem, then the accidental killing of people is not immoral. At worst, you made the wrong judgement resulting in an honest mistake.
Quoting jorndoe
That's a good answer. It agrees well with your morality.
Quoting jorndoe
Golden Rule. It is a great practical way to determine if justice was intended or not.
If the existence of God logically follows from the rest of the argument, then it does. Don't run away from the laws of reason just because you don't like the conclusions that follow. :wink:
Quoting charleton
No? The formula 2+2=4 is not objective, but man-made? What about the laws of logic then? After all, mathematics is just logic applied to numbers.
Why do you claim that mercy is never immoral? Is it not immoral to pardon Hitler over and over again, such that each time you set him free, he kills more and more jews?
Quoting BlueBanana
Either I misunderstand you, or misunderstood me. Regardless, the treatment of "imposing others' desires against my will" clearly breaks the golden rule of ethics, and the golden rule is directly derived from justice. As such, this treatment is necessarily unjust.
Quoting BlueBanana
But say that it does not result in a greater good, or a net gain, but rather a net loss. In which case, unequal happiness is not better than equal misery. As such, we cannot generalize that "unequal happiness is always better than equal misery".
It'd not be immoral to not give him a death sentence and instead put him in jail. The jail sentence doesn't exist for the sake of punishing criminals but simply to prevent the criminals from repeating the crimes, and therefore mercy doesn't apply to that situation.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Sure the golden rule can be interpreted that way but that leads to contradictions. I want to be treated the way I want to be treated -> treat others the way they want to be treated, which can directly contradict the way you want to be treated.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
That's of course another situation, which is treated differently from one where it leads to a net gain.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I didn't attempt to generalize it. I claimed that the opposite can't be generalized.
It does not. You have it backwards.Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Exactly. Now you are getting it.
Nature has no integers or equivalents.
There are no straight lines, circles, geometric shapes, in nature.
Maths relies on all these fictions including irrational numbers.
No it proves that women were not considered fully human.
Please state the "laws" of morality!
You know that's not what was meant by what was written.
Such a position has been the moral standard until the 20thC.
Why are you trying to deny the basic facts of history?
Irrelevant. We're talking about an opinion of a person in 21st century.
Quoting charleton
Why are you acting dumb? I couldn't have denied them as I haven't made any claims about any historical facts.
If you are going to use this absurd line of reasoning how can you claim that moral law is objective? When it is demonstrable that morals are different across time, culture, nation, and tribe, and between persons within those categories.
It is you that is acting stupidly, not me.
No they are not. They are the result of my experience with these issues, and are therefore subjective.
It's like you don't know what objective means.
You are only pointing out your own flaws my friend.
and you continue to avoid answering the question; please furnish the thread with some examples of objective morality.
I am happy to claim that my observations on the morality of the world is based on my experience of the world; my studies; my life.
But since you have yet to offer any kind of observations on the details of 'objective morals' or "objective moral laws', you are wasting the time of all who contribute to the thread.
That just about sums you up perfectly. Your absurdity is the claim that your narrowly focused and narrow minded moral code is universal in some way. This could not be more funny.
On what grounds?
And what do you mean 'objective' in this context?
I follow my moral code for my own sake, not for anyone else's, so I certainly have no anxiety about it if you decide not to follow it. It's your problem as far as I'm concerned.
Me too. But the difference is that you think yours is absolute.
Indeed. I think that with matters that relate to moral and emotional value, objectivity can be no more than the people in the room at the same time agreeing.
In the real world people have opinions.
So why does it bother you that I think mine is absolute? Being absolute just means that it applies to everyone, and if someone does not act according to it, then they are being immoral.
You certainly think absolutely that moral values are not absolute.
I agree with this. But I thought you were presenting an example where the act can be morally good yet unjust, when you said here "Having mercy is never immoral, while any punishment can be just as long as the same law is applied equally to all criminals." But now, you say it is merciful to put him in jail; which to me is a form of punishment. Long story short, we have yet to find a case where an act is morally good yet unjust, or vice versa.
Quoting BlueBanana
It now sounds like we are arguing about the same position, namely, that the act of "imposing my desires on others (and no other reasons)" cannot pass the golden rule without contradictions. As such, this act cannot be just.
Quoting BlueBanana
Quoting BlueBanana
Perhaps a misunderstanding once again, because I agree that for some situations, the net gain is a reasonable criteria for a morally good act. And as this "net gain" criteria is objective, it is compatible with an objective morality.
Don't drag me into that, that's not even my stance. If someone uses a bad or fallacious argument, I am going to point that out and argue against that argument, even if I agree with its conclusion. I don't agree with LaCrampe, but your claim that his opinion changed is false. From Wikipedia:
So if the existence of God does not follow from my position that morality is objective, then why did you bring it up in the first place?
Quoting charleton
And yet planes fly, houses stand, and you are using a computer to respond to these posts. But more importantly, if you do not believe that math is objective, then by extension you do not believe that logic is objective. And in which case, there is no common ground for you and I to have a coherent discussion.
Quoting charleton
In general, since morality is the science of "what ought to be", this "ought" implies a law. Specifically in my objective morality, the law is justice, that is, equality in treatment under similar situations, or by extension, the golden rule.
Even if it's unjust?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I wouldn't call the minimal action done to only prevent further crimes a punishment, but if that is done, what about not killing Hitler, instead putting him in jail? That's merciful, but arguably unjust.
What about dragging the moral agents into all this? Is killing other animals for food immoral? (I think it is but as >90% of people are not vegetarians I think it's a safe bet to ask this rhetorical question.) What about non-conscious things? Do they deserve equal treatment?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, I argued that treating others the way they want to be treated leads to contradictions. You can't take people's desires into account with golden rule in a way that doesn't lead to contradictions.
Indeed, no. Your assumption that god exists makes you think morality must be objective.
If you were to challenge your false belief then you can see how both god and morals is so obviously man-made.
It is evidently so.
Hello. There is an error in category. What pertains to survival, or more generally speaking health, is indeed a type of objective value (good/bad); but it is a physical value, not a moral one. Morality pertains to the interaction among beings, and for this discussion, I have limited the topic to the actions of man towards man. With that, there is no morality to speak of when there is a single person left in the world.
Quoting Vaskane
Even if you are right that equality does not exist, it does not follow that it cannot or should not exist.
Emotions are about feelings and that means subjective values are brought to bear on ALL moral situations.
Morals are subjective. Laws are objective.
No of course not. The "net gain" criteria is closer to a last resort, not the first. Equality in treatment, or justice is the first. Then in the rare case when we stubble upon a situation where two choices have the same level of justice, then we may look into the net gain. Such is the case in the Trolley Problem. I would think however that such cases are rare, and so the net gain criteria is not often required.
Quoting BlueBanana
For the sake of argument, let's assume that such an act is indeed unjust. It is also no doubt merciful. How do you now judge the merciful act to be morally good?
Quoting BlueBanana
As stated in the OP, I would like to keep the discussion to the morality of men towards men only. I can however point you to another discussion called In defence of the Great Chain of Being, which talks about morality of all beings, and should provide some answers. If you have any enquiries about it, I can see you there.
Quoting BlueBanana
I agree. Desires are not always just, and so should not be considered to determine the moral value of an act. (I admit I forget what the dispute was about on this one. Maybe we resolved it?)
It may be so that the existence of God and objective morality are directly linked. I.e., no God, then no objective morality, and vice versa. This seems to be your view since you brought up the topic of God in the discussion. However, my argument for an objective morality in the OP does not mention God at all, and so I am not using the existence of God to demonstrate that morality is objective. You are barking up the wrong tree.
But selfishness is unjust. Therefore objective morality, in which justice is the criteria, cannot come from the selfish desire of survival. Not that survival is incompatible with morality, mind you.
Suppose that it is true that some emotional feelings are in regards to morality. E.g., anger is triggered upon experiencing injustice. It does not follow that morality is subjective, just because the emotional feeling belongs to a subject. The sense of sight always belongs to a subject, and yet it does not follow that the object seen is not objectively real.
Why? The only reason I can see for that is one's selfishness resulting in that they don't want to be the one in the worse situation.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Mercy is an expression of love towards another person, and love has an intrinsic value. Alternatively, moral intuition. Moral theories should be made to fit the applications, not another way around.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It was about whether imposing everyone's will on everyone against their wills was unjust.
That's not what I am saying. I am saying that the fact that you think there is a god, prejudices you to the disposition of objective morality.
If you were open to the possibility of a natural universe you would see the absurdity of your position immediately. God and morality are human conceits.
This is a laudable aspiration, but plays no part in 99% of morality.Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It's interesting that you ask such questions, yet still see morality as somehow objective.
It's not only "how", but "who" and through which arbitrary set of criteria.
This is such a poor response. Morality is not "OUT THERE". You can't see it, and get agreement from others that only see a house or a car. Morality has no physical substance. It's all conceptual, and emotional.
We can stand in front of an object and agree it will persist after we walk away. Moral matters we take with us in our minds.
You cannot make a single moral statement that can get an agreement of all people and remain constant after they walk away.
Morality is codified behaviour; the rules that 'moral' behaviour follows and 'immoral' behaviour does not. These rules are subject to individual, historical, familial, and cultural particulars... Therefore...
Why would you believe morality is not subjective?
How can the demand for justice rise from selfishness? And if injustice is present, then what becomes the measure of the net gain?
Quoting BlueBanana
Let's take the example of mercy to the extreme. Out of mercy, we set Hitler free over and over again, and each time, he kills more and more jews, and yet we continue to set him free regardless. This act is no doubt merciful, according to your definition; yet, would you still judge such an act to be morally good? I take it you are an extreme pacifist, since this consists in mercy towards everyone and under all situations.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If they are both derived from the golden rule then then golden rule would differ from justice. In which case I'd be back to your original definition --
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
In which case I'd say that my principle is derived from your notion of justice. Or, at least, is compatible with what is stated by your definition of justice. So if I treat everyone as some sort of means to whatever happens to please me, then everyone is treated by the same rule, and would at least count as equal treatment.
Your counter-example to this was a person who wanted to kill a person who wanted to live. But this doesn't show that my principle isn't derived from your definition of justice. It's in line with it just as much as the golden rule is. Unless any conflict in desire counts as a counter-example?
In which case the golden rule also wouldn't count. What if I don't want to be treated like you want to be treated, after all? Or, in the so called platinum form of said rule, what if treating me as I want to be treated goes against what you want?
I'd like a massage, after all. Why aren't you giving it to me?
No, I don't think a mere conflict in desired outcomes would be enough to invalidate a principle, given the principles you've lain out here. After all, even if it is a just war, we both want to win it once it starts.
Which is just my way of saying that you need a more robust theory of justice than the preservation of the equality of treatment. It is too permissive to count for justice.
For the sake of argument, suppose that what you say is true, that my belief in God prejudices me. So what? It would not change the validity of the argument in the OP, and you would still have to refute it. Suppose that Einstein was a nazi and discovered the formula "E = mc^2" for evil purposes. It does not follow that the formula is false.
Quoting charleton
Not everybody agrees that the Earth is round (surprisingly). Does it follow that the shape of the Earth is subjective? Furthermore, I do not know a single person that likes injustice done to them, and so it is universally perceived as bad when done to us. It's a start.
Meaning equal punishments, but also that everyone lives in equal circumstances? That there is no occasion for 'moral accident'? Because otherwise we would be punishing an act of theft by a starving person the same way as an act of theft by a greedy one.
Mercy is part of the Golden Rule in that we would like others to extend the same understanding to us, because we can imagine circumstances where we might also act the same way. This is incorporated in justice systems, for example we do not have a single crime of killing with a single punishment, but a variety of crimes that reflect intention and circumstance, and also some defenses (insanity, self-defence) that admit the act but excuse it from punishment.
To put it another way, Nazis have often featured in this thread. We would like to think that if we had been born a German in the same epoch as Hitler and the others we would have not gone along with the Nazis. However the chances are that we would. Born earlier we would probably have seen nothing wrong with slavery, or beating wives, either. It is only the 'moral luck' of having been born later that means we do not share the guilt for such things.
1) You have not presented ANY argument. All you have done is to assert a falsehood, which is definitively so.
2) Analogies as to the facts of physical reality are not relevant. Morals are about how people feel. People feel differently about various things. Morals are value judgements, not facts.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Let me ask you this?
Can you prove that the round earth is good or bad?
You can demonstrate that the sun appears circular. You can even make 'circle' as defining by the shape of the sun. But can you demonstrate that the sun is evil or good?
Morals are not factual.
The closest you can get to objective morality is Law.
No it is not.
You obviously have a blind spot and have forgotten women AGAIN.
This indicates to me that you are not to be trusted with moral judgements.
I agree that your conclusion is valid given your postulates, however I, and I'd imagine others who believe morality is subjective, would disagree with your first postulate below:
(1) The criteria or standard to evaluate the moral value (goodness or badness) of an act is justice. I.e., if the act is just, then it is morally good, and if unjust, then morally bad. It is nonsense to speak of an act which is morally good yet unjust, or morally bad yet just.
My view is that it just so happens that most acts we consider to be moral are just, but this isn't a given. I therefore disagree with your assumption that this is the way one ought to distinguish between morally good and bad acts.
Hello. You post is merely an opinion or position. It needs to be backed up by reason to be a complete argument.
