An attempt to clarify my thoughts about metaphysics

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Quoting T Clark

So, anyway - Metaphysical questions cannot be addressed with yes or no answers. They’re not issues of right or wrong, what matters is usefulness.

On the face this seems false, just considered in a historical way. So I guess I'd ask -- Why do you want metaphysics to be one way, and not another way?

It seems to me that "Metaphysics" is a name for a category of philosophy which includes such and such. The division I had introduced to me in class was between Metaphysics-Epistemology-Axiology, and those were the broad categories which philosophy fell within.

Intelligent post. I can only hazard a couple of points as duty calls.

One point is that the specifically Aristotelian nature of 'metaphysics' ought not to be forgotten. The term was coined (as is well known) by a later editor of Aristotle's corpus, who applied it to the body of A's texts that were 'after physics'. I say that because often 'metaphysics' is interpreted to mean 'general spiritual philosophy' whereas in the formal sense, it has quite a definite lexicon and set of concerns.

But then, the one reference given in the OP is not Aristotelian at all, but Taoist. And I think the quote you're probably referring to - it's not actually stated - is 'the Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao'. I suppose that is a metaphysical claim in the second sense of being 'generally spiritual', but not in the Aristotelian sense, which was most concerned with 'saying', as precisely as possible. (One of its drawbacks, perhaps!)

But one useful consequence of thinking of metaphysics in the context of Aristotle and formal Western metaphysics generally, is that it can then be discussed in terms of the Western philosophical tradition. One fundamental source for that discussion is philosophical theology, Thomism (and neo-Thomism) in particular. And that's useful because it is still a living philosophical tradition with numerous, well-educated exponents, and because it provides a conceptual framework and lexicon, which is actually quite compatible with your bullet points.

But that leads to the issue of God: can you consider metaphysics in isolation from God? I find Thomist philosophy intellectually appealing, but it doesn't make me feel as though I ought to convert to Catholicism, even though it's the main philosophy of Catholicism. (Furthermore my own spiritual orientation is Buddhist, which is ostensibly not about God at all.)


Quoting T Clark

I don’t think metaphysics should include a discussion of the existence of a particular God or the substance of particular religions. At least as it’s often considered, the existence of God is a matter of fact – he does or he does not.

I think a huge amount hinges on the assertion of the belief in the existence of God. After all, one either believes, with all that this entails, or not. But my feeling is that, culturally, this dichotomy between belief and unbelief is very much a product of the Protestant insistence on 'salvation by faith alone'. So everything hinges on a choice: either you buy it, and simply accept it, or you reject it, and take your chances (to simplify it rather brutally).

HOWEVER, I think in much earlier philosophical theology, there was a much deeper and more nuanced understanding of the nature of the Divine, which was essentially dialectical, and the subject of metaphysical argument. It provided for a much more nuanced understanding of the whole subject of metaphysics, which got 'flattened out' by Protestantism and the scientific revolution. That is the direction in which I think the topic should be explored.

Quoting tim wood

R. G. Collingwood argued that metaphysics is figuring out the absolute presuppositions held at different times by different people. He wrote a (good) book about it, An Essay on Metaphysics,

Not sure, but that sounds like it may be what I'm talking about. I'll take a look.

Reply to tim wood Yes! I'm glad there is someone familiar with Collingwood!

Quoting Moliere

On the face this seems false, just considered in a historical way. So I guess I'd ask -- Why do you want metaphysics to be one way, and not another way?

I very much want there to be a place to go to discuss the underpinnings of reason. Where we can agree on the rules, or at least argue about the rules, before we start the substantive discussion. The closest thing we have to that place I can think of is what we call metaphysics. If that's not what metaphysics is, then what is it - seems to me it's just a junk drawer where we throw unrelated stuff we can't figure out how to resolve.

Quoting Moliere

It seems to me that "Metaphysics" is a name for a category of philosophy which includes such and such. The division I had introduced to me in class was between Metaphysics-Epistemology-Axiology, and those were the broad categories which philosophy fell within.

I read the "Metaphysics" entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia. It sort of sounds the way you describe it. It really does make it sound like my junk drawer analogy.

Quoting Wayfarer

One point is that the specifically Aristotelian nature of 'metaphysics' ought not to be forgotten. The term was coined (as is well known) by a later editor of Aristotle's corpus, who applied it to the body of A's texts that were 'after physics'. I say that because often 'metaphysics' is interpreted to mean 'general spiritual philosophy' whereas in the formal sense, it has quite a definite lexicon and set of concerns.

This is a helpful post, but I think it underlines what I was suggesting - that what we call metaphysics is not what I want it to be. Poor T Clark. What is the word for what I want? Where is the place we go to discuss the foundations of reason? The talking we have to do before we can talk.

Quoting Wayfarer

But then, the one reference given in the OP is not Aristotelian at all, but Taoist. And I think the quote you're probably referring to - it's not actually stated - is 'the Tao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Tao'. I suppose that is a metaphysical claim in the second sense of being 'generally spiritual', but not in the Aristotelian sense, which was most concerned with 'saying', as precisely as possible.

To me, Taoist philosophy is not "generally spiritual" at all. It provides the most concrete vision of the fundamental basis of existence I can imagine. If that's not metaphysical, I can't imagine what is. It's what filled the gap when my youthful materialism frayed around the edges.

Quoting Wayfarer

But one useful consequence of thinking of metaphysics in the context of Aristotle and formal Western metaphysics generally, is that it can then be discussed in terms of the Western philosophical tradition.

Ever since I took my first philosophy course - The Mind-Body Identity Problem - more than 40 years ago, I have not been able to put myself in the state of mind which allows me to discuss things in the manner Western philosophy requires. It all seems so convoluted, misleading, alien. Tangled up in it's own processes. That inability on my part has led to difficulties on this forum before and it probably has a lot to do with the issues I am having that we are discussing here. I just want to talk about reality the way I talk about everything else - Hey, looks like snow; Sox are in spring training, how do you think they'll do this year?; What is the nature of existence?

I'm not complaining (well, maybe I am). I recognize I have to play by the rules of the game set up by the people I want to play with. I guess I'm looking for common ground without abandoning my vision.

Thanks. Really helpful, as usual.

Quoting T Clark

I recognize I have to play by the rules of the game set up by the people I want to play with.

Why play if the rules are faulty?

Quoting Noble Dust

Why play if the rules are faulty?

In line with my metaphysics, rules are not faulty. It's just a matter of preference and usefulness. Also - I like it here. I want to play with the people on this forum. I need to make allowances for how things are done here.

Quoting T Clark

Ever since I took my first philosophy course - The Mind-Body Identity Problem - more than 40 years ago, I have not been able to put myself in the state of mind which allows me to discuss things in the manner Western philosophy requires.

I first studied philosophy about then, too. I enrolled as an adult entrant, in philosophy, anthropology, comparative religion, psychology and history. The long holiday before I started, I read pretty well all of History of Western Philosophy. Then I studied units in Descartes (as 'the first modern'), philosophy of science, logical positivism, David Hume and various other subjects. Two years worth. I passed, but I was a difficult student, and was accused of tendentiousness (with some justification). But ultimately I majored in Comparative Religion (not divinity or theology - important distinction.)

I came to the view, which I still have, that there is a gnostic element in religion, which had been driven out because of the way Western religions developed. It continued to exist in some streams of thought, often underground, but has mainly been forgotten or suppressed. The main thrust of gnosticism is, of course, knowledge - it is about attaining insight, not about simply believing what you're told. I discovered some writers, like Elaine Pagels, who wrote on the basis of the re-discovered gnostic scriptures from Nag Hammadi. She too argued that there was originally a much stronger gnostic orientation in the early Church, but that it was driven underground by the emerging Latin orthodoxy.

In fact there's a lot of tension in Christian thought between right belief (ortho-doxa) and spiritual insight. I think that was what drove many people like myself to Eastern religions, as they too put an emphasis on experiential insight, on learning by doing. (Of course, I now understand that in some ways these can also co-exist in Christian thought, although I don't think I ever would have reached that understanding had I stayed in the Church.)

There is a point to all of this. And that is, that in our culture, 'religion' is regarded as a matter of belief, almost by definition. Because of that, it is regarded as subjective and private. In liberal cultures we have freedom of conscience (and a good thing it is, too), and on this account respect is accorded to beliefs - but only on the basis that one is entitled to believe, not that the content of belief is worthy of respect (and in secular circles, it is mostly deprecated).

By contrast, scientific knowledge is by definition public (even if large subject areas are technically impenetrable for the lay reader). So implicitly here, the Platonic distinction between 'mere opinion' and 'true knowledge' turns up again - this time, however, in the sense that religious and metaphysical ideas are generally regarded as a matter of belief, therefore private, and contrasted with public, scientific knowledge. (Hence the interminable arguments about whether there can be an objective moral order.)

And that, I say, is a major factor in modern Western philosophy. It's a 'don't mention the war' kind of situation. Actually a really useful essay on that is Thomas Nagel's Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (something which I have discovered I have, it turns out.)

Quoting T Clark

I very much want there to be a place to go to discuss the underpinnings of reason. Where we can agree on the rules, or at least argue about the rules, before we start the substantive discussion.

Sounds to me like epistemology. But it doesn't matter what we call it, I'd say. What's more important is the question you're asking.

Though, this being philosophy, discussing the underpinnings of reason might actually be a substantive discussion :D.

The closest thing we have to that place I can think of is what we call metaphysics. If that's not what metaphysics is, then what is it - seems to me it's just a junk drawer where we throw unrelated stuff we can't figure out how to resolve.

I don't think that's too far off. I tend to think of metaphysics as being about being, or being about ontology -- questions about what exists, if it exists, and if there is some characterization about what exists what that characterization is.

As a historical category It's a bit eclectic, but from there I'd say it's just a category for dividing up philosophy and understanding it as a whole -- not something to invest too deeply into, overall. Almost like it's not-epistemology, and it's not-ethics, so it's all the other philosophy stuff.

The actual question at hand is more important than what category it might fall into.


Like discussing the underpinnings of reason, for instance. That's an interesting discussion, to me.

Quoting Moliere

Sounds to me like epistemology. But it doesn't matter what we call it, I'd say. What's more important is the question you're asking.

Except most definitions of metaphysics, I found 6 out of 10 once, include epistemology in metaphysics. I'm not arguing with you, I just want more order. The split that I'm interested in is between things that are matters of fact and those that are matters of preference e.g. is there an objective reality which human knowledge approaches or is there the Tao, which disappears when you describe it and transforms into - comes into being as, the 10,000 things - lipstick, hot dogs, and Australia.

