The Gettier problem
The Gettier problem is, in a general form, as follows: a person has a false belief a, from which a conclusion b is drawn. It is then found out that a was false, yet b is true (although only when interpreted in some different way).
Edmund Gettier made the following two assumptions:
1) b is a justified, true belief (JTB-definition of knowledge)
2) b is not knowledge
And therefore, JTB theory is false.
However, this is circular reasoning. Nowhere did Gettier actually prove that b is not knowledge. Gettier's own examples are evidence of knowledge being justified true beliefs.
However, let's jump to the JTB itself for a while. What does it really mean for something to be justified? Can't any belief be justified by itself? This is why I believe the definition actually means well justified. Alternatively we could just consider justified to mean, by its definition, the same as well justified.
What this means is that Gettier made two mistakes. The beliefs of Smith are based on false premises, and thus aren't justified.
Either one of the two mistakes by Gettier can be used to prove JTB definition of knowledge. However, together they form a challenge to it themselves. Smith's belief does not fulfill the JTB definition, but it cannot be proven to not be knowledge. This does not, however, disprove JTB. This is because any argument for or against it can't be presented, and this is because JTB itself does not present any arguments itself. The question is, why was the definition ever accepted, and why is it that it's opposers are considered the ones with the burden of proof?
For whatever it is worth, though, this is my argument against JTB: I can make a lucky quess and define it as knowledge, which is as valid as JTB. Therefore:
Edmund Gettier made the following two assumptions:
1) b is a justified, true belief (JTB-definition of knowledge)
2) b is not knowledge
And therefore, JTB theory is false.
However, this is circular reasoning. Nowhere did Gettier actually prove that b is not knowledge. Gettier's own examples are evidence of knowledge being justified true beliefs.
However, let's jump to the JTB itself for a while. What does it really mean for something to be justified? Can't any belief be justified by itself? This is why I believe the definition actually means well justified. Alternatively we could just consider justified to mean, by its definition, the same as well justified.
What this means is that Gettier made two mistakes. The beliefs of Smith are based on false premises, and thus aren't justified.
Either one of the two mistakes by Gettier can be used to prove JTB definition of knowledge. However, together they form a challenge to it themselves. Smith's belief does not fulfill the JTB definition, but it cannot be proven to not be knowledge. This does not, however, disprove JTB. This is because any argument for or against it can't be presented, and this is because JTB itself does not present any arguments itself. The question is, why was the definition ever accepted, and why is it that it's opposers are considered the ones with the burden of proof?
For whatever it is worth, though, this is my argument against JTB: I can make a lucky quess and define it as knowledge, which is as valid as JTB. Therefore:
- JTB has a valid basis, and therefore so does my argument, and therefore JTB-definition is false, or
- JTB is not valid.
Comments (237)
Such as?
If we take the first Gettier case, the premise Smith used to justify his belief that Jones will get the job is that the president of the company assured him that he would, and the premise Smith used to justify his belief that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket is that he counted them earlier. These are true premises.
If we take the second Gettier case, the premises Smith uses to justify his belief that Jones owns a Ford are that "Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford". These are true premises.
I don't really know what you mean by it was interpreted in some other way. What other way is there to interpret the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford"?
2) is assumed to be true by Gettier because, as you mention, JTB is just a definition. A person could technically bite the bullet and claim b is knowledge. However, the entire point is to show that the definition leads us to accept conclusions that, for all intents and purposes, are false.
I think I can show why you could not accept b as knowledge under JTB. Smith got lucky; his JTB in b is only true by chance as his justification is disconnected from what actually makes b true. Smith is no different than someone with an unjustified true belief, in that they do have a true belief, but only luckily so. The difference between someone luckily obtaining true belief and Smith is that Smith actually has justification. Smith only has "knowledge" because he is lucky, but still meets the criteria for JTB. If the virtue of luck is enough to carry someone and make their beliefs count for knowledge, then someone with TB also ought to count for knowledge. If we accept that, then JTB is false because it collapses in on itself; one does not require justification for knowledge, only true belief. It's similar to the last statement you made.
It also seems absurd to claim that one cannot be justified by false beliefs. If Smith fakes their vehicle registration for a Ford, pays people to vouch for him about owning a Ford, picks me up in a Ford that he does not own, and shows me pictures on social media of him driving around in said Ford, then I am, by any normal means of the word, justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. The claims are all false- Smith fabricated everything- but I am justified in believing Smith owns a Ford. From the proposition "Smith owns a Ford," I can derive the proposition "Someone I know owns a Ford." The justification from the first transfers over to the other.
"The president of the company told Smith that Jones will get the job." Seems like a good evidence, as the president of the company is a reliable source, however, "Jones will get the job" is an assertion about the future and so, it is indeterminate. The president of the company is a reliable source but he cannot predict the future. The mere fact that Jones didn't get the job proves that.
"Smith counts the coins in Jones pocket and sees that he has ten coins. Smith comes to the belief that the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket." The problem here is that the person Smith is referring to is clearly Jones because he knows that Jones has ten coins but not that he also has ten coins. He mistakenly thought that a good way to differentiate himself from Jones is to say that, unlike him, Jones has ten coins in his pocket. Therefore, the underlying meaning of "the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket" is "Jones will get the job".
Smith believed that "Jones will get the job" which turned out to be false and not "the person who gets the job has ten coins in his pocket" which turned out to be true, so it doesn't debunk the JTB theory.
As for arguments for the JTB theory, well, knowledge is in itself a true belief, the thing is, how can we know that the belief is indeed true? We have to rely on some sort of proof, a justification, hence the true justified belief.
If we consider the first case for example, the meaning of "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" changes if the person "the man who will get the job" refers to. This is what Lukasz Lozanski used in an article I found to solve the Gettier problem.
Quoting Chany
That should be done by coming to those conclusions from the definition alone. Taking one's own conclusion as a premise doesn't prove anything.
Quoting Chany
I know all this to be true, but for either JTB-definition to be shown true or Gettier to be shown correct it should be proven that b is not knowledge, not only under JTB.
Quoting Chany
But where is the line drawn? Are logical fallacies enough justification? Is any amount of evidence enough or is proof required? This is all further evidence against JTB. How can knowledge be defined as a justified true belief when the word justified itself is so unclear?
Except if we claim Gettier was incorrect and Smith does know that the person who gets the job has ten coins in their pocket.
Quoting Abaoaqu
Yes, by JTB-definition. We can also take it as a premise that false knowledge exists.
Quoting Abaoaqu
What is adequate justification?
Ie. any claim is an expression of an opinion (for example "God exists"="I believe God exists"), I believe in God, if God exists then God exists, God exists, therefore God exists. Therefore my belief in God is justified, so I know God exists.
Alright, so what does it matter? So long as I can derive the proposition that Gettier uses for his conclusion from the earlier beliefs, then the problem stands.
Quoting BlueBanana
Not all arguments require a super in-depth look into each premise. Gettier is assuming we will find b to not count for knowledge in the same way that we do not need to show that merely having belief as knowledge. I can define "knowledge" as "whatever I would like to be true," and you can't really show that definition to be false. As you note, it's a definition. We reject the definition because it clearly doesn't conform to how we use and think about the word. In the same way, b doesn't really conform to our understanding of knowledge and no one has presented a convincing argument as to why it should count.
Quoting BlueBanana
But my argument is that if we accept b to be knowledge, then that means one can have knowledge purely through luck. If one can have knowledge purely through luck, then the TB (true belief) theory of knowledge is true, as the main reason we want justification and rejct TB in the first place is to avoid merely being lucky in our beliefs. Therefore, the JTB theory is false because the "J" part is not needed. And, obviously, if we do not accept b to be knowledge, Gettier stands. So, either way, JTB is finished.
And, honestly, I don't think we should really have to argue why having unjustified beliefs being luckily true count as knowledge. It's so prima facie wrong that it's not worth discussing unless someone brings out a really good case for it.
Quoting BlueBanana
What counts as justification and whether or not it is what is really needed is a major point of discussion in epistemology, so I am not really sure that it matters. JTB could be true, but no one actually meets the requirements for justification for most beliefs, so therefore no one has knowledge. I do think that Gettier is within his bounds, however, to assume skepticism to be false and show that, even if we assume normal, everyday parameters for justification, JTB is fundamentally flawed.
I didn't say that the "justified" part was the problem though. I think both "true" and "belief" are bigger mistakes with the definition. First of all knowledge doesn't need to be true for multiple reasons, for example the existence of the words "false knowledge", and subjectivism redefining the term "truth". Belief, on the other hand, isn't enough to make something knowledge. One also needs to at least consider their beliefs to be objectively correct knowledge.
Quoting LD Saunders
I'd actually say that other way around: I consider the knowledge of physicists to be equivalent to the knowledge about the lottery ticket in its lack of proper justification.
Umm... I really don't understand what you mean, how is that an exception?
Quoting BlueBanana
That's a good question.
Yes, the lottery ticket winner only had a feeling he would win, he only believed he would win, nowhere did he know that he actually would.
Quoting BlueBanana
"False knowledge" is a misuse of the word knowledge. That is what you call a false belief.
Quoting BlueBanana
I agree, it isn't enough, they also have to be true, which should be verified with some sort of proof.
It isn't circular. What Gettier does is describe a number of thought-experiments in which the person has justified, true belief. But Gettier is inclined not to use the word "knowledge" to describe those cases. He thinks you will agree with him that it would be odd to use the word "knowledge" to describe those cases. Hence, "knowledge" does not mean "justified true belief".
Incidentally this whole method of doing philosophy I find unhelpful. Arguments of this sort produce vast and endless debates about the "ordinary" meaning of words. Empirical methods are better suited to figuring out whether there is such a thing as the "ordinary" meaning of "knowledge".
Are you suggesting that there's an alternative approach to the problem, or that the problem isn't really a problem at all?
Gettier argues he doesn't know that.
Quoting Abaoaqu
I consider that knowledge also requires the believer considers their beliefs knowledge, or at least objectively correct.
And why is that usage odd? Because, (Gettier claims,) b is not knowledge.
The logical conclusion we can draw from that is that either all claims are equivalent, OR all knowledge is NOT equivalent. Since knowledge can be either true or false, I claim the latter. You can know 2+2=5, but you're wrong and it doesn't make the correct knowledge that 2+2=4 any less right.
The reason for this is that this definition actually describes the everyday usage of knowledge most correctly. We can never prove anything, except our own existence, and even that to ourselves, strictly speaking, so either nothing is knowledge, or there exists a theoretical possibility of that knowledge being false, while we can still refer to it as knowledge.
Because I define knowledge so that it can be false. It's the most correct definition because most things called knowledge aren't certain. Knowledge is a belief that one considers knowledge, or subjectively believes to be an objectively true fact - as opposed to beliefs that one objectively recognizes as subjective ones.
If the information about the truth value of a thing that was referred to as knowledge changes, whether it is knowledge in the colloquial sense cannot change because whether it was, at the time, justified to refer to it as knowledge defines whether the belief was knowledge. A word means what it refers to, and false information is quite often referred to as knowledge.
In a way both. If you want to know what the usual meaning of "knowledge" is then go out and ask people. Do some surveys. Don't just consider thought-experiments among philosophers and assume that those judgements are representative. A number of philosophers have actually taken to using surveys for this recently.
But I also don't really see why some philosophers care so much about what regular people mean by "knowledge". Different people find different things interesting I guess.
The 'official' formulation of JTB is as follows:S knows P if S is justified in believing P and P is true.
Gettier argued against that formulation by stating that if S is justified in believing P, infers Q from P, then S is justified in believing Q. In both Gettier cases, it is claimed that Q is true, S is purportedly justified in inferring and thus believing Q, but given the case specifics, no one would reasonably assert that S knows Q.
The first case involves Gettier effectively changes S's belief that S will get the job to another slightly different belief that Gettier could show fault with. He does so by virtue of saying that S has ten coins in his pocket, and so S's belief changes(according to Gettier) from S believing that S will get the job, to S believing that "the man who has ten coins in his pocket will get the job", by virtue of S inferring Q from P where Q is "the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job. Well, according to Gettier and completely unbeknownst to S, the other guy also had ten coins in his pocket, and got the job. So, at first blush, it seems that S's belief that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job is both justified and true, but not a case of knowledge, for S believed that he(S) would get the job not the other guy. The problem here is that Gettier changes S's belief to 'The man with ten coins will get the job' using the notion of entailment. Originally it was 'Smith(the believer himself) will get the job'. So, in the first case, "the man" is equivalent to S, not the other guy. Gettier is unjustified in implying that "the man" is equivalent to Smith. Truth conditions matter. If Q has a different set of truth conditions than P, the inference thereof is highly suspect, and perhaps outright unjustified/invalid. Hence, the first case is no problem for JTB, but is a problem for the notion of entailment if Gettier followed all of those rules.
The second case involves a disjunction. That is, Q is a disjunction derived from P. P is a justified belief. The problem with the second case, just as in the first, is had in Gettier's failure to properly account for S's belief, although this one is more convincing to most. Being justified in believing that Q(a disjunction) is true, requires that S consider the truth conditions for Q. S can know that if either P or Q is true, then so too is (P or Q). S can validly infer (P or Q) from a belief that P, and already knowing that if P is true then so too is (P or Q), which is exactly what S does in the second case.To be clear, S's belief is that (P or Q) is true because P is true. Gettier leaves out the belief content that matters most.