Quoting creativesoul
As per the OP.
Not quite. Both the golden rule and the Just War Theory are derived from justice. The golden rule differs from justice inasmuch as an effect differs from its cause, but they are directly linked.
Quoting Moliere
As mentioned above, the golden rule is directly linked to justice; so much so that one cannot be followed without the other. Your behaviour of "treating everyone as some sort of means to whatever happens to please me" clearly breaks the golden rule because you would not want this behaviour from others onto you. And if the golden rule is broken, then the behaviour is unjust.
Justice: equality in treatment in all men.
Selfishness: treating yourself above others.
Therefore, by definition, selfishness is unjust.
Let's say we have culture A and culture B that don't interact with each other. Both cultures value different things.
In culture A, if you steal, you get your hand chopped off. This happens to everyone in this society. And people truly believe that anyone who steals truly does deserve to get their hand chopped off, including themselves if they were the thief.
In culture B, if you steal, you get sent to prison. This happens to everyone in this society. And people truly believe that anyone who steals truly does deserve to go to prison, including themselves if they were the thief. Yet, people in culture B don't think that a thief deserves to get their hand chopped off and find it too cruel.
Wouldn't both of these cultures be acting just?
Because the only rational reason to demand for justice is the fear of being the one that is in the worse situation. If one wants altruistic good, they'll prioritize the good and not its equal distribution.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I can't agree with that, for the reasons stated before. The concept of mercy just doesn't apply to means of crime prevention.
... according to your subjective opinion on the matter.
Leaving aside what I want for now, and whether the golden rule follows from justice...
I would say that on the formal level, if not in spirit, my maxim follows your definition of justice. But that's what I was trying to get at in the first place; what you state justice is -- the equality of treatment of men -- is not robust enough. The formal statement is too permissive, because it clearly allows for things which are not just, at least as yours and my intuitions would have them (since I don't think that the maxim I produced is exactly just, either, merely something which follows from your formally stated definition of justice). There must be more to justice, in that case, than merely the equality of treatment between persons.
This conclusion is false. It is no conclusion at all.
I think women are more important than men since men are incapable of giving birth. Different roles in society require different treatment. You can't even bring yourself to mention women. You have failed this simple test again and again.
To some degree we all have to treat ourselves before others since we would be incapable of working for others were we to not first look after ourselves.
If you were to stay hungry before ensuring the rest of humanity were properly fed, then you'd be dead before you got very far.
For Christ's sake give the guy a break.
Oxford English Dictionary definition of 'man' - "2A human being of either sex; a person."
He did not use this form of definition, which is, incidentally about 40 years out of date. Not "MAN" but men.
Firstly, unless you are a mind reader you cannot possibly know what definition he had in mind. Secondly I think you made it quite clear in your comments about the use of the term American Dream, that you set little store by statistics about the usage trends of certain words. Thirdly, seeing as the term was still ambiguous enough at the time of Miller and Swift's instructional on Non-Sexist Writing (1988) to require instruction to the layman, I can't see how it could have dropped out of common usage ten years before then.
Yes I can: the context.
The mention of the phrase "American Dream" is not relevant. My query about that was how the data was gathered.
1988 is a long time ago, and the use of "Man" is now defunct. Try using it at college and see how far you get. In fact it's been anathema since at least as long ago as 1990 in academic circles and throughout the media.
Oh ffs not this again, it has been made clear what OP meant and that you're for some reason blatantly misinterpreting what has been said.
Quoting charleton
So now you can claim someone's opinion to be whatever because of grammatical errors they make?
Quoting charleton
You've shown nothing in the context to imply your opinion.
Ah yes, I'd forgotten your supernatural ability to divine a person's deepest intentions from just 6 lines of rhetoric, and with such confidence that even just asking them what they meant to confirm would be a waste of your time. For the rest of us not so magically endowed perhaps you could explain exactly what it was about the context that lead you to uncover Samuel's secrect misogynist agenda.
Childish straw man!! LOL
Unless Mr banana is a Victorian gentleman, or both of you are pair of misogynistic twats - would it hurt you to use a gender inclusive word like the rest of the people in the English speaking world: human, human being, people..
Maybe you two are from Texas or something?
Quoting Kenshin
You may be right that, in theory, we cannot prove that morality is about justice. But I think we can in practice. Morality is about "what-ought-to-be", or in other words, duty. I mean here real duty from conscience, not legal duty from your country, as in during the nazi regime. In practice, no one can experience a sense of duty in accomplishing an act that they believe to be unjust. One may experience pleasure doing injustice (in a twisted way), but not duty.
In order to validate the claim that morality is separate from justice, we would need to bring up an example where duty from conscience demands for injustice. Note, it may be futile to bring external examples like Hitler, because we cannot conclude from his acts if he was motivated from duty or something else like pleasure. I am instead asking for your own personal experience here.
As per example (2) in the OP, justice is equality in treatment, but relative to the situation. It is reasonable to not punish theft motivated from starvation, because health and safety are objective values. Greed, or desire, is not. So the factor that determines the punishment is rational. Then justice is preserved if, under the same situation (whether starvation or greed), we give everyone the same treatment.
Quoting Londoner
Agreed. But this does not opposes my position, because the Golden is derived from the same concept of justice.
Quoting Londoner
The behaviour from the nazis breaks the Golden Rule, because they would not want to be treated as they treated their victims. Thus the behaviour is unjust.
Once again, either refute my arguments or back up your own position with a reason. As it stands, you have not done either, and as such, there is nothing here for me to either defend or refute.
Quoting charleton
Neither the earth's shape nor the sun are either morally good or bad. An essential component of morality is intentions or voluntariness, and neither the earth nor the sun have that.
Yes, for those who don't know better, man-made laws are good starting points to moral judgement. This assumes that the laws are good, which is for the most part the case in developed countries. Now if we speak of laws being good or bad, then this implies a higher morality which serves as the criteria to judge man-made laws.
If morality is objective, there there are moral truths or morally right acts, such as following the Golden Rule. If not, then not. So what is your reason for believing that morality is subjective?
In theory, your example indeed poses a problem. However, in practice, I claim that your culture A cannot exist. From experience, we know that nobody wants a degree of punishment that exceeds the degree of the crime. The punishment in culture A is clearly such a case, and so nobody would want to endure it. Not the citizens; not the law enforcers.
Alongside the principle of justice, human nature contains natural inclinations that apply to all, such as the fact that nobody wants unnecessary pain. As such, the principle of justice which may at first seem to be a mere equation without substance, is populated with inclinations from human nature, and this results in one single ethical system that would apply universally (in theory, if followed at all times).
In your view, does it follow that such persons as Martin Luther King Jr. were selfish? I cannot agree. If one acts to restore equality in treatment, even if it is because they are situated on the worse end, as long as they do not go overboard so as to be unjust the other way, then the act cannot be called selfish.
Quoting BlueBanana
I am not sure what you mean here. Let's take a step back to the definition of mercy. If mercy is defined as "never harming anyone ever", then it does not follow that mercy is always morally good, because it is sometimes necessary to harm, such as when defending a victim from a bully. If on the other hand, mercy is defined as "not being cruel" or "not giving a punishment that exceeds the crime", then mercy can indeed always be morally good, but also just.
The point of my comment was to talk about how people have different values. Individuals have different values, and to a greater extent societies have different values. Those values are what any justice or morality is dependent on. Values come from both biology and culture. How should a drug addict be punished? Some may think it's immoral to put them in prison and rather they should be only rehabilitated (some countries in Europe). Others may think drug addicts deserve 1 year, 5 years, 15 years in prison (the US). Some may go as far as saying they truly deserve the death penalty. An argument could be made that a democracy allows the greatest amount of peoples' values in consideration when making laws.
With presupposed values, something can be objectively more moral than something else. However, there is no objective standard for presupposed values that we are aware of that transcends human thought. Individuals and cultures disagree about what is moral. Natural inclinations are not the only thing that results in values. If that were true, everyone would have the same values, however we don't see that because of differing cultural effects or even just the parents one has. And I believe the differing values is what people mean when they say morality is subjective.
No. His work resulted in net gain.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I would use neither of those definitions. I'd maybe define mercy as an act or decision of not punishing (even if the punishment is just). Unless prisons are made inherently uncomfortable or dangerous for the inmates, I don't call imprisonment punishment.
I think I have already addressed this, but I will try again. "Equality in treatment in all men" means that, for a given situation, the treatment you choose must apply to yourself, and to others, and from yourself, and from others. With this, the treatment "do as you please, and only as you please" cannot be just, because what pleases you does not necessarily please others. So there is a contradiction, both when you apply the treatment to others, and when others apply the treatment to you.
Women are incapable of giving birth without men. :cool:
Quoting charleton
I thought your position was equality in treatment in men and women. Now you argue for different level of treatment? I am not sure where you stand.
Quoting charleton
I agree with you on that one. But if the act of helping yourself first is only intended as a means to the end of helping others too, then the act is not defined as selfish. Selfishness would be helping yourself only, with no intention of equal treatment for others down the road.
While I am secretly a misogynist, I am nevertheless offended that this was presumed from my use of words in the OP. :shade:
In theory we could all be born of stem cells. women would still be needed to gestate the foetus.
I stand on a platform which insists that morality is subjective. My personal position is not relevant. I've only to demonstrate that there are DIFFERENT positions which are based on preferences that are cultural, social and personal.
People cannot honestly believe that thieves truly deserve to get their hands chopped off unless they agree for it to happen to them under a similar situation. And I am fairly sure that no one in history has ever willingly got their hand chopped off.
Quoting SonJnana
What about the Golden Rule: do onto others as you want them to do onto you? This practical rule is objective, and is derived directly from the concept of justice as defined in the OP. Let's apply it to the aforementioned examples:
Thieves example: It is possible for ex-thieves to have a "change of heart" and decide to repay their debts to society. In which case, they may not mind jail time or money compensation (even with interests); however, no one would choose to get their hands chopped off in the name of 'justice'. Not even the makers of these laws.
Drug addict example: Should drug addicts go to jail, or get rehabilitated? Well, if the law makers were drug addicts, and through not fault of theirs (which can happen), then surely they would want to get rehabilitated, and not go to jail. As such, only rehabilitation passes the Golden Rule, and is therefore just.
I did not respond to all your objections to keep the post short, but I think this is a good start.
A few comments: (1) This does not seem to follow from what you said earlier, that the only rational reason to demand justice is out of selfishness (maybe you changed your mind; and I am just clarifying). (2) So your judgement of people's acts is based on results, not intentions? If the same acts had not resulted in a net gain, then would he have been judged as selfish? One is fully in control of intentions, but not necessarily of outcomes. (3) It seems that you too believe in morality being objective, since you speak of a "net gain" which sounds like an objective judgement. Now, what is your criteria to determine a gain vs a loss, if it does not involve justice?
Quoting BlueBanana
Alright. I find this 'prison is not punishment' to be an odd judgement, but I'll roll with it. Now can you find a case where justice demands for a punishment that exceeds prison time? I admit I cannot find one, and without it, your point that, sometimes morality is separate from justice, is incomplete.
True, I'll rephrase that as "demanding justice for the sake of it".
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, I base it on intended results, which in that example happened to be the same as the results.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
No, I only believe that to be my subjective opinion.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Is the code of Hammurabi unjust? I think "eye for an eye" is about as just as it gets.
People can honestly believe that thieves truly deserve to get their hands chopped off and agree for it to happen to them under a similar situation, until they are in that situation. Similarly, one can think it is moral for thieves to go behind bars and that one should themselves be put behind bars should they become a thief, yet when actually in that situation, not willingly want to go behind bars.
I understand that this is an extreme example, but it is entirely possible that historic civilizations really were like this.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If the law makers aren't drug addicts, it's entirely possible that because of their values they truly believe drug addicts deserve to go to jail, including themselves, while at the same time believing they will never end up that way. And if they do at some point become a drug addict, they may then change their minds and find that rehabilitation makes more sense.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Even if we have disagreements about the specific examples above, surely you must still acknowledge that individual people, and even more so different cultures, have different values. Natural inclinations are a huge factor of course, however people and cultures can come to different conclusions about what is justice because they have different wants. And they do all the time in the real world. What is justice will then vary between individuals and probably more so between cultures.
Also, even if theoretically everyone had the same wants and values, and miraculously somehow all were in agreement about how justice should be served, their justice would then still be dependent on their wants and values by your own definition of the Golden Rule.
I feel we're kind of going around the circle, too, but I'm willing to keep it up to see if something latches on.
My rejoinder here is that the same can be said for the golden rule you propose. "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" leads to a contradiction -- because what you want may not be what someone else wants, especially if the standard is necessity.
To contravene this sort of criticism of the golden rule others have developed the platinum rule: "Do unto others as they wish to have done unto them" -- but this likewise does not meet the standard of necessity, because you may not wish to do what I want you to do for me, and I likewise. It would not necessarily please any of us, though we may find ourselves pleased by others.
Even so, I would also say that justice isn't about pleasing others at all. Justice is about fairness. It's different from moral goodness, as I see it. They are actually very often in conflict with one another.