Quoting Moliere

I don't think that's too far off. I tend to think of metaphysics as being about being, or being about ontology -- questions about what exists, if it exists, and if there is some characterization about what exists what that characterization is.

Except that's not how it's defined and it's not what I want. As I said, those two things are not the same either. I'm not really arguing, I'm just frustrated. Philosophy makes up silly words for phenomena and explanatory systems all the time, why haven't they got one for this?

Quoting Moliere

The actual question at hand is more important than what category it might fall into.

For me it's not. The existence of procedural, foundational concepts that set the terms of all discussions is central to my idea of what philosophy is. I want to be able to talk about it. It's not fair!! Oops, where did that come from?

Quoting T Clark

I just want more order.

Consider this: Most philosophers we study aren't what you'd call all on the same page, making one single project which coheres well together. So even words like "Metaphysics" is going to differ from philosopher to philosopher -- consider how Kant and Heidegger use the word. While there is a kind of resonance between what they're talking about, the essay What is Metaphysics? makes clear that they also have very different things in mind.

So as categorizers of a field of knowledge, historians of philosophy, the boundaries aren't going to be exactly crisp. A word is going to gain more or less prominence through different historical periods, and it's not going to be used exactly the same between philosophers even within the same period.

What's important for us is just to be clear what we mean -- we can set the rules within our conversation, and communicate that way.


So when you say...

Quoting T Clark

For me it's not. The existence of procedural, foundational concepts that set the terms of all discussions is central to my idea of what philosophy is. I want to be able to talk about it. It's not fair!! Oops, where did that come from?

I would say that you can set the terms of the discussion yourself. Other philosophers may disagree with you, and I can offer you what I tend to think about as a starting point, but in order to proceed all you need do is say "this is what I mean" -- and we can go from there to talk about the underpinnings of reason, or whether there are matters of fact vs. matters of preference, or if there is an objective reality.

Does that make sense?

Quoting Moliere

I would say that you can set the terms of the discussion yourself. Other philosophers may disagree with you, and I can offer you what I tend to think about as a starting point, but in order to proceed all you need do is say "this is what I mean" -- and we can go from there to talk about the underpinnings of reason, or whether there are matters of fact vs. matters of preference, or if there is an objective reality.

Does that make sense?

Well, of course it makes sense - but it's not what I want. I want a cudgel of metaphysics I can take out and beat my opponents with. (stomps feet, pounds table, face turns red). All you big boys and girls get to say "Kant said this" and "Aristotle wrote that," while all I get to say is "seems to me." I'm going to think about this some more.

Thanks to you and @wayfarer

Quoting Wayfarer

And that, I say, is a major factor in modern Western philosophy. It's a 'don't mention the war' kind of situation. Actually a really useful essay on that is Thomas Nagel's Secular Philosophy and the Religious Temperament (something which I have discovered I have, it turns out.)

I've never thought of it in these terms. I've saved the Nagle essay to my Kindle. If I have any thoughts I'll get back to you.

Quoting T Clark

In line with my metaphysics, rules are not faulty. It's just a matter of preference and usefulness. Also - I like it here. I want to play with the people on this forum. I need to make allowances for how things are done here.

You probably score higher on "agreeableness" than I do on most personality tests, then. Good on ya'.

So if rules (no rules, no matter what?) are not faulty, then what's the issue? It seems like you have some issues with some rules, contrary to what you replied to me here. Preference and usefulness could be applied to...anything, without dragging out the corpses of obvious moral dilemmas. When it comes to metaphysics, I would think something more than preference, and perhaps something more precise than usefulness, would be in play.

Reply to T Clark Hi,

Quoting T Clark

For a minute, let’s discuss what I want metaphysics to be, but which it probably isn’t. At least not entirely – I want it to be the set of rules, assumptions we agree on to allow discussion, reason, to proceed e.g. there is a knowable external, objective reality; truth represents a correspondence between external reality and some representation of it; it’s turtles all the way down; the Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao

Most of these theses would be classified as metaphysical ones by tradition. The idea of an objective reality is usually called Realism. The idea of a correspondence between the world and thoughts is also metaphysical (although the debate about whether that's what "truth" is, is semantic). The Tao is much the same. They are all ideas that moderns would have called "special metaphysics". Modern philosophers would have added the existence of God, the nature of the mind, abstract objects and such. You say you don't want to include God because his existence is "a matter of fact" but then, the existence of an objective world is a matter of fact too, as is whether there is any correspondence between thoughts and the world; so would be the suggestion that "its turtles all the way down" if this refers to the myth about what holds up the earth. So I can't see how God's existence is different to any of those on your list.

Quoting T Clark

So, anyway - Metaphysical questions cannot be addressed with yes or no answers. They’re not issues of right or wrong, what matters is usefulness.

Why can't the question whether there is an objective world be answered "yes" or "no"? Why not the question whether there is any correspondence between thoughts and the world? You say in a reply to Moliere that these things are issues of "preference", but I don't see how they are issues of preference in any special sense which doesn't apply equally to any more mundane matter of fact.

Quoting T Clark

For me it's not. The existence of procedural, foundational concepts that set the terms of all discussions is central to my idea of what philosophy is. I want to be able to talk about it

...Quoting T Clark

I want a cudgel of metaphysics I can take out and beat my opponents with. (stomps feet, pounds table, face turns red). All you big boys and girls get to say "Kant said this" and "Aristotle wrote that," while all I get to say is "seems to me."

You can talk about it, can't you? Several people here have mentioned Collingwood. If you want a philosopher you can quote in discussion who shares your perspective, he would likely be your man. He thinks there are these assumptions of any area of discourse, absolute presuppositions, which can't be proven or disproven, but they make the discourse possible, and he thinks of Metaphysics as the task of describing these for different areas of discourse.

Quoting Noble Dust

So if rules (no rules, no matter what?) are not faulty, then what's the issue?

There are two issues. The first, which is the primary subject of this thread, is that seeing metaphysical rules as true or false is misleading. Choosing one approach over another, e.g. belief in objective reality vs. belief in the Tao, leads in a particular intellectual direction and cuts off access to another while either might be helpful in a particular situation. The second issue, or type of issue, deals with which approach is the most appropriate in a particular situation.

Quoting Noble Dust

When it comes to metaphysics, I would think something more than preference, and perhaps something more precise than usefulness, would be in play.

Not in my view, which I acknowledge is metaphysical, or meta-metaphysical, and, for that reason is not true or false.

Reply to T Clark Haha. Cool. Thinking is always good :D

Just don't worry about what I say, at least, about whatever somebody IMPORTANT said. I'm just interpreting the words that went through by head. You can say the same as long as you've read the words.

But at the end of the day if you have unique thoughts sometimes that's a lot better than arguing over interpretation. (though I do love arguments over interpretation) We're just some folks discussing some ideas.

Quoting PossibleAaran

the existence of an objective world is a matter of fact too, as is whether there is any correspondence between thoughts and the world; so would be the suggestion that "its turtles all the way down" if this refers to the myth about what holds up the earth. So I can't see how God's existence is different to any of those on your list.

I disagree that the existence of objective reality is a matter of fact. To me it's a matter of viewpoint. Sometimes it's useful, sometimes it's misleading. If it's true, then the Tao doesn't exist, which of course it doesn't. That's what I like about Lao Tzu - he acknowledges the unspeakability of reality. The view that there is no such thing as objective reality is not an uncommon one. I've participated in several such discussions here on the forum.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Why can't the question whether there is an objective world be answered "yes" or "no"? Why not the question whether there is any correspondence between thoughts and the world? You say in a reply to Moliere that these things are issues of "preference", but I don't see how they are issues of preference in any special sense which doesn't apply equally to any more mundane matter of fact.

• Good question. Let's see - here are some matters of fact:
• Protons and neutrons are made up of smaller particles known as quarks
• All living organisms on Earth are genetically related to all other organisms
• The capital of Azerbaijan is Baku. Not sure about that. I'm sure it's a matter of fact, but not whether it's true or false.
• I had cottage cheese for breakfast this morning.
• I am a 17-year old boy.

Those are matters of fact within a particular metaphysical system.

Quoting PossibleAaran

You can talk about it, can't you? Several people here have mentioned Collingwood. If you want a philosopher you can quote in discussion who shares your perspective, he would likely be your man. He thinks there are these assumptions of any area of discourse, absolute presuppositions, which can't be proven or disproven, but they make the discourse possible, and he thinks of Metaphysics as the task of describing these for different areas of discourse.

Sounds like he's up my alley. I'll take a look.

Quoting Moliere

But at the end of the day if you have unique thoughts sometimes that's a lot better than arguing over interpretation. (though I do love arguments over interpretation) We're just some folks discussing some ideas.

I came to the forum disagreeing with most of what I had read in Western philosophy. Not just disagreeing with it, but rejecting its value. Since I've been here, almost a year now, I've come to question that belief. Sometimes "seems to me" doesn't feel adequate, although as Emerson said?

To believe our own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, -- that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,--and our first thought, is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment.

I want to take a shot at laying out some questions/issues that are metaphysical and don’t have yes or no, this or that, true or false resolutions:

• Is there an objective reality?
• Does human life have value?
• Is the world good or bad?
• Is there an objective morality?
• Is the mind the same as the physical organs and mechanisms of thought?
• Do I exist?
• Do past processes act in the same manner as current processes? Not sure about this one.
• Are there certain unalienable human rights?
• Is truth correspondence between a proposition and actual facts?
• The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.
• How many pins can you stick in the head of a dancing angel?
• In the state of nature, life was nasty, brutish, and short. Maybe not.
• Man is naturally evil.
• Is the universe made of information? Mathematics? Ideas? Do we live in a simulation being run on a computer?
• Do we live in a multiverse? Not sure about this one.

Reply to T Clark Quoting T Clark

I disagree that the existence of objective reality is a matter of fact. To me it's a matter of viewpoint. Sometimes it's useful, sometimes it's misleading. If it's true, then the Tao doesn't exist, which of course it doesn't. That's what I like about Lao Tzu - he acknowledges the unspeakability of reality. The view that there is no such thing as objective reality is not an uncommon one. I've participated in several such discussions here on the forum.

Do you hold that there is no such thing as objective reality or do you hold that there is no fact of the matter whether there is such a thing or not? The two aren't equivalent.

Incidentally, a debate about the existence of objective reality is exactly what I would call a metaphysical debate.

Quoting T Clark

Those are matters of fact within a particular metaphysical system.

In which metaphysical system do the facts which you listed belong?

