A Question about the Particle-Wave Duality in QM
Some time back, I posted a question on Physics Forum, and a similar one on Physics Stack Exchange.
Basically the question comes out of discussions I had here about the famous double-slit experiment, and the implications of the so-called 'interference pattern' (a primer can be found on Youtube.)
The question was about the fact that the interference pattern that appears on the screen in the double-slit experiment is rate-independent. That is: up to a certain point, regardless of at what rate particles are fired, the interference pattern will be the same. Given an identical set-up, it could not be determined at what rate the particles had been fired in order to produce two observed interference patterns. So I am interested in the implications of the fact of this 'rate independence'
Now in the first of the two Forum responses above, the initial point - about the identity of the results - was acknowledged without any objections.
But I then introduced the argument that this shows that the 'wave equation' is independent of time (and therefore space, as I had understood these two to be related as 'space-time' in relativistic physics). I said, in particular, that 'what is causing the interference pattern is outside, or not a function of, space-time'.
But as soon as I said that, my argument was designated as 'gobbledegook' on Physics Forum. The objection was that 'The fact that time is not a factor has no relation to the fact that space is a factor', and also that 'The particles move in space-time. The double slit and the detector are in space-time. There is nothing outside of space-time.'
But what I'm arguing is 'outside space time' is the cause which actually produces the interference pattern. It is a real 'distribution of probabilities', but it's not 'in' some medium. It is an attribute of reality itself, like a pattern of tendencies. This is unlike the 'pilot wave' theory, because Bohm's 'pilot wave' is proposed to be physical. Whereas the so-called 'probability wave' is not actually physical - hence my argument that it is outside space and time. (It's literally meta-physical - hence the sharp reaction from the physicist, in my opinion.)
After a bit of to-and-fro, it was agreed that 'the pattern is not dependent on the rate', which is really what I wanted to establish.
The response on Physics Stack Exchange was that:
'The independence of an interference pattern produced by a given number of photons from the time required for those photons to be registered is simply further confirmation of the assertion that each "interferes with itself" ' - which personally I find an absurd explanation, even though it is one of the expressions that is commonly used.
Since posing these questions, I have found another OP - Quantum mysteries dissolve if possibilities are realities: Spacetime events and objects aren’t all that exists, new interpretation suggests. This OP says:
Now, you see, I think they're talking about exactly what I was getting at in my post - they are saying 'extraspatiotemporal', I simply said 'outside space and time'. But it means the same.
I think what it signifies is that 'potentia' are real, but they're not actualised. Whereas, modern philosophy tends to regards 'existence' as having a binary value - something either exists, or it doesn't; something can't be 'potentially real' anywhere outside the mind. Possibilities don't actually exist, we would say; but, think again!
But I would deeply appreciate some feedback by the more physics-educated contributors, such as @Apokrisis and @AndrewK, on such points.
__//|\\__
Wayfarer
Basically the question comes out of discussions I had here about the famous double-slit experiment, and the implications of the so-called 'interference pattern' (a primer can be found on Youtube.)
The question was about the fact that the interference pattern that appears on the screen in the double-slit experiment is rate-independent. That is: up to a certain point, regardless of at what rate particles are fired, the interference pattern will be the same. Given an identical set-up, it could not be determined at what rate the particles had been fired in order to produce two observed interference patterns. So I am interested in the implications of the fact of this 'rate independence'
Now in the first of the two Forum responses above, the initial point - about the identity of the results - was acknowledged without any objections.
But I then introduced the argument that this shows that the 'wave equation' is independent of time (and therefore space, as I had understood these two to be related as 'space-time' in relativistic physics). I said, in particular, that 'what is causing the interference pattern is outside, or not a function of, space-time'.
But as soon as I said that, my argument was designated as 'gobbledegook' on Physics Forum. The objection was that 'The fact that time is not a factor has no relation to the fact that space is a factor', and also that 'The particles move in space-time. The double slit and the detector are in space-time. There is nothing outside of space-time.'
But what I'm arguing is 'outside space time' is the cause which actually produces the interference pattern. It is a real 'distribution of probabilities', but it's not 'in' some medium. It is an attribute of reality itself, like a pattern of tendencies. This is unlike the 'pilot wave' theory, because Bohm's 'pilot wave' is proposed to be physical. Whereas the so-called 'probability wave' is not actually physical - hence my argument that it is outside space and time. (It's literally meta-physical - hence the sharp reaction from the physicist, in my opinion.)
After a bit of to-and-fro, it was agreed that 'the pattern is not dependent on the rate', which is really what I wanted to establish.
The response on Physics Stack Exchange was that:
'The independence of an interference pattern produced by a given number of photons from the time required for those photons to be registered is simply further confirmation of the assertion that each "interferes with itself" ' - which personally I find an absurd explanation, even though it is one of the expressions that is commonly used.
Since posing these questions, I have found another OP - Quantum mysteries dissolve if possibilities are realities: Spacetime events and objects aren’t all that exists, new interpretation suggests. This OP says:
“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extraspatiotemporal domain of quantum possibility,” write Ruth Kastner, Stuart Kauffman and Michael Epperson.
Now, you see, I think they're talking about exactly what I was getting at in my post - they are saying 'extraspatiotemporal', I simply said 'outside space and time'. But it means the same.
I think what it signifies is that 'potentia' are real, but they're not actualised. Whereas, modern philosophy tends to regards 'existence' as having a binary value - something either exists, or it doesn't; something can't be 'potentially real' anywhere outside the mind. Possibilities don't actually exist, we would say; but, think again!
But I would deeply appreciate some feedback by the more physics-educated contributors, such as @Apokrisis and @AndrewK, on such points.
__//|\\__
Wayfarer
Comments (309)
So it is the fact that the entire apparatus is kept constant over space and time that roots the interference pattern in space and time. If you fire enough identical particles at the slits, the same interaction between particle and path will be repeated. And so the interference pattern this will cumulative generate will slowly be revealed.
Space-time metaphysics (that all it is) is irrelevant to quantum and current quantum scientific activity is working to replace it, so why lose any sleep over it? As it turns out, Bohm mechanics reconciles the wave patterns without resorting to "wave collapses" in space-time.
I agree with you. I don't find the phrase 'interferes with itself' meaningful or helpful.
My current way of looking at it (it has changed in the past, and likely will again in the future) is that the wave part is a probability field for a photon striking the screen. With one slit, that probability field is strongest in the centre of the screen and decreases as we move away from there. With two slits, the field strength has an undulating profile as we move across the screen, with peaks and troughs. We call the peaks 'bars'.
If we dim the light, the probabilities decrease, but the fields retain their shape - single blotch or series of bars according to whether there is one or two slits. The blotch or bars are just weaker.
In any given small region Photon strikes appear by a random process (a Poisson process) whose frequency parameter ('probability') is the average field strength in that region. This builds up the pattern over time - quickly if the light is strong and slowly if it is weak ('slow photon rate'). There is no expected difference between the pattern built up from a constant light source over period of length T and that built up from a light source one millionth as strong over a period of one million times T.
This explanation satisfies me, without having to introduce any notion of photons interfering with one another, let alone with themselves. The interference is between the probability fields of the two slits - the 'waves' as some might put it.
Indeed. I approach this by regarding 'laws of nature' as descriptive rather than prescriptive. That way they do not need ontological classification. They are a just a tool we use to visualise what is going on and to make predictions. I accept that many, possibly most, people find that unsatisfying.
If one wanted to attribute an ontological status to the probability field, what do you think of regarding it as some sort of Kantian noumenon? We can never observe the probability field itself, only phenomena that arise from it (photon strikes). That sounds a bit noumenish to me, but I'm a bit of a noumenon newbie (just had to find a way to get that phrase in there).
What struck me about the fact of 'rate independence' is that it shows the idea of 'the wave' is actually a metaphor - it's not as if the probability wave is an actual wave, because it is not defined by time. What other waves are there, that are not time-related? And yet, it appears to have actual consequences. That's what is interesting about it.
Here is an exchange from the Stack Exchange post about this:
Quoting andrewk
Are you familiar with D'Espagnat?
[quote=Bernard D'Espagnat]What quantum mechanics tells us, I believe, is surprising to say the least. It tells us that the basic components of objects – the particles, electrons, quarks etc. – cannot be thought of as "self-existent". The reality that they, and hence all objects, are components of is merely "empirical reality".
This reality is something that, while not a purely mind-made construct as radical idealism would have it, can be but the picture our mind forces us to form of ... Of what ? The only answer I am able to provide is that underlying this empirical reality is a mysterious, non-conceptualisable "ultimate reality", not embedded in space and (presumably) not in time either [url=https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2009/mar/17/templeton-quantum-entanglement]
1[/url].[/quote]
It's significant that he uses this term 'self-existent', as that is actually from Buddhism, which says that all phenomenal entities (this would include 'atoms') are not self-existent but are produced.
D'Espagnat's books on Physics and Philosophy go into these questions in a lot of depth - more than I can understand, unfortunately.
The other interesting person is Ruth Kastner, who I mentioned above. She is developing an idea of Heisenberg's, that 'the real' includes entities which exist only as 'potentia'.
Thanks for your suggestions here, but not really what I was trying to understand. I mean, the fact of there being paths and interference is not at issue, what I am interested in is the nature of the so-called 'probability wave'. I do understand this to be an outstanding issue in current philosophy of physics. I think actually it's a pointer to the interface between physics and metaphysics, but I'm pretty hazy on a lot of the detail.
It is not some actual material wave hitting the screen. It is a description of predictable observables with a "wave-like" evolution in time.
In the same way, a quantum field is not a material field. It is a field-like description of observables.
Of course we then want to impute some kind of underlying reality that generates these observables. That is where all the interpretive machinery comes in, like physical pilot waves or spooky non-local connections.
So we can interpret the formalism in all sorts of metaphysical ways, the majority of which are then "bad" metaphysics. We would criticise them on grounds like that they are too profligate (many worlds), or too concrete (Bohmian mechanics).
It is fair enough to seek some kind of mental picture of what is "really going" on underneath the covers. However calling the evolution of a set of observables a "probability wave" is misleading as there is no actual wave in a material sense. It is just the pattern we see in our abstract model of how the probabilities of the situation will unfold.
Well that's your metaphysics and can be rejected for being too "nothing".
Bohmian Mechanics is real. The quantum potential wave field is real. The "particles" (actually field wave perturbations) are real. Action at a distance is built-in and predicted by the model. The delayed choice is easily explained without resorting to "going back in time". The only thing going for Copenhagen is that it v is so embedded into quantum textbooks that it would be an embarrassment for scientists when it is finally tossed out. And tossed out it will be, because unlike the West, China is not married to an antiquated model and is streaming full speed ahead into all types of quantum technology that will leave the Western nations in the dust. Recently they measured that action at a distance is at b least 10,000 times the speed of light and may very well be instantaneous as predicted by the Bohmian model. They have also successfully b verified entanglement from a satellite which b is the basis for a new encryption technology they are building.
I think one source of the confusion that often arises here is that we can predict the interference pattern using classical wave theory, ie avoiding QM altogether. In that case we are using actual electromagnetic waves emanating through the two slits. Then at each point on the screen the wave manifests as complementary sinusoidal variations in electric and magnetic potential over time. The result of the two waves interfering is that the amplitude of those variations on the screen varies as we move across the screen, giving high amplitude in the middle of the light bars and low amplitude in the dark bars. In that analysis the EM waves are moving in both time and space. But the static 'probability wave' of QM plays no part in this calculation, even though they give the same results.
It is often forgotten that the double-slit experiment is entirely explainable using classical electromagnetic wave theory. QM is only needed to explain various tricky variations of the experiment, such as the one you describe where photons may appear at the screen a rate of only one per second.
Coming from you, that's rich.
Quoting Rich
So reality is both fully deterministic and fundamentally tychic in your book? An interesting twist on quantum crackpottery.
Nope. Totally 100% wrong again.
The expert speaks.
The thing is the self-proclaimed expert is 100% wrong. Not even a modicum of study or understanding of Bohm's works. How did you put it? Too concrete. No where near the flights of imagination like other theories?
Therefore, maybe the observation in the OP confirms the latter rather than invites speculation about anything metaphysical.
I really don't think that physics has an adequate concept of time. We know that the past consists of events which have already occurred, and the future consists of things which may happen (possibilities), while activity occurs at the present. Physics doesn't seem to have any principles which make sense of these facts.
Quoting andrewk
Well, my question is quite specific. To recap, on the Physics forum, this was the sequence of questions I asked:
Q: So you could set up the [double-slit] experiment at various rates, and produce the 'interference pattern', and then send a copy of the patterns to a physicist, and the physicist wouldn't be able to deduce the rate at which the particles were fired?
A To get the an interference pattern that builds up the individual objects in the 'ensemble' must be identically prepared. A different ensemble, for instance having higher energies per particle, will give a different interference pattern. The gaps/bands will be smaller.
Q: But you could prepare it in such a way that the interference pattern would remain the same regardless of the rate at which the particles are fired?
A: Yes. 24 hours at 1 per second would give the same pattern as 1 second of 86400.
Q: Interesting! So energy is a significant variable - if you vary the energy, you vary the resulting pattern - but rate is not. Would that be a valid conclusion, all else being equal?
A : Yes, but only up to the point where the rate is so high that the interaction between different electrons can no longer be neglected.
Q: The argument that started this was about whether this means that time (being 'rate') is not a factor; which also that means that space (i.e. proximity of particles) is not a factor (as proximity is an aspect of space-time.) So, what is causing the interference pattern is outside, or not a function of, space-time.
A: Sorry, but this is gobbledygook.
So my question to you is: do you think my inference that 'what is causing the interference pattern is outside, or not a function of, space-time' is indeed 'gobbledygook'? Or do you think it's a valid inference?
Your approach is confusing as you start off suggesting that rate ought to matter. So your mental picture seems to be that each event has to be "close enough" in spacetime for interference to occur ... between individual events. Distant events - distant in space or time would not "feel the force". But events happening close together, would.
But that is not what it is about. It is about the interaction between the measuring apparatus and the individual event. Every particle is travelling in an identical fashion down the same apparatus. So - if the slits are not being observed - every particle will show the same probabilistic result. It is the two slits which are constantly in interaction if you like. If both slits are always "open" and free from measurement, then every particle running the gauntlet will behave in wave-like fashion.
So the statistics reflect the shape of the path. The same path is always going to give the same result for every identically prepared particle, regardless of the rate of their release (so long as they don't come so thick and fast they do physically interfere with each other!).
Of course you are correct. There is no space-time under quantum physics. That is why the latest theoretical physicists are abandoning it and apparently treating quantum as purely information and gravity as a product of information entanglement. When Bohm wrote about the quantum potential in his equations 60 years ago, he stated quite emphatically that it acted instantaneously because the field was everywhere (now being discussed as a holographic field) and it relied wholely in the form of information anticipating today's research direction. He also wrote that space-time would have to be reworked, again anticipating the latest direction of theory physics.
Don't want to upset too many of them during their fund raising efforts. You think I take them any more seriously than the average myth maker. Rather than read the actual works they read Wikipedia (like others who say Bohmian Mechanics is deterministic).
But if it's a wave, how can the rate NOT matter? Remember, the phenomenon at issue is interference. And interference implies interaction. You're prepared to say that 'particles interfere with themselves', but how is that any less confusing?
Furthermore, what is 'the path' defined by? There is no actual 'path' in reality, unless you accept the pilot-wave theory, which you have said you don't. So they follow 'a path' - what is the path defined by? I am saying, it's not defined by something in time.
So - I don't see my approach as 'confusing'. As far as I'm concerned, I have asked a novel question.
It's a great observation, and when the experts are embarrassed (because they really don't get it), they call it gobblygook. Bohm agrees with you. What matters is the form for the information. For further reading I recommend Science, Order, Creativity by Bohm, Hiley.
The girl on the Physics Stack exchange explicitly said, well, time is not a boundary factor in this experiment. And I asked: this means, it's a timeless wave? Where else in physics would you see something analogous? I didn't get an answer, but for all I know, there might be a quotidian answer to that question.
But I still think I'm onto something novel, here. :-)
"Think of the integers," he explains. "Every integer exists simultaneously. But some of the integers are linked in structures, like the set of all primes or the numbers you get from the Fibonacci series." The number 3 does not occur in the past of the number 5, just as the Now of the cat jumping off the table does not occur in the past of the Now wherein the cat lands on the floor." (emphasise mine) -- "There Is No Such Thing As Time"
You are absolutely on track. Bohm's book I mentioned is a good read and will confirm. His theories were rejected because of the nature of the quantum field but action at a distance is more experimentalky verified, the Chinese have demonstrated that at a minimum it acts 10,000x the speed of light. Space-time (which doesn't exist) had nothing to do with anything, not even gravity. The Relativity equations have no ontological merit.
Do what I do, ignore the common physicist and search for the exceptional like Erik Verlinde. They are rare (as Bohm was rare) but it is worth the hunt, since you'll actually get some usable insights.
And you know this how? Had anyone ever seen your memory?
They are not my words.
As for the actual flow of time, real time, the duration of life, everyone who is alive has experienced it every day of their life.
The problem is that by asking what 'caused' something you are moving from physics to philosophy - metaphysics, and there's quite a bit of sensitivity on physicsforums about discussions veering off into philosophy. They try - not always successfully - to maintain a clear boundary between physics and philosophy and it looks like you inadvertently crossed it. I thought the reaction was a bit harsh, especially as you, not being a regular there, would have no reason to be aware of that sensitivity.
I wouldn't comment on the validity of your inference because I see discussion of what caused what as frustratingly ambiguous. But I can observe that increasing the time between photon emissions also increases the average distance between photons, which reduces the frequencies of interactions and hence the extent to which interaction effects distort the pure proportionality discussed in the A to the second Q. And that maybe sounds something like what you were saying.
I wasn't upset by it in the least. It was instructive. You can see, I didn't push it, but I got the distinct impression that I had crossed a line. I learned something from it.
Quoting andrewk
Right! Time is NOT of the essence.
Mum! Mum! Those bad people are saying bad things.
Yikes!
If we do not need any concept of time to explain and make predictions about the physical world, why does this "flow of time" matter?
Occam's Razor seems to apply here.
Oh I know, Wayfarer! I was joking myself. This thread has been an interesting read so far. (Y)
Duration, real time, comes into play when understanding the nature and creation of the underlying quantum information (memory). This is not scientific clock-time. Bergson warned and challenged Einstein about the attempts to elevate scientific clock time to an ontology. As common in science, politics had a lot to do was at play. You see physicists really don't mind dabbling in metaphysics when it suits their purposes.
Robert Disalle wrote a book on the Philosophical Development of Space-Time. The Physicist and Philosopher by Canales is also worth noting.
The upshot is that philosophers should feel quite comfortable challenging the metaphysics of physicists and scientists. Most often they have no idea how poor their metaphysics really is. I loved it when Erik Verlinde came down hard on the Big Bang which is just more metaphysics along with the Laws of Nature.
I try to answer in a non-relativistic point of view.
Short answer: the particle does not interfere with itself. In QM the interference pattern is predicted by the form of the wavefunction which can be inferred by previous observations or by theoretical assumptions.
In my opinion here you are right. The wave equation is in fact independent of time in QM in form. However the wavefunction is of course a function of the positions (which in QM are (hermitian) operators, i.e. observables) and time (in QM it is a parameter and not an operator).However in non-relativistic QM the "squared modulus" of the wavefunction is proportional to the density probability to find a particle in a position at a given time.
However strictly speaking the cause of the interference pattern is not "outside".In this case, in fact, the wavefunction is a sum of two terms: there is a term that describes the path through the first slit and another relative to the other path. However the wavefunction itself is not an observable. What you can observe is the probability distribution. Forgive me if I use a simplified formula:
Let F be the wavefunction, f1 the part relative to the first path and f2 the path relative to the second.
F = f1 + f2. The wavefunction however is complex. So the probability density distribution is:
FF* = f1f1* + f2f2* + (f1f2* + f2f1*)
The first two terms (f1f1* and f2f2*) are always positive. The sum of the other two (the interference) however can be negative (hence the minima)! What you observe is that the particles follow that probability distribution (which of course is related to the interference pattern: the maxima of the interference pattern are the points where FF* has a maximum and the minima where FF* has a minimum). The interference therefore is given by the wavefunction itself: if our system is not time-invariant of course the probability distribution can change during time. The interesting feature of QM however is that you do not observe F (and so f1 and f2) itself but FF*. So it does not intefer with itself, simply the interference pattern depends on the (a-priori unknown) expression of the wavefunction.
The interaction is between the particle and the experimental apparatus. However the wavefunction has all the information about this interaction.
Remember that in a single experiment what happens is that we observe only one "path". To observe all possible path and therefore to verify that there is a "probabilistic" law we have to do a lot of measuerements. Consider a simplified version ot the experiment. Suppose that the particle can be observed only in two points of space, P1 and P2. Prior to the experiment you cannot know where the particle will be observed. You perform the experiment and you find the particle at P1. You perform a LOT of experiments and you find that with a probability p1 you find the particle at P1. QM says that when you perform another observation you will find the particle at the position P1 with a probailty p1.
Of course you can also predict the form of the wavefunction theoretically (i.e. from theoretical assumptions) - and in fact it is what is almost always done in physics. In fact you can include in the wavefunction all the information about physical interaction (i.e. for example the influence of a electro-magnetic field).
Regarding the ontology there is a lot of views.
Some adherents to the Copenaghen interpretation think that the real is what is observed, therefore until observed we cannot say that the particle "exists". (the wavefunction is not real and until observed the particle does not "exist" - Recall Einstein objections)
Others adherents instead think that it is an epistemological issue. They think that we can only make meaningful statements on the observed. Therefore prior the observation the "ontic status" of the quantum system is unknowable. In both cases the wavefunction is a "predictive tool".
Then there is the MWI (many-worlds). They think instead that the only existing thing is the universal wavefunction which never "collpases". All possibilities are actualized (therefore the particle goes to both slits!). The fact that we observe only a determinate path is due to a sort of an illusion.
The original Bohmian-mechanics treated both the particles and (universal) wavefunction as real. The wavefunction guides all the particles of the universe. Again we observe the probability distribution because of our "ignorance" (we do not observe the whole evolution of the universe).
The "new" Bohmian mechanics instead treats the wavefunction as a "law". The only reality is given by the particles.
There is also the Relational Approach, Statistical interpretation and others.
I suggest this link: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm/
I hope to have been of help :-#
The wavefunction according to the "standard/pratical interpretation" is merely a tool for the calculations. However the wavefunction itself does NOT give you the probability distribution. So it is not an observable and not therefore a physical "thing". To a physicist what we observe is what is real.
And what about the unobservable? Here to the pratical physicist you are already in philosophy (and some physicists actually have a sort of "aversion" to philosophy).
In the case of the experiment therefore: the "real" is the interference pattern (which of course is observed). If you perform a single-particle experiment, of course, you do not observe the interference pattern (and therefore you infer that the "quantum particle" behaves as a particle). However if you do a "large number" of single-particle experiments you will find that the "total" interference pattern follows a wave-like law. And therefore you conclude that the "quantum particle" behaves like a wave. The wave-like nature however is apparent only when you have a statistically significant number of single-particle experiment (or if you perform a single experiment with many particles).
Consider the case of a single experiment with a single particle. Are the other "possibilities" in some sense "real"?
1) If you accept the Copenaghen interpretation: no. They are not real. What is real is the observed. The quantum system, when unobserved is either "unknowable" or unreal. So do the other possibilities exist? Possibly some phyicists would say that "it does not apply". The question itself is meaningless. We can only say meaningful things about what we observe (similar to positivism). Or maybe "it does not apply" for other suggests that the "unobserved quantum particle" is indeed a "reality" but we cannot describe it in any ways.
2) If you accept the Many-Worlds yes. But you cannot observe them since the "other" paths actualize in "other worlds". In this interpretation actually the only fundamental "reality" is the universal wavefunction, which "never collapses". The fact that we observe only one occurence is due to the fact that we cannot observe "the universe".
3) If you accept the Bohmian mechanics actually the particle follows a precise path. The other paths are so to speak "empty". The other possibilities are "real" if you accept the wavefunction as a "thing" or "unreal" if you do not accept the wavefunction as real. Also in this case the only "true" wavefunction is the universal one which "guides" all the particles in the universe. However in practice since of course we cannot observe the whole universe we have to use "conditional wavefunctions" to describe the dynamics. Are the conditional wavefunctions real? No, they are only a tool.
There are also other interpretations. However they are all in agreement with the "observed reality". The contention is about how to interpret what we cannot observe. And in a sense speaking about what we cannot observe is "meta-physics". And in fact many physicists do not engage in philosophical discussions because of this, To them speaking about the "unobservable" is futile or "beyond our range". Therefore when someone begins to "philosophize" sometemise they grow angry!
However the real problem is not philosophy. The problem is that sometimes people try to use QM to "prove" that nonsense like "law of attraction" & similar are "true". For this reasons many physicists have a strong aversion to philosophy and tend to react "badly" IMO to honest philosophical discussions.
Sure! Apart from anything else, it is preferable to be told that I’m right, than that I’m speaking gobbledegook ;-). And also, I thank you for the lucid explanation, it makes sense to me, and is useful for understanding the subject better.
I do understand why physicists get exasperated with homespun philosophers using their discipline to justify crank ideas. But on the other hand, science is often cast in the role of being arbiter of what ought to be considered real. So the fact that this ontological ambiguity exists at the heart of physics ought to be more than simply a source of irritation; it ought to be a reminder of the mystery of existence.
Quantum Interference and the Quantum Potential?
C. Philippidis, C. Dewdney and B. J. Hiley† (1978)
"Our results using the quantum potential show that one can, in fact, re-
move the ambiguity of whether quantum objects are waves or particles and
provide, instead, a clear intuitive understanding of quantum interference in
terms of well-defined particle trajectories. More important than this, how-
ever, is the new perspective it gives to quantum interconnectedness. We
have shown that the quantum potential combines properties of all the par-
ticipating elements—masses, velocities of particles, widths and separation of
slits—in an irreducible way and suggests that, as far as the quantum domain
is concerned, space cannot be thought of simply as a neutral back cloth. It
appears to be structured in a way that exerts constraints on whatever pro-
cesses are embedded within it. More surprisingly still, this structure arises
out of the very objects on which it acts and the minutest change in any of
the properties of the contributing objects may result in dramatic changes in
the quantum potential.
This gives a new appreciation of Bohr’s insistence that quantum phe-
nomena and the experimental situation are inseparable. Moreover, it recalls
the relativistic relationship between space and inertial mass, and seems to
extend this relationship to include the geometrical and possibly the topo-
logical configu-rations of matter.
It is clear, therefore, that the quantum potential is unlike any other field
employed in physics. Its globalness and homogeneity in the sense of not
being separable into well-defined source and field points indicates that it
calls for a different conceptual framework for its assimilation. Notions of
structure, structural relationships and stabilities seem to be more appropri-
ate than those of dynamics (even though here we have started with what
appeared to be dynamical equations). However, a more detailed discussion
of these points will be presented in a further paper."
More importantly, Bohm, in his book, specifically describes his model as causal. I quote from his book Science, Order, and Creativity:
"Although the interpretation is termed causal [author's italics], this should not be taken as implying a form of complete determinism. Indeed it will be shown that this interpretation opens the door for the creative operation of underlying, and yet subtler, levels of reality."
Why do I bring this up? I invite readers to search for internet for information about Bohmian Mechanics and it's interpretation and you will find one physicist after another describing it as deterministic (including the Stamford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). They never studied his works. They are parroting what they read elsewhere, including the incorrect conclusions. I let you decide from now this what you wish regarding the reliability of information derived from "trusted sources".
The idea of particle passing from two slits and interfere with itself is nonsense. Please read this article for further information.
The Bohmian mechanics is the way to go.
That is not why they get exasperated. They get exasperated when any philosopher or scientist challenges the hegemony of their materialist metaphysics which is indoctrinated in education from the earliest grades. It is not accidental. It is as much part of "science" as God of part of various religions. In your particular case you were subtly challenging the materialist doctrine of space-time.
As it turns out, Bohmiam interpretation provides you with the clearest explanation of the issue you are investigating. If any of the physicists on that forum ever studied Bohmian Mechanics they would right away understand you are bringing up a reasonable issue regarding space-time and quantum behavior.
Personally I wish that philosophers wo(man)--up, develop a spine, do the necessary work, and stop accepting junk scientific materialism metaphysics as gospel, because that is all it is. Read the works of Bohm and Bergson as a starting point. Rupert Sheldrake and Stephen Robbins provide further valuable insights.
Actually I am a student of physics at the university and I have to say that I agree with you! To be honest I am quite dissatisfied by the "strict pragmatic approach" that many physicists use, especially after the '80s (however the problem is very old. For example Einstein famously was concerned with the hostility against what he called "epistemology", i.e. philosophy of science amongst some physicists of his time*). According to them physics deals with finding the best way to make "predictive calculations". In my opinion instead physics gives us information about "reality" and when you see it in this way, it is impossible to "separate" it from philosophy (epistemology and metaphysics). For example while the mathematical formalism of QM is well estabilished, there are a lot of interpretative problems. For example those who support the "pilot-wave theory" (let me call it "PWT") are very adamant in criticizing their colleagues because they feel that the lack of realism is meaningless. At the same time however some "Copenaghists" criticize the PWT for its explicit non-locality (this is the most serious problem of PWT, but not the only one) and other more techical stuff. A very interesting "school of thought" derives directly from the founder, Bohr. According to Bohr the "quantum world" is unknowable. Therefore concepts like "position", "velocity" do not apply to the "quantum world" because they were introduced for the classical "realm". This in a way resolves the "non-locality" problem, since even in quantum entanglement you cannot "see" the "supposed" faster than light interaction simply because the "signaling" process is a "classical concept" and it does not apply to quantum world**.
The Copenhagists on the other hand are criticized because they create a dichotomy between the quantum and the classical "realms", that sounds quite arbitrary (Bohr response to this issue, the so-called "correspondence principle" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bohr-correspondence/) to someone is not really satisfying) So there is also the "relational approach" proposed for example by the Italian physicist Rovelli. Briefly according to Rovelli QM must be able to describe all non-relativistic physics (and relativistic QM also the relativistic, but i prefer to not consider now relativity, since the relativistic version of QM, QFT, among other things is a field theory and there is even more confusion). The idea is that each "observer" "sees" his own "reality". Therefore in the "Schroedinger cat experiment" while, say, the cat observes its state as "alive" (fortunately for the cat, I love cats X-) ) while for the evil experimenter the cat the cat is "neither alive not dead" until he performs the observation. I do not know the precise details but according to Rovelli the non-locality is a non-issue in his interpretation. Then there is the MWI which is mathematically the simplest one but has problems with justifing the "Born Rule" (i.e. the "probabilistic rule for predictions") and also has a technical problem, the preferred basis problem (i.e. it does not really explain why we "observe" a classical world). So as you can see once you step in "philosophy" (personally I would call it "physics" but I am a "weirdo", it seems 8-) ) the views are many. It is IMO a shame that in the university classes it is seldom (if ever) mentioned.
*https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#1910s see the quote relative to EInstein's speech at the obituary of Planck.
**Since I noted (from other threads) that you have at least a very strong interest in buddhism, I find it somewhat reminiscent to the (mainly Mahayana) buddhist position about the fact that for "conditioned phenomena" neither "existence" nor "non-existence" apply. However do not take too seriously the analogy, take it just for "fun".
Regarding materialism, I also agree. But IMO in fact there are a lot of scientists that are actually "open". The problem however is that there is an awful number of (often "self-described") "gurus", "spiritual teachers" etc that insist that science either "proves" nonsense or that science is useless***. This behaviour causes a lot of skepticism among scientists. Also science is very empirical and therefore when one makes a lot of claims about "reality" which is not "in line" with the accepted theories (even after being corrected more than once...), scientists are (rightly IMO) adamant in dismissing him/her. The problem is that somewhat unconsciously this "aversion" sometimes is also "extended" to honest "inquirers", simply because sometimes the language is different. There is too much "suspiciousness" which is partly justified by the real presence of "crackpots" but I agree it is excessive (for example I find Krauss argument against the existence of God quite "shallow", since he does not really understand that "nothing" cannot be compared to either the "vacuum state" in physics or "the phyisical laws").
Regarding Bohm, we have to remember that his work had different phases and the latter part was not always "in line" with the early. The original article of Bohmian mechanics (the 1952 article I mean) does cite the "quantum potential" but it is a non-local deterministic theory. Later however he tried to introduce in physics his (interesting) concepts of "implicate and explicate order" in his scientific work. However usually physicists refer to the "early stages" of his work. And also now many "bohmians" do not accept the ontological status of the wavefunction and reject the "quantum potential" altogether (they do accept the strong non-locality of the theory, though, and consider the "wavefunction" simply as a sort of "physical law"... it is called the "nomological variant of Bohmian mechanics"). Also "Nelson mechanics" is causal, but non-deterministic, pilot-wave theory to my knowledge. If I do recall correctly it is partly based on the Pilot-Wave theory of Bohm (1952)| .
*** Edit: minor correction in this phrase.
Another variant of PWT is the "t'Hoof theory" where however superdeterminism is accepted (and therefore it is local!).
Also see these links:
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-refutation-of-bohmian-mechanics.490095/ (where many "objections" to Bohmian PWT are refuted... there are a lot of similar threads in "physicsforums")
http://www.bohmian-mechanics.net/whatisbm_links.html
also these Wiki articles are fine: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Broglie%E2%80%93Bohm_theory and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interpretations_of_quantum_mechanics
To me it is a very interesting "perspective" on QM, even if however I am more drawn to something along the lines of Rovelli and (especially) Bohr (of which I like his emphasis on the epistemological, rather than the ontological...). However to be honest all interpretations seem to me incomplete. However this does not of course undermine their value! It only reveals IMO that there is "something deep" beyond QM (and QFT), so to speak.
It is important for philosophers to understand this. They are using sources to pass judgement that wholely unreliable. If they wish to study and understand Bohm, they have to study it themselves. They cannot rely on some scientists hanging out on some forum no matter what kind of credentials they may present. This is most especially true when it comes to understanding any metaphysical questions since scientists are not trained in, and maybe don't even care about, metaphysical questions. They simply don't understand why the question even arises, as in the case that Wayfarer presented.
I would like to see philosophers to gear up and get up with modern ideas and problems and stop playing around with proofs of God's existence. I consider that lazy philosophy.
Bohm articulated a very interesting" holographic view of the universe which is now being picked up indirectly by many theoretical quantum physicists. As I observe the trajectory I believe that his thoughts will eventually bare out as fundamentally in the right track.
The question of God is very relevant. Understanding the nature of God, fundamentally "I am that I am", provides us with a perspective of time which is deeply incompatible with the perspective of time employed by relativistic physics. Simply stated, if God is proven to be real, then the space-time perspective of time is proven to be false, because the two are incompatible.
To arrive at a true understanding of time requires that we dismiss all prejudices and address the soundness of the premises and the logic of the arguments. Arguments concerning God's existence, are good practise, and the cosmological argument for one, which delves into the distinction between "potential" and "actual", is very important toward understanding the true nature of time.
There are many ways to approach the nature of duration (time) and if God is the preferred approach, that is fine. But who ever is discussing time in such a fashion had better be well versed in space-time metaphysics or risk being bullied by the science police. Proving God real is as difficult as proving space-time real and is a difficult path to follow.
In general, it is my observation that philosophy is atrophying for want of commitment to understand and apply the necessary effort. Philosophers have punted to scientists (a bad play) while they ease themselves into the same old games. Wayfarer would get better answers from a philosopher-scientist than from a scientist, any day of the week. Scientists, for the most part, do not understand philosophical inquiry. They only understand their own agenda.
If anyone comes across an exceptional philosopher-scientist I would love to know the name. The best I've seen so far is Stephen Robbins. He gets the whole picture.
Again, the wave refers to the probability of observing a particle at some location. It applies to the individual event and does not describe some collective weight of particles as you seem to imagine.
So the wave is happening, or evolving, while the emission/absorption event is happening. Its "rate" is one such probability wave per event. Or if you instead want to focus on the collective view that is the experimental apparatus expressing its statistics over time, then the rate is continuous over all the identically prepared events. The same probability wave is in play while trials are indistinguishable in terms of their spacetime reference frame.
So again, your issue seems to be to wanting to think of it as an actual wave - some kind of substantial force - rather than as a description of observables.
Of course you can go Bohmian despite all its well know issues - like no sensible way to give a relativistic version of BM, no good answer on the question of contextuality, etc.
And frankly - for me at least - there is just a basic metaphysical inelegance with a deterministic/substantialist ontology. QM really ought to be much more of a challenge to materialism and locality. So why try to make a Bohmian uber-materialism be the one that comes out right?
I mean I find it weird that the folk like Rich who seem happy with the whackiest kinds of idealism are also the first to commit to the most materialist versions of QM they can find. Well I guess maybe that if you treat the divine, or mind, as some kind of pseudo-substance, then perhaps there is some kind of consistency there.
Absolutely 100% wrong again.
Quoting apokrisis
If there was a way to be 200% wrong, this would be it.
A complete mess in all respects in a most profound manner.
Physicists don't think like crackpots. They've got better things to do than obsess over an interpretation with no observable consequences - and one not even able to make proper predictions in a relativistic setting.
So if BM had some metaphysical advantage in theory building - as in paving a way to a testable theory of quantum gravity - then the theoreticians would be all over it. No ambitious post-grad is going to overlook something that offers even an outside chance of stealing that ultimate glory. Your reading of the situation is comical just based on ordinary competitive human behaviour.
You will note that by contrast, holography is really hot. Every ambitious post-grad is all over that. They can see that bandwagon having an excellent chance of getting somewhere.
Sadly, your understanding of holography is as far off the mark as it is with anything else to do with physics. You've got stuck at the point where they mention a hologram as a helpful beginning analogy.