And I want to add a side note to the conversation: I realize that the topic is really about the objective/subjectivity of morality. But I think the meta- position on morality is better reached in the weeds, so to speak, rather than in yet even more abstract arguments regarding the objectivity/subjectivity of morality. My long term strategy here is to explore one of the main arguments for moral nihilism -- the argument of diversity in ethical commitments leading to a reasonable inference that there is nothing objective about them. I think a flip side of this argument is: even if you come up with something that sounds universally agreeable, that we only do so by abstracting moral norms to a point that they say virtually nothing about proper conduct.
While I know the response to this argument, from the moral realists perspective, is to point out that no subject matter has agreement, I wonder if there might just be degrees of agreement/disagreement which makes the inference to objectivity/subjectivity reasonable.
Edmu d
Yeah I actually don't know much about this biology thing so I'll give you that one.
Quoting charleton
I would still like your opinion on the matter. Do you not seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to yourself, if not to others too?
I agree with this new claim. Demanding a thing for its own sake and not as a means to another end like pleasure, is to say that the thing is good. But to seek something good despite it not necessarily resulting in pleasure is also called 'duty', or 'moral good'. So it seems that everyone has the same moral sense.
Quoting BlueBanana
Yes I agree. And the intended result must be good for the act to be judged as good. And the criteria for this good result in this case is justice, because this is what Martin Luther King Jr. intended to bring.
Quoting BlueBanana
It seems from our discussions that your moral system follows the criteria of justice, which itself is determined objectively. You believe that this justice-based moral system is itself a subjective choice, and although we disagree on this, we would come to agree about moral judgements in practice, as these would be based on justice. It's a start.
Now, the justice criteria for moral goodness is objective if, for every subject, the moral sense agrees with justice at all times. And this appear to be the case, unless we can come up with a case where the moral sense runs in opposition to justice.
Quoting BlueBanana
Recall that justice is defined as 'equality in treatment among all men'. From this, it follows that if, for a given situation, you want to be treated a certain way, then you ought to treat others in the same way; aka the Golden Rule. Now in some cases, the 'eye for an eye' treatment follows the Golden Rule, and in some case, it does not. E.g., if I murder your spouse, murdering mine in return would follow the 'eye for an eye' treatment, but violate the Golden Rule. Therefore the 'eye for an eye' treatment is not always just.
No, it's merely a means to an end, the end being the benefit, not the equality itself.
If you could give 1€ to two poor people each, or 5€ for one of them, it'd be just to give 1€ to both but (imo) morally right to give 5€ to one.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
People disagree on morality, and if justice is objective, someone's opinion must contradict it. For example, let's take abortions. What's the just way to act? Whichever it is, there are people who disagree.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'm certain there are people out there that would, being found guilty, be willing to suffer a punishment that they wouldn't want to suffer.
Obviously. But that is question begging. What is just?
Criteria or standards are mental.
Criteria, evaluation, and value are subjective (i.e. occurring in minds only).
The difference between the hands-chopped-off case and the jail case is that some people may willingly go to jail out of a "change of heart" or sense of duty, but no one can willingly accept getting their hands chopped off out of duty.
Quoting SonJnana
Unless I misunderstand you, it sounds like you agree, that on the basis of the golden rule, the jail decision is a mistake, while the rehabilitation decision is the correct one.
Quoting SonJnana
Those different values you speak of, called subjective, are secondary to the values all men have in common, called objective. Subjective values are tastes, such as different art styles, music, fashion and food. Objective values are (1) physical values; e.g., we all seek health and avoid diseases; and (2) moral values; e.g., we all seek to be treated as equal and not lesser individuals. Now objective values are primary to subjective values because we want clothes before fashion, food before taste, and equality before any subjective tastes. Based on those primary objective values, we can achieve one universal justice system (which, mind you, should allow room for secondary subjective differences).
Quoting SonJnana
That seems correct. If somehow our natural inclinations were to fluctuate back and forth, say from food to starvation, from health to sickness, and from pleasure to pain, then justice would be impossible in practice. We conclude that an achievable justice implies a common and unchanging human nature.
Morality is the science of duty or what one ought to do. With that definition, morality must be objective or else does not exist; because if subjective, then the person is free to choose the object of duty and change their mind, which renders the duty worthless. If objective, then we can think of morality as a law to follow, because like a law, it is above us to judge us, and can be broken.
Quoting Pollywalls
Let's expand on that question. Why do we do anything? Either because it is a means to an end which is good, or it is its own end which is good (if not truly, then at least perceived to be). If morality is objective, then the moral good is an objective good, and is therefore its own end. Why should we choose the moral good over other goods like pleasure? By its own definition, which is again, the science of duty or what one ought to do. Not that the moral good is necessarily in conflict with pleasure or other goods, but the moral good takes priority over other goods if they are ever in conflict.
I agree that intention is a necessary ingredient to a moral act (i.e., if unintentional, then the act is neither moral or immoral, but amoral), and that intention is a power possessed only by subjects. That said, to be morally good, the intention is to be directed towards justice, which itself is objective.
Morality is critically dependent on INequality - there has to be some who are underpriveleged or wronged. Ethics needs inequality for its existence.
That said, I guess it's morality itself that motivates our quest for equality - the point at which it would lose its purpose - strange!
Fair enough. I admit this example is a little extreme.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think you misunderstood what I was trying to say. What I meant is that yes, the law makers might change their minds when they are actually in that situation. But majority of them won't ever end up in that situation. So in their minds they may have no problem with truly believing that they should go to prison should they become drug addicts because they think the addicts are bad people and that they'll never end up as one.
Also, it's even possible that if the law makers do become drug addicts, they may Quoting Samuel Lacrampe while others want rehabilitation.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
This downplays the complexity of cognition that humans have. We are much more sophisticated than the way you described. Yes we all have natural inclinations, but we still have differing values that are relevant for morality. Person A thinks justice for drug addicts is rehabilitation. Person B truly thinks it is wrong and they should go to prison for sense of duty. Do you not think this is possible?
Some people think having sex outside of marriage for everyone is immoral. Some people think it's okay to have as much consensual sex as you want.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Morality is a word we use to characterize acts based on presupposed values. These natural inclinations you speak of are some presupposed values. For basic things like murder, yes most people in the world will have similar values - most will be against murder because they value life which is a natural inclination. Yet there are huge differences in values across people. Some think it is immoral for a 30 year old to get involved with younger than 18 year old. Yet in other cultures, they truly think it's acceptable for a 15 year old to be with a 30 year old.
If there was a set definition for morality with set presupposed values that somehow apply to everyone, then we could say things are moral or immoral based off of that criteria. However we don't see that because people value different things and use different presupposed values when using the word moral or immoral.
This is odd, because I would say when it comes to necessity, all men want the same thing: food, shelter, clothing, and health. What else would you mean by necessity?
The platinum rule is odd. Either we want the same things (primarily) or we don't. If we don't, then how can I know what everyone wants at all time, to abide to the rule? If we do, then it is simpler to go back to the golden rule.
Quoting Moliere
I would not use the word 'pleasure' because this sounds like it includes tastes (like in movies and music), which are subjective. But aside from tastes, we all 'want' the same things like honesty, respect, safety and health. I think justice is indeed synonymous to fairness. Would you have an example where justice and moral goodness are in conflict?
Quoting Moliere
As per above, aside from tastes, I claim that all men want the same things: we all want food, shelter, health, honesty, respect, and pleasure, and all avoid starvation, homelessness, diseases, dishonesty, disrespect, and pain. This is because we all have the same human nature. Men are men and not plants. This is why the golden rule is adequate for moral acts from man to man.
Quoting Moliere
I think I see your point here. We need to differentiate between innate desire and sense of duty. While we all have the innate desire of the things listed above for ourselves, we do not necessarily have that same desire for others. This is where the sense of duty comes in; to remind us to not only take care of ourselves but others too, as all have the same nature or ontological value.
What then is the benefit, if not the equality?
Quoting BlueBanana
This depends on the foreseeable results. For clarity, let's inflate this example to the extremes. (1) What if we could give 1€ to two poor people each, or 1 000 000€ to only one of them? In that case, even the one that gets nothing would still likely agree that the second choice is better, as 1€ does not result in much anyways. As such, this choice seems morally good, but also just, because it does not break the golden rule. (2) What if we could give 500€ to two poor people each, or 501€ to only one of them? Now the first choice seems more just, and also morally good. Your example is less clear and may fall closer to (1) or closer to (2), depending on the foreseeable results; but I think in either case, the justice does not conflict with the morality.
Quoting BlueBanana
People disagree only on matters on fact, not on the moral sense in theory. In the case of abortion, the main disagreement is about the fact of whether fetuses are human beings or not. If they are, then abortion is infanticide, which I believe everyone agrees to be wrong. If not, then it is merely a group of cells, and then abortion is not morally wrong, inasmuch as it is not wrong to cut your own hair.
Quoting BlueBanana
If they were rightfully found guilty, then being punished is just. If they were wrongfully found guilty, then being punished is unjust; but then would anyone accept the punishment out of duty?
Depends on the case. Could be anything. Well-being, happiness, money, health, etc. etc.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But the distribution of money isn't equal. I see how the outcome can be argued to be equal but that's merely a subjective interpretation of the situation. As I've stated, equality as a concept becomes far too vague when people's wills are considered, to an extent no objective statement can be made about which way to treat people is the equal one.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
What about nihilism? Or religious fundamentalists that believe the will of their deity is the absolute law? Or the trolley problem?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I wouldn't draw any generalizations out of 8 billion humans.
As per the OP, justice is equality in treatment among all humans (not falling for that one again).
So if your personal moral sense demands to seek justice and avoids injustice, and that justice is objective, then you follow a morality that is objective, even if you believe that the original moral sense is itself subjective.
That doesn't sound right. Criteria is defined as: The factors that determine the validity of a judgement or proposition. These factors are not always chosen subjectively. E.g.: The criteria to determine if an object is a triangle is for it to be a 'flat surface' with '3 straight sides'. These factors are not chosen subjectively.
Same goes for some values, such as physical values. What is physically good or bad or us is not chosen subjectively. This is why medicine is a science.
Morality is the science of duty, not of facts; the science of 'what ought to be', not of 'what is'. If we are not treating each other equally, then it is our duty to change our behaviour to reach equality. If we already are treating each other equally, then it is no less our duty to preserve equality.
But they still break the golden rule, even if they don't see it, from not thinking the treatment all the way through.
Quoting SonJnana
Hey! Don't quote me out of context :wink: . While it is possible out of duty to accept a punishment that fits the crime, no one would accept a punishment that exceeds the crime, even out of duty. Going to jail for stealing may fit the crime. Going to jail for a drug addiction, especially one that came through not fault of ours, clearly exceeds the "crime".
Quoting SonJnana
As described above, person B has not found true justice because that treatment breaks the golden rule.
Quoting SonJnana
By "sex outside of marriage", do you mean "extramarital sex"? I am fairly sure that nobody wants to be cheated on, and as such, this act clearly breaks the golden rule.
Quoting SonJnana
While I agree that this behaviour is frowned upon and illegal in some places, I think the reason is not really a moral one. Instead, I think it is either because it is thought that people younger than 18 are not old enough to make such important decisions, inasmuch as it is not permitted to quit school before a certain age, or it could be because of health concerns.
I see your point.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Couldn't resist quoting you there. Sorry, lmao!
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Sure, but my point is that people don't always agree on a punishment for a crime. Where I'm losing you is that you are suggesting everyone agrees that for a crime, a certain punishment is acceptable via Golden rule because of natural inclinations. And everyone agrees that any more severe punishment exceeds the crime. Do you really believe that there are not differences between individuals and cultures of what they think fits a crime via Golden rule? We will just have to break down specific examples to get to the bottom of this.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't see why it breaks the Golden rule. In the case of going out of your way to get drugs without coercion, then become addicted - many people would say that is immoral. While others disagree.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I meant sex without getting married, like virgin till marriage
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Why is it not a moral one? Some would say the 30 year old is being immoral because they're doing something with someone not old enough to make such important decisions. While others disagree and think they are old enough so the 30 year old is not immoral. This is the difference of values that I've speaking of.
Sex outside marriage is not necessarily cheating. One could have an open relationship.
Definitions a, b, and c: Notice how these definitions are circular because they contain the word 'justice' or 'just' in them.
Definition (2): It can indeed also mean "conforming to a principle or law", but this is not the meaning I am looking for here, because I would question whether these principles and laws are themselves just, that is, providing equal treatment to all.
Definition 3: "conforming to truth". Different meaning again.
Definition 2a: "Impartial". This is very close to my definition, because impartial is defined as "treating all rivals or disputants equally".
The dictionary is a good starting point to find the essence of concepts; although sometimes it is not perfect, as shown in definitions a, b, and c above. I like to use the good old socratic method of starting with real life examples where the concept is properly used, and arriving at the essential properties through induction.
Your reasoning is circular. I would deny the premise that morality is only a view, and hence also the conclusion that it is subjective.
So anything like as stated above but not justice. So to clarify, if there is a net gain, say in the economy of a state, but for this slavery was introduced, you would find this good? Conversely, if justice was gained by abolishing slavery, but there was no net gain in anything else (also no net loss), then you would not find this to be good?
Quoting BlueBanana
Morality is intending for equality in treatment, but one still looks to reason on the foreseeable outcome to make the reasonable choice. If two persons had deadly allergic reactions and you had one EpiPen, and knowing that a whole shot is needed to be effective, it would be absurd to give half the shot to one and half the shot to the other, just to "preserve equality". The same goes for the money example. If the 1€ is expected to save lives, then that is the reasonable choice. But if the money is not critical and one of the poor can wait for the next donation, then that becomes the reasonable choice, and we can balance out the share next time.