Our disagreement is fundamentally this. I hold the modern conception of philosophy on which it is continuous with science and ordinary enquiry. Questions about objective reality and correspondence and such are the same kind of question as questions about protons and Julius Ceasar. They are just more straightforward questions about how things stand. By contrast, you hold that these "metaphysical" questions are completely different: they are questions about how it is useful to think, or about how we want to think about ordinary matters of fact. Is this an accurate portrayal of your side?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Do you hold that there is no such thing as objective reality or do you hold that there is no fact of the matter whether there is such a thing or not? The two aren't equivalent.

I don't think I understand the difference. I believe that the concept of objective reality is one way, not the only way, and not the only good way, to think about our perceptions, knowledge, and understanding of how the world works.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Incidentally, a debate about the existence of objective reality is exactly what I would call a metaphysical debate.

Exactly.

Quoting PossibleAaran

In which metaphysical system do the facts which you listed belong?

One in which there something outside of myself which has an independent existence. One where I can use evidence of the current status of the world to understand past events. One where I can have reasonable, or at least verifiable, confidence in the information reported to me by other people. One where I can trust the results of my own observations.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Our disagreement is fundamentally this. I hold the modern conception of philosophy on which it is continuous with science and ordinary enquiry. Questions about objective reality and correspondence and such are the same kind of question as questions about protons and Julius Ceasar. They are just more straightforward questions about how things stand. By contrast, you hold that these "metaphysical" questions are completely different: they are questions about how it is useful to think, or about how we want to think about ordinary matters of fact. Is this an accurate portrayal of your side?

Yes, it's a pretty good summary. Now the question is whether your approach is true while mine is false or whether mine is just more useful than yours.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The idea of an objective reality is usually called Realism.

Important to note that it is 'realism' in the scientific or modern sense, rather than the 'realism' of scholastic philosophy. There, the subject of realism was universals. And this lead to an entirely different epistemological framework than the modern one - different in ways that are probably very difficult to articulate or comprehend.

Quoting T Clark

here are some matters of fact:
Protons and neutrons are made up of smaller particles known as quarks

Questionable. As is well-known, the nature of sub-atomic matter is inherently ambiguous - hence the 'wave-particle duality', the observer problem, and the uncertainty principle. All of which is actually germane to the discussion.

Quoting T Clark

How many pins can you stick in the head of a dancing angel?

The apocryphal question 'how many angels can dance on the head of a pin' was actually a reference to the medieval debate about whether two incorporeal beings could occupy the same spatio-temporal location. When expressed like that, it doesn't sound quite so silly.

**
A note from Buddhist philosophy - in early Mah?y?na, there is an idea called 'the doctrine of two truths'. By this is meant that 'truth' can be expressed on two levels - that of convention (sa?v?ti-satya) which roughly speaking includes all of what we would understand to be empirical observation and scientific analysis; and ultimate truth (param?rtha satya) which is the domain of the ultimate truths perceived by the Buddha (i.e. the actual teaching of the Buddha. However it should be added that part of this understanding is that these two domains are not finally different domains, because everything is ultimately part of one domain. This is like an heuristic or working distinction - it is, as I say, dialectical in nature.)

But this type of approach is able to capture the dialectical nature of metaphysics, which is is something that is generally utterly forgotten in a lot of modern and analytical philosophy. But by analysing questions with this in mind, some clarity can be found. For example, the questions regarding the status of 'objectivity' - the Buddhist analysis would be that there is not an 'ultimately objective reality', because objects and subjects 'co-arise' or are mutually conditioning and dependent. But that doesn't mean that on the level of conventional reality, there are not objective facts; there certainly are, and they can be extremely important to know, even if they have no ultimate meaning or applicability.

What's confused nowadays, is that it is thought on the one hand that scientific analysis (which exists in the domain of conventional truth) might reveal some ultimately-existing reality - which it can't, as it is inherently limited the level of conditioned perception. But that doesn't mean that 'nothing is ultimately real', which then falls into the error of nihilism or out-and-out relativism (which you see on this forum all the time.)

So the Buddhist view is dialectical or perspectival, meaning that different kinds of things are true on different levels; something which is true one on level might be false on another. This is expressed in the well-known Zen koan: 'First, there is a mountain [i.e. conventional truth]; then there is no mountain [i.e. perception of emptiness]; then there is [i.e. insight into the conditioned nature of all objects of perception]'.

Buddhism however does preserve a relationship with the domain of the transcendent, which has generally dropped out of secular Western thought. That is what enables it to make sense of metaphysical ideas. Corresponding schemas exist in classical Western philosophy also. But that is a subject for a different post.

Quoting Wayfarer

Questionable. As is well-known, the nature of sub-atomic matter is inherently ambiguous - hence the 'wave-particle duality', the observer problem, and the uncertainty principle. All of which is actually germane to the discussion.

In my fairly lazy understanding, quantum mechanics makes us make all our facts a bit conditional, but it doesn't stop us from treating them as facts.

Quoting Wayfarer

The apocryphal question 'how many angels can dance on the head of a pin' was actually a reference to the medieval debate about whether two incorporeal beings could occupy the same spatio-temporal location. When expressed like that, it doesn't sound quite so silly.

It had been my understanding that the angels/pins thing was something of a joke even in medieval times. I wasn't making any serious comment. I don't know if you've noticed, but I like to try to be funny sometimes. Sorry - can't help it.

Quoting Wayfarer

Buddhism however does preserve a relationship with the domain of the transcendent, which has generally dropped out of secular Western thought. That is what enables it to make sense of metaphysical ideas. Corresponding schemas exist in classical Western philosophy also. But that is a subject for a different post.

I like it when you participate in discussions. There's no one on this forum who has the perspective you do. I think my general understanding is similar to what you have written, without the depth, clarity, and understanding of history. I'm going to reread it a couple more times.

Quoting Wayfarer

But by analysing questions with this in mind, some clarity can be found. For example, the questions regarding the status of 'objectivity' - the Buddhist analysis would be that there is not an 'ultimately objective reality', because objects and subjects 'co-arise' or are mutually conditioning and dependent. But that doesn't mean that on the level of conventional reality, there are not objective facts; there certainly are, and they can be extremely important to know, even if they have no ultimate meaning or applicability.

This in particular rings bells with me.

Quoting T Clark

Metaphysical questions cannot be addressed with yes or no answers. They’re not issues of right or wrong, what matters is usefulness.

A tempting position.

A question, though - is being useful the very same as being true?

I don't think it is. What's your opinion?

Quoting T Clark

There's no one on this forum who has the perspective you do.

Thank you, very kind of you to say so.

Quoting Banno

A question, though - is being useful the very same as being true?

I don't think it is. What's your opinion?

For me, they are absolutely not the same thing. That's my whole point in this thread - we shouldn't act as though certain questions, which I have been calling metaphysical, but which might be something else, can be considered facts which are true or untrue. I see them as tools that we choose depending on the work we have to do.

Reply to T Clark Cool. No argument from me then.

Reply to T Clark

Hmmm, I'll have to think on that for awhile. I don't really get it.

Reply to T Clark Quoting T Clark

I don't think I understand the difference. I believe that the concept of objective reality is one way, not the only way, and not the only good way, to think about our perceptions, knowledge, and understanding of how the world works.

It depends what is being built into the concept of "objective reality" here, but I fear we are straying from the metaphilosophical topic.

Quoting T Clark

Yes, it's a pretty good summary. Now the question is whether your approach is true while mine is false or whether mine is just more useful than yours.

I would not say that my approach is "true". I don't think my approach is "the nature of philosophy" or something lofty like that. Take various questions I would call metaphysical:

Is there anything which exists unperceived by anyone?
Are there any other minds than my own?
Does God exist?
Is my mind separate from my body/brain?
Is the future in some sense fixed?

I interpret these questions in what I think is a straightforward fashion - to wit - as questions just like "Is the earth round?", " Did Plato teach Aristotle?" and even "Is there any milk in my fridge?". I think they are questions about which there is fact of the matter, even if they are difficult to answer. That's basically how modern philosophers saw "special metaphysics" and I share that with them.

Now look at some of your questions:

Quoting T Clark

Is there an objective morality?

This one I would happily include in my list above. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether anything is ever a right or wrong action, or a virtuous or non-virtuous person. I am open to the possibility that there is nothing which is correctly described as right or wrong - nothing which we really ought to do; if that were the case, that [I]would be[/I] the fact of the matter. I don't think the question is just whether it is useful to think one way or the other.

Quoting T Clark

Is the mind the same as the physical organs and mechanisms of thought?

I have this question in my list already. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether the mind has properties which nothing else in the physical world has - a fact about whether Dualism or Monism is true. I don't think its just a matter of whether it is useful to believe that the mind has different properties.

Quoting T Clark

Is truth correspondence between a proposition and actual facts?

I think this question is a semantic question about the ordinary meaning of the word "truth". I'm not particularly interested in that kind of question. I would be interested in the question whether it makes sense to think that propositions can correspond to "the way the world is", and I'd call that a metaphysical question and say that there is a fact of the matter about whether this is really coherent.

Quoting T Clark

How many pins can you stick in the head of a dancing angel?

If there are angels, I take it that there is a fact of the matter about this too, and that, if there are angels, how many pins you could stick an angel's head would not just be a matter of how many pins it is useful to believe you could stick in (I have trouble making sense of that last interpretation).

Quoting T Clark

Do we live in a multiverse?

A question much like "Is there milk in my fridge?", not a question about what it is useful to believe.

Like I said, I don't think my interpretation of these questions is "the true" interpretation. I'm not sure that even makes sense. But the interpretation I put on those questions is the one I find interesting. There is, perhaps, [I]also[/I] a question about what it is useful to believe in each of these cases, but I've never thought of philosophy as in the business of providing useful answers to questions - just true ones.

I suspect that our disagreement isn't just that I take the questions one way and you take them another way and we can both happily trot off in our own pursuits. That's the position I would take, but from your remarks, it sounds like you wouldn't be so liberal. It sounded like you would say that there is something wrong with my interpretation of the questions. Is that right?

Reply to PossibleAaran
Love this post. Lots of meat for me to chew on.

Quoting PossibleAaran

It depends what is being built into the concept of "objective reality" here, but I fear we are straying from the metaphysical topic.

Yes, differences and misunderstandings about definitions make these questions messy to deal with.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Is there anything which exists unperceived by anyone?
Are there any other minds than my own?
Does God exist?
Is my mind separate from my body/brain?
Is the future in some sense fixed?