Your understanding of Bohm is the absolute worse I've ever seen. I can only presume that you are equally messed up on all other subjects you speak of because you apparently you don't care how messed up your understanding is. I guess your forte is making up stuff.
Everywhere, it is described as a wave, and the whole interference pattern phenomenon is based on what waves do. The equation is described as 'a wave equation'. But if it's NOT an actual wave, then it's not physical. It is, as the description says, a 'probability wave'. And I think that undermines the so-called 'causal closure' principle - that physical effects can only have physical causes. Because 'a possibility' is not a physical entity, right? It's only the likelihood of one. That is why electrons don't actually exist; they only have a tendency to exist.
That is why I mentioned the article co-authored by Stuart Kaufman (who, perhaps mistakenly, I thought was one of the theorists in your general orbit.) The key sentence in that paper is '“This new ontological picture requires that we expand our concept of ‘what is real’ to include an extra-spatio-temporal domain of quantum possibility" - which is pretty well exactly what I think is the implication of my argument.
On this scale, we're on the edge of where 'the unmanifest' becomes 'the manifest'. Making an observation actually does create the object - not from nothing, but from a range of possibilities. But it's not as if 'the thing' is hiding there in those possibilities; it is only possibility, up until it is measured. It's not objectively existent until that point. That is why realists, like Einstein, objected violently to quantum physics - because it suggests an anti-realist ontology. It's why Einstein asked that exasperated question, 'does the moon not exist when we're not looking at it?' It's why he devised the EPR paradox, and look how that panned out.
Quoting apokrisis
It describes a wave, in which time is not a factor - hence, a timeless wave. Fire one particle over X seconds, or X particles over 1 second, you get the same result. I'm a bit disappointed you're not seeing the significance of that.
Quoting apokrisis
I'm not. From what I understand, I'm nearest to the Copenhagen Interpretation. Last year I read Manjit Kumar's Quantum, and also Stephen Lindley's Uncertainty, and I find overall I'm in agreement with Heisenberg (and the so-called 'Copenhagen' interpretation, which is not even a scientific theory, in my understanding, but a kind of heuristic). And again, Heisenberg is the main source for the Kastner/Kaufman article.
Quoting boundless
Agree. Krauss, and others of his ilk, are motivated by a deep animus towards religion. He and Dawkins formed a kind of anti-religion roadshow. But I think there is a general consensus that Krauss’ grasp of philosophy is practically non-existent. There was a damning review of his book in the NYT by a philosopher of physics named David Albert. Also see The Metaphysical Muddle of Lawrence Krauss. Many of the New Atheists verge on the crackpot in their own right, mainly because of their caricatured understanding of religion.
The thing I like about Bohr and Heisenberg’s attitude is that it’s epistemologically modest. It is mainly about what we can claim to know. I have read snippets from Heisenberg’s Physics and Philosophy and I find them pretty congenial. Actually there was an interesting review from a couple of years back which you might find interesting, Quantum Mysticism: Gone but not Forgotten.
The thing is, there is a lot more to time than duration, a fact which many of us overlook. More fundamentally, it is a distinction between past and future. That we can measure the distinction between past and future, and determine duration, is another thing. But one's measurements of duration are only as accurate as one's capacity to distinguish between past and future.
Quoting Wayfarer
What is required is to turn around the accepted relationship between space and time, such that time becomes the 0th dimension rather than the 4th. This allows for real non-spatial existence in relation to time, and for the possibility of inverted spatial dimensions as negative dimensions on the other side of the 0th dimension.
Yea, I agree. Bohm was a very interesting scientist (and philosopher). I find him very insightful. But actually many of the "founders" of QM and relativity were in fact very nice philosophers and scientists (and also there was much less "aversion" between philosophers and science until circa the '80s).
Thank you for the mention of his "holographic view". I will check as soon as possible. ;)
For all,
Regarding the issue about "Bohm as a materialist"... Well the original work (i.e. the article of 1952) describes a "world" made of "point-like" particles which move in a deterministic fashion. It sounds pretty materialistic to me (however it is also true that the position of each particle in the universe depends on all other particles - the "influence" does not really decrease with the distance etc so while being "materialistic" it is of a curious kind!). I also agree that it is not the most mathematically elegant theory, but IMO it is very interesting. However some time later Bohm created an interesting philosophical system about "the implicate order" and "the explicate order". See for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicate_and_explicate_order. The later Bohm IMO cannot be "called" materialist, at least not in the "common" sense of the world (for those who are a bit familiar with Hindu philosophy, the "implicate" order seems quite similar to the notion of Brahman of some Vedanta Schools (Advaita and Vishishtadvaita for example)).
Yeah, I do not like the "new atheist" movement. I find their arguments very shallow and motivated by a sort of "a-priori" rejection of religion and metaphyisics. While of course for certain types of "religions/metaphysics" (i am thinking about the "anti-science" movements) they are right in their criticisms, I do not think that they raise serious objections to any religion. They seem, as you note, stubbornly convinced that religion and metaphysics cannot do anything good for the human being. They are dogmatic in their own positions. And sadly, I know many people who are "in agreement" with them. They are just too skeptical... But I want to emphasize the fact that this general aversion and skepticism is also due to the fact that too many religious people are skeptical about science (or even averse to it). And of course those "false gurus" are the worst!
Regarding Bohr and Heisenberg I agree (actually Bohr IMO was a really good philosopher). Thank you for the various link ;)
If you had made a contextual claim - talked about the apparatus having some particular "interference pattern causing" arrangement - then it would have been clear that you weren't thinking the fact that individual events reflected the holistic constraints of their world was a puzzle. The issue of the "rate" making a difference couldn't even have arisen. It would be an obvious non sequitur - to you as well.
So I am taking a constraints-based view that endorses a spooky non-locality ... as it must. The path determines the nature of the event. If you have two slits open and unobserved, then the "particle" must take both of them to find its way to the detector screen. In just that single event, already the outcome speaks to the downward causal impact of the apparatus having a particular set-up in terms of its act of measurement.
And likewise, if there is just a single slit, or one of the two slits is being observed, then we get the statistics that that kind of path set-up would predict.
We can even choose to observe the slits after the particle is meant to have already passed and still change its statistics - the quantum eraser effect. So the spooky non-local holism transcends our ordinary notion of a smoothly unwinding passage of time. It seems causation can act backwards, with our choices as observers making changes that happened in the collective past of the Universe.
So yes, in some sense the full metaphysical picture of what is going on must transcend our usual Newtonian notions of space and time. It's non-local for Pete's sake!
And QM wavefunction formalism models this by talking about the evolution of the probabilities taking place in infinite dimensional Hilbert space. This is an abstract calculational space - although some interpretations would like to treat it as itself now the "true reality". Another can of worms along the lines of block universes, multiverses and modal realism.
But rather than treating a calculus of probabilities as a direct representation of an underlying metaphysical reality - that is, maxing out on fecundity of any numerical technique - I take the view that it is better to actually believe in a constraints-based ontology where classical regularity is what emerges from a generalised quantum potential. To the degree that you place macroscopic thermal constraints on existence, you will tend to restrict the kind of microscopic thermal fluctuations that then occur.
Any act of measure is a physical interference in that it creates an irreversible energy transfer and so forces that part of reality to become woven into the general emergent story which is the Cosmic clock of time winding down from the extreme energy density of the Big Bang to the least possible energy density of the Heat Death.
That is why the spread out wave-like potential of "an event" contracts, or decoheres, to become some highly located particle-like occurrence when there is any kind of thermal interaction. Time itself is emergent. Its "rate" is the cosmic-level rate at which the Universe is cooling or entropifying. And that flow of time is created out of a myriad of these little quantum events which fix the history of the Universe as some set of actual happenings - actual energy transfers.
So a post-QM theory - like a quantum gravity theory - is likely to explain time itself in this emergent fashion. And folk like Kauffman are talking about that.
Then whether you see reality behaving in a particle fashion, or a wave fashion, is really about the degree to which the inherent quantum uncertainty of any event has been constrained. If it is only weakly constrained - as in the very special thermal circumstances of a twin-slit apparatus - then you get "weird" single particle interference patterns. If it is more strongly constrained - as in that there is an act of observation effectively closing down one slit with its thermal interaction - then you instead get the kind of probability wave you would predict for the scattering of individual particles by a single narrow slit.
So this is a thoroughly contextual or holistic view - one where the organisation of the whole shapes up the identity of the parts. Particles are emergent features that reflect the constraints of their world.
And the wrinkle is that this emergent story applies even to space and time now as feature of that "world". Well, at least that is the story that quantum gravity would have to tell.
Yes, time isn't spacial and any ontology that spacializes it is going to yield all kinds of problems such as Zeno's paradoxes and time travel.
Thanks for your additional insights. In regards to quantum holographic research, I am most impressed by Erik Verlinde. There are several videos of his presentations available on YouTube. I thought this particular presentation most interesting.
https://youtu.be/f_BRyS93ucg
I am pretty convinced that research in this direction will yield many new insights into quantum theory in general.
Perhaps you could explain his entropic approach to gravity for our benefit? In your own words now, what is he saying?
https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=3610837013333397409&hl=en&as_sdt=0,7&sciodt=0,7
Yeah, I agree entropic gravity is a very interesting approach (even if I do not really understand it very well). In some sense it reminds the ideas of the later Bohm, IMO.
Regarding the article about Bohm, thank you. I was familiar with the attempts to build a Bohmian version of QFT. However I did not know that there were so many attempts in doing so! As I said the Bohm approach is certainly very interesting even if I now prefer other interpretations. However as Feynman said theoretical physicists should know the greatest possible number of "formulations" of a given theory, in this case QM, QFT etc
Ultimately all philosophical and scientific perspectives must merge because they are attempting to describe the same thing.
There are two things that are interesting about the latest efforts to describe gravity using entropy (information):
1) Yes, it follows some of Bohm's ideas that the universe can be considered holographic in nature. Notice it is a completely different conceptual view than space-time with major repercussions and allows for a new way of thinking of space and time, separately and distinct. I believe this will eventually merge with the Bergson/Stephen Robbins holographic view of the universe. In a way science and philosophy speech the problem differently, and in some ways the same, but ultimately the trajectory is toward a merge.
2) It it's utilizing information as the fundamental concept of the universe. Information is nothing more than Bergson's Memory. Memory/information implies a Mind that understands and utilizes the information (it is impossible to escape this unless one adopts the "It just happens, by some Miracle" theory of how information is created and utilized. While tangential to the problem of consciousness, it is heading headlong into the problem and scientific understanding, but given the economic biases against Mind, it will take a long, long time to become acceptable in the scientific world. Still, this should not stop philosophers from moving ahead and developing theories around these concepts.
Interesting... you might like also the idea behind Digital Physics https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_physics (the rather questionable assumption is the computability of everything. But maybe the centrality of information in these (speculative) theories might be of your interest )
Regarding your concept of Mind... Do you think that "Mind" is the ultimate reality?
@Metaphysician Undercover
I am rather curious to know your understanding of the concept of "time". What do you mean by time as the "0th" dimension?
Yes, there are many paths, so what I look for are central themes. There are always course directions.
Thanks for the link? I'll check it out?
You are welcome! And thanks you for the links about Bohm and Verlinde!
There are a number of different ways to look at it. First, we might consider that the passage of time is necessary for physical change to occur. But physical change is not necessary for time to be passing. It is just necessary for physical change to be occurring in order for us to measure time passing. This allows for the possibility that time could be passing with no change occurring. Are you comfortable with this possibility?
If we take this logical possibility as a hypothetical premise, then we need to turn to something other than spatial existence to describe the passing of time. This is why time becomes the 0th dimension, because it gets described in terms other than the terms of 3d spatial existence. Further, the passing of time becomes the necessary condition for spatial existence. Philosophers have been discussing immaterial (non-spatial) reality for thousands of years and these ideas are compatible with the concept of time being the 0th dimension.
Yes. And more, time is fundamental. There exist not a theory which can describe the creation of time or emergence of time.
Thank you. You might be interested in reading https://phys.org/news/2012-04-physicists-abolish-fourth-dimension-space.html and Smolin's thoughts (he wrote a book called "Time Reborn").
Yes I think that time is not like the spatial dimension. However I have some difficulty accepting that time passes without "any change". But I find it a respectable view. I will think about it in the following days.
I've read that book by Smolin. It's very interesting in the sense that it exposes the problems with the approach to time of physics, but lacking in the sense that he doesn't really get to the point of any serious speculations about the real nature of time.
Quoting boundless
Here's a way to imagine time without physical change. Imagine that we can divide time into shorter and shorter lengths of duration. Each length would be defined by some physical activity, a motion or some other activity. The physical activity which serves to measure the period of time must be "observable" in order that it can serve to measure the period of time. At some point we get to a period of time which is so short that there is no longer any observable physical activity in this short period of time, this is commonly supposed to be at the Planck time. However, we can still imagine a shorter period of time. In this shorter period of time, we cannot say that any physical activity occurs, yet time must still be passing. This is evident in the uncertainty principle which is exposed by the Fourier transform. The shorter the time period, the more uncertain the information, until the uncertainty approaches an infinite magnitude at an extremely short period of time.
Mmm interesting... I try to give you a rapid answer (hope it makes some sense X-) ):
Yeah to give some "support" to your view, maybe the Planck time is a limit for our "ability" to measure duration, i.e. it is the smallest observable duration. But again, even if it is so short to be unobservable, maybe we can still imagine that the same can be said for physical changes. I mean we can imagine some phenomena might have a duration which is inacessible to our measurements.
The reasoning is somewhat similar to the idea behind the "hidden variables". According to these theories we do not observe "reality as it is" but we can still understand quantum phenomena as the "result" of unobservable phenomena (i.e. the movement of the particles etc). In the same way even when we will (possibly) arrive to a quantum theory of gravity, IMO we can still think that there is a "subquantum" world.
By the way the problem of your hypothesis (at a scientific level) is that such a time would be a sort of "unnecessry" since it is a sort of "stage" where phenomena happen. So it is not to say that it is wrong, but for a scientific POV it is "unnecessary".
Regarding a metaphysical level, I think that time IS the "flow of change". This does not mean that it is "reducible" to the "events" themeselves. It simply means that as there is no flow in a river without water, there is no "time passing" without change. However the "flow" does not of course coincide without water.
IMO if time is not the "flow of change" then it "exists" as a sort of indipendent "process". But if that is the case, how can exist such a process?
Scientifically speaking, however, I do not think that a "time apart of change" can be really useful. But science is NOT metaphysics and therefore if we do not adhere to scientism it is not a problem ;)
Real time, the time of life experience, cannot be measured. It is a feeling.
When we are asleep, we dream. There is no space, but there are images. We feel the duration of these images. It may feel long or it may feel short. There is no way to fix such a feeling to a clock. Similarly when we are awake. Time flows. Sometimes it feels fast and sometimes slow. Regardless whether there are any clocks around, the feeling of time/duration permeates our very existence. Personal time of life, the feeling of duration, cannot be separated, because it is life.
Duration is a feeling of continuity. Being continuous, it cannot be restated symbolically by clock time that cuts it up. It is a flow. This is the flow one feels in deep meditative Tai Chi which allows one to feel the wave within the wave.
The Planck time is the limit which is imposed by the accepted physical theories. It is the boundary between observable and unobservable which is the manifestation of the theories in use. The point to consider is that the real boundary between observable and unobservable is produced by the physical disposition of the observer. We extend this boundary through theories, down to the Planck time, but this is an artificial boundary, created by the practical application of the theories. So it isn't a real boundary between observable and unobservable at all, it is a theoretical projection.
As an example, imagine if we make a complete description of what is occurring right now, then use logic and theories, to deduce what must have been occurring five, ten, or twenty years ago. We cannot say that these past occurrences are actually observable. We do this with geology, various morphologies, to project way back in time, and with cosmology we go right back to the big bang. We know that we do not actually observe the big bang, it is a product of the theories. But for some reason, when we take theories in the other direction, to look at shorter and shorter periods of time, instead of longer and longer periods, we tend to fall for the illusion that we are actually observing these short periods of time.
So there is a need to distinguish physical existence as it is actually observable, and verified by the senses of the human being, and physical existence which is not observable, but is demonstrated to be real by the validity of theories. The question is, at what point do we say that the object in question, is no longer a sensible (material) object, observable by the senses, and is really an intelligible (immaterial) object, apprehended only by the mind?
Quoting boundless
In my mind "unobservable phenomena" is a self-contradictory statement. If we observe physical activity, and apply logic, to conclude that it is necessary to assume that there is something unobservable going on to account for this activity, then we cannot refer to this as phenomena because that implies something perceivable by the senses. If we allow that "phenomena" refers to things apprehended by the mind, as well as by the senses, then we would need to adopt some other principles to distinguish between what has real material existence, and what is a product of the mind.
Quoting boundless
If the goal is to understand, then we cannot say that this is "unnecessary". Since the goal of scientists is often to predict, rather than to understand, then so long as the mathematical equations are set so as to adequately predict, understanding is "unnecessary". But as we found out with the discovery of the heliocentricity of the solar system, real understanding opens up vast new opportunities which cannot be accessed by mere mathematical predictions.
Quoting boundless
The flow of the river is not explained by the water. The water is one element, there is also gravity, and the form of the solid ground. So if change is related to time, like flow is related to the water in the river, we still have the background existence (the riverbed), and the cause of change (gravity) to identify. The cause of change, is more properly associated with time, than change itself, just like gravity is more properly associated with the flow than the water itself.
Yeah I agree... If you accept that "ultimate reality" is the "Mind", then the "real" time is the "percieved/experienced" time. There is no distinction between the two. In this framework "life" and the flow of experiences (i.e. the "flow of time") are the same (except the fact that maybe the "Mind" is a "center of awareness", but I do not really know much about Tai Chi, so it is only a guess...). It seems interesting.
Do you know if there are some online resources about it? May you please give some links - if there are any?
Interesting! Regarding the first part I think I agree. I see it as follows: we "map" reality according to certain assumptions. The "validity" of the map, however depends on the map itself, its properties. So a-priori even the smallest "observable" scale depends on the particular "way" we "map" reality (however being a theoretical physics student I believe that it is the "best" map, until contrary evidence). This however raises as you say the question: how we a-priori distinguish the two "realities", i.e. the sensible and the "intelligible" ? Actually if by sensible we include also what can be "observed" by the instruments (i.e. the definition of "observable" in physics) of the lab Heisenberg and other Copenaghists would say that there is no difference. Others, like the Bohmians disagree.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Mmm, interesting view (I hope to have understand what you mean...). Ok, it seems a strict empiricism. In this case, however all our scientific pictures do not refer to observation but to a "construct" of it (apart of course theories that predict only perceivable results by our senses).
Let me ask a question. Suppose you have an atomic clock. Why do you think that they do not "observe" such small durations (femtoseconds for instance)?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok, I see. What about "happenings"? :) Well I speculated a lot about the issue wether it is even possible to think that something can exist, but it is impossible to percieve in any possible way. My "hypothesis" is that the answer is "yes", but we cannot know anything about such "things". We can only "guess" or "speculate", without any hope to really know. Therefore even the existence of "matter" is a convenient "guess": we cannot prove its existence in any way. Outside direct experience and inference about direct experience we cannot have any "certain", so to speak, knowledge. We can however IMO make some reasonable "guesses". For example I have not find any "proof" against solipsism, however it is not clearly true. But the fact that it is extremely difficult - if impossible - to reject shows something interesting: outside the "direct experience" we cannot have certain knowledge. So in a sense we estabilish the existence of a reality "behind the phenomena" as a reasonable "leap of faith", so to speak. Do you agree? Therefore the only principle that I can (at least for now) propose is the "causal" argument: the "external reality" is somehow the cause of our experience (to avoid solipsism). However we can only make reasonable assumptions and inferences about it (and even for its existence). Note that since the Copenaghen interpretation became the "standard" one, physics now is seen as dealing with what is "observable" by physical instruments (and therefore claims about what "there is behind it" are seen as either speculations or fictions).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed! In my opinion the fact that there are many interpretation of QM means that we have yet to understand it. But it seems that many physicists do not agree, sadly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok. I think I understood... So in your view time is the cause of change. But why do you think it is necessay to posit it in the first place? In other words why the "causal chain of happenings" is not sufficient to understand reality, but need a "cause to exist"? :)
Personally I cannot see how such an "additional" cause might be required.
P.S. For those interested in interpretation of QM, I have found a nice criticism of MWI (many-worlds):
https://rekastner.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/decoherence-fail.pdf
Here there are no formulas and the argument is quite clear IMO: in order to explain the "split" we already have to know how the worlds must split (this problem is called "preferred basis problem" in literature). The problem is that according MWI in its most rigorous formulation only the universal wavefunction is real and a-priori by it we cannot know how the universe split. Therefore it becomes either a "many-many worlds interpetration" where there are many-many ways in which worlds split or "a no-world interpetration", where literally nothing happens.
For who is interested I give the link to two threads of "physicsforums":
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/why-does-nothing-happen-in-mwi.822848/
https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/many-worlds-proved-inconsistent.767809/
and the link to the pre-print of the paper where the criticism is found:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.8447
Here we must be careful. "Reality" is a fabric in which everything lies in a quantum information state. The Mind is embedded in this fabric and perceives it, as its own creation. What's out there is as real as what's in here, all being a continuum of mind/consciousness or quantum information, however you wish to envision it.
Quoting boundless
I have yet to discover a good source as most sources on the Web are commercially oriented or Communist government inspired, both with a keen interest to suppress any spirituality. It is similar with Yoga. My journey so far had been very long and the path winds through many aspects of life (sports, arts, music, dance, Tai Chi, Yoga, Qigong, history, philosophy, psychology, physics, etc. By looking for patterns, applying then, and understanding who I am, I discover new things that are not found in books but are certainly part of the traditions that were discovered long ago. I can only attest is that with patience and relaxation there is an enormous amount of life to be discovered.
Ok I think I understood your view. Thanks for the clarification.
And also thanks for the insights about Tai Chi and for sharing your experience!
I think this is exactly the point I was making. I wouldn't say that being observed by instruments is being observed, in any unqualified sense. That is because the instruments gather information, and the information must be interpreted according to theories. So there is an extra layer of interpretation there which is dependent on the validity of the theories employed. Take your map analogy. Suppose we have instruments, satellites for example, which are observing the earth, gathering information. Then, with the use of theories, the instruments produce a map of what a human being would see on the earth. You might say that the satellites allow us to observe the earth, but the observations are only as accurate as the theories which are used to interpret the information.
Quoting boundless
Yes, I think that all observations are ultimately reducible to constructs, and the accuracy of the construct is dependent on the theories employed. So even if you sit at your window, and describe what you are seeing outside, your description is limited by your language capacity. Your language represents the theories you employ in describing the situation.
Quoting boundless
I think that the standard caesium clock measures a time period much longer than a femtosecond. Regardless, I think that the clock doesn't "observe" the time duration, for the reasons discussed above. The clock gathers information which is interpreted according to theory and this produces an "observation"..
Quoting boundless
I look at "the cause of our experience" in a different way. I think of the biological systems of the human organism as the cause of our experience. Our bodies take information from our environment, interpreting it, and constructing something which is presented to the conscious mind, which interprets this, and constructs something again. So the causation is really within, in the act of constructing.
Quoting boundless
It is necessary because the nature of free will, creativity, and all that "construction" which occurs within us, that I just described, which indicates that we need to assume something more than the "causal chain of happenings" to understand reality. As a free willing being, I see possibilities in the future. I can influence the future with my decisions, such that I can start a causal chain of happenings intended to bring about what I want. This ability to start a causal chain of happenings, at any moment of the present, needs to be understood.
These are good points. John Bell considered it extravagant.
Have you attempted to imagine how many worlds are being created each moment as decisions are being made?
Ok I see. In principle you are right. We cannot have a "direct experience" of what the instruments in the labs register, i.e. we have an additional interpretative level. Or rather two... Let me explain what I mean.
What we experience is that the instruments "do some stuff" (pardon the imprecise language) and we interpret it an "observation". However it is an assumption, albeit a "very reasonable" one. We do not oberve what the satellite are observing but only how the satellite is "behaving". This is VERY similar to Heisenberg/Bohr reasoning, minus the fact that even they assumed that the observation is an interaction between the experiment apparatus and the "thing" observed by it. To me this is also the reason why science cannot "prove" itself. We need philosophy of science, i.e. we need to explain what we are observing when we analyse the experimental apparatus. But in the strictest sense this is not science, anymore. It is philosophy of science. But even if we accept that there is still a layer of interpretation, i.e. we need to use some assumptions in order to interpret the "results" of the observations. In the case of the satellites it is simple (in fact we can see the Earth...). But with an atomic microscope we cannot be so sure: we have not a direct experience of the atoms, for example (in fact this was, more or less, the objection of Mach against the atomic theory). We need a theory that can account for how the observation, i.e. the interaction of the instrument with the "thing" observed, happens. Here I think you are right, our theories actually condition how we interpret even how we interpret observations themselves. And in fact Bohr, for example, was agnostic about "the nature of the quantum world" - except the fact that the "cause" of the observation is a sort of interation of the "quatum stuff" and the experimental apparatus. In a similar way we can say that in fact we cannot really know "what the quantum world is" by performing experiments. After all it was Bohr who said:
"It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature." and "We must be clear that when it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. " https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Niels_Bohr (however I suggest you to read https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bohr-correspondence/ and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-copenhagen/)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I think I can agree. Direct experience is after all in some sense both "pre-conceptual" and "beyond concepts" (Very "zen" X-) ). We use our constructs as a map (this is not to say that they are "false" or a "misconception"...). For example a "chair" is concept we "impose" on our experience. But our experience does not tell us that there is a "chair". Yet conventionally/practically it is very useful to use those concepts. As I also said about the "world outside our experience" we can be agnostic and make some "reasonable guesses". (That's why I am very interested in many "eastern" philosophies which are interested in the "direct/non-conceptual" experience!).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ooops sorry, you are right. Atomic clocks arrive at "picoseconds", those who arrive near the "femtoseconds" seem to be "mode-locked" lasers.
According to what we have said, yes. But still I think that our present theories are so successful that we can say that it "observes" such a small temporal duration! But in principle you are righ, I think. And in fact this objection is even more justified for smaller scales
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But... our "biology" is conditioned by the external environment, as you say. So causation itself IMO is also "outised" us. The problem is how we interpret it. This in fact can be said to be "within". All our experience "arises" from the "contact" of our consciousness our biological systems and "something external" (unless one is a solipsist we have to admit that "the external world" co-causes our experience... but maybe a solipsist does not even accept the existence of the body). For example when we touch something, that "something" produces signals that are interpreted by our brain and our consciousness (brain and consciousness are not identical for the emergentist - let alone dualists or other theories). So causation cannot be said to be wholly "within", but at the same time our "description" of it IS "within".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok, so in our view time is in fact "within us"? I think I can agree: the "time" we "experience" is NOT the time "measured" by clocks. Are you saying this?
I agree that it is extravagant, but this argument is that it is even either more extravagant than Bell thought (i.e. there are "Many-Many" worlds) or describes a "universe" where literally nothing happens. In any case in MWI the "reality" is the wavefunction.
Of course even somehow we can "avoid" the objection raised by the article it is very "extravagant". We are in a sort of illusion, thinking that our world is "the reality". But even all "the stories" together cannot be said that are reality. The reality according to them IS the universal wavefunction which is eternally in a superposition state (the cat is always both alive and dead BUT we are inside the universe so we observe either alive or death). Interestingly both Bohm and Bell held that in PWT the wavefunction is as real as MWI, but according to them our "story" is "real" because there are also particles. This raised an objection to PWT itself (mainly by MWI-advocates) since if we hold that the universal wavefunction is real, then it never collapses and therefore there are, in fact, other stories but they are "empty" of particles. MWI-supporters see PWT as an unnecessary complication whereas PWT supporters raise the objection above and the (fatal IMO) objection that it CANNOT reproduce, without additional axioms, the Born Rule (the probabilistic predictions of QM). MWI-supporters (e.g. Tegmark, De-Witt, Deutsch...) hold that both are "resolved" or "not very important", but I never found a convincing "defense". Also some PWT no more treat the wavefunction as real, but as "nomological", i.e. a sort of physical law, because of the problem raised about the "empty stories".
Regarding your question about split... Well, no. But remember that according to MWI our world is not real as we normally think. To a well-written FAQ about MWI see http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html.
Personally I find too much "extravagant". I am more in line with Bohr and in a lesser grade Rovelli (but interestingly I am fascinated by also Bohm). MWI also would be very elegant (mathematically) but thetwo objections above IMO rule it out.
By the way Everett's original interpretation was a bit different, it was called "relative state interpretation", the MWI it seems is its most famous type. But I do not rember very well these things.
See also this for a "mental" interpretation of MWI: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Many-minds_interpretation (this might of your interest!)
This is exactly the issue. That is the nature of an experiment, we do something, and note what happens. We interact with the world and make observations of the interactions. In experimentation it is very important that we know precisely, what we are "doing", so we can separate cause from effect, in the observation. That's why we follow a very specific procedure. So for instance, if you were doing experiments in biology, raising cultures in a sterile environment, and you inadvertently introduced a foreign bacteria with some unsterilized equipment, that would be a problem because you wouldn't know where the bacteria came from. You might "observe" that its existence somehow got caused by your experiment. And if you repeated the experiment numerous times, making the same mistake, because this tiny little mistake slipped the grasp of the preparations for your procedure, then you'd confirm your inaccurate observations.
Now, let's look at the nature of observation itself, at the most fundamental level. We sense the world, and take notice. Sensing is doing something. So we must respect this fact, that the human being is an agent, acting in the world, sensing. The materialist, determinist perspective, positions the human being as reacting to the world, sensation is caused by the external world. But this is unacceptable because we really need to respect the fact that the human being is doing something when it is producing sensations, and unless we can adequately account for what it is doing, and separate the procedure, from the observation, our observations will be inaccurate.
There is an age-old argument for the immaterial soul, the tinted glass analogy. It's simple, and self-evident that unless you determine that the glass you are looking through is tinted, then all your observations will be tainted. So the argument is, that if we want to understand all of material existence, then we must give the soul a purely immaterial perspective. This is why dualism is unavoidable if our goal is to understand all of material existence. It is required to accept dualism in principle, to get there, to assume the immaterial perspective, and if it is wrong, i.e. the immaterial perspective is impossible, then we will just never get there. But we will not know until we try. Therefore we need to assume the immaterial perspective if our goal is to understand all of material existence.
Quoting boundless
The basic assumption which is required then, is that we need to find the immaterial perspective. That is why I suggested time as the 0th dimension. We take the division between past and future, which forms the passing of time, as the immaterial perspective of the soul. This boundary has been assumed, in the past, to have no temporal extension, therefore it provided for the location of the soul, because no material existence is possible at this point in time, which has no temporal extension. To exist is to have temporal extension.
Now, we find with modern physics, that this immaterial perspective may be illusory. Perhaps, the "change" from future to past is not absolutely instantaneous. Perhaps some types of objects move from future to past before other types of objects. If this is the case, then we need to determine the soul's immaterial perspective. So we need to refine our position, find out exactly what it means to move from future to past, to restore our hope of understanding all material existence.
Quoting boundless
Here's the problem I apprehend with the differential in time scales. For the sake of argument, let's assume the soul's immaterial perspective, at the point of division between future and past. Let's assume that when an object goes past this point it becomes observable to the soul. Going into the past is what constitutes observability. For a spatial analogy, consider a plane. Objects are crossing the plane and you see them only when they emerge on one side. This is what constitutes the object's existence from the perspective of the soul, its being in the past, across that line of division. Now let's assume some very large objects, and some very small objects. Suppose that a very large object, due to its size, takes a little longer to get into the past than a very small object which crosses the plane instantaneously. We can make a time scale by watching large objects go into the past, and, we can make a time scale by watching very small objects go into the past. But since the amount of time that it takes for a large object to go into the past has been assumed to be different from the amount of time that it takes for a small object to go into the past, then we need to determine this difference in order to properly relate these time scales.
Quoting boundless
With dualism we can extend this way of looking at things to include the entire human body. Not only does the soul create concepts which are the constructed map, the way of looking at the world, but the soul has created the entire human body first, as its way of looking at the world, its map. The map, the body, is the medium through which we are looking at the world. We need to account for all the elements of the medium, giving the soul the purely immaterial perspective, in order to avoid the tinted glass problem.
This type of perspective always makes any attempt to understand nature and life hopeless. Illusions make everything meaningless since there are no boundaries to the illusion.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that even sensing is an act. And in fact in classical mechanics the idea is that the "interaction" due to the measurement is negligible, whereas in QM the issue is of course problematic. I am not sure however how this argument helps to show that there is an immaterial soul. In fact even the emergentist would not say that "the mind" is a material "object" but rather an immaterial one (the closest analogy that an emergentist would give is that of a "phase" of matter, like say solidity. But even this analogy for the emergentist is very poor...). I possibly misunderstood your argument but if the "tint" is the immaterial aspect of reality, then you are saying that if we want to understand the glass (matter) we should verify if there is or not the "tint" (and therefore we need the concept of "tint" in the first place). But as I said before this reasoning can be used only against strict reductionists ("eliminativists") who argue that there is no absolutely anyhting that is not material.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Actually "physical space" and "physical time" should not be confused with "experienced time" and "experienced space". If we accept that "consciousness" is something real (i.e. we reject reductionism), then the two should not be confused. For the mind time is the "flow" and "space" is given by sensations, proprioperception etc. The problem is when we conflate the two creating conceptual confusion. Saying that according to physics our "space" and "time" are illusory is IMO meaningless since in the first place the concepts were different. At best we can say that "experienced space" is a "mental construct" that is used to represent the external objects whereas "experienced time" is instead correlated to physical time. But conflating the two creates only confusion: our "time" is not an illusion... instead, so to speak, it is the pre-condtion of our experience. Our experiences "appear" in the percieved time. If there were no consciousness time would be merely physical, i.e. the causal nexus between events. But since there IS congnition our "time" is not reducible to the time of clocks, it is a different, albeit correlated thing.
BUT it is also true that the causal nexus itself appears dynamic (if we are not advocating the "Block Universe") and therefore we have to say that "material" past and future events are non-existent. But while for material objects we can think that time IS change (the causal chain...), for us time has also a cognitive aspect which is a precondtion of experience. But I think that maybe even the psychological/experienced time is "quantized" even if it appears to not be the case. But possibly we will never know it. Anyway calling our "perception" of time an illusion simply because, say, there is a temporal dilation effect between our head and our feet whereas for us it appears "the same", is a product of either a mistaken reductionism (our consciousness IS our brain) or a conceptual confusion (the percieved time MUST have the same properties of the "clock/physical time"). Nobody actually estabilished that it is so. So who say so IMO is only speculating and not using "scientific evidence" in the correct way.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ah ok, a very creative thought 8-) Well... If you followed my reasoning about the difference between the two "types" of time, then I think you can rightly imagine that something similar actually happens. Our percieved time flows in a way that in principle is different than the "clock time". In our analogy, we might even think that instead of a plane there is a sort of "membrane" that has a small, but non infinitesimal, thickness. In this case the "crossing" might depend a lot also by the "orientation" of the objects. Or maybe the thickness might change during life and therefore the mechanism of "crossing" varies. What I want to say is that our "experienced time" might be very different from both our intuition and the "clock time" when analyzed carefully. But if we do not conflate the two "times" I think that we can accept this "weirdness". And if you believe in an immaterial soul, this should be more acceptable to you than an emergentist IMO. In fact the time of our immaterial soul in principle might be very different from the material/physical "clock time" when analysed in the details simply because we are talking about two different "substances". IMO even if physicists actually observe such small durations your reasoning can be still applied to our "experienced time". By the way your spatial analogy might apply also to "physical time" but I have reservation in accepting it because it is too complex. I prefer to keep the two times separate, since one involves a cognitive aspect (and cognition is immaterial).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Mmm, to me matter is not created by mind/soul but mind/soul is not reducible to matter (regarding the pre-existence of the soul or the after-life I am agnostic by the way... simply because I have difficulty to think that it is possible to have a self-awareness without a body). But while I agree that the mind creates concepts and also participates actively in creating the "direct experience", I would not said that it creates the body. It certainly creates however a "map" of the body itself. Yet there is in fact a sense in which what you say is true: we never experience "matter" itself. Therefore our experiences about both our body and the external world are in fact a product of the mind. And as for our direct experience is concerned the "material world" reduced to the "map" we create about it. As I said "outside" the experience we can only make reasonable guesses. So yeah the immaterial part of ourselves is in fact what "is central to us" and certainly uses the body as its "medium" with reality. But I would not say that it creates the body. (The difference IMO is that you speak of creation in an ontological sense, while i think it is true at the epistemic...)
Hope to have not misunderstood your post! (also my exposition maybe was not very clear this time :( )
In a sense I agree. But what I meant is that we never "experience" or "observe" with lab instruments the splitting in MWI and therefore it is impossible to "visualize". This however is not a problem for MWI since we already know that this "uniqueness" is due to our ignorance. Maybe "illusion" gives the wrong impression. I would probably used "distorsion". According to MWI our perspective is distorted in a way that we cannot see "reality-as-it-is" but only a sort of "reflected image" of it. This idea is not very different from Bohm's idea that we experience the "explicate order" instead of the "implicate".
The difference between Bohm and MWI is that the universe isn't splitting into an infinite number of other universes (assuming an infinite number of possibilities in the wave function) every time an observation is being. I suspect Bell was bring polite.
Concretely, experienced time is changes in memory. This is substantially different that oscillations in space.
Quoting boundless
One can look upon mind and matter as being vibrations, where mind is vibrating at a much higher frequency of life, while matter is coming deadening, losing life. Bergson, Peirce, and Louis Kahn shared this unitary perspective.