That's Gettier problems in a nutshell...
:yum:
You call that a nutshell? You lost my attention after about four sentences - pretty long sentences at that.
Look at the op. Conclusion b is drawn from the belief a, which is a false belief, in the first place. Therefore conclusion b is not a justified belief. That's the nutshell.
More to your words, but totally off the Gettier subject...
It seems quite odd to me... this idea... that it is somehow unjustified to concluder from false belief? That all belief based upon false premisses is unjustified???
What on earth would it take for that claim to be so?
The very idea is contrary to events that take place in each of lives. Thus, it contradicts what can be readily observed... everyday facts of everyone's lives. That realization ought cause one to pause...
Something is very wrong with this idea that inferring from false belief is unjustified.
Carefully consider the following...
One can and does infer from false belief.
It can be done validly.
It can be done reasonably.
At conception, we are completely void of all thought and belief. Belief is accrued. More complex belief is built upon the simple. Some simple is false. Some of our complex belief was built upon simple but false... belief. We all have no choice but to look at the world through the filter of our upbringing. All of our unbringings contained false belief.
Working from our belief system is unavoidable.
We all hold false belief.
It must be done
The point is that these things are true regardless of that which is subject to individual particulars. They are true descriptions of events that happen within everyone's lives, regardless of that which is subject to cultural, familial, and/or historical particulars. All of our upbringings naturally implant false belief into our belief systems.
Your claim leads one to necessarily conclude that one is only justified in drawing conclusions when one draws them from true belief.
It contradicts actual events in everyone of our lives. It is absurd on it's face in light of everyday fact. Here is what they consist in and/or of.
One is camping in an unfamiliar forest when s/he hears - quite suddenly - a loud startling sound.
It is as if a very large animal is coming through the underbrush. It is far enough away so as not to cause too much immediate fright. However...
The sounds are coming from an unknown source on a path. If it continues it's course it is directly at you. Unknown entity...
Turns out it was a lost dog, who happened to be deaf. This is a valid conclusion drawn from a false premiss and we were completely justified in our doing so. So...
Your criterion for what counts as being "justified" cannot admit that one who is fleeing for their own life were justified in doing so, because they were mistaken.
Did I miss anything?
Where's the problem? What the belief is based upon, is the justification for that belief. It has been stipulated that what the belief is based upon is a falsity. Why do you think one would be justified in believing something based in falsity?
Quoting creativesoul
It has been stipulated that the premise is unsound, false. Therefore the conclusion is unsound. An unsound conclusion cannot be said to be a justified conclusion.
Quoting creativesoul
Do you not recognize that if you assert that some of your basic beliefs are false, you ought to acknowledge as well, that any beliefs based on these false beliefs are unsound and therefore unjustified?
Quoting creativesoul
I don't see any contradiction. If I know that a belief is derived from a falsity I will not claim that the belief is justified. If I do not know whether a particular belief is false, and it really is false, then I might claim that a belief derived from that belief is justified, but clearly I would be wrong. The belief is false and my conclusion is unsound and not justified.
Quoting creativesoul
I don't understand your example. Where's the false belief? Where's the inference? Where's the supposed justified conclusion? All I see is a person in the forest who was scared by an approaching dog. Are you claiming that the person was justified in being scared, but at the same time ought not have been scared because it was just a dog? I don't get it, fear is instinctual.
What's the difference between being true and being justified, on your view?
How is that a misrepresentation? Up until the point where I claim the person has the knowledge, I'm arriving at the same conclusions as you were in your comment.
Of course, to say one is "mistaken" (wrong) in one's actions is to say that the actions are not justified. To argue otherwise would be irrational. The danger they're fleeing from is not real, so the fleeing is not justified. Likewise, if you attacked a person whom you believed was a danger to your life, claiming self-defence, but that person really didn't endanger you at all, then the attack would not be justified. To make such a mistake is to proceed in an unjustified action.
A belief can be true and justified, or true and not justified. But a belief cannot be said to be false and justified because the designation of "false" denies the possibility of justification.
So... it is exactly as suspected. You're arguing from definitional fiat. Semantic arguments are not interesting to me, especially when the definition is terrible to start with and the interlocutor engages in equivocation/self-contradiction.
We once went round and round about your notion of justification and how it relates to whether or not a belief is justified. You claimed that all justified belief require being argued for by the believer. It's the arguing that is the justification process, according to you, and without that the belief is not justified. A belief is, according to you, only justified after it has been argued for. So, your criterion for what counts
as being justified requires that the belief be both true, and that the author has argued for the belief.
Is convincing another required as well, or is just any old arguing good enough?
:sweat:
More to the thread...
Smith believes Jones owns a Ford. His justification for believing this is that Jones has always owned a Ford as long as Smith has known him, and Jones just today he gave Smith a ride while driving a Ford.
According to you, Smith's belief that Jones owns a Ford is not justified, unless Jones owns a Ford. That is to conflate truth and justification.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Evidently our notions of irrationality are irreconcilable as well. Conflating truth with justification is irrational. You're doing precisely that. Don't lose sight of the target here. It's not actions... it's belief.
It is irrational to deny that someone camping in unfamiliar woods who concludes that they are in danger because of hearing an unknown, unseen, and startlingly noisy entity coming directly towards them has justified belief simply because they were mistaken. Their belief was false, but if that doesn't count as sufficient reason to believe that one is in danger, and thus that that belief is justified, then nothing will.
I'm done with your semantic hogwash...
Gettier explicitly lays out the formulation he sets out to place under suspicion, and another he aims to do so with. There are two formulations underwriting the essay. Unless those are satisfactorily addressed and dealt with, you're aiming at the wrong target...
It most certainly can. All it takes it knowing the difference between what it takes to be true, and what it takes to be well-grounded/justified.
Are you claiming my addressing of them wasn't satisfactory enough? How so?
No, I don't conflate truth and justification. I state the simple fact that believing X to be true is a necessary condition of believing X is justified. One cannot believe X is justified without believing X is true. But this does not mean all truths are justified.
Quoting creativesoul
That's silly. You are arguing that not knowing what is out there is reason to believe oneself to be in danger. How do you suppose that the premise "I don't know what's going on" leads to the justified conclusion "I am in danger"? That's ridiculous, you're trying to justify fear of the unknown.
If it were the case that all justified belief were true, then it would also be the case that the "T" in JTB would be superfluous. But it's not. A belief can be justified and false. If it could not, then the "T" would be unnecessary for all justified belief would also be true... necessarily so. So there would be no need for the "T" is JTB. But it's not, and there is.
Gettier cases meet the standard formulation of JTB if B is a proposition. Gettier offers examples where S is justified in believing P, derives Q from P(validly), and thus is justified in believing Q. Q is true in both cases. However, no reasonable person would claim that S knows Q for in both cases Q is true as a result of something that S didn't believe. Take the second case...
Q is a disjunction. Disjunctions are true if either one of the disjuncts is true. S did not believe that the second disjunct was true. Rather he believed that the first disjunct was true, and as a result of his knowing that if the first one is true, then so too is the disjunct itself, he believed the disjunct was true for all the wrong reasons...
Not knowledge... epistemic luck.
I suppose it depends what is being built into the notion of being "justified" here. Normally, if I say someone is justified in believing something, I mean that they have good reason to believe it, and either no reason or a comparatively weak reason not to believe it. Clearly I could think there are such reasons for believing that P without my being psychologically convinced that P. Maybe I recognize the strong case to be made for P, but I just find the idea of P hard to believe. This is at least logically possible. Hence, it is possible to believe that X is justified without believing that X is true - in this sense of "justified".
Some Philosophers have a very weak notion of being justified as having been responsible in believing. It seems painfully easy for me to believe that you have been responsible in believing that P and yet I do not believe that P. Maybe I see that you have thought about it as carefully as you are capable, have made no obvious mistakes which you should have reasonably noticed etc, yet I still think you are mistaken.
Other Philosophers define "justified" as "produced by a reliable process". On thwt definition, I could believe that my belief that X is produced by a reliable process. Its just that I also believe that on this particular occassion the process got things wrong - X is false.
I don't see how one could "believe that P" without being "psychologically convinced that P". Aren't believing and being psychologically convinced the very same thing? Are you arguing that one could think that P is justified, but still not believe in P? I don't see how that's possible. Justification is the act which cause belief, psychologically convinces. If the supposed justification fails to cause belief, it would be false to call it a justification.
If one still does not believe in P, after the supposed justification, this means that the justification has been rejected for whatever reason, so the person cannot really say that P is justified. If the reasons for rejecting the justification are unknown, then the person is being irrational, but I still do not see how one can truthfully say "I think P is justified but I still do not believe P". I think that would be a lie.
Quoting PossibleAaran
I think you are appealing to contradiction here, saying I believe X is a reliable process, but I also believe X got it wrong. How can you believe that X is a reliable process and also believe that X got it wrong, at the same time? What you are arguing is nothing but lying to oneself, self-deception.
Try looking at it this way PA. To say "X is justified" is strong evidence that one believes X. To say "X is not justified" is strong evidence that one does not believe X. So to say "X is justified but I do not believe X" is evidence that one is being untruthful.
Take any definition which I gave you of "justified" and you will see how it is so. If "justified" means "responsible in believing" then you might think I am responsible in believing that P, even though you think P is false. Hence, you would think that I am justified in believing P, even though P is false. The way this would work is quite simple. You see that I have tried my absolute best to investigate things. You see that I have considered all of the objections against P, weighed up the best arguments for P, and I've made no obviously foolish mistake. I am convinced that P, and, you think, perfectly responsibly. You, however, have more information than I do, and you are far smarter than I could ever aspire to be. Because of this, you can see clearly that P is false. Here you believe that P is false and that poor foolish little me is justified in believing that P.
The very same for the notion of "justified" as "having reason to believe". I think that you have very good arguments for your belief that P - arguments which I don't quite know how to criticize. Still, I'm dogmatic and stubborn. I think that P is false and that there must be some answer or another to your arguments. I think you are justified in your belief, but I think that P is false.
Again, take the notion of "justified" as "produced by a reliable process". You think that my belief that P is produced by a reliable process. A process is reliable if and only if when it produces beliefs they are for the most part true. But, that my belief that P was produced by a process which usually gets things right does not entail that the process has gotten it right on this particular occasion. It's reliable, not infallible. Hence, you might think that my belief is produced by such a process whilst nevertheless thinking that, in this instance, the belief is false.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is a much weaker claim than the one you originally made, which was that
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Still, perhaps the weaker claim is right.
Hey, no ad hominems here.
Quoting creativesoul
No he's not. There is only enough information to make justified statements about probabilities.
Are you saying that a belief is only justified if it's certain?
So if I meet someone and she tells me that her name is Sarah then I'm not well justified in believing that her name is Sarah because it isn't certain – she might be lying? And even if she shows me her passport and driving license then I'm still not well justified because it still isn't certain – they might be forgeries?
Requiring certainty for (strong) justification seems unreasonable.
But the possibilities exist. You have a justified belief, although the justification is a bad one, so you know her name, but the knowledge might be false.
Well, I've my own argument against what Gettier does, and it's becoming sharper. However, it's all about the belief aspect, as hinted at in my first post in this thread. That's another matter altogether though.
You're changing the subject. What we were talking about is a hypothetical situation when the subject believes that X is false. and also believes that X is justified. Now you are talking about whether or not I think that you are justified in your belief of X. That's a different situation altogether. involving two subjects instead of one.
What is that supposed to mean? What is 'enough information to make justified statements about probabilities?
I mean, does he know all the influencing factors and the exact number of possible outcomes?
If not, then he doesn't have what it takes to know anything at all about probability, does he?
What's false knowledge? Knowledge has to be true, does it not? If it is false, then it is not knowledge.
Eventually folk accepted the fact that the sun did not revolve around the earth. The prior belief turned out to be false. It was justified false belief because it was as well grounded as possible given the knowledge base at the time, but false nonetheless.
Here's why it is the case that that is well-grounded belief...
If it would've turned out to be a bear there would be no difference in the reasoning.
Justification is about ones ground... ahem... one's reasons for believing.
If it were a bear, it would've also been true. It was justified regardless. To say that the second case is justified belief simply because it would've been true, is to ignore the reasoning(justification) aspect and focus upon the truth aspect. If the first case is claimed to be unjustified and the second case is claimed to be justified and the only difference between the two is the truth aspect, then again one is conflating truth and justification. The evidence of this is clear, for they would be completely ignoring the reasoning...
Justification is the reasoning.
Oh brother...
I can believe that 'X' is true, while knowing that I do not have good reason for believing it. Thus, I can sincerely say that one can believe 'X' even when they knowingly do not have good reason for it.
You should've read the rest of that statement. Stopping in mid sentence neglects the reasoning offered for why any reasonable person would say that S did not know (p v q). It is true as a result of things he did not believe.
Certainty is an attitude, a confidence as it were. One can be certain of X when X is false. One can also be certain of X when s/he has no justification for believing it.
Certainty is... therefore, irrelevant.
He doesn't need to. Estimates can be made perfectly well, and are done on a daily basis. For example, in that example, is it not valid to say that the probability of that person's name being whatever-it-was is about 99-100%?
Quoting creativesoul
Why?