I interpret these questions in what I think is a straightforward fashion - to wit - as questions just like "Is the earth round?", " Did Plato teach Aristotle?" and even "Is there any milk in my fridge?". I think they are questions about which there is fact of the matter, even if they are difficult to answer. That's basically how modern philosophers saw "special metaphysics" and I share that with them.

Generally, I disagree that these are questions like "Did I just eat onion soup for lunch?" with the exception of the one about God. I'll look at each of your questions.

Is there anything which exists unperceived by anyone? Unperceived or unperceivable? If you mean just unperceived, then do you mean "Do things cease to exist when no one's watching?" or "Are there hidden things?" If you mean unperceivable even in theory, then I'm not sure whether that is a metaphysical question or just meaningless.

Are there any other minds than my own? There is no way to finally know this. People have been arguing about it forever. So, no, it does not have a yes or no answer. On the other hand, there is no philosophy I'm interested in that doesn't acknowledge the existence of others.

Does God exist? As I said in my original post, I find this question frustrating because I think it's really two questions - one a matter of fact with a yes or no answer and the other not.

First question - Does any particular God, e.g. Allah, exist as an actual sentient entity which created and can influence the physical world. To me, that is a question which should have a yes or no answer.

Second question - Is the idea of god a useful way of understanding the world we live in? Here’s a one of my favorite verses from the Tao Te Ching:

The Tao is like a well:
used but never used up.
It is like the eternal void:
filled with infinite possibilities. It is hidden but always present.
I don't know who gave birth to it.
It is older than God.

So, God is one of the 10,000 things – like Cocoa Puffs and the mind.

Is my mind separate from my body/brain? The first philosophy course I took 45 years ago was called "The Mind/Brain Identity Question." I thought "How could anyone spend so much time on such a silly, unfruitful question?" I still feel the same way. I don't think it has a yes or no answer, but I think not acknowledging the existence of the mind separate from the brain is misleading.

Is the future in some sense fixed? General (metaphysical) principle - If a question is not answerable, even in theory, it does not have a yes or no answer. It's either metaphysical or rhetorical. So, if we're talking about a block universe and you think it can be established physically, then, sure, it's a yes/no, factual question.

Ran out of time for now. I'll get back to the rest of your post later.

Reply to PossibleAaran So, where was I?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Is there an objective morality?
— T Clark

This one I would happily include in my list above. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether anything is ever a right or wrong action, or a virtuous or non-virtuous person. I am open to the possibility that there is nothing which is correctly described as right or wrong - nothing which we really ought to do; if that were the case, that would be the fact of the matter. I don't think the question is just whether it is useful to think one way or the other.

I don't see this at all. Morality is a matter of human value - I like this, I don't like that.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Is the mind the same as the physical organs and mechanisms of thought?
— T Clark

I have this question in my list already. I think there is a fact of the matter about whether the mind has properties which nothing else in the physical world has - a fact about whether Dualism or Monism is true. I don't think its just a matter of whether it is useful to believe that the mind has different properties.

I believe strongly that the mind should be considered different from electrical impulses moving through the brain and nervous system. Let me think about that... No, even though I believe as I indicated, I can't see how it is a matter of fact. The real question to me is "Is the idea of mind a useful way of describing human behavior." Some people definitely think the answer to that is "no."

Quoting PossibleAaran

Is truth correspondence between a proposition and actual facts?
— T Clark

I think this question is a semantic question about the ordinary meaning of the word "truth". I'm not particularly interested in that kind of question. I would be interested in the question whether it makes sense to think that propositions can correspond to "the way the world is", and I'd call that a metaphysical question and say that there is a fact of the matter about whether this is really coherent.

You're right, that's probably a matter of definition rather than metaphysics, unless definitions are metaphysical. Let's not get into that. I'll change the question - "Given that truth means correspondence between a proposition and actual facts, is the idea of truth central to our understanding of the nature of reality. Or something like that. My answer to that question is "Not necessarily." We can go into that further another time.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Do we live in a multiverse?
— T Clark

A question much like "Is there milk in my fridge?", not a question about what it is useful to believe.

I'm not sure about this. Some people, on this forum and elsewhere, have said that the multiverse is a matter of fact, others that it is not. I'll go back to my criteria for the existence of a fact - If a phenomenon cannot be observed or verified, even in principal, then whether or not it exists is not a question of yes or no. It's either metaphysical, rhetorical, or meaningless. Some thoughts:

• The idea of the multiverse to address questions about the anthropic principal seems silly to me.
• My feelings about the idea of a multiverse as an interpretation of quantum mechanical theory hinge on whether or not it is possible, even in theory, to distinguish between the various interpretations of QM. If it isn't, then it's a meaningless question.
• TimeLine and Apokrisis duked it out a few weeks ago about the idea of a multiverse as a consequence of cosmic inflation in the very early universe. I didn't understand it well enough to have an opinion.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Like I said, I don't think my interpretation of these questions is "the true" interpretation. I'm not sure that even makes sense. But the interpretation I put on those questions is the one I find interesting. There is, perhaps, also a question about what it is useful to believe in each of these cases, but I've never thought of philosophy as in the business of providing useful answers to questions - just true ones.

Suddenly it seems like you're agreeing with me, although I don't think you think you are.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I take the questions one way and you take them another way and we can both happily trot off in our own pursuits.

That's exactly what I think.

Thank you for this. It's been really helpful.

Reply to T Clark Thanks for the detailed reply.

One thing that comes out in your discussion is your commitment to a certain kind of Verificationism - although perhaps a kind weaker than the once very popular doctrine. Here are samples of the commitment (I leave aside one quote in which you maintain that if people argue a lot about P, then there is no fact about whether or not P. I do not think you meant this literally, and perhaps it was just shorthand for what you say in these other quotes?):

Quoting T Clark

If you mean unperceivable even in theory, then I'm not sure whether that is a metaphysical question or just meaningless.

Quoting T Clark

I'll go back to my criteria for the existence of a fact - If a phenomenon cannot be observed or verified, even in principal, then whether or not it exists is not a question of yes or no. It's either metaphysical, rhetorical, or meaningless.

In these quotes you infer from the premise that X is unverifiable in principle to the conclusion that X is either "metaphysical or meaningless". I suspect you have your own definition of "metaphysical" in mind, according to which a question is metaphysical if and only if it is a question about how it is useful to think. Then your phrase "metaphysical question or just meaningless" equates to "a question about what it is useful to believe or just meaningless". If [I]that[/I] is what you mean, then you hold the following doctrine:

VERI: For any question, Q, Q is either (a) a question the answer to which is verifiable by perception, (b) a question about how it is useful to think, or (c) just meaningless.

I am not sure why you accept VERI. Do you have any argument for it? Relatedly, unless VERI is a useful thing for us to believe, then VERI is itself meaningless by its own standards, because it isn't verifiable by perception. I am not sure, however, what VERI would be useful for. Of course, an awful lot depends on your notions of "verification" and "meaningless", both of which might benefit some further definition.

Motivations for VERI aside, in some places, you hold views which are just incompatible with VERI, and so you hold views which, according to your own principle, are meaningless. The most clear case is the question "is there an objective morality?". If you really hold to VERI, what you ought to say here is that the answers to that question are unverifiable in principle, and so it must either be a question about whether it is useful to think of morality as objective, or meaningless. What you say, however, is very different:

Quoting T Clark

Morality is a matter of human value - I like this, I don't like that.

Saying that there is nothing more to morality except what different people like and dislike is the very same as saying that there is no objective morality - answering "no" to the question "is there an objective morality?". But if your answer is "no", then you presumably think that that is the fact of the matter. Yet if VERI is true, there is no fact of the matter. There is only what it is useful to believe and meaninglessness. I am not sure how to reconcile this quote with VERI.

Quoting T Clark

Suddenly it seems like you're agreeing with me, although I don't think you think you are.

I don't think I am either. I think that there is a fact of the matter about the questions I listed in my last post, but you insist that there is only an issue about how it is useful to think. You accept VERI (I think?), and I don't.

If I have interpreted you correctly in this post, and you are still looking for like-minded philosophers, I am now thinking of Rudolf Carnap,who accepts something much like VERI and has a similar attitude towards metaphysics. I find him personally more interesting than Collingwood.

Quoting PossibleAaran

One thing that comes out in your discussion is your commitment to a certain kind of Verificationism - although perhaps a kind weaker than the once very popular doctrine.

I don't remember seeing this word before. Wikipedia

Verificationism, also known as the verification idea or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is the philosophical doctrine that only statements that are empirically verifiable (i.e. verifiable through the senses) are cognitively meaningful, or else they are truths of logic (tautologies).

Do I believe this? Not at all. Not anything like it.

Quoting PossibleAaran

If you mean unperceivable even in theory, then I'm not sure whether that is a metaphysical question or just meaningless.
— T Clark

I'll go back to my criteria for the existence of a fact - If a phenomenon cannot be observed or verified, even in principal, then whether or not it exists is not a question of yes or no. It's either metaphysical, rhetorical, or meaningless.
— T Clark

In these quotes you infer from the premise that X is unverifiable in principle to the conclusion that X is either "metaphysical or meaningless". I suspect you have your own definition of "metaphysical" in mind, according to which a question is metaphysical if and only if it is a question about how it is useful to think. Then your phrase "metaphysical question or just meaningless" equates to "a question about what it is useful to believe or just meaningless". If that is what you mean, then you hold the following doctrine:

VERI: For any question, Q, Q is either (a) a question the answer to which is verifiable by perception, (b) a question about how it is useful to think, or (c) just meaningless.

First of all, you're right. When I say "metaphysical" I mean my previous conceptions of metaphysics. After this discussion I'll have to come up with a new way to describe what I mean. I like the way you've said it - a statement which is not a matter of fact but is a description of how it is useful to think. It doesn't capture everything I want - the fact that these statements are foundational, they set the rules of reason, they are something we have to agree on in order to go any further.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure why you accept VERI. Do you have any argument for it? Relatedly, unless VERI is a useful thing for us to believe, then VERI is itself meaningless by its own standards, because it isn't verifiable by perception. I am not sure, however, what VERI would be useful for.

First of all, you're right, it is not matter of fact. I find it very useful. To me, it's the most important procedural, foundational concept of philosophy I can imagine. Would it be stretching things to say that answering, or at least addressing, these types of questions is what philosophy is. I'll have to think about that. On these pages, who cares if Paris is the capital of France? All that's important here is how I can demonstrate my belief that Paris is the capital of France is correct.

By the way, what is "VERI?" Is that a word you just made up, or does it have some established meaning?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Saying that there is nothing more to morality except what different people like and dislike is the very same as saying that there is no objective morality - answering "no" to the question "is there an objective morality?"