Another extreme case is the Trolley problem, where equality in treatment is impossible, but that does not mean the person making the choice is immoral, because the intention for equal treatment remains.
Quoting BlueBanana
I am not sure what you mean about nihilism. Could you expand on it? As for the will of a deity, you are here using the word 'duty' ambiguously. If the god is unjust, then a religious person may obey it "out of duty", but this "duty" is similar in meaning to how the nazis were carrying out their acts "out of duty", which has nothing to do with moral duty. In that case, we actually speak of an immoral god.
Quoting BlueBanana
8 billion already?! We're gonna fall off the edge soon.
Alright, we can remain skeptics on this. But then to be fair, neither can we assert that there exist people that commit injustice out of moral duty. The only data we can be certain of are from you and me. I have no sense of moral duty to commit an injustice. Do you?
The economy only has an instrumental value. If the economic net gain also resulted in net gain in the happiness of people, slavery would then be morally right, but I don't see how that could be possible. In the hypothetical world where slavery didn't cause any kind of suffering to the slaves, I'd have nothing against it.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Why? This goes against that morality is based on equality.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
People making different decisions in that situation proves that people disagree not only on the facts but moral sense as well. How is the decision to not pull the lever just?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How can a nihilist believe in morality based on equality if they don't believe in morality in the first place? If they believe there is no moral or immoral way to act in any situation, how can the actions they believe to be the moral ones be considered just?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I didn't use that word.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If those people are deemed immoral because morality is based on equality and their god is unjust, that's circular reasoning.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How so? Do not people do things out of duty because they believe it's morally right to do so? If not, why then?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Do you mean "to commit injustice" or "to do things that are unjust"? To the former, no, to the latter, yes. I think some unjust actions are morally right, but I don't think injustice in itself is morally right.
OK, this is different from what I understood you saying.
By "necessity" I just meant true or felt for all. So while "Do as you want" may lead to contradiction in desire as people compete over fulfilling desires which negate one another, the same would be said of the golden rule "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" -- so if you acted by said maxim you would still fall into conflict with the desires of others.
But you seem to mean something different than I thought.
So by necessity you just mean a need -- what all humans want: food, shelter, clothing, health.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think the most straightforward example is mercy. Consider the story of Jesus. In a lot of ways it is a story about mercy over justice. What would be fair would be for Jesus to walk free and for those who sinned to be punished for their sins. But mercy abrogates the demands of justice, and in some sense is thereby non-just (at least -- not sure if injustice quite fits either, but it's not just at least).
Just in case it's an issue -- I'm just using the story as a common reference point and allegory to demonstrate a difference between moral goodness and justice by way of the value of mercy, and not trying to weigh in on any factual content to said allegory. We can come up with other examples of mercy -- but mercy is the virtue I'm citing to give a clear delineation between moral goodness and justice.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
See, I think this is where things get a bit too abstract. We may all have some needs. But we also want more than we need. We often even make choices against our needs for what we want.
And I'd contend that something we may want but do not strictly need are some kinds of moral attachments. So I may believe that homosexuality is a sin. Do I need this belief? Well, no. But I want it, at least in a bare sense of believing it to be so (I recognize that sometimes want indicates choice, but I'm not using that particular meaning at the moment). There are many such rules and maxims which people attach themselves to that they also call moral.
Now what you say here, by my reading at least, is that such attachments are somewhat extraneous to what you're getting at. You're getting at necessity as in need. We all have needs, and the golden rule should satisfy those needs since everyone wants them anyway.
I don't know if I'd agree with your list but I don't have a problem with the notion that we, or at least very many of us, have the same needs.
But then why does invocations of morality so very often not focus on such basic things as food, shelter, clothing, and so forth? Are these things morally good? Or is what is morally good the satisfaction of everyone's needs?
We can posit this. But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow.
In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
hrm? I feel like this kind of came out of left field. Not that it's unrelated, only that I wasn't talking about duty -- only that agreeable moral maxims tend to say very little about what to actually do.
Though I think that duty is an interesting thing to bring up in answering my original question/response with respect to needing a more robust theory of justice.
Obligation; but we still have the freedom to go for or against it.
Quoting Pollywalls
Of course. Laws of physics are discovered, not man-made; and therefore objective. As it is for physical laws, so it could be with the moral law.
I don't believe the challenge in finding the fitting punishment lies in the difference in primary values. Rather, I believe the challenge lies in the facts surrounding the crime. Was the criminal's act intentional, was the outcome foreseeable, etc. See below for examples.
Quoting SonJnana
The example changed. The original example was about people who got addicted through not fault of theirs. In this new example, the people intentionally broke the law before becoming addicted. This deserves a punishment of some sort. Note, I am not saying it is easy to separate the sincere from the insincere addicts, but the acts should aim to achieve justice as best as we can.
Quoting SonJnana
Quoting BlueBanana
Yep, you got me there. Sex seems to be a morally grey area. Some call premarital or extramarital sex immoral, others don't; and the act is not necessarily unjust. Notice however that if the act is unjust, e.g. nonconsensual, then virtually everybody would judge it to be immoral. My point is that, while justice may not be the only criteria for morality, it is nevertheless a necessary criteria. Morality may therefore be more than justice, but not less.
Quoting SonJnana
Your example points to disagreement on facts: whether a 15 y/o can make such important decisions or not; not a difference of values. It seems if people were to agree on the fact, then they would agree on the moral judgement, as per your reasoning.
Your position still sounds like it is for justice, dressed in different words. One more try: Your spouse cheats on you but you never find out. Your spouse is happy; you are happy. I see no net loss other than in justice. Do you find this act immoral or not?
Quoting BlueBanana
This is a misunderstanding of my position (which, granted, was not explicit in the OP). Morality is the intention for justice. Sometimes, justice is not easily achievable or straight up impossible. But the intent can remain, and in which case the person is not immoral.
Quoting BlueBanana
Why both the facts and moral sense? Why not just the facts? The decision to not pull the lever may come from the belief that all choices result in the same amount of gain/loss. This belief is of facts, not of moral sense.
Quoting BlueBanana
This depends on why they are nihilists in the first place. Are they nihilists because they perceive no moral sense, or do they perceive no moral sense because they are nihilists?
If the former, then it may be possible to have a reduced moral sense, inasmuch as blind people have a reduced sense of vision. This does not entail that the moral law is not real, inasmuch as the visible object is not unreal. Note also that if there is no moral sense, then there is no moral sense against justice either.
If the latter, then it could be they choose to ignore the moral sense on the grounds that it is a false perception, based on nihilism.
Quoting BlueBanana
:brow: I see nothing circular here. Only since the Abrahamic religions did people associate moral goodness with god. Before and outside these religions, one can speak of an immoral god. And if we judge a god to be immoral, the criteria for judgement must be separate from the will of god.
Quoting BlueBanana
I should clarify. Duty just means obligation, and is not necessarily for moral reasons. One may have a sense of duty for its country, and not for the belief that the country is always morally right. It could be other reasons like mere tradition, or feeling of belonging, or simply "somebody said so".
Quoting BlueBanana
The only difference I think I see between your first and second quote is about intentions. In which case, I agree. One's action may results in injustice without being immoral, if the intention was not unjust. Conversely, one may not intend injustice without being immoral.
Got it. This is what I have been calling "primary values": What all consider to be good or bad. But I don't think this it leads to competitions. Primary values such as honesty, respect, safety and health can be received as well as given without competition. Situations like the Trolley problem are more challenging, but as discussed a few times in this thread, it can be resolved.
Quoting Moliere
We should come up with another example, not so much because I disagree with your interpretation of the story of Jesus, but because it is about justice from God to man, which is not as clear as justice from man to man. I still think that mercy cannot be morally good if unjust, but we can test specific examples.
Quoting Moliere
This is why I prefer the term "primary value" over "need". Need sounds more like what is necessary for survival. As such, values like honesty, respect, and equality do not fit the category of need; and yet are considered good, and their opposites bad, by all. I have not met you, but I would still bet you do not want to be lied to, disrespected, or discriminated against.
As for homosexuality, it is true that this does not fall under the criteria of justice or the golden rule, and I am not sure where I stand on this. I briefly talk here about sexual acts and show that it does not harm the claim that morality is objective, but this may not be what you are looking for.
Quoting Moliere
You were talking about "proper conduct" and "what to do". Duty is defined as "what we ought to do", and so I think you are talking about duty even if you did not call it that. Since what is pleasurable and what is just is not always in agreement, this is where duty is needed: to have a sense to do what is just even when the act is not pleasurable.
The original example was simply if someone has a drug addiction. You responded with Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
With this statement you are still saying that going to jail for a drug addiction clearly exceeds the crime. And especially (which implies not necessarily) if it is no fault of ours - This part is irrelevant to me anyways, because that changes it to a completely different situation which is not the issue that I had intended for you to address - to clear up this misunderstanding
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Now here you are saying that going to jail does not exceed the crime, which is inconsistent with what you stated above.
Do you think a person intentionally going out of their way to do drugs and become an addict - do you think jail exceeds that crime or not? In the US many will say it doesn't. In Europe many will say it does. How do you reconcile this?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Exactly. Whether or not it is unjust depends on an individual's views.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
My point this whole time has been to say that justice is dependent on presupposed values. In extreme examples like this one, natural inclinations may fully account for what people consider to be just or unjust because other variables might not influence values that are consistent with not wanting to get raped. However, so many other variables like culture, parents, etc. can influence what people consider just in other situations, such as whether premarital sex is immoral or not. People may have the same presupposed values for extreme cases via Golden rule, but that doesn't mean it applies to every case.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
What is the criteria of whether or not a 15 y/o is old enough to make those decisions? You could look at the facts about brain development in 15 year olds. Some would argue that development is sufficient at 15 while others would say it is not - both views via Golden rule after looking at the same facts.
Conventionally, objectivity means that the property described is part of the object of thought, independent of the subject of thought. Objective properties may be either necessary or contingent. To say "the Earth is flat" is an objective statement, because the Earth is either flat or not, independent of the subject saying it. It is also a contingent property because it could logically be not flat (like round if you can imagine). Speaking about morality, I use the term "objective" in the conventional sense (notwithstanding the possibility that it can be necessary too, but this is besides the point).
It is true that without free will, then there can be no moral acts. But why think there is no free will? Most people believe in free will, and it sure feels like we have free will upon self reflection. As such, the onus of proof is on the other side.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Our claim about the property of the object depends on a prior claim that the object exists, so it can have a property. 'The Earth is flat' could be objective only if we also claim that there exists such an object i.e. the Earth.
But 'exists' in what sense? If we say its properties are either necessary or contingent and that this can be determined 'logically', then that is to say they can be determined purely from the way we have defined the subject. The existence of Earth would only be the existence of that definition. To say a claim about the shape of the Earth was objective we would only mean it related to the way somebody uses the word 'Earth',
Normally, I do not think that claims about the Earth are understood that way. Rather they are empirical. That 'the Earth exists' is 'exists as a material object' So to say 'the Earth is flat' is to make a claim about phenomena.
But claims about the existence of Morality are not usually understood to be about a material object. So to say that a claim about Morality was 'objective' is not be like an 'objective' claim about the shape of the Earth. It would only be a claim about 'how people use that word Morality' or 'what I mean by Morality'.
So to describe the Earth and Morality as both being 'objects of thought' is to blur a difference that makes all the difference.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Cool.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Cool.
Say you have a friend who is an alcoholic. They have lost their house, life, and work to said disease. They turn to you for help to keep them off the street while they try to get their life together, and you agree to do so. While you are at work said friend takes some money laying around your house, buys booze, and gets drunk without telling you.
Let's suppose after sobering up he's penitent.
The path of justice would have him pay you back. The path of mercy wouldn't. (or, at least, a path)
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Just linking your response earlier about sexual mores for reference.
I'd say that, from my perspective at least, the difference in sexual mores still gets at what I was trying to say. Even "need" as you define it here -- to include more than brute survival -- people still want more than they need. And some of those wants are moral wants. They appear, on the surface, to be preferences but with more emotional "umph" behind them than mere preference.
They are considered moral. But, by your notion of need (which is not bare necessity survival type need, but needs of a broader set which are still considered generally universal), they are not needs -- so, while a bit cumbersome, for the purposes of our discussion I'd call them moral wants.
So it seems you would have to contend that moral goodness is the satisfaction of everyone's needs in this broader sense. But that brings me to my question from before --
We can posit this. But it would just be one contender among many for what counts as moral goodness -- one rule among many to follow. In what way could we select this kind of rule such that it is not merely a matter of taste, with a little more emotional "umph", just like sanctions against certain sexual acts appear to be?
I guess I was not very clear. My bad.
Quoting SonJnana
The correct answer is: it depends on the facts. First, is the defend truly at fault, that is, was the crime intentional and foreseeable? If not, then no punishment is deserved. If yes, then was someone else harmed, either physically, financially, etc? If yes, then the defendant must pay for the harm done. If not, then what punishment can be done with the end to prevent the defendant from doing the crime again? If it can be done with a mere warning, then so be it. If not, then the punishment would be raised so as to meet that end. At the extreme, if a criminal keeps escaping from prison and killing everyone, then the capital punishment may be adequate at that point.