You know the Earth is round, right? There are also people who claim to know it's flat. Someone's knowledge must be false, and unless both are called knowledge, we can call nothing knowledge except things that are known with absolute certainty.
Quoting creativesoul
I did, but I only responded to that part. Having a reasoning for your opinion doesn't give you a right to make ad hominems against the people who disagree with you. Furthermore, you only made the claim there that knowledge can't be based on something one didn't believe, but offered no reasoning for that.
Quoting creativesoul
Quoting creativesoul
Depends on how strictly certainty is defined. In colloquial sense you are right, but strictly speaking certain information is information that can't be false by definition. Because only one such fact exists, it's understandable that outside philosophical discussion certainty can refer to information that is extremely unlikely to be false.
Quoting creativesoul
Justified enough to claim that they knew they were in danger. Not well justified enough so that they could objectively claim to know that their knowledge was true.
Quoting creativesoul
You're claiming that the second case would've been knowledge, but not the first one. The only difference is that the second one turned out, by sheer luck, to be true. That makes knowledge, by JTB, nothing but a lucky guess.
Quoting creativesoul
I agree, what is this a response to?
Hang out with Meta... birds of a feather and all...
I don't see this at all. All your examples are in the form of "You see that I...", or "I see that you..."
Quoting PossibleAaran
None of this relates to "I believe both that X is justified and that X is false", nor "you believe that X is both justified and false.
Quoting creativesoul
As I explained already, the issue Is not with "I believe both, that X is true, and that X is not justified". The issue is with "I believe both, that X is false, and that X is justified".
Your examples, like PossibleAaran's are not relevant, because they are examples of one person believing X is justified, with another person designating X is false. They are not examples of one person believing both X is false, and X is justified.
The point is, that no one can truthfully say both, that (a) is a false belief, and that (b) being a conclusion derived from the false belief (a), is justified. To say both, that (a) is false, and that (b) is justified requires that one lie. Either the person doesn't really believe that (a) is false, or the person doesn't really believe that (b) is justified. In other words, Gettier is lying when he says b is justified.
Someone uses that belief to justify their belief in something else, therefore it's a justification. It's a bad one, yes, and the belief is not well justified, but it is, technically speaking, justified.
It cannot qualify as a justification if the belief which supposedly justifies is known to be false. Otherwise we could justify all sorts of irrational beliefs by asserting falsities. So, "technically speaking" it is not justified.
Well, we do. Those justifications are just not valid.
Let 'X' be "The sun revolves around the earth". Let the timeframe be more than four centuries prior to Copernicus.
The first is questionable as well, but for other reasons. Gettier knows that "the man" is not equivalent to "Smith". If his move from "Smith will get the job" to "The man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job" follows the rules of entailment, then those rules do not preserve truth, and thus are invalid.
Well here is a very plain example. See if you agree with this one and then we can move to others which are more complex.
Think of the notio of "justification" as responsible belief. I believe that I have a very good argument that God exists. Because I believe that, I believe that "God exists" is justified - I believe it would be responsible for me to believe it. But, I'm a stubborn and dogmatic atheist and I don't really care much whether there are good arguments or whether I'm fulfilling my epistemic responsibilities. I insist that God does not exist. Such a person would be strange, but not logically impossible. Viola, a case where I believe that P is justified and that P is false - using a particular definition of "justified".
An invalid attempt at justification is not justification. If it is not valid then is doesn't qualify as a justification. X is not justified if the claimed "justification" for X is not valid.
Quoting creativesoul
What are you saying, that you lived, and believed X is false and justified, four centuries prior to Copernicus? I think you're lying.
Quoting PossibleAaran
I don't believe that you actually believe that "God exists" is justified and also false. I think it's easy to make up examples like this which are not really the case. They would be called lies.
Quoting PossibleAaran
I think it actually is logically impossible, by way of contradiction. To "justify" requires sound logic. If the premise or conclusion is false, then the logic is unsound. If the logic is unsound then there is no justification. To state that the logic is unsound, and that the conclusion is justified is to state a contradiction.
So you're saying that only certain beliefs are justified? So the only justified belief is that I exist?
No, I'm saying that you cannot honestly claim that you belief a specific belief to be both false and justified. If you belief that it is false, this denies the possibility of you believing that it is justified, because a false belief is known to be unsound and this contradicts "justified".
Every fact has a possibility of being false, in which case they would be unjustified according to you. Whether the belief is justified or not cannot depend on whether the belief later turns out to be true or not.
Think what you want.
'X' was justified and false at the specified time. 'X' is still justified(for the people at that time) and false.
Your claim that it is impossible for someone to believe that 'X' is both justified and false is itself... false.
No, what I am saying is that it is impossible to believe that X is false and also believe that X is justified. I am not saying anything about whether or not something believed to be justified, might be proven false in the future.
Look at the op. According to what is stated, Gettier believes that (a) is false, and that this false belief (a) can be used to justify (b). That is what is contradictory, Gettier's claim that the belief is false, and that it justifies. Something designated as false does not serve to justify, because it's been designated as false.
Quoting creativesoul
Are you saying that the people who believed X to be justified, at that specific time, also believed X is false? That's clearly not the case. So unless you are claiming that you now belief X is justified and that you also believe X is false, your argument is irrelevant. And if you are claiming that you believe X is false and that X is justified, I think you're lying.
So, you can assert all you want, that it is possible to believe X is false, and also believe X is justified, but those assertions are contradictory.
What if a justified belief turns out to be false? Does that change whether the belief was justified?
Here you are using a definition of "justified" which is not the definition I used. I defined it in terms of being responsible in belief. But I can be perfectly responsible in belief even if the argument I have for my belief is logically unsound. Suppose that I'm just not very smart or very good at logic. I try my level best. I've been responsible, but still my argument is fallacious. Clearly the way you are using the word "justified", I cannot be justified on the basis of a logically unsound argument. You might be right that in your sense of "justified", I cannot believe that X is both justified and false. To find out, we will need a precise statement of what you mean by "justified". Could you give one?
No, when the belief turns out to be false it's no longer justified.
Quoting PossibleAaran
The issue is whether you believe your argument to be unsound or not, so your example is irrelevant. If you belief the argument is unsound, you are irresponsible if you accept the argument as justification anyway.
My question is whether it was justified, not whether it is anymore.
Yes, now look at the op. We must disallow 1). Gettier cannot say that (b) is justified, all he can say is that (b) was justified.
I don't know, spell it out.
Try this. Gettier is describing the situation. From his description, Smith was never justified. Gettier lies when he says Smith was justified.
I thought we were working on the assumption of knowledge as JTB?
How is a guess sound?
This is pointless.
I've demonstrated how the Gettier problem described in the op is just a deception. What more do you want?
Does your definition of justification allow that an individual can believe that a particular belief is both justified and false at the same time?
So what you are asking is whether it is possible for me to believe that I have a sound argument for P and yet not believe that P. I'm not sure whether I can coherently do that.
In Gettier's coin case, Smith infers that a man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job using a deductively valid argument from premises which he is justified in believing. One of those two premises turns out to be false, and yet his conclusion is true.
Smith doesn't have a sound argument because one of his premises is false. So, by your definition, Smith isn't justified in the 1st place. This was an account offerred by Russel years before Gettier even published, and also pursued by Lehrer, Klien and Mcgrew. Is that your solution?
I don't see how it could be the case that one could believe that a belief is false, yet also have reason to believe in it. Believing it to be false would negate any reason to believe in it.
Quoting PossibleAaran
It's not so much to "not believe that P", because I think one one could still take an agnostic stance, as the skeptic does, holding the possibility of mistake. But more concretely, it is to have a sound argument for P, and also believe that P is false.
Quoting PossibleAaran
That's right. Smith looks at his conclusion as justified, because Smith does not know that the premise is false. From our perspective though, we know that the premise is false, so it would be false for us to say that Smith's conclusion is justified. Therefore Smith is not justified.
I said "... or a reason to believe in it or...". One can have an opinion but recognize it as a subjective opinion while accepting that other opinions are reasonable.
Perhaps someone has been framed for a crime, and so although the belief that they committed the crime is justified, I don't believe that they're guilty.
If you do not believe that the person is guilty, and you believe that the person has been framed, how can you also believe that it is justified to believe that the person committed the crime? Do you think it's justified for a person to be convicted of a crime which they were framed for?
Quoting BlueBanana
But if you thought that it was just an opinion, and other people might have contrary opinions which were reasonable, you wouldn't designate the belief as false. A false belief is not a reasonable opinion.
Truth is not justification.
A belief can be both justified and false. We can know that if we know that truth is not equal to justification. We can believe that another's belief is both false and justified, because the criterion for justified belief changes along with what one believes to be the case, whereas the criterion for true belief does not(if it is appropriately temporally qualified).
Folk back then did not know that the sun revolved around the earth, because it doesn't, and one cannot know a falsehood. It was not knowledge because it was not true. It was justified because it did not conflict/contradict what they thought they knew.
I've shown how Meta's notion of justification fails in at least three different ways...
If that doesn't suffice, nothing will. The worst kind of faith is that which is had despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Some folk take pride in maintaining false belief in such circumstances. Some communities of people call such a thing admirable.
I do not, and I'm done here. You folk have fun...
I know truth is not justification, and I'm far from claiming that it is. We've been through this already. I am just pointing out that one cannot believe that the same belief is both false and justified.
Quoting creativesoul
This has been claimed over and over again, but no one has given an acceptable example. And, if you took the time to think about what you are saying, you would notice how ridiculous it is. So go ahead and think about it. When would you ever say that another person has a false belief which is actually a justified false belief. That's nonsense.
Quoting creativesoul
I'm not talking about what "they knew", I'm talking about what you believe. If you believe a belief to be false, then it is because it contradicts something you believe to be true. So a false believe does contradict, and therefore cannot be a justified belief. Besides, you appear to be defining "justified" as non-contradictory, and that in itself is nonsense.
Quoting creativesoul
All you've given is nonsense.
Quoting creativesoul
Yes, nothing will, because it is blatantly obvious that if anyone claims that a particular belief is false, and also justified, that person is simply lying.
You might think "they were justified in believing X". But this does not mean that you think that X is a justified belief. So if you do not think that X is a justified belief, yet you think "they were justified in believing X", but you state "X is a justified belief", then you are not telling the truth.
That's all anyone can ask for out of being justified.
There's evidence that they committed the crime but no evidence that they were framed. However, they're a friend of yours and you don't believe that they're the kind of person who would commit such a crime, and so infer that they were framed.
People quite often believe things that are contrary to the evidence, and so believe that justified beliefs are false.
Also, we can talk about other people's beliefs being justified even if we have evidence that their belief is false (e.g. if I was with the accused at the time the crime was committed). So even though it wouldn't be justified for me to believe that he's guilty, given the evidence available to everyone else, their belief that he's guilty is justified.
How?
Because conventional wisdom at the time shared that particular belief.
:rofl:
"'J' stands for justified"
"'T' stands for truth"
"'B' stands for belief"
They are three different qualifications for the JTB criterion of/for knowledge. A belief can be justified and false, justified and true, unjustified and false, and unjustified and true. To the JTB'ers it is only belief that is both justified and true that counts as knowledge. That's why Gettier's paper has a bit of bite. He offered two examples. He argues for how they qualify as JTB but not knowledge. That is, he offers counterexamples to what is/was considered the criterion for S's knowing P when P is a proposition.
If you think that the person did not commit the crime, then you believe that the conclusion that they did commit the crime is unjustified.
Quoting Michael
Evidence may be used in an attempt to justify a belief, but producing evidence does not necessarily lead to justification.
Quoting Michael
You are making the same argument as creativesoul here. Here's my reply:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting creativesoul
If you believe that X was a justified belief, but is no longer a justified belief, then it is still a lie if you state "X is a justified belief".
A conclusion is justified if there's evidence for it. There's evidence for it; therefore, it's justified.
An opinion can be reasonable but false, so I would designate the belief as false.
Example: both believing in God and not believing in God are reasonable and justified beliefs and there exist valid arguments for both. I still have an opinion on that that I believe to be objectively true, but still objectively recognize as a subjective opinion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes but you could say it was a reasonable belief. It was justified to believe the Earth was justified in the medieval times.
That's not true, evidence supports a theory, it doesn't necessarily justify the conclusion. It is false to say that any time there is evidence for a particular conclusion, then that conclusion is justified. The evidence must be conclusive. And if the evidence is conclusive then falsity of that which is justified, is ruled out, in the mind of the one making the conclusion.
Quoting BlueBanana
If you are considering both options, to believe in God, and to not believe in God, then you allow that one of these is false, but you are not believing that a particular one of them is false.
Quoting BlueBanana
You could say that it "was" a justified belief, but notice that (1) in the op requires that it "is" a justified belief. Because knowledge is said to be justified true belief, we are not concerned with belief which was justified, but no longer is.
So, like BlueBanana, you're saying that a belief is only justified if it's certain? Then I'll repost what I said to him:
If I meet someone and she tells me that her name is Sarah then I'm not justified in believing that her name is Sarah because it isn't certain – she might be lying? And even if she shows me her passport and driving license then I'm still not justified because it still isn't certain – they might be forgeries?
Requiring certainty for justification seems unreasonable.
I don't see the relevance. Showing her id. seems like conclusive evidence to me, so you'd be justified in believing her name is Sarah. The point I made is that not just any piece of evidence serves to justify.