Sorry, I thought that the tinted glass argument was more obvious. The point is that if one is looking at (observing) something through a glass, and the person is unaware that the glass is tinted by some colour, then the person's observations of colour will be inaccurate. So the argument is that the soul, if it is to accurately understand material existence, must be given an immaterial perspective. If its perspective is "tinted" by material existence, the observations will be skewed like the tinted glass skews the observed colour. Try rereading that section of my post from this perspective. Actually if you didn't quite get that, you probably misinterpreted a large part of my post.
Quoting boundless
I disagree with the idea that for the mind, time is "flow". I find that most fundamentally, for the mind, time is the division between past and future. But since things are changing, while the division between past and future stays the same, we posit a flow. Things were different yesterday from today, so we say that yesterday was a different time. Since we have different times, we conclude that time must be flowing. But this is a constructed "time", just like we have a constructed concept of "space". All that is immediately evident to the mind, concerning time, is that there is a past, and there is a future, and we are at the present. We can sit at the present, meditate, calmly removing ourselves from the flow, while the world changes all around us. And this just makes us more keenly aware of the division between past and future.
So let's look at this from your perspective of a distinction between experienced time and physical time. I say there is no flow in experienced time. There is an experience of being at the present, which is the experience of being at the division between past and future. This is the immaterial perspective which I claim that we need to understand material existence. What we observe is that all around us, material things are moving from the present into the past. we assume that they are coming from the future, and moving into the past. So the "flow" is part of the physical time, it is the physical objects moving into the past. The state which exists in front of you now will be in the past by the time you say "now". You are the immaterial observer, at the static, non-moving "now", independent from the temporal world, while the entire physical world moves past you as time goes by.
Quoting boundless
The "soul", as I use it, is the principle of life, what it means to be alive. So when I say that the soul has created the body, this is what has happened over time, in the process of evolution. Now the living human body is the perspective which the soul has created for itself, from which it observes the world. So if we consider that the soul is immaterial, and its body is its observation instrument, then we must understand what the instrument is contributing to the observation in order to avoid the tinted glass problem.
I think the counter-argument is that the preferred basis is the decoherence basis (by which we all observe distinctly live or dead cats). That's not to deny the validity of all the other possible basis representations. But they are not preferred for us since we don't measure or observe states in those bases.
Quoting boundless
That's an interesting paper and well worth quoting the concluding section in full. (Note: CI and EI stand for the Copenhagen Interpretation and the Everettian Interpretation respectively.)
Quoting Nothing happens in the Universe of the Everett Interpretation - Jan-Markus Schwindt
I agree except I would claim that the EI already does incorporate the subject. The subject is not just a minor character appearing in the wave function but is also the artist that chooses the (preferred) basis for constructing the wave function. The subject is an integral part of the world that they are observing and that world-bustle is what they are seeking to represent.
Yes, I agree that the two cases are different, of course. And like you I prefer Bohm's and Bell's view over MWI. Regarding your definition of "life" and "matter" honestly I have a hard time in following you (maybe it is because I do not know almost anything about the authors you have named. I think I will read the thread about Einstein and Bergson). Rather than a frequency IMO it is the disposition of "matter" that counts. Our bodies are extremely complex "structures" of matter, so to speak. To make an analogy a very good concert is one where there is a perfect harmony between various instruments. So "life" depends on complexity rather than "frequency". Anyway in this view we are not of course "biological robots". Also, the experience of time is more related IMO to the immediate perception of change of experiences (see also my response to Metaphysician Undercover). But again it is also true that certainly this is only the "basic" aspect. On a more "complex" level there is also memory.
Hi Andrew M,
you might enjoy this paper by Max Tegmark who uses mind/consciousness as a defense to the criticism of Schwindt. However while it is an interesting defense, it posits a "fundamental role" of consciousness. Problem is that his theory about consciousness is highly speculative. Schwindt's criticism however applies to the "pure" version of MWI, i.e. one without "subsystems", like Copenaghist observer or Tegmark's mind. Positing a "mind" is adding an axiom to explain the efficacy of decoherence (which alone cannot refute Schwindt's criticism). But if you add additional structure, then the theory loses its simplicity and it is not more "simple" (mathematically) than Bohm's. In any case there is also the Born Rule problem.
Yeah, sorry I misunderstood the tinted glass argument. I never encountered it before, actually. But now I think is clear. Thanks, for the explanation!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Interesting view!! It reminds somewhat the "metaphysical subject" of the Early Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer etc. The most basic experience is possibly the "now" you are talking about. In this view the most fundamental experience is not even the "distinction between past and present" which already requires the cognition of a "dynamic" change. At this level the experience is to speak "timeless", there is no awareness of change (since "change" requires already the perception of the flow). Timelessness is like the "point" in space, a dimensionless object (In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein actually says: "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension"). The problem in this view is that such an observer cannot be "self-aware" and therefore it is quite inappropriate to be called thought as a "self", since self-awareness IMO occur in time. If the flow of time freezes, I believe, we can not have an "experience" of self-awareness (and a non-self aware soul can still be called a soul? ). To be a "self" IMO there must be some type of experience of change.
Timelessness is certainly like a dimensionless point but can we say that such an experience of "now" is an experience of a "self"? It sounds like the same "state" if there was a "stopping", a total "cessation" of the flow of "time". Maybe there would be some awareness but I am very hesitant to calling it an awareness of a "self". In timelessness there is no self-awareness. For the observer in fact to have a "feeling" of distinction between himself and "the physical world and other minds" IMO there must be some experience of change. So while maybe you are right to say that at the most fundamental level "time" is a "static now". But at the same time without the "flow" in my opinion the "observer" ould not be self-aware. This is why IMO for a "self-aware" subject the basic experience is in fact the "flow", the awareness of change. *
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ah ok... Again note that if the soul "acts"/creates, then it must be aware of the flow of time. But in this case the soul is indeed "interacting" with the physical body. So, in order to interact it cannot be "static" but itself a dynamic process, much like the "physical" body it uses as its instrument. So I still think that for such a "self-aware soul" the time is percieved as a "flow", rather than the "static now". Regardless, I think I agree with the tinted glass argument. I will ponder over it in the next days!
*@Wayfarer, maybe my response to Metaphysician Undercoverer is of your interest!
That matter is a wave-particle is not new to quantum. It was intuited by ancient philosophers by inverting inferring the micro from their observations of the macro. We can even completely eliminate particle from the description as the particle can be considered a wave spike perturbation.
A wave can have different frequencies and shapes especially as it spirals. This is how the mind creates matter out of itself. It spirals, vibrates and spreads and in so doing creates perceived density. Perception is a sensing or feeling of the different vibrational and frequency patterns. Different life forms are tuned to different frequencies and waveforms all of which are embedded in the holographic universe.
Quoting boundless
It is not that life depends upon complexity, life creates more complex forms by movement (action). An orchestra sound would be an analog for this process. Many minds (the musicians) play different sounds frequencies via their instrument to create more complex (our less complex) music (waves and frequencies). How is this accomplished? Via lots of practice that builds skills. This is evolution
Quoting boundless
Experiences would be a pattern of memory. Memory is created and embedded in the holographic fabric of the universe. Observe a holographic waveform embedded in the media. That is memory which is accessed by the mind via brain wave transmission/reception.
Hope this makes some sense. The basic ingredients of life are: memory (in the holographic fabric), mind (the creative impulse to get things going) and will (the directional application of energy used to make a choice).
I would like to add, they are no illusions or fabricated ideas in this explanation. Everything is real. Everything is experienced in every day life. It is only a matter of arranging the pieces of the puzzle in such a manner as to create a picture of life.
.
It may be that the most fundamental experience of time is as a simple now, but I don't think that is the case. I haven't read a lot of phenomenology, but I think the basic argument is that a conscious self doesn't not recognize oneself as being at the now, the present, until one already apprehends memories and anticipations. So recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future.
And recognizing a past and future is to already apprehend external change, the flow. So that argument concerning the "self of solipsism" is really not applicable, because the conscious self only shrinks oneself to a timeless point, without temporal extension, after already apprehending the reality of the past and future, and the flow itself. Producing a timeless point, as a point of view for the conscious self, is only deemed necessary in the attempt to understand, and make sense of the physical world, to avoid the tinted glass problem. Consider the timeless point which divides two time periods. Imagine if we didn't have a timeless point which divides yesterday from today. Suppose that at midnight, we had to leave a period of time, five minutes for example, to account for the transition between one day and the next. What would that five minutes consist of? Instead, we give ourselves a timeless point which separates one period of time from another.
So contrary to what you say, the self as a point in time without extension, is necessarily already self-aware. And this self-awareness is an awareness of the past and future, and consequentially the flow. This representation of the self is only produced after an apprehension of the past and future, and is produced only for the sake of giving oneself a position relative to the past and future; the past and future having been already apprehended. Once the self assigns itself this timeless point, it can project that point anywhere in time, to individuate particular periods of time, between this point and that point.
Quoting boundless
I agree, that there is a required apprehension of change, in order for a self to recognize itself as a self. But the self may designate this change as completely external to itself, assuming its existence as an immaterial soul, thus giving itself a timeless, immaterial point of existence, at the present, between those periods of time called the future and the past.
Quoting boundless
The point is that the self assigns itself this position, at the timeless point of the present. It is an assumption which is deemed necessary to avoid the tinted glass problem. To avoid the tinted glass problem we must start from a completely immaterial perspective in order to produce a complete understanding of material existence. As I said, we do not know whether or not the soul can actually have such a completely immaterial perspective, but we will not know until we try. So, we have already assumed this point, the dividing point in time, and utilize it quite regularly. If we find that there are problems with this assumption then we need to determine exactly what the problems are, to figure out why our conception of the division between the future and the past is inaccurate.
Simply put, the observer, the self, is aware of the flow of time, as you say. Then it determines that in order to understand the flow of time (avoid the tinted glass problem), it must give itself a perspective outside the flow, and this is the now of the immaterial soul. So it is as you say, that the experience of change and flow is most fundamental to the experience of time, but the self sees within itself, that the capacity to experience the flow is even more fundamental than the experience of the flow, as necessary for that experience. Therefore the self seeks to adopt this position, the most fundamental position which is prior to the experience of time, as the capacity to experience time, in its most pure form, and this is to separate oneself from the flow of time, in order to fully understand it.
Thanks - I'm assuming it's this paper: Consciousness as a State of Matter.
Quoting boundless
Actually I'm not suggesting an axiom for "mind" as such (that's too dualist for my taste), but I am suggesting that the human perceptual point-of-view is implicit in how we represent the world. The key distinction I'm making here is that interactions between objects (including those prior to human existence or far away from Earth) don't depend on humans or sentience. So there need be no preferred basis in the world itself, things happen (or not) in every basis but humans have evolved to perceive the world in the decoherence basis. I think this explains why humans have a basis preference without requiring additional structure or axioms in the quantum formalism itself.
Quoting boundless
In my view, the Born Rule can be explained. Briefly, in wave functions where the relative states have equal amplitudes, we would be indifferent to which state we would find ourselves measuring, so branch counting is sufficient. When they are not equal, the wave function can be transformed such that all the states do have equal amplitudes. For example, a superposition of two states with (non-normalized) amplitudes of 1 and 2 respectively can be mathematically transformed into five states each with amplitude 1. And then branch counting again gives the correct probabilities according to the Born Rule.
Quoting Rich
Ok, but I do not think that Verlinde, Bohm etc arrived to such conclusions (as far as I know). Anyway such a "universal mind theory" IMO will never have a scientific "proof". I am not saying that is wrong BTW, but it is only speculative. It somewhat reminds me some "concepts" of string theory like the idea that particles are mode of oscillation of strings. But as physics is concerned there is no "mind" involved, simply because it is an unfalsifiable concept.
Quoting Rich
Well, I guess what you mean by "life" ;) If panpsychism is true then what you say is obviously correct. But again except for "living beings" I do not see any "purpose" in the action of inanimate objects. In animals and humans I see it very clearly, of course. In plants for example there is clearly the tendecy to "live", albeit in a completely insentient way. In inanimate processes honestly I cannot say if there is a very subtle and latent "purpose" or not. IMO at this level we can only speculate. If there is, then it is so "subtle" that at the pratical level we cannot find almost a trace. Anyway again, your view reminds me the one of the stoics. They thought that indeed there was the "Universal Soul". So I concede that possibly in some forms your view can be right. However it is not scientific (but again as I said some time ago, we are in a Philosophy Forum!). Regarding the "orchestra" however I agree, it is "we" that collectively learn by our experiences and can in fact create complexity. Regarding instead the origin of "life" in general, however I only say that we cannot either prove or disprove theleology. It is a possibility that there is purpose, that the "Universal Mind" created everything, but in a way that there is no visible "purpose", at least as science is concerned.
Quoting Rich
To summarize your view it might be said that all things are either information or minds. Minds learn information and act upon such information. Minds also interact to each other is some ways. And everything is the result of these "interactions", these acts etc performed by the minds. However those minds are not really many, but neither are "one" (since there is plurality of minds). In a subtle level they work also at the level of inanimate processes. It is much more evident as "complexity" arises, like in animals and humans. But the "ultimate reality" is mental and an active mental "substance" that continues to act, learn etc. Is it a good (basic) representation of your view ?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The first two paragraph was actually my point. Especially "recognizing oneself as being at the present, is posterior to recognizing a past and future". This is why I think such a "self" cannot be said to an "actual self". To be an "actual self" (and so to speak not only "in potentia" - I am using Aristotelian terminology) one must experience the "flow". What I meant is that without the "experience" of change, there would be absolutely no self-awareness - and therefore nothing that could be rightly called as "self".
With what you are saying in the third paragraph, I am paradoxically in agreement. In fact to be aware of oneself as a "timeless" point one must clearly have been before self-aware. But we saw that self-awareness arises when AFTER there is the awareness of change. So in this case, to be aware of the "static now" requires, paradoxically, that one has been aware of change. If there is a "substantial self" then maybe it could actually be self-aware "timelessly" only after having "learned" self-awareness from change. Hope it made sense ;)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I can agree. There is however IMO a problem with this theory. We assumed that in all this it remained the same. So I was wondering does it interact in some way with "matter", or is it only a "detached" observer? If it interacts however it can change, and therefore the self does not strictly remain itself as time passes. But conversely if it does not change, how can it "learn" to be self-aware and to search to find a "a-temporal" perspective?
Yeah, that is the paper I was referring to!
Quoting Andrew M
Ok, In some sense this view reminds me Schopenhauer position that the world as an empirical object necessitates the "opening" of the first sentient "eye" in the world. It is certainly interesting. But how can, say, the cosmological model fit in such a description? Our "hypotheses" for the past are indeed in the "preferred basis". Do these "hypotheses" remain "true" in your view or they are a sort of "fiction"? (this point was never clear to me, I apologize if this question is obvious. But it is clear that all non-quantum theories work in the "preferred basis branches"... so if such a theory is correct how is the status of "predictions in the past"?) Anyway I think that your "solution" is a possiblity to avoid the rejection of "simple" MWI by Schwindt's argument. I concur, thereofore, that it is a valid "escape" from refutation!
Quoting Andrew M
Mmm interesting! I cannot say if it is a valid counter-argument, but maybe it is. Just for curiosity, is it based on some papers?
In a way yes, and a way no. How much of it do they perceive, how they may articulate it, how much they can articulate it (considering they both depend upon academic careers) only they know. They, as everyone else lives within constraints. Just recognize that any academic or researcher is subjected to enormous, career ending pressures if they stray too far from the materialist lines that given academic funding.
Quoting boundless
"Science" had morphed into a huge money making industry that depends upon the supremacy of chemicals over mind. While "science" has no problem fabricated unprovable concepts such as the Big Bang, Laws of Physics, Dark Matter, Dark Energy, Multi World/Multi Universe, Thermodynamic Imperative, Selfish Genes, Space-Time, etc., they do have a persistent problem with the everyday ubiquitous experience of Mind. Fundamentally, money distorts and pollutes any and every endeavor. The more the money involved, the greater the distortion. One in a while something interesting comes out of the corners of scientific research but it is tough to find.
Quoting boundless
All fundamental concepts of physics are unfalsifiable. Scientists just don't use the word Mind because that ends funding. They use substitute words such as the Laws of Physics in its stead.
Quoting boundless Inanimate objects, other than the manifestation of decay, no longer have the vibrational capacity to create, though in their own way (a super nova for a example) they still do create. It is interesting.
Quoting boundless
Science's alternative explanation is that there was this Big Bang (quite a comical concept if you meditate on it) and then Everything Just Happened By Accident. Even Erik Verlinde mocked this explanation.
Stephen Robbins provides a coherent explanation of perception, the "hard problem", in a Bergsonian framework here:
https://youtu.be/RtuxTXEhj3A
Quoting boundless
Actually memory and mind, which are aspects of the same. But I think you get the point. Science pretty much accedes to the memory/information part, they just can't get themselves to acknowledge themselves, that which is creating all like these theories and ideas. The rest of your summary it's pretty much on the mark. It is very holistic with a very precise ontology based upon memory, mind, and will. The only requirement is that one accept Mind as fundamental as opposed to the scientific explanation in which it magically appears out of no where, and is just an illusion created for no apparent reason or without any theory.
I'm not particularly familiar with Schopenhauer's position. However I tend to identify with Aristotle's position that the intelligible world just is the sensory world (as against the various two-world dualisms held by thinkers such as Plato, Descartes and Kant). We represent things from a point-of-view, but those things nonetheless precede their representation (as the existence of the Earth prior to the emergence of humans to talk about it attests).
Quoting boundless
Yes, they remain true. I see the bases in QM as similar to the reference frames of relativity. Just as descriptions are indexed to a relativistic reference frame, so they are also indexed to a basis (or a relative state within a basis). Any basis is valid and, if suitable language has been developed, can also be described (e.g., a particle that was detected at a particular position can also be described as having been in a superposition of momenta).
Quoting boundless
Cool! Although, as far as I'm aware, this is the mainstream Everettian view. For example, David Wallace says, "But emergent processes like [decoherence] do not have a place in the axioms of fundamental physics, precisely because they emerge from those axioms themselves."
The idea here is that things do not need to be fundamental nor precisely-defined in order to be real. Wallace often gives an example with tigers. They are real even though the Standard model doesn't mention them.
Quoting boundless
Yes, it's based on Carroll and Sebens' derivation which uses math from Zurek's envariance paper. Sean Carroll discusses it on his blog - here's a summary quote:
Quoting Sean Carroll - Why Probability in Quantum Mechanics is Given by the Wave Function Squared
Agreed. Of course we are conditioned by our education, environment etc. What I meant is that they knew that physics is based e.g. on quantitative predictions. And while they of course had a strong metaphysical component in their thought, they were well aware about the difference between the two.
Quoting Rich
Well, again in some aspects I agree and in others not. "Multi World" for example is IMO metaphysics. For example in the string theory version the idea is that all that is predicted to be possible, happens. To me thinking that this is scientific is very problematic, to say the least. In some senses I agree with what you say about "Laws of Physics": of course there are "regularities" but at the same time we need not to thin them as "things". The "Big Bang" is simply the "beginning", i.e. we see that our measurements suggest that the universe had a "start time". So it is an inference of our theories. Of course not all physicists might agree, but it is a "scientific concept", IMO. The same can be said for Dark Matter and Dark Energy. Especially for "Dark Matter" we see that if GR is right at cosmological scales, then we have to admit its existence. Alternative theories are, to my knowledge, at least, inelegant (and also they have difficulties to "reproduce" the same results of GR where it works well). Regarding "Selfish Genes" I do not know much, but IMO it is a speculative approach, and even not so "well accepted" by biologists. I do not know anything about Thermodynamic Imperative, instead. Finally "space-time" is at least a very useful concept. However here I agree that there is some tendency to reify it.
Quoting Rich
Physicists do not use the world "Mind" because it is not a concept that can be treated quantitatively. I cannot even imagine a formula about "mind". But again, I am not saying that your view is wrong ;) By the way as I said before "laws of physics" is a meta-physical concept, not a physical one in my view!
Quoting Rich
Actually in a different way I wondered about the capacity of inanimate processes to maintain themselves. For example a star is a system that has a tendency to maintain its identity due to internal processes of energy production. Again, I might even agree that a latent form of "mind" is present in them, but it is not useful as science is concerned.
Quoting Rich
I wasn't familar with Verlinde view. Interesting!
Thanks for the video ;)
Quoting Rich
Yeah, I am actually drawn to "panpsychism" and related ideas (after having read Spinoza's theory of psycho-physical parallelism). For example the simple fact that the universe has regularities suggests that some "latent mind" is a reality, IMO. I agree that physicists nowadays tend to be too much skeptical or even "a-priori" contrarian to this sort of ideas. As I said elsewhere this is IMO a mistake. They tend to refute these ideas too quickly.
Quoting Andrew M
Actually the term "dualism" has a lot of meanings. For example the Kantian version the "a-priori forms" are simply about how our mind works. Aristotle IMO it is still a dualist since he makes a distinction between the sensory world and "the real world" (again, it is not directly what Aristotle thought but it is heavely implied!). Schopenhauer's view ws very similar to Kant's. By the way only a naive realist would assert that the "percieved world" is the same as the "real world". I think that we are agreeing, and interestingly QM in its various interpretations seems to suggest the same!
Quoting Andrew M
Again interesting! The problem I have with MWI is that there are too many worlds. I find it very problemtic. But again it does not mean that some ideas are very sound!
Quoting Andrew M
Yeah, I agree. They are not "real in themeselves", so to speak. But of course they are real (reality seems to have layers).
Anyway I also agree that decoherence is emergent, and in fact the "purest" MWI does not even have that axiom. But again, this does not mean that decoherence cannot be addes to the formalism (and adding decoherence is not as adding "particles" etc).
Quoting Andrew M
Thaks! I will read!
This is the whole point. It highlights in bold the enormous bias of science. The intention of science is to clearly externalize space and most especially time (duration) so science built a whole ontology around so-called space-Time without any call to do so. And when it falls apart science literally, out of thin air, science creates an invisible universe composed of dark matter and dark energy.
Quoting boundless
Have you ever seen the Laws of Physics quantified, or Evolution, it Thermodynamic Imperative quantified? These are all placeholders and substitutes for Mind, a word that is verboten because science does not want to admit to it. Scientists have free minds seeking the truth but we don't. We are deterministic robots while they are seekers of truths (like Dennett) and this are are immune to illusions and are able to see through the illusions to help us along. This sleight of hand actually works!
Quoting boundless
Yes, but materialist science uses the term all the time. They never use the word Mind. This is not an accident. The allowable nomenclature is clear.
So I'd say we agree on this point, and what would be left would be to work out finer details, such as the relationship between the self, and the flow of time. What I proposed, is that the self desires to position the flow as external to the self, and this would alleviate the tinted glass problem. It places the soul at the eternal, unchanging now of the present, with all change occurring around it, giving the soul the "clear" perspective of all material existence.
Now, the problem I alluded to is that this perspective is just assumed. We realize that to avoid the tinted glass problem we must give the soul this perspective, so we assume that this perspective is a real possibility, and we attempt to locate ourselves there. This perspective gives us "the point in time". The point in time is a non-temporal division between two periods of time, which allows true contiguity between the two periods. As I said, it is assumed, so it is artificial. We just assume that periods of time can be separated from each other by inserting a point.
Special relativity however denies the reality of that perspective. It posits vagueness with respect to the division between past and future, and makes the point in time, which crisply divides one duration from another, unreal, inconsistent with physical reality. So special relativity adopts other principles which deny the soul this perspective, forcing us to look for another means to avoid the tinted glass problem.
Quoting boundless
Yes, this demonstrates that you understand exactly what I was saying. The self apprehends change. It recognizes that to understand change it must provide itself an observation point. So it assumes the soul to occupy the eternally unchanging position of "now", as an immaterial entity, with non-temporal and non-spatial existence. This is the purely non-dimensional point. It cannot be temporal because all time exists on both sides of that point, and there is no duration at the point. At this assumed point, we traditionally would have produced a "state". The state is represented by a statement of what is assumed to be, at this moment in time. States are subject to the fundamental laws of logic, non-contradiction etc..
Again, relativity theory messes this up, because with relativity, the state at an particular point in time, is dependent on the frame of reference. Assumed states, are dependent on the non-temporal moment in time for their staticity, and without that required moment in time, the statements cannot adequately describe reality. So, the self desires to posit that moment of division between future and past, as the pure observation point of temporal existence, but relativity has stipulated that this observation point is unreal, and has forced the tinted glass problem back upon us.
Quoting boundless
This is a complex issue which you raise, and this issue forces the need to assume a third aspect, and this is matter itself. The traditional concept of matter, as derived from Aristotle describes matter as the potential for change. It is the underlying substance which does not change when change is occurring. So for example, we take wood, and give it all different forms, the underlying thing, "wood" stays the same. It is the "matter". In this case "wood" is determined as the thing which stays the same (matter), while its form changes. We can go further though, and say that wood itself is just a form of the underlying molecules, which are the matter. Then we could separate out the molecules of the wood, and wood is no longer wood, this form has changed, and in this case the molecules are the underlying thing which doesn't change (matter). We can proceed to atoms, then the molecules would be a changing form, and the underlying atoms would be the unchanging matter. In modern physics, "energy" has replaced "matter" as the underlying thing which doesn't change (law of conservation). The concept of energy is much more versatile, because unlike matter which is the underlying substance of an objects, energy is transferrable from one object to another.
That was a big digression, to explain that "matter", and now "energy" are the concepts which account for our assumptions of temporal continuity. The assumption of this underlying thing, which stays the same from one moment to the next, as time passes, is what validates the belief that time is continuous, and all the "laws" of nature which we produce. Now let's put this together with the previous points. The self assumes an immaterial observation point at the "now" in time. From here it observes changing forms and notes in statements, particular states at particular times. It also observes continuity, aspects which stay the same from one moment to the next, and this feature is assigned to "matter", inertia and energy. So this concept, the underlying thing which stays the same as time passes, "matter", is the way that the self relates the assumed unchanging eternal point of the now, its observation point, to the changing forms. Matter partakes of both features. It persists at the present, as an eternally unchanging thing, yet all the changing forms, as time passes are said to partake of matter, being material forms, subject to the laws derived from the assumption of temporal continuity.
In my opinion, this concept which accounts for the underlying thing which does not change, "matter" or "energy", can be reduced to the passing of time itself. If we put aside special relativity, for the moment, we can assume that the passing of time is the underlying thing which does not change throughout all physical changes, and this provides the potential for change, the exact criteria for the Aristotelian concept of "matter". Once we take this step, we have the three aspects clearly individuated. The soul takes its observation point as eternal, and distinct from the passing of time. The changing forms of physical existence are apparent to it. The changing of those forms is made intelligible by noting the consistency in the passing of time. How we, as human beings interact with the changing forms, is now tied up with how time passes. This is how the eternal "now" relates to the changing forms of physical existence. This is the existence of the self, the interaction between the eternal now and the changing physical forms, which is the passing of time. How this is possible is the secret which will be unveiled when we discover the principles to unscramble the vagueness of the present moment which is disclosed by relativity theory, thus removing the tinted glass.
If you refer back to my earlier post I described this as objects passing a plane. And if we assume that bigger objects take longer to pass that plane than smaller objects, this necessitates the conclusion that the point, which is the now of the present, is not a point at all, but it must have some dimension, the plane has breadth. That is why there is a trend now in the philosophy of time, toward a two dimensional time, we must give the present breadth. Within this breadth, interaction can be accounted for.
I'm curious where you find Aristotle implying this. Aristotle rejected Plato's realm of Ideal Forms and instead located form in the natural world (see hylomorphism and also immanent realism).
Quoting boundless
OK, though isn't that a problem with our expectations of how the world should be rather than a problem with the Everettian interpretation itself? Or do you think there is more to it than that?
Apart from the consideration on Dark Matter, Big Bang etc I think that your objections are against how "scientists" present science itself. In my opinion, much of the concepts you are criticizing are either "speculative" or "metaphyisical". The problem IMO is that amongst scientists there are a lot "physicalists", i.e. who believe that only the "physical" is real. This is not my view, of course. But at the same time it seems to be the "metaphysical position" prevalent among scientists. This conditiones clearly how science is presented etc. For example many "materialist" use the term "phyisical laws" as a "figure of speech", i.e. they do not "reify" it. They use this term because it has less "metaphysical" connotations than "mind" (and therefore methodologically it is "more suitable" to use the term "phyiscal laws" than other terms - the contention is probably due to the fact that the "materialists" confuse the methodological with the ontological, so to speak!).
Regarding Aristotle, I admit that I was not clear. What I meant it is that Aristotle introduced a dualism between "the substance" and "the accidents" regarding "things in the sensible world". Of course Aristotle, as far as I know, was a direct realist and therefore he thought that we see reality as it is. The problem is that when epistemological concerns are appreciated, then there is another level of "accidents", i.e. how things appear to us in contrast to how things are in themselves. IMO Aristotle disinction between "substance" and "accidents" was the foundation of the distincion between "primary qualities" and "secundary qualities" of Galileo (and Descartes, Locke...). This introduced the "indirect realism" which then influenced Kant etc. For Plato the "changing world" was without substance, a world of accidents, so to speak. The epistemological concerns that began in the 17th centrury were due to Aristotle, rather than Plato (of course Aristotelism can be considered a "form" of Platonism, hence the saying of Whitehead "western philosophy is a series of footnote of Plato's philosophy").
Regarding Everett's interpetration. Yes in a sense I agree, it is a "issue" of "preference" on my part. But the same could be said for preferring SR (Special Relativity) over LET (Lorentz ether theory). Both give the same results and in their limits of validity can be considered two different "interpretations". But when GR came, SR was much more compatible with it (altough interestingly http://ilja-schmelzer.de/gravity/ here there is a serious proposal to make an extension of Lorentz theory to gravitation*.). In the same way I believe that MWI is a less "reliable" description of reality than other interpretation. Of course this is a "metaphysical/interpretative" reason. But it is the same reason why before the introduction of GR, SR was to be preferred over LET.
*Actually the reason of this proposal is the "non-locality" of Bohm's theory. Bohm theory is compatible with LET and not with SR (in its usual form. See for example https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.4102), therefore the idea is to extend LET in order to make a theory of gravitation compatible with Bohm's theory.
Thank you for the insightful response!
I will reply as soon as I can ;)
Yes, though this is a perfectly natural and ordinary distinction. For example, the straight stick appears bent when partially submerged in water. But it's something else entirely to say that the straight stick is itself merely an appearance. This kind of "Plato's Cave" conclusion was just what Aristotle rejected.
Quoting boundless
So I read it in the other direction. I see these philosophical innovations as a rejection of Aristotle's natural empiricism (where distinctions arise naturally in one's ordinary experience of the world) and instead as a reintroduction of Plato's dualism in different forms.
I also see the ordinary language philosophers as a corrective to that kind of thinking. For example, Wittgenstein's private language argument and Ryle's regress argument against indirect realism.
Quoting boundless
What interpretations would you suggest should be preferred to MWI for that reason? Note that MWI requires the least number of postulates of any interpretation and is also a local theory (so is naturally compatible with SR).
It just seems like whenever materialist/determinist theories are in trouble, science makes up invisible matter, invisible energy, and now who knows how many invisible universes (has anyone actually calculated the number of invisible universes that have been created?). Is invisible, unmeasurable, unknowable stuff the new paradigm of science? If so, does that make room for God?
Fair enough, let's see what the theory of quantum mechanics says. There are two postulates that are shared by all the different interpretations. They are:
Note that there are no invisible worlds postulated there.
Now here's the evolution of the wave function for the double-slit experiment with a detector at the slits and an observer that reads the result. The first quantum state is the particle being emitted. The second quantum state is the resulting superposition when the particle is detected.
You can see that there are two worlds described by the wave function. How do you interpret that as one world without adding a postulate to make one of the worlds disappear? Or, if you do add a postulate, what is the principled motivation for doing so?
Bohmian mechanics avoids this entirely by positing a real quantum potential and wave perturbation. MWI exists to preserve determinism, as does Relativity, with the embarrassing consequences that 95 % of our very own universe has become invisible and an uncountable number of new universes are created with every observation. It would be interesting to know exactly how much invisibility has now been created by modern scientific explanations, all done with a straight face as if there was a difference from this and mysticism.
The "real quantum potential" just is the branching wave function, so it's just Everettian worlds by another name. The additional postulate is that the quantum potential guides (non-locally) the particle that is observed.
As H. D. Zeh (the discoverer of decoherence) puts it:
Quoting Why Bohm’s Quantum Theory? - H. D. Zeh
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This position reminds me the Sankhya school of Hindu philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/sankhya/
You can ignore to the sake of the discussion the following paragraph. It is only a tangential remark due to personal considerations...
To be honest I am also very drawn to Buddhism, which explictly denies the "existence" of this kind of "self" (interestingly there was a "Personalist" school in Buddhism which disagreed on this point with all the others. See https://www.iep.utm.edu/pudgalav/.) . But again the "tinted glass argument" or the similar "eye and visual field analogy" (i.e. the knowing self and the known world are in a similar relationship to the eye and visual field) are actually very strong arguments to the "existence" of some kind of self. In particular Humean-like arguments do not really apply (since of course we cannot find the "trascendental" subject as an object to experience). By the way Buddhism is not materialistic since it is very clear between the distinction between "vijnana" (consciousness) and "rupa" (matter). Our minds are often compared to "streams", without a fixed "center" - i.e. it seems that both the "knowing" and the "material" aspect of reality are viewed as "in flux". But again, Buddhism seems to be very "empirical", i.e. concerned with the analysis of experience whereas the "self" we are discussing is, in fact "outside" the realm of experience.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Here I disagree. In fact I find a very strong analogy with the "immaterial" self we are discussing and the "observer" in SR. Both are not "part of experience": the "immaterial" self does not "participate" in experience, since it is in its timeless "realm", so to speak, whereas the "observer" is an abstraction (on the reality of which physics makes no claim). In any case if the observer of relativity is real, he certainly "knows" the "events" that are associated with its light cone. Therefore each observer has its associated "perspective" on the world (or even its own "world"). Again the "flow" is a property of the "changing world" and not of the observer itself. SR does however deny the existence of a "preferred" reference frame. But if we accept that every subject has its own experience on the world I do not really see how the immaterial self we are discussing is "questioned" by SR. IMO SR denies only that the events that one subject might take as "future" are "future" for all the subjects, but it does not mean that for each subject the above considerations we have made do not apply.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, I disagree. The tinted glass problem simply states that the "self" to really know the "world" must be outside it, in a "timeless" realm. All selves have "their" distinction between past and future. But nowhere it is stated that this distinction must be unique. As I said above what SR denies is precisely this uniqueness. Even without considering relativity all selves must have their "own" experience of the world, SR only introduces the idea that each "world" correponds to the "light cone".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Very interesting ideas! So all selves aknowledge both the "flow" and the consistency of the "flow". This make them "self-aware" since as we both noted without the experience of change it is not possible to be "self-aware". At the same time all selves have a very clear distinction of "past" and "future". The passing of time is in this "model" the "result" of the aknowledgement by the "selves" of the changeable forms.
However until now I do not see how SR (and GR) can be used against the "selves". In fact the "phenomenal" world is what is directly visible to the self and one self cannot "take" the perspective of others, because of subjectivity. Considering this and considering that "space-time" can be taken as an "abstraction" there is no tinted glass problem, here. Simply because the "phenomenal" is simply the experienced world.
Regarding your last paragraph, thanks for the input. I will reflect upon it. In some ways it, in some ways, can be used in support to the idea that the "self" can be both "unchanging" and "active", i.e. interacting. You speak of a "trend". Could you please indicate some "references", links etc about this (if possible, of course)? :smile:
Quoting Andrew M
Agreed. IMO one of the reason that I always disregarded "Aristotelism" is actually its "direct realism". Plato on this was much more interesting. Anyway in the years I came to appreciate some other parts of Aristotelian philosophy. But here I am going too "off-topic" ;)
Quoting Andrew M
The problem of direct realism is that even an optical illusion can be used as a strong argument against it. At the same time however "indirect realism" tries to speak about a "hidden reality" which can be inferred from inference and our "percieved reality". IMO the problem of indirect realism is that we have no clue wether our "categories" do apply to such a "hidden reality". This does not mean we can make "reasonable guesses" as I said elsewhere. But in order to avoid skeptical arguments of all sort we have to speak og "reasonable guesses".
Regarding Plato, in a sense I agree. In fact Plato explictly denies the "reliability" of senses. But at the same time he regards "phenomena" as changing, without substance. Substances are to be found in the Forms. Locke instead thought, like Aristotle, that they are in the world. So I see Locke as an Aristotelean trying to defend Aristotelism (in some forms) from Platonic attacks.
Quoting Andrew M
Agreed that mathematically is the simplest, but not ontologically. I prefer Bohr's take of Copenaghen Interpretation. Bu anyway I find all interpretations somewhat "lacking". CI seems to imply really anti-realism, which I find very problematical. Rovelli's take is very intriguing but it seems to go towards a sort of "solipsism". MWI has too many "worlds". Regarding Bohm there is the explicit "non-locality" and the ambiguity when it comes to define "real". Even the "nomological" variant which asserts that the "wavefunction" is nominal seems to go against the tendency to see reality in a way free from our "pre-conceptions" (I find the "point particles" an outdated concept).
So, in my opinion this shows that "beneath" QM there might be a "subquantum" theory. Maybe even weirder!
Edited for clarification.
There is no "collapse" into an infinite number of universes. It is real but still probabilistic in that some areas are more likely than others.
I have no idea what he's talking about. Maybe it's overlooked because it doesn't exist. The guiding wave and the wave perturbation are real and do not branch because there is no collapse of the wave function. The wave function in Bohmian Mechanics becomes a quantum potential so it really isn't a wave function any more.