I am not saying any of the above facts are easy to uncover; but they remain objective facts nonetheless.
Quoting SonJnana
Not 'unjust'; 'immoral'. As defined in the OP, 'justice' is objective; and even when it comes to sex, justice is easy to determine by applying the golden rule. E.g., if I have premarital sex but am intolerant of my spouse having done it, then I am unjust.
Quoting SonJnana
Even in the case of sex, justice is a necessary criteria for morality, even though it is not a sufficient criteria. Note, this does not exclude the possibility that other criteria to determine morality are also objective. But I concede that justice alone is not sufficient in all cases. Can we agree to this: If just, then it is not necessarily moral, but if unjust, then it is necessarily immoral.
Quoting SonJnana
Whether or not the criteria is easily found, it does not make it less objective. Would anyone disagree that a 15 y/o is better suited to make this decision, than a 5 y/o? If no one, then the property of "being suited to make this decision" is objective.
There are people who believe that if someone intentionally goes out of their way to do drugs while not harming anyone, the person deserves to go to prison. And there are also people who think prison exceeds the crime. How do you reconcile these two opposing views?
How can you say one is more objectively right than the other when people of both opposing views see their own view as just via Golden rule?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Your viewpoint is that if it is unjust, then it must also be immoral. How can you say that it is not unjust but it is immoral?
You would be unjust in that case, but there are also people of an opposing viewpoint who have premarital sex are not intolerant of their spouse having done it, and therefore are not unjust. So how can premarital sex itself be just or unjust? It depends on the viewpoint of the person.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I agree justice is necessary and that it is not sufficient. That is because justice requires presupposed values. One's Golden rule is based off of their values. The presupposed values are the criteria by which to judge an act as just or unjust. As you've now acknowledged, people can have different values and therefore different different judgements about what is just via Golden rule.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If it is just by one's view and unjust by another's view, how you even then determine if the act is moral or immoral. I don't really understand this.
I think it makes more sense to just say that an action is moral if it is just according to the criteria. The Golden rule is dependent on one's values therefore the presupposed values are the criteria. People have different values therefore the presupposed values will be dependent on an individual. And that is what I believe people mean when they say morality is subjective
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
When judging something, that is dependent on the criteria you are using. The criteria itself is constructed. And my point is that since people differ on the criteria they are using when they use the word morality - they have different values - that is why you can't just say something is objectively morally right. If everyone were to use the Golden rule in a situation, everyone wouldn't always come to the same judgements about what is just or unjust.
I agree that what is objective is found either because the property is necessary, or because we observe it empirically. I also agree that we can find what is necessary from definitions, or essence of things; although we do not create essences, we discover them.
I disagree that all that is empirical is material. To observe an inner sense of moral duty is empirical, though the sense is not necessarily material. And if we all have the same inner moral sense of duty to seek justice and avoid injustice, then this justice-based morality is objective because justice is objective.
Free will does not mean we have freedom in every way. We seem to not be free to choose to abide to the laws of physics, and we are certainly not free from the laws of logic. Rather, free will means freedom of intentions, and acts that follow the intentions, insofar that the acts abide to the laws of logic and physics. As far as I can tell, we cannot prove that we do not have freedom of intentions.
Something doesn't add. Being merciful sounds morally good only if he is penitent. And if he is sincerely penitent, then he would intend to pay you back when he can. If he can but refuses to pay, then there is no real penitence, and so mercy does not sound morally good here. Or else, declining to receive the money back sounds like irrational mercy, and thus also not morally good.
It seems the morally good mercy would be, after showing sincere penitence and intending to pay back when possible, you choose to keep sheltering him and retain the trust without further retribution. And this would not be unjust.
Quoting Moliere
Since the moral judgements of sexual acts appear to go beyond the criteria of justice, I can only deduce it comes from religions, like Christianity, where the bible says that marriage is the union between a single man and woman (thus disapproving of homosexuality and polygamy), and commands against adultery (thus disapproving of premarital and extramarital sex).
If Christianity is true, then the moral commands posited in the bible would be true. But since not everyone has heard of or believes in Christianity or other religions positing these commands, not everyone will agree to follow these, even if they were true. So I think that, in practice, there may always be moral disagreements about sexual acts.
It would not be unjust, but surely you understand that demanding reparation would itself be just. It is the fair thing to do, since you have been wronged. While there is a path that reconciles the two values -- the one you outline -- there is also a path which demonstrates their differences too. That's what I'm trying to get at here.
The path of mercy would not demand, it would understand that you have a friend in need who is sorry and intends to pay you back whenever he can. Mercy is much more in line with the Christian response, since mercy flows from love (which I would say is the central organizing value of Christian values, if we had to choose one).
However, if justice be the central organizing value -- which flows from a sense of equality, fairness, and respect -- it would not violate justice to demand your friend leave and pay you back (obviously only when he can, but the debt would be enforced). If he were a friend he'd understand, after all, that he has to make amends.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I agree.
But let's resolve the above first before proceeding further. I think these are similar, but the above is probably closer to the matter because it's a case of core values as opposed to acts.
If the golden rule criteria is met, then the disagreement must be about facts about the event, or else about the purpose of a punishment. As previously stated, the goal of the punishment is to pay for the harm done, if any, and then to prevent the defendant from doing the crime again. The first goal restores justice, and the second goal prevents further injustice or harm to oneself. If the judges agree on the goals and the facts that meet those goals, then I see no other reasons for a disagreement.
Quoting SonJnana
For criteria other than justice in the case of sex. I can only think of religious reasons at the moment, like Christianity that commands against adultery.
Quoting SonJnana
Human justice and the golden rule are indeed relative to human values. But aside from subjective tastes, all men have the same values. E.g., we all want respect, honesty and health. The exception to this rule seems to be sex; which moral judgement seems to come from religion. But that is an exception rather than the rule. I honestly don't think we can find another exception.
Quoting SonJnana
No, because this does not fit the case about sexual acts which may be deemed immoral even if the person committing it passes the golden rule.
Quoting SonJnana
I still claim that the only objective value that creates a disagreement is about sex. All other objective values (i.e., not subjective tastes) are virtually universally agreed upon. So if the case is not about sex, then the disagreement in judgement must come from a disagreement of facts, not values.
I feel as though you did not address the example I gave. Person A thinks the drug addict does not deserve to go to prison via Golden rule. Person B thinks the drug addict does deserve to go to prison via Golden rule. This is not a disagreement about facts about the event, or about the purpose of a punishment. It is a disagreement about what is just via Golden rule.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Why is something that is not unjust considered immoral just because a religion commands against it? Are you saying the criteria of whether Christianity deems something as moral or not is sufficient?
Also, you never answered my question which was: if one person considers premarital sex as just via golden rule, and the other considers it unjust via Golden rule - how do you determine whether it is moral or immoral?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
We shall see. I'd like to see if you can address the example above first before moving on to others.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I still don't understand how you can determine something to be not unjust yet immoral. If you are saying it is not unjust, what criteria are you using to determine that it is immoral?
A just punishment is one that serves two goals. (1) restore justice, and (2) prevent injustice from occurring again. If the friend truly intends to pay you back when he can, then goal (1) is met. If in addition he is sincerely penitent, then goal (2) is met without further punishment; and in which case any additional punishment like kicking him out would be overboard and result in injustice the other way.
The problem in real life is that intentions of others are never fully known, and so the disagreement in punishment can come from disagreement in the perception of the defendant's intentions.
Quoting Moliere
We would need to define the term 'mercy' to obtain a full understanding of it. If it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but enough to restore justice", then mercy is always in line with justice by definition. But if it means "Never over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way, but also sometimes not fully restore justice", then mercy is not always just; and at which point, I would say that this kind of mercy is immoral.
I think that addiction doesn't work so cleanly as all that, or akrasia in general for that matter. Suppose both conditions are met the first time. What if he does it again? And so on? Or perhaps this is the first time he has done it to you, but he's done this elsewhere before.
We are prone to repeat mistakes. We can be sincerely penitent and yet fail.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Mercy is to forgo punishment. You have a right to punish (a concept associated with justice), but you do not exercise said right. It may be morally correct to enact justice in some scenarios, and morally correct to enact mercy in others. Mercy is a value which flows from love -- the kind of general love for humankind. While you may have the right to punish, to enact just consequences, you forgo them out of compassion.
I don't fully understand what you are saying, and so my response may not be adequate. Here it is anyways. We are physical beings (though maybe not only physical). As such, our bodies obey the laws of physics, and so we are not free from these. Our intentions can be influenced but not compelled by our surroundings. Even locked in jail, a saint can have saintly intentions.
Quoting Pollywalls
Not sure. How do you define it? Your answer might help me understand your question.
My position is that morality is more than a mere social construct. It is discoverable through our moral sense called conscience, universal because all humans have the same human nature, and unchangeable because our nature does not change. Even though slavery was more socially accepted 2000 years ago, it was just as morally wrong then as it is today, because it always fails the golden rule of ethics.
If you think ethics is grounded in our "nature" then you need to show how slavery was or was not grounded by or in our nature. I think you have the burden of proof here.
If there is no disagreement about facts, then there cannot be a disagreement via the golden rule either. What are the specific facts in your example? Did the drug addict become addicted through his own will? Did he harm anyone? Does he intend to do it again if no punishment is inflicted? If yes to all, then jail sounds just, and nobody could say it is undeserved; not even him with regards to justice. If no to all, then jail sounds unjust, and in which case, nobody would want that punishment.
That said, remember that the source of the golden rule is justice. As such, if we can judge straight from justice, then we don't need to rely on the golden rule; although they would not contradict. And a just punishment is one that restores justice and prevents injustice from occurring again. So if the judges agree about the facts, then they will necessarily agree on the just punishment.
Quoting SonJnana
Religious claims. E.g., if Christianity is true, then its claim that fornication is immoral is true, even if not unjust. But don't misunderstand; I am not here claiming that Christianity is true (that would far exceed the scope of this discussion); I am merely giving you a candidate criteria that goes beyond justice.
I don't know much about this akrasia condition, but if he relapses, it is either out of his own free will or it is not. If the former, then he was not sincere in the first place and is not to be trusted. If the latter, then his act is not immoral, but harmful nonetheless, and at which point the "punishment" would not be out of retribution but to "save him from himself" so to speak, like an intervention.
Quoting Moliere
I think that the case where mercy fails to meet justice and is yet morally good does not add up. Recall that justice is defined as equality in treatment among all men. As such, we can define injustice as mistreatment for some men. If justice is not met, even out of mercy, then it follows that somebody gets mistreated.
E.g. You are a judge. Person A is unjust to person B. You could give a just punishment to A but decide not to, out of mercy, which comes from love for A. The logical consequence is that justice is not restored for B. This unjust decision from love for A entails a lack of love for B.
Akrasia is just a fancy term for failure in spite of our intent. We may correctly judge what is good for us, and yet act against said judgment. Addiction is a good example of this because it is easy to see how one is harming themself, but yet the bad behavior continues. You can even get caught in a kind of cycle of guilt because you are actually sorry, but you still continue to behave badly. Usually this is attributed to a weakness of will.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Do you think someone else might disagree with you on this?
I don't think that's true. Do I not love myself because I forgo pressing for my friend to pay me back?
I am going out of town and will be unresponsive for a couple of days. Back mid-next week.
Stay ethical!
I’ve attempted to make my example clear and I’m willing to clear it up more. Unless I change something about it, the example is still the same, which I would still like you to address. Yes he did it through his own will and no he didn’t harm anyone. And to answer your last question, yes he intends to do it again if no punishment is inflicted. Do you think jail time is deserved in this case?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
And I claim that the judges wont necessarily agree on what punishment should be deserved via Golden rule becuase they can differ on what they think is a deserved punishment via Golden rule.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
In the hypothetical scenario that all religion is proven to be made up: One person does think premarital sex is okay via Golden rule. Another person is conditioned by parents and culture to believe premarital sex is wrong and unjust via Golden rule. Both of them are atheist. Is premarital sex immoral or not in this case? And what criteria are are you using to determine that?
Also another point - If some sect Christianity were to be true, all of its claims of morality would be right. This wouldn't make its moral claims an extra criteria for determining morality, this would make it the only criteria. Justice via Golden rule would be completely irrelevant. It wouldn't matter if everything thought that killing homosexuals is too cruel. If the sect of Christianity claimed that is the moral thing to do, it would be the moral thing to do. Or else the sect of Christianity wouldn't be true.
And I'll throw in another example. A collectivist thinks that if the father tells the son to become something, the son should do that. They think it is immoral to go against parents' word, and that the son has an obligation to his family that raised him. A more independent culture on the other hand thinks parents shouldn't impose on their kids to tell them what to become. They think that would be immoral. So which culture do you think is immoral and what criteria are you using to determine that?
Conscience is not the inclination towards comfort nor conformity. It gives info on what we ought to do, even if it goes against comfort or conformity. During the Nazi regime, conscience may tell you to protect Jews, despite the risks it entails and the fact that it does not conform to the political regime of the time.
Quoting bloodninja
Conscience informs us on what we ought to do, which is not necessarily what we can do or what is easiest to do. People may choose against their conscience like choosing to own slaves, because they can (through power) and it makes their lives easier. But conscience tells us we ought to seek justice and avoid injustice; and no one can say that slavery is just, as justice is defined in the OP. Neither the slaves, nor even the masters.