Quoting Michael
I agree with this. What I don't agree with is the idea that one could think "her name is Sarah" is both a justified belief and also false. So after checking her id, you honestly believe that her claim to be Sarah is justified, but you also honestly believe it to be false.
It's conclusive evidence even though it might be a forgery?
If you believe it to be a forgery then you do not believe it to be conclusive evidence. This is irrelevant to my point, which is that you cannot believe it to be false (a forgery), and justified at the same time.
Sure I can. If Sarah shows you her ID then your belief that her name is Sarah is justified. However, being that she's my sister and that she's showing you an ID that I forged then I know that your belief is false.
You're conflating my belief with your belief. The point is that the same person cannot hold these two beliefs. That's what is stated in the op.
I'm not. I believe that your belief is justified and I believe that your belief is false. So I believe that your belief is both justified and false.
I don't believe that you believe my belief is justified. You know that the documents are falsified so you know that my belief is not justified, and you are lying by telling me that you think my belief is justified. it's called "deception".
It doesn't matter that I know that they're forgeries. Whether or not your belief is justified depends on whether or not the evidence available to you is compelling, which you admitted it is. You said that her ID is conclusive evidence.
It would be unreasonable for me to believe that her name is Sarah, but it doesn't then follow that it would be unreasonable for you to believe that her name is Sarah.
To make this clearer, consider you were accused of having sex with a 15 year old (and the age of consent is 16). You tell the judge that she showed you her ID and that it said she was 16. Would it be right for the judge to counter by claiming that he knows that it's a fake ID, and so that your belief that she was 16 wasn't justified – that you're guilty? Of course not. The judge will say that although your belief was false it was justified, and so you're innocent.
I think that's a very strange definition of "justified". If we go with "compelling evidence" as you suggest, then justification cannot be, as you suggest, a matter of the evidence being compelling to me, or else all my beliefs would be justified, because I only believe something when the evidence compels me to believe.. This would be a completely subjective Justification and justification is meant to bring objectivity to the belief. Therefore justification cannot be defined as "compelling to me", or "compelling to you", it requires more than this. So your claim, rather than being a lie, is just based in a misunderstanding of what it means to be "justified".
I'm not considering them both, I accept both as justified beliefs.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
How does it matter what time we're talking about? Does it change with time whether a false belief can be justified? If we were having this discussion in the medieval times, it'd have clearly been possible to have a justified false belief.
A foundationalist would probably disagree with this...it would also rule out all forms of a priori knowledge, it seems to me, as I generally associate "evidence" with empirical modes of investigation.
"if", not "if and only if". ;)
So you have contradictory justified beliefs then. "God exists" and "God does not exist" are both justified. I think that an individual would necessarily be lying to claim them both as justified.
Quoting BlueBanana
Things change. We're discussing predication, whether "justified" mat be predicated of a specific belief. In all matters of predication, time is important due to the reality of change.
And we're not discussing whether a false belief can be justified, we're discussing whether one can believe that a belief is both false and justified.
Quoting Michael
I don't agree, because there is a difference between being held not liable, and being justified. Being found not liable is not the same as being justified. To be justified is to be demonstrated as being right. To be not liable is to be demonstrated as being not legally responsible for something which is wrong. One involves rightness, the other wrongness.
So the judge would not say that the man was "justified" meaning "right" in having sex with someone underage, just because she showed him false id. The false id. might be considered as a mitigating factor, but it cannot negate the fact that the act itself was wrong. The judge might leave the man as unpunished, but that does not mean that the judge thinks that the man was justified (right) in committing the wrongful act. This would be contradictory, to say that the act (sex with a girl under 16) is a wrongful act, and also that the man was justified (right) in committing it. And this is evident in drinking establishments which get their licenses revoked for serving alcohol to minors even though the minors were using false id.
I'm not saying that the man was right to have sex with the girl. I'm saying that the man was justified in believing that she was 16, given the evidence available to him.
If we look at an actual example, the law states that a person commits an offence if "B is under 16 and A does not reasonably believe that B is 16 or over". The law recognises that one can reasonably believe that someone is 16 even if they're not; the law recognises that one can have a justified false belief. And this isn't just some technicality of the law, but common everyday understanding.
Clearly he wasn't right in believing that she was sixteen, so he wasn't justified in believing that she was sixteen. Justification requires demonstrating that one is right.
If a belief is false, then one could believe that belief to be false. Yet, if the belief is justified, one can also believe it to be justified.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, unless you mean belief as in believing it. Contradictory justified beliefs exist, but one can't have contradictory justified beliefs.
Actually, I'm taking that back: one can have contradictory beliefs, but one can't have beliefs they believe to be contradictory.
So how could one believe the same belief to be both justified and false?
You're equivocating. His belief was incorrect, but given the evidence was reasonable. A reasonable belief is a justified belief. A belief doesn't have to be correct to be reasonable, and so doesn't have to be true to be justified.
Why not? For example, when a belief has sufficient evidence it's justified, but if two equally valid conclusions can be drawn from evidence, one could say that the other conclusion is valid and basing one's beliefs in it would be justified, while believing the other conclusion but recognizing the choice of conclusion as subjective.
I'm not equivocating, because I've already said that your definition of "justified" is unacceptable. We ought to adhere to an acceptable definition of 'justified". If you check your dictionary you'll find that "justify" requires demonstrating the correctness of.
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/justified
1. Having, done for, or marked by a good or legitimate reason.
A belief is justified if there are legitimate reasons to believe it. Someone's ID showing them to be 16 provides you with legitimate reasons to believe that they are 16.
So you are justified in believing that they are 16, even if unbeknownst to you it's a fake and that they're 15.
I agree that "justified" does not mean certain. However, demonstrating that a belief is "not wrong", does not demonstrate that it is correct. Nor does it demonstrate "good legitimate reason" to believe it. Therefore I reject your argument which assumes that demonstrating a belief to be "not wrong" qualifies as justifying that belief.
Seems far fetched but that might work :chin:
We might clear up the issue if we revisit the time factor. I submit that the judge might say "you were justified in your belief". But now, the truth is exposed, and that belief no longer qualifies as a justified belief. That's the point with the op. The falsity is exposed, yet the belief is still referred to as a justified belief.
Got it.
If the truth is exposed to us but not to him then his belief is still justified. Given the evidence available him, it is reasonable for him to believe what he does. That we can see it to be false doesn't change that.
It is reasonable for him to believe what I know is false.
No it's not, that's the point, once the belief is exposed as false it cannot be considered reasonable to hold that belief. Furthermore, it would require withholding evidence, and deception to say that his belief is justified. The judge has evidence that the documents are false, and saying that his belief is justified without revealing this evidence constitutes deception.
Quoting Michael
I disagree that you can honestly say this. If you know it's false, then you know that his belief is unreasonable. If you were honest, you would either let him go on with his belief which you know to be an unreasonable belief. or act to convince him that the belief is unreasonable. But I think it ought to be quite clear to you that to say that you know his belief is false, and to also think that it is reasonable for him to maintain this false belief, is to be dishonest. It is similar to what we call "rationalizing" which is a form of dishonesty, coming up with reasons to defend what one knows is wrong.
It isn't reasonable for me to hold that belief, but it's still reasonable for him to hold that belief.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A belief is justified if it would be reasonable for the believer to hold the belief given the evidence available to him.
If John doesn't know that the ID is fake then it would rational of him to believe that Sarah is 16. It would be wrong to say that because I know that it's fake that John's isn't being reasonable in committing to such a belief.
In thinking that I agree, and in furthering this train of thought:
There’s a difference between fallibilist systems of epistemology and infallibilist systems of epistemology—although the two often seem implicitly converged in addressing knowledge. I’m one to strongly argue against infallibilism (that we can obtain knowledge guaranteed to be perfectly secure form all possible error), so I’m addressing the position I uphold, that of fallibilistic epistemology. Some homemade perspectives:
Justified and true belief is, in a sense, the ideal standard by which we declare what is and is not knowledge. It is ideal because implicit to it is the affirmation of an infallible, or ontic, truth. In practice, however, all we ever have to work with is believed to be truths. So, in practice, what we uphold to be knowledge can be specified as “believed to be true beliefs which we can justify in being ontically true” or, more briefly expressed, “justified believed truths” … which we then assume to be justified true beliefs by default of being justified in being true. (I take this to be similar enough to what you mean by “justified belief is [...] knowledge”.)
JTB—due to being ontically true—cannot hold the potential of being wrong: it is infallible. The issue here becomes whether or not one knows the given truth, in which case one can justify it, or if one is merely lucky in holding a belief that is ontically true. But, again, in practice we only have JBT—which we then assume to be JTB when in deed justified (e.g., noncontradictory to our other JBTs, etc.). We can’t guarantee that what we assume to be a true belief is in fact true; this because we are fallible in our appraisals of what is true. And, I believe, it is because of this that we must then also be capable of justifying our beliefs as true. If we can’t evidence that our beliefs are in fact true then we don’t have grounds for confidence that our beliefs are true (either due to a then resulting uncertainty or due to flagrant contradictions between the beliefs we hold within awareness at any particular time).
This summing up my current views, what you’ve termed “false knowledge” is, to me, then JBT which we take to be JTB by default which, nevertheless, is however not in fact true (though it remains fallibly justified as being true).
As an example: if Tom believes he’s seen a sheep at a distance and can justify this belief (e.g., it looks like a sheep, etc.), then, to Tom’s awareness, he holds (fallible) knowledge of there being a sheep at a distance—though, in fact (in truth), what Tom has seen is a white coated shepherd dog bred to look like sheep. When Tom approaches the sheep he discovers that what he previously took to be knowledge was wrong—for new JBTs now evidence (justify) that the animal is in fact a dog.
Even if not everything here rings true, I yet maintain that there should be first made an explicit distinction between fallible knowledge (which always holds the potential to be incorrect and thereby false in what it upholds as true belief) and infallible knowledge, which by definition is incapable of being false (specifically in that which it affirms to be true).
Maybe some of this will help … again, only meant to confirm what I interpret you as saying.
Please state the criterion for both, what it takes to be true and what it takes to be justified... on your view.
The person had a belief that ended up being true. The belief was also justified as there exists a correct answer that could be calculated. However, even I wouldn't accept that guess as knowledge. I can see that someone might claim the belief wasn't justified to the person in the example, but we can also come up with examples of cases where the person, whether they are correct or not, believe to be justified. In that case I'd claim the person does have knowledge, so to those situations I have an alternate solution: knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, regardless of whether it's true or not and regardless of whether it's justified or not.
I fully agree with your comment otherwise, but I think the distinction between these two should be made through the justification rather than the knowledge itself. One might, for example, have an infallible knowledge, which should have a certain justification, but if the person doesn't know of this justification, they can't have the knowledge and claim it to be true beyond doubt.
This sort of leads its way into the issue of what justification is. There’s foundationalism, coherentism, or Susan Haack’s proposal of a hybrid, which I favor (I’ve yet to find reason to take other theories of justification seriously). All the same, if truth has no bearing on justification, then I so far find that the term “justification” would be devoid of meaning.
I’ll elaborate a little: Imo, justification is the process of evidencing that addressed to be just. To be just can hold two meanings: just in terms of facticity and just in terms of morality. When it comes to propositional knowledge, to justify a belief is to evidence how the belief’s contents are factually just (not morally just). This, in turn, entails that justification is about evidencing a belief to be true (with truth loosely meaning “conformity to that which is factually just”—which to me encompasses correspondence theory of truth).
So if knowledge is belief that is believed to be justified, it would then need to be belied to be true. So then when we discover that our believed to be justified beliefs are not true, then they cease to be knowledge for us.
Also, doesn’t a belief need to be to some extent justified by oneself in order for one to believe it to be justified by oneself?
All too true. The issue as you pointed out is one of demonstrability. To add an example, one can hold an intuitive certainty about something—a gut feeling—and this belief can in fact be infallibly true, or infallibly correct (when ontically appraised from some supposedly omniscient perspective). But—as you’ve mentioned—if one has no means of evidencing this gut-felt certitude to be infallible, one would have no means of knowing whether or not it in fact is infallible.
But this then to me signifies that we can’t have infallible knowledge, since knowledge in part requires that it be justified. To be in possession of infallible knowledge seems to me to require that one is also in possession of a demonstrably infallible justification for that which one believes (again, with justification to me being an evidencing that that addressed is factually just).
To be more explicit, I take infallibilism to be about demonstrably infallible believed truths (Descartes comes to mind as an infallibilist, for that’s what he was searching for prior to commencing his methodological doubt; he had faith that he could demonstrate infallible believed truths). Fallibilism—as I see it at least—is like holding a null hypothesis that all of one’s knowledge is infallible despite not having infallible justification for this which, as a null hypothesis, will always then hold the potential of being falsified … thereby making all knowledge fallible from the get go.
So one could unknowingly hold infallible beliefs at any time. But without being able to infallibly justify any particular instantiation of this, one then could never be in possession of infallible knowledge (for one wouldn’t be able to appraise whether or not one’s beliefs are infallible). More to the point, because justification is an intrinsic aspect of propositional knowledge, devoid of infallible justification one cannot then have infallible knowledge. No?
Its late for me and I’m a bit tired; hoping I didn’t misinterpret your latest posts.