To begin with, I find that there is ambiguity with "self" which I think I should try to expose to some extent. In most instances, "self" refers to an experiencing, observing and acting, human being. But the immaterial perspective which we I am describing, that perspective at the point of the now, is separate from the human being, as immaterial, and this is why I preferred to refer to it as the "soul". While some might call it the "mind", or something like that, we have to keep it separate from "self" because of the ambiguity as "self" implies a composite mind and body. I believe phenomenology provides an approach to this perspective. The point is that the "soul" or the "mind" is other than the "self" of the human being, and this is how we transcend the physical human existence of the "self" by recognizing the soul.
Once we assume that this transcendent position exists, and assume that it is potentially real, then we try to adopt this position as an observation point, to avoid the tinted glass problem. The position is assumed to be the point of "now", the eternal non-dimensional boundary between past and future. Once we assume this point, we project it everywhere, to separate out periods of time and describe what exists in that period of time.
The problems with this perspective are numerous, and it is by understanding these problems that we can start to get a real grasp of the nature of time. First and foremost, there is the issue of interaction, which you mentioned. And to understand this problem we must appreciate the duality of the soul's interaction. The soul is not only an observer at this point, it is causal at this point, and that's what we discussed with the problems of observation. So when we analyze the problems involved with the immaterial observation point, the non-dimensional now, and attempt to construct the real observation point, (determine what colour the glass is tinted, you might say), we have to take into account this dual aspect, the capacity to observe the physical world, and the capacity to act in the physical world.
Quoting boundless
I think you are making an incorrect comparison to SR here. The basic premise of relativity theory is that motions are relative. The assumption of an immaterial observation point for the soul assumes absolute rest. This is a fundamental difference. Relativity theory, as developed through Newton and Galileo, is a sort of by-product of the Copernican revolution, the realization that mathematics could describe and predict the motions of the planets in a geocentric, or in a heliocentric way. Positioning the soul as an immaterial observer at absolute rest, assumes that there is a "correct" way of representing motions. The absolute rest is necessary in order to validate the "correct" way.
Special relativity explicitly denies that there is such a thing as absolute rest, and by replacing absolute rest with the constant, the speed of light, it produces a condition in which the "correct" way of representing motions is in relation to light. However light is itself a thing in motion, and this assumes that time is necessarily passing. The constant, or fundamental premise is the activity of light, and activity assumes that time is passing. So this is fundamentally different from the premise of absolute rest, which assumes the immaterial soul to be at a point where no time is passing. The difference being that absolute rest provides a viewpoint for the observation of time passing and therefore all motions, while special relativity ties "time passing" to the activity of light. So special relativity provides no viewpoint to observe the activity of light, and if there is any inaccuracy in the assumed relationship between time passing and the activity of light, then there is a tinted glass problem.
The consequence of this difference is that the premise of the non-dimensional point, absolute rest provides a position to view all motions in relation to each other, including the motion of light. The premise of special relativity does not allow this, because it sets as the viewpoint, the activity of light. So the soul's perspective, from special relativity, is as moving light, a photon or some such thing, and all other motions are viewed from this perspective. If we had a complete understanding of the activity of light, and how other activities related to it, then we could use this as an accurate viewpoint. But we do not, so we have created for ourselves, a tinted glass problem. We have assumed a perspective, the activity of light as a constant, without properly understanding that perspective, and what it adds to (how it tints) our observations.
Quoting boundless
So the tinted glass problem is implied right here within this assumption of a "light cone". The notion of a light cone assumes some things about the relationship between time and light, which are really unknown. But in order for the light cone be a true representation, these assumed things must be true. The unknowns are the tinting of the glass, and when we assume that there is no tinting, we assign these properties to the things being observed. The colour of the glass is assigned to the objects observed. You could insist, as some adherents do, that special and general relativity give us a "clear" perspective, and assert that the effect of the tinting really is the property of the object, but I speak of it as tinting because I think that there is overwhelming evidence, beginning with the Doppler effect on the cosmic scale, and the whole idea of waves without a medium, that the glass really is tinted. Therefore what is needed is to untie the passing of time from its designated relationship with the activity of light, such that we can establish a proper perspective to observe the activity of light.
Quoting boundless
This indicates that you don't yet quite understand the application of the tinted glass analogy to this problem. Basic relativity theory dictates that an observation point is a frame of reference. The possibility of motion is inherent, assumed within the concept of a reference frame, and this sets it apart from the position of absolute rest inherent within the assumption of the soul at a non-dimensional point. The actual motion which is inherent within the observation point is the tinting of the glass. We can never know the actual motion which is inherent within the observation point, because it is treated as possible motion, and so it taints the observations as an unknown factor. From the perspective of the non-dimensional soul, and absolute rest, relativity theory necessarily produces a tinted glass problem. It allows that there is motion within the observation point which cannot be accounted for because it cannot be known. The observation point is an active physical object.
Now consider special relativity. It fixes light as the observation point. Light is the constant, the absolute frame of reference, the soul's new viewpoint. However, there is motion inherent within this absolute frame of reference, which we do not know in any complete or absolute sense, so we have a tinted glass. Since it is our absolute frame of reference, instead of the absolute rest, we have no viewpoint from which to further understand this motion, the activity of light, and these unknowns will inevitably taint our observations.
Yes, they perceived in memory.
Quoting boundless
Yes, this is unshared memory. Still embedded in the universe (holographic) but inaccessible to others (most of the time) because the brain "frequency" is more or less unique for each person.
Quoting boundless
There is flow everywhere. Internal memory and external (the objects). We feel time as duration when internal memory changes. These changes can be caused by flow anywhere (internal or external) because it is fundamentally all memory.
If one views everything as memory imbued in the fabric of the universe and the brain as the access wave (holographic reconstructive wave) for this memory everything becomes clear. As for SR and GR, they are so convoluted and distorted, they cannot be used to understand anything. Quantum yes. Relativity no. Relativity is best understood as a way to transform events between frames of references as a way of explaining (and this is important) only why people way perceive simultaneity differently. It is a measurement issue that Relativity addresses. It had nothing to do with real time and had no ontological value.
If Poor Tim is hooked up to a circuit that is completed if two lightening bolts hit it simultaneously, Poor Tim is dead, no matter what someone in a distant planet may see. There is real duration in life and it v is not dependent on whether someone's clocks see it differently. Really, don't assign any ontology to Relativity or else you will never have a clear ontology of your own.
I would disagree. Opponents take a distinction that arises naturally in everyday experience and then their conclusion generally involves denying that same distinction. For example, "How do you know everything isn't an illusion?" or "We don't perceive things as they really are, because illusions".
Quoting boundless
Perhaps so, but his "primary qualities" and "secondary qualities" isn't a natural distinction. Trying to draw a line regarding which qualities the apple "primarily" has is to misunderstand the nature of language abstraction.
Quoting boundless
Agreed.
Quoting boundless
I find Rovelli's RQM very intriguing as well, but it is a realism of sorts. Its difference to MWI is that only interactions of other systems with the system in question define what is real for that system. So you can't compare accounts between systems until they interact, in which case their respective accounts will always be found to be consistent.
Quoting boundless
It seems only as many as is necessary. Note that the vast size of Hilbert space is the same under all interpretations. If it is not interpreted physically, then where do the unitary transformations happen?
Quoting boundless
Agreed.
Quoting boundless
In my view the universe just is quantum mechanical at base. If decoherence emerges from QM, then perhaps gravity does as well. For a possible explanation along these lines, see Sean Carroll's recent talk entitled "Extracting the Universe From the Wavefunction". The main idea starts at 29:49.
There is no wave function collapse in the Everettian Interpretation.
Quoting Rich
In Bohmian Mechanics the wave function describes quantum potential at both slits - which are the "potential" worlds or branches that are in superposition. Zeh describes them as "empty" wave components since they don't specify where the actual particle is (this is instead specified by the Bohmian guiding function).
What problem is the Many Worlds Theory of Hugh Everett a solution to? In other words, why was it necessary for Everett to propose an hypotheses comprising the apparently radical speculation of ‘infinitely branching universes’? If it turned out not to be tenable, what would we be obliged to accept?
If you could answer in as simple terms as possible, for the benefit of those unschooled in the mathematical intricacies, that would be appreciated. (Unless, of course, any answer is not comprehensible to such an audience.)
Everett's theory is just unitary quantum mechanics [*]. Everett was the first to realize that it predicted many worlds (his term was "relative states") when understood as a realist theory. If unitary QM were to be falsified by experiment, then a different theory with different predictions would be required. For example, a dynamical collapse theory like GRW.
--
[*] Unitary quantum mechanics includes only two postulates and is common to every interpretation of quantum mechanics.
No proposal of new universes. It is not an ontological assertion.
I disagree with the author's proposal of quantum suicide to test the theory since other interpretations predict the same results.
A "potential world" (what we see in our minds as virtual action) does not entail an actual world (the MWI) solution. I read Everett's paper, and clearly his ontology is poles apart from Bohm's description and equations. Bohmian Mechanics had no need for an infinite number of universes and measurements which is why he described his interpretation as causal and not deterministic. Zeh wants to make it deterministic which is why he is attempting to create the equivalence. Everett's interpretation stands alone in this regard, and after reading part of his original theses, my eyes glazed over at how extravagant it really was. Really quite an imagination compared to the simplicity of the Bohm model.
The precise ontology of Everett's equations can of course remain a mystery. However, there are some clues as to what he might have been thinking:
http://lesswrong.com/lw/5dh/the_many_worlds_of_hugh_everett/
"Byrne writes of Everett's views: "the splitting of observers share an identity because they stem from a common ancestor, but they also embark on different fates in different universes. They experience different lifespans, dissimilar events (such as a nuclear war perhaps) and at some point are no longer the same person, even though they share certain memory records." Everett says that when a observer splits it is meaningless to ask "which of the final observers corresponds to the initial one since each possess the total memory of the first" he says it is as foolish as asking which amoeba is the original after it splits into two. Wheeler made him remove all such talk of amoebas from his published short thesis."
"Byrne says Everett did not think there were just an astronomically large number of other universes but rather an infinite number of them, not only that he thought there were a non-denumerable infinite number of other worlds. This means that the number of them was larger than the infinite set of integers, but Byrne does not make it clear if this means they are as numerous as the number of points on a line, or as numerous as an even larger infinite set like the set of all possible clock faces, or maybe an even larger infinity than that where easy to understand examples of that sort of mega-infinite magnitude are hard to come by. Neill Graham tried to reformulate the theory so you'd only need a countably infinite number of branches and Everett at first liked the idea but later rejected it and concluded you couldn't derive probability by counting universes. Eventually even Graham seems to have agreed and abandoned the idea that the number of universes was so small you could count them."
Those scientists who refuse to confront Everett's Interpretation and equations for what they are, are merely trying to save the only deterministic interpretation of quantum theory while avoiding the ontological mythology of everything constantly splitting into probabilistic infinities. The only question that remains is how large are the infinities.
So to maintain a determinist interpretation, we just need to assume an infinite number of infinite numbers of universes?
It seems that they are all "somewhere" in other "worlds" or "universes", depending upon how one wishes to conceive of am infinite number of splitting real things which in turn are splitting all the time. To some, this ontology may seem "extravagant", to others just another mystical attempt by scientists to preserve determinism. Of course the toughest problem for determinists is to weld together Everett's equations with Relativity's block universe. How does one do that? Ugh. I guess the standard answer is that quantum theory and Relativity live in separate universes.
Science can be fun.
Well, perhaps the Wikipedia entry on the topic needs to be updated, because it begins:
So - this is all wrong?
It came to be called ‘the many worlds theory’ because according to it there are an infinite number of universes which allow all possible observations to be realised in one of those universes. Contrary to what noAxioms says, that is an ‘ontological’ argument, in that it really does propose a multiplicity of universes. So, in line with the principle that ‘drastic problems call for drastic solutions’, the question I asked is, if as drastic a solution as ‘many universes’ is warranted, what is the drastic problem that it is responding to? ‘If the many-worlds formulation were found to be impossible in principle, then we would be obliged to accept that: ...’
(Incidentally, there’s an insightful profile of Everett published in Scientific American.)
My bolds. Make no mistake - ‘many worlds’ means exactly what it says. And all to avoid the embarrassment of consciousness being assigned a foundational role in observation. It's motivation is maintaining the hypothesis of scientific realism at all costs.
And besides - Max Tegmark is the author of speculative science books about the multiverse which make Everett's ideas seem quotidian!
It's not scientific realism, since Bohmian Mechanics does that. It is determinism without the observer that is draw. As I mentioned in my other post, determinism pretty much eliminates philosophy and science as a preferred path for studying nature since either and both are simply Illusions.
Worlds do not have identity (there is no objective has-split or not state), so the cat being both dead and alive (in superposition) is a relation to something, not an objective state. So while still in the box, it is superposition from the point of view outside the box, but very much not in superposition from the cat point of view. From within the box, the live cat is in a different world from the dead one at all times, despite still being in superposition relative to the external point. Likewise, all worlds are just one universe in superposition from outside the closed system. There is never a new universe.
Not sure how copenhagen interprets the cat thing. Surely the cat observes the quantum event, and if that is denied, put the expendable lab assistant in there instead. Schrodinger's cat exercise has always been MWI of sorts it seems. They have had such boxes a long time, and recently have managed to put a macroscopic object in one, putting a thing visible to the unaided eye, in superposition. Never build a local one that can hold a cat. Trivial if non-local.
You’re mistaken there. It is called ‘many worlds’, because that’s what it says. Read the excerpt above again, on how John Wheeler redacted Everett’s first draft.
Quoting noAxioms
It’s editable by the public, if it’s incorrect, you can change it. (Maybe in some other world, it’s correct :-) )
Quoting noAxioms
two points - the expression ‘Copenhagen interpretation’ wasn’t coined until many years later - 1955, I think - in Heisenberg’s later lectures on physics and philosophy.
Secondly, ‘the copenhagen interpretation’ is neither a scientific model, nor hypothesis. As I understand it (which is probably not much), it’s mainly concerned with what can and can’t be said on the basis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Schrodinger meant his infamous ‘cat’ metaphor to illustrate the apparently absurd entailments of the ‘observer problem’. Schrodinger was said to have found the philosophical conundrums thrown up by quantum physics to be distasteful in the extreme, so his ‘cat’ was a way of pointing out the absurdities it brought up. (Quantum joke; ‘what have you done with the cat, Erwin? It looks half dead’ - Mrs Schrodinger (of which there were actually two)).
Making Sense of the Many Worlds Interpretation
Stephen Boughn1
Department of Physics, Princeton University and
Departments of Astronomy and Physics, Haverford College
The number here calculated was:
N~10 to the 10th to the 80th power. " A plethora of universes, indeed!"
"Another problem is how are we ever to identify universes like ours with people
like us in the nearly googolplex of universes included in the universal wave function.
This is often referred to as the problem of identifying a preferred basis in Hilbert space.
Clearly most of the universes will be chaotic and bear no resemblance to the one in which
we live but there will still be very many with nearly identical copies of ourselves. A great
deal has been written about how one might identify such bases or equivalently how
universes such as ours naturally emerge. I’ll briefly discuss this issue in Section 5.
Everett, for his part, didn’t worry about the problem and maintained that all components
of all bases are “actual” universes in the same sense. He even supposed that occasionally
different universes could interact with one another. Deutsch (1997) maintains that the
phenomenon of quantum interference is evidence of precisely this sort of interaction."
Now this is interesting, since Everett appears to back away from assigning any intimidating to his interpretation :
"Another indication of Everett’s take on
realism appeared in the second appendix to the preliminary, long version of his thesis.
The title of the appendix was “Remarks on the Role of Theoretical Physics” and in it he
notes:
The essential point of a theory, then, is that it is a mathematical model…
However, when a theory is highly successful and becomes firmly
established, the model tends to become identified with “reality” itself,
and the model nature of the theory becomes obscured. The rise of
classical physics offers an excellent example of this process. The
constructs of classical physics are just as much fictions of our own
minds as those of any other theory we simply have a great deal more
confidence in them. It must be deemed a mistake, therefore, to attribute
any more “reality” here than elsewhere… Once we have granted that
any physical theory is essentially only a model for the world of experience,
we must renounce all hope of finding anything like “the correct theory.”
Everett seems to be telling us that the [b]notion of a universal wave function is actually just
a “fiction of our own minds”.[/b]
This last point had always been my point? Mathematical equations are fictions of our minds. No ontology can or should be assigned to mathematical symbology.
Yet despite not being actual, it has actual effects. This is why Bohmian Mechanics requires two equations. The wave equation to describe the quantum potential. And the guiding equation to describe the potential's effect on actual particles.
As I see it, this is analogous to Descartes' res cogitans and res extensa where the mind guides the body. Would you agree with that analogy?
On the Everettian model, there are just particles and the wave equation is sufficient to describe their dynamics. There is no need for a superfluous guiding equation.
The quantum potential had possibilities? That it's all. Ontologically one can say that the human mind considers possibilities but only one is actually acted upon. MWI says all are acted upon. That is a huge difference. In Zeh's attempt to make Bohmian Mechanics deterministic, which it isn't, he misses the whole point.
Yes, MWI doesn't need a guiding wave, it only needs a googleplex of universes which apparently even he described as fiction.
I think you're getting needlessly distracted by the idea of "infinite universes". Unitary quantum mechanics postulates only one universe and it is described by the universal wave function. Given the premise (which I accept) that the universe has a finite age, size and divisibility, there can only be a finite number of branches. I recommend reading Max Tegmark's, "Infinity Is a Beautiful Concept – And It's Ruining Physics". As he says, "This means that today's best theories need a major shakeup by retiring an incorrect assumption. Which one? Here’s my prime suspect: infinity."
Quoting Wayfarer
... the theory is wrong and so back to the drawing board.
Now let me try to explain as clearly as I can why Everett seems likely to be correct.
The problem is to account for observed quantum phenomena. Unitary quantum mechanics (a.k.a. Everettian QM) does that in a simple and elegant way with only two postulates. It does not postulate many worlds, they are emergent in the theory.
Every quantum interpretation depends on unitary quantum mechanics. If the emergent worlds are not desired, then the general strategy is to add postulates until they go away, while being careful to continue matching the predictions of unitary quantum mechanics.
So your question could be put in another way. Why is it so important to match people's prior expectations about how the universe should be? Both Bohmian Mechanics and the various collapse interpretations are analagous to utilizing the heliocentric model to make all the predictions and then packaging it as a geocentric model. Alternatively, we could all accept that the underlying predictive model just seems to be the correct theory.
Well, my physics is crappy, but my English is excellent - and ‘many’ means ‘more than one’ ;-)
But, thanks for taking the time to spell that out.
Hi,
Yeah, I noted the great ambiguity, here! I think that both "mind" and "self" can cause confusion, so I go with "soul" ;)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I see your point, now! Since we cannot define a particular reference frame for light, then we have still to resolve the tinted glass problem. After all light is still "physical". And the tinted glass problem seems to require that we must have a "reference" frame outside all physical processes. Right now I cannot find a counter-argument to make SR compatible with the tinted glass problem. (If I manage to find a solution, I will let you know BTW...). So I declare my "defeat" in this debate :wink: ... (for now :cool: )
However there are still two possible (very inelegant, but possible) solutions, maybe.
The first is this: "c" is the speed limit of relativity. Strictly speaking relativity does not imply that light moves as fast as "c". Interestingly you can read this article https://www.sciencealert.com/heavy-light-could-explain-dark-energy. This solution is very inelegant, especially due to Gauge symmetry problems. But IMO it is possible. If indeed no particle is massless, then IMO the tinted glass issue can be circumvented.
Another possibility maybe is Lorent ether theory (LET), which posits a preferred frame of reference. There is a serious attempt to explain gravity in this framework http://ilja-schmelzer.de/gravity/.
What do you think about them?
Yeah, IMO an universe seen as an inscindible net of interaction is compatible to "panpsychism"!
Ah ok! Yes, with this I would agree. In fact "illusionism" if we want to call it in this way, is a very peculiar form of "direct realism". But I was thinking about the "common-sense direct realism".
Quoting Andrew M
Yet, If we close our eyes reality is not coloured, anymore. So IMO if we want to avoid solipsism, a distinction between "how we percieve reality" and "reality beyond our perception" is necessary. In the case of Locke the second one was given by the "substances". Since the apple does not appear "red" if we close our eyes, then its colour is not a "property" of the apple itself, but of our perception of it (of course I accept that science explain why we percieve a red apple instead of a blue apple, but I am thinking about the "redness" of our experience!).
Quoting Andrew M
Agreed!
Quoting Andrew M
Well, here is the contention! The problem is IMO that you are regarding the "Hilbert space" as something actual. Even if we accept "mathematical realism" we can think about different "levels" of reality: the other branches exist potentially, and not actually. I concur that this solution appears inelegant, mathematically. But as I said I find alla interpretations somewhat "lacking". In some sense I agree with Einstein. And because of this I find Bohr's epistemogical take as "the most correct".
Quoting Andrew M
Yeah, I respect your viewpoint (and thanks for the video! I'll surely watch it...). You are maybe right. However, personally I find "many-worlds" idea quite "inelegant" (ontologically, so to speak). Also the idea that "what is mathematical is actually existing" presupposes that (1) our world is no different from a mathematical structure (2) that the mathematics we "use" is a perfect representation of the "actual existing". Again, while I respect that viewpoint, I do not think that (1) and (2) are correct. I know that, strictly speaking, is not a "scientific" argument, though.
There are several other reasons for my not acceptance of MWI. But in this discussion are quite useless, so I do not write them (unless one is VERY curious and VERY patient to read them, of course ;) ).
Hi,
I agree with you. There is indeed the splitting (we infer it because we observe a "classical" world). However all "universes" are in fact an "aspect" of the same "thing" in MWI!
The problem with this "thing" is that the ontology of life becomes unknowable and unintelligible. As does determinism, it makes rubbish out of the meaning of life, philosophy, and science. Understanding this, even Everett didn't try very hard (not at all) to defend it as an ontology. He just saw it as mathematical equations that worked out fine for his theses. Invisibility, illusions, are just Alice in Wonderland holes. They are good stories. Once you travel down them as ontologies, everything, including science, becomes meaningless. Are we trying to understand the nature of nature or is it something else?
The alternative which I was trying to lead our discussion toward earlier, is to assume that the tinted glass cannot be avoided. This is to deny the reality of the non-dimensional point at the present, and to deny the soul its immaterial view point, as impossible, unreal. That is the result of your objection earlier, which is a standard materialist objection to dualism, that such a point would disallow the possibility of interaction between the soul and the physical world. All of this lead me to the long digression concerning the nature of "matter".
So we assume that the soul is fundamentally united with matter, and cannot be separated the immaterial perspective is impossible. We assume that the glass through which the world is observed is tinted, and this cannot be avoided, the tinting of the glass cannot be removed to give us a clear perspective. Therefore we must determine the nature of the tinting and account for this. Now we're back to where we began the discussion, with a slightly different perspective. The soul "interacts" with the world, and this means that it is a cause and an effect. An observation cannot be pure because we cannot adequately distinguish cause from effect, and this is the tinting of the glass. So we must determine the nature of the tinting. The soul interacts with the world through the concept of "matter" (in modern physics, "energy"). Matter is the potential for change.
The illusion, which results in a failure to properly account for the tinting, is in the assumption that matter or energy is something physical rather than something conceptual. If the soul is fundamentally united with matter, or energy, denying the possibility of a clear perspective, then matter or energy is conceptual, of the soul. The soul observes the world through this concept (tinted glass), and when it is not diligent it perceives this matter, or energy, to be a property of the thing being observed, rather than as the concept (tinted glass) through which the world is being observed. The fundamental point being, that "matter" is a concept introduced to allow us to understand the nature of change in the world. There is nothing to prove that "matter" refers to anything real, independent of the mind (what Berkeley demonstrated). Aristotle simply assumed "matter" as a necessary assumption in order to make change intelligible. So it is something we assume "about the world", but it is fundamentally conceptual, therefor not really "of the world"
So what is revealed is that the tinting of the glass is what is referred to by the concept of "matter" and "energy". To the extent that this concept does not adequately represent the real tinting of the glass, i.e. what really prevents the soul from having the pure non-dimensional perspective, then we have misunderstanding.
Quoting boundless
Light is fundamental to the concept of energy, and the concept of energy relates light to matter and mass. As described above, the tinting of the glass is this concept, we interact with the physical reality through this concept. The extent to which this concept misrepresents itself, is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem.
Imagine these three scenarios:
1. You're looking through a tinted glass and you do not know that it's tinted. You believe that your observations are providing a real description, despite the fact that your descriptions are inaccurate because the glass is tinted.
2. You're looking through a tinted glass and you know that it's tinted, but you do not know in which way it's tinted. You know that your observations are inaccurate because of the tinting, but you do not know how to rectify that, because you do not understand the tinting. Therefore you must determine how the glass is tinted in order to produce accurate descriptions.
3. You're looking through a glass and you know that it's tinted, you've determined exactly what the tint is, therefore you can produce accurate descriptions.
What I suggest is that physicists are at position #2. The concept of matter, energy and mass, is the tint. The physicists know that they are looking at the world through this tint, but they do not actually know the tint, and how it affects the observations. The appropriate metaphysical procedure is to recognize that we must determine precisely how the glass is tinted, before we can produce any accurate descriptions. However, the commonly practised metaphysics is to claim #3, that the physicists already know exactly what the tint is, they know what the concept of energy, mass and matter, "adds" to the observations, and therefore accurate descriptions are being produced. Adopting this metaphysical perspective amounts to, in reality, #1, that they are looking through a tint which they do not know is there, because they have assumed that all the tinting has been accounted for within the concept. This is why I say that if the concept represents itself, or is represented as, accounting for the tint, when it really doesn't, then there is a problem.
The fact that whenever talking about this theory that ‘worlds’ or ‘universes’ have to be enclosed in quote marks is a warning, in my view.
In my opinion the advocates of MWI are not acknowledging the radical implications of the idea - that the theory really does entail parallel or many universes - literally and physically, nothing allegorical about it. As per the quotation given above, Everett’s thesis supervisor had him strip out all reference to ‘splitting’ (even an analogy of the observer multiplying ‘like an amoeba’) in order to make the thesis more acceptable. But it was clear that Everett really did believe in many worlds and ‘splitting’.
Also, as is well-known, Everett later left academic life and made his fortune creating the systems that enabled ICBM warheads to theoretically wreak maximum possible desctruction in the event of a catastrophic nuclear conflict. He was plausibly identified as one of the characters being portrayed in Dr Strangelove.
The review ends:
:groan:
Which is related to what I argued for in the OP of this thread, and also the OP Being, Reality and Existence.
From which perspective, the many-worlds interpretation is forced on us only because there is no provision for ‘degrees of reality’. In that view, something is either real or unreal. Whereas in fact, there are degrees of reality, and consciousness plays a role in actualising the potential through the process of observation. It is, I suppose, much nearer the Copenhagen interpretation, but I still think it is philosophically preferable to the alternative.
This is the issue with the nature of time. Common sense shows us that we need to accept as brute fact the substantial difference between past and future. Things which have become actual are all in the past, and the future consists of possibilities, "potential". We ought to confine "physical existence" "spatial-temporal existence" to the past, because the future consists only of possibilities, whereas the past consists of what has actually occurred. But this produces an ontology where the physical world must be continually coming into existence (becoming), from possibilities, at each moment of the present.
Each moment of passing time must be represented not as a state of physical existence, but as the entire physical world actively coming into existence at each moment of passing time. You can imagine that the speed at which the spatial temporal world comes into being at each passing moment, from the world of possibility, must be so incredibly fast, to give us the appearance that there is a state of physical existence corresponding to each moment of passing time. So the emergence of the physical world, from the "extraspatiotemporal domain" of possibility, at each moment of passing time, must consist of activity which is faster than anything we could imagine.
I must admit, I cannot grasp the holographic concept. I've read Bohm's "Wholeness and the Implicate Order", but I find that there is something missing in the conception which renders the whole holonomics movement unintelligible to me. Doesn't a hologram require a medium?
The holographic universe might be imagined as quantum foam or an information (memory) fabric which the quantum foam represents.
The information (memory) is not in the brain. The information, like TV signals) are out there in the holographic universe. The brain is merely reconstructing/constructing images as can transmitter/receiver might. Rupert Sheldrake came up with a similar analogy. The mind constructs space from the memory hologram. Gravity emerged from the information entanglement. If you follow this trajectory you'll notice that space-time is headed for the c elephant burial ground.
This is what I don't understand. What is the holographic universe?
A hologram requires a surface, in the video demonstration it's a plate. Is Bergson saying that in the case of the human mind, the body acts as the surface, or as he says, "the screen"?
One thing that I did was just look out of my windshield while driving and imagined it as a hologram that is being created as my mind flowed through it. It requires one to flip the way one normally thinks of space but anyone who has been in one of those immersive video fun rides has had somewhat of a similar feeling.
As I said, MWI-supporters take the correspondence between reality and mathematical formalism to an "extreme" level. Interestingly it is a MWI-supporter, Tegmark, who both holds the MUH (mathematical universe hypothesis) and gives a fundamental role to consciousness (which according to him is a "mathematical pattern"). But generally "mathematical consistency = actuality" is a very questionable tenet, even if in fact mathematics does a wonderful job to describe regularities in nature. But again I find this line of thought somewhat reductionistic: I cannot, simply, agree that our "existence" is described perfectly by mathematics.What about ethics, values, aesthetics etc? In fact I prefer Plato's view that if mathematical "ideas" exist then also the ethical, aesthetical "ideas", for example, exist. Regarding determinism, this is the main reason of my "break" with Spinoza and Schopenhauer. IMO while compatibilists disagree, ethics requires free will.
Anyway, according to them reality is the universal wavefunction. From the "bird's eyeiew" (an expression used by Tegmark quite often) there is nothing but it. We however cannot see the universe from the outside. Instead, what we are "bounded" to the "frog's eye view", where we see a particular "branch". So, from the bird's eye view, it is a perfect monism (in some sense similar to Adviata) whereas form the frog's eye view there are indeed "many worlds".
But even if we accept that "mathematics is a reality", this is very far from saying that "whetever is mathematical is actually existence". At best mathematics describes a potentiality!
Note that the apple also doesn't appear solid if I'm not looking at or touching it. Yet it doesn't follow that it's not solid. Properties of things are identified in experience, but are real independent of experience. That's the nature of language abstraction.
So, in normal usage, there is nothing wrong with saying that the apple appears green but is actually red (e.g., because of background lighting or filter glasses). Or that the apple in the dark, sealed box is red. Whereas it would be wrong to say that it appears red when no-one is looking, or when there is no light, since "appears" refers to perceptual experience, not the object.
Quoting boundless
Yes, the problem is that that distinction doesn't arise in the mathematics - each relative state is treated equivalently. So why make such a distinction? As I suggested in another post, it seems like taking a heliocentric model and packaging it as geocentric.
Quoting boundless
Yes, in the Aristotelian sense that the universe has a nature (form) and we are seeking to discover it.
Quoting boundless
Feel free to write them - I'd be interested.
"Of course the introduction of the observer must not be misunderstood to imply that some kind of subjective features are to be brought into the description of nature. The observer has, rather, only the function of registering decisions, i.e., processes in space and time, and it does not matter whether the observer is an apparatus or a human being; but the registration, i.e., the transition from the "possible" to the "actual," is absolutely necessary here and cannot be omitted from the interpretation of quantum theory." - Werner Heisenberg,
"Nature does not know what you are looking at, and she behaves the way she is going to behave whether you bother to take down the data or not." - Richard Feynman
"Was the wave function waiting to jump for thousands of millions of years until a single-celled living creature appeared? Or did it have to wait a little longer for some highly qualified measurer - with a PhD?" -John Stewart Bell
Even Everett viewed mathematical model as a fiction of the mind. It is a strange ontology that views symbols (mathematical, linguistical, or otherwise) created by the mind more real than the mind that creates them (for practical purposes).
So the surface is the boundary between past and future? This boundary is the medium upon which the hologram exists?
Precisely.
In 1958, Schrödinger, inspired by Schopenhauer from youth, published his lectures Mind and Matter. Here he argued that there is a difference between measuring instruments and human observation: a thermometer’s registration cannot be considered an act of observation, as it contains no meaning in itself. Thus, consciousness is needed to make physical reality meaningful.1
(Besides which, 'the apparatus' is to all intents a human instrument, or a means of enhancing human perception, so it makes no sense to speak of 'an apparatus' as if it were part of what is being observed.)
The whole conundrum of the 'observer problem' is that the so-called 'particle' can't be said to exist prior to it being measured; it not in some place, waiting to be detected. It is merely a possibility, or a potentia. This is one of the reasons that the so-called 'many worlds interpretation' was devised in the first place i.e. there was no conception of the notion of something that could only 'potentially exist' and yet still be real (as per the Kastner paper.)
Quoting Pseudonym
This is because science naturally assume a realist attitude; but that is precisely what is at issue in this whole topic. It is the reason that the particle-wave duality and so on are large, unsolved problems in philosophy of science, as I understand it.
Bryan Magee Schopenhauer's Philosophy, Pp 106-107
The reason this is not merely 'subjective', is because it does not pertain to this or that individual mind, but to the way the mind interprets the nature of experience.
Quoting boundless
Of course I agree. The problem lies with the interpretation of mathematics as describing the 'primary attributes' e.g. mass, velocity, and so on, and relegating the domain of the qualitative to the subjective realm of mind. This manifests as the attitude that science is the sole custodian of fact and that qualitative and ethical judgements, whilst they may or not have merit, are regardless a private matter. It is another facet of the modern 'mind-body' problem. (The subject of a classic text, E A Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science.)
OK, but that requires that the boundary between past and future is a real medium, a substance,as the holographic film or plate, and that's quite difficult to conceive of. I can conceive of "matter" as that which exists at the present, but matter is not substantial without form. And the forms of matter are already assumed to be what exists as a hologram. Now we need another form, to account for the real existence of the boundary, which must be independent of holographic forms. And we still need another form to be the cause of the brain's activity in creating the hologram, this would be the soul. So we have three distinct substances and we still haven't gotten to the substantial existence of all the independent physical objects, when there is no soul to produce the hologram. Is there a need for God as well, as a fourth substance, to produce the universal hologram?
One has to consider the medium consciousness (mind) itself establishing itself as memory. Observe who you are. You are memory. You feel existence as past memory penetrating into the present with the mind establishing a possible future - but all in memory. That is the fabric of existence. Everything penetrates the fabric as some memory or as the physicists like to think of it, quantum information.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is difficult which it eludes common imagination. Actually. I think those who see it for what it is are called delusional and put in mental institutions. So one must be careful. :)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, the mind creates form out of the pattern and vibrational structure.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not as a hologram but rather a wave pattern within the hologram. Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There isn't really a boundary, but rather the hologram morphing from m what is into something new (the present).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I would just consider it the mind, and I reserve the concept of the soul for the mind with memories that transcend physical lives. But yes, with this it can be considered the soul.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's the same with differences in creative activity, will, and memory. So the trick is to figure out how it can be all the same with differences. Bergson gives ideas as do I.
No God but one unified mind and all if the little minds.
I don't agree. I am much more than memory. I think, I anticipate, and I act, none of these things can be directly attributed to memory. So memory is only one of my many attributes.
Quoting Rich
Those wave patterns of the universe are not necessarily within the hologram, they would exist even if the mind wasn't making the hologram. So they are a partial cause of the hologram. And those patterns are very specific, very particular, therefore there must be a cause of this peculiarity. That's why I asked if God was necessary, as the source of all these particular wave patterns.
Quoting Rich
If each mind creates its own hologram, where is the unified mind? That's what Bohm seemed to be onto, and why I asked about it earlier, how is there a universal hologram.
Yes, there is also will and the ability to imagine a future possibility which is definitely an aspect of existence, but if you observe what is defining you as you, it is the memory of what was passing into a different what was. This duration of memory defines your existence.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, mind and all it creates is embedded or comprises the hologram. The waves of mind cannot be separated from what it creates.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, they are all weaving within the same hologram. Each wave in the ocean is creating but also part of the whole. There is no differentiation. It's all One as the Dao suggests.
Well, I can't agree with this.
Quoting Rich
That's not what the Robbins video described though. It described each person's mind as creating a hologram from the brain wave patterns interfering with the wave patterns of the rest of the universe, so the hologram is the world as it is, being experienced within the mind. That's what supports his claim of direct realism.
So each individual has one's own hologram but I don't see the means for a universal hologram. All there is in the universe is wave patterns, except where the individual minds create holograms for themselves. But I wonder why all the wave patterns are such as they are, what causes them to be the patterns that they are? We still need to assume God don't we?
What Robbins described was the brain creating a holographic image via a reconstructive wave pattern. The singular universal hologram can create as many images as there are reconstructive waves passing through it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No individual is continuosly creating holographic images from the holographic universe. The holographic universe is all the wave patterns, the individual creates images that perceives as the outside v objects and inner memory.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It is the result of creative evolution of the mind, moving from the very simple to the very complex. In life we go through an analogous process when we learn art, music, math, speech, dancing, reading, everything we do. It is how we evolve and how mind evolves.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, just a mind that is learning, creating, an evolving. Even microbes can be observed evolving. This is the nature of Bergson's Creative Evolution.
Within the brain, there is an agent, which creates its own wave patterns, interacting with the other wave patterns such that the person perceives the world. In the case of the universal hologram what would create the waves to interact with the other waves?
Quoting Rich
The video clearly shows the individual's brain creating a holographic image.
Yes, this would be the mind or Bergson's Élan Vital.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, this would be the holographic universe.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So you have the holographic universe which is just entangled waves. That's the universe.
These same waves are the Mind and minds. It is monolithic. The mind in a sense is peering into itself. When the mind creates reconstructive waves, it is creating images which in a sense are images of itself depending upon how you conceive there Big Mind the the little minds. Yes they are different but they are the same. Just suppose the waves are minds.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Absolutely. The image is part of the conception in the mind and it's also part of the holographic image.