The disagreement is of no value if it is not backed up by an objective reason. :wink:
Quoting Moliere
Let's expand your example to the extreme for the sake of clarity. You forgo pressing your friends to pay you back for money they stole; all your friends, all the time. Would you agree that your act is not judged to be virtuous, but instead, either foolish or lacking self-respect?
That said, if this act of mercy is a means to the end of inciting your friend to penitence (e.g. see Les Miserables), then it may be morally good. But then it is also just, because in penitence, the friend would be willing to restore justice and avoid further acts of injustice.
I think it just depends on what a person cares about -- which value they hold to be the most dear.
I love myself, and I care about mercy -- so I act on my conception of mercy regardless of what others may think of me, foolish or not foolish.
or
I love myself, and I care about justice -- so I act on my conception of justice and demand recompense.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
While a joke, I did want to note that people can believe their moral grounds are objective. Religion is often given as the sort of thing which gives an objective ground to moral commitments, and different religions emphasize different values.
I will also assume that anything lower than jail time would not be sufficient to deter him. Then yes, jail time is deserved (plus rehab afterwards). Laws and their enforcements are installed for the end of not only justice but also safety for the citizens. Yes, the addict did not commit injustice, but he nevertheless acted unsafely for himself and potentially others (e.g. he could be driving under the influence). Note that such punishment, while not for the end of justice, is also not unjust, for it can be applied to everyone.
Quoting SonJnana
It seems that the golden rule is not the only criteria for determining a deserved punishment, because safety seems to be another criteria, as described above. Once again however, the deserved punishment cannot be unjust, and therefore the golden rule remains a necessary criteria, even if insufficient.
Quoting SonJnana
"If God does not exist everything is permitted" - Dostoevsky :wink: The reason being that a true objective law is necessarily above the law abiding subjects; and this being would be what we call God. But this is entering metaphysics and goes beyond the scope of this discussion, so let's just ignore that.
Quoting SonJnana
For both cases, the criteria to determine morality is justice, and by extension, the golden rule. The person that breaks the golden rule is immoral, and the person that does not, is not. Even though the act and outcome are the same for both persons, the intention is not, because the first person is insincere where as the second person is not. This is the same rationale as the difference between intentional and accidental homicide. The act and outcome are the same, but the intent is not. This makes justice relative, but not subjective.
Quoting SonJnana
In theory yes. But in reality, Christianity does not command to kill homosexuals; and in fact, makes the golden rule one of the two Greatest Commandments: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."
Let's define the term 'love'. The Christian love, agape, means "willing the good to the object loved".
Thus loving love yourself means willing the good to yourself. But to will injustice towards yourself (out of mercy) means you will less good to yourself than to others, which means you love yourself less than you love others. As such, the statement "I love myself, and I care about mercy, even when unjust to me" leads to a contradiction.
On the other hand, if you love others as much as yourself, it follows that your acts of mercy will always remain just.
Quoting Moliere
If morality is objective, and different religions teach contradicting moral systems, then it follows that some moral systems taught by religions are wrong, as truth does not contradict truth.
Note however that nearly every religion uses the golden rule in their morality. Source
I think this is just to place the value of justice above the value of mercy. "Good" is a placeholder for "just", but I would say that one could just as easily say that "Good" should be a placeholder for "Mercy" or any other core value.
So if we define love as you say...
Loving yourself means willing the good to yourself. But to will mercilessness towards yourself (out of justice) means you will less good to yourself. You should be merciful to yourself just as you are merciful to others, and forgive them out of compassion regardless of what may or may not be just. This is what it means to love.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
If morality is objective, might it be possible that all the religions are wrong about the golden rule? Or is it just what all religions happen to agree to the basis of objective morality, in your view?
If I read you right you believe that moral propositions are the sorts of things which are true. I am willing to grant to you that moral propositions are truth-apt. But I'd submit to you that it is possible for them to all be false -- that there is nothing which makes them true. We may believe them to be true. But the astrologist also believes that astrology is true. There is a huge and varied system of justification for astrology that lends it conceptual coherence and makes the person who studies it think they are learning something of the truth.
Since it is possible to build elaborate systems of justification that appear to be true it is possible that morality is one such system.
I think we've covered the argument from difference pretty thoroughly. Here it seems to me that you're staking your claim on the similarities between religions.
But this is what I was trying to get at by saying there is a point where we can reach what appears to be agreement -- something akin to the golden rule, or even more abstractly we can also say that all moral systems believe we should "Do good". The differences only appear in particular cases, where we must make a decision -- and disagreement abounds on actual decisions even if the abstract principles might be agreed to.
I'd suggest that this agreement is superficial -- that the only reason people agree at abstract levels of moral thinking is that such propositions don't say anything at all. Or, to the extent that they do, they may be disagreed with. There is some element of choice involved.
If that be the case, then it seems reasonable to infer that there is nothing which makes moral statements true -- unlike statements about the temperature today or capitals and dates and heights, there is nothing to refer to which we can thereby say we are assured that this moral statement is true. The only thing we have is conviction, which is neither true or false. Rather, it is a psychological maneuver by which we reinforce beliefs in spite of their truth.
Might that be possible, in your view?
To recap, we have defined mercy as "Don't over-respond so as to prevent injustice the other way (and also sometimes not fully restore justice)". By extension, mercilessness means "Over-respond so as to produce injustice the other way". Do you agree with these definitions?
As such, mercilessness can never be willed out of justice, by definition of mercilessness. Additionally, being as merciful to yourself as you are to others can never be unjust, by definition of justice.
Quoting Moliere
One way to determine a necessary truth is to use "The Test of the Imagination", as Chesterton calls it. If we cannot imagine a subject x without the predicate y, then y is a necessary property of x, and by extension, y is a necessary criteria to determine if the object of enquiry is x. E.g., we cannot imagine a triangle without 3 sides, therefore "having 3 sides" is a necessary property of triangles; therefore "having 3 sides" is a necessary criteria to determine if the object of enquiry is a triangle.
I claim we cannot imagine an act to be morally good without the will of justice. Therefore "willing justice" is a necessary property of moral goodness; therefore "willing justice" is a necessary criteria to determine if an act is morally good.
I just mean mercy in a mundane sense -- so Meriam Webster states:
And that's what I mean.
So to be merciless is to punish offenders within your power, to not be lenient but rather to exercise a right or a power over someone due to some offense. At least in the context of this conversation -- since the word merciless has other shades of meaning as well which don't quite fit into a pure sort of opposite.
There are acts that are neither just nor merciful. There are acts that are both just and merciful. But there are also acts that are just and not merciful and acts which are unjust and merciful. To forgo punishing your friend would be merciful. It may not be wise, in the eyes of someone who believes in justice -- but so would justice appear unwise to someone who believes in mercy.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'd say that the problem with this test is that those with a lack of imagination will come to different conclusions than those with an expansive imagination. I would say that "having three sides" is a necessary property of triangles because it follows tautologically from triangles, not because we can't imagine it otherwise. Were a triangle given another side then, by definition, it would be a quadrilateral. It just follows from how we set things up at the beginning.
The imagination shifts its boundaries with desire. So if we want moral statements to be true then the imagination will shift to make it appear so, and vice-versa. Rather than seeing what is necessary -- that which is true in all possible worlds -- we see what is plausible to us. It's a plausibility test rather than a test for necessity.
It seems strange to me to stake the objectivity of morals on the imagination. A moral statement is either true or false. That much we agree upon, since some statements made by religions are in conflict, and so one or the other must be true, or they must both be false. But if our test for truth by way of necessity is in our imagination then I would claim I can't think of one moral statement which is true in all possible worlds.
Lastly I'd highlight here that you are prioritizing justice as something which must hold in order for something to be good. I think that is a viable option, but I also think that one could prioritize mercy in the exact same way that you are.
"I claim we cannot imagine an act to be morally good without the will of mercy. Therefore "willing mercy" is a necessary property of moral goodness; therefore "willing mercy" is a necessary criteria to determine if an act is morally good"
It's largely bound to what seems important to the speaker, since we are dealing with the imagination, which doesn't exactly seem objective. It seems the result of choice based upon moral desire.
So by extension, mercy simply means "not to punish offenders within your power". Let's roll with it.
Quoting Moliere
This claim can be refuted if we find a case where the act is not merciful, and yet we judge it to be morally good: Hitler starts killing Jews, and we have the power to stop this. We therefore capture him and put him in jail, which effectively prevents further victims.
Our act is merciless, as defined above, and I judge it to be morally good. Do you? If so, then mercy is not a necessary criteria for moral goodness.
Quoting Moliere
Yes but this is a non-issue. As a parallel, think of math. For problems solvable with math, math is an infallible method in theory, even though some people may make errors. To prevent human error, the math reasoning can be checked by different people, as it is unlikely for everyone to repeat the same error; and once discovered and shared, the error is easily seen by everyone. As is the case with math, so it is with the test of imagination. Some people may erroneously believe that "blue" is a necessary criteria for triangles, because they lack the imagination to imagine a triangle that is another colour. But another person can easily show them the error.
Quoting Moliere
You are mixing the word 'triangle' with the concept of a triangle. The word may change but the concept may not. We can arbitrarily change the word 'three' to 'two', but we cannot modify the concept III to II. Similarly, we cannot modify the concept ? to have four sides.
Quoting Moliere
"An act cannot be morally good if unjust". We have yet to find an example where this is false. I know the examples with mercy were an attempt at this, but I think we can both come to the conclusion that they are incorrect if we agree on the definition of mercy.
Okie doke.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I do.
But that's not my point here. I don't believe mercy is the foundational value by which I can judge something to be good or not.
However, if someone did believe this to be so then they would say that punishing Hitler is immoral. (though could agree to stopping him). Said hypothetical person would say there wouldn't be a point after having stopped him from doing evil, that evil is prevented and that bringing more evil to the world, by way of not observing the value of mercy, only brings more evil and does not bring balance.
What is the difference, in your set up, between justice and goodness? Aren't they basically the same thing?
And if that be the case then what prevents someone else from holding to another value as having priority to the claim of goodness?
If you think the mercy example is far-fetched, consider the pacifists during World War 2 for some actual people who differed in opinion on the appropriate course of action. It would depend on how a given pacifist frames their commitment, but if you believe WW2 to be just -- I'm guessing you do from your example -- then here's a clear example of people who believed abstaining from war was morally good.
This would certainly pass the imagination check. In fact the pacifists would just say that they cannot imagine an act which is both violent and good. Hence, regardless of the evil it may prevent -- even the evil of violence! -- to indulge in violence would be an evil. It is outside the scope of the imagination.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
How exactly would you show them that this is so?
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I wrote some stuff here about math and concepts, but then upon reading it again I thought we were getting side tracked. So I'm just noting that here.
You skipped my argument here against the imagination test from desire (which relates to the point about pacifism above):
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I have yet to find an example which persuades you, I agree. But if goodness and justice mean the same thing, for you, then I couldn't possibly do so. Any such action would fall outside of your imagination as something which could be considered good.
I don't think that's a bad thing, mind. I just think it would follow from what I've set out -- that whatever is good is what is chosen to be the best value.
You would err on the side of justice. Someone who prioritized differently would err on the side of (pacifism, mercy, whatever might be in conflict). You may care about what someone else sets as the supreme value, but you would attempt to reconcile said values with the core value of justice.
Does it really fall outside of your imagination that someone would believe differently from yourself and earnestly believe it to be good?
You may say they are wrong. But on what basis other than your own belief that justice and goodness are one and the same, or that you are unable to imagine an act which is both good and unjust? What is objective about that?
We are not really in disagreement here, because the end of putting Hitler in jail is to prevent further harm. If the end can be accomplished by another less extreme means, then that is acceptable too. In addition, if the harm done could be repaid, to restore justice, then that should be done too; but this may not be possible when it comes to killing people.
Quoting Moliere
In this case, I think justice is a necessary and sufficient criteria to determine goodness.
Quoting Moliere
P1: If one truly believes an act to be morally good, then they may willingly accept it, despite the harm it may cause them, because moral goodness is believed to be the ultimate end for a lot of people. E.g., one may willingly accept to tell a truth that is damaging to them, if they believe it to be the morally right thing to do.
P2: Nobody willingly accepts injustice to happen to them (unless it is to prevent an even greater injustice); not the saints, not Hitler, nor anyone else in between. This is a posteriori knowledge, but we all know this to be true.
C: Therefore nobody believes a unjust act to be morally good.
The pacifists you speak of may have thought that Hitler could be stopped in a more peaceful way than violence, but I don't believe they sincerely thought it was morally good to not stop him.
You brought up other objections, but if that's okay, let's put them aside to focus on the main ones above.
I disagree. :D
I think you believe in both justice and mercy, and so you attempt to reconcile the two. You also seem like a very sociable person, so you're trying to find a solution which is beneficial to different points of view -- all to what is usually the better, I'd say.
One person who is merciful wants to stop a person committing great evil. You agree that if there is some way less harsh that this is fine because as long as he is stopped, then that's good enough.