I don't think so because if the knowledge doesn't depend on the justification, only whether one believes the belief to be justified, it only matters what stance the person in the example takes.
Quoting javra
Justification is evidence, not proof (although the evidence can be proof as well). Based on that, truth has some bearing on justification, but both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs are possibilities, so I don't exactly see what you mean by that "“justification” would be devoid of meaning". As you stated, there exist countless of definitions for it and opinions on what is justification, but the conclusion I draw is that whatever is that, it's not entirely dependent on truth.
Quoting javra
Knowledge clearly needs to be believed to be true, but I think that's a part of the definition, not a conclusion of it. Knowledge is a belief that is believed to be both true and justified, but a belief that is believed to be justified isn't necessarily believed to be true.
Quoting javra
In theory, yes. In practice I don't think there's a limit to how irrational a person can be. I also think, however, that people can be objective and that doesn't necessarily contradict the irrationality, so there could very well exist a person that has an unjustified belief that they don't believe to be justified but still believe to be true.
Whoa, I didn't consider this at all to be honest - that one could have infallible knowledge with justification that isn't infallible. I'd actually like to define this as knowledge so I'd go as far as to say that the person does have an infallible knowledge about the fact, but they do not have knowledge, only a belief, that the knowledge is, in fact, infallible.
As I stated somewhere earlier in this thread, I try to make definitions that describe colloquial uses, and that knowledge is in colloquial sense never certain is the very reason I'm using my idea of false knowledge. This leads to basically that when one believes to know something (that is, they believe to have a justified true belief) instead of knowing that they only believe that information, they must know that thing. Because of this, it must be that as the person in your example believes their belief to be true and infallible, they do know that which their intuition tells them. What I'm not sure about is whether intuition, which I think is a valid justification, can justify intuition. Objectively the answer would be no, thus "they do not have knowledge, only a belief, that the knowledge is, in fact, infallible", but as I also said, people are irrational.
So you're saying that if a person has reasons for one's belief, even if those reasons involve falsities, then that belief is reasonable? The problem is, that I always have reasons for my beliefs, and I think that others do too, but that doesn't make the beliefs reasonable. If those reasons include falsities then clearly my belief is unreasonable, despite the fact that I have reasons for that belief.
Quoting Michael
I don't agree with that. If I hold evidence that makes your belief unreasonable, then it's very clear that it's not reasonable for you to hold that belief. This is what justification is all about, discussing these beliefs and working out the unreasonableness which lies there. If I had the attitude that it was reasonable for you to hold false beliefs, then I would never be inclined to convince you of the reality of the situation. It is through confronting such unreasonableness that beliefs get justified.
Quoting Michael
Not only is John being unreasonable but so are you. John is committed to a belief which you know is false, and is proceeding in activity which you know is wrong. You are claiming that it is reasonable for John to hold such a belief, and therefore reasonable for him to be proceeding in a wrong activity. If you do not designate his actions as unreasonable you will not be inclined to prevent him from proceeding with the wrongful actions. If you designate his actions as wrong, then to prevent him from proceeding, you will need to back this up with reasons, showing that his beliefs are unreasonable. If you truly belief his beliefs are reasonable, you have no recourse. So it is completely counterproductive, and unreasonable to think that John is being reasonable by committing to such a false belief. And I don't believe that anyone can honestly say that committing to a false belief is a reasonable thing to do.
Being reasonable isn't the same thing as having reasons.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Earlier you agreed though that in the medieval times it was reasonable with the given evidence to believe that the Earth was flat.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can't see any self-consistent way in which it matters whether anyone holds that evidence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In that situation you'd present the evidence to that person, after which the belief would no longer be reasonable. The person is justified in believing what they believe, but the belief itself is not within the knowledge you have justified, so you change the circumstances so that the person is no longer justified in believing what you think is a false belief.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're conflating moral justification and epistemological justification, and also jumping into unjustified conclusions regarding what actions to take with unreasonable beliefs considered.
Seems like there’s something in the way here, though I’m not sure what it is. As you’ve mentioned, (fallible) justification is about (imperfectly) evidencing something to be the case, not about (absolute) proof. Then the implicit question is, “justified to be true to whom?” To the individual, to a cohort of those concerned in the matter, or, else, in an absolute sense as viewed from some supposed omniscient perspective? To the individual and the cohort, justification will always be fallible; from the latter ideal perspective, it will be infallible, i.e. serve as absolute proof.
To readdress a former example, that there is a sheep in the field is justified to Tom as a true belief—and is therefore fallible knowledge to Tom. But it is not factually justified as a true belief to the shepherd (and to us) who knows that what Tom was looking at was in fact a shepherd dog in the field. (Tangentially, the shepherd (or else us the onlookers) might find Tom’s presumption morally justified—else stated, understandable, and thereby not deserving of reprimand even if wrong—but the shepherd will nonetheless not find Tom’s belief to be factually justified, this due to being based on Tom’s false belief of having seen a sheep). To complete the example, the shepherd’s knowledge on this matter, though outstanding, is nevertheless fallible as well—this because it is not literally omniscient.
Hence, given Tom’s limited information, Tom has valid but fallible knowledge of there being a sheep in the field. If Tom doesn’t approach the animal or talk to any shepherd, that’s all he will ever know about what he saw in the field. And when Tom tells his friend about it, his friend will have no reason to doubt that Tom has knowledge of there having been a sheep in this one field.
The shepherd (as also applies to us the onlookers) also holds limited information—and is thereby not infallible due to not being omniscient. But he holds more information on this topic than does Tom. So both the shepherd and us the onlookers hold valid but fallible knowledge of Tom not knowing that there is a sheep in the field, this due to our knowing that Tom was wrong in what he thought he saw.
To Tom, his belief is justified (to the best of his awareness). For clarity, Tom here factually holds justifications for his belief being true—for he has no info that would evidence any of his other beliefs which he uses as justification to be false.
To the shepherd, Tom’s belief is not factually justified (to be technically correct, also to the best of his awareness), due to the belief being based either on false premises or illusory experiences.
(A problem however emerges when one wants to affirm that a believed to be justified belief is not justified from an omniscient perspective—for no sentient being is endowed with this perspective in practice.)
Longwinded but this serves as a background to this conclusion: Wherever knowledge is upheld, relative to the individual(s) who so uphold, knowledge will always be factually justified to be true.
The property of truth doesn’t follow from the property of being justifiable; rather the reverse applies. If a belief is true, it will then necessarily also be to some extent justifiable. Untrue beliefs will not be factually justifiable (at least given sufficient enquiry into the matter and a sufficiently large body of information being obtained). So if one can’t justify a belief, it evidences the belief to either be uncertain or to be certainly false.
To that extent, both unjustified true beliefs and justified false beliefs would not be propositional knowledge whenever they are known to so be, this to whomever knows them to so be (this latter instantiation of “to know” is referencing knowledge via acquaintance/experience, maybe to greater extent than propositional knowledge … it would all be contingent on the particular examples).
So—while one can try to argue that knowledge is beliefs believed to be justified and true irrespective of whether or not they are in fact justified and true (this from an omniscient perspective?)—I’m maintaining that in practice knowledge will always be justified and true to the best awareness of the knowers … and will be so maintained to be until evidenced otherwise.
If an individual stubbornly maintains an irrational belief to be true and justified as true (e.g., the belief that Earth is hollow … believe it or not, I’ve heard this one before), while it will be considered knowledge to the individual, it will not be knowledge to us. That it is a “belief that is believed to be justified” is insufficient to make it knowledge to us. What would make this belief knowledge to us is a justification for this belief that would evidence this belief to be true (this in light of the many things we already (fallibly) know, such that gravity requires mass, thereby entailing that a hollowed planet would be devoid of the gravity we experientially know our planet to have).
We would hypothetically concede to this being knowledge only because we’d then come to believe that it is true on account of the justifications provided. Yes, it would then be a believed to be true and justified belief—but it’s status as knowledge would be fully contingent on these beliefs of being true and justified. Hence, I’m maintaining, whether or not a belief is (fallibly) true and (fallibly) justified is pivotal to what knowledge is.
Quoting BlueBanana
Right, but I don’t endorse the term of “infallible knowledge” in this case for the reasons I previously tried to provide. If knowledge is not a lucky guess, then one cannot have infallible knowledge—not unless one infallibly demonstrates it to so be "infallible belief that is infallibly true and is infallibly justified as being true".
On the other hand, one can luckily guess a conclusion which is ontically true and, in so being, which is factually correct and, thereby, perfectly devoid of error--hence, which is infallible. If one can’t justify this conclusion, though, it would not be knowledge. Where it gets trickier is: If one can justify that some conclusion is ontically true—but not infallibly justify the conclusion to so be—one would then have only fallible knowledge of an ontic truth, but not infallible knowledge.
Why would this conclusion not properly fit the stance of a fallibilistic epistemology? (From previous exchanges, we both agree with epistemology being fallible.)
Quoting BlueBanana
I fully agree with this.
Quoting BlueBanana
But an somewhat unclear about this. Whenever we believe things--and are not then uncertain about them--we then hold a subjective certainty that our beliefs are true. But mere subjective certainty does not then imply that one holds knowledge of what one is confident about. I can be certain that the universe is most properly depicted by a cyclical model, but this in itself is not knowledge of the universe so being--not unless I can justify this certainty to be ontically true (which I can't).
Quoting BlueBanana
Interesting issue. To me an intuition is an apprehension of awareness. This is in parallel to physiological perceptions being apprehensions of awareness. Foundationalism would hold that these immediate apprehensions of awareness are self-evident truths (though I'm not certain about how it typically addresses intuitions). The rebuttal is that they could be illusion, hallucination, or delusion. So, to me, that's where Haack's foundherentism shines. But I'll leave this open for some other post, if this topic of justification gets further addressed.
Not always: one can always know their own existence. Mathematics and logic can also be argued on. I also think the context matters, as some information can be said to be infallible with specific premises, like that we can generally speaking trust our perceptions. Considering "I think, therefore I am" to be the only certainly justified belief and the only infallible knowledge won't get one far and I think no meaningful conclusions can be drawn from that.
Quoting javra
What about the situations where people might disagree on whether the evidence justifies a belief? If Tom believes that there's a sheep on the field, but we know that he neither has seen or believes to have seen a sheep there, but instead thinks "I have a glass of water, therefore there must be a sheep on the field outside", I wouldn't consider the belief unjustified to me, but also relative to Tom. He'd of course believe the belief to be justified, and thus it would count as (false) knowledge.
Quoting javra
Certain justification considered? If the Russell's teapot existed there'd be no justification for individuals of it.
Quoting javra
First I'd like to say that the hollow Earth theory is a poor choice of example, as it makes a lot more sense than for example the flat Earth theory: you can conclude the Earth is round by simple everyday observations, but to know Earth's exact size, mass, density and gravitational effect we do need to rely on the words of the scientists.
More on topic, I find the view peculiar in that it allows false knowledge but does not really allow its practical usage. Basically it gives individuals the possibility of belief that their knowledge has a chance of being incorrect, but the hollow Earth model is, although stupid, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us, theoretical possibility, like the idea of evil daemon deceiving us. This is why I'd prefer to define irrational beliefs, when believed by other to be justified, to be knowledge, that one then has a belief about that the knowledge is false.
I'd say that depends on the situation, there are some specific cases of individual holding infallible knowledge. Generally speaking I see what you mean though, I might have accidentally used "infallible" there to mean the same as "certain" in its colloquial meaning.
Quoting javra
That seems logical but I also can't quite agree. I feel like there's a jump between the colloquial sense of uncertainty and absolute certainty. There surely are many people that believe their beliefs to be certainly true, but I for one see in most of my beliefs the slight theoretical possibility of being wrong, even though I wouldn't claim to be uncertain about them in any way.
Furthermore, on the connection to knowledge, even though denying that a belief believed to be certain needs to be justified sounds exactly like a thing I'd personally do, I have to say it'd be a rare exception. If you are certain of the shape of the Universe, I think you have a justified reason for that belief.
Then we ought to differentiate between these two. But Michael seems to be arguing that if there are reasons for a belief then the belief is reasonable. I think that a belief which is known to be incorrect cannot be reasonable.
Quoting BlueBanana
If I said that, then I misspoke. I don't think that it's reasonable for anyone to believe that the earth is flat. I probably implied that they thought it was reasonable, and that's why they believed it. They thought it was justified, so for them it was justified. I do not think it was reasonable for them to believe this, because I think that it is not a reasonable thing to believe, so I do not think it was justified. They are a different people from us.
Quoting BlueBanana
That the person does not have the evidence to demonstrate that the incorrect belief is incorrect, does not make the incorrect belief justified. So it is impossible for us to say that the incorrect belief which the person holds, or held, is justified. The person, and others may have held the belief as justified, but we now see this was wrong, and they were not justified in holding that belief.
Quoting BlueBanana
These moral and legal examples were Michael's examples of justification. I find Michael's argued position to be downright abhorrent. Michael is trying to deny the true nature of mistake; that to make a mistake is to do something wrong; and to do something wrong is inherently irrational; by arguing that it may be reasonable and justified to do something wrong, if the incorrect beliefs which lead to the wrongdoing, the mistake, can be supported by evidence. So for example, if a police officer shoots an unarmed, innocent civilian, this mistake might be reasonable and justified, if the reasons for officer's incorrect belief that the unarmed civilian was an armed criminal, can be supported with evidence.