What you are asking is precisely how is that transformation from waves to image accomplished, within the holographic universe? It is the transformation that is bewildering. Beats me. That is as far as I've got. I look at a hologram and it's just a mass of entangled waves, and light passes through it as a reconstructive beam, and we see an image! Somehow the mind imprints an image into a wave pattern and then is able to reconstruct it.
I'm reading a lot about light and I think about it when I draw or do photography. Light is that which illuminates. What it all means is a work in progress. Something for me to try to understand. Maybe I will someday via some of my practices. The mystery of image and qualia remains.
Here he's providing his opinion on what makes an observation meaningful, he's not making anything like the claim you're making, that concious observation is actually required to "actualise the potential". All those potentials were quite happily "actualised" well before the evolution of conciousness.
Quoting Wayfarer
I understand that, but you keep shutting down the opposing stories as if they had some kind of world-dominating agenda. Other people do not agree that these unsolved problems are best solved by inventing some spiritual woo, they think they can be solved whilst maintaining realism, there are theoretical solutions to the problems of quantum physics that maintain physicalism, there are even interpretations that maintain determinism. No-one's trying to "push an agenda" against all the evidence as you so frequently portray it, people are just trying to fit the evidence into they way they see the world.
If more people see the world through physicalism than through your brand of spiritualism, then tough. You're going to have a hard time getting your opinions taken seriously. Same went for the likes of Galileo the other way round 400 years ago.
Ah, ok :wink: When I said I was "defeated" I meant that I admitted that we cannot accept both relativity and "the immaterial perspective". Yeah, a solution might be admitting we cannot "go outside" all "tints".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, if we cannot avoid all "tints", then we cannot have the "pure perspective", of course. So, our perspective will be always "conditioned" by some tint or an other. And even more importalntly all our observation cannot be "perfect" since our observations play a causal role.
So, in this view "the pure observation" seems nothing more than an useful abstraction, like, say, a "free particle". The problem is, however, that if there is not a "total pure point of view", then it is impossible to the "soul" to know "how things really are".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed! In that case, the "reality" outside our mind(s) is simply unknowable to us. In fact even if we change our "basic concepts" we would still have the same problem. It would simply changing a tint with another one. In any case, the the tint through which we "see" reality is always arbitrary and therefore all "truths" we find are not "absolute truths", but truths that depend on the "tint" we use. We can still have "universal truths" (universal = shared truths by all members of a group), among who use the same "tint" but this ambiguity introduces a "pluralism" of "truths". This, therefore, undermines the possibility to find out, trough science how things are in themselves. Personally I have not a problem with this perspective (in fact I think this is exactly our "situation", so to speak).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Is not better to say that "the extent to which "reality", is the extent to which the tinted glass is a problem"? If we rephrase in this wa the sentence then I agree. The problem, in any case, is that if we cannot avoid the "tints", then such a problem will never be solved.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In fact I think that many physicists simply ignore this problem due to some "aversion" to philosophy. It is undeniable that, for example, QM is a great theory which is in (almost) perfect agreement with experimental data. But at the same time, we do not "build" all the "fundamental concepts" that we use to create the theory by "observation". In reality, even how we observe is conditioned by our "fundamental concepets", which as you rightly say are, in fact, our tint. However, many scientists tend to forget this issue, due to the fact that no other "mode of inquiry" has produced such spectacular results. I agree with it. But at the same time I admit that it is "a mode of inquiry, not the only possible mode of inquiry". I think that many issued about the so called "scientism" is due to this kind of problem.
This is also one of the most important reasons (if not the most important one!) why I follow more or less Bohr's (epistemological) perspective on QM.
Thanks for the insights! :wink:
I'm not convinced of the conclusion that if it is impossible to avoid the tint, then it is impossible to know how things really are. I think it just means that we have to take a detour in our proceedings, and work on determining the nature of the tinting. This is why we have numerous different senses to compare, we have logic, and we have philosophy. These are the tools for assessing the tint.
So for instance, I have assumed that the immaterial point of observation, the tint free observation point, is the non-dimensional point between future and past. Now we say, that this is impossible, unreal, it cannot be the case, there is no such observation point. This necessitates that we reconceive "activity", "change", to allow for this reality. We have assumed that as time passes, it goes from future to past, and the present marks the supposed dimensionless boundary. But this dimensionless boundary is a mistaken assumption.
Activity and change occur as time passes and are measured and understood in relation to time passing. Under the new principle, we must allow for the reality that activity occurs "at the present", not just as time passes the present, because we've denied the possibility that the present is a dimensionless boundary. We have no capacity to measure this activity "at the present" because it doesn't correspond to time passing. Therefore we must introduce another dimension of time (I think I mentioned this earlier in the thread), to account for the activity which exists at the present.
This was my analogy of objects coming through a plane, at the present. Suppose you could look straight ahead down a plane. To the right of the plane is absolute nothing, only possibility, that's the future. To the left is all the physical existence of the past. As time passes, the objects of physical existence are coming out of the plane on the left. Suppose that a tiny object comes out instantaneously, but a large object takes a little time to get out. How does this "little time" exist? So the plane must have breadth. The small object gets out immediately, and is in the past for a short period of time, before the big object gets across the plane.
Now assume that we've created a concept of time, duration, the flow of time, by looking across the emergence of the big objects. When the big objects are fully emerged from the plane of the present, this marks the moment when time has gone from future to past. So the non-dimensional plane, which is "the present", which we have created artificially, has been produced by looking across the moment when the big objects are fully emerged into the past. Now we look at the tiny objects, and these tiny objects must make a plane of "the present" as well. They emerge from the future slightly before the big objects, so we can create a separate plane of "the present" by looking across their emergence There are two planes of the present, and the breadth of the present is the entire area between. BY establishing a relationship between the one plane and the other, we can determine the passage of time at the present.
In the analogy, the tiny objects pop out from the future to the past, first. This seems intuitive, but it's not necessarily the case. To really understand the way things exist at the present, we need to look at the way we act in the world, and interact with it. There are some things, with large mass and inertia, which appear to be fully determined. And, we find possibility in small things, and this allows us to make changes which are actually very small in relation to the vast universe. If we assume that change only occurs at the present, then the large things must come out first, determined with mass and inertia, and by the time that the tiny human brain is out, and apprehends what is going on, it has no capacity to alter what has already come out into the past. So the human brain exercises the capacity of free choice only over the tiny things, because the big things are already in the past. This is consistent with the Neo-Platonist's principle of emanation, or procession. The One, which represents the unity of the universe is first, then the Soul, then the Mind.
However, it is clear that we would need to allow some way that the smaller, massless things which would come into existence last, at the present, can cycle back to have an affect on the massive, as the human mind, has the capacity to control the human body, which can control even bigger things. So I've considered before, that the tiny must be the first to emerge, to effect such change. I don't think that this is possible though, that the tiny emerge first, because the first must be the most determined, and this is contrary to what is known. So in reality, the tiny must only change the massive, through an instability in the massive. A tiny change, by a tiny thing at the final emergence of the present, will throw off, or change a larger object due to instability.
If this is the case, the ramifications are that when we divide time into shorter and shorter time periods, to observe tiny particles, we are taking duration measurements on the past side of the present. As we get into these smaller and smaller particles, we lose our ability to observe, because we are crossing the border into the past. If anything is still moving in the past, it has no capacity to affect the future, and appears as infinite possibility. But since it's in the past it's really the possibility for nothing, and so appears to be infinite. When we look out into the universe, on the other hand, at huge massive structures, we need to produce a system for measuring duration which is close to the future side of the present. In this way, we can establish the boundaries of the present, and work on the second dimension of time, which is the relationship between these two. The massive structure appear to be absolutely determined, because the possibilities which exist on the past side of the present appear to be incapable of penetrating through that inertial stability.
In the past, we have produced a system for time measurement based on the motions of the earth and sun, so this is pretty much in the middle of the breadth of the present. Now we have produced atomic clocks measuring duration with tiny objects, so this would be (presumably) measuring time duration at the past side of the present. But we have established no real principles to determine the breadth between these two. How much behind the present, which is determined by the motions of the earth and sun, is the present which is determined by the atomic clocks? Both these clocks can keep time in a synchronized, accurate way, but according to the theory above, they represent parallel "presents", with time, breadth between them.
Quoting boundless
I think the issue here is that we approach a point where there is no separation between the concept and the reality represented by it. For example, there must be a concept of concept. And this is where we approach unintelligibility. That is what happens with the concept of "matter". Matter is fundamentally a concept. By the nature of the concept, as produced by Aristotle, there cannot be any real physical thing which corresponds to "matter", because the physical matter, necessarily has a form and form is not matter. So the physical thing is a form, and that the form has matter, is simply an assumption. We have to assume that it has matter to make the changing of forms intelligible. There is no such thing as "prime matter", matter without form, yet "matter" is a concept, and we must assume that this concept corresponds to something real, independent of the concept. Therefore "matter" is whatever we make it to be, as purely conceptual, but matter is still real, and that's why we need the concept of matter. So the concept must conform to real matter, but we really can't know real matter because what we know are the forms of matter, and matter itself is unintelligible.
This is the tinted glass problem in a nutshell. The tint is the concept, "matter", which is the means by which we make the changing of the physical world intelligible in relation to the assumed static, eternal "soul". We look through the tint, and we know that it's a tint because it's a source of error, and we have figured out that it's there. Therefore we must conclude that there is a part of reality independent from us, which is unintelligible to us, because of the tint. It is the inversion of the tint, what the tint negates, which is unintelligible. Whatever we assume as matter, the concept of matter, then the deficiencies of this assumption, is what remains unintelligible to us. What is not assumed, but ought to be assumed creates the unintelligibility caused by the assumption "matter". So we have to approach the concept of "matter" in a kind of trial and error way, we produce a concept, like Aristotle did, and see if it works. The success was limited, and the concept was replaced by a more comprehensive assumption, "energy". Now we have to assess this assumption for successes and failures. It's a matter of assessing failures which are the result of improperly representing the tint, on and on, until we figure out the tint and represent it properly.
Hi,
I think in this latest answer you have written really good points. Be patient but right now I cannot make a well-made reply due to the flu. I hope to be able to answer this week end.
Best wishes. Get well!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agree!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Some time ago, I actually considered an idea similar to this. I was wondering how "big" is the present. And in fact I arrived that if the "present" has some "thickness" change would be impossible. But interestingly, here you are giving an interesting perspective on this, i.e. that it is possible to accept both a "thick" present and change.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The reasoning is in fact, sound. The possibility of being more "presents" as the "scale" of observation varies is something that I have never encountered in physics (and in philosophy for that matter). But again, nothing tells us that there is only a "present". In fact, the tendency to hyper-semplify sometimes had its side-effects: for example the Newtonian "absolute" space is certainly simpler than SR, but it is not really effective.
In any case, if you are right then there is an even stronger relationship between the measures of distance and time: atomic clocks measure a "present" which is different than "macroscopic" clocks. If this is the case we need a "meta-theory" which must explain the relationship between all these clocks, i.e. a theory about the "interaction" between the "knower" and the world, or something in that direction. Such a theory certainly would help us to understand better the tint.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Here I see two possibilities, BTW:
1) We at best can have a "partial knowledge" of the tint. In this case our "trial and error" procedure allows us to know partially the "tint" by the "inside", so to speak. We can think that the "tint" actually has two "parts". One part is changeable by us: we can in fact use whatever concept we like and "test" it. However a part of the tint is completely "hidden", it is "a priori" in all our observations. We cannot "remove" it, so to speak. In this case we can never have the possibility to "see things as they are", but we can have a "partial knowledge". This IMO is quite a rational perspective.
2) On the other hand we can accept that we can "trascend", so to speak, all tinting. In this case the "tint" can be modified by our trials until we arrive to a "perfect" untinted perspective. Note that this is possible only if no "part" of the tint is "a priori", since in that case we could not even imagine "reality as it is". If there is no "a priori" part of the tint, then in fact we can infer how the untinted perspective is by studying the "behavior" of the results of our trials and errors.
Hi, sorry for the delay in answering (mainly due to the flu)...
By the way, I think that I agree with the above. Unfortunately expressing these concepts sometime creates a lot of confusion.
Quoting Andrew M
I see what you mean. But at the same time, conflating the "actual" and the "potential" can appear to be inelegant in its way. In any case, if this perspective is used then one must accept MUH (Mathemaical Universe Hypothesis).
Quoting Andrew M
Yeah, I am very sorry but you have to wait a couple of days (the reasons being the aforementioned flu plus academic business :( ). I anticipate that it is a mainly ethical problem...
Quoting Rich
Regarding mathematics, I think that a part of it is "real" and another of it is "conventional". But I still cannot see where there is the distinction...
I am in agreement with this. To be more clear: I agree that a part of both mathematics and ethics is "conventional" or a "creation" of humans. On the other hand however there is a very important part of both which is "very real".
Therefore I agree with most religions that there is a "moral order" in the universe. And sages do discover it in some sense (in fact it is not a case that on ethical matters there is a strong agreement in most religions)
What exactly is matter? Ultimately it is just quantum stuff of some sort. Matter feels solid. Matter is perceived of as solid. But we know it is empty. It is something we call energy. It is energy tightened into a ball as one might imagine vapor tightening into a snowball.
So what is this stuff? What is the medium? It is mind. The mind begins its journey (the Dao) by creating waves of energy (yin/Yang/qi) and from there it learns how to evolve and create things. Everything is fundamentally vibrating (energetic) waves. Call it quanta if you will or call it intelligence (mind).
P.S. Not sure, but I may have previously answered this question.
There are patterns (habits) in the universe, because of the intelligence imbued in the universe. That which is not alive, tends to be more stable (habitual) because it cannot exert will or choice.
The human mind studies these patterns and creates symbolic patterns (math) that mimics these patterns in n such a way they they have predictive ability for practical purposes. They are not exact, but good enough, because everything in my the universe has some amount of non-predictably.
Math is simply a tool. A tool just like any other tool that had practical utility. But it is symbolic, and because it is symbolic can never accurately describe nature. Whatever symbolic language is issued, it will always be inadequate to describe that which is living and creating - its Creator.
The idea of a two dimensional present is becoming more common amongst speculative physicists. I think it provides a basis for explaining our experience of activity occurring at the present, and it might also help to create a bridge between relativity theory, and our intuitions, that the present is a substantial aspect of reality.
Have you ever wondered how we observe motion visually? If one's viewpoint is the dimensionless point of the present, then we can only notice static states at this non-temporal point. We'd have to infer motion by stringing together still frame states. What we see as activity would have to be a creation of the memory. It may be that this is actually how we observe motion, but the problems are numerous. If we observe static states at the moment of the present, then we have a big logical hole, between the static points, which needs to be filled. The actual passing of time would have to occur between the points, when we couldn't see it, and therefore actual change would have to also be occurring between the points of observation. So we'd be seeing a serious of still-frames, but the entire activity of change, whereby one still-frame is replaced with the next, would be completely invisible to us.
If this were the case, then the actual change that occurs behind the scene, which we cannot see, must occur extremely fast because it wouldn't be as if the object moves from point A to point B, while we're not seeing it, the object would have to be reconstituted at each point where we see it in a still frame. We cannot assume that the object "moves" from point A to B or else we'd have to allow that it could be at intermediate points. The behind the scenes activity would have to consist of a re-creation of each object at each moment of time, as time passes. So even this way of looking at motion requires a second dimension of time. There is the time that we know, which consists of the series of still frames, but there is a second time which we could call "real time", which is the time passing in between the still frames. I called it real time, because it is when the real activity is going on, which is the preparation of the next still frame. But all this activity is not evident to our eyes.
Now consider how we observe motion with other senses. Let's take the tactile senses, touch, taste, and smell. Heat will burn, and that's a sensation of molecules moving fast, causing damage. The olfaction senses are themselves extremely active, with nerves and other activities, and they sense molecules which are less active (unless they are overly active causing burns). In these senses we have activities of the nerves, which are sensing states of the object. And this is what seeing does as well, it is activities within, which are sensing unchanging things (objects). The conscious mind, sees movement within sight, and in understanding the movement of these large objects, it turns back toward the movement of tiny objects, which the unconscious already uses to sense states of existence.
So we must account for this difference in "direction" when we try to understand motion. The conscious mind produces a concept of motion from large objects moving, and looks back toward the tiny, from this artificial perspective. But the living being already has a natural perspective, which is the reverse of this, it is already utilizing these tiny fast motions to rule over the more static, temporally extended states. The natural "rule" of the living being therefore may be derived from the "real time", the activity between the static states, and the static states may be completely artificial.
Quoting boundless
Consider the possibility that the static states of the still frame representation are artificial, created at the conscious level. The states correspond to objects. The objects we see are masses of molecules in different shapes. We create a present, a timeline by giving these shapes temporal extension, inertia. But if we look at individual molecules, as shapes, then we have created a different set of static frames with a different, but supposedly parallel timeline. If we go to atoms, we have a different set of frames, and a different parallel timeline.
This model of reality is of course very complex and the natural inclination is to reject its complications as unnecessary. But the key to believing it, or accepting it, is to recognize the logical necessity of concluding that physical objects are necessarily re-created at each moment of passing time. There are different approaches to this conclusion, mostly presented by different religions. But the best, I believe, is the direct approach from personal experience. Consider the difference between what has been in the past, and what may be, in the future. All of physical existence is in the past, and it has been sensed by us. Now turn your attention to the future. I see an abrupt wall, where my senses cannot go. There is nothing here to sense, no physical existence. I sit here without moving, and I realize that I can move my arm whenever I want. So it's impossible that where my arm will be in the next second is already existing, because only I can make that designation, now, and I can do it whenever I want. If there is no definite place where my arm will be in ten seconds from now, then it is impossible that it has physical existence at that future time. So I must conclude that it comes into existence at the present moment, at each moment as time passes. Now I can look around the physical world at all the things which human beings have the power of changing, and I can extrapolate to conclude that all physical existence must come into being at each moment as time passes.
This produces all sorts of problems and complexities with the nature of spatial extension. Let's assume that all physical objects, static states with temporal extension and inertia, are artificial, created by the conscious mind, as described above. This means that "space", which is our conception produced to allow for the real existence of objects, is created according to our observations of these objects as well. So if we go to a parallel time line, as described above, we need a different conception of space at this timeline. And each timeline requires a different conception of space, to allow for the necessity that spatial existence, and therefore space itself, comes into existence at each moment of passing time.
Quoting boundless
So I think that the issue with the tint is to figure out the exact nature of the tint. I believe it is as you say "a priori" within all our observations, but that does not mean that it must remain hidden to us. The reason, is that we have different senses, so the tint will appear differently to the different senses. And this is how we will determine the nature of the tint. Notice, that in my discussion of the different senses above, I did not even approach the relationship between seeing and hearing, of which the Fourier transform and the frequency/time uncertainty are derivative. The uncertainty, being a product of the tint, ought to have a different measure in sight than it has in sound, and that would help to expose the nature of the tint.
Let's assume for the sake of argument, that the tint is in how we draw our timeline. If for example, we create a timeline by using relatively large bodies like the earth and sun, and stay true to that timeline, we will produce accurate knowledge of things within this spatial realm of "objects", objects this size. But this knowledge would not be very reliable in relation to larger objects like galaxies which exist on a different timeline, because we would be making a diagonal across from one timeline to another, without knowing this. The desire would be for an orthogonal relation between timelines, but how would we know what's orthogonal? Likewise, if we study tiny subatomic particles, an atomic clock would give us a good timeline, but to relate this timeline to the one of the earth and sun would be problematic because we would know the orthogonal relation. To determine the orthogonal relation would require figuring out how spatial existence comes into being at each moment. Anytime one timeline is related to another, without determining the true tint, it would cause a problem.
Quoting Rich
Why would you assume that matter is "quantum stuff"? Why wouldn't matter be better represented as a continuous field, or wave function. Matter is how we understand continuous existence, not how we understand particular changing forms.
Yes, this would be Bohm's quantum potential. He also perceived the universe as some sort of holographic field which he called the Implicate/Explicate Order. Rupert Sheldrake goes a bit further and describes it as hierarchies of morphic resonance fields that define the forms of biological life.
They are not being recreated. They are morphing. There are no static states. Static states (nothing is static) are symbolic projections which the mind creates to share observations or solve practical purposes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No, existence is just continuously morphing exactly as it is perceived. Memory of the past gives us the sense of duration.
I am not sure why your model is overcomplicating itself, because fundamentally the pieces are all there. Maybe you are trying to preserve some remnants of some other ontology that really doesn't fit. If you observe anything from any angle, it is just a holographic form morphing, via movement in duration, into a new form. It's all "out there" just as it is perceived. Nothing is "in the brain" which is somehow, in some magical way, storing images.
This is where I disagree with process philosophy. Process assumes no static states. But the biological systems create static states by which we perceive and apprehend the physical world. So the assumption of static states is fundamental to the conscious understanding of the physical world, as is evident from the basic laws of logic. Since these static states are fundamental to conscious understanding, we must give some sort of reality to them, even if their realness is completely artificial. Artificial things are real, and if the biological systems are creating these artificial states we need to understand how, and why.
There is a problem which process philosophy runs into which involves associating one activity, or one type of activity, to another. Then process philosophers end up having to invent imaginary things, like Whitehead's prehension and concrescence, to account for the relationships between various activities. So instead of going this route I find it much more reasonable to assume the real and natural existence of the imaginary static states, which is supported by the natural trend of biological systems.
Quoting Rich
The assumption that all of reality is completely composed of continually morphing forms, doesn't give us what is required for a complete understanding reality. We need a static viewpoint, independent of the morphing forms, from which to observe and produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. Without this perspective our understanding will never be complete. That is why the biological systems evolved in this way, to produce the static states from which we understand the world. If we cannot give reality to these static states, we cannot produce a complete understanding of the morphing forms. So, the model may appear to be "overcomplicating itself", but these complications are what is necessary to understand reality. Some of us like to believe that science is on the verge of a complete understanding of reality, but I think the evidence is overwhelming that we're very far from it, due to these complications.
We don't ever actually obseve anything that it's static. However, we can sort of view something as static in our minds though it too is always changing. The closest thing we can create that is static is some c symbolic language, but when we do this, the mobile nature of nature is lost.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not really. Observing movement directly, e.g. music, is Infinitely better than trying to understand music from notes. Everything is lost with a musical score, but it can be brought back to life with the movement and creativity of mind. Symbolics are practical for certain problem solving or communication but have very little to do with the movement of nature. Movement can only be comprehended by the mind. Once this is fully set and understood, then it is possible to understand the practical value of symbolics which is why the mind invented them.
The point being that we choose a static unchanging thing to act as the temporal reference. So for example the day, or the year is a relatively unchanging thing which acts as a reference to measure time against. To the extent that these activities of the earth are static and unchanging, our measurements according to these references would be inaccurate.
Quoting Rich
To observe music, we need a static unchanging point, the present. From the perspective of this point, the notes and musical score flow past as a procession. If your perspective flowed from future to past, like one of the notes, you would only be able to observe that one note or chord, which you exist along with. So we have a perspective, which we assume as the unchanging present, the now; we assume that the soul exists at the eternally unchanging now; and from this static perspective we can observe and measure all the changes as they occur around us.
I don't observe it that way. For me, music just flows in my mind, one sound penetrating into another.
Yes. So what I'm getting at is that a notion of res potentia (i.e., a dualistic substance) does not arise in the Schrodinger equation. As far as the Schrodinger equation is concerned, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily regardless of observed measurement outcomes, with each state equally physical.
Positing an invisible and undetectable res potentia (whether for the wave function itself or just the unobserved states) seems to be a purely semantic move and not one that is motivated by the Schrodinger equation itself.
Quoting boundless
Not necessarily. MUH is an example of Platonic realism about universals. In his paper, Tegmark says:
Quoting Max Tegmark - The Mathematical Universe
Whereas I accept Aristotle's immanent realism about universals. That is, the universe is substantial (matter and form), not merely formal.
While the Schrodinger equation is all well and good, one still had to give credit to the minds that created it based upon the observations of said minds.
Ok, with this I agree. In fact the problem arises with the interpretation of the Schroedinger equation. If you accept it as the "reality", then of course all branches are as real as ours. However, if we accept from the beginning that the wave-function is epistemic and not ontic, then the relation between "potential" and "actual" becomes much more relavant.
Quoting Andrew M
Neither the Schroedinger equation necessarily motivates one to take the wave-function as "the reality" (except maybe in the "Platonic" realm, if it exists). I admit that "simplicity" is a respectable motivation, but personally I do not see it as a compelling one. IMO QM, among many other things, suggest us that the "model" is not necessarily a "picture" of reality. And to me saying that reality reduces to "one wavefunction which never collapses" seems too reductionist. As I said, it seems a subjective issue. Of course this is not an argument. But IMO "simplicity" is not an argument for the same reasons. :smile:
Quoting Andrew M
Good point. BTW what I meant is that the universe becomes literally a "mathematical structure" also in "normal" MWI. To me saying that "the universe is" (nothing more than) "a universal wavefunction which never collpases" is reductionism. I prefer to use the much more modest epistemological view of Bohr, or something similar to that. I do not deny however that also his version of QM has problems.
Regarding the "non-scientific reasons"... Well consider ethical responsibility. The reason why we give importance to ethics relies on the fact that we have to choose everytime what to do. We have to make up decisions. With determinism we are completely helpless: we think we have the possibility to choose but in fact we have not that possibility. Every movement and every thought in fact is simply "necessary".
Of course determinism is not the "view" of MWI and before considering the ethical, let us now see what MWI predicts. According to MWI as time passes the universe continue to "split". The are now a huge number of "boundless adults" that "came" from "boundless child". With some I share the same memories. However we all have a distinct consciousness. Therefore while every "story" is in fact meaningful since can be traced back to "boundless child", the problem is that in the opposite verse of time there is a continuous splitting. I concede that energy conservation is not a problem for MWI, but what about the splitting and consciousness? There is a continuous creation of "subjects" every moment. And here we have a quite inelegant consequence - there is a multiplication of "sentient beings" among other things.
Also, if it is possible according to MWI that "boundless" commits a crime and we observe he does not, then we know that necessarily another "clone" of "boundless" committed the crime. Therefore, "boundless" is simply one of the possible actual outcome of the "universal wavefunction". Free will becomes meaningless because in fact "one" of the "boundlesses" always commits the "wrong action" (or the "right action"). In this case what "boundless" does is simply due to the fact that it is a possibility. But at the same time the other possibilities are, in fact, actualized. Therefore unless you add some "subsystems" in the structure of the universe MWI has the same problems of other determinisms in ethics. The "right" action becomes simply a possible (and therefore actual) occurence. In fact if there are two possible choices, then both in two different branches are done.
So all actions in reality have the same value since they are inevitable. If the universal wavefunction is all there is, then all stories are actual and our "illusion of free will" is due to the fact that we see a story. Note that IMO according to most ethical theories it is of fundamental importance that they can be broken. In fact virtue becomes relevant when X can decide to follow it and not to follow "vice". In MWI X follows vice and virtue in two different stories. Both the virtuous and the vicious are "two outcomes" of the wavefunction. . If both choices are a possibility then in two different "worlds" Xs choose both. And the existence of the virtuous X depends on the existence of vicious X. So actually every time all (possibile) good and bad choices are actualized.
I don't disagree, but this is already stepping into interpretation territory. QM doesn't say what the states actually do.
Quoting boundlessEpistemic, not ontic, yes. I find that ontic makes no difference to anything, and ontology itself is perhaps a relation and nothing more than that. It is meaningless to say something exists. It always exists in relation to something else, and there is perhaps no objective base to act as a foundation for relation-independent ontology. This is just a proposal of mine, not an assertion, but it does away with a whole lot of problems.
They can both be correct. The wave function in its simplest form exists in relation to the whole structure of the Schroedinger equation for any closed system, but it exists in collapsed form for any isolated quantum state such as the point of view a human subjective view. These are just different relations, not mutually exclusive interpretations, at least one of which is necessarily wrong.
Yes, it is this unnecessary breathing of fire that I'm talking about. Is such a structure real, in that Platonic sense? Turns out it doesn't matter. The human in the mathematical structure will behave identically, asking the same questions about the same experience, whether or not there is some ontological status to the structure itself. That designation does not in any way alter the structure.
In a way I find myself to be a reverse Platonist. I believed numbers to be real for a while, but now I favor a view that ontic structural realism, where yes, we perhaps share the same ontology as those numbers, not that the numbers must exist, but that the existence of our universe is required much in the same way that numbers don't need it. OSR says we're made of the same stuff, so it presumes the two have the same ontology, but it doesn't presume that shared status must be some kind of objective existence.
Doing away with ontology might appear to you as a solution, but we, as good philosophers are interested in determining the truth, and that means the true nature of reality. Since doing away with ontology renders this as an impossibility, it is an unacceptable proposal.
Quoting noAxioms
Stephen Hawking proposed "model-dependent realism" as your replacement for ontology. This claim of yours, that ontology "doesn't matter" is nothing more than intellectual laziness. If the problem is to difficult, let's direct our attention away from it and pretend that it doesn't matter. Of course it really does matter though, as is evident from the difference between the geocentric and the heliocentric models of the solar system.
No, the model is not the reality. Turns out we don't yet have an accurate model, so I can hardly claim that say the current standard model is our reality.
My proposal of reality being a relation (not actual ontology) is something like model dependent realism, except the realism claimed is more like existential quantification.
To quote fragments from the wiki header:
"Where several models overlap in describing a particular subject, multiple, equally valid, realities exist"
That use of 'exist' is open to interpretation, but I agree, the stance would seem to be contradictory if 'exist' means 'is objectively real'. If used as a relation as I propose, then yes, all of the models (if they are accurate ones) describe existing realities. Idealism even makes sense this way.
"[MDR] claims that it is meaningless to talk about the "true reality" of a model as we can never be absolutely certain of anything. "
This is just acknowledgement of epistemology. Few stances claim that absolute certainty can be known. But does MDR take a stance that despite the inability to know it, there might be (must be???) a true reality?
I will look at it more, and what Hawking has to say about it.
Hi,
interesting. Could you please provide an example? I would be very interested in it. Thanks in advance!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed! If our POV is dimensionless then the "experienced world" would be a succession of static images and change is an artifact of memory, so to speak. If this is the case, we would not percieve change but rather we would only infer it (and also, our memory would "create" the illusion of continuity between the static images - which a-priori for us would be independent).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, if we do not want to fall into solipsism or a sort of "Evil Genius" theory we have to assume that there are two "times". And the "real time" is not a part of our experience but a part of the "external world". But as I said some posts ago, this is only a "reasonable inference" for the "external world". And in fact "the sense of continuity" is a "creation" of our memory, which a-priori is unrelated to the "real time".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Mmmm, very interesting. In fact we started by assuming that the "static" view was the "natural" one and we ended up with three "times". The real time is "behind" both the external reality and the workings of our senses, the "static" is the perspective of the "soul" and finally we have the "time" that is created by memory (or other falculties) to "connect" the static images. So in fact our "perception" of time is completely artifical.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If this is the case, then what we think are "objects" in reality are a "construction" of our mind. And also, we need to re-construct any time we change the scales. I might add that this process can be done also for very big objects (by this I mean objects with a spatial dimension of orders of magnitude greater than ours). In this case we need to change "the map" every time. And the "maps" relative to each scale might be different and therefore we have a multi-layered map of reality. Somehow this reminds me the "plurastic realism" by Putnam (but of course in our case we are discussing a "pluralistic representionalism". But IMO there are some affinites).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
True, if our model is "right" then also spatial existence must be reconsidered. In fact as the "static image" is a construction also space is. We continue to recreate "space".
At the same time, however, like time we can think that there is a "real space". But like "real time", "real space" is beyond (in the sense that it precedes) our experience. If this is the case then the same ideas about the "multi-layered" represention applies also to space and therefore we have a lot of maps. And each map has its "space", its "time", its "objects" etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, the only way to know (at least partially) the tint is to study all our senses and the relationship between them.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah the relation between the various timelines is a very problematic issue. In fact as you say we even recreate space as we change the scale. So, yeah in order to avoid these issues we need to determine the tint.
It's quite simple. Ontology puts forward the fundamental principles by which we understand reality, it determines how we distinguish true from false. So you ask "which empirical observation would be different", and the answer is every observation would be different. That is because one's ontology (world view) determines how one describes what is observed. If you replace description with mathematics, you no longer have a description. True understanding requires description because it will always come to a point where you have to say what it is that is being counted.
Quoting noAxioms
This is the point, to quantify something and to describe that thing are two distinct procedures. To understand something requires that one do more than quantify that thing, it requires that one can describe it, say what it is that is being quantified.
Quoting noAxioms
No, I believe that MDR states that there is no "true reality", reality is according to the model, very similar to what you stated in the last post. That's why it's called "model-dependent reality", reality is according to the model. It's a radical idealism.
OK, but that would seem to require giving up realism. Physics World has a good analysis of the current thinking on psi-epistemic theories (quote below):
Quoting The life of psi - Jon Cartwright
Quoting boundless
The Schrodinger equation is deterministic but it is descriptive/predictive not prescriptive. That I predictably drink tea rather than coffee doesn't imply I don't freely choose tea. And showing me an equation predicting that I will drink tea wouldn't prevent me from drinking coffee on that occasion.
Quoting boundless
Yes, it would be a natural fissioning process (like amoeba fissioning). Merging can also potentially occur (i.e., interference). While it's admittedly a problem for people's preconceptions, it's not a problem for MWI.
Quoting boundless
Yes, but only if it is possible according to MWI, i.e., only if such a possibility hinges on a quantum event. Whereas I think a person's intentional choices demonstrably resolve at a higher level than quantum events. For example, I don't find myself inexplicably drinking coffee instead of tea half the time even though the choice to drink coffee is an ostensive possibility. So what we would regard as possible outcomes and what quantum outcomes actually occur are very different things.
Quoting boundless
I think your analysis here assumes that choices under MWI result in branching. But our ordinary experiences with making choices don't exhibit the uncertain outcomes that one would expect if branching did occur. Consider the MZI experiment where, on a classical understanding, the photons should have a 50/50 chance of ending up at either detector. Yet the experiment can be setup such that all the photons end up at only one of the detectors. I think this is analogous to the single outcome that reasoning and intentional choice converge on and so the outcomes of our choices aren't actually probabilistic or random. To get multiple outcomes, we would instead need to make the choice contingent on a quantum event (e.g., if spin-up is detected, drink tea; if spin-down is detected, drink coffee).
Unitary QM does. If a quantum state describes a photon being emitted towards a 50/50 beam splitter then, per the Schrodinger equation, this initial quantum state evolves into a superposition of two quantum states with one state describing a transmitted photon and the other state describing a reflected photon.
Other interpretations provide different accounts because they alter or add to unitary QM in some way (e.g., adding collapse).
Quoting noAxioms
There are either two photons emerging from the beam splitter in the scenario I described above (per unitary QM) or just one (per most other interpretations). Aren't they mutually exclusive claims?
Quoting noAxioms
OK, but the theory still has to be coherent. I think it's a category mistake to talk about "the human in the mathematical structure..." or to presume that humans and numbers have the same ontology.
You'll find a two dimensional time in Itzhak Bars "Two-Time Physics". But mostly the idea is developed by presentist philosophers who see the need for a wide present to account for human experience. How much time does the present consist of? Check out J.W Dunne, An experiment with Time. And in Jack Meiland's "A two dimensional Passage model of Time for Time travel", you'll find a diagram. I just got these names from google searches when I started realizing the need for two dimensions of time.
I would make a graphic representation similar to Meiland's. At each moment of passing time there is something occurring. I can represent each moment as a horizontal line, with an arrow pointed left, like Meiland. The lines are numbered from bottom to top as t1, t2, t3, etc.. I can then make a perpendicular line (P1, perspective 1) crossing all the t lines, with an arrow pointed up, and this represents a standard model of the flow of time. Each horizontal line crossed represents a static image of a moment in time. However, our experience is of a wide present, so I produce two lines of time flow, one to represent the beginning limit to our experience, the other to represent the end limit. So we now have two parallel vertical lines representing the beginning and end of the human experience of the present, one is perspective 1 (P1) the beginning, and the other perspective 2, P2, the end. Now you can imagine that P1 is crossing t2, t3, or even a later time, as P2 is just crossing the earlier time, t1.
The more difficult question is what is that "something" which is occurring at 'the present", and is represented as happening along the lines of t1, t2, t3, etc.. This is the coming into existence of the physical world at each moment of the present. It is represented in cosmology as the expansion of space, the discrepancy of a long time line, crossing many t lines . As I said in an earlier post, large things, the massive objects which we see, must come into existence first, and these are represented in quantum physics as fields, they appear as the background continuity and exist along the line of P1. At the other extreme of human experience, is the tiny objects, coming into existence last, their existence is represented by P2. So you see that there is the entire width of the human "present" separating the fields from the particles, and this is why quantum mechanics is so difficult to understand. This temporal breadth represents a vast unknown area between the mathematical fields, based in the observation of massive objects, and the observations of tiny particles. This allows for theories about strings and loops.
So the correct order of coming into existence must be established. This is what is represented by the horizontal arrows at t1, t2, t3, etc. It is directly perpendicular to our experience of passing time, so it cannot be observed, but we infer logically everything we know about it from the discrepancies in our observations due to the breadth of our observational present.
Quoting boundless
Yes, so we can speculate as to how we create "objects". Let's start with the assumption that what we observe with our eyes, "see", is as close a representation to the continuous existence represented by mathematics as possible. This is what is at the right hand side of the lines of t1, t2, etc., what I represent as P1. The key is that these are not really physical objects, but more like Rich's hologram. Way back in history they would have represent these images as physical objects, drawing them on paper, and producing a concept of space between them, allowing for them to move in time. But there's no real "space" between these objects, because they are all united as the "One", the whole continuous universe. However, it was assumed that they were real physical objects with separate existence, even though they are not. Now let's assume that we hear waves in a physical medium, sound. This assumes that there are real physical particles, vibrating in relation to each other. Lets say that this is P2, the existence of a real physical medium, particles vibrating in space. At P1 there are no existing particles, and at P2 there are existing particles. So on each line of t1, t2, etc., there is particles coming into existence, and these particles allow for the existence of sound.