But suppose you're in a conversation with three people. And now the third and so far silent conversation partner pipes up and says, "In order for justice to be served, for there to be a balance for what he has done. Having killed millions he also must die -- only by forfeiting his life, after having orchestrated the death of so many innocents, will there be any kind of equality; he would deserve worse if there was something worse to give him"
Two courses of action. Neither of which can both be acted upon. So there is a choice involved -- resolved by what you or I or we or they care most about.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'd say that you're framing the issue differently from what pacifists framed it as. A quick google search brought up this: http://www.ppu.org.uk/pacifism/pacww2.html
To give an idea. It's really more an opposition to war itself than anything else. Hitler was evil, but he was only able to do what he did because others went along with it. If everyone were committed to pacifism, then the horrors of war -- including the systematic slaughter of innocent people -- would not exist on our world.
So, sure it's morally good to stop him. But the notion is more along the lines of converting him and everyone under him to pacifism.
Which, if you were me, I'd say is a bit of a far fetched dream -- but it's at least consistent with itself.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I don't think this establishes the objectivity that you're after. Nobody wants to be treated unfairly -- sure, maybe some odd ball here or there, but that's an attitude common enough that I'm not willing to raise a fuss over it.
But what counts as unfair? What counts as unjust? I think the story I started with highlights this nicely.
Also, I don't think I need to establish an act that is both good and unjust. The act and its motivation merely has to prioritize something besides justice first. Surely other people try to reconcile multiple conflicting values, as you do. But the values have differences, and caring about one or the other more results in different courses of action.
That's why I said earlier that this "in the weeds" approach is more appropriate for looking at moral nihilism. "Be good", "Do not accept injustice", "Do unto others as you would have done unto you" -- all very general maxims that covers over the very real fact that people act differently to the same circumstances.
And if it is the motivation and the act which are good or evil, and the circumstances are the same (kill or not kill the ex-fascist leader) -- then there must be some reason for our different acts. We have different values upon which we come to different conclusions on what is good or evil.
So right only means what you choose, and wrong only means what you don't choose, is that correct? So if I chose to be unjust to you, you likely would not choose this, and so the event would be wrong for you, but right for me. Would there be any reason why I should stop being unjust to you?
Not the way we have defined 'mercy', meaning "never punish". I value mercy only when it is just, which simply translates to justice.
Quoting Moliere
If the third person is sincere, then his error is not a moral but rational one. We appeal to the principle of a just punishment: A punishment is just if (1) it restores justice when possible, and (2) prevents further injustice. Also, if numerous punishments accomplish these ends, then we ought to choose the one that is the least harmful.
Killing a criminal does not restore justice to the victims. It does prevent further injustice from the criminal, but then jail time accomplishes this too and is less harmful.
Quoting Moliere
And if there were no sinners, then we would all be saints. Can't disagree with that logic, but it says nothing about how to deal with current warriors and sinners. I am not sure how extreme pacifism or 'mercy' as we have defined it, can stop current wars or injustice. As such, I claim rational error again, because the means does not meet the end.
Quoting Moliere
Unequal treatment among men for a given situation. And this is evaluated objectively.
Quoting Moliere
Indeed there are. I will exclude rational errors here. We all know what is morally good and bad, but free will entails we have the choice to be morally good or bad. Why decline the moral good if we know it to be good? To prioritize other kinds of good such as physical good (e.g. unfaithful sex) or emotional good (e.g. merciless revenge). Now why should we prioritize the moral good over the other kinds of good? By definition of the moral good which is "what we ought to do". In other words, to say "we can do something else than we what ought to do" is a contradiction.
Justice can be interpreted in this manner, but it doesn't need to be. What I refer to here is retributive justice -- an old form of justice, by all means, but one which people do believe in.
What is more rational about a punishment that simply prevents further injustice? What in reason makes this so?
I'd say nothing. Upon accepting one form of justice or another then reason can tell us what we must do. When attached to some interpretation of justice then I'd say that it even appears that this attachment is a kind of fact of reason, to borrow a phrase.
But there wouldn't be a way to differentiate your commitment here from our third man's commitment on the basis of which is more rational.
Our third interlocutor would simply say that a man who murders a million deserves a million deaths. That being impossible to do he deserves the most that we can give him -- one death.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
But sometimes it isn't so much about the means and ends. Sometimes commitments are motivated by good will alone -- it isn't the results of actions, but what they intend to accomplish which compels persons to adopt a particular moral position.
There's nothing more rational about consequentialist reasoning. Consequentialist and deontological reasoning are both two forms of thinking through moral problems. You'd have to have some third way of reasoning that was somehow able to lay claim to being more rational to decided between the two before you could claim that the pacifist here is simply making an error that reflects their irrationality.
They certainly have reasons.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
So far "objective", though, has just been fleshed out as a test in the imagination -- what someone is able to conceive of as being possible or impossible, in the same manner that a triangle cannot have anything but three sides.
If math is the metric for necessity, then I'd say that it's fairly obvious that people can imagine different things -- things which are no more or less rational than one another. In fact, once thought through, they are sort of a founding principle of rationality in making moral decisions.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
It goes deeper than mere temptation. All that happens after having determined what is good or evil.
But there are those who disagree on those terms. Rationality isn't the basis for deciding between good or evil -- people can be consistent and supply reasons for why they think this or that is just.
Really, it's in the competition between moral goods that you see this -- so in the above, we have kinds of justice or interpretations of justice. Before, acts of mercy from God to man or between men. Or in the case of the pacifists a conflict on how to reason about moral goods, whether it be measured by the outcomes of our acts or the motives and purity of our acts.
Each story is about a person who is good, and people who are good disagreeing with one another on what that means in particular circumstances.
To my mind the subjective-objective distinction is only applicable to practical situations in which there is a verifiable criterion of truth that is independent of one's feelings about the matter. For example, when betting on the outcome of a football match.
Ethical judgements do not fall into this category, since one's feelings are the ultimate arbiter of truth here.
I'd put it differently. Truth is invariant of feelings. Action and choice aren't, but the truth is.
Actions coupled with motivation are the bearers of the terms "good" or "evil". So "Helping people in need is good" describes the property which attaches to the action which is the subject of the sentence. Sometimes motivation is an important aspect in evaluating the truth of some sentence which describes. So helping people in need is good, but "Taking donations for the needy out of a desire to help the needy is good" differs from "Taking donations for the needy out of a desire to keep a non-profit afloat is good". Some may argue that the motivation is irrelevant, but we sometimes do care about the motive, and some people only care about motive in certain cases, so I think it's important to add that in there. Plus it fits well enough with the notion that actions are the bearers of the terms "good" or "evil".
These sentences, to all appearances, look no different from statements like "The grass is green" -- they follow a subject-predict form and attribute some property to some subject. Further, people argue as if certain norms are true or false, so it seems sensible to admit that such kinds of statements are truth-apt. On their face, at least, they appear to have that sort of semantic meaning and function.
It's just that, when we look how such values are used in practice we see that people choose differently using the same values within the same circumstances. So it is reasonable to infer that there is no fact to the matter. Hence, all such sentences are false.
As previously mentioned, the Golden Rule is derived straight from justice. Thus anything that breaks the golden rule is necessarily unjust. Our third person observes the rule "Do unto others as they do unto you", which is different than the Golden Rule "Do unto others as you would want them to do unto you". Killing a man breaks the Golden Rule, unless it is done to prevent a yet greater harm, such as killing more people. Our third person breaks the Golden Rule, and is therefore not just.
Quoting Moliere
Agreed. But if you truly intend to accomplish a thing, then you would necessarily try to find the correct means to accomplish that thing, and discard the means that don't. Say I intend to help people, and find out the means to do so which is in my power to do. Then I will necessarily do it. If I don't do it, then it is either because I don't believe the means to be correct, or because my intentions were not true.
Same for the pacifists. If their intentions is to bring peace and justice, and pacifism does not provide the means to do so, then they will necessarily find another means, or else their intentions were not truly to bring peace and justice.
Quoting Moliere
I think you are mixing up two topics here. The test of imagination only served to determine if there is a case that is morally good yet unjust. But my above quote concerns justice only. 'Objective' means "Independent on the subject of thought, the observer". Two treatments are equal or not, independent on the observer; and therefore justice is objective.
Quoting Moliere
It is simpler than you think. To summarize my position so far: Criteria for moral judgements are Justice and the Golden Rule (aside from religious authorities, but these only add and don't reduce the previous criteria). Then all humans, due to human nature, know what is good and evil. E.g. Respect, honesty, and health are good. Disrespect, dishonesty, and harm are bad. With that, we have all the ingredients we need to make moral judgements for a given situation. Then if there are disagreements, these can only come from errors of facts or reason.
We can test this with particular examples if desired.
Hello. I dispute the claim that what comes from our feelings is necessarily subjective inasmuch as what comes from our physical senses is necessarily objective (we could be dreaming). I agree that if we believe the criteria to be objective, then the thing the criteria is applied to is objective. But how do we judge the criteria itself to be objective? This seems to result in infinite regress.
First, let's group physical senses and feelings in the same category, because they both serve to convey information about the outside world to the subject. The information they convey may be either objective, that is, attributed to the object, or subjective, that is, merely coming from the subject. Since all info we perceive must necessarily come through our senses and feelings, how do we tell which is objective and which is subjective? By checking if many subjects perceive the same info. E.g., if I see a unicorn and nobody else does, then it is likely not real; but if all subjects present see the unicorn, then it is reasonable to judge it is real, that is, objective.
Same goes for moral senses. If I sense that Mother Teresa's deeds are morally better than Hitler's deeds, and a large majority agrees with this, and although some may be indecisive (due to possible moral blindness), nobody senses Hitler's deeds to be morally better than Mother Teresa's deeds, then it is reasonable to judge that morality is objective.
Fortunately our conversation is not constrained to repeat the thoughts expressed in the OP, but only to reflect on them along with some of the remarks that followed in their wake.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Add that he assaults himself every time he catches himself looking at him crooked, and wants others to behave likewise.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
See my initial reply to the OP: Rationality and fairness are not in general sufficient to resolve the issue.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I've already provided a counterexample to disrupt your position. You might try addressing it responsibly instead of merely repeating yourself and pointing at the OP. Perhaps you can even apply the problem raised by my example to your own thoughts, by problematizing the distribution of profits in your Example 2 in a manner analogous to that in which I problematized the distribution of cake in my initial reply.
If you're not willing to take that sort of hint, there may be hardly any point in our continuing this conversation.
Because to do otherwise, is to have a subjective belief about morality.
M
It's a bit circular. Of course if what you say is true then what you say is true. But the same could be said for the man who believes in the death penalty -- in which case it is you who wish to spare a man's life who justly deserves death, to use your reasoning, that is falling to an error in fact or reasoning.
And so to answer my question, if I am unjust to you, e.g. I am your employer and pay you less than the others for the same work, you would not say "it is wrong", but say "I disagree with your choices, inasmuch as I disagree that blue is the best colour". Is that correct?
People in their right mind do not want to be assaulted. This behaviour does not make him immoral but crazy. We do not send this type of person to jail but to a mental hospital.
Quoting Cabbage Farmer
Add human nature. All men want respect, health, and honesty, and dislike disrespect, diseases, and dishonesty (excluding the aforementioned crazy person). Combined with human nature, this justice-based morality is no longer an empty equation but a system with substance.
Quoting Cabbage Farmer
Let's stick to the cake example. You write: "Another says the size of the cake should be proportionate to the weight of the consumers." You can claim that if it was true, but you must justify why it would be true. Is the end goal of sharing the cake survival or pleasure? If survival, then maybe it is true that one must eat an amount proportionate to one's weight, and therefore the just act is indeed relative to weight. But if pleasure, then I see no reason why the claim would be true.
Hi. Let's use the same logic for a different topic:
"Why do you believe math is subjective? Because to do otherwise, is to have a subjective belief about math".
Math is clearly objective; therefore there is a flaw in the logic.
'Clearly objective' to whom?
M
I disagree with this point, as it excludes the "crazy person" as being someone to which a code of justice or morals would not apply to. If there is someone who likes disrespect, diseases, and dishonesty it does not make them separate from morality, if morality is truly objective. If morals are objective, they would have to apply to everyone regardless of mental state.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
Math, being a system of defining the world invented by humans, is not necessarily objective. It could be argued that the things that math defines are objective, but it does not make math itself objective. Similarly, the things that language defines may be objective, but language itself is not.
There are people who disagree on the shape of the earth. It does not make the topic subjective. And if objective, then some people are necessarily in error on the topic.
Quoting Moliere
One of the most anyways. I would like to meet such a person who don't think so, and see how they react when experiencing injustice from others.
Quoting Moliere
Do you claim that not everyone values respect, honesty, and health? If that is not what you claim, then I don't see what else you dispute in my position.
Quoting Moliere
If they are correct, then yes, I am the one in error in this case. But the very fact that there can be an error proves the objectivity of the topic. There cannot be any error on subjective topics, for it is by definition only a matter of opinion.
Say that my "legal justification" is that the law is corrupted. Would you not find this legal system wrong?
To all that understand the concept. Do you believe "2+2=4" is right, and "2+2=3" is wrong? If so, then you too believe math to be objective, because only things which are objective can be either right or wrong. On the other hand, subjective things are neither right nor wrong, but only a matter of opinion.
Hello Mr Ex Caelo. Morality indeed should apply to everyone if objective. But the necessary ingredient to a moral act is intentions. I.e., if good intentions, then morally good; and if bad intentions, then morally bad. E.g., accidental killing is not immoral, but intentional killing is, despite both acts resulting in the same amount of harm to the victims.