Ok - Morality is a matter of human value - [s]I like this, I don't like that[/s] I find this useful, I don't find that useful. I'm not trying to be funny and I'm not backtracking. I guess I was not careful enough with my language. I like it or I find it useful - either way, it's a matter of preference not fact. I take philosophy seriously, when I say I like something in this context, I mean I find it useful.

Quoting PossibleAaran

If I have interpreted you correctly in this post, and you are still looking for like-minded philosophers, I am now thinking of Rudolf Carnap,who accepts something much like VERI and has a similar attitude towards metaphysics. I find him personally more interesting than Collingwood.

I'll take a look.

This has been really fun, by which I mean useful.

Reply to T Clark I always had thought that Carnap was 'scientism' incarnate. I am willing to be corrected, though.

Quoting Wayfarer

I always had thought that Carnap was 'scientism' incarnate. I am willing to be corrected, though.

I always thought he was great



Wait - that's Carnak.

Reply to T Clark 7Quoting T Clark

First of all, you're right, it is not matter of fact. I find it very useful. To me, it's the most important procedural, foundational concept of philosophy I can imagine. Would it be stretching things to say that answering, or at least addressing, these types of questions is what philosophy is. I'll have to think about that. On these pages, who cares if Paris is the capital of France? All that's important here is how I can demonstrate my belief that Paris is the capital of France is correct.

You distanced yourself from Verificationism in your post, but then you accepted VERI. VERI it seems to me is incredibly close to Verificationism, but that doesn't really matter. At any rate you say that VERI is useful. You say it is the most important "procedural and foundational concept of Philosophy". Could you explain more what you mean by this? Give me some example of how VERI is useful perhaps?

Quoting T Clark

Would it be stretching things to say that answering, or at least addressing, these types of questions is what philosophy is.

I am not sure which questions you are talking about here. I think I missed a step. Could you show me which questions you meant? I think this is related to the previous issue.

Quoting T Clark

On these pages, who cares if Paris is the capital of France? All that's important here is how I can demonstrate my belief that Paris is the capital of France is correct.

Perhaps here we agree. I do think that a major part of philosophy involves justifying these sorts of beliefs which we do not usually try to justify.

Quoting T Clark

By the way, what is "VERI?" Is that a word you just made up, or does it have some established meaning?

It was just a name I gave to the principle which I attributed to you. I used "VERI" as a shortening of Verificationism because I thought the principle was very close to that doctrine.

Quoting T Clark

it's a matter of preference not fact.

I think you missed my point here. The view that "morality is a matter of preference" is the denial of the claim that morality is objective. Presumably, you think that "morality is just preference" is a fact. But if you accept VERI this is exactly what you cannot hold. Because the view that " morality is just preference" is not verifiable by perception. So you cannot say that "morality is preference" is a fact. You can either hold that "morality is preference" is a useful thing to believe, or that "morality is preference" is a meaningless sentence. Or you could abandon VERI and admit that the question "is morality objective?" has a factual answer - the answer being "no, morality is just preference".

Thanks again for your reply.

Reply to Wayfarer Quoting Wayfarer

I always had thought that Carnap was 'scientism' incarnate. I am willing to be corrected, though.

Well he was a Verificationist and thoroughly disliked metaphysics. So in a way yes, he was scientism incarnate. But, contrary to his own protestations, his philosophy contains very serious metaphysical commitments. His philosophy is quite fascinating, if you see through his surface level scientistic rhetoric.

Reply to T Clark :grin:

Reply to PossibleAaran I did a unit on A J Ayer as an undergrad which told me everything I need to know about positivism (although I softened my view of Ayer somewhat after reading this.)

Quoting PossibleAaran

You distanced yourself from Verificationism in your post, but then you accepted VERI. VERI it seems to me is incredibly close to Verificationism, but that doesn't really matter. At any rate you say that VERI is useful. You say it is the most important "procedural and foundational concept of Philosophy". Could you explain more what you mean by this? Give me some example of how VERI is useful perhaps?

Here's an example of when what you call "VERI" is useful:
Let's imagine a discussion - Question - Is abortion immoral.
Speaker 1 - It's clear to me that human life begins at conception. Destroying human life is immoral. Therefore abortion is immoral.
Speaker 2 - I don't believe that human life begins at conception. Abortion is not immoral.
Speaker 1 - Boy, this is a problem. If we can't agree whether or not human life begins at conception, I don't think we can resolve this issue.
Speaker 2 - Geez - you're right. What say we get a beer.
Speaker 1 - Sounds good to me. What about them Sox.

Yes, joke, but not completely. If we can't agree on the basic assumptions of our discussion, there's nothing to talk about. If people could just understand that, one of two things would happen 1) a lot of pointless arguments could be avoided or shortened or 2) People would pay more attention to the underlying assumptions they are making and work to make sure everyone is on the same page before the discussion begins. Many (most?) discussions on this forum come down to this - the participants never make the underlying assumptions of the discussion clear so there is no possibility of resolution.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure which questions you are talking about here. I think I missed a step. Could you show me which questions you meant? I think this is related to the previous issue.

I'm talking about questions that are not matters of fact but rather of the most useful ways to think about things, as we have been discussing.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I think you missed my point here. The view that "morality is a matter of preference" is the denial of the claim that morality is objective. Presumably, you think that "morality is just preference" is a fact.

My view that morality is a matter of preference is not a matter of fact. It is a matter of what is the most useful way of looking at the issue. It's a matter of preference. Yes - I am serious.

Quoting T Clark

My view that morality is a matter of preference is not a matter of fact. It is a matter of what is the most useful way of looking at the issue. It's a matter of preference. Yes - I am serious.

But isn't 'most' useful then a matter of fact. How are you measuring 'most' useful?

Quoting Pseudonym

But isn't 'most' useful then a matter of fact. How are you measuring 'most' useful?

If I find it useful or we can negotiate what we both agree is useful, it's useful.

Reply to T Clark

Yes, but what does it mean to be useful? What is the use we are putting the theory to that you and I agree it is good at?

Quoting Pseudonym

Yes, but what does it mean to be useful? What is the use we are putting the theory to that you and I agree it is good at?

Let's try an example:

T Clark - John X killed George Y, what punishment do you think he should receive?

Pseudonym - I don't believe in free will, so I don't think he should be punished.

T Clark - I don't believe there is no free will. Given that you do, how should the situation be handled?

Pseudonym - I think we should find the most effective way to keep something like that from happening again with no consideration for blame or responsibility.

T Clark - Well, as I said, I believe there is free will and John X should be held responsible and punished, but I'd like to hear what your ideas are, so for the purposes of this discussion, let's assume there is no free will. Can you give some specific examples of how the killing should be handled?

Pseudonym - ......

Reply to T Clark Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: "I am looking for God! I am looking for God!"
As many of those who did not believe in God were standing together there, he excited considerable laughter. Have you lost him, then? said one. Did he lose his way like a child? said another. Or is he hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? or emigrated? Thus they shouted and laughed. The madman sprang into their midst and pierced them with his glances.

"Where has God gone?" he cried. "I shall tell you. We have killed him - you and I. We are his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained the earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is it not more and more night coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? Do we not hear anything yet of the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Do we not smell anything yet of God's decomposition? Gods too decompose. God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we, murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That which was the holiest and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify ourselves? What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we need to invent? Is not the greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we not ourselves become gods simply to be worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whosoever shall be born after us - for the sake of this deed he shall be part of a higher history than all history hitherto."

Here the madman fell silent and again regarded his listeners; and they too were silent and stared at him in astonishment. At last he threw his lantern to the ground, and it broke and went out. "I have come too early," he said then; "my time has not come yet. The tremendous event is still on its way, still travelling - it has not yet reached the ears of men. Lightning and thunder require time, the light of the stars requires time, deeds require time even after they are done, before they can be seen and heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the distant stars - and yet they have done it themselves."

It has been further related that on that same day the madman entered divers churches and there sang a requiem. Led out and quietened, he is said to have retorted each time: "what are these churches now if they are not the tombs and sepulchres of God?"

Quoting T Clark

Many (most?) discussions on this forum come down to this - the participants never make the underlying assumptions of the discussion clear so there is no possibility of resolution.

You have to learn to look at your spectacles and not just through them. Particularly challenging for realists.

Quoting bloodninja

Have you not heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning hours, ran to the market-place, and cried incessantly: "I am looking for God! I am looking for God!"

A really interesting story. You write well.

I think it relates to one of the comments I made previously - the existence of God as both a matter of fact and as a matter of metaphysical preference.

Quoting Wayfarer

You have to learn to look at your spectacles and not just through them. Particularly challenging for realists.

Oddly enough, I was laying in bed this morning with my reading glasses sitting on the bedside table. The sun was shining through them showing they are covered with fingerprints. Maybe that's been my problem all the time.

Reply to T Clark Hah. Well I’ve discovered the miracle of disposable contacts. But the analogy remains.

BTW the Bloodninja story is almost word for word from Nietszche - Twilight of the Idols, I think it was. It is the passage associated with the famous ‘Death of God’ proclamation.

Quoting Wayfarer

BTW the Bloodninja story is almost word for word from Nietszche - Twilight of the Idols, I think it was. It is the passage associated with the famous ‘Death of God’ proclamation.

Yes, well, I didn't recognize the specific quote but it didn't seem very Bloodninjay and did sound sort of Nietszchey, so I checked. I was just being cute.

Quoting Wayfarer

Twilight of the Idols, I think it was.

I believe it is quoted, word for word, from The Gay Science.

Reply to Janus RIght! I stand corrected.

Reply to T Clark as I understand it, you find VERI useful because its a conversation stopper. It stops people talking on and on about things where they will never agree with one another, because they don't share the same assumptions. That's hard to deny. VERI sure does do that. But then, we don't really need anything as strong as VERI for that. All we need to do to avoid endless conversations is try hard to lay out agreed starting assumptions for our discussions. We need not insist that if something isn't verifiable by the senses then it is either a useful perspective or meaningless. That's a very strong claim which isn't needed for the goal you want to achieve. So I still can't really see the use of VERI.

Quoting T Clark

It is a matter of what is the most useful way of looking at the issue

It does not generally seem true that it is useful to think of morality as preference. In fact it encourages an "anything goes" type attitude where everyone just does what they prefer. Murder? Rape? Genocide? Kidnap? Hey if that's what you prefer! This does not seem like a useful attitude for the human race.

Quoting PossibleAaran

All we need to do to avoid endless conversations is try hard to lay out agreed starting assumptions for our discussions.