Here is the difficult part. Between P1 and P2 we have an inversion between what is possible and what is actual, the possibility for particles, and actual particles. The inversion is not merely epistemic, because it must be ontological to allow for freedom of choice represented in the actual coming into existence of particles. The inversion is represented epistemically in QM by the distinction between the wave function and particular existence. But each line of t1, t2, t3, extends indefinitely, beyond P2, which represents the human perception particular existence. We have created our conception of "objects in space", from the P1 side of the present, as what we see, along with the possibilities for motion. But there are no real objects at the P1 side, only the potential for particles. The real "objects in space", need to be represented from what is on the P2 side of the present. So to produce a real concept of "objects in space", we must ignore all the visual observations, which are not of actual objects, but of the potential for objects, and produce a conception of "objects in space", particles, which is based only on other senses such as hearing. This is where we find real objects in space, on the past side of our experience of the present, P2, where we cannot see because our visual image is of P2 where there is not yet any real particles. Our current conception of "space" is produced from these visual observations, assuming that what we see is objects, when it is really not what we see, and this does not provide us with a representation of the real space which particles exist in. We cannot see the real particles, so we can only get an idea of how they behave in real space through the senses of hearing, touching, smelling, tasting. And from these senses we can produce a concept of "space" which allows for the real existence of objects, particles moving in space, this "space' being on the P2 side of the present. Our current representation, based in visual observation doesn't allow for the real existence of "objects in space", it is just based in the determining factors which we see at P1, prior to the coming into existence of real particles at P2.
I always wondered how they detect superposition of say macroscopic states. They put some object (a small bar just large enough to see unaided) into a superposition of vibrating and not. I didn't get from the article how they knew this state had been achieved.
The interpretations with which I am familiar say the photons are both there, in superposition, so long as they've not been measured. It is only after measurement where they differ. Mostly talking about collapse or not interpretations. Copenhagen is mutually exclusive with MWI only in its choice of reality against which the state is defined. If reality is a relation, this is no more contradictory than my location being both north-of and south-of something. Just different things.
If the physical universe is a mathematical structure, and humans are part of it, and not something separate from it but interacting, then humans are 'in' the structure, just like my engine is in my car. How is that a category mistake?
- - -
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverClearly I do not take this assertion as a given. I just said that my description relies not a bit on the ontology of the situation. I do have a description, having just described it.
I think you don't understand the view, in the same way you claim eternalism is false because the empirical experience would be different.
If it is a description, it relies on an ontology, because the description must claim to describe something. Maybe you're just trying to deny that your description relies on an ontology.
Quoting noAxioms
I'm, not questioning your view, I haven't taken the time to properly interpret it. I'm questioning the claim that you could produce a model of reality without an ontology. Without an ontology you couldn't call it a description of reality. And if it's a model without an ontology, then you have no claim to model reality.
As for MDR (which does not assert this mathematical reality), that is another view that makes reality a relation, not an objective state, known or not. A thing is real to something else. I think perhaps the view denies an objective correct answer as to which model is in fact correct, be it proposed somewhere or not.
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverI am. I don't really hold to a specific view. I'm just exploring in this area lately, and looking for inconsistencies.
The quest comes from all the unsatisfactory answers typically offered for the "Why is there something, not nothing?" question. Taking a step back and noticing the biases in the asking of that question sheds a lot of light on a suggested solution.
Michel Bitbol, Relations physiques ou relations fonctionnelles
(In this paper, Bitbol compares his own pragmatist interpretation to Rovelli's relational interpretation, and he compares the latter to both Bohr's and Everett's. It's the fourth paper by Bitbol that I read on the topic of the intepretation of quantum mechanics.)
Michel Bitbol, De l'intérieur du monde : Pour une philosophie et une science des relations
(This is a fascinating 720 pages book. I've only read a few dozen pages. It appears to have much affinities with my own neo-Kantian pragmatist proclivities in metaphysics and epistemology.)
Manuel Bächtold, Interpreting Quantum Mechanics according to a Pragmatist Approcach
(This is a summary of Bächtold pragmatist interpretation, which he developed more fully in his thesis, written under the supervision of Michel Bitbol)
Manuel Bächtold, Le Possible, l'actuel et l'événement en mécanique quantique : Une approche pragmatiste
(This is Bächtold's thesis. I am currently reading section 3.8 Les interprétations everettiennes, and section 3.9 L’interprétation en termes de corrélations)
So you assume that 12 and 6 exist. You don't think that this presupposes an ontology? If you can't say what you mean by "6 exists", then how are you using that word "exists"?
Quoting noAxioms
Do you recognize that "a relation" requires things which are related? When you say that reality is a relation, don't you think that the things which are related are at least as real as the relation itself? What do you think it means to say "a thing is real to something else"? Does this mean that reality consists of at least two things?
Quoting noAxioms
Here's a suggestion. Forget about the question of why there is something rather than nothing because you will never find a satisfactory answer. Instead, ask why there is what there is, rather than something else. Suppose you answer this with "there is what there is, instead of something else, because of the particular relations which exist". We still have to ask what does it mean to occupy the position of being related to something else.
Hi, interesting. Have to think about it. This seems interesting: https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/is-the-pbr-theorem-valid.924718/. https://www.physicsforums.com/threads/the-quantum-state-cannot-be-interpreted-statistically.551554/
I will read these threads...
Tank you for the objection!
Quoting Andrew M
Agreed!
Quoting Andrew M
Good point!
In fact what MWI says is that all the possible outcomes occur and at the classical level there is determinism, so IMO it has the same problem of "classical determinism" if what you say is right ;)
Quoting Andrew M
Well yes, I admit you are right and I am defeated :lol: but at the same time the unitary evolution of the Schroedinger equation implies that "all possibilities occur". So FW is incompatilble with MWI (well for that matter is incompatible with all theories in science)... IMO this is one of the reasons why I do not think reality is (only) mathematical, like MWI esplictly holds. At least other interpretations do not go so far.
Thank you for the insights!
Quoting noAxioms
Hi, I need a clarification. Do you think that our experience is totally illusory?
Quoting noAxioms
Mmm, do you follow Rovelli's interpretation?
Quoting noAxioms
Well this seems a "relational ontology", i.e. that everything exist in virtue of relation with something else. Nothing exist independently. Well, this is really a fascinating idea to me!
I think the term is 'existential quantification'.
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverYes to both questions. The reality of both things is probably the same.
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverThere are biases in the asking of this. I wanted to get below that. So wrong question.
Quoting boundlessHave to look it up.
Meta pointed me to MDR (model dependent reality), which I had not seen either. I find no references to Rovelli in it. His work is more on the QM level than just, um..., I guess macroscopic metaphysics.
I'm sometimes pretty slow to respond. Plenty of new things to read are being suggested.
Rovelli's paper on relational quantum mechanics is available here.
He also discusses his idea of relationality in non technical terms in his popular book Reality Is Not What It Seems: The Journey to Quantum Gravity.
He also has co-written with Federico Laudisa the entry on Relational Quantum Mechanics in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
As I mentioned above, Bitbol's paper Relations physiques ou relations fonctionnelles ? Une lecture non-métaphysique de l’interprétation relationnelle de la mécanique quantique de Rovelli is excellent. It's a pity that it's only available in French. Bitbol has written a bunch of papers in English about his favored interpretation of quantum mechanics, though. Most are available on his web-page. I recommend especially:
Quantum Mechanics as Generalised Theory of Probabilities and
Reflective Metaphysics: Understanding Quantum Mechanics for a Kantian Standpoint.
Sorry for the misunderstanding. Anyway, I suggest you to check Rovelli's ideas and similar. (for a start you might enjoy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Relational_quantum_mechanics and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/)
Quoting noAxioms
Yeah, MDR is very nice too (If I recall correctly, it has also a more "epistemological" streak, so to speak, rather than an "ontological" one. By this I mean that MDR is more interested on what we can know about reality, rather than what "is" reality. However I might be wrong :wink: ).
Well I am quite slow, too. So it is not a problem for me :wink:
Why must there be "time passing between still frames"?
It would have been far preferable if in fact 'the atom' was discovered as this would have dispensed with 'the problems of metaphysics'. Then, existence = 1, non existence = 0 - atoms and the void. What a perfect model.
Didn't work out, though. Hence the problems of interpretation.
Quoting noAxioms
Model-dependent realism is a fancy name for relativism.
Hi Wayfarer,
I think that it is more a "perspectivism" of sorts. I mean it says that there is an objective reality but there are multiple descriptions possible. Whereas "relativism" denies that there are universal truths.
In some sense it is similar to "realistic pluralism" by Putnam.
But as I said to noAxioms I might recollect badly.
If I am to believe the Wikipedia entry on Model-dependent realism, it rather looks like a half-baked mixture of pragmatism and Popperian falsificationism. Putnam's mature pragmatic pluralism also is a form of realism, which he distinguishes from metaphysical realism. It is a realism that is essentially relational. It dispenses entirely with the idea of the world as it is in itself, which our models would only convey incomplete understandings or representations of. It is thus neo-Kantian and, likewise, not any more relativistic than Kantian epistemology is. While the elements of the open ended plurality of objective empirical domains, in Putnam's view, each are essentially related to definite sets of pragmatic considerations (or to ways of being-in-the-world), they don't constitute relative points of view on some fundamental reality that grounds them all.
Quoting Pierre-NormandWhile I actually agree with the paper, it seems to relate measurement event outcomes to observers, and not the more general case of relating is-real as opposed to property of is-real. So to illustrate, take something not part of quantum mechanics: 5 exists in the set of integers (existential quantification). That's a relation, not an ontological assertion. Do the integers exist? Two ways to answer: Existential: Sure, they exist in the set of rational numbers for instance. Ontological: The have (or do not have) platonic reality. I find that a meaningless distinction, lacking a relation. They exist to or in something, but that just defers the ontological question to the something, adding another turtle to the pile. There seems to be no need for there to be a bottom turtle (an objective set of all things that actually are).
As for relational quantum mechanics, they point out something I've always noticed: There is a quantum measurement that triggers the poison release that kills Schrodinger's cat. Surely the cat counts as having measured the sample. If not, put Schrodinger's underpaid lab assistant in the box. The wave function of the measurement collapses to the observer in the box, but not to the observer outside. Doesn't copenhagen interpretation (and any of the others) already say that? And there's always a larger box, so the outside observer peeks in and sees both a dead and live lab assistant. In what way does copenhagen interpretation allow for the cat to be both dead and alive without asserting that it does not count as a measurement?
If they are "still" frames, then no time is passing within them. And time must pass sometime, so it must be between the still frames.
Each frame must have some duration or it could not exist.
If the frame has duration, then it cannot be a still frame. I already discussed this problem with boundless. The human mind is inclined to give the soul an immaterial perspective. This perspective is supposed to be the point of the now, which is neither past nor future. There is no temporal duration in this point, because all temporal duration must be either in the past or in the future, so the "now" is eternal, outside of time. It is simply a boundary which separates two contiguous durations of time. We assume this artificial point and project it to separate different periods of time. Noon is the point which separates morning from afternoon. Furthermore, we describe what exists, as a state, at any artificial point in time, and this forms the basis for deductive logic, what is and is not.
The problem is that this point in time is artificial. It is assumed in order to give us the perspective we need, to understand things. But as you claim, it is most likely that such a point could not exist. So I presented boundless with the tinted glass analogy. If the glass you are observing reality through is tinted, then the tint gives something to your observations. If you do not know that the glass is tinted, then you will not account for the tint in your observations, and your observations will be tainted. The tinted glass analogy was used in the past to indicate why the soul must be given a completely immaterial perspective in order to understand all of material existence. As I argued, that perspective has been assumed as the point of "now", where there can be no temporal extension, and no temporal existence. The point of "now" has been assumed in the past, in order for the soul to have its immaterial perspective.
If we now come to the conclusion that this point in time cannot be real, then we assume that the glass through which we observe the world, is necessarily tinted. There is no such thing as the non-temporal point of division between past and future, and no completely immaterial perspective from which the soul could observe reality. Now the task is to determine the nature of the tint, so that we can separate what is proper to the tint, from what is proper to the thing being observed. My argument is that the tint is the thickness, "breadth" of the present, "now".
What if each frame persists for a while without change? This is the case with projected moving films. Then the present is not 'dimensionless', but still there is no past or future within it because of the lack of change.
Collapse doesn't preserve the norm of the state vector so it's a non-unitary transformation. It reduces the superposition state to just one of the relative states which had a probability less than 1.
Quoting noAxioms
One way is to look for interference effects (as in the double-slit and Mach-Zehnder interferometer experiments). Another way is to do repeated measurements and see if the results conform to the probabilities predicted by QM for measuring each relative state in superposition. That's the case here - they repeatedly put the metal bar into an excited state that decays as a superposition into the ground state and measured the state after different delay times.
Quoting noAxioms
Actually Copenhagen takes an instrumentalist view of the wave function and so denies there is ever more than one photon. And Bohm says that there is only ever one photon whether measured or not (the photon rides the wave, so to speak).
Defining reality as a relation only shifts the basic claim. The claim now is whether there is one measured outcome or whether there is a measured outcome for each relative state. Copenhagen and Bohm (and most other interpretations) deny the latter, contrary to MWI.
Quoting noAxioms
A mathematical structure is a formal construct not a physical thing. The analogy is saying that your engine is in an equation. Of course we could, in principal, describe your car with a formal equation. But the form of the car is not the car. The car has materiality and substance that the equation does not.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Thank you for the reference :smile:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If this is the case, we can also think that there is a qualitative change in behaviour between various scales. So, quantum weirdeness might originate from the properties of time (and space) at those scales.
(As a side note, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_interpretation the famed mathematical physicist Sir Roger Penrose held the view that gravity/space time curvature has a special role in the collapse of the wavefunction. I shared this because there is the idea of a "connection" between QM and the properties of spacetime...)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This reminds me strongly of the "Implicate and Explicate Order" by Bohm (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Implicate_and_explicate_order): I discussed (maily) with Rich about it some time ago in this thread.
But also of "Advaita Vedanta" and Neoplatonism. Also this article https://phys.org/news/2015-05-spacetime-built-quantum-entanglement.html may be of interest.
In this view plurality arises in the "representations" rather than in "reality". In fact, the notion of "reality" itself is challenged. Time and space exist only in the representation. And outside it these concepts do not apply: "reality" is neither spatial nor temporal. And so since discernible objects are possible if and only if there is space, then if space is a representation, then objects must exist only as a construction (like in a "hologram").
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And here with other senses "objects" return. So, we "see" the potentiality and with other senses we "feel" actual, existing objects. If this is true then our concept of "space" is mistaken because it is really the "space" of potentialities, rather than actualities. So "reality", thanks to the "two dimensional time" is both a sort of hologram of "potentialities" and a world of real objects. It is not that one is "more or less" real than the other but simply if we consider the totality of our sensations we see both "aspects" of reality. Very nice (I hope to not have misunderstood something... in that case, I am sorry). But...
I might wonder however to what "happens" if there is no "perciever". If all what we said is right then objects, time and space are all real if there is a subject (in some sense this is reminiscent of trascendental idealism, especially the version of Schopenhauer). But if this is true, then the "object is always in relation with a subject", therefore if we remove the "subject", the object too "disappears". Well, this reminds me of "neither one nor many" of Mahayana Buddhism (also for that matter Schopenhauer noted a common ground here) :wink:
Quoting Pierre-Normand
Thank you for the elucidation.
MWI says that the quantum states with non-zero amplitude all occur, so that is the level that is deterministic. As I've argued, our everyday ostensive possibilities don't all occur.
Quoting boundless
Free will isn't incompatible with MWI (or deterministic theories in general). It is the dynamic systems themselves that are driving things, not the equations. The equations merely describe and predict (rightly or wrongly) what the systems will do.
Quoting boundless
And thank you for yours!
That’s pretty well how I see it.
Quoting Andrew M
True.
Quoting Andrew M
Well, in my understanding "classical determinism" says that we have the illusion of "free will". According to classical determinism and for "Pilot-Wave" theories the future is "fixed" once a set of "initial conditions" are estabilished. If this is true, it is not possible to make "free choices" because in fact everything is determined by the past.
On the other hand we have MWI and we have two possibilities. The first is that "choices" are a "classical" phenomenon and therefore are determined as in the case of "classical determinism". The second one is that choices are a "quantum phenomenon" and everytime we choose the universe "splits". In this case we might argue that there is more room for a free choice but the problem is that all the possible occurence happen as I argued before.
I always had this problem with "compatibilism". Free will requires that the "choice" is not totally conditioned by the past events whereas determinism implies that when the "initial conditions" are fixed (or better: when the state of the system is fixed at a certain time) then all events are "fixed".
On the other hand we may argue that determinism is not completely right in the description of "things" at classical level and therefore, autentic free will can be "saved" (are you suggesting this?).
Quoting Wayfarer
Very well :up:
That's definitely a possibility, but I think it makes things unnecessarily complex, producing unresolvable difficulties in deeper analysis. To begin with, you have proposed that time is passing between the frames, without any physical change occurring. However, some sort of change is necessarily occurring at this time, because the next frame is being prepared for observation by us. Furthermore, we must allow that the free willing human being has the capacity to influence the change which is occurring, between frames, such that we are actually taking part in this preparation of the next frame.
So we have now assumed an entire level of activity which is "not physical", it is entirely unobservable because it is prior to the presentation of the frames, which is all that can be observed. The real difficulty with this perspective is in describing the production of the frames. You have proposed that the frame is fixed, unchanging, so we must conclude that the frame comes into existence at a point in time, fixed, and remains fixed from that point. Prior to that point in time it is being prepared. This allows no time for the frame to "come into existence", to "become". There is simply a division between preparation and existing, when the frame pops into existence. So all we have done now is pushed that timeless division of "now", to a deeper level, leaving us with the very same problem, of how to account for "becoming", but at a deeper level.
If the frame is unchanging as time passes, it must just pop into existence from the underlying preparation, without any changes happening to it. If changes happen to the frame, then it is a changing frame, like I described. And we know that things don't just pop into existence without change, that is contrary to our experience. Everything which comes into existence, "becomes", requires time to come into existence, there is no such thing as fixed state (an object) just popping into existence from one moment to the next without a time of becoming. This analysis indicates that the frame itself must be changing in some way, even though it may appear to us as if it is not
Quoting boundless
I read Bohm's "Implicate and Explicate Order" and I found that there was a deficiency in establishing a relationship between the two, implicate and explicate. If the explicate is what is evident to us, and this is proven to be illusionary, such that we must assume an implicate, then we need stronger principles upon which to found the implicate. So I find that there are two vague and deficient assumptions. The first is in the proposed illusionary nature of the explicate. There is actually a large amount of "reality" within what is taken to be representations or reflections, and this reality must be accounted for. The second, is that since the reality inherent in the illusionary explicate is not accounted for, then the implicate can be whatever one wants it to be, completely imaginary, because it does not necessarily need to relate to the explicate which is void of reality.
Quoting boundless
Yes, I think you've understood what I was getting at quite well. That's the type of reality I propose. I may or may not be looking in the right direction, but this needs to be further developed to expose any deficiencies. I propose that the human consciousness straddles the divide between past and future, and that there is no crisp line of division. At this division between past and future, an inversion occurs whereby potentialities become actualities. The "space" of potentialities is entirely different from the "space" of actualities, so what is happening at the present is that space is changing in this way, from the space which accommodates potentialities to the space which accommodates actualities. I call this an inversion of space, perhaps the inside becomes outside.
We've denied the non-temporal point of division between past and future as unreal, so we assume that the inversion requires time, and is not instantaneous. We have no observational access to this inversion because it occurs as an activity in a time which is perpendicular to our constructed flow of time. The constructed flow of time is a continuous present, whereas the inversion is constantly occurring across the present from future to past. We must therefore take observational data from each side of the inversion to create parallel timelines on each side of the inversion, and use logic to infer the nature of the inversion. So I suggest that we determine which senses receive data on which side of the inversion, and proceed from there. It appears like sight may be an interaction with existence on the side of the present which consists of potentialities, while hearing may be an interaction with existence on the side of the present which consists of actualities.
Quoting boundless
The issue of removing the "subject" is not a real issue. It is a distraction. It is impossible to remove the subject, because this would be an act carried out by the subject, self-annihilation, and this would leave us with nothing, no perspective. If we imagine "no-perspective" then all time and space become one. there would be no individuation of one part of time, or one part of space. But the individuation and identification of objects, events, or anything, requires an individuation of a place in space, and a place in time. So it doesn't really make any sense to talk about these things as if there were no subject, because the existence of the subject is already necessarily assumed as inherent within us talking about these things. To ask questions about whether "the object" disappears without a subject is just to introduce contradiction into the discussion through the back door, because "the object" is something individuated by the subject in the first place. And introducing undetected, contradiction into the discussion, renders the discussion unintelligible.
Yes, I can relate to your point. In fact to use the model of the five senses it only "explains" what we "see". In fact we are now saying that indeed there are "objects", which are not reflections. So Bohm's theory is incomplete in our reasoning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am very glad to have not misunderstood, then. It can also be said that in order to know "reality" we must know both the spaces. In this view a lot of metaphysics is "trascended", so to speak. What I mean by this? For example there are those who deny the existence of the potentialities. Instead we are saying that potentialities are an aspect of reality. On the other hand there are those who deny actualities. Again they are wrong. Anyway, both views are partial and incomplete in this model. And in fact to know reality we need to study both aspects. And again we return to the problem of the tint: we need more "means" to study it to have a "right understanding" of it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, if the analysis made until now is correct, that is the way to proceed.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, I was only wondering the implications of what we are saying to see if I understood correctly (in fact it is a bit tangential). If there is a subject then time, space and objects are "real". Subject and objects cannot exist "on their own", so to speak. Like in Schopenhauer philosophy all that things exist in relation to the subject.
Also let me explain better what I meant in these sentences:
Quoting boundless
I was not thinking about an "annihilation" of the perspective or of the subject, but I was trying to make a connection wit what I think I understood of Buddhist philosophy and Schopenhauer. In that eastern philosophy the "subject" is not real. So if we have estabilished that individuation is possible where there is the "subject", then if they are right there is no individuation. Also space and time also are not "real", in this case. But I agree that it is not a part of the model we are discussing, since we are assuming that the "subject" is real to make a theory of knowledge. But I found interesting the parallel :wink:
if you wish you can ignore this part.
There are numerous different theories which model reality as waves. Objects are described as disturbances, and interference patterns. They are incomplete, as you say, and there are two directions of incompleteness. We have to account for the cause of the disturbances which we know as objects, and we have to account for the effects of the disturbances, which we also know as objects. The cause being described by forces like gravity, momentum, and such, and the effects being what is observed as actual particles. These wave models might account for seeing, as you say, but to account for hearing, and the other senses, I think we need real moving particles.
Quoting boundless
Yes that's the way I model it in my mind, with two "spaces". One type of space is described by fields and wave functions, while the other type allows for objects moving freely in space. Then I propose that we draw a continuum between the two types of space, connecting them, that they are not really distinct, but one transforms into the other at each moment. This is the change which happens at each moment of passing time, and is allowed for by the time which is orthogonal to our timeline. I like to say, that at each moment of passing time, space inverts. The physical objects, particles which come to be at each moment, have traditionally been modeled as objects moving freely in a static space as time passes, but they need to be represented as features of an active space. Then space is the thing, and the objects are an attribute of it.
Quoting boundless
I suppose, it's not that the issue of "the subject" is completely irrelevant, it's a matter of determining the position of the subject, what the subject is doing, and how the subject is capable of doing that. All these points are tied together and need to be answered together. We've denied the pure observation point, and allowed that the subject interacts with the material which is being observed.
I've placed the physical objects, particles, on the effects side of the "field". Now we would need to turn toward the causal side. In my opinion, the field representation is inadequate. That's where I'm disappointed with Bohm, because he leads us directly toward this conclusion, but does not speak it, nor does he present any sort of alternative. Let me explain my misgivings in this way. A physical object, particle, or whatever, must occupy space in order that it be a real object. This principle allows that a particle may be infinitesimally small, but it cannot exist at a non-dimensional point. So there is a need to separate "a particle" which necessarily exists at a multitude of points, from the non-dimensional points themselves, which must be referred to in an effort to describe the dimensional particles.
It is implied therefore, that we need to give reality to the non-dimensional point, in a manner other than as a particle, such that the non-dimensional point may have causal influence over real dimensional particles. This is why we need to model time as the 0th dimension, rather than the 4th. Perhaps the speed of light could serve as the basis for the 0th dimension. We create a baseline, 0 time, which represents the precise "present", and this is a claim to the point of spatial inversion. On the one side is positive spatial existence, particles which actually occupy space. On the other side is negative spatial existence, and this is represented by mathematical formulae which determine points of causal influence in the positive space. The further step is to determine the activity within the negative space, which is not necessarily limited by the speed of light because spatial existence, and extension itself, is inverted on the other side of zero.
The difficulty with "the subject" is that the human being, in the form of the conscious mind, and free will, is active within the negative space. That is how we have the capacity of self-locomotion. So this refers back to the tinted glass problem, the subject doesn't really have the 0 time observation point, it must be created in hypothesis, and adhered to in order to determine the accuracy of the hypothesis. How the subject sees, or observes, an object is dependent on the type of object which the subject individuates, and this is dependent on the choice of a zero timeline.
Relational also denies the latter it seems. The other outcomes don't exist in relation to any observation.
Agree. If the universe is a mathematical structure, then yes, it is not a physical thing. Doesn't seem to be one even if not. It contains physical things, but that's just how this structure works.
No, the car is, and it is a bad analogy because a car is thought of as a physical thing in a world of other things. The universe is not such an object.
Conway game of life is such a structure. Not a physical thing, just formal construct. It does however have physical things in it, with particles that zoom around at varying speeds with casual laws, etc.
I am considering the possibility that no time is passing and that there is no duration between frames, also that no time is passing, but that there is duration within frames. ( So time doesn't really "pass" at all).The only "preparation" for subsequent frames is previous frames. the previous frames infect or carry over into the subsequent frames. Change consists in the difference between frames, but there is really no 'continuous' change; a change is a quantum leap, so to speak.
Now you're not making sense because you have no provision for change. How could change occur in this model unless the frames are not really still frames, but active frames? And if they are active frames why even propose a separation between them? They might just as well represent a continuously changing reality with arbitrary points of separation.
Quoting Janus
We must be able to account for change. To say that one frame is different from the next, and that there is a "quantum leap" from one to the next does not suffice, because there is still the issue which I described as the production of each frame. Each frame, being distinct from the last, must be individually produced. The production of the frames must be accounted for.
Subsequent frames are products of previous frames. If change were continuous then nothing could ever be anything. There would then not actually be any frames at all. We can think it only as one or the other; either each frame is changeless for the duration of its existence after which it immediately changes into the next different more or less frame and so on, or else one frame changes to the next gradually; in which case there would be no actual frames at all.
OK, so each frame is active, it is doing something, it is creating the next frame.
Quoting Janus
Right, you have described continuous change. What makes you want to describe this as frames?
Agreed!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, in this model "objects" are not "active", but passive. It is space that "inverts" and causes the existence of objects. So, it is not that space arises from the interaction of objects (a la Leibniz) or that space is the static "background" (a la Newton), but space is an active agent in reality. Objects are therefore secondary ontologically. We know that Newton was wrong and now most physicists tend to accept the idea that space is "a product" of objects. Instead, it might be the other way around.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Agreed!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, I always had a problem with "point-particles". At best I always regarded them as a very useful approximation. In fact to me they cannot be real: they are simply a mathematical construct (that's way among other things I do not like Bohm's original theory - I mean: still those boring point-like particles :sad: )
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, in the "negative" space, there is no need to have a speed limit. After all we are talking about of potentialities and not real things (so, actually even defining a "speed" in this space is impossible). On the other hand we observe that (except maybe quantum entanglement) every interaction is local (it has a space dependence). So, in the "positive" space we need to take into account this "localization".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This part is very interesting because speed of light can be both the limit speed of objects and be connected to time. However I have no idea how it might be related to the 0th dimension.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The "knowing subject" of the trascendental idealists in fact lacks the ability to actively "interact" with its "world". Therefore the analogy I suggested with Schopenhauer is in fact limited.
In fact as you note here even the individuation process is dependent on the actions of the subject. But here we can IMO gather infromation about the tint. In fact we can study how the individuation varies, how the objects vary etc. So, in fact we are not "stuck" in a certain perspective without hope to know other point of views.
What if the "doing" is not within each frame but consists in the the succession itself? You might want to talk about causation in terms of exchanges of energy or vectors of force; but these are inferences to 'something behind the scenes'; that does not appear within the frames at all.
Agreed, however this characterizes mathematically the duality of conjugate variables in quantum mechanics without supplying an interpretation (either realist or otherwise) of the wave function or of the measurement process. Hence, Heisenberg initially developed the mathematical apparatus of his "matrix mechanics" while being guided by the idea that the measurement process introduces an unavoidable perturbation of the measured system, and proceeded to quantify the resulting uncertainties. It was Bohr who convinced him to endorse a more radically instrumentalist interpretation of quantum states, which justified the characterization of Heisenberg's principle as a principle of (ontological) indetermimination rather than a principle (merely epistemic) uncertainty.
Bitbol's own interpretation has been characterized by him, recently, as a radicalization of Rovelli's relational interpretation. That's because, like Rovelli, Bitbol views the nature of the relation between a quantum system and the agent who actively sets it up, and actively interacts with it, to be constitutive of (rather than merely informative about) what it is that is being measured. However, unlike Rovelli, Bitbol argues against the idea that the wave function (or vector state) that describes the composite system comprised of the observer, the apparatus and the observed system, constitutes a tool that allows for describing all the possible ways to factor this composite systems into an observed system an observer that this system is allegedly "relative" to. Bitbol rather interprets the wave function of the combined systems as merely a mathematical tool by means of which observers coordinate their mutual interactions and their intersubjective judgments about the physical systems that they interact with (and that are constituted by those interactions).
It's a difference of definitions. As I use the term, free will means one can intentionally drink tea rather than coffee because that is what one wants to do. As distinct from situations where that freedom is absent, e.g., when there are no options or when one is forced to do something against their will.
I think that reflects ordinary, pragmatic usage and is not precluded by a universe that evolves deterministically.
It implies that even if you have a completely deterministic description of the universe which predicts I will drink tea, I am not bound by that description. Instead the correctness (or incorrectness) of the description depends on my choice to drink tea (or not).
Quoting noAxioms
Per Copenhagen, if the cat (or the Geiger counter) does the measurement then it is not described as being in superposition, only the atom is. And regarding the atom, the wave function is just a tool for calculating probabilities, nothing more. So asking about reality beyond what is observed is a meaningless question.
Quoting noAxioms
It would seem so, but I'm not really sure. Per RQM, the quantum state continues to evolve unitarily for an external non-interacting observer (i.e., the superposition is maintained) while at the same time the quantum state reduces to a single definite outcome for the interacting observer (where that outcome is undefined, not merely unknown, for the non-interacting observer).
That difference in perspective is easily accounted for in MWI. But it's not clear to me whether RQM allows multiple outcomes or not. If so, then it seems to be essentially MWI in different language. If not, then what explains interference?
Quoting noAxioms
If Conway's Game of Life is instantiated on a computer, then gliders and the like emerge. But without that instantiation, it's just a formal construct where nothing happens at all.
This is tricky. What you mean to say, possibly, is that the description of what it is that you are determined to do (actually, given "the past" and the deterministic laws that govern the evolution of the material universe) would not bind you if it were (counterfactually) supplied to you. That's because, of course, in the counterfactual scenario where you would be told what it is that you actually are predicted to do, the physical system that you are a part of would be (counterfactually) perturbed away from its actual evolution. Hence, in the counterfactual scenario, you may choose to deliberately do the opposite of what it is that was "predicted". That's because the "prediction" was effected under the assumption that you would not be informed about its content.
What is most deeply true about compatibilism, I think, is the intuition that what can be concluded from a passive theoretical (predictive) stance does not conflict with that it is that can be decided on the basis of a practical (deliberative) stance. And that's because no agent can adopt both stances about herself at once. Deciding what one rationally ought to do is an activity that is inconsistent with passively predicting what it is that one is determined to do conditionally on one's own antecedent psychology and character. Mainstream compatibilist theories spoil this insight when they attempt to theorize the question of agency (and its internal conceptual link with practical deliberation) from within the theoretical stance and hence reify desires, wants and dispositions as some sorts of psychological forces that determine action.
I agree with your comments. However it wouldn't matter if the prediction did take into account that I would be informed about its content (assuming it didn't include a reward or threat). I would still be free to either accept or reject that prediction (i.e., to drink either tea or coffee) and there would be no inconsistency in either outcome.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
The ghost in the machine.
Yes, that "free will" is certainly possible in determinism. Nobody denies the "phenomenon" of "willing" and that in principle it is possible to choose tea rather than coffee.
On the other hand, if determinism is true then all my choices are inevitable even if there are different options and if is not forced to choose in a way. Spinoza for example thought that "Blessedness" was the result of the realisation of this "inevitability". But in my opinion to have "free will" means that are choices are not inevitable. But it is also true that no theory of physics is compatible with this "type" of free will, not even "probabilism". Again, it is my opinion that this does not show the absence of "free will" but rather this incompatibility shows that our understanding of reality is incomplete.
It's unusual to get such agreement at TPF, especially since most would consider my ideas to be rather unconventional.
Quoting boundless
There is a matter of distinguishing the concept from the thing which it is a concept of. The Newtonian concept of space was derived from an understanding of objects, and the need for a "space" for them to move in. In this way, space is derived from objects, but that's only conceptually, in abstraction. We can look at the relationship between space and objects logically (if there are objects then there is space) and conclude that space is necessary for the existence of objects. Therefore space is prior to objects. Of course the real existence of point particles would defy this principle, but as you say, the trend is to make space a property of what exists, not vise versa. We can look at time in the same way. The concept of time is derived from an understanding of motion and change. It is a generalization. So we can say "if there is change then there is time". This logical process leads to the necessity of positing "time" as something real, but its reality is only apprehended directly by the mind (intuited). But we cannot logically support "if there is time then there is change". So this allows for the proposition that time is prior to change.
Quoting boundless
This is probably beyond my capacity to explain or even understand, but since you seem to have a fundamental understanding of my hypothesis I'll offer some further speculation. We have two distinct concepts of space, one allows for the movement of actual massive objects, the other has mathematical formulae, fields which allow for possibilities, wave functions. We have allowed that each corresponds to a real space, the former positive space and the latter negative space, and we have discussed a hypothetical zero time, zero dimension, which separates the two as the proposed precise moment of the present.
Consider Galilean relativity. Motion is determined relative to an inertial frame, but it could be any inertial frame, and the motion is through the medium, empty space. Now Einstein created consistency between Galilean relativity, and the constancy of the speed of light, so light is brought into this conception of space, which allows for objects moving in space. Light is positioned as the boundary to this conception of objects in space, but it is important to note that it is a conception of objects in space, rather than the alternative conception of light, which was waves in an ether. So light is placed into positive space, therefore it can only be understood, under the precepts of special relativity, as an object in space. Now we have a massless non-inertial particle, a photon, and this is a precedent for other such particles to follow in conception.
Let's separate negative space from positive space. We'll assume that from the human being's perspective, mass is the defining property of positive space, actual existence. Individual objects of mass have actual existence in spatial relations with inertia (temporal extension). Light is proper to negative space, and it is the activity of negative space, the space of possibility, which is most evident to us. Our understanding of the temporal extension of mass is as actually existing objects which will continue to be in a determinate way, expressed in a simple way, by Newtonian laws. However there is still instability of mass, which allows massive objects to be broken apart, united, or moved by energy from the negative space, so not even mass is free from possibility, in reality (this is why we can move our bodies freely, as inclined by free will). This means that even mass, despite its primary attribute of inertia, must come to be from the negative space of possibility. From our consciously produced temporal perspective, it appears to have already come to be actual, and has a determinate existence.
When we look at a massive object, we see a solid object. But sight sees in the negative space, so we are not really seeing the mass of the object. Mass doesn't really exist as solid objects it exists as tiny particles at the nucleus of the atom, with space between them. So there is space, as positive space, between particles of mass, and the representation of an object of mass as having a centre point of gravity cannot be accurate. Each particle of mass has its own spatial location. The problem is that this space within objects (or between massive particles) is understood by us through the interactions of light, electrons, and other massless particles which is most likely the activity of negative space. So our approach to positive space, using the speed of light as a constant, is through negative space and we have an inadequate understanding of negative space. This becomes more evident if we extrapolate to larger and larger massive objects, like the solar system, and the galaxy. Each planet is seen as a massive object with space between, and we understand and measure this space through the activity of light. But space between massive objects is positive space, and the activity of light is in negative space. So we have basic principles which measure distance in positive space, then we relate the activity of light as if it were moving in positive space, and we derive a speed of light. The designated speed of light is inaccurate because of this conflation of negative space with positive space.
To derive the true speed of light we must bring light into the positive space, as a particle of mass, having determinate, actual existence, instead of existing as possibilities. But this may be just out of the range of the breadth of the present of human perception, because light appears to us as the possibility for change. So it must be redefined as an actuality and this requires locating individual particles in relation to massive objects and establishing a positioning in this way. This could create the base for the zero dimension line.
Remember, the orthogonal timelines marking moments in time represent a changing space The zero point represents the emergence of massive existence, which means that things are fixed, determined as actual, inertial, at that point. If we hypothetically draw the zero line, it will go diagonally, or most likely curved (due to exponential features of changing space) across the orthogonal breadth of the present, toward the future of the traditional timeline. If the orthogonal timelines represent an inverting space, then spatial distances cannot be properly related from one side of the present to the other, without producing this diagonal line. The massive object comes into positive space, having actual existence, at the far right end of the hypothetical orthogonal timeline, t1, and it is determined in its positioning by spatial separations (distances) which are radically different from the spatial separations at the left side of the orthogonal timeline, where light obtains fixed, actual, inertial existence. By the time that t1 has reached this point of light having actual existence in positive space, photons, the coming into positive space of the more massive particles, is probably already up to t3, t4, or some higher number.