But this is simply to not face up to the fact that a mistake is a mistake; and that to make a mistake is to do something wrong; and to do something wrong is to do something which is inherently irrational. So instead of facing up to our mistakes, we might try to rationalize them, insisting that the irrational belief which lead to the mistake was really rational and justified. But this is nothing but contradiction, and so this entire argued perspective is nothing but an abhorrently detestable attempt at deception.
Quoting creativesoul
I cannot state any such "criterion", but I'll say that truth is based in honesty, so a true belief is an honest representation of what one thinks. Justification is a demonstration of the correctness of one's belief. So if I make a true representation of what I think, concerning a particular issue, and I manage to demonstrate the correctness of this belief, that is a justified true belief.
I rest my case.
It's a soundness/validity kind of thing. Reasons that actually support the conclusion, if imperfectly, are what we want, not just any old stuff.
We distinguish between how well a claim supports a conclusion and whether that claim is itself factual.
Do you not understand the distinction, or do you reject it for some reason?
But of course one can always fallibly know about one’s own existence, that 1 and 1 equates to 2, etc. In your statement though I read the implicit affirmation that knowledge is infallible in order for it to be real/true knowledge. Reminds me of my take on why so many philosophical skeptics in history maintained that there can be no knowledge: because to others knowledge is always taken to entail infallibility.
To be clear, by “infallible” I don’t intend “infallible for all intended purposes” of “infallible given the conditions X, Y, and Z” but, instead, that which is “perfectly secure from all possible error”. I duly uphold that the argument for the law of noncontradiction is abnormally strong to an extreme—or at least that it can be—but I as of yet don’t know of an infallible justification for it. Because there is no justification that is perfectly secure form all possible error that either you or me (or anyone else that we’ve ever heard of) can evidence for the law of noncontradiction, the law of noncontradiction then will not be perfectly secure form all possible error as far as we can evidence. It is thereby fallible—i.e. holds some capacity of being wrong, regardless of how miniscule and utterly insignificant this capacity might be. Which is not to say that it is therefore false.
Then, 1 and 1 being equivalent to 2 could potentially entail that 1 and 1 does not equate to 2 at the same time and in the same way. This is acknowledgedly aberrant. But since there is no infallible justification for the law of noncontradiction, contradictions could then be instances of non-erroneous reasoning in ways in which our limited (non-omniscient) minds can’t currently fathom. This is my short-cut argument for 1 + 1 = 2 being fallible—and not infallible—knowledge (for it could be that 1 + 1 is also not equal to 2 … iff contradictions were not errors of reasoning … which we can’t infallibly evidence one way or another). This, though, doesn’t make it untrue that 1 + 1 = 2 and only 2. Our notion of 1 + 1 = 2 could well be an ontic truth, and thereby infallibly correct, but I’m not holding my breath for anybody to demonstrate its literal infallibility.
As to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum, Descartes took the “I think” proposition for granted, without demonstrating its infallibility. In fact, the thought he refers to could conceivably be caused by some given other than himself—the “I” he is addressing—such as by the evil demons we’ve all since Descartes time have become so accustomed to … or else the thoughts could be utterly uncaused in all senses (a block-universe model could account for this). Were any of these alternatives to describe that which is true, the proposition “I think” would then be false. As with 1 + 1 = 2 however, this isn’t to say that “I think” is therefore false. But it is not an infallible premise, or proposition, or conclusion form which other infallible conclusions—namely, that of “I am”—can be drawn.
In short, knowledge pertaining to non-omniscient first person points of view will always be fallible, regardless of what it may be about. I can argue this one further if needed. Simply present an instantiation of what is supposed to be infallible knowledge. :razz:
Though, because justification can be strong and weak, so too can knowledge be strong and weak. We hold strong knowledge that we are earthlings (right up there with BIVs, say rather than all 7(?) billion of us being extraterrestrial offspring) … as well as that 1 + 1 = 2 and that we are/exist. We hold comparatively weak knowledge of what the weather will be like in a few days from now (but we generally still know something about it).
That all knowledge is theoretically capable of being wrong, again, does not then mean that all our knowledge therefore is wrong (it could in fact depict that which is ontically true). Only that it is fallible, sometimes to an exceedingly insignificant degree—this outside of philosophical contemplations such as those regarding the nature of knowledge.
Quoting BlueBanana
In these cases, these very same people would disagree on whether or not knowledge is had. My quoted statement states that where knowledge is had it will always be (fallibly) epistemically justified to be true. Where there is disagreement about the validity of justification, however, there will then also be disagreement on there being knowledge.
Quoting BlueBanana
A good point. Poorly worded on my part. Here I meant that truths are always justifiable in principle. For example, if a teapot floats in space between the Earth and Mars, it will be capable of being evidenced to so be given a sufficiently large body of acquired information and analysis of this information. So too with there being a needle in a haystack. But, yes, we were talking in context of knowledge being justifiable true belief in practice. What I was getting at, in retrospect, is a little more complex, and it deals in large part with what I take to be ontological themes. To not seem like a charlatan: Ontic givens will, I uphold, not be mutually exclusive (will not be contradictory) and will cohere with each other when sufficiently related … akin to saying that the cosmos is a whole (it in fact gets more complex due to ontic randomness/indeterminacy being, imo, part of the picture, but to keep this on the brief side …). Truths, then, by virtue of conforming to ontic givens in one way or another, shall then hold similar properties: they shall not contradict and will cohere when sufficiently related. I won’t try to justify this here; its more than a mouthful even if I haven’t missed the mark. But then, if so, to justify a truth is to show how it is noncontradictory to other established truths (with those of direct experience being paramount, though fallible; here invoking foundationalism) and, with this, how it coheres into sufficiently related truths (here invoking coherentism). So truths are then always justifiable, at least in principle. But, in retrospect, my bad for bringing this up. It’s a topic for a different thread, maybe. And, again, good call on what I previously said. Yes, some beliefs which are ontically true cannot be justified in practice.
Quoting BlueBanana
I personally like the hollowed Earth example. The Earth is either hollow or it is not; they can’t both be true (and even if contradictions were to be non-erroneous reasoning, we wouldn’t be able to make any sense out of them anyway). Even when knowledge is specified as “believed to be true beliefs epistemically justified in being ontically true” it would still pivot around ontic truth … thereby being upheld to be justified true belief (till evidenced to in fact be untrue, were such time to ever present itself … it might never do). It could be that my expressions/understandings are off base—in which case I’m very grateful for the criticism—but, to me, propositional knowledge then entails that that which is known is always assumed to be ontically true. Then, because those who know the earth to be hollow hold contradictory positions to those who know the earth to be solid, at least one of these two maintained instances of knowledge will be false. Justifications for the Earth being solid far outweigh justifications for the Earth being hollow (e.g., tectonic plate movements caused by convection currents of magma explain earthquakes … earthquakes being something which the hollow Earth model cannot as coherently justify).
Now that I think of it, this turns out to be a fairly good example of the complexities involved with knowledge. But I’ll leave it as it is unless there’s greater interest in this example.
Quoting BlueBanana
I’m so far not getting this. While I haven’t myself explicitly made use of the phrasing “false knowledge”, I can understand it in this way: false knowledge is not knowledge because it is false. This in parallel to a false truth (e.g., a lie) not being truth because it is false.
Quoting BlueBanana
My take is that if we don’t find a means to amalgamate common sense uses of certainty (as in, “I’m sort’a certain that […]” or “my certainty of […] is strong”) with philosophical certainty, then we deprive ourselves of a term (and corresponding concept) used for “not being uncertain about” within realms of philosophy of mind. What I meant was that to believe X is to not be uncertain about X (therefore, to not be uncertain that our beliefs concerning X are true)—and not that it means “believing belief X to be (philosophically/absolutely) certain”.
... And now, without further ado, I'm off to bed. Man, I'll try to keep my posts shorter next time around. No promises though.
That tells me nothing. What we're talking about is falsities which support the conclusion. If someone is going to use a falsity to support a conclusion, they''ll probably use one which supports it well.
Quoting BlueBanana
Why would you say that? We can always make those claims, and often do. What I am saying is that if one makes such a claim, and is later proven wrong, then that person ought to admit to having been wrong, admit that the belief was unreasonable and unjustified, instead of trying to claim that the wrong belief really was "justified" or "reasonable", supported by other wrong beliefs. Such a failure to admit to having been wrong creates contradiction in what is meant by "reasonable" and "justified", and this allows deception to be reasonable and justified.
You could probably state such criteria, but you've already demonstrated that you'd be wrong. I prefer to maintain integrity, not insisting on the correctness of something already proven to be wrong.
There's always a possibility of being wrong, so can you claim that your belief is justified if that claim isn't justified? Then you couldn't make that claim. In your belief, you can't have an idea that can't be justified and be justified in making the claim that it is justified simply as the belief justified by the justification is believed to be justified.
Hmmm.
Here's another way to look at the issue. The word "reason" is ambiguous in an interesting way: we reason from our knowledge of effects to their causes and call those beliefs about effects our "reasons" for our belief about their causes; on the other hand, the cause is the "reason" for the effects. That I can see an iceberg is my reason for believing it's right in front of me; that an iceberg is right in front of me is the reason I can see it. We strive to perfect our conditionals, to believe that we can see iceberg right in front of us if, and only if, it's right in front of us. Thus our reasoning would be not a groping about in the dark, but our way of discovering the true structure of the universe, the real connections between things. We want to believe the universe is itself rational, has a rational structure, a structure we can come to understand through reasoning, a process of matching the movements of our minds to the movements of the universe without.
The interesting case is when we hold reasonable beliefs but derive from them a conclusion that turns out to be false. What has gone wrong? We have a choice: we could give up the vision sketched above, draw in our horns a bit, and take reason to be something we do, setting aside faith in the rational structure of the universe; or we could say that we must've failed, that reasoning that reaches a false conclusion cannot be "true reasoning" -- that the premises must only appear to support the conclusion but could not really support it.
Responses to Gettier along the lines of, "Well, he had a false belief -- garbage in, garbage out," rather miss the point, I think. Do we allow falsehoods to have real connections? Traditional logic says yes, valid but unsound, But how can this be? If our reasoning mirrors the rationality of the universe, those connections must also be only seemings, conditionals that cannot ever be perfected, for there is no truth underlying them.
For that belief to exist one would have to exist to believe it. Similarly
Quoting javra
in Descartes' argument, it's not the cause of the thought that is relevant. Even if the thought was thought by the evil demon, the one that holds the belief about thinking it, the one that is conscious of the thought and experiences it, must exist in order to do so.
I can agree on mathematics and most of logic being fallible though.
Quoting javra
I see this theory making sense: I've defined knowledge as a belief believed by the believer to be true and justified, and if I've understood you correctly, in that view the definition would be equivalent to that knowledge is a belief believed believed to be justified and believed by the believer to be true and justified.
Quoting javra
Ah, yes, in Russell's example the teapot is too small to have been perceived. But what if the teapot is not only small, but also invisible and does not interact with the Universe in any way - it can't be perceived and does not influence anything? How could its existence be proven even in theory?
Quoting javra
Not a problem at all.
Knowledge is justified, unfalisfied, true belief.
Gettier doesn't impress me. The fact we missed this detail is likely coincidental or even imaginary.
As a meta-example of what I’m saying: I uphold that fallibilism is true. It fallibilism is indeed a true belief (a belief which conforms to the ontic given which it references, namely our psychological/mental capacities), then it will be justifiable, at least in principle (it will not contradict any other epistemically established, believed truths and will cohere into such truths which are related). So here the onus is on me to justify that my belief is in fact ontically true (and not merely a believed truth that is in fact false, i.e. not true).
Some will uphold the Buddhist stance of no-self to signify that we do not exist--more particularly, that there is no ontic given which the pronoun "I" references. (Something which is not in keeping with what the Buddha stated; he said, “neither is there a self nor is there not a self” … or something along these lines, which need not be a contradiction if not at the same time or in the same way. More recently saw a documentary, “Compassion in Emptiness,” in which it is stanchly affirmed that self-worth is crucial for compassion—thereby acknowledging there being a self while yet maintaining a no-self thesis … different issue though.) As a different example, others will argue for one form or another of hard-determinism and, in so doing, will denounce all agency … as in “I did this (I caused this to happen)” or “Descartes thought things (Descartes caused his own particular thoughts to hold presence)" … which can also result in an argument against the presence of selves (minimally as pertains to the agency involved with thoughts, beliefs, interpretations (which are essential to the meaning/significance that either accompanies or is embedded with perceptions), etc.—and what is a self when deprived of all agency? … but I won’t play the devil’s advocate in arguing for this).
Feel like my hands are tied. I, for example, don’t want to rely upon a hard-determinist argument because I disagree with it. But I’ll conclude with this: until one can demonstrate with infallible certainty that all such alternatives are false, or impossible, there will remain some degree of possible error in our appraisals that we exist … even that anything exists (for it is we who make such appraisals).