Seriously - have you ever tried that on this forum? Anyway, if I "insist that if something isn't verifiable by the senses then it is either a useful perspective or meaningless," I'm just pointing out that that something has to be included in our starting assumptions because it can never be rationally established.

Quoting PossibleAaran

It does not generally seem true that it is useful to think of morality as preference. In fact it encourages an "anything goes" type attitude where everyone just does what they prefer. Murder? Rape? Genocide? Kidnap? Hey if that's what you prefer! This does not seem like a useful attitude for the human race.

I disagree. To me, it is much more useful to think about how to solve what we call moral problems in a practical way than it is to wring our hands about what is right and wrong.

Quoting T Clark

So, anyway - Metaphysical questions cannot be addressed with yes or no answers. They’re not issues of right or wrong, what matters is usefulness.

What would be an example of a "useful" metaphysical answer or thesis?

Quoting Arkady

What would be an example of a "useful" metaphysical answer or thesis?

Example 1 - A belief in an objective morality can lead people to focus more on blame than on solving the problem.

Example 2 - Belief in objective reality is very useful, indispensable, for most of physics. On the other hand, it can lead to an overly reductionist approach that doesn't work well in other areas such as biology. Take a look at StreetLightX's discussion - "More Is Different."

Quoting T Clark

Seriously - have you ever tried that on this forum?

I am new here, relatively speaking.

Quoting T Clark

I'm just pointing out that that something has to be included in our starting assumptions because it can never be rationally established.

I can't help but wonder whether there is something controversial being built into the notion of "rationally established" here, but that's probably off topic.

Good talking to you. Hope I helped in some small way.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I can't help but wonder whether there is something controversial being built into the notion of "rationally established" here, but that's probably off topic.

I don't think it's off topic. To me it's the whole point of this discussion. Let me reword to see if that works better.

I make the distinction between questions of fact that can be answered yes/no, true/false and epistemological/ontological questions that cannot and which are decided by preference or agreement and which are then included as assumptions, whether or not they are recognized as such.

Quoting T Clark

Example 1 - A belief in an objective morality can lead people to focus more on blame than on solving the problem.

Hmm...the thesis of moral realism is more a matter for (meta-)ethics, rather than metaphysics, it seems to me.

Example 2 - Belief in objective reality is very useful, indispensable, for most of physics. On the other hand, it can lead to an overly reductionist approach that doesn't work well in other areas such as biology. Take a look at StreetLightX's discussion - "More Is Different."

I take it you are here using "objective" to mean something like "mind independent"? I have not seen StreetLightX's thread that you reference here. I am curious as to why biologists shouldn't assume that the phenomena which they study are mind-independent (that is, independent of their minds). I am also curious as to how, say, a solipsistic physicist would go about his work as compared to the physicist who held a realist position. (Again, this assumes that I have sufficiently understood the sense in which you mean "objective.")

Quoting Arkady

I am curious as to why biologists shouldn't assume that the phenomena which they study are mind-independent (that is, independent of their minds).

They should assume that. Biologists are very successful operating under the assumption that biology is a branch of physics. I think it's purely a philosophical issue that the distinction between living and non-living is not in the realm of empirical discovery, but rather in our perspective on causation.

Quoting Arkady

I have not seen StreetLightX's thread that you reference here.

I suggest you look at it.

Quoting frank

Biologists are very successful operating under the assumption that biology is a branch of physics.

I doubt any biologist thinks of herself as practicing a branch of physics.

Quoting T Clark

I doubt any biologist thinks of herself as practicing a branch of physics.

Yes and no. Biology is my training. And I've seen it become normal to think of life as an essentially thermodynamic phenomenon.

So back in the 1960s, life would have been seen as a chemical phenomenon. There was a reason organic chemistry was pretty mandatory. Biology 101 focused rather a lot on metabolic equations.

Schrodinger's What is Life? was famous for spelling out that biology was in fact really about dissipative structure. The duo of negentropic order and the entropy it can produce.

And this was good for the biologist's ego. It said not only was biology well-founded on deep cosmic principles, but biology was showing physics needed re-writing in a substantial fashion. Biology - because it understood this new nexus of information and dynamics - was the "larger view".

So physics was really a simpler and less complex branch of biology, if you like. ;)

Reply to T Clark Why wouldn't she?

Quoting apokrisis

Yes and no. Biology is my training. And I've seen it become normal to think of life as an essentially thermodynamic phenomenon.

This point came up a few posts ago when I said reductionist science that might work for a lot of physics can lead you astray in other branches, e.g. biology. From past posts, I think of you as pretty anti-reductionist, in particular in your discussions of how life develops out of non-living matter.

Quoting frank

Why wouldn't she?

This is a quote from P.W. Anderson StreetlightX used in his "More is Different" discussion.

"The main fallacy in this kind of thinking is that the reductionist hypothesis does not by any means imply a 'constructionist' one: The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. In fact, the more elementary particle physicists tell us about the nature of the fundamental laws, the less relevance they seem to have to the very real problems of the science, much less to those of societies". (Anderson, "More Is Different").

Reply to T Clark I just started looking at the article. If you've already read it, we could discuss why LaPlace's Demon would have a problem reconstructing the universe from fundamental laws. What are your thoughts on that?

But in regard to whether biologists think of biology as a branch of physics, the opening lines of the article confirm that. The article is suggesting reasons they might question that assumption.

As I continue reading that article, it appears the author is firmly reductionist.

Quoting frank

I just started looking at the article. If you've already read it, we could discuss why LaPlace's Demon would have a problem reconstructing the universe from fundamental laws. What are your thoughts on that?

I started this thread because I wanted to get some ideas straight in my own head, not to talk in-depth about specific scientific issues. The threads I've referenced are better places to have the discussion you are talking about.

Reply to T Clark OK. :)

D'oh. Can't keep myself away. The link between the European Enlightenment and scientific reductionism needs to be noted. Basically Comte (who invented both 'social science' and the term 'positivism') saw culture evolving from primitive religion through the metaphysical phase to finally emerging blinking into the sunlit uplands of Science. Measurable, predictable, certain, progressive - Steve Pinker's vision of Progress. Everything would eventually yield to an understanding in terms of simple principles, of which Newton's laws were, at that stage, the paradigmatic example. That's where you're 'reductionism' had its heyday - the vision of simple, universal laws in terms of which everything could be understood. Science could be omniscient.

Whereas traditional philosophy was created around myths of 'the fall' whereby the origin or 'ground of being' was not material or physical at all, but The One, which was then hybridised with the Christian God and biblical mythology but which in the Greek understanding was much less a 'sky-father' type of deity. Aristotle's original metaphysics was much nearer to that vision, partially for historical reasons, but also because of the stage of cultural development of which they were a part. Aristotle is sometimes said to be atheist, but he did recognise a kind of cosmological intelligence, the Prime Mover or First Cause, which later became incorporated in scholastic philosophy.

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. There doesn't have to be - there are people who embody and understand both scientific and religious perspectives (such as various Catholic scientists and philosophers.) But as far as the Pinkers of the world go, 'to be scientific' means rejecting anything that sounds religious - which covers a lot of territory.

I think there is a wholly novel kind of metaphysic emerging, which is neither materialistic in the old sense, nor necessarily theistic in any obvious way. Have a look at this old David Brooks column, The Neural Buddhists.

Quoting Wayfarer

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'.

So Aristotle did argue against atomism and in favour of a full "four causes" systems ontology. And atomism then made its roaring return as Enlightenment science.

In terms of metaphysics, that was its own culture war. And Newtonian physics was seen to defeat Aristotelian physics - for the time being at least.

But theistic metaphysics was its own dualistic thing. It stood against Aristotelian hylomorphism and immanence to bring in a transcendent and immaterial "mind". It was Platonic. So that led to the culture war that was not holism vs reductionism, but the Enlightenment vs Romanticism.

Of course, if we are talking "traditional", then animism would be the original generic metaphysics. And the general materialism of Ancient Greek philosophy - coupled in uncertain fashion to the shock that mathematics could have an axiomatic basis - was the initial culture war against that.

Step back and you can see the bigger story is of metaphysics finding it always wants to split in two. Some, indeed most, then take this as a sign it should be utterly split - resulting in a war. Some, always a minority, see that the split itself is what the holism of the metaphysics needs to embrace.

So that is where the "meta-cultural war" takes place. Between the reductionists who are happy with opposed worlds, and their opposing world-views, and the holists who see division or symmetry-breaking as the creative step that produces a world in the first place. It takes yin and yang to tango. :)

Quoting T Clark

I started this thread because I wanted to get some ideas straight in my own head, not to talk in-depth about specific scientific issues. The threads I've referenced are better places to have the discussion you are talking about.

Finished the article. Its conclusion is not anti-reductionist.

Quoting frank

Finished the article. Its conclusion is not anti-reductionist.

Ok.

Quoting frank

Finished the article. Its conclusion is not anti-reductionist.

I just read it too. Anderson doesn't define very clearly what he takes reductionism to amount to, or what analysis is. His examples illuminate what he seemingly thinks (without making it explicit), and his main goal seems to be to refute the unwarranted inference from reduction (defined as the possibility of successful analysis) to constructionism (defined as the ability to come up with the high-level laws deductively on the basis of the low level ones). He is really setting the stage for what have been more recently advanced as anti-reductionist and strong emergentist arguments by some of his colleagues.

A weird moment occurs when Anderson sets up two columns listing sciences that have increasingly complex objects, with each one having the objects from the previous science as its immediate constituents, and he asserts that the objects of science X obey the law of science Y (where science Y is dealing with the constituents of the objects of science X). This is supposed to cash out the idea of reduction qua analysis, I think. But then, immediately after that, he claims that each new stage of complexity brings up entirely new laws. And he proceeds to argue for this claim over the rest of the paper (quite successfully). So, if there are emergent laws, that are new to X, how do those laws relate to the laws of Y? Anderson doesn't say.

More recent philosophers of emergence, such a Karen Crowther, and physicists like George Ellis, argue that the higher level laws (of science X) can be strongly emergent from the lower level laws (of science Y) because, as a result of symmetry breaking, the very constituents of the objects of X don't exist at all under the conditions (such as higher energy conditions) where the objects of Y are typically (and exclusively) manifested. Furthermore, the emergent laws of X are complete in the sense that they fully govern the objects of X in a manner that is, to a large degree, insensitive to the laws that govern the objects of X and to the properties of those 'constituent' objects.

Quoting T Clark

I make the distinction between questions of fact that can be answered yes/no, true/false and epistemological/ontological questions that cannot and which are decided by preference or agreement and which are then included as assumptions, whether or not they are recognized as such.