The speed of light is now the base speed for activity in the negative space. It is derived from the left hand side of the orthogonal timelines when space has fully inverted and spatial separation at 'the present" has maximized its meaningfulness. As we look toward the source of the orthogonal timelines, to the right, when the inversion of space is just beginning, spatial separation is completely different, allowing for interactions between particles, which if they were related at the other end of the timeline would appear as faster than the speed of light.
This is the salient point when it comes to freedom of the will. The conundrum is that our understandings of reality are always couched in terms of causation. When we try to understand freedom of the will, we inevitably try to understand what could cause such a freedom to exist, and the inevitable answer is that nothing conceivably could, because if freedom were other-caused, rather than self-caused, then it simply would not be freedom as it is conceived in the libertarian sense.
Hello,
Thank you for your informative reply. Much appreciated :smile:
Actually I am here to learn unconventional ideas and ways to looking at things. So I am really enjoying our discussion :up: I cannot tell you if your model is "right" or not, but IMO it has indeed its good points.
Anyway, I will not be able to write a decent reply until probably Friday, so please be patient :pray:
Quoting Janus
Hi,
Indeed it is a very contentious point. I propose now three "solutions".
The first solution might be thinking "free will" as an emergent phenomenon, like the "phases of matter". But clearly this "emergent" phenomenon is quite strange (for example, I do not think that it is possible to make a mathematical model that describes it).
The second solution is to accept that our ability of "free agency" has an origin in time and that it is impssible to explain it with a natural explanation. In this case we need to assume a "supernatural" origin and a theist might argue that our soul is a creation of God.
A third possibility might be assuming that we are in a situation like the beginningless "samsara" of many Indian philosophies and religions (or something close to it). In this case our "souls" or (as the Buddhist would say) "mindstreams" have no beginning and therefore their "free agency" is beginningless (and therefore has no cause*).
I am assuming you are referring to a cause "in time" and not an "ontological" cause, which is more general and can be atemporal.
P.S. I had some problems in posting this reply. In fact I edited two precedent versions of it and they "disappeared" automatically. I apologize for the inconvenience.
Apart from the difficulties you noted, the problem with this solution would again be that a physical cause or determining conditions would be posited for something which, if it is truly what it is purported to be, must be unconditioned.
Let's assume that babies do not have free will. But the idea that free will could have an origin in time just is the idea that it is an emergent phenomenon, it seems. Free will in each person's life must have an advent in time; but it does not follow from this that its origin must be temporal.
Personally, I don't resonate with the idea of beginninglessness. An actually infinitely extended past seems to be impossible, as does an actually infinitely extended future (even though the future could go on forever it could never be infinitely extended). I prefer the idea that souls are eternal. We each have only one temporal life, and that life taken as a whole exists 'all at once', as it were, eternally. Freedom could then be thought to have an origin in eternity.
Yes, I think the problem is that we cannot conceive of atemporal causation. This is the problem of ascribing causation to the noumenal which Heidegger, I think, referred to as "ontotheology".
While I agree that the occurrence of the prediction, and the presentation of its putative content to the agent, take away nothing from the agent's freedom of choice, it must be noted that this setup may make it impossible for the prediction to be successful. That's because if the agent has set up her mind to do the opposite from whatever she is told that she had been predicted to do, then, conditionally on her being presented with the prediction that she would drink tea, say, the predictor will predict that she will drink coffee, and vice versa. So, under those conditions, the prediction, as written down and shown to the agent, can't succeed.
I must disagree. This lack of need for instantiation is critical to the view that the universe is such a structure.
The CGoL needs instantiation (via simulation by us on a computer for instance) only for us (not part of it) to view the structure. But the structure is unaltered by said instantiation. Time is built into the structure (I'm picturing 2d space and a third time dimension, an eternal view), just like it is in this universe. An eternal view is necessary since we are not part of the CGoL and the block has no 'current state' from our point of view. The simulation might, but not the structure itself.
I would agree that instantiation of sorts would be needed to define a 'present', something external that moves that present along. Presentism doesn't fit well with the view, nor does dualism, both involving things external to the structure.
So the ontology of the structure need not exist for the physics of the thing to be there. The gliders and such exist as 'physical' parts of that universe. If the structure was sufficiently complex, thinking beings could be part of it, that deduce the nature of their world and contemplate their ontology. But the instantiation of the structure is unnecessary for any of these thinking-relationships to be part of it, just as surely as 3+5=8 does not require numbers to have Platonic existence in order to be true.
They were caught by our (apparently not very good) spam filter. Apologies for that.
No worries. Thank you for the explanation :wink:
Quoting Janus
Yes! also this is true. Free agency is a real enigma (I think that Kant regarded it as an antinomy for the reason you said here). The simplest "explanation" is to say that we have an "effective" free will, but honestly I find it unsatisfying. Anyway, it is even worth mentioning that it is only partially unconditioned since our "souls" do interact with the "external world". So in fact IMO it is neither "conditioned", if by that we mean it is completely "determined", neither "unconditioned", if by that we mean it is totally unaffected by conditions. It is a true enigma, in fact.
Quoting Janus
We can speculate that babies have free will but are unaware of it. In this case, there is no problem with time. Souls are created with free will as an intrinsic property. It becomes manifest when we gain the "awareness" of it. In this case, its origin is not temporal. In fact it is simply hidden.
Quoting Janus
Although I am very drawn to Indian religions (especially Buddhism) the notion that the "world cycles" have no beginning (and no end) is a notion that is very hard for me to accept (let alone the idea that my "mindstream" or "soul" has "wandered" since "beginningless" time). Anyway, I do not find that notion incoherent and actually IMO it has its good points.
If we have one temporal life, then I agree that we might have an unchanging "soul" (loosely in this case "my soul" can be defined as what makes me, me). And I agree that a property of the soul may be the fact that during the "temporal" life has the ability of "free agency". We have now two possibilities. The first is that the "soul" is not only unchanging but also "eternal". In this case there is no need to think of a cause for its existence (and its free will). Or we accept for example theism, where God creates the unchaning soul at a certain point (indeed we need "theism" and not "deism", i.e. we need that God interacts with the "temporal" world) with its intrinsic property to have "free agency". (I do not find a "logical" problem with thinking that an unchanging entity might be created at a certain point in time...)
Quoting Janus
Well I agree that it is a weird concept (and yes maybe even the world "causation" is misleading). Anyway for "atemporal causation" I mean the idea found in some philosophies where the temporal exists thanks to an "eternal" cause. For example IMO in Platonism there is a "vertical"/atemporal causality due to the participation of the Forms and a "horizontal" causality which happens in time (i.e. the "causal nexus"). Without the Forms according to Platonism no "thing" in this world can exist but at the same time things in this "changing world" affect each other. So in this sense we can think of a double causation.
Quoting Michael
I got a pile of notifications.
Then we just go back to the prior problem. We have to account for the production of the frames, and the mechanism which displays them. When I said this already, you said, what if it's the frame itself which produces the next frame. So you are just going back and forth, proposing one completely different scenario to resolve the problems involved with the other scenario, then going back to the other to resolve the problems of that one. Since the two are completely different models, and mutually exclusive, they cannot both be the case.
The other thing is the issue of free will which is being discussed. Whatever type of "frame" model one proposes, it must allow that the free willing being can interfere with the production of the frames, to the effect of real change.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There is no contradiction. One frame gives rise to the next, without any activity being either in each frame or between them. It is the succession itself that we perceive as activity.
There may be "forces' operating "behind the scenes", including free will; but these do not appear within the frames; we do not perceive any operation of forces or exchange of energy, these are merely inferences to causation.
It's possible, but what could it mean to have free will if you could neither experience nor conceive of that freedom, let alone exercise it?
Free will could be a result of the soul's temporal development, that is, its advent could be temporal without necessitating that it's origin must be temporal.
Quoting boundless
I see no contradiction between the idea that the soul is eternal and the idea that God created the soul. If eternity is the condition for the existence of the soul then the soul is in a sense created by eternity. This is because eternity is greater than the soul; even if the soul is eternal it cannot be the whole of eternity.
I also don't see why we need the notion of God "interacting" with the temporal world. The temporal world could be the expression of God, not something Dre interacts with. I don't interpret Theism as a claim that God "creates the unchanging soul at a certain point"; rather I understand that the soul is created by Dre* from all eternity.
* 'Dre' is a non-gendered personal pronoun I created because I don't like referring to God as 'He' or 'She'
Quoting boundless
I think of this situation as the eternal being the condition for existence of the temporal. If the existence of the temporal is necessary, though, then the temporal is equally as much a condition for the existence of the eternal. Could the Forms exist without the "changing world"?
As Plato says "Time is the moving image of eternity". We could equally say that eternity is the unmoving image of time. I think the idea of interaction or activity occurring between eternity and time is incoherent.
I'm quite sure there's contradiction here. If "one frame gives rise to the next", then it is impossible by way of contradiction, that there are forces behind the scenes.
The question is, what is it that really gives rise to each frame, is it forces behind the scene, or is it the prior frame? I suggest to you, that it is impossible that one frame gives rise to the next, because this cannot account for the difference between the two, unless the frame is active, but you've already denied that the frame is active.
The point is that if reality consists in discrete durational moments within which no change occurs, there may or may not be forces at work which are not themselves perceptible within those changeless moments, and those forces may or may not be quantized into discrete changeless moments. I am still seeing no contradiction.
I would just note that it is the agent herself that is the locus and determinant of her choice, not her will or desires. (As Pierre-Normand explains in his last sentence here.)
Quoting boundless
I think it's worth considering something like Rovelli's (and Bitbol's) relational approach here. Bob may be able to secretly predict the outcome of Alice's choice with certainty, per Bob's deterministic theory. But there is no specific outcome that Alice should regard as certain, since she can always reject that outcome and choose differently.
In my view, both those perspectives should be taken as equally valid. Which means that whether or not an outcome is inevitable is indexed to the agent considering the outcome, it's not an absolute claim.
Quoting Pierre-Normand
Exactly. So, per my comments to boundless above, the agent should never regard any specific outcome as inevitable for her since she can always choose otherwise if she wants to. Whereas a specific outcome may be appropriately regarded as inevitable from the predictor's perspective.
I haven't seen Rovelli directly discuss the issue of multiple outcomes but the Wikipedia entry on RQM does:
Quoting Relational Quantum Mechanics - Wikipedia
Which is to say, multiple measured outcomes can occur, but this can't be coherently expressed in relational terms since no interactions between the worlds occur. That is, in relational language, the other worlds are not real for observers in this world and neither is our world real to them.
Quoting noAxioms
OK. So to clarify, you're saying that CGOL (as a formal and non-instantiated structure) nonetheless has its own internal physics. And from inside the structure, gliders are physical but, from their frame of reference, their universe is formal.
And similarly for us, birds, trees and human beings are physical. But our universe is formal.
So these forces are not part of reality then? If they are real forces, then it is false to say that reality consists of those discrete unchanging moments. If they are not real forces, they are irrelevant, and are not "at work".
Quoting Andrew MWow, a lot of context is missing here. Had to go back to the wiki entry to figure out the scenario being described. O' is observing system O and S. One could say that O is the cat, and O' is the guy outside the (initially closed) box.
As you quote, no paradox was described in the scenario when the question is correctly framed. A full description of the interaction between O and O' (with all worlds in superposition) can always be expressed by some outside O'' so long as interaction with O'' does not take place.
Yes. Except I'm not sure about the necessity of the frame of reference. Both universes are formal structures from either frame of reference, but each is its own local reality. So CGol structure is not part of my personal reality, and our universe is not part of theirs. Each is not real to the other, but there is no objective (instantiated) reality to any of them.
Looking for inconsistencies in the view. I really like the view since it removes the need for instantiation, which always seems rationalized, and not actually rational, when I see it explained for other views. Cosmological argument for God is such an example.
I didn't say "exhaustively consists", so your objection is inapt.
Inapt? You said "if reality consists in discrete durational moments within which no change occurs, there may or may not be forces at work which are not themselves perceptible within those changeless moments," Clearly you implied that these "forces" are outside of reality because you said that the discrete moments (reality) are changeless. If you bring the forces into reality, assume that they are real, then how is it that these forces are not acting on the discrete moments, such that the discrete moments are not actually changeless? The assumption of discrete unchanging moments is now contradictory to the assumption of forces acting on the discrete moments, because then they would be changing It's as I said already, you're just going back and forth between two incompatible models, refusing to address the real problems with your model, which is that it is inherently contradictory..
So what are you trying to say then, reality appears to us as discrete frames, but another part of reality is other than the discrete frames? But reality doesn't even appear to us as discrete frames, it appears to us as continuous. And since you have the need to assume a continuity, as the forces behind the discrete frames, then why even posit discrete frames in the first place? Why not just consider the discrete frames as a product of the imagination?
Again, you're assuming 'exhaustive' when that was not what you intended. 'Reality' is a very plastic term; the forces are assumed to be part of reality but are really inferred not observed; so they may or may not be part of reality; whereas what we observe is obviously part of reality as it is perceived by us.
It's true that reality is perceived by us as continuous, just as movies are, but if it can only be understood in terms of discrete frames, then we have a problem. I have only been putting forward, and trying to think through, a possibility; that at the 'smallest' levels, reality is quantic, and consists of a succession of unchanging frames or moments, rather than a seamless progression where any discrete position or moment becomes arbitrary.
I understand, but the point is this. You have posited unchanging discrete moments of reality, with temporal duration. You have also posited other "forces". If the forces have any real effect, then they must act on, and therefore change the unchanging discrete moments. Obviously that's contradictory. If they do not act on the frames to bring about some effect, then necessarily, they are completely irrelevant to reality as it appears to us, and we can dismiss them as unreal, imaginary, having no basis in reality.
Quoting Janus
Do you remember how we started this engagement? I had proposed active frames. You made some points about the relationship between time and the frames. Now I am just demonstrating to you the reason why we cannot assume "still frames". The assumption of stills disallows the possibility of change. That is why if we want to accept the proposition that reality consists of discrete moments, we must assume active discrete moments. And this necessitates the two dimensional time.
Sorry! What I was actually drawing attention to in that quote was that observer O' measures particle S with spin-down. But, earlier, observer O had measured particle S with spin-up.
In quantum mechanics, subsequent spin measurements of a particle in the same basis give the same result. So there would seem to be a paradox here, since (in realist terms) the measurements by observer's O and O' contradict each other.
But, per RQM, no comparison can be made until observer's O and O' physically interact and compare results. And when they do, they will find their two spin measurements are in agreement, just as quantum mechanics predicts! So there is no paradox in relational terms.
That should seem a bit fishy. Is there any possible mechanism by which that agreement could come about without bringing in many physical worlds?
Quoting noAxioms
OK, I'll take up the challenge. :-) Are the physical things in the universe also merely formal? Or does your ontology have two kinds of things - the formal structures (the universes) and substantial (physical) things in the universes?
Also is the equation "x = 1" a universe? How about just individual numbers, like the number 1? Or 0?
- - -
Quoting Andrew MWell, I'd have to say two kinds of ontology: The structures themselves, which have no ontology, and the things in it (galaxies, cups, photons, gliders) which have a relationship to the structure as a whole. That relation is 'is a member of' as best I can articulate it, and is effectively as close as you're going to get to ontology. So 5 exists in the set of integers because it is a member of that set.
This here glider exists in some CGoL block, having perhaps finite duration. It seems appropriate to use 'physical' to describe that since it has analogies to our universe. But other cellular automata don't really have objects or sub-structures like that, and it becomes less appropriate to use the term 'physical' to describe states or movements of 'objects'. At least it is a temporal structure. The universe of the Mandelbrot set has an obvious 'physical' object in it, but it isn't temporal. So is it appropriate to use that term then?
I think they can be trivial universes on their own. Does x=1 mean anything that just '1' doesn't? What is '1' if the set has no other members? The universes are so trivial that there seems to be no way to have any relations except the identity relation. The universe have no requirement to have meaning, lacking something external to give it that. But we're considering them here, so in the context of this discussion, '1' should have meaning to us I think. Don't think I was out of line to ask it.
Mmm, interesting. Regarding Newtonian space it is interesting to note that "space" is not a "thing" in that model. In fact it is simply the "backstage" of phenomena and in fact if we "remove" objects we are left with "nothing", i.e. simply the absence of objects. In the same way "Newtonian time" is also a "backstage". Space and time in Newtonian mechanics are often regarded as "absolute" when in fact they are simply the "backstage". What is absolute in that theory is simply the measure of distances and durations. But distances and durations are not a property of space or time but are meaningful concepts in the presence of objects themselves. So in fact even in the Newtonian picture the observable "properties" of space are in fact dependent on the objects.
In this model instead space and time are ontologically "prior" to objects. Objects need space and time for their existence. Space and time therefore are not merely an "abstraction" we use to "individuate" objects, but in fact are what allow objects to be "individuable". This is the big distinction between - as far as I understand - Kant/Schopenhauer and Newton. According to Newton space and time have no ontological role, so to speak. Instead in our case and in trascendental idealism space and time are necessary for the existence of objects (or phenomena). With space and time there is individuation.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And I am very grateful for your effort! Unfortunately, I am not very sure to have really understood this time. So what I wrote might be completely wrong.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes, in SR everything we can observe is in the space of objects, not in the space of potentialities. But IMO this was also true in the Newtonian case: in that theory everything physical was "in" the space of objects. But "our" model splits the "potentialities" and "actualities", and therefore seems to take into account the double nature of quantum particles by saying that each aspect of "particles" is "real" in the two spaces.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I think that there is a possible problem here. "Fields" and "potentialities" are properties of the negative space, whereas objects are a property of "positive" space. According to QFT, fields are both of massive and massless particles. If what we said before is correct then for massive particles the interpretation is easy: fields live in the negative space whereas their associated particles live in positive space. At the same time we said that light give us information about potentialities and not actualities. If this is so then photons are in fact not "objects" but in fact "potentialities".
Massless particles are not strictly speaking real. They arise as the projection of light into the "physical space". In fact we need them to make a unitary picture of our perception of the two spaces. With other senses we acquire informations about the physical objects in the positive space. With sight we "see" the negative space, but to have a unitary picture of reality we "translate", so to speak, the information into the positive space. This means that when we look a tree we do not see the "negative" space, but rather we see a fictional projection of what we see (in fact we see the negative space) into the positive space. In fact our "experience" (say for evolutionary reasons) must be unitary and therefore we conflate the two space into one.
The problem is that objects do interact with light as it is an "actual" object. Think about the photoelectric effect. In that case you need to take into account the particle nature of light. While in fact I can think about our experience as given by the "projection" on the positive space of the negative, I do not understand how a physical massive object can interact with a massless one in the model we are discussing. In fact in the negative space we have the interaction of the fields (e.g. QED describes the interaction between an atom and a photon as the interaction of fields, after all) but in the positive space we have the corrisponding interaction between particles. In fact the interaction between, say, two massive atoms is an interaction that takes place in the positive space. Whereas the interaction of a massless and a massive one is solely in the negative space (and the positive we have a "projection" of it).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
If massless particles are not real I think that you are right here. The only way to observe "massive light" is to change completely our perception. But this may even not be possible IMO.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This seems follow from the above reasoning. The fact that we do not observe particles faster than light is because we do not observe light as a massive object. In fact it is because we superimpose observed light in the negative space on the positive space that we observe light as the speed limit. So in fact if we could separate the observation of the two spaces then we might a rather different experience.
The problem for this is if a moment is active it cannot be fundamentally discrete, because if it is active then there will be change, process, within it which can then be divided into further discrete moments and so on ad infinitum. If moments are discrete then we must posit fundamental discrete moments which are not active. So, as I said activity consists in the progression of discrete moments or it a seamless continuum. We don't know which, but at least those two positions make sense.
Well, IMO it is like learning a particular skill. It is not that babies do not have free will, but rather they cannot "use" it. Over time however they learn from experience and they gradually begin to "master" that ability.
Quoting Janus
Yes, this is another possibility.
Quoting Janus
Interesting! But if eternity means "timelessness" then this implies that we always existed from the perspective of the "temporal world" and in fact this creation coincides with "atemporal causation".
Quoting Janus
Ok, I see your point here but I (respectfully) disagree. But think about Spinoza's "pantheism". According to him all things are "modes" of the single Substance. This means that whatever can happen, happens neessarily. In turn this implies that sub specie aeternitatis both the Substance and the modes are necessary. But even here IMO there is a clear ontological hierarchy: the modes exist because there is the Substance, instead one a mode is destroyed the Substance persists.
This is how I understand the relationship between the Forms and the "changing world". To exist every table necessitates the existence of the Form of the table. The table in the "changing world" is a possible instantiation of the related Form. And in Plato's case there is not even the constraint that all possible "instantiations" must be realized. So since (supposedly) not all possible "instantiations" are actualized then the Form of the table existed in the past, exists now and will exist in the future even if some possible instantiations are never realized. From this IMO it is clear that the Forms have an ontological priority over the changing world.
This means that the temporal does not affect the eternal while the temporal cannot exist without the eternal. And I think that with this in mind we can speak even of "causation".
Quoting Andrew M
Ok, I can be in agreement with this. But at the same time the agent is still bound to make a precise choice. If determinism is true the agent cannot make another choice (ideally it is possible, but it is not possible in reality).
Quoting Andrew M
Well, the relational approach is very interesting in this issue. But again, the outcomes of choices are either random or deterministic (in the "reference frames" of the various agents) and randomness cannot explain free will. On the other hand, if we allow the existence of libertarian free will in the case of Alice, maybe we can still assume that in Bob's "reference frame" the choice was inevitable. I wonder if this makes sense (if it does we actually solved the problem of "free will" and omniscence using an interpretation of QM :wink: Sometimes life can be very surprising :rofl: )
Quoting Wayfarer
I wonder what Krishnamurti would have thought about the relational interpretation of QM. Probably he would have preferred it over Bohm's.
Well said. I had something of an epiphany when I realised the power of the ‘theory of ideas’ - that ideas are real as possible modes of existence, but are in some sense prior to any and all particulars. I’m still researching it. (You might find an article by Kelly Ross relevant - Meaning and the Problem of Universals. I have read it many times, I don’t agree with all of it, or understand all of it, but I still feel it has a useful interpretation of this question from a contemporary point of view.)
Oh, and there’s another web essay that you might be interested in - The Debate between Plato and Democritus, by Heisenberg. It’s the transcript of a lecture. He too comes down in favour of Plato over Democritus, or idealism over materialism:
Yes the two had apparently a close relationship. In fact there is a lot of confusion about what "Bohmian mechanics" is. Most physicists use that term to refer to the original paper of 1952: the deterministic non-local theory with point particles, the real wvefunction and the quantum potential. In the last twenty years from that work it was derived the "nomological Bohmian mechanics" where the universal wavefunction is treated as simply a "law" (rather than a "real thing", so to speak) and the "quantum potential" has been removed. Among physicists apparently this "kind" of Bohmian approach is the most studied. From the 70's to the 90's Bohm introduced many other concepts with (supposedly) the strong influence of Krishnamurti. In fact concepts like "Inplicate and Explicate order" are found in the later stages of the work of Bohm. Among non-scientists, this approach is what is usually called "Bohmian mechanics". But this later work is not really scientific but philosophical. And much skepticism in the scientific community to Bohm's early and later work also derives from this "metaphyisical" tendeicies later part of his work. Recently Rovelli compared his "relational" interpretation with the work of Nagarjuna and in fact many times "summarised" his views but saying that things are processes, relations, events etc. So, IMO Krishnamurti would be certainly fascinated by RQM (I suggest you the article on SEP or Wikipedia about it).
Quoting Wayfarer
Thanks for the link. I have already read it too some time ago, but I forgot to re-read it. Anyway I remember that when I read it, I had a similar impression. I take this opportunity to re-read it :wink:
Anyway since we are both attracted by Buddhism and Platonism, I found this interesting sutta, SN 12.20:
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.20/en/bodhi (Ven. Bodhi's translation)
This sutta reads at a certain point:
IMO this means that eternal "truths" are in fact not rejected by Buddhism - as far as we do not understand them as "things". Therefore, I think that "timeless" truths are compatible to Buddhism.
In fact I had a similar experience when I first encountered Plato in high school, when the professor mentioned the "second navigation". So, to be really honest I am maybe more a Platonist than anything else.
Quoting Wayfarer
Well, I am still reluctant to endorse idealism but I appreciate his reasoning. After all, mathematically the "foundemental thing" is the state in the Hilbert space. Even the wavefunction is actually a "representation" in the position space. This means that we can think the wavefunction as an "aspect", an instantiation of the abstract state. And of course the "outcome" of our measurement can be also thought as an instantiation. So yes, when one begins to reflect on these things then the "strangeness" of the Copenaghen interpretation* begins to become "reasonable", so to speak.
*Also the same could be said of MWI.
I wouldn't go so far as to say that "space" is simply a backdrop for Newton because I think he looked at space in different ways, depending on the purpose of his inquiry. For the purpose of describing the motions of physical objects, space is just a backdrop. But Newton was one of the pioneers in the experimentation with optics, and he proceeded to speculate into the nature of light itself. In this more metaphysical speculation it is evident that Newton believed space to be more than just a backdrop for physics. Although he put forth a corpuscular theory of light, Newton did extensive experimentation with refraction, and I believe he attributed the wave properties of light to something other than the light itself, but to its interactions with an aetheral space. Also, if I remember correctly he posits a type of spatial inversion between matter and light which he claims to occur within the sun.
Quoting boundless
Right, so in the space of potentialities, negative space, we cannot accurately say that particles are real. We have to look at positive space to find actual particles. And a real particle will occupy space, and have mass.
Quoting boundless
I wouldn't go so far as to make this conclusion either. The problem which I alluded to in the last post is with the definition of "light". It is defined in the mathematics of physics as energy, meaning the capacity to do work, and therefore it is necessarily, by definition, a potentiality. But since it actually does work, then it must get related to physical objects in the cases that it actually does work, and so it must be described in an actual form which can relate to physical objects. This is the photon.
Quoting boundless
Great, you've followed well. Now we get to the nitty gritty of dealing with the incompatibilities of other theories, which necessitates picking apart the other theories if we want the model to survive. What I suggested in the last post is that the current representation of the speed of light is inaccurate. Do you agree that an electron has mass, and that it has a variable velocity? Having a variable velocity is directly related to having mass. A photon cannot have a variable velocity, nor can it have mass, due to conventional definition. So what I think is needed, is an adjustment to the constancy of the velocity of light, allowing that a photon can have an actual position on the orthogonal timelines.
Remember, the speed of light is currently measured as a phenomenon in the negative space, related to objects in the positive space. On the orthogonal lines, the nature of space is actually changing. So if we give more time on the orthogonal line, beyond the range of human perception, to allow light to come into positive space, we ought to allow that distances would change due to the changing space, the distance between the same massive particles would increase. This seems to imply that the actual velocity of a photon would be greater than the recorded speed of light. If we do not allow light into the positive space of actuality, it becomes the infinite possibility, which feeds the notion of time travel. But that's just a basic idea, there are different things to sort out, such as the relationship between different frequencies. If we establish the orthogonal lines, it may be the case that different frequencies of electromagnetism actually become fixed at a slightly different position on the line, and so have different photons. There are complexities here that need to be worked out, and we probably ought to start by fixing the position of the electron.
Now let's plug this into the model. We have two time dimensions, the traditional timeline, and the orthogonal timelines of each moment in passing time. There is a different type of activity associated with each timeline. The traditional timeline affords us change of place, locomotion. The orthogonal lines afford us "real change", and this is what I called spatial inversion. If we take an individual orthogonal timeline, an individual moment in time, the right side extends indefinitely toward the beginning (future), while the left indefinitely toward the end (past). The line indicates how things come to be at the present moment. They come to be from the future (potential), and establish actual existence of determinate being, toward the past. The human experience of being at the present, thought and sense perception, occupies an important section of this line. However we should assume that the orthogonal timelines extend beyond the limits of human perception.
Human beings have come to notice temporal extension of being, of objects. This is the continuity of sameness across the orthogonal lines, along the traditional timeline, existence. The continuity of sameness is attributed to mass, and inertia, and this is what we attribute to the determinateness provided by coming to be in the past. As something comes to be in the past its spatial position is fixed and it is passive. So from our perspective, massive objects come to be on the right side of our perspective of the orthogonal timelines, so we see them as passive matter with mass and inertia. They are always on the past side of the zero line present, from our perspective.
If we go to the other end of the human perspective, we'll find the energy of light. It is always on the future side of the present, from our perspective so we define it in terms of potentialities. Notice that the electron would be in between, and could be viewed in both ways. But let me get to the issue with the current theories involving the speed of light. An object, or particle, must have a fixed place on each orthogonal line in order that it may be engaged in locomotion. Locomotion is the particle's relative position from one orthogonal line to the next. If the particle has mass its position from one line to the next will be orderly according to laws of inertia. And, to fix the particle's position on the orthogonal lines is to give it mass. If it had a position without inertia, its relative position from one line to the next would be random and there would be no way of knowing its position. This is what happens to the photon under current definitions of light. Because the velocity of light is fixed, constant, and it is fixed in the position of negative space, potential, the photon cannot have a position on the orthogonal line. Not only is its position forced to be beyond the realm of human perspective, it is forced right off the end of the orthogonal line. By definition, the photon is not allowed to be apprehended as a determinate passive object, with a fixed spot on the orthogonal lines.
Quoting boundless
Interaction is not a problem, because at the far right of the orthogonal lines, all existence must come from the negative space (potentiality). So in this zone, of the very beginning of the present moment, where even massive particles are in the form of potential, interaction occurs. Massive particles are compelled by the forces described by inertia, so they are not very susceptible to interference. However, changes to electrons can affect more massive particles, and electrons can be changed by photons. Even things at the low end of the scale (photons) can interfere with determined massive existence through the medium of electrons and existing instability.
It would not be correct therefore to describe any such interaction as within the positive space. In relation to "real change", activity takes place only within negative space, as negative space moves to become positive. In positive space, the position of things is fixed, as in the past, and the only change is locomotion, which is the fixed position of objects from one moment to the next. So a massive atom may move in relation to another, but this is strictly the locomotion of the massive nucleus. The electron however has an obscured motion because its locomotion (activity as an actual massive particle in positive space) is conflated with its real change (activity as potential within negative space). From one perspective, the electron has a potential position in its relations to the coming into being of massive nucleus, but from another perspective it has an actual position in relation to the coming into being of the photon. From the human perspective, the electron may be described as existing in negative space relative to the nucleus, or as in positive space relative to the photon. We model all real things as changing from potential to actual at each moment in time. This means we must adjust the constancy of the speed of light to allow that photons have actual existence.
I don't see the logic here. You are claiming that a discrete entity cannot be divided. I don't see your principle to support this claim. A unity is a discrete entity, and a unity can be divided.
Yes sure, a discrete entity can be composed of smaller discrete entities. The point is that if a discrete entity is active then that activity can only be understood to consist in relations between further entities (activity cannot be understood otherwise or it would not be coherently thought as being activity at all). The point is that this is an infinite regress unless there are fundamental discrete entities which are not active.
All that glisters is not gold.
Physics forum proves only one thing:
that much of academic physics is lower than
the lowest fundamentalist pseudo-religion.
So much of academia is just a mindless regurgitation of sophistry and jargon.
If the entity is composed of parts, then the activity which it is involved in may be an activity of the eternal parts. The activity of the entity is understood without relating the entity to further entities.
Quoting Janus
I don't see the relevance of any claim to infinite regress. If each "frame" consists of activity which is composed of parts which are active, why is there a need to worry about infinite regress? The source of activity may remain an unknown factor.
Yes, I was meaning the equation for a line. In this case, would the line have an infinite number of points or would it be discrete? And if both a line and a number (a point on the line?) can be a universe, does that mean that there are universes within universes?
Quoting noAxioms
My main objection is that you seem to be making a distinction between things in a universe, which are physical, and the universe itself which is not physical. But aren't the things in the universe themselves mathematical on your view? In which case, isn't the term "physical" merely human "baggage", to use Tegmark's term?
Quoting boundless
Instead of random, I would say Alice's choice is determined by her (i.e., self-determined) in her reference frame, whereas the outcome can be predicted with certainty in Bob's reference frame.
On a relational approach, no contradiction arises since Alice and Bob haven't interacted and jointly considered the specific predicted outcome. But if they did, then Bob's prediction would no longer be certain, since he can only predict the outcomes of isolated systems, not outcomes of the (Alice + Bob) system he is now a part of. So Alice is free to reject that outcome. But Carol, an observer of the isolated (Alice + Bob) system, could still predict the outcome of Alice's choice.
Quoting boundless
Yes. Though it's worth noting that Bob can only predict the outcome of Alice's choice on the condition that he doesn't interact with Alice (perhaps itself a choice).
There can be, sure. Our universe might be defined as our own chunk of spacetime as we know it, but inflation theory says that we are but one bubble condensed from inflation stuff, each of which is a non-interacting universe on its own, some as trivial as x=1. That bubble-space might be considered to be a larger universe that contains ours. In that view, our bubble is not a universe, just a bubble among others in this container.
I like the term ‘human baggage’. I’m not calling contained objects ‘physical’, but in the example of CgoL, similarities can be drawn. In other ways, the similarity are thinner. CgoL has no concept of inertia or force for instance. Time has an arrow at the quantum level, not just at the entropy level.
Another mathematical structure example is the set of all valid chess states. This is a finite set (there is a maximum possible chess game of around 5000 moves), and there is time, entropy, and the possibility for the addition of dualism to the universe to allow ‘players’ which designate which of the states are real (in relation to the player) compared to the other states. But sans-player, the states as a universe unto itself is all equally real.
Quoting Andrew MWanted to comment on this. Where is Bob in relation to Alice? If outside (non-interacting) with closed Alice system, and if hard single-outcome determinism is true and Bob has access to full state and the resources to make the prediction, then yes, Alice, in the deterministic contained system, can be perfectly predicted and has no ‘predicted outcome’ to reject. Bob cannot divulge the prediction to Alice as that would be interacting, making the system not closed.
OK, so if Bob is within the closed system, there are several reasons, determinism or not, that he cannot make such a prediction. 1: State cannot be known, per Heisenberg uncertainty. 2: Bob cannot predict himself, even if he had this unobtainable state. It would require a mechanism to simulate itself faster than real time. Alice of course would just be waiting for Bob’s prediction, at which point Alice will choose the opposite thing. I can make a small mechanical device with only a couple parts that does that, and Bob will fail to predict its behavior. That doesn’t demonstrate that the device has free will, however you might define it.
Well I kind of agree with you. But you have to accept that Alice in her reference frame has "libertarian" free will, which is not strictly speaking allowed by the known theories of physics. But that's exactly is the problem. How can it "emerge" from either random or deterministic processes?
Quoting Andrew M
Excellent point, indeed!
Quoting Andrew M
Agreed! :wink:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Good point!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yeah, it seems the necessary conclusion of the theory :wink:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Another very interesting point, indeed! to tell the truth I find the usual interpretation of E = mc^2 a bit "wrong". Strictly speaking it does not say that energy and mass are the same, but only that there is an associated quantity of energy to the mass of an object. And in fact, as you say the basic definition of energy is after all "the ability to produce work" - we can say the ability to cause some kind of change - and it is a potentiality. If we take the usual interpretation then everything is a potentiality and nothing is actual. The usual solution of this is to "actualize" energy, while in fact "our" model is maintaining the idea that energy is a potentiality and that mass is an actuality. This is indeed a very interesting point!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes! There is a qualitative difference between massless and massive particles in relativity. In fact a conosequence of that difference is exactly this different behaviour you are pointing at here!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok... I also had in mind a solution like that in mind. Interaction is between fields. This determines the outcome in the "positive" space. An objection might be made on the fact that photons interact with protons, too. But at the same time protons are made of quarks. So the interaction with the proton is an effective explanation of the phenomenon.
For now I stop here. I know it is an incomplete response. But I need some more time to think about the other things you wrote. Anyway it is a very interesting theory :wink:
Right, and this association is made through the constant called the speed of light. That is why "length contraction" is such a counter-intuitive concept. Mass is related to density. But under the concept of length contraction an extremely fast moving object would appear to be contracted and therefore more dense, the same mass in a smaller area. What happens to the mass if the object reaches the boundary, the speed of light? I think it's more intuitive to think of an extremely fast moving object as covering more area in the same period of time required for measurement, and therefore being less dense. If a tiny object, such as an electron, or even a photon, actually has some mass, that mass might be spread out over a large area due to the velocity it has.
Quoting boundless
The concept of energy is actual quite complex. It is defined as the capacity to do work, so it is inherently a potential. A potential must always be attributed to something actual in the form of a property of that thing, or else nothing substantiates, or grounds that potential. That's what differentiates a logical possibility, as imaginary and fictional, from an actual possibility. In the case of energy, the potential is attributed to the activity of an object, as kinetic energy. So activity is a potential, called energy. Beyond this we have potential energy, and this is the potential for a potential. If I understand correctly, potential energy is modeled by fields, so in this case the field mathematics represents the potential for a potential.
As you say, the usual approach is to simply actualize energy, but this is not to stay true to the conceptual foundations and the result is misunderstanding. The problem being that energy was conceptualized as the property moving mass. A moving object has energy, mv^2. When the speed of light was introduced as the limit to velocity, in the way that it was, then energy became simply the property of motion. With the transmission of electromagnetic energy, it is not possible that there is any "thing" which is moving from A to B, there is simply energy that is transmitted. But logically, conceptually, energy is the property of motion, and if there is motion from A to B there must be something moving from A to B. So we say that it's "energy" which moves from A to B, making the predicate into the subject. That is of course, circular logic. If energy gets from A to B, it must be the property of something which moves from A to B. What moves from A to B? Energy. The concept of energy is not really designed for describing what is transmitted by wave impulses.