Here’s a justifiable possibility (as compared to possibilities that are for example contradictory, thus unjustifiable, thus invalid--such as the possibility of a square composed of three sides) with which to more formally back this up: we humans are not the pinnacle of what intellect can existentially be, such that if our species survives some 100 millennia from now, it will then obtain some instances of knowledge which we currently cannot fathom. No one can prove a) that our species will go extinct and b) that 100 millennia from now some sapient descendent of our species will not discover some strongly justified alternative to our needing to be/exist (or to anything needing to be/exist). The very potential for such justifiable alternative being someday discovered in itself makes our current convictions that we exist less than perfectly secure from all possible error—therefore, our belief that we exist is yet technically fallible.
This is all taken to an extreme--though I so far find it to be a sound argument. But again, the onus is now on me to justify fallibilism as currently being ontically true (though maybe not at some future period of our awareness as sapient beings given all universal time that is yet to come … For, if fallibilism is currently true, the impossibility of this scenario could not be demonstrated with infallible certainty).
As you may notice, falliblism does away with the crutch of absolute/infallible subjective certainty. But this is not to say that it denies there being such a thing as the ontic, as well as conformity to that which is ontic.
Quoting BlueBanana
To keep this short for now: Why presume that such a teapot is an ontic given to begin with? If it’s not an ontic given, then all beliefs affirming its truth would be false … and thereby unjustifiable.
It's not the claim "this is justified" which makes a belief justified, it's to demonstrate the correctness of the belief to others and have them agree with the demonstration, as correct, which makes it a justified belief. One's claim that a belief is justified or not, is meaningless and irrelevant except in arguments of whether or not the belief has been justified. But anyone can claim any belief as justified, so I don't see your point.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
The issue I take against Gettier is that he seems to be arguing that an unsound (because it's based in a false premise) conclusion, may be a justified conclusion. I think that's contradictory nonsense. If you can honestly state that the conclusion is unsound then you cannot honestly state that it is a justified conclusion.
He doesn't argue for this position; he asks us to accept it as a premise. You don't.
The word "justified" is really not particularly important here -- you can substitute any epistemic virtue you like. What Gettier discovered is that if we assume, what seems reasonable, that material implication preserves epistemic virtue in much the same way it preserves truth, then it is trivial to construct counterexamples where our intuition is that the conclusion is not known even though it is believed, true, and has whatever virtue it inherited from the premise (that it is reasonable, rationally believed, that we have warrant to believe it, that we are justified in believing it, whatever). What the conclusion doesn't inherit from the premise is truth -- that it usually gets somewhere else.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In the Gettier literature this is the "no false lemmas" view, I believe. So you would say that material implication only preserves epistemic virtue when the premise is true. I'm inclined to disagree. If I have good reason to believe my keys are in the kitchen, then I have good reason to believe they're in my house. If I can't say that sort of thing, of what use is material implication?
I think you'll have to lay out for me what you mean by "material implication". In any case, you don't seem to be getting at the point here. The issue is not the relationship between truth and epistemic virtue, it concerns the relationship between falsity and epistemic virtue.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Again, this does not address the point. It is implied by the op, that Gettier believes that a particular argument is an unsound argument (having a false premise), and he also believes that the conclusion of this argument is a justified conclusion. This is what I see as irrational. If you recognize that the argument uses an incorrect premise, you cannot recognize the conclusion as justified. Your example of a conditional is irrelevant because it doesn't utilize a false premise.
Just the usual. I think Gettier actually talks about "entailment" but it's not clear whether he means something special by that. We can come back to this.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Let's start there. How do you know the premise isn't false?
All I said was "IF I have good reason to believe my keys are in the kitchen, THEN I have good reason to believe they're in my house." I think this conditional is true whether or not I do in fact have good reason to believe my keys are in the kitchen. Do you disagree?
Let's vary the example slightly. Suppose I remember leaving my keys in the same place I always do, and that memory is veridical, I really did that. There's my reason for believing they're where they usually are. Now I could be wrong -- maybe I'm forgetting that later I put them in my coat pocket when I went out. I still have reason to believe they're where I usually leave them, just not conclusive reason. Does that reason suddenly become conclusive if I didn't move them later? Do you see anything here, in either case, you'd consider me justified believing?
The Gettier version would be this: you grab my keys to head out, recognize your mistake and put them back, all unbeknownst to me. Now I have that original reason to believe the keys are where I left them, and they are, but now my belief about where my keys are is true by luck.
That's irrelevant, what I'm talking about is when one believes that the premise is false, and also that the conclusion drawn from it is justified. Look at the op. Gettier believes that a person has a false belief, belief (a), from which a conclusion is drawn, belief (b). It is stated (1), that belief (b) is justified. My claim is that it is impossible to believe that a conclusion drawn from a belief which is believed to be false, is a justified conclusion. An unsound argument is not justifiable. Therefore the proposition (1) is nothing better than irrational nonsense at the best, or outright deception at the worst.
What about just the premise?
Is it possible (whatever you mean by "possible") for me to believe that your claim is reasonable but wrong?
No. Do you think that being wrong could be reasonable? Isn't this how we define "unreasonable", as wrong? I think so. And if unreasonable is wrong, then how could wrong be reasonable? To say that something which is wrong is reasonable is simply contradictory. By designating it as "wrong" you are declaring it unreasonable.
My so far favorite Gettier case is this one (I’ve only read about Gettier cases online):
Quoting Stephen Hetherington
I find it far more realistic than most others. For the record, I too sponsor a no false lemmas resolution to the Gettier problem. If a premise or observation is false, that it cannot be rationally used to obtain a true conclusion, thereby making all Gettier cases epistemically unjustifiable derivative beliefs that, thereby, are held due to luck and are hence not instances of knowledge.
But in saying that, this quoted example illustrates the tentative nature of what we presume, or uphold, to be knowledge. Such that were you or I to be in the same position, we’d of course maintain that we knew that the match would light (in absence of the information regarding the specific match we pick and of the perfectly timed jolt of Q-radiation [have no idea what this is but I’m rolling with it]).
As the IEP article points out, one problem with the no false evidence resolution is that it can result in methodological doubt of what is true knowledge (the one form of skepticism which has been commonly understood for some time by the term, “skepticism”). Yet to the other form of skepticism that is subjectively certain/sure of there not being anything which is demonstrably infallible (the non-Cartesian form of skepticism which holds no doubts about this being so—e.g., Pyrrho, Academic, Cicero, Hume, etc.—not here addressing the subsequent differences between these--a form of which Descartes was not), the technically tentative nature of knowns is just an intrinsic aspect of what knowing is all about. Yes, like many in history, this second form can wind its way towards a negating fallibilism where all knowledge becomes denied, but here I’m addressed a Pragmatist-like stance of a positing fallibilism (illustrated, for example, by Cicero and Hume … and, in at least some measure, the Pragmatist Pierce who came up with the term “fallibilism” [ I haven’t read his works to figure out if the guy was a closet skeptic]).
So in looking back at the example, most everything we do and know could hold intervening causal elements that are not those which we use to epistemically justify our knowledge. But until we discover that our premises are false, we then hold all the reasoning in the world to conclude that we know.
That said, in Gettier’s Case I, for example, one here discovers that one was wrong in that which is used to justify the conclusion … so, again, I agree that the conclusion here is then not knowledge.
Have you got an example of this?
You mean belief 'a' is falsely confirmed by a co-incidence of fact.
Like a black cat walked across my path and I subsequently tripped over and broke my leg, falsely confirming the black cats are unlucky?
post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.
Depends on the justification surely? If I continued to have bad luck after seeing black cat it could be confirmation bias. Eventually I'd have to ignore the sighting of a black cat that was not followed by bad luck.
No, the reason for a is not specified in the example, although iirc, the example was given of the employer telling Smith that they're going to hire Jones.
Quoting charleton
I don't see the connection tbh.
Uh... No. No. No.
Read the paper...
1) I have abelief that black cats are unlucky.
2) One walks across my path.
3) After that I break my leg.
4) I know justify my belief that black cats are unlucky because I broke my leg. Justifed and believed true. JTB
However the breaking of the leg and the cat are not connected, therefore JTB is false.
How is your example different?
Your example doesn't seem at all like a Gettier case. In Gettier cases, the general form is:
1. P is justified
2. P entails Q
3. Q is true
4. P is false
What are P and Q in your example?
[i]a person called Smith is applying for a job.
Another person, Jones, whom is known to have 10 coins in his pocket, is applying for the job as well,
and Smith (for a justified reason) believes Jones will get the job. This is the belief a.
The conclusion b is that the person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket.
What happens is that Smith himself gets the job, but also, although he didn't know this, had 10 coins in his pocket.[/i]
How does P entail Q in this example. Having 10 coins in your pocket is not relevant to employment opportunities and so that would mean that P does not entail Q.
P is "Jones will get the job and has 10 coins in his pocket" and Q is "the person who gets the job has 10 coins in his pocket".
If P is true then Q is true. P entails Q.
Neither of those examples deserves the words "justified" or "entails".
Maybe Gettier expressed the situation more clearly?
So unless there is a more convincing example I'll bow out.
What about when multiple premises are concerned? I am justified in believing a, I am justified in believing b, and c follows from a and b. Am I justified in believing c?
A particular counterexample is that of a lottery. Given the high odds, I am justified in believing that any given ticket won't win. But I am not justified in believing that no ticket will win, even though that no ticket will win follows from the conjunction of each given ticket not winning.
Perhaps we just need the additional qualification that ¬c isn't justified?
Hmmmm.
1. Is there a hidden premise here that some ticket will win? Because the way the big lotteries work here in the States, it's quite common for no ticket to win for months, and that's how the jackpot grows into hundreds of millions.
2. Given some such premise, you just have to be careful with quantifiers and sums, I think. If you have ye olde urn of a hundred marbles, 99 white and 1 black, the chances of having drawn a black marble are 1/100 for as many individual trials as you'd like, but obviously if you draw more marbles per trial your chances are better, right up to guaranteed success if you draw all of them. I don't think there's a problem here.
((Btw, this slippage from individual to collective can be really interesting. It's thought one of the earliest examples of a game-theoretical problem is a story somewhere in Plato about a soldier who reasons thus: we're either going to win or lose this battle; my participation can't make much difference to the outcome and I run the risk of dying; therefore I should desert. The reasoning isn't bad for an individual, but doesn't scale up very nicely.))
Yes, sorry.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Let's say that 100 people have each picked out a ball. Given the high odds, I am justified in believing that Person 1 doesn't have the black ball. But then I am also justified in believing that Person 2 doesn't have the black ball, given that he is just as unlikely to have it as Person 1. And the same for each individual person.
It's perhaps explained better here:
Right, I had forgotten about this.
My hot take is still that this is a muddle that arises from ambiguity over what constitutes a trial. The closure principle relied on here is no substitute for doing the math right. That can mean the math seems counterintuitive (e.g., the Monty Hall problem), and that's interesting as a fact about our epistemic biases but nothing more.
Maybe @fdrake could chime in.
I'll think about it some more...
P(at least one ticket wins) = 1
P(any particular ticket does not win)=very high
Keep multiplying 'very highs' together, they're all <1, and you end up with 'very low' - IE, take enough tickets and you can become very confident that your selection of tickets contains the winner.
Trying to map probabilistic reasoning, which in some respects is an uncountably infinite valued logic, onto a set with two values 'is justified' or 'is not justified' corresponding to probability thresholds doesn't really represent anything about our reasoning. This kind of logic always has difficulties dealing with iterated disjunction and conjunction. If you take many 'very certain' things together conjunctively (they all must happen), you end up with 'very uncertain', if you take many 'very uncertain' things together disjunctively (at least 1 must happen) you get something 'very certain'.
You are justified in believing any particular ticket loses, you are not justified in believing the entire sample of tickets loses; especially if it's set up a priori that there is always and only 1 winner.
Always and only 1 winner is the same as 'if you take them all, the probability that you take the winner is 1', if there isn't an 'all' then the probability that a sample of size n contains the winner is a function of n and the probability of winning the bet for each ticket (under the usual equiprobability assumptions this is obtained by the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution with n trials up to k successes with ticket winning probability p).
It's true that you're not justified in believing that the entire sample of tickets loses, and I think that shows that justification isn't necessarily inherited, which is the issue under consideration.
If a is justified, b is justified, c is justified, and d follows from a, b, and c then d is not necessarily justified.
So epistemic closure for justification can fail where there are multiple premises. Presumably because, as you say, for each additional premise the degree of justification for the set decreases.
Wait -- does it? I think in this case, it's that the inference that would preserve justification is faulty. (You just can't go from "each individually" to "all taken together" like that. It's like the Logic 101 example of inferring there's someone everyone loves from everyone loving someone.)
Assuming a lottery of n tickets, the premises are:
P1. Ticket 1 won't win
P2. Ticket 2 won't win
P3. Ticket 3 won't win
...
Pn. Ticket n won't win
From this we can deduce:
C1. No ticket will win
It's a valid inference.
It's deductively valid to conclude that no ticket will win when you have evaluated whether each and every ticket wins or does not win, and all evaluate as not win. IE P1,P2,...,Pn derives P1 & P2 & ... & Pm when and only when m is less than or equal to n. IE, when each each ticket has been observed and evaluated as not winning (also a purely technical thing with the indices on the left and right of the sequent, must pick out the same tickets). If there are unobserved tickets, that makes m>n and it's no longer a deductively valid inference.
If there are unobserved tickets - or equivalently if the subject does not know the set of observed tickets is an exhaustive set containing a winner - the subject reasons differently. In the cases where the subject has no reason to believe there's not exactly one winner in all the tickets or they are given a subset of tickets they can evaluate how likely the subset is to contain any number of winners if they also know the probabilities that each ticket wins.