Our crazy person, liking disrespect, may in turn give disrespect to others with complete sincere intentions of doing the good. As such, the act would not be immoral, albeit crazy and dangerous. Note that a crazy person can still be immoral if his intentions are still bad. It's just harder to tell from the outside.
Quoting Anguis Ex Caelo
Agreed about language; disagreed about math. Numbers are man-made, but the concept they point to are not, and these are still part of math. We can change the numbers 2 and 4, but we cannot change II+II=IIII.
You have no legal justification. Something can be ethically or morally wrong but legal or vice versa. You seem to not understand the difference between morals and laws. Laws are enforced rules, what you find morally wrong and write does not matter in the slightest.
Sure. But it's sensible to ask, then, how it is you know what you claim? Why is it that some people believe in the death penalty, and some do not, and both call it justice -- how do you adjudicate between these two possibilities, and justify your belief?
I have granted the possibility of error. But given the diversity of opinion on the topic it seems reasonable to also say that not only is error possible, but we are all actually in error -- because there is no fact to the matter.
To all that understand the concept. Do you believe "2+2=4" is right, and "2+2=3" is wrong? If so, then you too believe math to be objective, because only things which are objective can be either right or wrong. On the other hand, subjective things are neither right nor wrong, but only a matter of opinion.
Wow, there is a serious amount of presumption in this assertion. First you are stating that both math and I can partake in a true and objective reality pertaining to "1" or "2" or "4" and when these concepts are put to together there is some objective truth that is distinct from the subjective validation and or acceptance of these numerical ideas.
Objectivity is purely theoretical conjecture it is agreed upon as much as it is disagreed upon .... and all this is done subjectively.
To assert that mathematics offers some objective truth is to put a lot of faith in your math. Math has as much trouble with being objective, as any subject might have with its impossibility.
For arguments sake lets forget about Math's obvious difficulties with; Zero, or the impossibility of 'infinity', or the square root of minus 2, or the impossibility of "irrational numbers", or the absolute impossibility of precise "objective" measurement of anything vis: weight, length, density etc, ..... Or the impossible math behind Xeno's simple arrow.. etc etc,
But for the sake of a bit of crack.... Lets forget these 'problems' with math and begin with the very basic concept of "1".
In accordance with Leibniz's law of indiscernibles it its accepted amongst scientists and philosophers alike that no 'one' thing in the universe can be exactly the same as another 'one' thing: if they are exactly the same, then they must be the same thing. Therefore if I begin my math with the assumption that 1=1, I am beginning with a subjectively accepted falsity. No things are alike, and no one thing in the entire universe is exactly equal to another 'one' thing IE: One is not equal to One . It is equal only to itself. Beyond subjective thinking we can have no two things that are actually equal.
Therefore our starting point, the very foundation of math which asserts with confidence that 1=1 is untrue, and as such is a falsity that must be subjectively overcome or collectively 'believed' if we are to have any math at all.
M
Subjective doesn't mean "whatever you think is right" it means shades or tones of right and wrong.
If country A outlaws beating sheep on Wednesdays and country B outlaws beating sheep on Tuesdays, the moral is permissive under the notion subjectivity.
If country A outlaws beating sheep on Wednesdays and country B allows you to beat sheep on Wednesday Tuesday or any amount of days the transgression is no longer a question of subjectivity. It's wrong to beat sheep, it doesn't matter what day it is.
Given my original statements implying beating sheep on any other days besides Wednesday and Tuesday is incongruent, but that wasn't the point.
The point is, the word subjectivity pretends that things can't be arbitrary or capricious.
I am now confused as to where you stand. If you believe that "something can be ethically or morally wrong but legal or vice versa", then you believe in true ethics and morality, do you not? Those who don't believe in objective morality will use the man-made laws as the only criteria for what is considered wrong.
I understand your point, that strong disagreements on a topic suggests subjectivity. But two counter-points.
(1) Subjectivity is not necessarily entailed; inasmuch as people disagree on religions even though it is clearly an objective topic (E.g., if the Christian God exists, then He exists for everyone; and if not, then not).
(2) I dispute the claim that the disagreements are strong; even for the case of the death penalty. People do not argue on the death penalty when it comes to simple cases like children jaywalking; they do only when it comes to complex cases like dealing with terrorists. E.g., if only put in jail, will they escape? Will they do it again once released? Will their buddies continue to terrorize because jail time is not a strong enough incentive to stop? etc. If we know the answer to these questions with certainty, then there would be very few disagreements; and these are matters of facts, not values.
Your conclusion that "One is not equal to One" is wrong because it fails the Law of Identity: For all A: A = A. Now let A = 1. Therefore, 1 = 1. I fail to understand your demonstration using Leibniz's law of indiscernibles, because the first "1" is the same as the second "1" in the equation; so it does not fail the law of indiscernibles.
Samuel
I think you have missed my point entirely.
The issue at hand is whether morality is subjective. My point is that the notion 'objectivity' is an impossibility and as such to have an opinion as to whether morality is objective is impossible to answer from any viewpoint other than a subjective one.
The reference to Leibiniz is in response to a counter argument that you made that mathmatics is objective "to all who know that 2+2 = 4"
Think about this for a moment. We have a subjective personal understanding that 1 thing plus another makes two things. This is a belief that we hold, it is nothing more than that and it does not describe the reality of real objects. We can apply the belief to dollars and we can say that 1 dollar plus 1 dollar equals 2 dollars. This is still a subjective belief that we have. Now lets examine the objects that are dollars: each of them (the paper bills) are completely unique no matter how precise the technology applied in their manufacfture, they are not equal and can never be so. We have the subjective belief that 1Kg of salt plus 1kg of salt gives us 2 kgs of salt. Yet this is only a belief an agreement between two people, neither kg of salt is in fact1kg. Now if we agree upon the type of weigh scales we are to use in the measurement we are simply refining our beliefs we are in essence agreeing to dismiss the real objective difference.
Because no two things can be the same 1+1 will only be two when we agree that A=1. In doing so we merely agree on a simillarity between A and 1. We can certainly construct a math out of our agreement, but once we assign an object be it an atom or a dollar to the 'A' and then assign a second atom or dollar we cannot have two real objects that are the same, and as such 1+1 remains vaild only as a subjective concept. In reality there is no possibile equality between two material objects. Because two observers agree upon their subjective assesment of an objects simillarity to another object this can never overcome the impossibility of their being objectively different. As such math is only subjectively true, the moment it is applied to the reality of objects it fails to give a precise description of objects. (Objective reality)
One thing to consider, is that numbers and other symbols are not actually things or phenomenal objects. They're meanings which are assigned to a particular shape or form. So A = A is a matter of definition, it is true a priori. Without that being the case, then it would be impossible to converse, as there would be no agreed definitions or conventions whatever. This holds for all the basics of logic and arithmetic, which are likewise true by definition.
Another point that is relevant here, is that in Aristotelian and Thomistic dualism the 'form' of a thing, or the 'value' of a numerical symbol, is entirely intellectual or intelligible in nature. It is immaterial - and that is precisely why, in such traditional philosophies, the knowledge of an arithmetic proposition is of a higher order to the knowledge of material objects. 2 - 2 = 0 is by its very nature an abstract and general truth. We see it, in our mind's eye, with a certainty that doesn't pertain to the seeing of material particulars (even though it can be applied to them).
Lloyd Gerson, Platonism Vs Naturalism.
Quoting Marcus de Brun
It is not subjective, it is the same for all who can count. But it's also not objective, as number (etc) is not strictly speaking 'an object' except for in an allegorical sense. (This is a point I tried to make at the beginning of this thread, in respect of the distinction of a priori and objective truths. My claim is that you have to have the former in order to establish the latter.)
I admit I don't understand your post. Subjectivity means 'only a matter of opinion' and 'no right or wrong'. Objectivity means 'part of reality independent of a subject' and 'with a right or wrong'.
This statement is a self-contradiction, because if objectivity is not real, then nothing can be objectively true, including the above statement.
Quoting Marcus de Brun
I think you misinterpret Leibniz's law of indiscernibles. The law states that no two things can be the same in every way, that is, have all the same properties. But two things can have some properties that are the same. Two things can have the same genus or species, or accidental properties.
Are you a human being? So am I. Yet I am not you. Although we are separate beings, we participate in the same species: human. 1 human + 1 human = 2 humans. No more, no less.
That's a good analogy actually. By your terms I agree that morality is objective. The notion that I'm proposing is that every moral statement is false.
Similarly with religion -- every religion has truth-apt statements. And that makes them objective. And they are false statements, i.e., there is not one true religion.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I think there's one important question that you're missing there. Do they deserve it? And that is not a question of fact, but of values.
I agree that there is agreement for absurdly simple cases, but I don't know if there is agreement even for most cases. First, how would we determine such a thing? It would seem we'd have to know the opinion not only of everyone who exists now, but even people who have existed -- since moral difference is most clear when viewed historically, and not just by asking your neighbor. And that just isn't possible to know down to every detail. We have to make assumptions of some kind to determine what everyone ever has believed.
Given the changes in laws over time and the differences between even current countries, and persons within countries, I'd say that it is at least reasonable to believe that there is more disagreement than agreement with respect to all persons. I mean, we used to have a feudal society ruled by a single church. And now we have a democratic capitalist society with a plurality of religions. In what ways would all the people of the past agree with our current world? And wouldn't they actually disagree with it on what they consider to be moral grounds?
Great. To determine if morality is objective or not was the main goal of this discussion. Everything else is secondary. Now why do you claim that every moral statement is false?
Quoting Moliere
Asking "Do they deserve it?" is another way of asking "Is the punishment just?". If we unpack the question, we get "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?". The objectively correct punishment is the one that answers "yes" to both questions (if possible). But I only see a matter of facts here. Why do you say this is a matter of values?
Quoting Moliere
Given that we agree that morality is objective, this question becomes virtually irrelevant; because objective truth is found by reason and not opinions. But I'll try to answer your objection anyways.
You point to the differences in political and economical systems, but believing that morality was always an end goal is a questionable assumption. The end goal of some of these could have been power only. It is hard to believe that the Nazi regime had morality in mind, instead of power. Moral systems on the other hand are very similar in different places and times. The Golden Rule is called such because it is universal. It occurs in some form in nearly every religion and ethical tradition (Source).
Because the question I offered is not asking, "Does the punishment prevent further injustice?" and "Is justice restored?", but rather "Does the person who is deserving of punishment deserve this punishment?" -- It's a question of how we interpret justice, and what we mean by justice. In the case of the death penalty it is thought of as just when the person in question has done something so wrong that the worst punishment we have is the only possible way to rectify what they have done. Justice, in this sense, is seen as a kind of balance. One person kills, and so is killed in return.
Another sort of justice would just be restorative justice. Killing a murderer only creates more death, rather than rectify the wrong. Seeing as we can do nothing to bring back the dead the debt owed by the murderer is unpayable, and so they are given some sort of life sentence.
Another sort of justice would be rehabilitative justice. Killing a murderer not only fails to rectify a wrong, it also misses out on what the truly just act would be: turning the murderer into a productive member of society. Justice, in this sense, is more about the health of a community than rectifying wrongs.
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
I'd say this confuses truth with justification. So while we agree that moral statements are truth-apt, in that they seem to be describing things which are or are not the case invariant of one's point of view, what I am asking is how you determine whether such a statement is true or false. Agreement seems to be the metric on hand, so we'd have to ask how it is we determine that people agree.
I'd say that this is not enough:
Quoting Samuel Lacrampe
For the reasons against the golden rule I already mentioned, one, and also because "moral systems" could just be read as synonymous with "systems with the golden rule". So any system with the golden rule is a system with the golden rule, meaning that definition-ally they'd all be similar. But this just begs the question.
I'd say that, for instance, the Nazi system you propose contra moral systems is another example of people acting on moral impulses. These were moral impulses of disgust and a fascination with human unity in the state. There is a certain desire for purity in Nazi emotions, as well as a desire to be rid of a previous embarassment and rectify wrongs done to the people. But I would call it an immoral system, in the evaluative sense -- but in the descriptive sense, just like capitalism, communism, or feudalism, I'd say that it counts as a system of prescripts for society, and so is in that sense at least a normative system. It would count when looking at whether or not people agree on goodness.
I am not sure I understand your point. Your three options, death, life sentence, and rehabilitation, appear to aim at answering the two questions about stoping injustice and restoring justice; and they can be judged against these two questions to determine which one is most just, or mostly deserved. If not justice, how else would you judge which option is mostly deserved?
Note that if it works, rehabilitative justice is the best one, because being rehabilitated not only prevents further injustice, but can also restore justice a bit, by helping out the relatives of the victim.
Quoting Moliere
A moral system is a system that applies to everyone about what ought-to-be, or good behaviour. It is evident that everyone views justice onto them as good, and injustice onto them as bad. Therefore everyone ought to be just and not unjust. Justice is therefore a criteria to determine the morality of an act.
Quoting Moliere
Again, a moral system is about good behaviour for anyone. Part of the Nazi system was to subdue other ethnic groups like the Jews. Surely no one, not even the Nazis, would view this behaviour done onto them as good. It is therefore not a system of good behaviour, and therefore not a moral system.