Maybe it will be helpful to start over like you suggest. Let me just try to clarify your distinction by asking some questions. When you say that there are questions which "can be answered yes/no, true/false", do you mean that there is a fact of the matter about these questions or do you mean more strongly that there is a fact of the matter [i] and[\i] that fact can be "rationally established"?

Quoting T Clark

I suggest you look at it.

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might address my questions, above, regarding how belief in "objective reality" (vs. the alternatives) would be useful in physics.

Quoting Wayfarer

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'.

Um, no. The "culture wars" (at least as generally defined in the U.S. - perhaps it's different in Australia) usually refers to the political struggle between the progressive and the regressive in shaping public policy and direction of society. The regressive side in the U.S. is the one generally aligned with evangelical or fundamentalist Protestants, as well as conservative Catholics. It has little, if anything, to do with debates over "the One" or the "ground of all being", or other metaphysical abstracta.

Quoting Wayfarer

Science could be omniscient.

Sorry, but it's the religious people who claim to have all of the answers. Please stop projecting.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Maybe it will be helpful to start over like you suggest. Let me just try to clarify your distinction by asking some questions. When you say that there are questions which "can be answered yes/no, true/false", do you mean that there is a fact of the matter about these questions or do you mean more strongly that there is a fact of the matter and[\i] that fact can be "rationally established"?

Well... I'm talking about your standard type question. Matters of fact. Is the capital of France Bucharest? Are neutrons and protons made up of smaller particles? Did the universe begin with the big bang?

This is a quote from earlier in this thread about the other, non-yes/no, kind of question.

Quoting T Clark

I very much want there to be a place to go to discuss the underpinnings of reason. Where we can agree on the rules, or at least argue about the rules, before we start the substantive discussion. The closest thing we have to that place I can think of is what we call metaphysics. If that's not what metaphysics is, then what is it - seems to me it's just a junk drawer where we throw unrelated stuff we can't figure out how to resolve.

j

Quoting Wayfarer

D'oh.

I like it when posters go back to the great philosophers for their inspiration.

Quoting Wayfarer

So there's a collision between the traditionalist understanding and the Enlightenment mentality - this is what arguably underlies the 'culture wars'. There doesn't have to be - there are people who embody and understand both scientific and religious perspectives (such as various Catholic scientists and philosophers.) But as far as the Pinkers of the world go, 'to be scientific' means rejecting anything that sounds religious - which covers a lot of territory.

Does enlightenment = reductionism?

Quoting apokrisis

So that is where the "meta-cultural war" takes place. Between the reductionists who are happy with opposed worlds, and their opposing world-views, and the holists who see division or symmetry-breaking as the creative step that produces a world in the first place. It takes yin and yang to tango.

You, StreetlightX, and fdrake have set me thinking about these issues a lot recently. I think you can see me thrashing about in various discussions trying to get my arms around it. It's a lot of fun.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

Anderson doesn't define very clearly what he takes reductionism to amount to, or what analysis is. His examples illuminate what he seemingly thinks (without making it explicit), and his main goal seems to be to refute the unwarranted inference from reduction (defined as the possibility of successful analysis) to constructionism (defined as the ability to come up with the high-level laws deductively on the basis of the low level ones).

This is what really helped me in the Anderson paper - the discussion of reductionist vs. constructionist views. It clarified for me how the magical, arm-waving, gee whiz presentation of chaos and complexity theories can be replaced by an understanding that provides insight into how the world works in a practical, concrete way.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

Karen Crowther, and physicists like George Ellis,

First of all, I want to make sure the Karen Crowther you're referencing is not the outrigger canoe racer from Maui. Is that correct?

I'm looking on the web for articles. Any specific references would be helpful.

Quoting Arkady

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might address my questions, above, regarding how belief in "objective reality" (vs. the alternatives) would be useful in physics.

Perhaps I will. However, in the meantime, you might look at StreetlightX's thread.

Quoting T Clark

I very much want there to be a place to go to discuss the underpinnings of reason.

A possible fruitful avenue: to what extent is the world itself reasonable? Is it possible that it isn't? If it is, what does that imply?

Background: the ancient word for immanent logic was Logos (although some question whether immanent is the right word.) The stoics, who were physicalists, thought the Logos is hot air.

Just a suggestion. :)

Quoting T Clark

First of all, I want to make sure the Karen Crowther you're referencing is not the outrigger canoe racer from Maui. Is that correct?

I'm looking on the web for articles. Any specific references would be helpful.

She is the one. Her only paper that I read is Decoupling Emergence and Reduction in Physics, but it has been extremely enlightening. I've mentioned her a few times in this older thread where I had been discussing Weinberg's reductionism.

By the way, @StreetlightX also had referenced the excellent paper The Theory of Everything by R. B. Laughlin and David Pines. This paper pursued some of Anderson's earlier insights and developed a view a emergence that struck me as having many commonalities with Crowther's own. So, I searched the content of Crowther's new book -- Effective Spacetime: Understanding Emergence in Effective Field Theory and Quantum Gravity, Springer Publishing (2016) -- and found out that she indeed refers several times to Laughlin and Pines. (This book has a whole chapter devoted to discussing the issue of the emergence of classical spacetime in the context of Quantum Loop Theory, which is a theory of quantum gravity developed by Ashtekar, Smolin and Rovelli as an alternative to sting theory.)

Quoting frank

A possible fruitful avenue: to what extent is the world itself reasonable? Is it possible that it isn't? If it is, what does that imply?

This is exactly the kind of question I was talking about. Why don't you start a new thread. I'll participate.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

She is the one. Her only paper that I read is Decoupling emergence and reduction in physics, but it has been extremely enlightening. I've mentioned her a few times in this older thread where I had been discussing Weinberg's reductionism.

I'll look for the paper on the web and I'll look at your thread.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

By the way, StreetlightX also had referenced the excellent paper The Theory of Everything by R. B. Laughlin and David Pines. This paper pursued some of Anderson's earlier insights and developed a view a emergence that struck me as having many commonalities with Crowther's own.

I've ordered it.

Quoting T Clark

This is exactly the kind of question I was talking about. Why don't you start a new thread. I'll participate.

I doubt there would be much interest (beyond yours).

Quoting frank

I doubt there would be much interest (beyond yours).

I used to feel bad if no one was interested in things I wanted to talk about. Now I just through things out there and find out without worrying if anyone else wants to participate. You never know what will catch people's interest.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

So, if there are emergent laws, that are new to X, how do those laws relate to the laws of Y? Anderson doesn't say.

Sorry I missed your comment. I think Anderson is assuming some relationship which is in principle knowable.

A modified Laplace's Demon could construct the next level from what's known down below. Am I mistaken there?

Reply to T Clark My own thoughts on the topic are a bit nebulous. My home base is Kant. Apokrisis seems to me to be giving voice to the critical ingredient (yin yang).

Reply to T Clark Quoting T Clark

Well... I'm talking about your standard type question. Matters of fact. Is the capital of France Bucharest? Are neutrons and protons made up of smaller particles? Did the universe begin with the big bang?

So there are questions of this kind and there are questions about "the underpinnings of reason". The questions above are questions about which there is a fact of the matter. Either the capital of France is Bucharest or it isn't. Either neutrons are made of smaller particles or they aren't. The questions about the "underpinnings of reason" aren't factual in this way. We just agree to accept those 'underpinnings' when it is useful to accept them.

Could you give an example of a question about the "underpinnings of reason"? I sense that we have travelled over this before, but please humour me. I think having one specific example of such a question in front of us will be very helpful.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Could you give an example of a question about the "underpinnings of reason"? I sense that we have travelled over this before, but please humour me. I think having one specific example of such a question in front of us will be very helpful.

Some examples:
Does objective reality exist?
Do we have free will?
Is there an absolute morality?

Quoting T Clark

This is what really helped me in the Anderson paper - the discussion of reductionist vs. constructionist views.

Yep. Reductionism can mean two different things.

All modelling involves a reduction of a world to a model. So even holism is a reduction of the lived, messy complexity of the world to the abstracted simplicity of a model.

But then holism is opposed to reductionism as reductionism is about bottom up construction, and holism adds the other countering thing of top down constraint.

In reductionism, global organisation can emerge, but it is just a sum of all the parts. Nothing new of different arises. We might describe the global organisation with higher level macro laws. But in principle, the real explanation is all the detailed mechanics going on down at the base level.

It is like freewill. It can’t be real - according to bottom up construction - as ultimately it is the result of a whole mass of completely deterministic atomic actions.

But holism - as argued with mathematical clarity in hierarchy theory and cybernetics - says global organisation is a real level of causation as it has the power to bear down and shape the very parts making the whole.

The world on the microscale is actually pretty irregular, indeterminate, unconstrained. Global order then arises by constraining those parts so they are simplified and regularised in a way that makes them all fit.

You can think of a bee honeycomb. To squish a whole lot of wax tubes together, they must become hexagons. Maybe they could be all sorts of flattened shapes in principle. Triangular, octagonal, some kind of irregular never repeated lattice like your Mayan stone wall. But through the principle of least action, the regularity of a hexagonal pattern is the simplest way to tile that space.

And hexagonal patterns are what we see emerging in the classic examples of self organising chaos, or dissipative structure, like the hexagonal convection currents of Benard cells -https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rayleigh–Bénard_convection

So more is different gets at this constraints based view. Hierarchical organisation develops because higher levels can simplify the world enough to shape the parts, regular and numerous, needed to construct them.

It is cybernetic feedback. The system emerges from the noise as it tunes into its own grounding simplicity or regularity.

Quoting T Clark

Does enlightenment = reductionism?

It’s too sweeping a generalisation but there’s some truth in it.

Quoting T Clark

I'm talking about your standard type question. Matters of fact. Is the capital of France Bucharest? Are neutrons and protons made up of smaller particles? Did the universe begin with the big bang?

You keep overlooking the so-called ‘fact-value’ dichotomy, specifically, that judgements about what is amenable to measurement are of a different order to judgements about what one ought to do or believe. It is not a smooth continuum awaiting only the revelation of further facts.

Quoting Wayfarer

You keep overlooking the so-called ‘fact-value’ dichotomy, specifically, that judgements about what is amenable to measurement are of a different order to judgements about what one ought to do or believe. It is not a smooth continuum awaiting only the revelation of further facts.

Let me think about that.

Quoting apokrisis

You can think of a bee honeycomb. To squish a whole lot of wax tubes together, they must become hexagons. Maybe they could be all sorts of flattened shapes in principle. Triangular, octagonal, some kind of irregular never repeated lattice like your Mayan stone wall. But through the principle of least action, the regularity of a hexagonal pattern is the simplest way to tile that space.

