What makes a philosophy "Neo"?
So in the history of philosophy, you encounter a lot of philosophical schools of thought with the prefix "Neo" attached to them. For example, some philosophers from the late 19th century might be considered Neo-Kantians, or Neo-Marxists. I know that "neo" means new, but when is a philosophy considered a new version of an old one versus a separate philosophy altogether? How far from the original can one get before one can no longer affix the "Neo" in front of the new philosophical thought? Does it have to follow the same principles as the original but answer different question? Does it have to recast the original in a modern context?
Now, applying that to myself, when would it be appropriate to call my own philosophy a Neo-Schopenhauerean one.. besides the lame answer of "Call your philosophy whatever you want".
Now, applying that to myself, when would it be appropriate to call my own philosophy a Neo-Schopenhauerean one.. besides the lame answer of "Call your philosophy whatever you want".
Comments (7)
In the beginning was the philosopher and his idea, then comes the remodeler who makes adjustments here and there.
Good enough. I guess my philosophy can be called Neo-Schopenhauerean in a way. The repetitious and systemic futility of life (what I call structural suffering), and the contingent harms of a particular life with its set of circumstances, etc. It has similar themes and conclusions and even can accept Will as a principle of sorts of nature and certainly in the human psyche, but perhaps without the Platonic forms, or his seemingly static, non-evolutionary metaphysics.
Drop the -ea-, please. Neo-Schopenhauern will suffice.
Quoting schopenhauer1
(I sure hope you're not a follower of the Cynics.)
Anyway, 'will' or freedom does not have to be at odds with non-suffering existence. I mean, you could be both free and not-suffering at the same time. Humanism, for instance, could possibly be the cure for the automatic, uncritical obedience to rationalism and scientism if we are willing to risk being called "un-philosophical".
That's the point of the thread, right? Are you a Neo-Schopenhauerean, or a Post-Schope?
Who cares? Why define your own views against your mentor's views? You remain in Shope's shadow, preventing you from forming your own distinct philosophy, independent from Shopey. Am I a Neo-Berdyaevian? A post-Biblicalist? A Neo-existentialist? Am I a neo-classicalist-mystic? Am I syncretistic skeptic? Who cares? I don't.
This is a bit unclear, do you want to expand?
Well, sometimes it can be useful. Why are Neo-Kantians called Neo-Kantians? Labels can be useful, though by no means exhaustive. Existentialists- well, you know their philosophy is going to focus on existence qua existence. Realists- they have some idea of some objective something. Again, not exhaustive but useful. So Neo-Kantians will conjure up certain ideas- transcendental limits of thought, categories of thought, noumena/phenomenal, thing-in-itself, etc. However, it is also suggesting there are tweaks, as perhaps it is applying Kant to different applications, or synthesizes it with other philosophies. Or adds things that Kant overlooked or didn't know during his lifetime.
Anyways, I would say my philosophy is in the school of Schopenhauer because it is influenced by him, and this is useful to know.
Similar themes between our two worldviews could be:
1.) The futility or emptiness of all pursuits/ the systemic futility/ the structural suffering of all lifeforms
2.) A principle of striving that goes but nowhere and is always filled with goal-seeking and boredom fleeing
3.) The recognition of immense amounts of circumstantial suffering
4.) The implicit idea that it is perhaps good not to procreate more suffering
Differences that would make my philosophy "Neo":
1.) The splitting of suffering categories into structural (systemic) and contingent (based on circumstances)
2.) No Platonic forms (this seems a holdover of not really recognizing evolutionary thinking or Darwin and too much attachment to Kantian metaphysics)
3.) The principle of Will may be simply immanent with nature and not transcendent (nature itself manifests some strivingness to it, it is not a thing-in-itself)
4.) More explicit categories for how our wills manifest in survival-related pursuits, maintenance/comfort-related pursuits, and boredom-fleeing pursuits, as well as the recognition that these three categories are shaped by culture and historical circumstances.
There are some other differences as well, but those are a good start.
The main argument against free will is that we live in a world that must obey cause and effect and the whole foundation of determinism and rationalism. Living in this world suppresses our ability to think of the 'impossible' and beyond. And that's where the pain is -- on the one hand, the proponents of free will are not anti-something, wholesale. They are not condemning anything -- just the illusion of the wall. On the other, this 'impossible other' is very difficult to articulate philosophically, let alone support.
So, proponents of free will must first take the risky step of introducing that other part of our intellect that could accommodate thinking of the impossible:
By introducing the impossible, they don't mean turning rocks into bread or any of that nonsense.
The 'impossible' is really a misnomer -- they refer to impossible because normally, in this world, the sun rises in the morning and there's no arguing our way out of it. If then they begin to explain that the opposite could also be true, they are penalized with vulgar accusations and a exclamation of "But that's impossible! This world is in order. It has laws." and a possible relegation to philosophical nuisance.