Another example of the qualitative difference is this: In relativity we can always find a rest reference frame for massive particles, but for massless particles the concept of "rest frame" becomes meaningless. I find this point under-emphasized by physicists. In fact it means that - ultimately - we can speak about "flow of time" thanks to mass. If there were no mass, then temporal measurements could not be made (this is why it is said that photons are "timeless"...).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, but there is no problem now to have a faster than light photon. In fact the reason why there are no tachyons is not simply because they are "faster than light" but because in relativity information cannot travel faster than light. But, if we consider that space is changing etc, then there is no problem with this. Time travel is still avoided due to the fact that space changes. So I prefer the first idea here since time travel is illogical.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, this explains that the "two natures" of particles (waves/fields vs particles) is due to the dual nature of space. Inertia therefore is related to the persistence of particles in time. It is their "substance".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, this part is interesting. If this is true then the dualism quantum-classical world can be explained by the mass of the object. In fact we can imagine a mass-limit where all "quantum weirdness" disappears. Actually a drawback of "Copenaghism" is that it assumes this dualism but cannot explain why our world is classical. This is the main reason why MWI and the relational approaches are very popular: QM, for that approaches, is a complete theory at all massive scales.
Anyway there is a deep connection between energy/momenta and space/time. In physics courses it is often stressed that as we study small scales energy becomes gradually greater. Also in the De-Broglie wave-matter theory the higher is the mass, the lower wave-lenght we have. This strong bond between cinematic and dynamical quantities is therefore present both in current theories and this model.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Ok... but IMO we can think it in gradual terms. The electron has a "fuzzier" location because it is less massive than the nucleus. This gradation leads us to a quantitative dependance and in principle this dependance can be observed by experiments.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, this "conflict" might not be a problem for this theory if the experimental results are "saved". In fact that lenght contraction is derived by measurement of distances in SR (and based on the "speed of light" constancy that you discussed earler). This theory instead is quite different from SR in the explanation of the nature of space and time. So again "lenght contraction" is explained as a sort of illusion due to the fact that we do not use the orthogonal timelines.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In a sense I think you are right. While kinetic and rest energy can be thought as the potential of particles (and therefore it is a property of particles in the "actual" space), the potential energy in fact can be thought as a potential of that potential and therefore it can be thought to "exist" in the negative space. Before an apple falls from a tree the apple has (circa, in our frame etc) zero kinetic energy. Once it begins to fall it acquires kinetic energy and once it hits the ground it loses its kinetic energy. We can in fact think that potential energy and kinetic energy are two different concepts. They are both potentials but of different types. Today we tend to think them as more or less "the same" but this tendency might be due to the "craving for generality" to use an expression of Wittgenstein. In fact there are many "types" of energy and each should be distinguished. The conservation of "energy" is in fact a conservation of the "sum" of many different (but very similar) quantities, not the conservation of the same "thing".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
IMO this objection maybe is solved by the reasoning above, i.e. that the different kinds of energy are different concepts that should be distinguished. Therefore "what" is transmitted by wave impulse is different by "what" is transmitted by a moving particle, but we need to count both of them to make a conservation law.
Quoting Andrew MI think the use of the word 'universe' is about as much loaded human baggage as the term 'physical'. The (our) universe could be a mathematical structure, but to call any mathematical structure a universe is to load it with meaning unintended.
The point I wanted to discuss is that IF our universe is such a structure, it need not be instantiated in some larger context to explain empirical experience. It needs to be instantiated in said larger context only in order for something in that larger context to examine it. I've given examples.
I agree that it doesn't need to be instantiated in some larger context (since there may be no larger context), but I would argue that it still needs to be concrete, not merely abstract. I'd like to highlight this part of Tegmark's (shorter) explanation of the MUH:
Quoting Shut up and calculate - Max Tegmark
So I don't agree that there is a bird's eye view of the universe (i.e., a view from nowhere). We never directly observe numbers or mathematical structures, only concrete things that we can then describe in abstract terms. Mathematical equations ultimately derive their meaning from those concrete things, they aren't dispensable "human baggage". So a complete mathematical description of the universe would need to be in human-observer terms (i.e., a view from somewhere).
The idea that there are pure abstractions or a view from nowhere seem to be claims without an empirical basis.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes.
Quoting noAxioms
It doesn't. But I don't define free will as implying unpredictability (nor predictability as implying its absence), but as choosing what one wants. The point is that there is no outcome that Alice must accept if she doesn't want to.
Quoting boundless
The free will here is that Alice can choose the outcome she wants (and the outcome she wants can change as new information is brought to her attention). I don't see that known (deterministic) theories of physics disallow that, though I would agree they don't explain it either.
To clarify what I meant with the problem of "free will":
I think that the problem with compatibilism is that in fact we do not have a "libertarian" free will which is neither compatible with determinism nor with "randomism" (and I think, neither with a combination of the two, if such a combination is possible). The "effective" free will advocated by compatibilism in fact is not a "real" free will, but simply it is a statement of "unpredictability". If our choices are due to deterministic processes then they are inevitable and ideally even predictable. If our choices are in part due to quantum phenomena then (if Pilot-Wave Theory is wrong, of course) there is a random component but still there is no real "libertarian" free will. Therefore if all phenomena, including our mental processes, volitions etc, are either deterministic or random then "libertarian" free will is impossible. If we allow that instead there is some real free agency then, as I discussed with Janus last week in this very thread (see the end of page 12 onwards), it seems that either free agency has no "physical explanation" or that there are some aspects of reality that cannot be treated mathematically (in its known form) in a coherent and complete way.
Anyway, you seem to agree with me on this point :wink: :
Quoting Andrew M
P.S.
likely unrelated note, but might be of interest: if I do not err, Max Tegmark suggested that to avoid the constraints of Goedel theorem his "mathematical universe hypothesis" should be modified into the restricted version "computable universe hypothesis". This (and similar things I read some time ago but unfortunately I cannot remeber now), seem to suggest that if there is a "theory of everything" then "physical laws" are computable. And therefore there is not "libertarian" free will of course. Hence "free will", if it exists, seems to imply that we cannot produce a coherent and complete "theory of everyting".
I think that this is the most important aspect of the subject, how we relate to temporal continuity. We see that mass has a tendency to persist, to continue its existence in time, and this is what inspired Newton's laws regarding mass and inertia. But how we actually understand the temporal continuity of existence is not so straight forward. It's best to go right back to Aristotle's hylomorphism to get a firm understanding of these principles.
Plato had exposed the difference between those who believe in the logical principles of being and not being as fundamental to reality, and those who believe in becoming as fundamental. According to Aristotle, sophists could argue that becoming, and change, are not real. What is real is describable by "what is", and when change occurs, there is a new "what is". But Aristotle demonstrated how this leads to infinite regress. If "what is" at one moment is other than "what it was" at the last moment, then to account for the change between them, we must posit an intermediate "what is". This would create an infinite regress of always needing to posit an intermediate "what is" between any two different states to account for the change which occurs between them. This is similar to Zeno's paradoxes. So Aristotle allowed for a special category of "potential", to account for becoming and change, and "potential" was designated as having exclusion from the law of excluded middle. He also used "potential" to refer to future things which may or may not occur, and said that it is incorrect to say that there is truth or untruth concerning these things.
In his physics, he describes a world of changing forms (what is), and posits matter as the underlying potential for change. Matter, having the character of potential, is what persists, or remains the same, when change occurs. So matter is what gives reality to temporal continuity between one state and the next changed state, as that which persists through change. Without matter, change becomes unintelligible, due to the infinite regress described, as one state distinct from another changed state, with no connection of "becoming" between them. But "matter" is just assumed, and the term may be applied to whatever is observed to be unchanging in the changing world, to account for temporal continuity. So if we take a tree, and describe the different things we can do with the wood, in this case, "wood" is the unchanging thing, the matter. But we could break the wood down to molecules and in this case the molecules would be the matter. And so we can go further, to atoms, fundamental particles, or energy, and these would be "the matter". "Matter" signifies a concept which accounts for what persists, unchanged, as time passes.
Newton attempts to attribute fundamental properties to matter, like mass and inertia, but this is problematic, because it is to say that matter has some necessary form, mass, and inertia. That matter has a necessary form is contrary to the conception. So even though mass and inertia are the fundamental principles by which we observe temporal continuity, these concepts are not necessarily representative of the reality of temporal continuity. They represent how we observe temporal continuity. And observations are of forms, while temporal continuity is represented by "matter". With the current conception of energy, based in Einsteinian physics, physicists deny mass and inertia as the necessary properties of matter, attempting to strip it down to its true conception of simple temporal continuity.
Now we have the issue of formless matter, pure energy. But this is strictly denied by Aristotelian metaphysics as inherently unintelligible, because the form which matter has is what is apprehended by us. So our observations of temporal continuity is what is provided for by the concept of matter, but if we remove all form from matter, then temporal continuity becomes unintelligible because it's unrelatable to any observations. As much as "matter" represents temporal continuity, and is apprehended by us as such, without a particular form, (what it is), it becomes unintelligible to us. Now under the precepts of special relativity theory we get the claim "time is just an illusion". The problem though is that time is very real, so if we're working under a theory which renders it as an illusion, this will only hinder the progress.
What do you mean by ‘abstract’? Just not-concrete? The word has connotations of being a mental construct (thought or idea), which is not the direction I’m going. Our universe is not necessarily conceived of by something not part of the structure.
Agree. Tegmark is speaking of an objective description of the universe, not a relational one. There is indeed no nowhere from which there is such a view. I find his bird analogy a poor one, since it is only panning back to a larger picture, but not one from outside. Telescopes and microscopes are both still subjective views.
One can consider the universe in objective terms, but it is not an actual ‘view’. At best, the structure can be simulated, and the simulation viewed. The simulation serves no purpose to the thing simulated. It only serves a purpose to the runner of the simulation, allowing examination. The fact that it does not server a purpose to the structure simulated is a primary motivation for realization that the structure being concrete is not a requirement.
The meaning might be indispensible human baggage, but the structure itself (not necessarily any ‘equation’ that describes it to an observer for whom it means something) seems not to require said observer. OK, ours comes with humans built in, so it seems to be a structure that finds meaning in itself, but that’s an internal relation, not ontology.
We seem to just be asserting opposite views. I don’t see either of us making good justification of our positions. Doing my best. I don’t claim that there is no ontology, just that it is not necessary. To me, that seems to put at least some burden on you to show (not just assert) that it is necessary. The humans in the uninstantiated universe would have the exact same observations and thoughts as the humans in the instantiated universe. Do you disagree? It seems to assume that humans are part of said universe, and not external experiencers of it, so kind of discarding dualist biases, which is hard to do.
Not claiming this, so agree. From nowhere, there is no view at all.
I may comment on the free will thing separately. Doesn’t belong in this post.
I disagree. How one views free will is a reflection on how one views the passing of time. And that is central to this issue.
So the question seems to break down into the nature of self (am I a soul or a physical construct?), and the thing which is holding you responsible for your actions. I think of three primary cases, and the definition of free will seems to apply differently to each of them, making it a mistake to apply one argument to all the cases.
Case 1: Physicalism: Your definition works fine here. Alice definitely can choose as she wills, and held responsible for her actions by physical society. Not completely. Alice wills to fly, and physics prevents that. Alice cannot be held responsible for failing to fly.
Free will is rarely defined your way. The argument typically points out that Alice's will is determined as well, being a causal effect of prior state, which makes it not free. I have no idea why it would be a bad thing for my will to be based on prior state. Example: Alice sees a person cross the road in front of her car. She's more responsible for her actions if she ignores that state? Physics says Alice sees the person and wills to hit the brakes because of that input, but a free willed person will base the decision on something other than the detection of a person crossing in front of her. This makes no sense. Why is that a better thing?
Case 2: Non-physical interactive soul: The analogy here is Tomb Raider. The player is the spirit soul, and Lara is the physical avatar. Lara is not responsible for her mistakes, you are. You are punished (in the spirit realm) for screwing up by not finishing the game.
The soul is not part of the physical system, and can be held responsible by some similar non-physical entity, typically a deity. Most proponents of free will assume biases for case 2, but fail to understand that the logic only applies to case 2.
Alice (spirit soul) again can do what she wants since her soul is supposedly in charge. It means that physics must must include a mechanism for introduction of external change, else the actions of Alice's physical person do indeed come from physics, fully determined or not. I agree, determinism or predictability is irrelevant. It just makes the analysis easier, but doesn't change the answer.
Absurdly, the physical Alice in the case 2 scenario is considered to be free willed precisely because she's not able to choose for herself, but lets her actions be determined via remote control. "You can't jail me you honor, my soul made me do it!".
Case 3: Epiphenomenal soul: This one is dualism with no violation of physics. The analogy this time is Harry Potter being held responsible for wandering the grounds after hours. You are the spirit soul experiencing Harry. Harry can be held responsible by Snape, who is also part of the physics, but you the epiphenomenal experiencer cannot be held responsible for Harry's actions either by Snape nor by your society since you lack the ability to choose. Again, I like your definition. The viewer and Harry are two separate entities, not one with a agent/avatar relationship.
- - -
Quoting Metaphysician UndercoverThat post was not about the passage of time. Neither is this one, but I agree that interpretation of time is relevant to the issue.
Ed
It is well-known that Schrodinger was a lifelong fan of Schopenhauer, more than Berkeley. and also expressed an interest in Vedanta. I referred to this article earlier in this thread but you might have missed it, having just joined (and welcome, by the way) - Quantum Mysticism: Gone but Not Forgotten.
My considered view after many years of study is that the assumption of 'mind independence' arises from methodological naturalism. It is not an explicitly metaphysical attitude, but it is one that has deep metaphysical consequences.
Oh, sorry noAxioms, my mistake. I somehow misread your comment as saying that such a discussion doesn't belong in this thread. Read too fast sometimes, and miss some words.
Quoting Edmund
This is the age old difference between being and becoming. Parmenides and the Eleatics insisted reality is described by being, and not being, what is and what is not. The natural philosophers of ancient Greece, like Heraclitus claimed that all is flux, and described reality in terms of becoming. Plato exposed a deep chasm separating these two world views. Aristotle demonstrated that being and becoming are fundamentally incompatible, and suggested an exception to the law of excluded middle to allow for the reality of becoming, under the concept of potential, in relation to the logical categories of being and not being. He insisted that the law of non-contradiction be upheld, but some modern schools such as dialectical materialism, adopting the principles of Hegelian dialectics, promote dialetheism which allows the law of non-contradiction to be violated.
Quoting Wayfarer
Metaphysical differences produce epistemological consequences.
Alice could choose tea over coffee all her life and everyone who knows her could predict this. But I don't think this demonstrates that it wasn't really her choice.
I think conceiving of determinism in an absolute sense (the view from nowhere) does seem to negate agent causality, as you indicate. However my argument is that deterministic theories are only applicable within a context (the view from somewhere). So, for Alice, the context includes her ability to make choices, her perceptual capabilities, her knowledge and so on. She can then use deterministic theories to predict what external physical systems will do. But those theories can't circumvent or undermine the intentional context that they are empirically grounded in. And so we see that when Bob interacts with Alice, his prediction about her choice breaks down and Alice's intentional choice prevails.
Quoting boundless
Yes, I agree with the computability thesis (though not with Tegmark's Platonism).
As an example, I see two apples on the table but I don't see the number two. The apples are concrete particulars, the number two is an abstract quantity.
On the problem of universals, my position is Aristotelian realism. So I regard the universe as concrete and observable. Also the universe has a mathematical structure, but that structure is not separable from matter.
Quoting noAxioms
I agree that the universe doesn't need an observer. But given that we are observing it, it follows that it is concrete (since we can't observe universals). Just as the apples must be concrete in order to observe them.
Now your claim seems to be that that is just us humans talking about the universe in our human way - the universe could really be something else in itself. But my argument is that abstractions (and representations) have an essential logical dependency on concrete particulars in our language use. So we can't then just posit something as being purely abstract (which we never observe) and expect that to be a meaningful statement.
Quoting noAxioms
I do disagree since, on my view, an uninstantiated (purely abstract) universe would be just nothing. But I do also agree that we are internal experiencers of the universe and that dualism is mistaken. While my specific arguments are the observation and coherency arguments above, generally speaking it's really just the philosophical question of the problem of universals.
Quoting noAxioms
Exactly.
I agree with your analysis in the rest of your post and your analogies are great. My general thought is that a pragmatic definition is an abstraction that enables different people to fill in the details according to their own preferred philosophical views. But, being pragmatic, everyone understands how it is used and so communication remains possible despite those different philosophies. We see this in a striking way with the different QM interpretations despite there being broad methodological agreement on how to use the math to solve practical problems.
Just read the article on quantum mysticism that you directed me to...excellent. my linking berkeley and schrodinger was not to claim the influence of the former on the latter but rather as an example of the fermat solution issue which it seems involves aspects of geometry inaccessible to fermat so in a sense is another solution to his alluded to in his marginal note. I am fascinated by how early thinkers often prefigure/frame debates furthered later in contexts alien to them but which arguably subjectify their initial thoughts. The quantum article suggests the shift of thinking research to an anglo american context demystified it. I read all the contributions in this thread with great interest. Thanks all.
Thank you for this explanation! Unfortunately I do not know much of Aristotle, and in fact I am discovering that what I thought to know about him was very incorrect.
But "potential" has some causal role in change or is merely a substratum? I mean, we observe acts, i.e. changing forms. We assume that there is a "potential" to take into account change to avoid the intermediate "what is" paradox and we call "matter" this "potential".
So, the above question can be rephrased as: are "changing forms" simply an "expression" of "what persists", i.e. matter? If this is true, then I agree with you that this "matter" must be something that in itself has almost no "properties" - hence it is "formless". The property it has is that it can be actualized in all possible "forms".
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
...And therefore we need to introduce the distinction between the "potential" and the "actual" into two dfferent spaces. So, in fact, maybe it can be said that SR tends to consider only an aspect of reality, i.e. "pure energy". But in fact if we want to really understand the nature of time, we need to consider both "aspects".
So, if we do not consider the "positive" space then we will conclude that "time does not exist". But, time in fact, contrary to what many physicists think, might be real, after all :cool:
Quoting Andrew M
Agreed!
Quoting Andrew M
I agree that deterministic theories are context-dependent.
What I do not understand however is how can something like "free agency" arise from deterministic processes (or a combination between deterministic and random processes). But as you said, this is normal since no theory has ever explained it :wink:
Quoting Andrew M
I, too, disagree with Tegmark's Platonism. But I disagree with computabilism because I think that, for example, the "workings" of our minds cannot be explained in computabilistic terms. At the same time however our theories to be both consistent and complete must be computable. This shows, however, the limits of physics IMO. (and of course I did not mean to "lower" the importance of it with this observation :wink: )
You’d observe them the same if they were not concrete. The exact same relations would exist, just between two things (observer/apple) in the same structure that happens to not be concrete. If the empirical experience is different because of this, the relations would be different, meaning it was not the same structure. I’m assuming a closed structure here, but I think no more.
I observe it, being part of it. Indeed, I could not observe it from outside, lacking a particular ‘it’ to observe. It could be simulated, but then it is the simulation being observed, not the structure itself.
Again, I reach for the simplest cases like 2+2=4, which has no particular, but the relation between 2+2 and 4 exists, particular or not. I can simulate (perform the addition) to observe this, but doing so is just for the benefit of the performer of the operation and has no effect on the truth of the relation.
It would not be at all, which is different from being nothing.
I don’t really claim anything one way or the other on universals. I need to see how this fits in, since you seem to lean on the problem of universals as a counter-argument to my idea here.
The issue with "potential" gets more complicated with Aristotle's cosmological argument. The argument is that no potential can be eternal, therefore there must be an actuality which is prior to all potential. This is how Aristotle denies the reality of "prime matter", potentiality without any actuality (what is sometimes called the eternal flux of the infinite apeiron). A boundless potential denies any actuality, and therefore could not actualize itself. If such an infinite potential ever existed, it would always exist, and therefore there could not ever be anything actually existing. But this is contrary to what we observe, which is the actual existence of forms. So we must deny the reality of infinite potential, assuming that there is always actuality which is prior to and therefore limits any potential.
Understanding this cosmological argument can have a great influence over the way that one understands time. Suppose that the passage of time is understood by us through the analysis of changing forms. The passage of time, in conception, is tied to and bound by the changes in actually existing forms. But we also learn from our understanding of free will and such things that the potential for any actual form precedes its actual existence. This is how ethical determinism is denied, we allow that a form of actual existence comes from the potential for that existence. So any actual state of existence, at a particular point in time, doesn't necessitate the next state, there is the potential for a multiplicity of next states.
If we apply this to our understanding of time, we see that this understanding is incomplete because the conception of time is produced from the changing forms, but we have determined the logical necessity for a "potential" which is "prior to" the changing forms. Our concept of time cannot grasp this potential, because it is prior to the changing forms, upon which the concept of time is based. The idea of something prior to time is irrational and contradictory. Now we bring in the cosmological argument which states that this "potential" cannot refer to anything real and therefore cannot account for the real existence of the changing forms, unless it is soundly based in something actual. So we must find the means to give actual existence to the potential, in order to bring it into the realm of intelligibility (potential, as it is, defies the fundamental principles of logic).
What I infer from this is that we need to extend our concept of time, to establish a relationship between the actuality of changing forms, and the actuality which is prior to the potential for changing forms. Our concept of time stymies us because the idea of something prior to time is contradictory. But the concept of time doesn't extend beyond the changing forms, and this is what is necessary to allow for the potential for change. The potential for change is prior to the changing forms, and therefore outside of "time" as presently conceived. So we must extend "recreate" the concept of time to allow for the potential for change, which is now outside of time. "Potential" itself doesn't give us anything to base a concept of time in, because it can refer only to the passing of time which is the potential for change, and this produces nothing but infinite possibility. So we must turn to the actuality which is behind this potential, to restrict what appears as infinite potential, determine what the passing of time actually is, in order to relate the changing forms to the underlying actuality, thereby expanding the conception of time in a real way.
Quoting boundless
Right, the two different spaces account for the two distinct actualities. Without distinguishing between them they are conflated and produce the appearance of infinite possibility, or potential. There is nothing actual which "the passing of time" refers to, so it appears as infinite potential. What the cosmological argument teaches us is that "infinite potential" is an unintelligible concept which renders metaphysics and ontology as incomprehensible. Idealists and materialists alike get drawn into the trap of infinite potential as Aristotle demonstrated. The cosmological argument refutes Pythagorean (Platonic) Idealism, in which human ideas are said to be eternal, by showing the true nature of these ideas as having the characteristic of potential, and it also refutes Anaximander's materialism which refers to an eternal chaos, or "aperion", which is matter, or potential.
Interestingly, both "idealist" and "materialist" philosophies tend to say that the "first cause" (or "first principle") is something that is "simple", has infinite potentialities etc. While I do respect these philosophies (well, after all my username is "boundless", apeiron in Greek), I saw no convincing explanation on how the "world" could arise from this "primordial potentiality". As I said, I know almost nothing about Aristotle, but interestingly here he criticizes exaclty this point.
Anyway, Aristotle's argument is sound. If it is true, then a "double-aspect" is heavily implied.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This could solve the problem that Janus posited, before. From a purely "naturalistic" (in our langauge if we consider only the "changng forms") reasoning free-will is literally impossible. If we accept the view that we are completely "natural" phenomena then free-will is simply illusory (or it is taken as an emergent phenomenon, in a way that is not very convincing).
In this theory, free-will seems well explained.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well, I agree that in this "dual-aspects" (potentialities and actualities) model, our concept of time needs redefinition. If we think about measurements, clearly we measure "time" in relation to the changing form. Hence we need a redefinition.
In your view the universe had a beginning? I agree that speaking about something "before time" is illogical ("before" is a temporal relation and outside time speaking of "before" or "after" is meaningless), but at the same time, to me it seems that this model requires that time had no "beginning" due to the fact that potentialities and actualities cannot be separated.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I agree that their system have an inconsistency (or at least a "non-sequitur"). Ideas are not separable from changing forms and also changing forms are not enough to explain reality. The undeniable merit of this metaphysics is that it accepts both levels. It might be very difficult (or even impossible...) to make a scientific theory from it (although there are some attempts as you remarked earlier) but philosophically has a very good point: the two "aspects" of reality need each other. This explains nicely the difficulties of both "materialism" and "idealism".
Just for curiosity: do you know online sources that explain well the cosmological argument of Aristotle? I am very curious to learn about his philosophy after this discussion :grin:
Unfortunately I will probably be very busy in the following days, so I will likely have a hard time in keeping up with the conversation. Even this answer is somewhat lacking and I am quite sorry for this :sad:
Anyway, thank you very much for the interesting discussion we had so far :blush: ... and thanks in advance for the reply!
Interesting review. Voit ends up with acknowledging the relevance of Zurek's work on decoherence for the measurement problem in QM. Coincidentally, I had just been reading today the section discussing decoherence theories in Manuel Bächtold's voluminous dissertation Le possible, l’actuel et l’événement en mécanique quantique, une approche pragmatiste (which he wrote under the supervision of Michel Bitbol). And I had been re-reading yesterday what Bitbol himself had to say about decoherence theories in a couple of his papers on the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Browsing the comment section I saw one commentator alluding to Rovelli's relational interpretation and declaring himself unsatisfied with it because it is "obviously instrumentalist and can’t answer our burning questions about how nature actually does that". Voit answers thus:
"I’d rather do almost anything with my time than try and moderate a discussion of what is “real” and what isn’t.
Any further discussion of ontology will be ruthlessly suppressed."
In a recent interview Rovelli complained that this sort of agressive and dogmatic anti-philosophical stance being adopted by most of his colleagues might be in part responsible for the stagnation of the field.
While searching for it I also happened on this.
David Deutsch the cult leader, and the Quantum Computer the cargo. :cool:
When I was a physics student, in the mid 90s, I had been quite seduced by Deutsch's arguments in favor the MWI interpretation of QM. That was before he was a popular figure. I also attended a seminar on quantum algorithmic with Gilles Brassard. Later, I was much impressed with his book The Fabric of Reality. And then I discovered philosophy.
Agreed. At present, I think of them as equally valid descriptions in different reference frames (as with Rovelli's RQM or Einstein's relativity).
Quoting boundless
What I think of as computable here is the physics for Alice's actions from Bob's (non-interacting) reference frame.
However Alice can't compute her own physics for Godelian reasons. For example from Bob's reference frame one of the statements, "Alice will choose tea" or "Alice will choose coffee" will be predicted to be true, but she can't herself construct a proof for the true statement. Either outcome is an open possibility for her and requires her to make that choice for herself.
Quoting noAxioms
The Aristotelian position is that cases like '2+2=4' derive from concrete particulars, they don't have an independent existence. For example, there are two apples in the basket and I add two more. By generalizing from apples to any object and abstracting away physical constraints, we derive a formal rule for adding things without limit.
This is an empirical account of mathematics that doesn't require positing a Platonic existence for abstract mathematical entities.
Quoting noAxioms
It's a question of how one conceptually models the world. I think the arguments that you or I find plausible in our discussion really stem from this philosophical issue.
Quoting Andrew MThen the position I am proposing is not compatible with the Aristotelian position. To frame what I am proposing in such terms is to say that our universe is a (non-Platonic) universal with no necessary particulars. For it to be a particular, said particular would need to be in (relative-to) some container universe which again would be a universal at its foundations.
As for the apples, I don't see how 2+2=4 would necessarily not be the case just because there are no apples (or any other concrete particular) to instantiate the relationship.
I am absolutely not proposing Platonic existence for what I see to be universals.
What the cosmological argument shows is that "infinite potentialities" (as infinite possibility) is physically impossible. Whatever has actual existence, at any given time, will limit the possibilities, such that "infinite possibility" implies that there is nothing actual. Because something actual is required to actualize any particular possibility, then if there ever was infinite possibility there would always be infinite possibility, and therefore nothing actual would exist ever. Since we observe that there is actual existence then it is impossible that there ever was infinite possibility.
"Many Worlds" has the means to avoid the cosmological argument (or is a manifestation of the disregard for it) by claiming that what we perceive as "the world" is just one of many possible worlds. But the fundamental problem with this is that we must adhere to this designation, and the logic of "possible worlds". And this means that we cannot declare any world as the "actual world". Each world is equally a possible world and there can be nothing to distinguish one world from another as the actual world. If we try to declare one world as the actual world, we step outside the boundaries of what is permitted by the logic. So we would have to refer to some other principle, something extra-worldly as that which distinguishes the actual world. Now we've just put ourselves back to Rene Descartes' position. What principle is going to ensure us, that the world we live in is "a real world"? So all we have is "my being", "my existence", "I am", to validate "my world". Therefore Many Worlds is inherently solipsistic because there are no principles whereby my world ought to be the same world as your world.
Quoting boundless
It's unusual that a scientifically minded individual would say that the cosmological argument is sound. It is generally framed in a theist/atheist argument where the scientifically minded person would take the atheist perspective. The problem is that the atheist is prone to denying the argument simply because it is used to support the theist position. Therefore instead of acting to properly understand the principles involved, and the force of the argument which is consequent upon understanding, the atheist will expend all sorts of energy attempting to dismiss the principles as unsound.
Quoting boundless
The "double-aspect" is a duality of "actual" existence. Forms of existence are describable states, which are assumed to have actual existence. This is the basis for logic, what is and is not. "Becoming" falls between the cracks of actual existence, so it is described as potential, the potential for this or that state of existence to follow what actually is right now. However, "becoming" is itself understood to be an activity, so this activity must be accounted for by something actual. Thus we have two distinct actualities, what actually "is", and what is active. Without employing this second actuality "becoming" appears to be infinite potential. Infinite potential is impossible, so we must, according to the cosmological argument assign a second type of actuality to account for activity itself.
In Aristotelian philosophy "form" refers to what is actual. We get a glimpse of this second type of form in his biology, as the soul. The primary definition of "soul" is as the actuality of a body having life potentially in it. This body is an active body, and the form here, the soul, is responsible for the activities (becoming) of the body. So in his biology, the describable states, forms of being are referred to as the potencies of the soul, and the soul itself is the principle of activity which is required to actualize the various potencies.
Quoting boundless
Free will is well explained because it is taken as a premise, something concluded from observation, that human beings interfere in natural processes creating artificial things. Human activity is what necessitates the concept of "potential", that there is a multiplicity of possible states to follow any current state. And when we assume the reality of potential, what may or may not be, we need to allow exceptions to the fundamental laws of logic, referring to moral laws instead.
Quoting boundless
The point is not necessarily that the universe had a beginning, it's more like facing the fact that there are aspects of reality which are outside of our conception of time. So if "the universe" is restricted to temporal existence, (as we define time), then there are things outside the universe, things outside of time. If there are things outside of time, and temporal existence defines the universe, then it appears like the universe had a beginning. But in my mind, to say that there are things outside the universe is to speak contradiction, and so I conclude that our conception of time is faulty because it forces on us the contrary notion of something prior to time.
Imagine a point which is supposed to mark the beginning of time. At this point, there is only future and no past. In relation to temporal existence, this implies infinite possibility and nothing actual. There are numerous ways to demonstrate that this is a faulty principle. First, the notions of future and past are derived from the activity of time passing. At this point, there would be no time passing, as there is no past, and therefore to even use "future" and "past" in this context is invalid. Second, at this point, we need time to begin passing, so this is the "necessary cause" the "eternal actuality", which is external to the temporal universe and is implied by the cosmological argument.
But what the cosmological argument really does is demonstrate that our concept of time is inadequate for describing all of reality. There are parts of reality which are non-temporal according to our concept of time. But these parts have causal influence, so we can infer that they are in some way "temporal". Therefore we can conclude that our concept of time is in some way a misconception, and needs to be reconceived to bring these apparently "non-temporal" aspects into relation with the temporal.
This is not a new endeavour, it is what Plato grappled with in The Timaeus, and was taken up by the Neo-Platonists and earlier Christian theologians. Once we see the reality of that which is outside of time, we give it a name, the eternal. However, the eternal must have relations with the temporal or else we would not be able to see its existence. So the enterprising metaphysician is tasked with determining this relationship between the eternal and the temporal. My understanding is that our concept of time falls short, creating this separation between what is temporal and what is eternal. "Eternal", meaning outside of time, only refers to something real because our concept of time doesn't extend far enough to include those things which appear as being outside of time.
Quoting boundless
I haven't found a good presentation of Aristotle's cosmological argument online. it's very misunderstood and presented through various different lenses. The problem is that it's not well formulated by him in the first place, so it is left to others to pick and choose which statements to reproduce. The key aspects I find are in Bk.9 of his Metaphysics. A good, probably the best, re-formulation is that of Aquinas, in his Five Ways. I think it's Way #3. But even this is a re-presentation, from a Neo-Platonist, Christian perspective.
What Aristotle concludes is that anything eternal must be actual. He uses this to refute Platonic (Pythagorean) Idealism which assumes that human ideas, mathematics and geometry, are eternal. He shows that human ideas are "discovered", made actual, by the human mind, so if they exist prior to this they are of the nature of potential. He then proceeds to posit the idea of "unmoved mover" which is formulated as a perfectly circular motion. Because the perfect circle cannot have a beginning or an end (similar to the Hawking "no-boundary"), the circular motion is eternal. The Aristotelian proposal is defective though, so the Neo-Platonists just go on to assume eternal Forms which are actual. This produces a separation between human ideas which are potentials, and actual divine Forms, which are property of the divine mind, in Christian theology.
Aquinas has developed a quite complex concept of time. He introduces the concept of "aeviternal", which serves to differentiate between the two directions of time, looking backward, and proceeding forward. These two ought to be properly distinguished. Remember, the goal at that time was to produce a concept of time which related the eternal to the temporal. In the realm of the aeviternal are the angels, which are created at a point in time, as time has already passed, but live indefinitely into the future.
There is a way of ;looking at time implied here, which sees temporal existence as completely in the past. Instead of extending time equally to past and future, as we commonly do, we can say that only the past has real temporal existence, the future has not yet come to be temporally. The past is always being extended, all the time, and things come into existence at any moment of the present, and proceed with temporal extension. To account for things coming into existence, we look toward the future, they must come "out of the future". If, on the future side, there is a being like us, which always remains in the future (like we always remain at the present), never slipping into the past, then that being is always outside of time, eternal, always remaining ahead of the present, never coming into view at the present as it would if it slipped into the past. We have no way of understanding any activity of that being, because it is outside of what we know as time. It is eternal because it never slips past our view at the present, into the past. However the actions of that being could create things which slip into the past, come into view in our temporal existence.
Quoting boundless
Well it's been a long process, we might take a break it up again on a later thread. You've been quite attentive to listen to some very unconventional ideas, demonstrating that you actually take the time to understand. I appreciate that. As you say, we are not at a position to produce any scientific theory but we may find a way in if we could carefully analyze and compare wave features. There are probably aspects of wave phenomena which are veiled by the Fourier uncertainty.
No, Platonic existence is abstract and immaterial. From Wikipedia:
Quoting Platonic realism - Wikipedia
Quoting noAxioms
It wouldn't. On an Aristotelian view, all that is needed is the familiar distinction between things that are a part of the universe and the universe itself. There is no need to assume a separate reality beyond the universe (as is assumed with Plato's allegory of the cave).
Quoting noAxioms
The meaning of '2+2=4' derives from particulars, it shouldn't be assumed to be meaningful independent of the concrete universe that we find ourselves a part of. What distinguishes Aristotle from Plato on this just is the idea of a natural concrete context that establishes meaning versus an abstract view that is untouched by empirical concerns.
Almost everything seems to be a relation. Redness seems to be a 3-way for instance. The banana and my avatar (particular objects) evoke the experience of yellow (the universal) to you and me (subjects). Take away the particulars and we'd not know of yellow. Take away the yellow universal, and I suppose it would not be platonism. Change the subject experiencer, and the truth of it goes away. The banana, but not the avatar evokes the experience of yellow to a squirrel, a being that actually senses the yellow wavelength. My avatar does not emit any yellow light. So the relation to a human is necessary.
I have a hard time coming up with an example of a property. A proton (not even a particular one) has X much rest-mass. That seems to be a property, relating possibly only to "in the physics of this bubble of spacetime".
Quoting Andrew MSeems not necessarily so. Our knowledge of the truth of it (an epistemological thing) stems from interaction with particulars, but I was after the truth of it, not our knowledge of the truth of it or what meaning 2+2=4 has to us.
I realize that there are stances where sans-particulars, '7 is prime' is false. I might even agree, since insufficient relation is specified. Better is '7 is prime in the set of whole numbers'. The truth of it is now not objective, but only relative to something.
I think I'd like to take this offline and start a new thread since it only has small bearing on Wayfarer's OP. The relational QM bit was very relevant, and is a good answer to the OP, but what I'm pushing here goes way beyond the confines of QM, and thus seems off-topic. I want relational everything.
Give me a day or two to frame it.
:up: thank you for the detailed and insightful response.
If we will resume the discussion in the future, maybe I will be more learned in Aristotle's metaphysics. Now, I think it is too underrated in our time.
Good point! Unfortunately, I am sorry but I have to take a break from the Forum, now.
Anyway, thank you for the interesting discussion!
I agree.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, if properties are understood in an absolute sense. But they can also be understood as implying a relational context. So to use your color example, the statement "noAxioms' screen avatar is yellow" is true when indexed to humans (as is normally implied) but false when indexed to squirrels. Whereas, the statement "noAxioms' screen avatar emits light with red and green wavelengths" is true in a broader context that includes both humans and squirrels.
I'll leave the rest for now and we can pick it up in the new thread.
Quoting boundless
And thank you! I'll be travelling over the next week so will be taking a break from the forum as well.