Ensuring that there is exactly one winner requires giving out the entire set of tickets and that the entire set of tickets contains one winner.
How the subject can reason depends heavily on their beliefs about the lottery and whether those beliefs are true; also whether the subject is equipped with the reasoning tools to evaluate probabilities in general. If the subject knows the mathematical structure of the lottery and their sub-sample of tickets they can assign probabilities. If they don't, they can't.
Note that the belief that 'I'll never win' is deduced from knowledge of the lottery's structure. A set of true enough empirical/contingent facts about the lottery set up and their mathematical implications. Rather than requiring the purchase of many tickets to furnish the belief with evidence.
The conclusion doesn't follow. Validity is a component of deductive arguments not inductive arguments. I think the way one should look at this argument is the following:
As each ticket is bought it increases the probability of winning, so the conclusion that follows from P1, P2, P3...Pn does not lead to the conclusion that "No ticket will win." It leads to the conclusion that one or more tickets will win. In an inductive argument, as the number of supporting premises increases so does the strength of the conclusion (e.g., it increases the probability of winning). Obviously if you buy ten tickets it would be a weak inductive argument to say that the next ticket you buy will be a winner. However, if I buy 100 million tickets, then you strengthen the probability of justifying the conclusion that you will win.
Are you justified in believing that if you buy 100 million tickets that you will win? It depends, if the chance of you winning is 1 in 110 million, then you are justified. Even if you lose, you were still justified in believing you would win, because of the strength of the justification. Most of what we claim to know is based on inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning doesn't require that you know with absolute certainty. Not that you're claiming this, I'm just making further points.
Because you cannot rule out the possibility that any of these people have the ball you are not justified in believing that any one of them doesn't have the ball. Until you rule out the possibility that X is the case you are not justified in believing X is not the case. The justified belief is X is probably not the case. Likewise, with the lottery, if one has a ticket, the belief that this person will not win is not justified. That's why people buy tickets, the belief "I will not win" is not justified despite the low odds. However, "I will probably not win is justified".
Quoting BlueBanana
To the above I wrote:
Then came this...
Quoting BlueBanana
Uh, no it's not. The differences matter tremendously. That's why the charge of 'nitpicking' reveals neglect on your part to take note of them and why they matter.
No skin off my nose. I was enjoying the discussion you were having about fallibilism/infallibilism...
It does. If for each ticket "this ticket won't win" is true then no ticket will win.
What's really the difference? How do they matter? Smith justifiedly believes in one outcome and the other one happens.
I disagree with your claim that justification requires certainty, as we discussed earlier. If someone shows me some ID and if the ID shows them to be 18 then I am justified in believing that they are 18, even though it isn't certain as the ID might be fake.
As a rough definition I would say that my belief that X is true is justified if, given the evidence available to me, there is a high probability that X is true. In the case of the lottery example, given my understanding that the odds that any given ticket will win is 1/n, and given that 1/n is a very low probability, my belief that any given ticket won't win is justified.
While it's true that for each ticket that ticket won't win, it's not true that if you buy P1, P2, P3,...Pn that no ticket will win. That's like saying if I buy every possible ticket, no ticket will win, again it doesn't follow.
That wasn't my argument, though. My argument was that if P1 won't win and if P2 won't win and if P3 won't win ... and if Pn won't win then no ticket will win.
There are different degrees of certainty which are appropriate for the different fields of study. Aristotle explained this in his Nicomachean Ethics. Theoretical knowledge requires a higher degree of certainty than practical knowledge. What is being discussed in this thread is knowledge in theory, justified true belief. When you bring an example such as you have, saying I would be justified in believing X, in Z situation, you conflate practise with theory. You, knowing X, in Z situation, is an instance of practical knowledge, when justified true belief is concerned with knowledge in theory, epistemology.
The problem with introducing examples of practise into theory is that theory does not deal with the particularities of the various situations. You can never specify all the particulars of a situation of practise, in a theory. So in reality you cannot claim to be justified in your belief that the person is over 18, just because they showed you ID. The ID might be clearly fake, or the person might be a 5 year old with an older person's ID. Such examples, which attempt to introduce practise into theory are just examples of category mistake.
Perhaps the real issue of this thread is a failure to distinguish between knowing-how (practical knowledge), and knowing-that (theoretical knowledge). Such a failure will lead to the conclusion that there is no such thing as certainty because the skeptic can always find an example to make mistake possible.
If all your saying is that no one ticket will win, obviously that's true, but the argument doesn't appear to be saying that.
The argument is:
P1. Ticket 1 won't win
P2. Ticket 2 won't win
P3. Ticket 3 won't win
P4. There are 3 tickets
C. No ticket will win
(Except with more than 3 tickets, obviously).
What about the person who just knows they have the winning ticket?
Have you ever seen the game show "Deal or No Deal?" Fascinating exercise in probability which in its heyday sparked long math debates on the internet. You could always see someone on there turning down hundreds of thousands of dollars because they just knew they had picked the case with a million dollars in it.
Those people drove me nuts. Only time I was tempted to yell at the television. "No you don't! You don't know any such thing! It's random! Take the money!"
The more we talk about this example, the more I'm inclined to agree with @Metaphysician Undercover that you are no more justified in claiming that a given ticket will not win than you would be in claiming that a given ticket will.
In the lottery case, the urge to say "Just do the math" is almost overwhelming. 1 in 3.2 billion is a small number but it's not 0. It's just not, and saying that it is is just wrong.
What about the chair I'm sitting in? Is there a vanishingly small but non-zero chance it will disappear as I sit here, or turn into pudding, or whatever? Maybe? The difference is that knowing how lotteries and probability work, we know the mechanism responsible for uncertainty. Even if I'm a good Humean and accept that my knowledge of this chair is only probable, I think we should still call my beliefs about it justified because an unknown mechanism having unforeseeable consequences can have no place in our reasoning. Only probable, yes, but still justified because the only factors I have not taken into account are factors I cannot possibly know anything about.
Gettier cases frequently rely on coincidence. We all have lots of experience of coincidence, but no experience predicting the occurrence of a coincidence. Hence, the subjects in Gettier cases have beliefs that are indeed only probable, but still justified.
I would think it acceptable to say that my belief that they are 18 is justified because the probability that it's a fake is very low. Are you saying that such a belief isn't justified – indeed that I'm not justified in believing anything I'm told because it relies merely on the probability that I'm being told the truth? That strikes me as untenable.
No I'm inclined to agree with you, because I take the justification to be a practical thing. It's a matter of applying your knowledge of circumstances in the way members of your epistemic community do. In retail, for instance, you exercise slightly more caution accepting large bills than you do as the customer at a bank because it's a known fact that people try to pass counterfeit bills at stores. If you have no reason to think someone's ID is fake, and if members of your epistemic community would as a rule see no reason to think the ID is fake, then I think you're justified in assuming the ID is genuine, even though you know there is a non-zero chance that it's not.
Then what makes the ID example different to the lottery ticket example? We're justified in believing that the ID isn't fake because the probability that it is is high, but we're not justified in believing that the lottery ticket won't win even though the probability that it will is high?
I think you're being too casual with the word "probability" there, is all.
If there are 500 million government-issued ID cards in the US, and an additional, say, 200,000 fake IDs, does that mean the odds of any given ID being a fake are about 3.8%? No, of course not. Because IDs don't randomly appear. The driver's license in my wallet came directly from the Georgia Department of Transportation; I don't have to wonder if it might be a fake.
But if you're the owner of a bar, and some kid presents you with an ID showing that they're of legal drinking age, then you might have a responsibility to look closely at that ID. As with counterfeit, that's a situation where people are known to present a fake ID and we know why they do it.
EDIT: dropped some 0's, but never mind that.
This argument I can agree with, but it's more complicated than that. Here we're talking about what's probably the case, and the inductive argument above is weak, so the conclusion that no ticket will win follows. However, if my argument is based on P1, P2, P3...P4 (P4 being the total number of tickets bought, viz., 1.2 x 10^8), out of a possible number of possibilities of 1.5 x 10^8, then what conclusion do you think follows? It certainly isn't that C. No ticket will win. It's then probable (my e.g.) that you have a winning ticket based on the number of tickets you've bought in relation to the total number of possible combinations.
The question then arises, "Are you justified in believing that you have a winning ticket?" The answer is, you are justified in believing that you have a winning ticket, i.e., it's based on what's probably the case. Much of our knowledge is like this, I can say, "I know..." based on what's probably the case, not what's necessarily the case. It's another use of the word know, this somewhat connects to what's already been talked about in this thread.
Part of the problem with Gettier is that there seems to be a disconnect between how we define knowledge (JTB for e.g.), and a claim to knowledge, as you know they are very different animals.
I'm not sure how this relates to my point, though.
All I'm saying is that the above argument follows, but the conclusion would change based on the number of tickets bought. Originally you included P4 as Pn, which would mean a range of possible numbers, and its this range which would change the conclusion. The conclusion that no ticket will win depends on the range of Pn, and if the range is high enough, then your conclusion would be false. It's true, given this e.g., but it may be false given your other example. If this doesn't relate to your point, then I'm not sure what you're saying.
This was my original argument:
Assume a lottery of n tickets.
P1. Ticket 1 won't win
P2. Ticket 2 won't win
P3. Ticket 3 won't win
...
Pn. Ticket n won't win
From this we can deduce:
C1. No ticket will win
It's exactly the same as the above, except there are n tickets rather than 3. The reasoning is the same regardless of the number of tickets.
I so far find the concept of possibility to be very obnoxious. To me it seems to be equivocated all over the place within realms of philosophy but, like so many others, I haven’t been able to satisfactorily make peace with it on a philosophical level—i.e., to figure out how it is equivocated.
To illustrate (via what to me a semi-humorous example): Is it possible to be struck by lightning during the time when bit by a shark while holding a winning lottery ticket in one’s pocket? This form of possibility to me is a different beast than that of a vanishing chair. I can’t come up with any contradictions involved in such a thing happening. Yet, without crunching numbers, the improbability of this first mentioned occurrence is so extreme as to make the occurrence utterly noncredible. So here I conclude it to be a justifiable but noncredible, existential possibility. There’s so many of these that it’s not worth mentioning.
With the vanishing chair, however, I’m venturing that contradictions between believed truths would need to occur for this possibility to be valid. But this would falsify at least some of these believed truths (a set likely including laws of nature, etc. together with that of the vanishing chair possibility). Therefore, such conceivable possibilities might likely be invalid due to contradictions.To me this comes close to the BIV hypothesis being upheld as valid possibility by some; though not by me and I presume not by most others.
In addressing a lottery ticket on its own, that there is some possibility of winning a lottery—as MU has argued—is justifiable (a lot more so than the possibility of lightning + shark + lottery ticket, since the former is more probable than the latter). But then we venture into the likewise nebulous world of credibility. Whether or not the possibility of winning a lottery ticket is credible will depend on the character of the individual. Las Vegas is all about people finding such possibility credible.
Here, you can have a series of premises stating "it is credible that ticket n might (/will?) win".
Don't know how the altered premises would work out. I mainly wanted to draw some distinction between possibilities which we appraise to be validly noncontradictory and those conceivable possibilities which stand a good chance of being contradictory if enquired into deeply enough, this apropos the vanishing chair example.
I think I'm largely with you here, with the proviso that we do have experiences that falsify our beliefs sometimes. (And of course science sets out to produce just such experiences.) So while self-contradiction might rule out a possibility, contradicting some belief or beliefs of ours does not.
And I come back also to the sense of an epistemic community with shared norms of evidence and rationality. Those are, similarly, not absolute.
I'm in agreement. While this isn’t a formal argument, one could I think devise an argument against BIV along these lines for example: BIVs are a possibility of what ontically is resulting from all first-hand experiences of what ontically is; yet the BIV hypothesis contradicts the reality of all first hand experiences in fact being of that which is ontic; hence, either BIV or not-BIV where BIV results in logical contradictions and not-BIV does not. Therefore, not-BIV is justified whereas BIV is not. Anyways, something along these lines would make, I believe, possibilities such as that of BIVs invalid. (if there are rebuttals to this informal argument, I'm not going to try to more formally uphold it)
The ID example is different from the lottery example. One consists purely of odds, the other there is a person and ID to be judged. What justifies "the person is over 18" is the time of birth until now. Strictly speaking, the ID does not justify, it's a substitute, a representation of the time of birth, which serves the purpose, in practise.
The criteria for justification is specific to the particular situation at hand, and the person judging, and that is why I could not answer creativesoul's request for the criteria for justification. You use the ID, and appeal to the "odds" that it is correct, in an attempt to justify your claim to the time of birth, just like you use odds in your attempt to justify your claim to "this ticket will not win". Whether or not your claim is actually justified is a matter of the discretion of those who judge your argument. But there is more to judging ID than an appeal to odds, and since you have not produced the person, and the ID, so that we can judge the authenticity, we cannot judge your justification on this matter. We are familiar with the odds in lotteries, and some participants here think that your claim "this ticket will not win" is justified, I do not. All you demonstrate here is a difference between those who buy lottery tickets and those who do not.
All the premises are justified, but that doesn't mean they're true. You forgot
P(n+1). One of the P(1,2,...,n) is false.