And hexagonal patterns are what we see emerging in the classic examples of self organising chaos, or dissipative structure, like the hexagonal convection currents of Benard cells -https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rayleigh–Bénard_convection

Columnar basalt

Quoting T Clark

Columnar basalt

Either that or Cretaceous bees were mighty big buggers.

Quoting Pierre-Normand

Either that or Cretaceous bees were mighty big buggers.

Apisodactyl.

Quoting T Clark

Columnar basalt

Nice. Cooling causes contraction. Hexagonal cracking expresses the outcome which distributes the effort of rupture in the most symmetric or general fashion possible. The highest number of the smallest sides - given the cooling is slow enough, the liquid even enough, not to insert any local preferences into the story.

Metaphysics constitutes the following . .

Intrusive thoughts suffering from constipation

The Vietnam War writing movie reviews

Press conferences becoming scientists

Different religions taking turns to laugh at the same nation

Gravity visiting Buckingham Palace

Quoting Thomas H Cullen

Metaphysics constitutes the following . .

Intrusive thoughts suffering from constipation

The Vietnam War writing movie reviews

Press conferences becoming scientists

Different religions taking turns to laugh at the same nation

Gravity visiting Buckingham Palace

You complain about being censored, but your comments are not responsive and don't contribute to the discussion.

Reply to T Clark The examples you choose create some difficulties. My goal here is just to understand what your distinction between fact of the matter questions and underpinning questions really amounts to.

The free-will question quite often degenerates into a semantic debate about how to use the word "free-will". I don't read much in that area because of this, so I'll leave this one aside.

The question about absolute morality is one of some interest to me. You call it a question about the 'underpinnings of reason' and you contrast it with questions like "are neutrons made of smaller particles?". There is a fact of the matter about the latter but, you say, not about the former. We just decide whether to [I]think about[/I] morality as absolute or not, but there is no truth to be had. I am not sure why you think this. Perhaps it has something to do with what can be "rationally established"? I remember previously you had said that whether or not there is an absolute morality cannot be verified by sense perception. Maybe that is why you think there is no fact about it?

The question about objective reality is serious tangle. When you say that there is a fact of the matter about whether neutrons are made of particles, this claim itself seems to already presuppose that there is an objective reality. After all, what is a 'fact of the matter' if it isn't an objective truth? And so the positive answer, "yes" is something which you presuppose in even stating your distinction. It all depends what you mean by "objective" when you ask your question. What do you mean?

Reply to PossibleAaran

Keep in mind that my understanding of the the distinction between matters of fact vs. matters of underpinning is itself a matter of underpinning.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The free-will question quite often degenerates into a semantic debate about how to use the word "free-will". I don't read much in that area because of this, so I'll leave this one aside.

One test for a question that doesn't have a yes or no answer is if it "quite often degenerates into a semantic debate about how to use the word ..." Not always true, but often.

Quoting PossibleAaran

We just decide whether to think about morality as absolute or not, but there is no truth to be had. I am not sure why you think this. Perhaps it has something to do with what can be "rationally established"? I remember previously you had said that whether or not there is an absolute morality cannot be verified by sense perception.

Of course, many disagree with my contention that the question of whether there is an objective morality is not a matter of fact. All I can tell you is that I don't make my moral decisions based on a belief in absolute moral standards. I just don't. It's not a matter of principle, it's just how I work. I can give a rational justification as to why it's a useful way to behave, but that really comes after the fact. Even so, in most, but not all, cases, my moral decisions will likely be consistent with most of the people in my community, however you want to define that. That includes people who do believe in such absolute standards.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The question about objective reality is serious tangle. When you say that there is a fact of the matter about whether neutrons are made of particles, this claim itself seems to already presuppose that there is an objective reality. After all, what is a 'fact of the matter' if it isn't an objective truth? And so the positive answer, "yes" is something which you presuppose in even stating your distinction. It all depends what you mean by "objective" when you ask your question. What do you mean?

What we are calling underpinning matters are situation dependent. I come from science and I'm comfortable with the concept of objective reality. I use it. At the same time, in some situations I think it is deeply misleading. It often degenerates into a belief that reductionist science is the only valid approach to understanding the universe. Even when I am understanding the world from the viewpoint of objective reality, in the back of my mind I remember that viewpoint is provisional. In my heart, I don't feel as if there is a fixed reality. After all, every story about how the world works; science, theistic religion, Eastern philosophy, Western philosophy, Scientology, ....is talking about the same world.

Quoting T Clark

In my heart, I don't feel as if there is a fixed reality

Do you just find it useful to believe that there is no fixed reality, or is it a fact that there is no fixed reality?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Do you just find it useful to believe that there is no fixed reality, or is it a fact that there is no fixed reality?

To me, whether or not there is a fixed reality is not a matter of fact. Use what works best in a particular situation.

Reply to T Clark Isn't it objectively true that there are mountains on earth? Isn't it objectively true that you exist? That I exist? Aren't these 'fixed realities'?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Isn't it objectively true that there are mountains on earth? Isn't it objectively true that you exist? That I exist? Aren't these 'fixed realities'?

On a day to day basis, I certainly act and feel as if those things exist without thinking about it. I've already acknowledged the value of an objective point of view. There are also other ways of looking at things. In a very real, non-mystical, naturalistic, practical sense, reality does not come into existence until it is conceptualized. The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. That is always in my mind, even when I am acting on the basis of an objective view. It's the way I see the world. And no, it's not a matter of fact. It's an understanding I've chosen, that chose me. For me, it is very useful.

Reply to T Clark Quoting T Clark

And no, it's not a matter of fact. It's an understanding I've chosen, that chose me. For me, it is very useful.

The distinction you made earlier between facts and useful perspectives has vanished. The "fact of the matter" side has collapsed into the useful perspectives side. Even something like "there are mountains" or " I exist" is just a useful perspective among others. Thinking of things as "facts" itself turns out to be a merely useful perspective. But then your distinction is between things its useful to believe and things its useful to believe. No distinction at all!

I'm not sure if this is really coherent. Isn't it an objective fact that "believing X is useful"? And if something is useful to believe, isn't there an objective fact about who its useful for? And these facts cannot just be more useful beliefs. Well, I suppose they could be, just like the earth could rest on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle...etc.

First, there is a mountain. Then there is no mountain. Then there is.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The distinction you made earlier between facts and useful perspectives has vanished. The "fact of the matter" side has collapsed into the useful perspectives side. Even something like "there are mountains" or " I exist" is just a useful perspective among others. Thinking of things as "facts" itself turns out to be a merely useful perspective. But then your distinction is between things its useful to believe and things its useful to believe. No distinction at all!

Exactly, exactly, exactly! But I'll say this again - I acknowledge that in many, maybe most, situations acting as if an objective reality exists is the way I operate.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I'm not sure if this is really coherent. Isn't it an objective fact that "believing X is useful"? And if something is useful to believe, isn't there an objective fact about who its useful for?

For me, usefulness is a question of value, not fact, like beauty or wonderfulness.

Quoting PossibleAaran

And these facts cannot just be more useful beliefs. Well, I suppose they could be, just like the earth could rest on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle on a turtle...etc.

Just to be clear - I'm really serious about this. I'm not just being a contrarian. What I'm saying is really no odder than what Descartes said.

Reply to T Clark I don't just think that your position here is odd. I think its incoherent.

Take any proposition, P, which most people believe is objectively true. You say that there are no objective truths, only things its useful to believe. So, the most you will say about P is:

(1) it is useful to believe that P

One wonders again whether it is an objective fact that (1), but you have already shown that you aren't scared to ride the infinite stack of turtles so lets try something else.

Is it objectively true that there are people? You say, no, because there are no objective truths. But if there aren't any people what sense does (1) make? How can it be useful to believe that P if there is nobody for whom it is useful? You might say that its useful to believe that there are people, but how can that be useful unless there are people to whom it is useful?

Utility only makes sense against a background in which there are creatures to whom these things are useful.

Compare me saying that a hammer is useful. I say that its useful, but not for smacking nails or breaking things. It cannot be useful for those things, since there is no objective fact about whether there are any nails or any things to break. The hammer can't even be useful [i]to me [/] because there is no fact about whether I even exist.

I am not sure why you made the comparison to Descartes. Maybe you could elaborate.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure why you made the comparison to Descartes. Maybe you could elaborate.

Descartes started out doubting everything. Back when I was in college for the first time in the 1970s that kind of thinking always bothered me. I remember reading something by Wittgenstein where he went on about doubt and how we could know anything. Then, at the end, he just said - since we can't be sure of anything, just go ahead and make decisions, live your life, based on your opinions. I remember thinking - there, you and every other philosopher have spent thousands of years and millions of words arguing about what we can know and you, in once sentence, resolve the whole stupid issue. Everything humans know, everything we do, is based on opinions. All of science and philosophy. Just opinions. No truth, just opinions. We need knowledge to figure out what to do next. Opinions are conditional knowledge.

As for your comment on the incoherence of my position, I don't agree, but I don't know how to make my point any clearer or more convincing. I'll just start repeating what I've already said.

Reply to T Clark As you no doubt expect, I disagree with your short assessment of the project Descartes takes up. I also disagree that "everything is based on opinions" if this is to mean that we cannot have any good reason to believe anything. An honest reading of Descartes also shows that he never thought his doubts had to be answered before you can "live your life" and "make decisions". He thought his project was important, but not because somehow life has to be on stand still until you solve it. He says this repeatedly both in the Meditations and in the Discourse, so its so strange to me that people constantly think he was holding all of their day to day lives ransom pending his project of radical doubt. I also don't think its a "stupid issue", but one of the most fundamental issues in philosophy.

So much for my disagreements. Perhaps we can discuss Descartes and his project another time and I can convince you to be more sympathetic to it. But, concerning your views which are the topic of the thread, this view still strikes me as incoherent, and I've tried to show why with argument. Perhaps here is a good stopping point, since we both understand each other yet neither of us is likely to convince.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I disagree with your short assessment of the project Descartes takes up. I also disagree that "everything is based on opinions" if this is to mean that we cannot have any good reason to believe anything. An honest reading of Descartes also shows that he never thought his doubts had to be answered before you can "live your life" and "make decisions". He thought his project was important, but not because somehow life has to be on stand still until you solve it. He says this repeatedly both in the Meditations and in the Discourse

I wasn't trying to put down Descartes or his ideas, I was only responding to your question about why I don't my consider my ideas Quoting T Clark

odder than what Descartes said.